II Calendar No. 96 119th CONGRESS 1st Session S. 1731 IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES May 13, 2025 Mr. Coons (for himself, Mr. Ricketts , Mr. Kaine , Mr. Cornyn , and Ms. Slotkin ) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations June 18, 2025 Reported by Mr. Risch , with an amendment Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert the part printed in italic A BILL To require the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense to develop a strategy in response to the global basing intentions of the People’s Republic of China.

1. Short titles This Act may be cited as the Combating PRC Overseas and Unlawful Networked Threats through Enhanced Resilience Act of 2025 or the COUNTER Act of 2025 . 2. Findings According to multiple sources, including the 2024 annual report to Congress, titled Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China and known informally as the China Military Power Report — (1) the PRC is seeking to expand its overseas logistics and basing infrastructure to allow the PLA to project and sustain military power at greater distances; (2) a global PLA logistics network could disrupt United States military operations as the PRC’s global military objectives evolve; (3) in August 2017, the PRC officially opened the first overseas PLA military base near the commercial port of Doraleh in Djibouti; (4) in June 2022, the PRC and Cambodia hosted a ceremony to mark the groundbreaking on PRC-built upgrades to Ream Naval Base, including a joint logistics and training center and a pier to accommodate larger ships; (5) officials from Cambodia and the PRC officially inaugurated expanded port features at the Ream Naval Base in April 2025; and (6) in addition to the base in Djibouti and the PRC's access to the port at the Ream Naval Base in Cambodia, the PRC is likely pursuing access to additional military facilities to support naval, air, and ground forces projection in many countries, including Angola, Bangladesh, Burma, Cuba, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Indonesia, Kenya, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Seychelles, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, and the United Arab Emirates. 3. Sense of Congress While the executive branch has undertaken case-by-case efforts to forestall the establishment of new PRC bases in several countries, it is the sense of Congress that future efforts to counter the PRC's global basing intentions must— (1) proceed with the urgency required to address the strategic implications of the PRC’s actions; (2) reflect sufficient interagency coordination with respect to a problem that necessitates a whole-of-government approach; (3) ensure that the United States Government maintains a proactive posture rather than a reactive posture in order to maximize strategic decision space; (4) identify a comprehensive menu of actions that would be influential in shaping a partner’s decision making regarding giving the PRC military access to its sovereign territory; (5) appropriately prioritize the subject of the PRC's global basing intentions within the context of the overall United States strategic competition with the PRC; (6) factor in the potential contributions of key allies and partners to help respond to the PRC's pursuit of global basing, many of which— (A) have historic ties and influence in many of the geographic areas the PRC is targeting for potential future bases; and (B) rely on the same basic intelligence picture to form our baseline understanding of the PRC’s global intentions; (7) establish and ensure sufficient resourcing for enduring organizational structures to effectively address the issue of PRC global basing intentions; and (8) ensure that future force posture, freedom of movement, and other interests of the United States and our allies are not jeopardized by the continued expansion of PRC bases. 4. Definitions In this Act: (1) Appropriate congressional committees The term appropriate congressional committees means— (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate ; (B) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate ; (C) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate ; (D) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate ; (E) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives ; (F) the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives ; (G) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives ; and (H) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives . (2) PLA The term PLA means the People's Liberation Army of the PRC. (3) PRC The term PRC means the People's Republic of China. (4) PRC global basing The term PRC global basing means the establishment of physical locations outside the geographic boundaries of the PRC where the PRC maintains some element of the People’s Liberation Army, PRC intelligence or security forces, or infrastructure designed to support the presence of PRC military, intelligence, or security forces, for the purposes of potential power projection. 5. Assessment of executive branch's C–PRC global basing strategy (a) Assessment Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit an intelligence assessment, in classified form, if needed, to the appropriate congressional committees. The assessment shall analyze the risk posed by PRC global basing to the United States or to any United States allies with respect to their ability to project power, maintain freedom of movement, and protect other interests as a function of the PRC's current or potential locations identified pursuant to subsection (b)(2)(A). (b) Strategy (1) In general Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense and other appropriate senior Federal officials, shall submit a strategy to the appropriate congressional committees that contains the information described in paragraph (2). (2) Contents The strategy required under paragraph (1) shall— (A) identify not fewer than 5 locations of chief concern where the PRC maintains a physical presence, or is suspected to be seeking a physical presence, which could ultimately transition into a PRC global base; (B) include a comprehensive listing of executive branch entities currently involved in addressing aspects of PRC global basing, including any resource or personnel constraints limiting the ability to effectively address the issue of PRC global basing intentions; (C) describe in detail all executive branch efforts— (i) to mitigate the impacts of the locations referred to in subparagraph (A); or (ii) to prevent the PRC from establishing new global bases; and (D) for each of the locations referred to in subparagraph (A), identify the actions by the United States or its allies that would be most effective to enable the respective foreign governments to terminate plans for hosting a PRC base. (c) Task force Not later than 90 days after submitting the strategy described in subsection (b), the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense and other appropriate senior Federal officials, shall establish an interagency task force— (1) to implement the strategy described in section (b) to counter the PRC’s efforts at the locations of chief concern; and (2) to identify mitigation measures that would prevent the PRC from establishing new bases in locations beyond the locations of chief concern identified pursuant to subsection (b)(2)(A). (d) Quadrennial reviews and reports Not later than 4 years after the submission of the strategy required under subsection (b), and not less frequently than once every 4 years thereafter, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, the Director of National Intelligence, and other appropriate senior Federal officials, shall— (1) conduct a review of the Executive Branch’s strategy and overall approach in response to the PRC global basing intentions; and (2) submit the results of such review, including the information described in subsection (b)(2), to the appropriate congressional committees.

1. Short titles This Act may be cited as the Combating PRC Overseas and Unlawful Networked Threats through Enhanced Resilience Act of 2025 or the COUNTER Act of 2025 . 2. Findings According to multiple sources, including the 2024 annual report to Congress, titled Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China and known informally as the China Military Power Report — (1) the PRC is seeking to expand its overseas logistics and basing infrastructure to allow the PLA to project and sustain military power at greater distances; (2) a global PLA logistics network could give the PRC increased capabilities to surveil or disrupt United States military operations; (3) in August 2017, the PRC officially opened the first overseas PLA military base near the commercial port of Doraleh in Djibouti; (4) in 2019, the PRC also attempted to acquire strategically important port infrastructure at Subic Bay in the Philippines, but was stopped by the Governments of the United States, the Philippines, and Japan, and by private investors; (5) in April 2025, officials from the PRC and Cambodia officially inaugurated the China-Cambodia Ream Naval Base Joint Support and Training Center and celebrated the expansion of port facilities at Ream Naval Base, some of which appear to have been reserved for the use of PRC ships that have been continuously stationed at Ream Naval Base since December 2023; and (6) in addition to the base in Djibouti and the PRC's access to the port at the Ream Naval Base in Cambodia, the PRC is likely pursuing access to additional military facilities to support naval, air, and ground forces projection in many countries. 3. Sense of Congress While the executive branch has undertaken case-by-case efforts to forestall the establishment of new PRC permanent military presence in several countries, it is the sense of Congress that future efforts to counter the PRC's global basing intentions must— (1) proceed with the urgency required to address the strategic implications of the PRC’s actions; (2) reflect sufficient interagency coordination with respect to a problem that necessitates a whole-of-government approach; (3) ensure that the United States Government maintains a proactive posture rather than a reactive posture in order to maximize strategic decision space; (4) identify a comprehensive menu of actions that would be influential in shaping a partner’s decision making regarding giving the PRC military access to its sovereign territory; (5) appropriately prioritize the subject of the PRC's global basing intentions within the context of the overall United States strategic competition with the PRC; (6) consider how the PRC uses commercial and scientific cooperation as a guise for establishing access for the PLA and other PRC security forces in foreign countries; (7) factor in the potential contributions of key allies and partners to help respond to the PRC's pursuit of global basing, many of which— (A) have historic ties and influence in many of the geographic areas the PRC is targeting for potential future bases; and (B) rely on the same basic intelligence picture to form our baseline understanding of the PRC’s global intentions; (8) establish and ensure sufficient resourcing for enduring organizational structures and security and foreign assistance and cooperation efforts to effectively address the issue of PRC global basing intentions; and (9) ensure that future force posture, freedom of movement, and other interests of the United States and our allies are not jeopardized by the continued expansion of PRC bases. 4. Definitions In this Act: (1) Appropriate congressional committees The term appropriate congressional committees means— (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate ; (B) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate ; (C) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate ; (D) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate ; (E) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives ; (F) the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives ; (G) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives ; and (H) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives . (2) PLA The term PLA means the People's Liberation Army of the PRC. (3) PRC The term PRC means the People's Republic of China. (4) PRC global basing The term PRC global basing means the establishment of physical locations outside the geographic boundaries of the PRC where the PRC maintains some element of the People’s Liberation Army, PRC intelligence or security forces, or infrastructure designed to support the presence of PRC military, intelligence, or security forces, for the purposes of potential power projection. 5. Assessment of executive branch's C–PRC global basing strategy (a) Assessment Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit an intelligence assessment, in classified form, if needed, to the appropriate congressional committees. The assessment shall analyze the risk posed by PRC global basing to the United States or to any United States allies with respect to their ability to project power, maintain freedom of movement, and protect other interests as a function of the PRC's current or potential locations identified pursuant to subsection (b)(2)(A). (b) Strategy (1) In general Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense and other appropriate senior Federal officials, shall submit a strategy to the appropriate congressional committees that contains the information described in paragraph (2). (2) Contents The strategy required under paragraph (1) shall— (A) identify not fewer than 5 locations that pose the greatest potential risks, as identified in the assessment required under subsection (a), where the PRC maintains a physical presence, or is suspected to be seeking a physical presence, which could ultimately transition into a PRC global base; (B) include a comprehensive listing of executive branch entities currently involved in addressing aspects of PRC global basing, including estimated programmatic and personal resource requirements on an agency-by-agency basis to effectively address the issue of PRC global basing intentions, and any relevant resource constraints; (C) describe in detail all executive branch efforts to mitigate the impacts to the national interests of the United States and partner countries of the locations referred to in subparagraph (A) and prevent the PRC from establishing new global bases, including with resources described in subparagraph (B); and (D) for each of the locations referred to in subparagraph (A), identify the actions by the United States or its allies that would be most effective in ensuring the respective foreign governments terminate plans for hosting a PRC base. (c) Task force Not later than 90 days after submitting the strategy described in subsection (b), the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense and other appropriate senior Federal officials, shall establish an interagency task force— (1) to implement the strategy described in section (b) to counter the PRC’s efforts at the locations of chief concern; and (2) to identify mitigation measures that would prevent the PRC from establishing new bases in locations beyond the locations of chief concern identified pursuant to subsection (b)(2)(A). (d) Quadrennial reviews and reports Not later than 4 years after the submission of the strategy required under subsection (b), and not less frequently than once every 4 years thereafter, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, the Director of National Intelligence, and other appropriate senior Federal officials, shall— (1) conduct a review of the Executive Branch’s strategy and overall approach in response to the PRC global basing intentions; and (2) submit the results of such review, including the information described in subsection (b)(2), to the appropriate congressional committees.

June 18, 2025 Reported with an amendment