WMD Prevention and Preparedness Act of 2014

Bill: 113-hr-4034
Sponsor: full_name: Rep. Pascrell, Bill, Jr. [D-NJ-9]
Introduced: 2014-02-11
Policy area: Emergency Management
Subjects: Administrative law and regulatory procedures

Advisory bodies

Arms control and nonproliferation

Biological and life sciences

Chemical and biological weapons

Computer security and identity theft

Congressional oversight

Criminal investigation, prosecution, interrogation

Criminal justice information and records

Criminal procedure and sentencing

Department of Agriculture

Department of Health and Human Services

Department of Homeland Security

Drug therapy

Emergency communications systems

Emergency medical services and trauma care

Emergency planning and evacuation

Executive agency funding and structure

Federal officials

First responders and emergency personnel

Food supply, safety, and labeling

Government information and archives

Government studies and investigations

Hazardous wastes and toxic substances

Health information and medical records

Health personnel

Health programs administration and funding

Health promotion and preventive care

Homeland security

Immunology and vaccination

Infectious and parasitic diseases

Intelligence activities, surveillance, classified information

Intergovernmental relations

International law and treaties

International organizations and cooperation

Medical research

Natural disasters

Nuclear weapons

Performance measurement

Public transit

Radioactive wastes and releases

Research and development

Technology assessment

Terrorism

Trade restrictions

United Nations

User charges and fees

Violent crime

World health
Latest action: action_date: 2014-02-27
text: Referred to the Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response and Communications.

Summaries:
action_date: 2014-02-11
action_desc: Introduced in House
text: <p>WMD Prevention and Preparedness Act of 2014 - <strong>Title I: A National Biodefense Enterprise</strong> - Requires the President to assign a member of the National Security Council as Special Assistant to the President for Biodefense to: (1) serve as the President's principal advisor regarding coordination of federal biodefense policy; (2) identify inefficiencies in existing biodefense activities and the actions necessary to overcome them; (3) lead the development of a coordinated National Biodefense Plan, a coordinated National Biosurveillance Strategy, and a coordinated national research and development strategy and implementation plan for microbial forensics; (4) oversee, in coordination with the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the development of a comprehensive cross-cutting biodefense budget analysis to inform prioritization of resources and ensure that biodefense challenges are adequately addressed; and (5) conduct ongoing oversight and evaluation of implementation of federal biodefense activities by relevant government agencies.</p> <p>Directs the Special Assistant to submit to the President and update as necessary a National Biodefense Plan that: </p> <ul> <li>defines the scope and purpose of a national biodefense capability; </li> <li>identifies biological risks to the nation and activities and tasks to be performed to address them; </li> <li>defines organizational roles, responsibilities, and coordination of federal, state, local, and tribal authorities with respect to such activities and tasks; </li> <li>defines research and development needs for improving the capacity for threat awareness and prevention, protection, response, and recovery; </li> <li>identifies biodefense assets, interdependencies, and capability gaps; </li> <li>provides goals and performance measures; </li> <li>identifies resource and investment needs; </li> <li>integrates and supports the strategies outlined in Presidential Policy Directives 2 and 8 and Homeland Security Presidential Directives 5, 9, 10, 18, and 21, the National Biosurveillance Strategy, and the National Medical Countermeasure Dispensing Strategy; </li> <li>is consistent with the National Response Framework; </li> <li>incorporates input from federal, state, local, and tribal stakeholders; and </li> <li>provides planning guidance to biosecurity and biodefense stakeholders.</li> </ul> <p>Directs the Special Assistant to publish and update every four years a National Biosurveillance Strategy that: </p> <ul> <li>identifies the purpose and scope of a nationally integrated biosurveillance capability; </li> <li>establishes objectives and performance measures to guide the development of such capability; </li> <li>defines and prioritizes costs, benefits, and resource and investment needs, with particular attention to leveraging existing resources; </li> <li>delineates federal, state, local, tribal, and private roles and responsibilities; and </li> <li>describes how the Strategy is integrated with related national strategies.</li> </ul> <p> Requires the Special Assistant to publish an implementation plan for such Strategy that includes a plan for: (1) advancing situational awareness of biological threats; (2) fostering information sharing among national biosecurity and biodefense stakeholders to identify potential threats, reduce vulnerabilities, and improve collective response to and investigations of suspected biological attacks; and (3) enhancing the capability of the federal government to rapidly identify, characterize, localize, and track a biological event of national concern by integrating and analyzing data relating to human health, animal, plant, food, and environmental monitoring systems.</p> <p>Requires the Special Assistant concurrent with the submission of the President's annual budget to Congress, a comprehensive cross-cutting biodefense budget analysis that delineates and integrates the biodefense expenditure requests for the Departments of Agriculture (USDA), Commerce, Defense (DOD), Energy (DOE), Health and Human Services (HHS), Homeland Security (DHS), Justice, State, and Veterans Affairs (VA), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the National Science Foundation (NSF).</p> <p><strong>Title II: Intelligence Matters</strong> - Requires the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) to develop and implement: (1) a National Intelligence Strategy for Countering the Threat from Weapons of Mass Destruction that is designed to improve U.S. capabilities to collect, analyze, and disseminate intelligence related to weapons of mass destruction (WMD); and (2) a plan to implement such Strategy. Requires such Strategy to: (1) identify and address core capabilities needed for successful intelligence collection on WMD; (2) include methods for the recruitment, training, and retention of a workforce with expertise in the collection, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence related to all types of WMD and science and technology related to WMD, as well as expertise in science and technology relating to risks posed by WMD; and (3) include methods for information sharing and collaboration with non-federal national biosecurity and biodefense stakeholders.</p> <p>Requires the implementation plan to include: (1) actions necessary to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of the sharing of intelligence on WMD throughout the Intelligence Community and with other federal partners; (2) methods to disseminate intelligence products to national biosecurity and biodefense stakeholders in classified and unclassified formats to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of information sharing; and (3) actions necessary to provide open-source intelligence relating to WMD to appropriate governmental authorities and private entities.</p> <p>Requires the DNI to develop and implement: (1) a National Intelligence Strategy for Countering Biological Threats that is integrated into the National Intelligence Strategy for Countering the Threat from Weapons of Mass Destruction, and (2) a plan for implementing such Strategy. Requires such Strategy to: </p> <ul> <li>identify and address target capabilities needed for successful intelligence collection on biological threats;</li> <li> include a plan for establishing in the Intelligence Community a cadre of collectors and analysts that are familiar with biological threats, biological science, and biotechnology;</li> <li> include a plan for defining the functions, capabilities, and gaps in that Community's workforce with respect to assessing the biological threat; </li> <li>include methods for collaboration with non-Intelligence Community technical experts within and outside of the federal government, in particular with state and local biodefense stakeholders; </li> <li>include a plan for defining, integrating, focusing, and enhancing existing capabilities in the Intelligence Community dedicated to current and strategic biological threats; and </li> <li>include a plan for ensuring the prioritization and sustained commitment of intelligence personnel and resources to address biological threats.</li> </ul> <p>Requires the implementation plan to: (1) include actions necessary to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of the sharing of intelligence through the Intelligence Community on biological weapons and organisms that could be used for biological terrorism; (2) address strategic and tactical human intelligence, measurement and signature intelligence, technical intelligence, medical intelligence, and open-source intelligence activities necessary to implement the Strategy; and (3) include a schedule for regularly evaluating the efforts of the Intelligence Community and progress on understanding and countering biological threats.</p> <p><strong>Title III: Homeland Security Matters</strong> - Amends the HSA to require DHS's Office of Intelligence and Analysis to: </p> <ul> <li>conduct intelligence and information sharing activities consistent with the National Intelligence Strategy for Countering the Threat from Weapons of Mass Destruction under this Act and the National Intelligence Strategy for Countering Biological Threats; </li> <li>support homeland security-focused intelligence analysis of terrorist actors, their claims, and their plans to conduct attacks against the nation involving chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear materials; </li> <li>support homeland security-focused intelligence analysis of global infectious disease, public health, food, agricultural, and veterinary issues; </li> <li>support homeland security-focused risk analysis and risk assessments of such hazards by providing relevant quantitative and non-quantitative threat information; </li> <li>leverage existing and emerging homeland security capabilities and structures, including fusion centers, to enhance prevention, protection, response, and recovery efforts with respect to a terrorist attack; </li> <li>share information and provide tailored analytical support on such threats to state, local, and tribal authorities, as well as other national biosecurity and biodefense stakeholders; and </li> <li>coordinate with other relevant DHS components, others in the Intelligence Community, and federal, state, local, and tribal authorities on optimal information sharing mechanisms.</li> </ul> <p>Directs the Secretary to report to specified congressional committees on: (1) the intelligence and information sharing activities described above and of all relevant entities within DHS to counter the threat from WMD, and (2) DHS's activities in accordance with relevant intelligence strategies.</p> <p>Directs the Under Secretary for Science and Technology to produce and periodically update: (1) a terrorism risk assessment of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats; and (2) an integrated terrorism risk assessment that assesses all of those threats and compares their relative risks. Directs the Secretary to: (1) convene an interagency task force of relevant subject matter experts to assess and provide recommendations on the adequacy of proposed methodology to be used for such assessments; (2) conduct sensitivity analysis on each assessment to identify and prioritize research activities to close knowledge gaps; (3) consider the evolving threat from an intelligent adversary; (4) share the risk assessments with federal, state, local, and tribal officials with appropriate security clearances and a need for the information in the classified version; and (5) make available an unclassified version for government officials involved in prevention and preparedness for chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear events.</p> <p>Requires the Export Enforcement Coordination Center to be maintained in DHS, with capability for coordinating the export enforcement activities. Directs the Center to: (1) enhance federal coordination for law enforcement counter proliferation investigations; (2) address licensing inquiries, reviews, requests, checks, and verifications; and (3) conduct outreach and provide training to the export trade community.</p> <p>Directs the Administrator of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to: (1) develop a communications plan designed to provide information to the public related to preventing, preparing for, responding to, and recovering from chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear attacks; and (2) develop and disseminate, through an alerts and warnings system, pre-scripted messages and message templates for state, local, and tribal authorities to quickly disseminate critical information to the public in anticipation of, during, or in the immediate aftermath of such an attack, to be included in DHS's lessons learned information sharing system.</p> <p>Directs the Secretary to: (1) ensure that homeland security information concerning terrorist threats is provided to state, local, and tribal authorities and the public; and (2) establish a process to optimize opportunities for qualified heads of state, local, and tribal government entities to obtain security clearances so that they may receive classified threat information.</p> <p>Directs the Secretary to prepare unclassified threat bulletins that include guidance to the public for preventing and responding to acts of terrorism arising from chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats, which shall be made available on the Internet website of DHS and other publicly accessible Internet websites, communication systems, and information networks.</p> <p>Directs the Secretary, using information provided by the terrorism risk assessments and material threat assessments and determinations under the Project BioShield Act of 2004, to: (1) provide to state, local, and trial authorities written guidance on communicating terrorism-related threats and risks to the public; and (2) articulate the governmental rationale for identifying particular communities as being at heightened risk of exploitation.</p> <p>Directs the FEMA Administrator, to assist government authorities in improving and promoting individual and community preparedness and collective response to terrorist attacks by: (1) developing and disseminating guidance and checklists of recommended actions for individual and community prevention and preparedness efforts, (2) providing information and training materials in support of individual and community preparedness efforts, and (3) conducting individual and community preparedness outreach efforts.</p> <p>Directs the Secretary to carry out a program to detect a biological attack or event that poses a high risk to homeland security, including by: </p> <ul> <li>deploying detection capabilities to high risk areas to indicate the presence of biological agents; </li> <li>considering multiple deployment strategies, including surge capability; </li> <li>providing information to participating laboratories and programs for use in monitoring public health, and biological material or other data from those detectors to participating laboratories and programs for testing and evaluation; </li> <li>regularly communicating with, and providing information about the presence of biological agents to, federal, state, and local agencies responsible for public health, law enforcement, and emergency services in a manner that ensures transparency; </li> <li>providing advanced planning tools, concepts of operations, standard operating procedures, and training exercises for collective response to and recovery from biological attacks; and </li> <li>providing technical assistance to jurisdictions hosting the program to improve their ability to respond to a detected pathogen.</li> </ul> <p>Directs the Secretary: (1) to require the Under Secretary for Science and Technology to assess whether the development of technological screening capabilities for biological agents, pandemic influenza, and other infectious diseases should be undertaken by the Directorate of Science and Technology to support entry and exit screening at ports of entry and for other homeland security purposes; and (2) if the Under Secretary's determination is affirmative, to initiate development of safe and effective methods to rapidly screen incoming persons at ports of entry.</p> <p>Authorizes the Secretary, in coordination with the Director of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), to carry out a program to: (1) establish near-term minimum performance metrics to support public safety actionable activities to evaluate the effectiveness of detection technology for high-priority biological agents and toxins and high-priority chemical agents; (2) establish a process for voluntary testing and evaluation of technology by an accredited laboratory to demonstrate conformance to consensus standards, or performance metrics if standards do not exist, for the effective detection of high-priority biological agents and toxins and high-priority chemical agents; and (3) make available to federal agencies, state, territorial, local, and tribal entities, and the private sector, with permission from the detection technology manufacturer, the results of detection system testing and evaluation.</p> <p>Requires the Director of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office to: (1) establish and maintain a multilayered system of detection technologies, programs, and guidelines designed to enhance the nation's ability to detect and prevent a radiological or nuclear attack in high-risk U.S. cities; and (2) develop a surge capability for radiological and nuclear detection systems that can be deployed within the United States rapidly in response to actionable intelligence or warnings. Requires such programs to be integrated into the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture and inform architecture studies, technology gaps, and research activities of the Office.</p> <p>Directs the Secretary to: (1) develop for police, fire, emergency medical services, emergency management, and medical and public health personnel voluntary guidance for responding to a release of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear material; (2) make such guidance available to state, local, and tribal authorities, including primary and secondary schools and other educational institutions, nongovernmental organizations, the private sector, and the public; and (3) review the experiences of other countries and the expertise of academic institutions and nongovernmental organizations and to consider the unique needs of children and other vulnerable populations.</p> <p>Directs the Secretary to: (1) acquire, use, and disseminate the best available integrated plume models (i.e., assessments of the location and prediction of the spread of agents following a chemical, biological, nuclear, or radiological attack or event that integrate protective action guidance) to enable rapid response activities following such an attack or event; and (2) carry out a program for system assessment and validation of emergency response equipment at DHS, to be known as the SAVER Program.</p> <p>Authorizes federal agencies, in carrying out functions to counter biological terrorism, to enter into contracts with laboratories that comprise the Laboratory Response Network for Biological Terrorism and other federally networked laboratories for the provision of laboratory testing services.</p> <p>Authorizes in DHS a bioforensics analysis center to provide definitive bioforensics analysis in support of the executive agencies with primary responsibilities for preventing, deterring, responding to, attributing, and recovering from biological attacks.</p> <p>Directs the Secretary to conduct a Metropolitan Medical Response System Program that shall assist state and local governments in preparing for and responding to public health and mass casualty incidents resulting from acts of terrorism, natural disasters, and other man-made disasters. Allows a grant under such Program to be used to support the integration of emergency management, health, and medical systems into a coordinated response to mass casualty incidents caused by any hazard.</p> <p>Directs the Under Secretary for Science and Technology to conduct tailored risk assessments to inform prioritization of national recovery activities for chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear incidents, to be updated as necessary.</p> <p>Directs the Secretary to develop and issue guidance for clean-up and restoration of indoor and outdoor areas, including subways and other mass transportation facilities, that have been exposed to chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear materials.</p> <p>Directs the Secretary to: (1) develop exercises to facilitate recovery from a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear incident and to foster collective response to terrorism; and (2) provide lessons learned reports to designated representatives of state, local, and tribal jurisdictions and private sector entities that participate in National Level Exercises of DHS.</p> <p>Directs the FEMA Administrator, the DHS Chief Medical Officer, and the National Metropolitan Medical Response System Working Group to conduct a review of the Metropolitan Medical Response System Program and report the results of the review to specified congressional committees.</p> <p>Directs the President to establish the Federal Experts Security Advisory Panel to make technical and substantive recommendations on biological agent and toxin security. Requires the Panel to deliver to the Secretaries of Agriculture, HHS, and DHS recommendations concerning: </p> <ul> <li>the designation as highest risk of that subset of biological agents and toxins that presents the greatest risk of deliberate misuse with significant potential for mass casualties or devastating effects to the economy; </li> <li>the development of a set of minimum risk-based prescriptive laboratory security performance standards based on the risk at the lowest level, allowing for enhancements as risk increases; </li> <li>the establishment of appropriate standards and practices to improve vetting and monitoring, and ensure reliability, of personnel with access to highest risk biological agents and toxins at facilities registered under the Public Health Service Act (PHSA); </li> <li>the establishment of appropriate practices for physical security and cyber security for facilities that possess highest risk biological agents or toxins; </li> <li>standards for training of laboratory personnel in security measures; </li> <li>other emerging policy issues relevant to the security of biological agents and toxins; and </li> <li>adequacy of information sharing protocols with biodefense and biosecurity stakeholders. Directs the Secretaries, after the date of receipt of such recommendations, to promulgate rules under the PHSA establishing security standards and procedures that are specific to highest risk biological agents and toxins.</li> </ul> <p>Requires the heads of specified government entities to: (1) develop and implement a plan for the coordination of biological agents and toxins security oversight for facilities in which the entity supports biological agent or toxin laboratory activities, that articulates a mechanism for coordinated inspections of and harmonized administrative practices for facilities registered under the PHSA and that ensures consistent and timely identification and resolution of biological agents and toxins security and compliance issues; and (2) coordinate or consolidate laboratory inspections and ensure that such inspections are conducted using a common set of inspection procedures across such entities to minimize the administrative burden on laboratories.</p> <p>Directs the Secretaries of HHS and Agriculture to: (1) develop a process for sharing information pertaining to biological agents and toxins with agencies that support biological agent or toxin laboratory activities; and (2) share relevant information pertaining to biological agents and toxins with each other and with appropriate state, local, and tribal government authorities.</p> <p>Expresses the sense of Congress that the field of synthetic biology has the potential to facilitate enormous gains in fundamental discovery, public health, and biotechnological applications, but it also presents inherent dual-use homeland security risks that must be managed.</p> <p>Directs the Under Secretary for Science and Technology: (1) every two years, to undertake a risk assessment of the dual-use and other risks associated with synthetic biology; and (2) to develop and provide to all agencies that fund life sciences research, guidance on compliance with U.S. laws, arms control agreement, and agency policies for research, development, or acquisition projects in the life sciences. Authorizes the Under Secretary to conduct research into the risks and ways to mitigate such risks of synthetic biology, including: (1) determining the current capability of synthetic nucleic acid providers to effectively differentiate a legitimate customer from a potential terrorist or other malicious actor, and to effectively screen orders for sequences of homeland security concern; and (2) making recommendations regarding screening, software, protocols, and other remaining capability gaps uncovered by such assessment.</p> <p>Amends HSA to require the dissemination of information analyzed by DHS to state, local, tribal, and private entities with responsibilities relating to homeland security to assist in preventing, deterring, or responding to acts of terrorism.</p> <p><strong>Title IV: Public Health Matters</strong> - Expresses the sense of Congress that: (1) coordination among federal agencies involved in activities relating to researching, developing, and acquiring medical countermeasures still needs improvement; and (2) aggressive action should be taken by HHS, DHS, and the DOD to foster greater coordination with respect to such activities.</p> <p>Amends the PHSA to direct the Secretary of HHS, in coordination with the Secretaries of DHS and Agriculture, and other appropriate federal agencies, to develop, implement, and periodically update a National Medical Countermeasure Dispensing Strategy to enhance preparedness and collective response to a terrorist attack on humans or animals with any chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear material, that delineates federal, state, and local responsibilities.</p> <p>Directs the HHS Secretary, in coordination with the Secretaries of DHS and Agriculture, to: (1) review the adequacy of domestic vaccination and antimicrobial dispensing policy, guidance, and information provided to the public in light of any known terrorist risk of a biological attack or other phenomena that may have serious health consequences for the United States, including wide-scale fatalities or infectious disease outbreaks including those associated with the avian flu; and (2) report to specified congressional committees on the review and any recommendations relating to the availability of domestic vaccine and antimicrobials for disbursing to the public and voluntary immunization by first responders.</p> <p>Directs the HHS Secretary to: (1) make available to state, local, and tribal first responders surplus vaccines and antimicrobials, and vaccines and antimicrobials with short shelf lives from the strategic national stockpile of drugs, vaccines and other biological products, medical devices, and other supplies; (2) establish any necessary logistical and tracking systems to facilitate making such vaccines and antimicrobials available; and (3) distribute disclosures regarding associated risks to end users.</p> <p>Amends the PHSA to require the HHS Secretary, on an ongoing basis, to: (1) establish criteria for the issuance of a material threat determination, and (2) review and reassess determinations of whether agents continue to present a material threat against the U.S. population sufficient to affect national security and homeland security.</p> <p>Amends the PHSA to direct the Attorney General, in identifying whether an individual is within a category of individuals reasonably suspected by any federal law enforcement or intelligence agency of knowing involvement with an organization that engages in domestic or international terrorism or with any other organization that engages in intentional crimes of violence, to consult with the Secretaries of DHS, Defense, and State.</p> <p><strong>Title V: Foreign Relations Matters</strong> - Directs the Secretary of State to: (1) support efforts of other countries to effectively implement legislation criminalizing the development or use of biological weapons or acts of bioterrorism; (2) engage other countries and international nongovernmental entities to establish common standards for actions relevant to preventing acts of bioterrorism and the illicit use of life sciences; (3) support the efforts of other countries to enhance biosecurity and safety practices at laboratories and other facilities with materials that could be used in biological weapons or in an act of bioterrorism; (4) promote the development and adoption of international guidance for the safety and security of high-risk pathogens and toxins; and (5) promote information sharing relating to threats and best practices between the intelligence community, federal law enforcement, and international law enforcement and security officials.</p> <p>Directs the Secretary of State to: (1) support efforts in other countries and regions to develop mechanisms and capabilities for reporting to U.N. organizations validated data on biological attacks or other phenomena that may have serious health consequences for the United States; (2) engage other federal and nongovernmental entities and other countries to advance awareness and understanding of the risk posed by information derived from the life sciences that has the potential for misuse to cause harm; (3) advance recommendations on how best to address such risk; (4) engage such entities and countries to promote greater awareness and understanding of the global availability of and access to life science technologies and materials; and (5) promote the development and use of mechanisms for reporting, preserving, and sharing data on federal programs and investments in international scientific, agricultural, medical, and public health collaborations in support of efforts to enhance global biosecurity.</p> <p>Directs the Secretary of State to convene and lead an interagency task force to examine: (1) the state of global biopreparedness for a major biological event, (2) necessary components of a global biopreparedness architecture that would advance international health security, (3) best practices for preparedness based on lessons learned from domestic efforts to address such issues and that may be applicable internationally, (4) activities undertaken through the National Intelligence Strategy for Countering Biological Threats and the International Health Regulations 2005, and (5) the utility of working through existing international forums as a mechanism for distributing this information to the international community.</p> <p>Directs the Secretary of State to: (1) promote confidence in effective implementation of and compliance with the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction by promoting transparency with respect to legitimate activities and pursuing compliance diplomatically to address concerns; (2) promote universal membership in the Convention; (3) develop an action plan for increasing international adherence to the Convention; and (4) ensure that U.S. participation in Convention meetings is broadly inclusive of representatives of relevant federal departments and agencies.<br /></p>

tv_txt: I 113th CONGRESS 2d Session H. R. 4034 IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES February 11, 2014 Mr. Pascrell (for himself and Mr. King of New York ) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Homeland Security , and in addition to the Committees on Energy and Commerce , Transportation and Infrastructure , Foreign Affairs , and Select Intelligence (Permanent Select) , for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned A BILL To enhance homeland security by improving efforts to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from an attack with a weapon of mass destruction, and for other purposes.

1. Short title; table of contents (a) Short title This Act may be cited as the WMD Prevention and Preparedness Act of 2014 . (b) Table of contents The table of contents for this Act is as follows: Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents. Sec. 2. Definitions. Title I—A National Biodefense Enterprise Sec. 101. Special Assistant for Biodefense. Sec. 102. National Biodefense Plan. Sec. 103. National Biosurveillance Strategy. Sec. 104. Comprehensive cross-cutting biodefense budget analysis. Title II—Intelligence Matters Sec. 201. National Intelligence Strategy for Countering the Threat from Weapons of Mass Destruction. Sec. 202. National Intelligence Strategy for Countering Biological Threats. Sec. 203. State, local, and tribal defined. Title III—Homeland Security Matters Sec. 301. Weapons of mass destruction prevention and preparedness. Title XXI—WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION PREVENTION AND PREPAREDNESS Subtitle A—Prevention Sec. 2101. Weapons of mass destruction intelligence and information sharing. Sec. 2102. Risk assessments. Sec. 2103. National Export Enforcement Coordination. Sec. 2104. Communication of threat information. Sec. 2105. Individual and community preparedness for chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear attacks. Subtitle B—Protection Sec. 2121. Detection of biological attacks. Sec. 2122. Rapid biological threat detection and identification at ports of entry. Sec. 2123. Evaluating detection technology. Sec. 2124. Domestic implementation of the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture. Subtitle C—Response Sec. 2131. First responder guidance concerning chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear attacks. Sec. 2132. Integrated plume modeling for collective response. Sec. 2133. Establishment of the system assessment and validation for emergency responders (SAVER) program. Sec. 2134. Payment for laboratory response services. Sec. 2135. Bioforensics capabilities. Sec. 2136. Metropolitan Medical Response System Program. Subtitle D—Recovery Sec. 2141. Identifying and addressing gaps in recovery capabilities. Sec. 2142. Recovery from a chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear attack or incident. Sec. 2143. Exercises. Sec. 302. Enhancing laboratory biosecurity. Sec. 303. Definitions. Sec. 304. Dual-use terrorist risks from synthetic biology. Sec. 305. Dissemination of information analyzed by the Department to State, local, tribal, and private entities with responsibilities relating to homeland security. Title IV—Public Health Matters Sec. 401. Sense of Congress regarding Federal coordination on medical countermeasures. Sec. 402. National Medical Countermeasure Dispensing Strategy. Sec. 319F–5. National Medical Countermeasure Dispensing Strategy. Sec. 403. National pre-event vaccination and antimicrobial dispensing policy review. Sec. 404. Management of short shelf life vaccine and antimicrobial stockpiles. Sec. 405. Material threat determinations reviews. Sec. 406. Background checks. Sec. 407. State, local, and tribal defined. Title V—Foreign Relations Matters Sec. 501. International engagement to enhance biodefense and laboratory biosecurity. Sec. 502. International collaboration and information sharing relating to biosecurity. Sec. 503. Interagency task force on best practices for global biopreparedness. Sec. 504. Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. 2. Definitions In this Act: (1) The term appropriate congressional committees means the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives and any committee of the House of Representatives or the Senate having legislative jurisdiction under the rules of the House of Representatives or Senate, respectively, over the matter concerned. (2) The term Intelligence Community has the meaning given that term in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)). (3) The term national biosecurity and biodefense stakeholders means officials from the Federal, State, local, and tribal authorities and individuals and other persons from the private sector who are involved in efforts to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from a biological attack or other phenomena that may have serious health consequences for the United States, including wide-scale fatalities or infectious disease outbreaks. I A National Biodefense Enterprise 101. Special Assistant for Biodefense (a) In general The President shall assign a member of the National Security Council to serve as Special Assistant to the President for Biodefense, who shall— (1) serve as the principal advisor to the President regarding coordination of Federal biodefense policy including prevention, protection, response, and recovery from biological attacks or other phenomena that may have serious health consequences for the United States, including wide-scale fatalities or infectious disease outbreaks; (2) identify gaps, duplication, and other inefficiencies in existing biodefense activities and the actions necessary to overcome these obstacles; (3) lead the development of a coordinated National Biodefense Plan, in accordance with section 102; (4) lead the development of a coordinated National Biosurveillance Strategy, in accordance with section 103; (5) lead the development of a coordinated national research and development strategy and implementation plan for microbial forensics, the latter to be updated not less than once every 4 years; (6) oversee, in coordination with the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the development of a comprehensive cross-cutting biodefense budget analysis to inform prioritization of resources and ensure that biodefense challenges are adequately addressed, in accordance with section 104; and (7) conduct ongoing oversight and evaluation of implementation of Federal biodefense activities by relevant Government departments and agencies. (b) Access by congress The appointment of the Special Assistant to the President for Biodefense shall not be construed as affecting access by Congress or committees of either House of Congress to information, documents, and studies in the possession of, or conducted by or at the direction of, the Special Assistant. 102. National Biodefense Plan The Special Assistant to the President for Biodefense shall submit to the President a National Biodefense Plan that— (1) defines the scope and purpose of a national biodefense capability; (2) identifies biological risks to the Nation to be addressed by the Plan, consistent with section 2102 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, as amended by this Act; (3) delineates activities and tasks to be performed, including prevention, protection, response, and recovery activities, to address the risks identified under paragraph (2); (4) defines research and development needs for improving the capacity for threat awareness and prevention, protection, response, and recovery; (5) identifies biodefense assets, interdependencies, capability gaps, and gaps in the integration of capabilities; (6) provides goals, activities, milestones, and performance measures; (7) identifies resource and investment needs; (8) defines organizational roles, responsibilities, and coordination of Federal, State, local, and tribal authorities (as those terms are defined in the Homeland Security Act of 2002 ( 6 U.S.C. 101 et seq. )) with respect to the activities and tasks delineated in paragraph (3); (9) integrates and supports the strategies outlined in Presidential Policy Directives 2 and 8 and Homeland Security Presidential Directives 5, 9, 10, 18, 21, and their successors, the National Biosurveillance Strategy published under section 103 of this Act, the National Medical Countermeasure Dispensing Strategy developed under section 319F–5 of the Public Health Service Act, as amended by this Act, and other strategy documents as appropriate; (10) is consistent with the National Response Framework as published by the Secretary of Homeland Security in May 2013, and any successors thereof; (11) incorporates input from Federal, State, local, and tribal stakeholders; (12) provides planning guidance to biosecurity and biodefense stakeholders, including leveraging of existing guidance; and (13) shall be submitted to the President and the Congress within 18 months after the date of the enactment of this Act, and updated as necessary. 103. National Biosurveillance Strategy (a) Strategy for biosurveillance The Special Assistant to the President for Biodefense shall publish a National Biosurveillance Strategy that shall— (1) identify the purpose and scope of a nationally integrated biosurveillance capability; (2) establish goals, objectives, priorities, milestones, and performance measures to guide the development of such capability; (3) define and prioritize costs, benefits, and resource and investment needs, with particular attention to leveraging existing resources; (4) delineate Federal, State, local, tribal, and private roles and responsibilities; and (5) describe how the Strategy is integrated with related national strategies. (b) Matters for consideration In developing the strategy required under subsection (a), the Special Assistant shall take into consideration— (1) the state of biosurveillance domestically and internationally; (2) material threat assessments and determinations developed by the Secretary of Homeland Security in accordance with the Project BioShield Act of 2004 ( Public Law 108–276 ) and the amendments made by that Act; (3) risk assessments consistent with section 2102 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, as amended by this Act; (4) reports on global trends produced by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence regarding the biological threat; (5) Intelligence Community needs as articulated in relevant intelligence strategies; (6) information available in biosurveillance systems and changes to information technology including systems used commercially to allow for the incorporation and integration of this information; and (7) costs associated with establishing and maintaining the necessary infrastructure to integrate biosurveillance systems. (c) Implementation plan In addition to the strategy required under subsection (a), the Special Assistant shall publish an implementation plan for such strategy that includes benchmarks for measuring the success of the Strategy. The implementation plan shall— (1) include a plan for advancing situational awareness of biological threats, by rapid detection and dissemination of biosurveillance information in real time, and through other means; (2) include a plan for fostering information sharing among national biosecurity and biodefense stakeholders— (A) to identify potential threats, reduce vulnerabilities, and improve collective response activities to, and investigations of, suspected biological attacks; (B) that addresses the type of information to be shared and how it will be shared; and (C) that identifies critical sensitivities to be protected; and (3) include a plan for enhancing the capability of the Federal Government to rapidly identify, characterize, localize, and track a biological event of national concern by integrating and analyzing data relating to human health, animal, plant, food, and environmental monitoring systems (both national and international). (d) Deadline; submission; updates The Special Assistant shall— (1) publish the strategy, and submit it to the appropriate congressional committees, by not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this Act; and (2) publish an implementation plan for such strategy not later than 2 years after the date of enactment of this Act, and update the implementation plan at least once every 4 years. 104. Comprehensive cross-cutting biodefense budget analysis (a) In general In order to enhance strategic planning, eliminate redundancies, identify capability gaps, and provide for greater transparency, the Special Assistant to the President for Biodefense, in coordination with the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, shall transmit to the appropriate congressional committees, concurrent with the submission of the President’s annual budget to the Congress, a comprehensive cross-cutting biodefense budget analysis that delineates and integrates the biodefense expenditure requests for the departments and agencies headed by the officials listed in subsection (c). (b) Contents (1) In general The comprehensive cross-cutting biodefense budget analysis shall provide a detailed, separate analysis, by budget function, by department or agency, and by initiative area (as determined by the Administration), for the prior fiscal year, the current fiscal year, and the fiscal years for which the budget is submitted, identifying the amounts of gross and net appropriations or obligational authority and outlays that contribute to biodefense, with separate displays for mandatory and discretionary amounts, including— (A) summaries of the total amount of such appropriations or obligational authority and outlays requested for biodefense; (B) an estimate of the current service levels of biodefense spending; and (C) an indication of how the Federal activities or accounts covered by the analysis support the activities delineated in the National Biodefense Plan under section 102(2). (2) Account-level amounts With respect to subparagraphs (A) through (C) of paragraph (1), amounts shall be provided by account for each program, project, and activity. (c) Coordination (1) Submission to special assistant Each official listed in paragraph (2) shall, by not later than 30 days before submitting the annual appropriations request for the agency under section 1108 of title 31, United States Code, submit to the Special Assistant— (A) the proposed appropriations request; and (B) a progress report on how the department or agency under the official’s authority agency has met the responsibilities of the official under the National Biodefense Plan under section 102. (2) Covered official The officials referred to in paragraph (1) are— (A) the Secretary of Agriculture; (B) the Secretary of Commerce; (C) the Secretary of Defense; (D) the Secretary of Energy; (E) the Secretary of Health and Human Services; (F) the Secretary of Homeland Security; (G) the Secretary of State; (H) the Secretary of Veterans Affairs; (I) the Attorney General; (J) the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency; (K) the Director of the National Science Foundation; (L) the Postmaster General of the United States; and (M) heads of other Federal departments and agencies as considered appropriate by the Special Assistant. (d) Consultation with Congress Periodically, but at least annually, the Special Assistant for Biodefense shall consult with the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives, the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate, the Budget Committees of the House of Representatives and the Senate, the Appropriations Committees of the House of Representatives and the Senate, and the Congressional Budget Office. II Intelligence Matters 201. National Intelligence Strategy for Countering the Threat from Weapons of Mass Destruction (a) Strategy (1) Development The Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security and the heads of other appropriate Federal departments and agencies, shall develop and implement— (A) a strategy designed to improve the capabilities of the United States to collect, analyze, and disseminate intelligence related to weapons of mass destruction; and (B) a plan to implement such strategy. (2) Title The strategy required under paragraph (1) shall be known as the National Intelligence Strategy for Countering the Threat from Weapons of Mass Destruction . (b) Contents The strategy required under subsection (a) shall— (1) identify and address core capabilities needed for successful intelligence collection on weapons of mass destruction; (2) include methods for the recruitment, training, and retention of a workforce with expertise in the collection, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence related to all types of weapons of mass destruction and science and technology related to weapons of mass destruction, as well as expertise in science and technology relating to risks posed by weapons of mass destruction; and (3) include methods for information sharing and collaboration, as appropriate, with non-Federal national biosecurity and biodefense stakeholders. (c) Implementation plan The plan for implementing the strategy required under subsection (a) shall include— (1) actions necessary to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of the sharing of intelligence on weapons of mass destruction throughout the Intelligence Community and with other Federal partners, including a description of statutory, regulatory, policy, technical, security, or other barriers that impede such sharing, and, as appropriate, the development of uniform standards across the Intelligence Community for such sharing; (2) methods to disseminate intelligence products to national biosecurity and biodefense stakeholders in classified and unclassified formats to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of the sharing of information; (3) actions necessary to provide open-source intelligence relating to weapons of mass destruction to— (A) appropriate Federal departments and agencies; (B) State, local, and tribal authorities; and (C) private entities; (4) specific objectives to be accomplished, with corresponding schedule, for each year of the 5-year period that begins on the date on which the strategy is submitted to the appropriate congressional committees under subsection (e) and tasks to accomplish such objectives, including— (A) a list prioritizing such objectives and such tasks; and (B) a schedule for meeting such objectives and carrying out such tasks; (5) assignments of roles and responsibilities to elements of the Intelligence Community to implement the strategy; and (6) a schedule for assessment of the effectiveness and efficiency of the strategy, including metrics, and a description of the components of the assessment. (d) Coordination The Director of National Intelligence shall coordinate with State, local, and tribal government authorities, the private sector, and nongovernmental organizations in the development of the National Intelligence Strategy for Countering the Threat from Weapons of Mass Destruction. (e) Deadline for Submission Not later than 6 months after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees the strategy and plan required under subsection (a). The submission shall be in unclassified form but with a classified annex, as appropriate. (f) Updates The Director of National Intelligence shall update the implementation plan at least once every 4 years. 202. National Intelligence Strategy for Countering Biological Threats (a) Strategy (1) Development The Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, the Secretary of Agriculture, the Special Assistant to the President for Biodefense, and the heads of other appropriate Federal departments and agencies, shall develop and implement a strategy and a plan for implementing the strategy that is integrated into the National Intelligence Strategy for Countering the Threat from Weapons of Mass Destruction, as required under this title. (2) Title The strategy required under paragraph (1) shall be known as the National Intelligence Strategy for Countering Biological Threats . (b) Contents The strategy required under subsection (a) shall— (1) identify and address target capabilities needed for successful intelligence collection on biological threats; (2) include a plan for establishing in the Intelligence Community a cadre of collectors and analysts in all relevant agencies in the Intelligence Community that are familiar with biological threats, biological science, and biotechnology, including— (A) biological scientists; (B) biotechnologists; and (C) experts with knowledge of the current state of technologies that could be used to develop a weapon of mass destruction; (3) include a plan for defining the functions, capabilities, and gaps in the Intelligence Community workforce with respect to assessing the biological threat; (4) include methods for collaboration— (A) with non-Intelligence Community technical experts within Federal departments and agencies; and (B) as appropriate, with individuals with expertise described in paragraph (2) who are not employed by the Federal Government, in particular with State and local biodefense stakeholders; (5) include a plan for defining, integrating, focusing, and enhancing existing capabilities in the Intelligence Community dedicated to current and strategic biological threats; and (6) include a plan for ensuring the prioritization and sustained commitment of intelligence personnel and resources to address biological threats. (c) Implementation plan The implementation plan for the strategy required under subsection (a) shall— (1) include actions necessary to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of the sharing of intelligence throughout the Intelligence Community on biological weapons and organisms that could be used for biological terrorism, including a description of statutory, regulatory, policy, technical, security, or other barriers that prevent such sharing, and, as appropriate, the development of uniform standards across the Intelligence Community for such sharing; (2) address strategic and tactical human intelligence, measurement and signature intelligence, technical intelligence, medical intelligence, and open-source intelligence activities necessary to implement the strategy; (3) identify specific objectives to be accomplished during each year of the 5-year period that begins on the date on which the strategy is submitted to the appropriate congressional committees under subsection (d) and tasks to accomplish such objectives, including— (A) a list prioritizing such objectives and such tasks; and (B) a schedule for meeting such objectives and carrying out such tasks; (4) assign roles and responsibilities to elements of the Intelligence Community to implement the strategy; (5) a schedule for assessment of the effectiveness and efficiency of the strategy, including metrics; and (6) a schedule for evaluating on a regular basis the efforts of the Intelligence Community and progress on understanding and countering biological threats. (d) Report Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees the strategy and plan required under subsection (a). The report shall be in unclassified form but with a classified annex, as appropriate. (e) Updates The Director of National Intelligence shall update the implementation plan at least once every 4 years. 203. State, local, and tribal defined In this title, the term State, local, and tribal has the same meaning that term has in the Homeland Security Act of 2002 ( 6 U.S.C. 101 et seq. ). III Homeland Security Matters 301. Weapons of mass destruction prevention and preparedness (a) In general The Homeland Security Act of 2002 ( 6 U.S.C. 101 et seq. ) is amended by adding at the end the following new title: XXI WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION PREVENTION AND PREPAREDNESS A Prevention 2101. Weapons of mass destruction intelligence and information sharing (a) In general The Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the Department shall— (1) conduct intelligence and information sharing activities consistent with the National Intelligence Strategy for Countering the Threat from Weapons of Mass Destruction under section 201 of the WMD Prevention and Preparedness Act of 2014 and the National Intelligence Strategy for Countering Biological Threats under section 202 of that Act; (2) support homeland security-focused intelligence analysis of terrorist actors, their claims, and their plans to conduct attacks involving chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear materials against the Nation; (3) support homeland security-focused intelligence analysis of global infectious disease, public health, food, agricultural, and veterinary issues; (4) support homeland security-focused risk analysis and risk assessments of the homeland security hazards described in paragraphs (2) and (3), by providing relevant quantitative and nonquantitative threat information; (5) leverage existing and emerging homeland security capabilities and structures, including fusion centers established pursuant to section 210A, to enhance prevention, protection, response, and recovery efforts with respect to a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear attack; (6) share information and provide tailored analytical support on these threats to State, local, and tribal authorities as well as other national biosecurity and biodefense stakeholders; and (7) perform other responsibilities, as assigned by the Secretary. (b) Coordination Where appropriate, the Office of Intelligence and Analysis shall coordinate with other relevant Department components, others in the Intelligence Community, including the National Counter Proliferation Center, and other Federal, State, local, and tribal authorities, including officials from high-threat areas, and enable such entities to provide recommendations on optimal information sharing mechanisms, including expeditious sharing of classified information, and on how they can provide information to the Department. (c) Report (1) In general Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this section and annually thereafter, the Secretary shall report to the appropriate congressional committees on— (A) the intelligence and information sharing activities under subsection (a) and of all relevant entities within the Department to counter the threat from weapons of mass destruction; and (B) the Department’s activities in accordance with relevant intelligence strategies, including the National Intelligence Strategy for Countering the Threat from Weapons of Mass Destruction and the National Intelligence Strategy for Countering Biological Threats. (2) Assessment of implementation The report shall include— (A) a description of methods established to assess progress of the Office of Intelligence and Analysis in implementing this section; and (B) such assessment. 2102. Risk assessments (a) In general The Secretary, acting through the Under Secretary for Science and Technology, shall, in coordination with relevant Department components and other appropriate Federal departments and agencies— (1) produce and update periodically a terrorism risk assessment of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats; and (2) produce and update periodically an integrated terrorism risk assessment that assesses all of those threats and compares them against one another according to their relative risk. (b) Methodology (1) In general The Secretary shall— (A) convene an interagency task force of relevant subject matter experts to assess the proposed methodology to be used for assessments required under subsection (a), and to provide recommendations to the Secretary as to the adequacy of such methodology; (B) conduct sensitivity analysis on each assessment to identify and prioritize research activities to close knowledge gaps; and (C) consider the evolving threat from an intelligent adversary. (2) Inclusion in assessment Each assessment under subsection (a) shall include a description of the methodology used for the assessment. (c) Usage The assessments required under subsection (a) shall be used to inform and guide risk management decisions, including— (1) the threat assessments and determinations by the Secretary regarding agents and toxins pursuant to section 319F–2 of the Public Health Service Act; (2) allocation of resources for research and development for chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear attack prevention, protection, response, and recovery; (3) prioritization of medical countermeasure research, development, acquisition, and distribution activities and other national strategic biodefense research; (4) tailored risk assessments and risk mitigation studies, as appropriate, on topics such as radiological materials security or the economic risks of a biological attack; and (5) other homeland security activities as determined appropriate by the Secretary and the heads of other agencies. (d) Input and sharing The Secretary shall, for each assessment required under subsection (a)— (1) seek input from national biosecurity and biodefense stakeholders, and other Federal, State, local, and tribal officials involved in efforts to prevent, protect, respond to, and recover from chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats; (2) ensure that written procedures are in place to guide the interagency development of the assessments, including for input, review, and implementation purposes, among relevant Federal partners; (3) share the risk assessments with Federal, State, local and tribal officials with appropriate security clearances and a need for the information in the classified version; and (4) to the maximum extent practicable, make available an unclassified version for Federal, State, local, and tribal officials involved in prevention and preparedness for chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear events. (e) Written procedures The Secretary shall establish written procedures for appropriate usage of the assessments required under subsection (a), including— (1) a description of the types of departmental activities for which the assessments should be considered; (2) the extent to which the findings of the assessments should play a role in such activities; (3) the point in planning processes at which the assessments should be considered; and (4) how users can access expertise within the Department to aid in interpretation of the results of the assessments. 2103. National Export Enforcement Coordination (a) Establishment There shall be maintained in the Department the Export Enforcement Coordination Center, with capability for national export enforcement coordination that is managed by the Secretary and coordinates the export enforcement activities among the Department, the Department of Agriculture, the Department of Commerce, the Department of Defense, the Department of Energy, the Department of Justice, the Department of State, the Department of the Treasury, the Intelligence Community, and other Federal agencies as appropriate. (b) Responsibilities The Center shall— (1) enhance Federal coordination for law enforcement counterproliferation investigations, including coordination and deconfliction with intelligence counterproliferation activities; (2) address licensing inquiries, reviews, requests, checks, and verifications; and (3) conduct outreach and provide training to the export trade community. 2104. Communication of threat information (a) Findings Congress finds the following: (1) The Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism recommended that the Federal Government should practice greater openness of public information so that citizens better understand the threat and the risk this threat poses to them . (2) There are unique challenges for community preparedness for attacks from weapons of mass destruction. (b) Communications plan (1) In general The Administrator of the Federal Emergency Management Agency shall develop a communications plan designed to provide information to the public related to preventing, preparing for, responding to, and recovering from chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear attacks. (2) Consultation As appropriate, the Administrator of the Federal Emergency Management Agency shall consult with State, local, and tribal authorities and coordinate with other Federal departments and agencies in developing the communications plans under paragraph (1). (3) Pre-scripted messages and message templates (A) In general The Administrator of the Federal Emergency Management Agency shall develop and disseminate, through an alerts and warnings system, pre-scripted messages and message templates for State, local, and tribal authorities so that those authorities can quickly and rapidly disseminate critical information to the public in anticipation of, during, or in the immediate aftermath of a chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear attack, and to be included in the Department of Homeland Security’s lessons learned information sharing system. (B) Development and design The pre-scripted messages or message templates shall— (i) be developed in consultation with State, local, and tribal authorities and in coordination with other appropriate Federal departments and agencies; (ii) be designed to provide accurate, essential, and appropriate information and instructions to the population directly affected by an incident, including information regarding an evacuation, sheltering in place, hospital surge operations, health, and safety; (iii) be designed to provide accurate, essential, and appropriate information and instructions to children and other special needs populations within the population directly affected by an incident; (iv) be designed to provide accurate, essential, and appropriate information and instructions to emergency response providers and medical personnel responding to an incident; and (v) include direction for the coordination of Federal, State, local, and tribal communications teams. (C) Communications formats The Administrator shall develop pre-scripted messages or message templates under this paragraph in multiple formats to ensure delivery— (i) in cases where the usual communications infrastructure is unusable; (ii) to individuals with disabilities or other special needs and individuals with limited English proficiency; and (iii) to educational and childcare facilities, including daycare centers, grade schools, universities, hospitals, and elderly care facilities. (D) Dissemination and technical assistance The Administrator shall ensure that all pre-scripted messages and message templates developed under this paragraph are made available to State, local, and tribal authorities so that those authorities may incorporate them, as appropriate, into their emergency plans. The Administrator shall also make available relevant technical assistance to those authorities to support communications planning. (E) Exercises To ensure that the pre-scripted messages or message templates developed under this paragraph can be effectively utilized in a disaster or incident, the Administrator shall incorporate Federal, State, local, and tribal communications teams that deliver such pre-scripted messages or message templates into exercises, including those conducted under the National Exercise Program. (4) Report Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this subsection, the Administrator of the Federal Emergency Management Agency shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees the communications plans required to be developed under this subsection, including pre-scripted messages or message templates developed in conjunction with the plans and a description of the means that will be used to deliver these messages during such incidents. (c) Terrorism threat awareness (1) Terrorism threat awareness The Secretary, in coordination with the Attorney General and heads of appropriate Federal agencies, shall for purposes of preparedness and collective response to terrorism and for other purposes— (A) ensure that homeland security information concerning terrorist threats is provided to State, local, and tribal authorities and the public within the United States, as appropriate; and (B) establish a process to optimize opportunities for qualified heads of State, local, and tribal government entities to obtain appropriate security clearances so that they may receive classified threat information when appropriate. (2) Threat bulletins (A) In general Consistent with the requirements of paragraph (1), the Secretary shall, on a timely basis, prepare unclassified threat bulletins on chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats. (B) Requirements Each assessment required under subparagraph (A) shall— (i) include guidance to the public for preventing and responding to acts of terrorism arising from such threats; and (ii) be made available on the Internet Web site of the Department and other publicly accessible Internet Web sites, communication systems, and information networks. (3) Guidance to State, local, and tribal authorities The Secretary, using information provided by the terrorism risk assessments under section 2102 and material threat assessments and determinations under the Project BioShield Act of 2004 ( Public Law 108–276 ) and the amendments made by that Act— (A) shall provide to State, local, and tribal authorities written guidance on communicating terrorism-related threats and risks to the public within their jurisdictions; and (B) shall identify and articulate the governmental rationale for identifying particular communities as being at heightened risk of exploitation. (4) Use of existing resources The Secretary shall use Internet Web sites, communication systems, and information networks in operation on the date of an assessment under this subsection, and shall coordinate with other heads of Federal departments and agencies to provide information through existing channels to satisfy the requirements of paragraph (2)(B)(ii). The Secretary shall provide guidance on how State, local, tribal, and private entities can partner with public television stations to disseminate information provided by the Department and shall provide information on best practices on disseminating information to residents of local communities, including leveraging public television stations. 2105. Individual and community preparedness for chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear attacks (a) In general The Secretary, acting through the Administrator for the Federal Emergency Management Agency, shall assist State, local, and tribal authorities in improving and promoting individual and community preparedness and collective response to terrorist attacks involving chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear materials against the United States by— (1) developing guidance and checklists of recommended actions for individual and community prevention and preparedness efforts and disseminating such guidance and checklists to communities and individuals; (2) updating new and existing guidance and checklists as appropriate; (3) disseminating to communities and individuals the guidance developed under section 2131, as appropriate; (4) providing information and training materials in support of individual and community preparedness efforts; (5) conducting individual and community preparedness outreach efforts; and (6) such other actions as the Secretary determines appropriate. (b) Coordination The Secretary shall coordinate with Federal departments and agencies and with private sector and nongovernmental organizations to promote individual and community preparedness and collective response to terrorist attacks involving chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear materials against the United States. (c) Best practices In compiling guidance for individual and community preparedness in order to carry out subsection (a)(4), the Secretary shall give due regard to best practices based on the experience of other agencies and countries and the expertise of academic institutions and nongovernmental organizations. B Protection 2121. Detection of biological attacks (a) Program The Secretary shall carry out a program to detect a biological attack or event that poses a high risk to homeland security. Through such program, the Secretary shall— (1) deploy detection capabilities to areas, based on high risks identified by Department assessments, to indicate the presence of biological agents; (2) consider multiple deployment strategies including surge capability; (3) provide information to participating laboratories and programs for their use in monitoring public health, and biological material or other data from those detectors to participating laboratories and programs for testing and evaluation; (4) regularly communicate with, and provide information about the presence of biological agents to, appropriate Federal, State, and local agencies responsible for public health, law enforcement, and emergency services, in a manner that ensures transparency with the governments served by such personnel; (5) provide advanced planning tools, concepts of operations (including alarm resolution protocols and response guidance), standard operating procedures, and training exercises (including in collaboration with relevant national level exercises) for collective response to and recovery from biological attacks; and (6) provide technical assistance to jurisdictions hosting the program to improve their ability to respond to a detected pathogen. (b) Program requirements Under the program required under subsection (a), the Secretary shall— (1) enter into memoranda of agreement or interagency agreements under the Economy Act of 1933 (31 U.S.C. 1535 et seq.) with the Director of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, and the heads of other Federal departments and agencies, setting forth roles and responsibilities, including with respect to validating performance and developing testing protocols for participating laboratories and coordination with appropriate State, local, and tribal agencies; (2) establish criteria for determining whether plans for biological detector capabilities and coverage sufficiently protect the United States population, and make such determinations on an annual basis; (3) acting through the Under Secretary for Science and Technology, and in consultation with the Director of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, implement a process for establishing assay performance standards and evaluation for equivalency for biological threat assays, that— (A) evaluates biological threat detection assays, their protocols for use, and their associated response algorithms for confirmation of biological threat agents, taking performance measures and concepts of operation into consideration; (B) develops interagency peer-reviewed assay performance and equivalency standards based on the findings of the evaluation under subparagraph (A); (C) requires implementation of the standards developed under subparagraph (B) for all Department biological detection programs; (D) promotes use of such standards among all other Federal biological detection programs and makes them available to the private sector and other end-users as appropriate; and (E) is updated as necessary; (4) prior to obligating funds to acquire biodetection systems for purposes of operational testing and evaluation, require— (A) a determination of the sensitivity and specificity of the currently deployed biodetection system; (B) an assessment of the sensitivity and specificity of the next generation biodetection system or systems under consideration for acquisition and whether it meets established operational requirements; (C) provision of all raw data to the Science and Technology Directorate to enable the Under Secretary to— (i) conduct a trade-off study comparing the results of subparagraphs (A) and (B); and (ii) perform a technical readiness assessment in accordance with section 308(b); and (D) that the findings under subparagraph (C) inform the cost-benefit analysis under paragraph (5)(A) and any Departmental acquisition review board decision regarding the biodetection system or systems under consideration; and (5) prior to acquiring and deploying biodetection technology, require— (A) a cost-benefit analysis, including an analysis of alternatives, that shall be informed by the terrorism risk assessments under section 2102; (B) operational testing and evaluation; (C) operational assessment by the end users of the technology; and (D) the Department, other relevant executive agencies, and local jurisdictions intended to host the systems to agree on concepts of operations for resolving alarms. (c) Contract authority The Secretary may enter into contracts with participating laboratories and programs for— (1) the provision of laboratory services or other biosurveillance activities as appropriate for purposes of this section on a fee-for-service basis or on a prepayment or other similar basis; and (2) administrative and other costs related to hosting program personnel and equipment in these laboratories or programs. (d) Definitions In this section: (1) The term participating laboratory means a laboratory that has been accepted as a member of the Laboratory Response Network for Biological Terrorism that— (A) is fully equipped to detect and respond quickly to acts of biological terrorism; (B) provides biocontainment and microbiological analysis in support of the Department and relevant law enforcement agencies with responsibilities for investigating biological incidents; and (C) supports assay evaluation, research and development. (2) The term assay means any scientific test that is designed to detect the presence of a biological threat agent that is of a type selected under criteria established by the Secretary. 2122. Rapid biological threat detection and identification at ports of entry (a) In general The Secretary of Homeland Security shall require the Under Secretary for Science and Technology, in consultation with the heads of other relevant operational components of the Department of Homeland Security, to assess whether the development of technological screening capabilities for biological agents, pandemic influenza, and other infectious diseases should be undertaken by the Directorate of Science and Technology to support entry and exit screening at ports of entry and for other homeland security purposes. (b) Development of methods If the Under Secretary determines that the development of such screening capabilities should be undertaken, the Secretary shall, to the extent possible, initiate development of safe and effective methods to— (1) rapidly screen incoming persons at ports of entry for biological agents, pandemic influenza, and other infectious diseases; and (2) obtain results of such screening near the point of entry. 2123. Evaluating detection technology To inform the purchase of detection technology, the Secretary, in coordination with the Director of the National Institute of Standards and Technology, may carry out a program to— (1) establish near-term minimum performance metrics to support public safety actionable activities, based to the greatest extent practicable on voluntary consensus standards, to evaluate the effectiveness of detection technology for high-priority biological agents and toxins and high-priority chemical agents; (2) establish a process for voluntary testing and evaluation of technology by an accredited laboratory to demonstrate conformance to such consensus standards, or performance metrics if standards do not exist, for the effective detection of high-priority biological agents and toxins and high-priority chemical agents, including incentivization for the program through potential cost sharing with technology manufacturers and for SAFETY Act certification or placement on the authorized equipment list, or both; and (3) with permission from the detection technology manufacturer, make available to Federal departments and agencies, State, territorial, local, and tribal entities, and the private sector the results of detection system testing and evaluation under paragraph (2). 2124. Domestic implementation of the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture (a) Securing the cities The Director of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office shall establish and maintain a multilayered system of detection technologies, programs, and guidelines designed to enhance the Nation’s ability to detect and prevent a radiological or nuclear attack in high-risk United States cities, as determined by the Secretary. (b) Surge capabilities The Director shall develop a surge capability for radiological and nuclear detection systems that can be deployed within the United States rapidly in response to actionable intelligence or warnings, and includes procurement of appropriate technology, training, and exercises. (c) Integration The programs under subsections (a) and (b) shall be integrated into the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture and shall inform architecture studies, technology gaps, and research activities of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office. C Response 2131. First responder guidance concerning chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear attacks (a) Establishment of voluntary guidance Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this section, the Secretary, in coordination with the Secretary of Health and Human Services, the Secretary of Agriculture, the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, the Attorney General, and the heads of other Federal departments and agencies, as appropriate, shall— (1) develop for police, fire, emergency medical services, emergency management, and medical and public health personnel, voluntary guidance for responding to a release of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear material; (2) make such guidance available to State, local, and tribal authorities, including primary and secondary schools and other educational institutions, nongovernmental organizations, the private sector, and the public; and (3) in developing the guidance under paragraph (1)— (A) review the experiences of other countries and the expertise of academic institutions and nongovernmental organizations; and (B) consider the unique needs of children and other vulnerable populations. (b) Contents The guidance developed under subsection (a)(1) shall be voluntary, risk-based guidance that shall include— (1) protective action guidance for ensuring the security, health, and safety of emergency response providers and their families and household contacts; (2) specific information regarding the effects of the chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear material on those exposed to the agent; and (3) best practices for emergency response providers to effectively diagnose, handle, and otherwise manage individuals affected by an incident involving chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear material. (c) Review and revision of guidance The Secretary shall— (1) review the guidance developed under subsection (a)(1) at least once every 2 years; (2) make revisions to the guidance as appropriate; and (3) make any revised guidance available to State, local, and tribal authorities, nongovernmental organizations, the private sector, and the public. (d) Procedures for developing and revising guidance In carrying out the requirements of this section, the Secretary shall establish procedures to— (1) enable members of the first responder and first provider community to submit recommendations of areas in which guidance is needed and could be developed under subsection (a)(1); (2) determine which entities should be consulted in developing or revising the guidance; (3) prioritize, on a regular basis, guidance that should be developed or revised; and (4) develop and disseminate the guidance in accordance with the prioritization under paragraph (3). 2132. Integrated plume modeling for collective response (a) Development (1) In general The Secretary shall acquire, use, and disseminate the best available integrated plume models to enable rapid response activities following a chemical, biological, nuclear, or radiological attack or event. (2) Scope The Secretary shall— (A) identify Federal, State, and local needs regarding plume models and ensure the rapid development and distribution of integrated plume models that meet those needs to appropriate officials of the Federal Government and State, local, and tribal authorities to enable immediate response to a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear attack or event; (B) establish mechanisms for dissemination by appropriate emergency response officials of the integrated plume models described in paragraph (1) to nongovernmental organizations and the public to enable appropriate collective response activities; (C) ensure that guidance and training in how to appropriately use such models are provided; and (D) ensure that lessons learned from assessing the development and dissemination of integrated plume models during exercises administered by the Department are put into the lessons learned information sharing system maintained by the Department. (b) Definitions For purposes of this section: (1) The term plume model means the assessment of the location and prediction of the spread of agents following a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear attack or event. (2) The term integrated plume model means a plume model that integrates protective action guidance and other information as the Secretary determines appropriate. 2133. Establishment of the system assessment and validation for emergency responders (SAVER) program The Secretary shall carry out a program for system assessment and validation of emergency response equipment at the Department, to be known as the SAVER Program . The Secretary shall ensure that such program— (1) conducts objective, impartial, practitioner-relevant, and operationally oriented assessments and validations of commercial emergency responder equipment and systems, including hand-held detectors for chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear agents; (2) prioritizes such evaluation based on the technical results obtained from the program established under section 2123, if available; (3) is supported by a network of scientists who, in coordination with subject matter experts, perform the assessment and validation activities using strict scientific and testing protocols; (4) provides results along with other relevant equipment information to the emergency response provider community in an operationally useful form; (5) provides information on equipment that falls within the categories listed in the Department’s authorized equipment list; (6) provides information that enables decisionmakers and responders to better select, procure, use, and maintain emergency responder equipment; and (7) shares such information nationally with the emergency response provider community. 2134. Payment for laboratory response services In carrying out their functions, responsibilities, authorities, and duties to counter biological terrorism, the Secretary, the Attorney General, and the heads of other participating Federal agencies are authorized, subject to the availability of appropriations, to enter into contracts with laboratories that comprise the Laboratory Response Network for Biological Terrorism and other federally networked laboratories that agree to participate in such a contract, for the provision of laboratory testing services on a fee-for-service basis or on a prepayment or other similar basis. Prior to entering into such a contract with any laboratory in the Laboratory Response Network for Biological Terrorism, the Secretary, the Attorney General, or the head of any other participating Federal agency shall inform the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. 2135. Bioforensics capabilities (a) Bioforensics analysis center There is authorized in the Department a bioforensics analysis center to provide support for law enforcement and intelligence-related investigations and actions to— (1) provide definitive bioforensics analysis in support of the executive agencies with primary responsibilities for preventing, deterring, responding to, attributing, and recovering from biological attacks; and (2) undertake other related bioforensics activities. (b) Payment for services The center shall charge and retain fees to reimburse the cost of any service provided to an executive agency that requested such service. (c) Detailee program Subject to the availability of appropriations, the Secretary may implement a program under which executive agencies as considered appropriate by the Secretary provide personnel, on a reimbursable basis, to the center for the purpose of— (1) providing training and other educational benefits for such stakeholders to help them to better understand the policies, procedures, and laws governing national bioforensics activities; and (2) bolstering the capabilities and information sharing activities of the bioforensics analysis center authorized under subsection (a) with national biosecurity and biodefense stakeholders. 2136. Metropolitan Medical Response System Program (a) In General The Secretary shall conduct a Metropolitan Medical Response System Program, that shall assist State and local governments in preparing for and responding to public health and mass casualty incidents resulting from acts of terrorism, natural disasters, and other man-made disasters. (b) Financial Assistance (1) Authorization of grants (A) In general The Secretary, through the Administrator of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, may make grants under this section to State and local governments to assist in preparing for and responding to mass casualty incidents resulting from acts of terrorism, natural disasters, and other man-made disasters. (B) Consultation In developing guidance for grants authorized under this section, the Administrator shall consult with the Chief Medical Officer. (2) Use of funds A grant made under this section may be used to support the integration of emergency management, health, and medical systems into a coordinated response to mass casualty incidents caused by any hazard, including— (A) to strengthen medical surge capacity; (B) to strengthen mass prophylaxis capabilities including development and maintenance of an initial pharmaceutical stockpile sufficient to protect first responders, their families, and immediate victims from a chemical or biological event, including the procurement of home medical kits that are approved pursuant to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act ( 21 U.S.C. 301 et seq. ) or the Public Health Service Act ( 42 U.S.C. 201 et seq. ), as applicable; (C) to strengthen chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive detection, response, and decontamination capabilities; (D) to develop and maintain mass triage and pre-hospital treatment plans and capabilities; (E) for planning; (F) to support efforts to strengthen information sharing and collaboration capabilities of regional, State, and urban areas in support of public health and medical preparedness; (G) for medical supplies management and distribution; (H) for training and exercises; (I) for integration and coordination of the activities and capabilities of public health personnel and medical care providers with those of other emergency response providers as well as other Federal agencies, the private sector, and nonprofit organizations, for the forward movement of patients; and (J) for such other activities as the Administrator provides. (3) Eligibility (A) In general Except as provided in subparagraph (C), any jurisdiction that received funds through the Metropolitan Medical Response System Program in fiscal year 2009 shall be eligible to receive a grant under this section. (B) Additional jurisdictions (i) Unrepresented states (I) In general Except as provided in subparagraph (C), the Administrator may make grants under this section to the metropolitan statistical area with the largest population in any State in which no jurisdiction received funds through the Metropolitan Medical Response Program in fiscal year 2009, or in which funding was received only through another State. (II) Limitation For each of fiscal years 2014 through 2016, no jurisdiction that would otherwise be eligible to receive grants under subclause (I) shall receive a grant under this section if it would result in any jurisdiction under subparagraph (A) receiving less funding than such jurisdiction received in fiscal year 2009. (ii) Other jurisdictions (I) In general Subject to subparagraph (C), the Administrator may determine that additional jurisdictions are eligible to receive grants under this section. (II) Limitation For each of fiscal years 2014 through 2016, the eligibility of any additional jurisdiction to receive grants under this section is subject to the availability of appropriations beyond that necessary to— (aa) ensure that each jurisdiction eligible to receive a grant under subparagraph (A) does not receive less funding than such jurisdiction received in fiscal year 2009; and (bb) provide grants to jurisdictions eligible under clause (i). (4) Distribution of funds (A) In general The Administrator shall distribute grant funds under this section to the State in which the jurisdiction receiving a grant under this section is located. (B) Pass through Subject to subparagraph (C), not later than 45 days after the date on which a State receives grant funds under subparagraph (A), the State shall provide the jurisdiction receiving the grant 100 percent of the grant funds, and not later than 45 days after the State releases the funds, all fiscal agents shall make the grant funds available for expenditure. (C) Exception The Administrator may permit a State to provide to a jurisdiction receiving a grant under this section 97 percent of the grant funds awarded if doing so would not result in any jurisdiction eligible for a grant under paragraph (3)(A) receiving less funding than such jurisdiction received in fiscal year 2009. (5) Regional coordination The Administrator shall ensure that each jurisdiction that receives a grant under this section, as a condition of receiving such grant, is actively coordinating its preparedness efforts with surrounding jurisdictions, with the official with primary responsibility for homeland security (other than the Governor) of the government of the State in which the jurisdiction is located, and with emergency response providers from all relevant disciplines, as determined by the Administrator, to effectively enhance regional preparedness. (c) Performance measures The Administrator of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, in coordination with the Chief Medical Officer, and the National Metropolitan Medical Response System Working Group, shall issue performance measures within 1 year after the date of enactment of this section that enable objective evaluation of the performance and effective use of funds provided under this section in any jurisdiction. (d) Metropolitan Medical Response System Working Group defined In this section, the term National Metropolitan Medical Response System Working Group means— (1) 10 Metropolitan Medical Response System Program grant managers, who shall— (A) include 1 such grant manager from each region of the Agency; (B) comprise a population-based cross section of jurisdictions that are receiving grant funds under the Metropolitan Medical Response System Program; and (C) include— (i) 3 selected by the Administrator of the Federal Emergency Management Agency; and (ii) 3 selected by the Chief Medical Officer; and (2) 3 State officials who are responsible for administration of State programs that are carried out with grants under this section, who shall be selected by the Administrator. (e) Authorization of appropriations There is authorized to be appropriated $42,000,000 to carry out the program for each of fiscal years 2014 through 2018. D Recovery 2141. Identifying and addressing gaps in recovery capabilities (a) Risk assessment (1) Tailored risk assessment The Secretary, acting through the Under Secretary for Science and Technology and in coordination with the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, shall conduct tailored risk assessments to inform prioritization of national recovery activities for chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear incidents, to be updated as necessary. (2) Considerations In conducting the risk assessments under paragraph (1), the Secretary shall— (A) consult with the Secretary of Health and Human Services, the Secretary of Agriculture, the Secretary of the Interior, the Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the heads of other relevant Federal departments and agencies; (B) consider recovery of both indoor areas and outdoor environments; and (C) consider relevant studies previously prepared by other Federal agencies, or other appropriate stakeholders. (3) Collaboration Upon completion of the risk assessments required by this section, the Secretary shall provide the findings to the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency and heads of other relevant Federal agencies in order to inform ongoing and future work, including research and guidance development, undertaken by those agencies in recovery and remediation from chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear incidents. (b) Research The results of the risk assessment under this section shall inform appropriate Federal research to address the high-risk capability gaps uncovered by each assessment. (c) Submission to Congress The results of each risk assessment shall be submitted to the appropriate congressional committees within 30 days after completion of the assessment. 2142. Recovery from a chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear attack or incident (a) Establishment of guidance The Secretary shall develop and issue guidance for clean-up and restoration of indoor and outdoor areas, including subways and other mass transportation facilities, that have been exposed to chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear materials. The Secretary shall develop and issue the guidance, within 24 months after the date of enactment of this section, in consultation with— (1) the Secretary of Agriculture; (2) the Secretary of Commerce; (3) the Secretary of Education; (4) the Secretary of the Interior; (5) the Attorney General; (6) the Secretary of Labor; (7) the Secretary of Transportation; (8) the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development; (9) the Secretary of Health and Human Services; (10) the Secretary of Veterans Affairs; (11) the Secretary of the Treasury; (12) the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency; and (13) the Administrator of the Small Business Administration. (b) Contents The guidance developed under subsection (a) shall clarify Federal roles and responsibilities for assisting State, local, and tribal authorities and include risk-based recommendations for— (1) standards for effective decontamination of affected sites; (2) standards for safe post-event occupancy of affected sites, including for vulnerable populations such as children and individuals with health concerns; (3) requirements to ensure that the decontamination procedures for responding organizations do not conflict; (4) requirements that each responding organization uses a uniform system for tracking costs and performance of clean-up contractors; (5) maintenance of negative air pressure in buildings; (6) standards for proper selection and use of personal protective equipment; (7) air sampling procedures; (8) development of occupational health and safety plans that are appropriate for the specific risk to responder health; and (9) waste disposal. (c) Review and revision of guidance The Secretary shall— (1) not less frequently than once every 2 years, review the guidance developed under subsection (a); (2) make revisions to the guidance as appropriate; and (3) make the revised guidance available to the Federal Government, State, local, and tribal authorities, nongovernmental organizations, the private sector, and the public. (d) Procedures for developing and revising guidance In carrying out the requirements of this section, the Secretary shall establish procedures to— (1) prioritize issuance of guidance based on the results of the risk assessment under section 2131; (2) inventory existing relevant guidance; (3) enable the public to submit recommendations of areas in which guidance is needed; (4) determine which entities should be consulted in developing or revising the guidance; (5) prioritize, on a regular basis, guidance that should be developed or revised; and (6) develop and disseminate the guidance in accordance with the prioritization under paragraph (5). (e) Consultations The Secretary shall develop and revise the guidance developed under subsection (a), and the procedures required under subsection (d), in consultation with— (1) the heads of other Federal departments and agencies that are not required to be consulted under subsection (a), as the Secretary considers appropriate; (2) State, local, and tribal authorities; and (3) nongovernmental organizations and private industry. (f) Report Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this section, and annually thereafter, the Secretary shall provide appropriate congressional committees with— (1) a description of the procedures established under subsection (d); (2) any guidance in effect on the date of the report; (3) a list of entities to which the guidance described in paragraph (2) was disseminated; (4) a plan for reviewing the guidance described in paragraph (2), in accordance with subsection (e); (5) the prioritized list of the guidance required under subsection (d)(4), and the methodology used by the Secretary for such prioritization; and (6) a plan for developing, revising, and disseminating the guidance. 2143. Exercises (a) In general To facilitate recovery from a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear attack or other incident involving chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear materials and to foster collective response to terrorism, the Secretary shall develop exercises in consultation with State, local, and tribal authorities and other appropriate Federal agencies, and, as appropriate, in collaboration with national level exercises, including exercises that address, to the best knowledge available at the time, analysis, indoor environmental cleanup methods, and decontamination standards, including those published in the guidance issued under section 2142. (b) Lessons learned for national level exercises The Secretary shall provide electronically, to the maximum extent practicable, lessons learned reports to each designated representative of State, local, and tribal jurisdictions and private sector entities that participate in National Level Exercises of the Department. Each lessons learned report shall be tailored to convey information on that exercise that could be leveraged to enhance preparedness and response. . (b) Clerical amendment The table of contents in section 1(b) of such Act is amended by adding at the end the following new items: Title XXI—WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION PREVENTION AND PREPAREDNESS Subtitle A—Prevention Sec. 2101. Weapons of mass destruction intelligence and information sharing. Sec. 2102. Risk assessments. Sec. 2103. National Export Enforcement Coordination. Sec. 2104. Communication of threat information. Sec. 2105. Individual and community preparedness for chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear attacks. Subtitle B—Protection Sec. 2121. Detection of biological attacks. Sec. 2122. Rapid biological threat detection and identification at ports of entry. Sec. 2123. Evaluating detection technology. Sec. 2124. Domestic implementation of the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture. Subtitle C—Response Sec. 2131. First responder guidance concerning chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear attacks. Sec. 2132. Integrated plume modeling for collective response. Sec. 2133. Establishment of the system assessment and validation for emergency responders (SAVER) program. Sec. 2134. Payment for laboratory response services. Sec. 2135. Bioforensics capabilities. Sec. 2136. Metropolitan Medical Response System Program. Subtitle D—Recovery Sec. 2141. Identifying and addressing gaps in recovery capabilities. Sec. 2142. Recovery from a chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear attack or incident. Sec. 2143. Exercises. . (c) Conforming amendment Section 316 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 ( 6 U.S.C. 195b ), and the item relating to such section in section 1(b) of such Act, are repealed. (d) Metropolitan Medical Response Program review (1) In general The Administrator of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Chief Medical Officer of the Department of Homeland Security, and the National Metropolitan Medical Response System Working Group shall conduct a review of the Metropolitan Medical Response System Program authorized under section 2136 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, as added by this section, including an examination of— (A) the extent to which the program goals and objectives are being met; (B) the performance metrics that can best help assess whether the Metropolitan Medical Response System Program is succeeding; (C) how the Metropolitan Medical Response System Program can be improved; (D) how the Metropolitan Medical Response System Program complements and enhances other preparedness programs supported by the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Health and Human Services; (E) the degree to which the strategic goals, objectives, and capabilities of the Metropolitan Medical Response System Program are incorporated in State and local homeland security plans; (F) how eligibility for financial assistance, and the allocation of financial assistance, under the Metropolitan Medical Response System Program should be determined, including how allocation of assistance could be based on risk; (G) implications for the Metropolitan Medical Response System Program if it were managed as a contractual agreement; and (H) the resource requirements of the Metropolitan Medical Response System Program. (2) Report Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this Act, the Administrator and the Chief Medical Officer shall submit to the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate a report on the results of the review under this section. (3) Consultation The Administrator of the Federal Emergency Management Agency shall consult with the Secretary of Health and Human Services in the implementation of paragraph (1)(E). (4) Definition In this subsection the term National Metropolitan Medical Response System Working Group has the meaning that term has in section 2136 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, as added by this section. 302. Enhancing laboratory biosecurity (a) Federal Experts Security Advisory Panel (1) Panel (A) Establishment The President shall establish a permanent advisory panel to be known as the Federal Experts Security Advisory Panel to make technical and substantive recommendations on biological agent and toxin security. (B) Membership The members of the Panel— (i) shall consist of the voting members appointed under subparagraph (D) and the nonvoting members appointed under subparagraph (E); and (ii) except as provided in subparagraph (E), shall each be an official or employee of the Federal Government. (C) Co-Chairs The voting members of the Panel appointed under clauses (i), (v), and (vi) of subparagraph (D) shall serve jointly as the Co-Chairs of the Panel. (D) Voting members The voting members of the Panel shall consist of 1 voting representative of each of the following Government entities, appointed (except with respect to the National Security Council) by the head of the respective entity: (i) The Department of Agriculture. (ii) The Department of Commerce. (iii) The Department of Defense. (iv) The Department of Energy. (v) The Department of Health and Human Services. (vi) The Department of Homeland Security. (vii) The Department of Justice. (viii) The Department of Labor. (ix) The Department of State. (x) The Department of Transportation. (xi) The Department of Veterans Affairs. (xii) The Environmental Protection Agency. (xiii) The National Security Council, which shall be represented by the Special Assistant to the President for Biodefense. (xiv) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence. (xv) Any other department or agency designated by the Co-Chairs. (E) Nonvoting members The nonvoting members of the Panel shall consist of— (i) such additional representatives of the Government entities listed in subparagraph (D) as may be appointed by the heads of the respective entities; and (ii) a representative of the public health laboratory community or biological laboratory community (or both). (F) Administrative support The Secretary of Health and Human Services shall provide to the Panel such facilities, staff, and support services as may be necessary for the Panel to carry out its responsibilities under paragraph (2). (2) Responsibilities Not later than 6 months after the date of the enactment of this section, the Panel shall, with respect to biological agent and toxin security, deliver to the Secretaries of Agriculture, Health and Human Services, and Homeland Security plurality recommendations, including any statements of dissent, concerning— (A) the designation as highest risk of that subset of biological agents and toxins listed pursuant to section 351A(a)(1) of the Public Health Service Act ( 42 U.S.C. 262a(a)(1) ) that presents the greatest risk of deliberate misuse with significant potential for mass casualties or devastating effects to the economy, informed by— (i) any biological or bioterrorism risk assessments conducted by the Department of Homeland Security and relevant assessments by other agencies; and (ii) determinations made by the Secretary of Homeland Security pursuant to section 319F–2(c)(2)(A) of such Act (42 U.S.C. 247d–6b(c)(2)(A)); (B) the development of a set of minimum risk-based prescriptive laboratory security performance standards based on the risk at the lowest level, allowing for enhancements as risk increases; (C) the establishment of appropriate standards and practices to improve vetting and monitoring of, and ensure reliability of, personnel with access to highest risk biological agents and toxins at facilities registered under section 351A(d) of the Public Health Service Act ( 42 U.S.C. 262a(d) ); (D) the establishment of appropriate practices for physical security and cyber security for facilities that possess highest risk biological agents or toxins; (E) standards for training of laboratory personnel in security measures; (F) other emerging policy issues relevant to the security of biological agents and toxins; (G) adequacy of information sharing protocols with biodefense and biosecurity stakeholders; and (H) any other security standards determined necessary. (b) Revision of rules and regulations (1) Proposed rules The Secretaries of Health and Human Services and Agriculture, in coordination with the Secretary of Homeland Security, no later than 1 year after the date of receipt of recommendations under subsection (a)(2), shall, as appropriate, propose rules under section 351A of the Public Health Service Act ( 42 U.S.C. 262a ) establishing security standards and procedures that are specific to highest risk biological agents and toxins. (2) Final rules The Secretaries of Health and Human Services and Agriculture, in coordination with the Secretary of Homeland Security, no later than 24 months after the date of the enactment of this section, shall promulgate final rules described in paragraph (1). (c) Coordination of Federal oversight To ensure that the Federal Government provides for comprehensive and effective oversight of biological agents and toxins security, the heads of the Government entities listed in subsection (a)(1)(D) shall for facilities in which the entity supports biological agent or toxin laboratory activities and by no later than 6 months after the submission of recommendations under subsection (a)(2), develop and implement a plan for the coordination of biological agents and toxins security oversight that— (1) articulates a mechanism for coordinated inspections of and harmonized administrative practices for facilities registered under section 351A(d) of the Public Health Service Act ( 42 U.S.C. 262a(d) ), pursuant to subsection (d) of this section; and (2) ensures consistent and timely identification and resolution of biological agents and toxins security and compliance issues. (d) Common inspection procedures The heads of the entities listed in subsection (a)(1)(D) shall coordinate or consolidate laboratory inspections and ensure that such inspections are conducted using a common set of inspection procedures across such entities in order to minimize the administrative burden on such laboratory. (e) Inspection reports Any inspection report resulting from an inspection described in paragraph (1) shall be available to— (1) each Federal agency that supports biological agent or toxin laboratory activities at the laboratory that is the subject of the inspection report; and (2) the laboratories that are the object of inspection. (f) Laboratory biosecurity information sharing (1) Federal sharing The Secretaries of Health and Human Services and Agriculture shall— (A) develop a process for sharing of information pertaining to biological agents and toxins with agencies that support biological agent or toxin laboratory activities, that identifies the purpose for sharing, and a mechanism for securing, such information; (B) share relevant information pertaining to biological agents and toxins, including identification of laboratories possessing highest risk biological agents and toxins, and compliance issues with the Secretary of Homeland Security; and (C) share relevant information pertaining to biological agents and toxins, including identification of laboratories possessing highest risk biological agents and toxins, with appropriate State, local, and tribal government authorities, including law enforcement authorities and emergency response providers. (2) Classified and sensitive information The Secretaries of Agriculture and Health and Human Services shall ensure that any information disseminated under this section is handled consistently with— (A) the authority of the Director of National Intelligence to protect intelligence sources and methods under the National Security Act of 1947 ( 50 U.S.C. 401 et seq. ) and related procedures or similar authorities of the Attorney General concerning sensitive law enforcement information; (B) section 552a of title 5, United States Code (commonly referred to as the Privacy Act of 1974 ); and (C) other relevant laws. (g) Definitions In this section: (1) The terms biological agent and toxin refer to a biological agent or toxin, respectively, listed pursuant to section 351A(a)(1) of the Public Health Service Act ( 42 U.S.C. 262(a)(1) ). (2) The term highest risk means, with respect to a biological agent or toxin, designated as highest risk as described in subsection (a)(2)(A). (3) The term Panel means the Federal Experts Security Advisory Panel under subsection (a). (4) The term State, local, and tribal has the same meaning that term has in the Homeland Security Act of 2002 ( 6 U.S.C. 101 et seq. ). 303. Definitions Section 2 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 ( 6 U.S.C. 101 ) is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraphs: (19) The term Intelligence Community has the meaning given that term in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)). (20) The term national biosecurity and biodefense stakeholders means officials from the Federal, State, local, and tribal authorities and individuals from the private sector who are involved in efforts to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from a biological attack or other biological incidents that may have serious health or economic consequences for the United States, including wide-scale fatalities or infectious disease outbreaks. . 304. Dual-use terrorist risks from synthetic biology (a) Sense of Congress It is the sense of Congress that the field of synthetic biology has the potential to facilitate enormous gains in fundamental discovery, public health, and biotechnological applications, but that it also presents inherent dual-use homeland security risks that must be managed. (b) Assessment of risk Not less frequently than once every two years, the Secretary of Homeland Security, acting through the Under Secretary for Science and Technology, shall undertake a risk assessment of the dual-use and other risks associated with synthetic biology. (c) Establishment of guidance Not later than six months after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall develop and provide to the heads of all departments and agencies that fund life sciences research, guidance on compliance with United States laws, arms control agreements to which the United States is a party or signatory, and individual department and agency policy, including consideration of— (1) best practices for establishing a department or agency process that achieves compliance for department or agency research, development, or acquisition projects in the life sciences; (2) the types of projects that should be assessed; (3) at what stage or stages such projects should be assessed; and (4) means for preventing the release of homeland or national security information. (d) Research and development Based upon the findings of the risk assessment undertaken in accordance with subsection (b), the Under Secretary may conduct research into the risks and ways to mitigate such risks of synthetic biology, including— (1) determining the current capability of synthetic nucleic acid providers to effectively differentiate a legitimate customer from a potential terrorist or other malicious actor; (2) determining the current capability of synthetic nucleic acid providers to effectively screen orders for sequences of homeland security concern; and (3) making recommendations regarding screening software, protocols, and other remaining capability gaps uncovered by such risk assessment. 305. Dissemination of information analyzed by the Department to State, local, tribal, and private entities with responsibilities relating to homeland security Section 201(d)(8) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 ( 6 U.S.C. 121(d)(8) ) is amended by striking and to agencies of State and all that follows and inserting to State, local, tribal, and private entities with such responsibilities, and, as appropriate, to the public, in order to assist in preventing, deterring, or responding to acts of terrorism against the United States. . IV Public Health Matters 401. Sense of Congress regarding Federal coordination on medical countermeasures It is the sense of Congress that— (1) 10 years after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and 7 years after enactment of the Project BioShield Act of 2004 ( Public Law 108–276 ), coordination among Federal agencies involved in activities relating to researching, developing, and acquiring medical countermeasures still needs improvement; and (2) aggressive action should be taken by the Department of Health and Human Services (in particular, the heads of the National Institutes of Health, the Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and the Food and Drug Administration), the Department of Homeland Security, and the Department of Defense to foster greater coordination with respect to such activities, including adoption of an interagency agreement that sets forth the relative areas of responsibility with respect to establishing medical countermeasure requirements and researching, developing, and acquiring medical countermeasures to meet those requirements. 402. National Medical Countermeasure Dispensing Strategy Title III of the Public Health Service Act is amended by inserting after section 319F–4 (42 U.S.C. 247d–6e) the following: 319F–5. National Medical Countermeasure Dispensing Strategy (a) Definitions In this section— (1) the term dispense means to provide medical countermeasures to an affected population in response to a threat or incident; and (2) the term medical countermeasure means a qualified countermeasure (as defined in section 319F–1(a)(2)). (b) Strategy (1) In general The Secretary, in coordination with the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of Agriculture, and other appropriate Federal agencies, shall develop, implement, and, as appropriate, periodically update a National Medical Countermeasure Dispensing Strategy to enhance preparedness and collective response to a terrorist attack on humans or animals with any chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear material, that delineates Federal, State, and local responsibilities. (2) Considerations The strategy shall be sufficiently flexible to meet the unique needs of different communities, including first responders, and shall consider— (A) a variety of options for dispensing medical countermeasures, including to individuals, schools, universities, hospitals, and elderly care facilities; (B) post-incident requirements for emergency use authorizations before countermeasures can be distributed legally; (C) the inclusion of locally held caches of countermeasures in event-specific authorizations covering federally held countermeasures of the same type; and (D) distribution to the public of home medical kits for personal stockpiling purposes, within 30 days after a domestic or international bioterrorist attack resulting in human infection. (c) Coordination The Secretary shall coordinate with the Administrator of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, State, local, and tribal authorities, representatives from the private sector, and nongovernmental organizations on the National Medical Countermeasures Dispensing Strategy. (d) Report Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this section, the Secretary shall submit the National Medical Countermeasures Dispensing Strategy to the appropriate congressional committees. . 403. National pre-event vaccination and antimicrobial dispensing policy review (a) Requirement The Secretary of Health and Human Services, in coordination with the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Secretary of Agriculture, shall review the adequacy of domestic vaccination and antimicrobial dispensing policy, guidance, and information provided to the public in light of any known terrorist risk of a biological attack or other phenomena that may have serious health consequences for the United States, including wide-scale fatalities or infectious disease outbreaks including outbreaks associated with the avian flu. In carrying out the review under this section, the Secretary shall consider— (1) terrorism risk assessments under section 2102 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, as amended by this Act, and material threat assessments and determinations under the Project Bioshield Act of 2004 ( Public Law 108–276 ) and the amendments made by that Act; (2) reports on global trends and intelligence produced by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and the Intelligence Community regarding biological threats; (3) the availability of federally provided vaccines and antimicrobials to dispense to first responders and the public, on a voluntary basis, in anticipation of a biological attack; (4) applicability of Federal shelf-life extension programs to locally held stockpiles of medical countermeasures, to the extent that information on local stockpiles is available; (5) making expiring products available to appropriate international organizations or foreign partners once the requests of domestic stakeholders have been fulfilled; (6) the implications of pre-event vaccination and antimicrobial dispensing to livestock; and (7) mechanisms to increase coordination between the Strategic National Stockpile established under section 319F–2 of the Public Health Service Act ( 42 U.S.C. 247D–6b ) and the National Veterinary Stockpile that would enhance vaccination and dispensing capabilities. (b) Report Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Health and Human Services shall report to the appropriate congressional committees on the review required by subsection (a), together with any recommendations relating to the availability of domestic vaccine and antimicrobials for disbursing to the public and voluntary immunization by first responders. 404. Management of short shelf life vaccine and antimicrobial stockpiles The Secretary of Health and Human Services shall make available surplus vaccines and antimicrobials, and vaccines and antimicrobials with short shelf lives, from the strategic national stockpile under section 319F–2(a) of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 247d–6b(a)) to State, local, and tribal first responders, including health care responders, for administration to such responders who voluntarily consent to such administration, and shall— (1) establish any necessary logistical and tracking systems to facilitate making such vaccines and antimicrobials so available; and (2) distribute disclosures regarding associated risks to end users. 405. Material threat determinations reviews Section 319F–2(c)(2)(A) of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 247d–6b(c)(2)(A)) is amended— (1) in clause (i), by striking and at the end; (2) by redesignating clause (ii) as clause (iii); (3) by inserting after clause (i) the following: (ii) establish criteria for the issuance of a material threat determination; ; (4) in clause (iii), as so redesignated, by striking the period at the end and inserting ; and ; and (5) by adding at the end the following: (iv) review and reassess determinations under clause (iii) to determine whether agents continue to present a material threat against the United States population sufficient to affect national security and homeland security. . 406. Background checks Section 351A(e)(3)(A) of the Public Health Service Act ( 42 U.S.C. 262a(e)(3)(A) ) is amended by adding at the end the following: In identifying whether an individual is within a category specified in subparagraph (B)(ii)(II), the Attorney General shall consult with the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of State to determine whether these officials possess any information relevant to the identification of such an individual by the Attorney General. . 407. State, local, and tribal defined In this title, the term State, local, and tribal has the same meaning that term has in the Homeland Security Act of 2002 ( 6 U.S.C. 101 et seq. ). V Foreign Relations Matters 501. International engagement to enhance biodefense and laboratory biosecurity The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Special Assistant to the President for Biodefense, and the heads of appropriate Federal agencies, shall, as appropriate— (1) support efforts of other countries to establish and build capacity to effectively implement legislation criminalizing the development or use of biological weapons or acts of bioterrorism; (2) engage other countries and international nongovernmental entities to develop and establish common standards, guidance, and best practices for actions relevant to preventing acts of bioterrorism and the illicit use of life sciences; (3) support the efforts of other countries to enhance biosecurity and safety practices at laboratories and other facilities with materials that could be used in biological weapons or in an act of bioterrorism; (4) promote the development and adoption of international guidance for the safety and security of high-risk pathogens and toxins; and (5) promote information sharing relating to threats and best practices between the intelligence community, Federal law enforcement, and international law enforcement and security officials. 502. International collaboration and information sharing relating to biosecurity The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of Agriculture, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, and the heads of other appropriate Federal agencies, shall, as appropriate— (1) support efforts in other countries and regions to develop mechanisms and capabilities for reporting to United Nations organizations validated data on biological attacks or other phenomena that may have serious health consequences for the United States, including wide-scale fatalities or infectious disease outbreaks; (2) engage other Federal and nongovernmental entities and other countries to advance awareness and understanding of the risk posed by information derived from the life sciences that has the potential for misuse to cause harm, and advance recommendations on how best to address such risk; (3) engage such entities and countries to promote greater awareness and understanding of the global availability of and access to life science technologies and materials; and (4) promote the development and use of mechanisms for reporting, preserving, and sharing data on Federal programs and investments in international scientific, agricultural, medical, and public health collaborations in support of efforts to enhance global biosecurity. 503. Interagency task force on best practices for global biopreparedness (a) Sense of Congress It is the sense of Congress that preparedness for a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear incident must be undertaken not only domestically but also internationally. Specifically, there is a need for a global preparedness architecture for such an event. Congress supports efforts to provide an international forum for discussion of key health security policies with international dimensions, and the establishment of a formal United States interagency task force to develop best practices and recommendations for implementation of a global preparedness architecture could enhance global preparedness. (b) Establishment of task force The Secretary of State shall convene and lead an interagency task force to examine— (1) the state of global biopreparedness for a major biological event; (2) necessary components of a global biopreparedness architecture that would advance international health security, including considerations of— (A) risk assessments; (B) prevention; (C) protection; (D) regional stockpiling of medical countermeasures, including considerations of— (i) security of the stockpile; (ii) preservation of the stockpile through effective detection and diagnosis, shelf life extension programs, and other means; (iii) delivery planning; and (iv) legal considerations for implementing such an architecture; (E) response and attribution; (F) other elements that should be a component of such an architecture; and (G) obstacles to implementing such an architecture; (3) best practices for preparedness based on lessons learned from domestic efforts to address the above issues, and that may be applicable internationally; (4) activities undertaken through the National Intelligence Strategy for Countering Biological Threats developed under section 202 and the International Health Regulations 2005, as well as other activities deemed relevant by the task force; and (5) the utility of working through existing international forums as a mechanism for distributing this information to the international community. (c) Membership Members of the task force shall include representatives from— (1) the Department of Homeland Security; (2) the Department of Health and Human Services, including the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention; (3) the Department of Agriculture; (4) the Department of Defense; (5) the Department of Justice; (6) the Department of State; (7) the Director of National Intelligence; (8) other Federal departments and agencies, as determined appropriate by the Secretary; and (9) national biosecurity and biodefense stakeholder community, including from the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries, and the diagnostic laboratory community, as determined by the Secretary. (d) Report Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the findings of the task force established under this section. 504. Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention The Secretary of State shall— (1) promote confidence in effective implementation of and compliance with the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (commonly referred to as the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention ) by the States party to the Convention by promoting transparency with respect to legitimate activities and pursuing compliance diplomatically to address concerns; (2) promote universal membership in the Convention; (3) develop an action plan for increasing international adherence to the Convention; and (4) ensure that United States participation in Convention meetings is broadly inclusive of representatives of relevant Federal departments and agencies.