II 118th CONGRESS 2d Session S. 4230 IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES May 1, 2024 Mr. Warner (for himself and Mr. Tillis ) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation A BILL To improve the tracking and processing of security and safety incidents and risks associated with artificial intelligence, and for other purposes.

1. Short title This Act may be cited as the Secure Artificial Intelligence Act of 2024 or the Secure A.I. Act of 2024 . 2. Definitions In this Act: (1) Artificial intelligence safety incident The term artificial intelligence safety incident means an event that increases the risk that operation of an artificial intelligence system will— (A) result in physical or psychological harm; or (B) lead to a state in which human life, health, property, or the environment is endangered. (2) Artificial intelligence security incident The term artificial intelligence security incident means an event that increases— (A) the risk that operation of an artificial intelligence system occurs in a way that enables the extraction of information about the behavior or characteristics of an artificial intelligence system by a third party; or (B) the ability of a third party to manipulate an artificial intelligence system in order to subvert the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of an artificial intelligence system or adjacent system. (3) Artificial intelligence security vulnerability The term artificial intelligence security vulnerability means a weakness in an artificial intelligence system that could be exploited by a third party to subvert, without authorization, the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of an artificial intelligence system, including through techniques such as— (A) data poisoning; (B) evasion attacks; (C) privacy-based attacks; and (D) abuse attacks. (4) Counter-artificial intelligence The term counter-artificial intelligence means techniques or procedures to extract information about the behavior or characteristics of an artificial intelligence system, or to learn how to manipulate an artificial intelligence system, in order to subvert the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of an artificial intelligence system or adjacent system. 3. Voluntary tracking and processing of security and safety incidents and risks associated with artificial intelligence (a) Processes and procedures for vulnerability management Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the National Institute of Standards and Technology shall— (1) initiate a process to update processes and procedures associated with the National Vulnerability Database of the Institute to ensure that the database and associated vulnerability management processes incorporate artificial intelligence security vulnerabilities to the greatest extent practicable; and (2) identify any characteristics of artificial intelligence security vulnerabilities that make utilization of the National Vulnerability Database inappropriate for their management and develop processes and procedures for vulnerability management for those vulnerabilities. (b) Voluntary tracking of artificial intelligence security and artificial intelligence safety incidents (1) Voluntary database required Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Institute, in coordination with the Director of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, shall— (A) develop and establish a comprehensive, voluntary database to publicly track artificial intelligence security and artificial intelligence safety incidents; and (B) in establishing the database under subparagraph (A)— (i) establish mechanisms by which private sector entities, public sector organizations, civil society groups, and academic researchers may voluntarily share information with the Institute on confirmed or suspected artificial intelligence security or artificial intelligence safety incidents, in a manner that preserves confidentiality of any affected party; (ii) leverage, to the greatest extent possible, standardized disclosure and incident description formats; (iii) develop processes to associate reports pertaining to the same incident with a single incident identifier; (iv) establish classification, information retrieval, and reporting mechanisms that sufficiently differentiate between artificial intelligence security incidents and artificial intelligence safety incidents; and (v) create appropriate taxonomies to classify incidents based on relevant characteristics, impact, or other relevant criteria. (2) Identification and treatment of material artificial intelligence security or artificial intelligence safety risks (A) In general Upon receipt of relevant information on an artificial intelligence security or artificial intelligence safety incident, the Director of the Institute shall determine whether the described incident presents a material artificial intelligence security or artificial intelligence safety risk sufficient for inclusion in the database developed and established under paragraph (1). (B) Priorities In evaluating a reported incident pursuant to paragraph (1), the Director shall prioritize inclusion in the database cases in which a described incident— (i) describes an artificial intelligence system used in critical infrastructure or safety-critical systems; (ii) would result in a high-severity or catastrophic impact to the people or economy of the United States; or (iii) includes an artificial intelligence system widely used in commercial or public sector contexts. (3) Reports and anonymity The Director shall populate the voluntary database developed and established under paragraph (1) with incidents based on public reports and information shared using the mechanism established pursuant to subparagraph (B)(i) of such paragraph, ensuring that any incident description sufficiently anonymizes those affected, unless those who are affected have consented to their names being included in the database. 4. Updating processes and procedures relating to Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures Program and evaluation of consensus standards relating to artificial intelligence security vulnerability reporting (a) Definitions In this section: (1) Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures Program The term Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures Program means the reference guide and classification system for publicly known information security vulnerabilities sponsored by the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. (2) Relevant congressional committees The term relevant congressional committees means— (A) the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, the Select Committee on Intelligence, and the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate; and (B) the Committee on Oversight and Accountability, the Committee on Energy and Commerce, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives. (b) In general Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Director of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency shall— (1) initiate a process to update processes and procedures associated with the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures Program to ensure that the program and associated processes identify and enumerate artificial intelligence security vulnerabilities to the greatest extent practicable; and (2) identify any characteristic of artificial intelligence security vulnerabilities that make utilization of the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures Program inappropriate for their management and develop processes and procedures for vulnerability identification and enumeration for those artificial intelligence security vulnerabilities. (c) Evaluation of consensus standards (1) In general Not later than 30 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Director of the National Institute of Standards and Technology shall initiate a multi-stakeholder process to evaluate whether existing voluntary consensus standards for vulnerability reporting effectively accommodate artificial intelligence security vulnerabilities. (2) Report (A) Submission Not later than 180 days after the date on which the evaluation under paragraph (1) is carried out, the Director shall submit a report to the relevant congressional committees on the sufficiency of existing vulnerability reporting processes and standards to accommodate artificial intelligence security vulnerabilities. (B) Post-report action If the Director concludes in the report submitted under subparagraph (A) that existing processes do not sufficiently accommodate reporting of artificial intelligence security vulnerabilities, the Director shall initiate a process, in consultation with the Director of the National Institute of Standards and Technology and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, to update relevant vulnerability reporting processes, including the Department of Homeland Security Binding Operational Directive 20–01, or any subsequent directive. (d) Best practices Not later than 90 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Director of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency shall, in collaboration with the Director of the National Security Agency and the Director of the National Institute of Standards and Technology and by leveraging efforts of the Information Communications Technology Supply Chain Risk Management Task Force to the greatest extent practicable, convene a multi-stakeholder process to encourage the development and adoption of best practices relating to addressing supply chain risks associated with training and maintaining artificial intelligence models, which shall ensure consideration of supply chain risks associated with— (1) data collection, cleaning, and labeling, particularly the supply chain risks of reliance on remote workforce and foreign labor for such tasks; (2) inadequate documentation of training data and test data storage, as well as limited provenance of training data; (3) human feedback systems used to refine artificial intelligence systems, particularly the supply chain risks of reliance on remote workforce and foreign labor for such tasks; (4) the use of large-scale, open-source datasets, particularly the supply chain risks to repositories that host such datasets for use by public and private sector developers in the United States; and (5) the use of proprietary datasets containing sensitive or personally identifiable information. (e) Rule of construction To the extent practicable, the Director shall examine the reporting requirements pursuant to division Y of the Cyber Incident Reporting for Critical Infrastructure Act of 2022 ( Public Law 117–103 ) and the amendments made by that division and ensure that the requirements under this section are not duplicative of requirements set forth in that division and the amendments made by that division. 5. Establishment of Artificial Intelligence Security Center (a) Establishment Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the National Security Agency shall establish an Artificial Intelligence Security Center within the Cybersecurity Collaboration Center of the National Security Agency. (b) Functions The functions of the Artificial Intelligence Security Center shall be as follows: (1) Making available a research test-bed to private sector and academic researchers, on a subsidized basis, to engage in artificial intelligence security research, including through the secure provision of access in a secure environment to proprietary third-party models with the consent of the vendors of the models. (2) Developing guidance to prevent or mitigate counter-artificial intelligence techniques. (3) Promoting secure artificial intelligence adoption practices for managers of national security systems (as defined in section 3552 of title 44, United States Code) and elements of the defense industrial base. (4) Coordinating with the Artificial Intelligence Safety Institute within the National Institute of Standards and Technology. (5) Such other functions as the Director considers appropriate. (c) Test-Bed requirements (1) Access and terms of usage (A) Researcher access The Director shall establish terms of usage governing researcher access to the test-bed made available under subsection (b)(1), with limitations on researcher publication only to the extent necessary to protect classified information or proprietary information concerning third-party models provided through the consent of model vendors. (B) Availability to Federal agencies The Director shall ensure that the test-bed made available under subsection (b)(1) is also made available to other Federal agencies on a cost-recovery basis. (2) Use of certain infrastructure and other resources In carrying out subsection (b)(1), the Director shall leverage, to the greatest extent practicable, infrastructure and other resources provided under section 5.2 of the Executive Order dated October 30, 2023 (relating to safe, secure, and trustworthy development and use of artificial intelligence). (d) Access to proprietary models In carrying out this section, The Director shall establish such mechanisms as the Director considers appropriate, including potential contractual incentives, to ensure the provision of access to proprietary models by qualified independent, third-party researchers, provided that commercial model vendors have voluntarily provided models and associated resources for such testing.