II 119th CONGRESS 1st Session S. 1588 IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES May 5, 2025 Mr. Merkley (for himself and Mr. Curtis ) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations A BILL To support United States policy toward Taiwan.

1. Short title This Act may be cited as the Taiwan Relations Reinforcement Act of 2025 . 2. Sense of Congress It is the sense of Congress that the United States Government should continue strengthening cooperation with Taiwan under the framework of the Taiwan Relations Act ( Public Law 96–8 ; 22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq. ) and the Six Assurances with consideration of the ongoing military buildup in China and the imbalance in the security environment in the Taiwan Strait, including by— (1) promoting dignity and respect for its Taiwan counterparts, who represent more than 23,000,000 citizens, by using the full range of the United States Government’s diplomatic and financial tools to promote Taiwan’s inclusion and meaningful participation in international organizations, as well as in bilateral and multilateral security summits, military exercises, and economic dialogues and forums; (2) urging Taiwan to increase its own investments in military capabilities that support implementation of its asymmetric defense strategy; and (3) prioritizing the negotiation of a free-trade agreement with Taiwan that provides high levels of labor rights and environmental protection as soon as possible to deepen economic ties between the United States and Taiwan. 3. Interagency policy coordination on Taiwan (a) Statement of policy It is the policy of the United States to create and execute a plan for enhancing its relationship with Taiwan by strengthening the robust partnership that meets the challenges of the 21st century while remaining faithful to United States principles and values in keeping with the Taiwan Relations Act and the Six Assurances. (b) Interagency Taiwan Policy Task Force Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall review and consolidate existing interagency processes related to Taiwan (including formal National Security Council-led processes and other informal, ad-hoc interagency coordination processes) to create an interagency Taiwan Policy Task Force consisting of senior officials from the Office of the President, the National Security Council, the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the Department of the Treasury, the Department of Commerce, and the Office of the United States Trade Representative. (c) Report The interagency Taiwan Policy Task Force established under subsection (b) shall contribute annually to existing congressionally mandated reports outlining policy and actions to be taken in the next year to enhance the United States partnership and relations with Taiwan, including reports required under the Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act (subtitle A of title XII of Public Law 117–263 ), the Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative (TAIPEI) Act ( Public Law 116–135 ), and the Taiwan Travel Act ( Public Law 115–135 ). 4. American Institute in Taiwan (a) Appointment of Director The Director of the American Institute in Taiwan’s Taipei office shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, and effective upon enactment of this Act shall have the title of Representative. (b) Vacancy A vacancy in the position of Director shall be filled within 60 days. If such position remains unfilled for more than 60 days, the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, in consultation with the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, shall immediately appoint a senior Foreign Service Officer to serve as acting Director until a new Director is appointed and confirmed for such position pursuant to subsection (a). 5. Participation of Taiwan in international organizations (a) Statement of policy It is the policy of the United States to promote Taiwan’s inclusion and meaningful participation in meetings held by international organizations. (b) Support for meaningful participation The Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations and other relevant United States officials should actively support Taiwan’s meaningful participation in international organizations, including membership where applicable. (c) Report Beginning not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall annually incorporate reporting on China’s efforts to block Taiwan’s meaningful participation and inclusion at the United Nations and other international bodies, and recommend appropriate responses to be taken by the United States, as part of existing congressionally mandated reports, including reports required under the Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act (subtitle A of title XII of Public Law 117–263 ), the Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative (TAIPEI) Act ( Public Law 116–135 ), and the Taiwan Travel Act ( Public Law 115–135 ). 6. Invitation of Taiwan counterparts to high-level bilateral and multilateral forums and exercises It is the policy of the United States— (1) to invite Taiwan counterparts to participate in high-level bilateral and multilateral summits, military exercises, and economic dialogues and forums on issues of mutual concern; (2) that the United States Government and Taiwan counterparts should resume meetings under either the United States-Taiwan Trade and Investment Framework Agreement, the United States-Taiwan Initiative on 21st Century Trade, or other appropriate mechanisms to reach a bilateral free trade agreement; (3) that the United States Government should invite Taiwan to participate in bilateral and multilateral military training exercises; and (4) that the United States Government and Taiwan counterparts should engage in a regular and routine strategic bilateral dialogue on arms sales in accordance with Foreign Military Sales mechanisms, and the United States Government should support export licenses for direct commercial sales supporting Taiwan’s indigenous defensive capabilities. 7. Prohibitions against undermining United States policy regarding Taiwan (a) Finding Congress finds that the efforts by the Government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Chinese Communist Party to compel private United States businesses, corporations, and nongovernmental entities to use PRC-mandated language to describe the relationship between Taiwan and China are an intolerable attempt to enforce political censorship globally and should be considered an attack on the fundamental underpinnings of all democratic and free societies, including the constitutionally protected right to freedom of speech. (b) Sense of Congress It is the sense of Congress that the President, in coordination with United States businesses and nongovernmental entities and in consultation with Congress, should develop and implement a strategy for interacting with the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Chinese Communist Party and affiliated entities, the aim of which is— (1) to counter PRC sharp power operations, which threaten free speech, academic freedom, and the normal operations of United States businesses and nongovernmental entities; and (2) to counter PRC efforts to censor the way the world refers to issues deemed sensitive to the Government of the People’s Republic of China and Chinese Communist Party leaders, including issues related to Taiwan, Tibet, the Tiananmen Square Massacre, and the mass internment of Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims, among many other issues. (c) Prohibition on recognition of PRC claims to sovereignty over Taiwan (1) Sense of Congress It is the sense of Congress that— (A) issues related to the sovereignty of Taiwan are for the people of Taiwan to decide through the democratic process they have established; (B) the dispute between the People’s Republic of China and Taiwan must be resolved peacefully and with the assent of the people of Taiwan; (C) the primary obstacle to peaceful resolution is the authoritarian nature of the PRC political system under one-party rule of the Chinese Communist Party, which is fundamentally incompatible with Taiwan’s democracy; and (D) any attempt to coerce the people of Taiwan to accept a political arrangement that would subject them to direct or indirect rule by the PRC, including a one country, two systems framework, would constitute a grave challenge to United States security interests in the region. (2) Statement of policy It is the policy of the United States to oppose any attempt by the PRC authorities to unilaterally impose a timetable or deadline for unification on Taiwan. (3) Prohibition on recognition of PRC claims without assent of people of Taiwan No department or agency of the United States Government should formally or informally recognize PRC claims to sovereignty over Taiwan without the assent of the people of Taiwan, as expressed directly through the democratic process. (4) Treatment of Taiwan government (A) In general The Department of State and other United States Government agencies should treat the democratically elected Government of Taiwan as the legitimate representative of the people of Taiwan. Notwithstanding the continued supporting role of the American Institute in Taiwan in carrying out United States foreign policy and protecting United States interests in Taiwan, the United States Government should not place any restrictions on the ability of officials of the Department of State and other United States Government agencies from interacting directly and routinely with counterparts in the Taiwan government. (B) Rule of construction Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed as entailing restoration of diplomatic relations with the Republic of China, which were terminated on January 1, 1979, or altering the United States Government’s position on Taiwan’s international status. (d) Strategy To protect United States businesses and nongovernmental entities from coercion (1) Initial report Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the heads of other relevant Federal agencies, shall submit an unclassified report, with a classified annex if necessary, to protect United States businesses and nongovernmental entities from sharp power operations, including coercion and threats that lead to censorship or self-censorship, or which compel compliance with political or foreign policy positions of the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Chinese Communist Party. The strategy shall include the following elements: (A) Information on efforts by the Government of the People's Republic of China to censor the websites of United States airlines, hotels, and other businesses regarding the relationship between Taiwan and the People's Republic of China. (B) Information on efforts by the Government of the People's Republic of China to target United States nongovernmental entities through sharp power operations intended to weaken support for Taiwan. (C) Information on United States Government efforts to counter the threats posed by Chinese state-sponsored propaganda and disinformation, including information on best practices, current successes, and existing barriers to responding to this threat. (D) Details of any actions undertaken to create a code of conduct pursuant to subsection (b) and a timetable for implementation. (2) Subsequent reporting Beginning not later than one year after submission of the report required under paragraph (1), the Secretary of State shall include the elements required in such report as part of existing congressionally mandated reports, including reports required under the Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act (subtitle A of title XII of Public Law 117–263 ), the Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative (TAIPEI) Act ( Public Law 116–135 ), and the Taiwan Travel Act ( Public Law 115–135 ). 8. Report and strategy to support Taiwan’s response to sharp power operations (a) Finding Taiwan is at the forefront in responding to sharp power operations supported by the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Chinese Communist Party. (b) In general Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall— (1) submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on existing United States efforts supporting the Taiwan government’s efforts in countering the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Chinese Communist Party’s sharp power operations; and (2) submit to the appropriate congressional committees a strategy developed in coordination with the heads of relevant Federal agencies and international partners to identify, and provide targeted assistance to address, remaining vulnerabilities in the Taiwan government’s efforts to counter the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Chinese Communist Party’s sharp power operations. (c) Report elements The report required under subsection (b)(1) shall describe the response of the United States to People’s Republic of China propaganda and malign foreign influence campaigns and cyber-intrusions targeting Taiwan, including the following elements: (1) A description of assistance in building the capacity of the Taiwan officials, media entities, and private-sector entities to document and expose propaganda and malign foreign influence supported by the Government of the People’s Republic of China, the Chinese Communist Party, or affiliated entities. (2) A description of assistance to the Taiwan government’s efforts to develop a whole-of-government strategy to respond to sharp power operations, including election interference. (3) A description of exchanges and other technical assistance the United States has collaborated with Taiwan on to strengthen Taiwan’s legal system’s ability to respond to sharp power operations. (4) An assessment of the extent to which the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Chinese Communist Party have attempted to influence local political parties, financial institutions, media organizations, and other entities, and the degree to which these efforts could be considered successful. (5) An assessment of the extent to which like-minded governments have collaborated with the Taiwan government on ways to address sharp power operations supported by the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Chinese Communist Party. 9. Report on deterrence in the Taiwan Strait (a) Initial report Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a joint report that assesses the military posture of Taiwan and the United States as it specifically pertains to the deterrence of military conflict and conflict readiness in the Taiwan Strait. In light of the changing military balance in the Taiwan Strait, the report should include analysis of whether current Taiwan and United States policies sufficiently deter efforts to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means. (b) Subsequent reporting Beginning not later than one year after submission of the report required under subsection (a), the Secretary of State shall include the elements required in such report as part of existing congressionally mandated reports, including reports required under the Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act (subtitle A of title XII of Public Law 117–263 ), the Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative (TAIPEI) Act ( Public Law 116–135 ), and the Taiwan Travel Act ( Public Law 115–135 ). 10. Definitions In this Act: (1) Appropriate congressional committees The term appropriate congressional committees means the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives . (2) Sharp power The term sharp power means the coordinated and often concealed application of disinformation, media manipulation, economic coercion, cyber-intrusions, targeted investments, and academic censorship that is intended— (A) to corrupt political and nongovernmental institutions and interfere in democratic elections and encourage self-censorship of views at odds with those of the Government of the People's Republic of China or the Chinese Communist Party; or (B) to foster attitudes, behavior, decisions, or outcomes in Taiwan and elsewhere that support the interests of the Government of the People's Republic of China or the Chinese Communist Party.