II Calendar No. 369 118th CONGRESS 2d Session S. 1651 IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES May 17, 2023 Mrs. Shaheen (for herself, Mr. Wicker , Mr. Cardin , Mr. Durbin , Mr. Van Hollen , and Mr. Welch ) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations May 7, 2024 Reported by Mr. Cardin , with an amendment Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert the part printed in italic A BILL To encourage increased trade and investment between the United States and the countries in the Western Balkans, and for other purposes.

1. Short title; table of contents (a) Short title This Act may be cited as the Western Balkans Democracy and Prosperity Act . (b) Table of contents The table of contents for this Act is as follows: Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents. Sec. 2. Findings. Sec. 3. Sense of Congress. Sec. 4. Definitions. Sec. 5. Codification of sanctions relating to the Western Balkans. Sec. 6. Congressional review of certain actions relating to sanctions imposed with respect to the Western Balkans. Sec. 7. Democratic and economic development and prosperity initiatives. Sec. 8. Countering malign influence and promoting cross-cultural engagement. Sec. 9. Peace Corps in the Western Balkans. Sec. 10. Balkans Youth Leadership Initiative. Sec. 11. Supporting cybersecurity and cyber resilience in the Western Balkans. Sec. 12. Sense of Congress regarding an interim agreement. Sec. 13. Sunset. 2. Findings Congress finds the following: (1) The Western Balkans countries (the Republic of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Kosovo, Montenegro, the Republic of North Macedonia, and the Republic of Serbia) form a pluralistic, multi-ethnic region in the heart of Europe that is critical to the peace, stability, and prosperity of Europe. (2) Continued peace, stability, and prosperity in the Western Balkans is directly tied to opportunities for democratic and economic advancement available to the citizens and residents of those 6 countries. (3) It is in the mutual interest of the United States and the 6 countries of the Western Balkans to promote stable and sustainable economic growth and development in the region. (4) The reforms and integration with the European Union pursued by countries in the Western Balkans have led to significant democratic and economic progress in the region. (5) Despite economic progress, rates of poverty and unemployment in the Western Balkans remain higher than in neighboring European Union countries. (6) Out-migration, particularly of youth, is affecting demographics in each Western Balkans country, resulting in negative population growth in all 6 countries. (7) Creating an enabling environment for transparent, accountable, and market-oriented investment and creating employment opportunities in the Western Balkans, especially for youth, can provide powerful tools for economic development and for encouraging broader participation in a political process that increases prosperity for all. (8) Offering opportunities for inclusive, transparent economic growth and merit-based employment to people living in the Western Balkans will encourage higher levels of trade and direct investment and support positive economic and political developments occurring throughout the region. (9) Existing regional economic efforts, such as the Common Regional Market and the Open Balkan initiative, when aligned with European Union standards, norms, and regulations, have the potential to improve the economic conditions in the Western Balkans, while promoting inclusion and transparency. (10) The Department of Commerce, through its Foreign Commercial Service, plays an important role in promoting and facilitating opportunities for United States trade and investment. (11) Corruption continues to plague the Western Balkans and represents one of the greatest impediments to further economic and political development in the region. (12) Disinformation campaigns targeting the Western Balkans threaten the credibility of Western democratic institutions. (13) Vulnerabilities to corrosive capital, malign economic influence, interference, and economic coercion are acutely present in Western Balkans economies. (14) Vulnerability to cyberattacks or attacks on information and communication technology infrastructure increases risks to the functioning of government and the delivery of public services. (15) United States Cyber Command plays a critical role in defending the national security interests of the United States. (16) Securing domestic and international cyber networks and electronic infrastructure is a national security priority for the United States, which is exemplified by offices and programs across the Federal Government that support cyber security, including— (A) the Department of Homeland Security’s Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency; (B) the Department of State’s Bureau of Cyberspace and Digital Policy; (C) the United States Agency for International Development’s Digital Strategy; and (D) the Department of Energy’s CyberForce Program. (17) Corruption and disinformation proliferate in political environments marked by autocratic control or partisan conflict. (18) Dependence on Russian sources of oil and natural gas for the countries of the Western Balkans ties their economies and politics to the Russian Federation and inhibits their aspirations for European integration. (19) The reliance of the Western Balkans on fossil fuels for energy sources causes damage to the environment and to human health, while inhibiting economic development in the region. (20) Reducing the reliance of the Western Balkans on Russian natural gas supplies is in the national interest of the United States. (21) The growing influence of China in the Western Balkans could also have a deleterious impact on strategic competition, democracy, and economic integration with Europe. (22) The United States International Development Finance Corporation plays an important role in the pursuit of United States policy goals focused on economic development. (23) In March 2022, President Biden launched the European Democratic Resilience Initiative to bolster democratic resilience, advance anti-corruption efforts, and defend human rights in Ukraine and its neighbors in response to Russia’s war of aggression. 3. Sense of Congress It is a sense of Congress that the United States should— (1) encourage increased trade and investment between the United States and allies and partners in the Western Balkans; (2) expand United States assistance to regional integration efforts in the Western Balkans; (3) strengthen and expand regional economic integration in the Western Balkans, especially enterprises owned by and employing women and youth; (4) work with allies and partners committed to improving the rule of law, energy resource diversification, democratic and economic reform, and the eradication of poverty in the Western Balkans; (5) increase United States trade and investment with the Western Balkans, particularly in ways that— (A) decrease dependence on Russian energy sources and fossil fuels; (B) increase energy diversification, efficiency, and conservation; and (C) facilitate the transition to cleaner and more reliable sources of energy, including renewables; (6) support the efforts of countries of the Western Balkans to develop— (A) strong civil societies; (B) public-private partnerships and dialogue in policy development; (C) independent media; (D) transparent, accountable, citizen-responsive governance, including expanded representation for women and youth in democratic spaces; and (E) political stability; (7) support the expeditious accession of the Western Balkans countries to the European Union and to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (referred to in this section as NATO ) for those that desire and meet the criteria for membership; (8) support— (A) maintaining the full European Union Force (EUFOR) mandate in Bosnia and Herzegovina as being in the national security interests of the United States; (B) encouraging NATO and the European Union to review their mission mandates and posture in Bosnia and Herzegovina to ensure they are playing a proactive role in establishing a safe and secure environment, particularly the defense environment; (C) using the voice of the United States in NATO to encourage alliance planning and support of an international military force to maintain a safe and secure environment in Bosnia and Herzegovina, especially if Russia blocks reauthorization of the mission in the United Nations; and (D) a strengthened NATO headquarters in Sarajevo; (9) continue security cooperation with the Republic of Albania, Montenegro, and the Republic of North Macedonia through the auspices of NATO and through continued bilateral cooperation; (10) continue to support Montenegro’s ongoing accession negotiations with the European Union, including by providing assistance to Montenegro to help the country promptly meet European Union membership criteria; (11) continue to support the applications of the Republic of North Macedonia and the Republic of Albania for European Union membership by supporting improvement of their respective abilities to meet democracy benchmarks required for accession; (12) continue to support the overarching mission of the Open Balkan initiative provided the initiative remains inclusive of all Western Balkans countries and remains aligned with the objectives and standards laid out by the European Union for requirements for accession to the European Union; (13) continue to support the pursuit by Bosnia and Herzegovina of European Union candidate status by encouraging meaningful advancement of its reform agenda; (14) continue to support the cultural heritage, and recognize the languages of the Western Balkans; (15) coordinate closely with the European Union, the United Kingdom, and other allies and partners on sanctions designations and work to align efforts as much as possible to demonstrate a clear commitment to upholding democratic values; (16) expand bilateral security cooperation with NATO-aspirant Western Balkan countries, particularly efforts focused on regional integration and cooperation, including through the Adriatic Charter, done at Tirana May 2, 2003; (17) increase efforts to combat Russian disinformation campaigns and any other malign, destabilizing, or disruptive activities targeting the Western Balkans through engagement with government institutions, political stakeholders, journalists, civil society organizations, and industry leaders; (18) develop a series of cyber resilience standards, consistent with the Enhanced Cyber Defense Policy and Readiness Action Plan endorsed at the 2014 Wales Summit of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to expand cooperation with partners and allies, including in the Western Balkans, on cyber security and ICT infrastructure defenses; (19) articulate clearly and unambiguously the United States commitment to supporting democratic values and respect for international law as the sole path forward for the countries of the Western Balkans; and (20) support the mission of the Peace Corps to promote world peace and friendship by helping the people of interested countries to meet their need for trained men and women, which provides an invaluable opportunity to connect the American people with the people of the Western Balkans. 4. Definitions In this Act: (1) Appropriate congressional committees The term appropriate congressional committees means— (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate ; (B) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate ; (C) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives ; and (D) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives . (2) Western balkans The term Western Balkans means the region comprised of the following countries: (A) The Republic of Albania. (B) Bosnia and Herzegovina. (C) Montenegro. (D) The Republic of Kosovo. (E) The Republic of North Macedonia. (F) The Republic of Serbia. (3) Western balkans country The term Western Balkan country means any country listed in subparagraphs (A) through (F) of paragraph (2). 5. Codification of sanctions relating to the Western Balkans (a) In general Each sanction imposed through Executive orders described in subsection (b), including each sanction imposed with respect to a person under such an Executive order, as of the date of the enactment of this Act, shall remain in effect, except as provided in subsection (c). (b) Executive orders specified The Executive orders specified in this subsection are— (1) Executive Order 13219 ( 50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to blocking property of persons who threaten international stabilization efforts in the Western Balkans), as in effect on the date of the enactment of this Act; and (2) Executive Order 14033 ( 50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to blocking property and suspending entry into the United States of certain persons contributing to the destabilizing situation in the Western Balkans), as in effect on such date of enactment. (c) Termination of sanctions The President may terminate the application of a sanction described in subsection (a) with respect to a person if the President certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that— (1) such person— (A) is not engaging in the activity that was the basis for such sanctions; or (B) has taken significant verifiable steps toward stopping such activity; and (2) the President has received reliable assurances that such person will not knowingly engage in activity subject to such sanctions in the future. 6. Congressional review of certain actions relating to sanctions imposed with respect to the Western Balkans (a) Definitions (1) Covered congressional committees and leadership In this section, the term covered congressional committees and leadership means— (A) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate ; (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate ; (C) the Majority Leader of the Senate; (D) the Minority Leader of the Senate; (E) the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives ; (F) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives ; (G) the Speaker of the House of Representatives; (H) the Majority Leader of the House of Representatives; and (I) the Minority Leader of the House of Representatives. (2) Joint resolution of approval The term joint resolution of approval means only a joint resolution of either House of Congress— (A) the title of which is as follows: A joint resolution approving the President’s proposal to take an action relating to the application of certain sanctions with respect to the Western Balkans. ; and (B) the sole matter after the resolving clause of which is the following: Congress approves of the action relating to the application of sanctions imposed with respect to the Western Balkans proposed by the President in the report submitted to Congress under section 6(b)(1) of the Western Balkans Democracy and Prosperity Act on _____ relating to ______. , with the first blank space being filled with the appropriate date and the second blank space being filled with a short description of the proposed action. (3) Joint resolution of disapproval The term joint resolution of disapproval means only a joint resolution of either House of Congress— (A) the title of which is as follows: A joint resolution disapproving the President’s proposal to take an action relating to the application of certain sanctions with respect to the Western Balkans. ; and (B) the sole matter after the resolving clause of which is the following: Congress disapproves of the action relating to the application of sanctions imposed with respect to the Western Balkans proposed by the President in the report submitted to Congress under section 6(b)(1) of the Western Balkans Democracy and Prosperity Act on _____ relating to ______. , with the first blank space being filled with the appropriate date and the second blank space being filled with a short description of the proposed action. (b) Submission to Congress of proposed action (1) In general Notwithstanding any other provision of law, before taking any action described in paragraph (2)(A), the President shall submit a report to the covered congressional committees and leadership that includes— (A) a description of the proposed action; and (B) a justification for the proposed action. (2) Actions and sanctions described (A) Actions described An action described in this subparagraph is— (i) an action to terminate the application of any sanction described in subparagraph (B); (ii) with respect to a sanction described in subparagraph (B) imposed by the President with respect to a person, an action to waive the application of such sanction with respect to that person; or (iii) a licensing action that significantly alters the foreign policy of the United States with respect to the Western Balkans. (B) Sanctions described A sanction described in this subparagraph is a sanction imposed under— (i) Executive Order 13219 ( 50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to blocking property of persons who threaten international stabilization efforts in the Western Balkans), as in effect on the date of the enactment of this Act; or (ii) Executive Order 14033 ( 50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to blocking property and suspending entry into the United States of certain persons contributing to the destabilizing situation in the Western Balkans), as in effect on the date of enactment of this Act. (3) Type of action Each report submitted pursuant to paragraph (1) with respect to an action described in paragraph (2)(A) shall include a description of whether the action— (A) is not intended to significantly alter the foreign policy of the United States with respect to the Western Balkans; or (B) is intended to significantly alter the foreign policy of the United States with respect to the Western Balkans. (4) Inclusion of additional matters (A) Additional matters Each report submitted pursuant to paragraph (1) that relates to an action that is intended to significantly alter United States foreign policy with respect to the Western Balkans, as determined pursuant to paragraph (3)(B), shall include a description of— (i) the intended significant alteration to such foreign policy; (ii) the anticipated effect of the action on the national security interests of the United States; and (iii) the policy objectives for which the sanctions affected by the action were initially imposed. (B) Requests from banking and financial services committees The Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate or the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives may request the submission to such committee of the matters specified in clauses (ii) and (iii) of subparagraph (A) with respect to a report submitted pursuant to paragraph (1) that relates to an action that is not intended to significantly alter United States foreign policy with regard to the Western Balkans, as determined pursuant to paragraph (3)(A). (c) Period for review by Congress (1) In general Except as provided in paragraph (2), during the 90-legislative day period beginning on the date on which the President submits a report pursuant to subsection (b)(1)— (A) in the case of a report that relates to an action that is not intended to significantly alter United States foreign policy with regard to the Western Balkans, as determined pursuant to subsection (b)(3)(A), the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate and the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives should, as appropriate, hold hearings and briefings and otherwise obtain information in order to fully review the report; and (B) in the case of a report that relates to an action that is intended to significantly alter United States foreign policy with regard to the Western Balkans, as determined pursuant to subsection (b)(3)(B), the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives should, as appropriate, hold hearings and briefings and otherwise obtain information in order to fully review the report. (2) Exception The period for congressional review under paragraph (1) of a report submitted pursuant to subsection (b)(1) shall be 120 calendar days if the report is submitted on or after July 10 and on or before September 7 in any calendar year. (3) Limitation on actions during initial congressional review period Notwithstanding any other provision of law, during the congressional review period described in paragraph (1) of a report submitted pursuant to subsection (b)(1) proposing an action described in subsection (b)(2), including any additional period for such review as applicable under the exception provided in paragraph (2), the President may not take that action unless a joint resolution of approval with respect to such action has been enacted in accordance with subsection (d). (4) Limitation on actions during presidential consideration of a joint resolution of disapproval Notwithstanding any other provision of law, if a joint resolution of disapproval relating to a report submitted pursuant to subsection (b)(1) proposing an action described in subsection (b)(2) passes both Houses of Congress in accordance with subsection (d), the President may not take such action until the date that is 12 days after the date on which such joint resolution of disapproval has been passed by both Houses of Congress. (5) Limitation on actions during congressional reconsideration of a joint resolution of disapproval Notwithstanding any other provision of law, if a joint resolution of disapproval relating to a report submitted pursuant to subsection (b)(1) proposing an action described in subsection (b)(2) passes both Houses of Congress in accordance with subsection (d), and the President vetoes such joint resolution, the President may not take such action until 10 days after the date of the President’s veto. (6) Effect of enactment of a joint resolution of disapproval Notwithstanding any other provision of law, if a joint resolution of disapproval relating to a report submitted pursuant to subsection (b)(1) proposing an action described in subsection (b)(2) is enacted in accordance with subsection (d), the President may not take such action. (d) Joint resolutions of disapproval or approval (1) Introduction During the 90-legislative day period described in subsection (c)(1), including any additional period applicable under the exception provided in subsection (c)(2), a joint resolution of approval or joint resolution of disapproval may be introduced— (A) in the Senate, by the Majority Leader (or designee) or the Minority Leader (or designee); and (B) in the House of Representatives, by the Majority Leader or the Minority Leader. (2) Floor consideration in house of representatives If a committee of the House of Representatives to which a joint resolution of approval or joint resolution of disapproval has been referred does not report the joint resolution to the House of Representatives within 10 days after the date of referral, such committee shall be discharged from further consideration of the joint resolution. (3) Consideration in senate (A) Committee referral A joint resolution of approval or joint resolution of disapproval introduced in the Senate shall be— (i) referred to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate if the joint resolution relates to a report submitted pursuant to subsection (b)(1) that relates to an action that is not intended to significantly alter United States foreign policy with regard to the Russian Federation, as determined pursuant to subsection (b)(3)(A); and (ii) referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate if the joint resolution relates to a report submitted pursuant to subsection (b)(1) that relates to an action that is intended to significantly alter United States foreign policy with respect to the Russian Federation, as determined pursuant to subsection (b)(3)(B). (B) Reporting and discharge If the committee to which a joint resolution of approval or joint resolution of disapproval was referred does not report the joint resolution to the Senate within 10 days after the date of referral of the joint resolution, such committee shall be discharged from further consideration of the joint resolution and the joint resolution shall be placed on the appropriate calendar. (C) Proceeding to consideration Notwithstanding Rule XXII of the Standing Rules of the Senate, it is in order at any time after the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate or the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate , as the case may be, reports a joint resolution of approval or joint resolution of disapproval to the Senate or has been discharged from consideration of such a joint resolution (even though a previous motion to the same effect has been disagreed to) to move to proceed to the consideration of the joint resolution, and all points of order against the joint resolution (and against consideration of the joint resolution) are waived. The motion to proceed is not debatable. The motion is not subject to a motion to postpone. A motion to reconsider the vote by which the motion is agreed to or disagreed to shall not be in order. (D) Rulings of the chair on procedure Appeals from the decisions of the Chair relating to the application of the rules of the Senate, as the case may be, to the procedure relating to a joint resolution of approval or joint resolution of disapproval shall be decided without debate. (E) Consideration of veto messages Debate in the Senate of any veto message with respect to a joint resolution of approval or joint resolution of disapproval, including all debatable motions and appeals in connection with the joint resolution, shall be limited to 10 hours, to be equally divided between, and controlled by, the Majority Leader of the Senate and the Minority Leader of the Senate, or their designees. (4) Rules relating to senate and house of representatives (A) Treatment of senate joint resolution in house of representatives In the House of Representatives, the following procedures shall apply to a joint resolution of approval or a joint resolution of disapproval received from the Senate (unless the House has already passed a joint resolution relating to the same proposed action): (i) The joint resolution shall be referred to the appropriate committees. (ii) If a committee to which a joint resolution has been referred has not reported the joint resolution within 2 days after the date of referral, such committee shall be discharged from further consideration of the joint resolution. (iii) Beginning on the third legislative day after each committee to which a joint resolution has been referred reports the joint resolution to the House of Representatives or has been discharged from further consideration thereof, it shall be in order to move to proceed to consider the joint resolution in the House of Representatives. All points of order against the motion are waived. Such a motion shall not be in order after the House has disposed of a motion to proceed on the joint resolution. The previous question shall be considered as ordered on the motion to its adoption without intervening motion. The motion shall not be debatable. A motion to reconsider the vote by which the motion is disposed of shall not be in order. (iv) The joint resolution shall be considered as read. All points of order against the joint resolution and against its consideration are waived. The previous question shall be considered as ordered on the joint resolution to final passage without intervening motion except 2 hours of debate equally divided and controlled by the sponsor of the joint resolution (or a designee) and an opponent. A motion to reconsider the vote on passage of the joint resolution shall not be in order. (B) Treatment of house of representatives joint resolution in senate (i) If, before the passage by the Senate of a joint resolution of approval or joint resolution of disapproval, the Senate receives an identical joint resolution from the House of Representatives, the following procedures shall apply: (I) That joint resolution shall not be referred to a committee. (II) With respect to that joint resolution— (aa) the procedure in the Senate shall be the same as if no joint resolution had been received from the House of Representatives; but (bb) the vote on passage shall be on the joint resolution from the House of Representatives. (ii) If, following passage of a joint resolution of approval or joint resolution of disapproval in the Senate, the Senate receives an identical joint resolution from the House of Representatives, that joint resolution shall be placed on the appropriate Senate calendar. (iii) If a joint resolution of approval or a joint resolution of disapproval is received from the House of Representatives, and no companion joint resolution has been introduced in the Senate, the Senate procedures under this subsection shall apply to the House of Representatives joint resolution. (C) Application to revenue measures The provisions of this paragraph shall not apply in the House of Representatives to a joint resolution of approval or joint resolution of disapproval that is a revenue measure. (5) Rules of house of representatives and senate This subsection is enacted by Congress— (A) as an exercise of the rulemaking power of the Senate and the House of Representatives, respectively, and as such is deemed a part of the rules of each House, respectively, and supersedes other rules only to the extent that it is inconsistent with such rules; and (B) with full recognition of the constitutional right of either House to change the rules (so far as relating to the procedure of that House) at any time, in the same manner, and to the same extent as in the case of any other rule of that House. 7. Democratic and economic development and prosperity initiatives (a) Anti-Corruption initiative The Secretary of State, through ongoing and new programs, shall— (1) seek to expand technical assistance in each Western Balkans country to develop new national anti-corruption strategies, or to strengthen existing national anti-corruption strategies focused on priorities, including good governance, election administration, and transparent economic investments, taking into account local conditions and contingent on the agreement of the host country government; (2) seek to share best practices with, and provide training to, civilian law enforcement agencies and judicial institutions, and other relevant administrative bodies, of the Western Balkans countries, to improve the efficiency, transparency, and accountability of such agencies and institutions on priorities, including the promotion of human rights; (3) provide to the Western Balkans countries support to combat corruption, particularly in the judiciary, independent election oversight bodies, and public procurement processes, and to strengthen regulatory and legislative oversight of critical governance areas, such as freedom of information and public procurement, including by strengthening cyber defenses and ICT infrastructure networks; and (4) include the Western Balkans countries in the European Democratic Resilience Initiative of the Department of State, or any successor initiative, and considers the Western Balkans as a recipient of anti-corruption funding for such initiative. (b) Prioritizing cyber resilience, regional trade, and economic competitiveness (1) Sense of congress It is the sense of Congress that— (A) promoting stronger economic, civic, and political relationships among Western Balkans countries will enable such countries to better utilize existing resources and maximize their economic security and democratic resilience by reinforcing cyber defenses and increasing trade in goods and services among other countries in the region; and (B) United States investments in and assistance toward creating a more integrated region ensures political stability and security for the region. (2) 5-year strategy for economic development and democratic resilience in western balkans Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State and the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, in coordination with the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Commerce, and the Chief Executive Officer of the United States International Development Finance Corporation, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a regional economic development and democratic resilience strategy for the Western Balkans that— (A) considers the full set of tools and resources available from the agencies overseen by such Federal officials; (B) includes efforts to ensure coordination with multilateral and bilateral partners, such as the European Union, the World Bank, and other relevant assistance frameworks; (C) includes an initial public assessment of— (i) economic opportunities for which United States businesses, or those of other like-minded partner countries, would be competitive; (ii) legal, economic, governance, infrastructural, or other barriers limiting United States trade and investment in the Western Balkans; (iii) the effectiveness of existing regional cooperation initiatives, such as the Open Balkan initiative and the Western Balkans Common Regional Market; and (iv) ways to increase United States trade and investment in the Western Balkans; (D) develops human and institutional capacity and infrastructure across multiple sectors of economies, including clean energy, energy efficiency, agriculture, small and medium-sized enterprise development, health, and cyber security; (E) assists with the development and implementation of regional and international trade agreements; (F) supports women-owned enterprises and gender equality; (G) promotes government and civil society policies and programs that combat corruption and encourage transparency, free and fair competition, sound governance, judicial reform, environmental protection, and business environments conducive to sustainable and inclusive economic growth; and (H) includes a public diplomacy strategy that describes the actions that will be taken by relevant agencies to ensure that populations in the Western Balkans are aware of the development activities of the United States Government. (3) Briefing Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall provide a briefing to the appropriate congressional committees that describes the progress made towards developing the strategy required under paragraph (2). (c) Regional trade and development initiative (1) Authorization The Secretary of State and the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, in coordination with the Chief Executive Officer of the United States International Development Finance Corporation and the Secretary of Commerce, shall coordinate a regional trade and development initiative for the region comprised of each Western Balkans country and any European Union member country that shares a border with a Western Balkans country (referred to in this subsection as the Western Balkans region ) in accordance with this subsection. (2) Initiative elements The initiative authorized under paragraph (1) shall— (A) promote private sector growth and competitiveness and increase the capacity of businesses, particularly small and medium-sized enterprises, in the Western Balkans region; (B) seek to increase intraregional exports to countries in the Balkans and European Union member states; (C) advance opportunities to increase United States exports to, and investments in, countries in the Balkans; (D) support startup companies in the Western Balkans region by— (i) providing training in business skills and leadership; (ii) providing opportunities to connect to sources of capital; and (iii) encouraging startup companies that are led by youth or women; (E) encourage and promote inward and outward trade and investment through engagement with the Western Balkans diaspora community in the United States and abroad; (F) provide assistance to the governments and civil society organizations of Western Balkans countries, through an inclusive process incorporating the input of local private sector and civil society stakeholders, to develop— (i) regulations to ensure fair, transparent, and effective investment; and (ii) economic security policies, such as foreign direct investment screening mechanisms and anti-coercion initiatives, to identify and counter corrosive and malign investments and use of economic coercion by foreign countries potentially in the areas of critical infrastructure, critical technologies, dual use items, media, supply of critical inputs, and access to sensitive information and data; (G) review existing assistance programming relating to the Western Balkans across Federal agencies— (i) to eliminate duplication; and (ii) to identify areas of coordination within the Western Balkans region; (H) identify areas where application of additional resources could expand successful programs to 1 or more countries in the Western Balkans region by building on the existing experience and program architecture; (I) compare existing single-country sector analyses to determine areas of focus that would benefit from a regional approach with respect to the Western Balkans region; and (J) promote intraregional trade throughout the Western Balkans region through— (i) programming, including grants, cooperative agreements, and other forms of assistance; (ii) expanding awareness of the availability of loans and other financial instruments from the United States Government, including from the United States International Development Finance Corporation and the Export-Import Bank of the United States; and (iii) coordinating access to existing trade instruments available through allies and partners in the Western Balkans region, including the European Union and international financial institutions. (3) Support for regional infrastructure projects The initiative authorized under paragraph (1), consistent with the BUILD Act of 2018 (division F of Public Law 115–254 ) and the European Energy Security and Diversification Act of 2019 (title XX of division P of Public Law 116–94 ), should facilitate and prioritize support for regional infrastructure projects, including— (A) transportation projects that build roads, bridges, railways and other physical infrastructure to facilitate travel of goods and people throughout the Western Balkans region, particularly international travel; (B) technical support and investments needed to meet United States and European Union standards for air travel, including screening and information sharing; (C) the development of telecommunications networks from trusted providers; (D) infrastructure projects that connect Western Balkan countries to each other and to countries with which they share a border; (E) the effective analysis of tenders and transparent procurement processes; (F) investment transparency programs that will help countries in the Western Balkans analyze gaps and establish institutional and regulatory reforms necessary— (i) to create an enabling environment for trade and investment; and (ii) to strengthen protections against suspect investments through public procurement and privatization and through foreign direct investments; (G) sharing best practices learned from the United States and other international partners to ensure that institutional and regulatory mechanisms for addressing these issues are fair, nonarbitrary, effective, and free from corruption; (H) projects that reduce reliance on fossil fuels and facilitate the transition to clean sources of energy; (I) technical assistance and generating private investment in projects that promote connectivity and energy-sharing in the Western Balkans region; (J) technical assistance to support regional collaboration on environmental protection that includes governmental, political, civic, and business stakeholders; and (K) technical assistance to develop financing options and help create linkages with potential financing institutions and investors. (4) Loans (A) In general Amounts appropriated under the headings economic support fund and assistance for europe, eurasia and central asia in any Act making appropriations for the Department of State, foreign operations, and related programs may be made available for the costs (as defined in section 502 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 ( 2 U.S.C. 661a )), of loan guarantees, including the cost of modifying loans and loan guarantees, for programs, projects, or activities in any Western Balkans country, which are authorized to be provided. (B) Classification of loans and loan guarantees Amounts made available under subparagraph (A) for the costs of loans and loan guarantees, including the cost of modifying loans and loan guarantees, shall not be considered assistance for the purposes of any provisions of law limiting assistance to a country. (C) Consultation and notification Amounts made available under this subsection shall be subject to— (i) prior consultation with the appropriate congressional committees; and (ii) the regular notification procedures of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives . (5) Requirements All programming under the initiative authorized under paragraph (1) shall— (A) be open to the participation of each Western Balkan country; (B) be consistent with European Union accession requirements; (C) be focused on retaining talent within the Western Balkans; (D) promote government policies in Western Balkan countries that encourage free and fair competition, sound governance, environmental protection, and business environments that are conducive to sustainable and inclusive economic growth; (E) include gender analysis and efforts to promote gender equity; (F) include a public diplomacy strategy to inform local and regional audiences in the Western Balkans region about the initiative, including specific programs and projects; and (G) support the Western Balkans countries in meeting international commitments agreed to by the European Union on clean energy and energy security goals. (d) United States International Development Finance Corporation (1) Appointments Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, subject to the availability of appropriations, the Chief Executive Officer of the United States International Development Finance Corporation, in collaboration with the Secretary of State, should take steps to ensure that— (A) a regional office of the United States International Development Finance Corporation with responsibilities for the Western Balkans is established and operational in the Western Balkans region; and (B) sufficient full-time employees of the United States International Development Finance Corporation, including at least 1 permanent hire from the United States, are stationed in the regional office to serve United States interests in the Western Balkans. (2) Report Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Chief Executive Officer of the United States International Development Finance Corporation shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees that includes— (A) a summary of the steps that have been taken to fulfill the requirements under paragraph (1); (B) an account of any additional resources and authorities needed to complete the requirements under paragraph (1); and (C) a description of the initial outreach plan for the new regional office of the United States International Development Finance Corporation. (3) Joint report Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Chief Executive Officer of the United States International Development Finance Corporation, the Secretary of State, and the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development shall submit a joint report to the appropriate congressional committees that includes— (A) an assessment of the benefits of providing sovereign loan guarantees to countries in the Western Balkans to support infrastructure and energy diversification projects; (B) an outline of additional resources, such as tools, funding, and personnel, which may be required to offer sovereign loan guarantees; and (C) an assessment of how the United States International Development Finance Corporation can deploy its insurance products in support of bonds or other instruments issued to raise capital through United States financial markets. 8. Countering malign influence and promoting cross-cultural engagement (a) Sense of Congress It is the sense of Congress that— (1) promoting university partnerships in the Western Balkans, particularly in traditionally under-served communities, advances United States foreign policy goals and requires a whole of government approach, including the utilization of public-private partnerships; (2) such university partnerships would provide opportunities for exchanging academic ideas, technical expertise, research, and cultural understanding for the benefit of the United States; and (3) the 6 countries in the Western Balkans meet the requirements under section 105(c)(4) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 ( 22 U.S.C. 2151c(c)(4) ). (b) University partnerships The President, working through the Secretary of State, is authorized to provide assistance, consistent with section 105 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 ( 22 U.S.C. 2151c ), to promote the establishment of university partnerships between the United States and the Western Balkans, including— (1) supporting research and analysis on foreign policy, cyber resilience, economic resilience, and disinformation; (2) working with partner governments to reform policies, improve curricula, strengthen data systems, train teachers, and provide quality, inclusive learning materials; (3) providing individuals, particularly at-risk youth, women, people with disabilities, and other vulnerable, marginalized, or underserved communities, with relevant education, training, and skills for meaningful employment; (4) removing barriers to entering formal education for out-of-school individuals, assisting such individuals to stay in school, and providing an opportunity for any individuals left behind to catch up on schooling; (5) promoting teaching and research exchanges between institutions of higher education in the Western Balkans and in the United States; and (6) encouraging alliances and exchanges with like-minded institutions of education within the Western Balkans and the larger European continent. (c) Authorization of appropriations There are authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary for each of the fiscal years 2024 through 2028 to carry out this section. 9. Peace Corps in the Western Balkans (a) Sense of Congress It is the sense of Congress that— (1) the Peace Corps should be reinstated in the Western Balkans by reopening Peace Corps programs in as many Western Balkans countries as safely possible, including where the Peace Corps had previously operated, or has suspended operations due to the COVID–19 pandemic; (2) the Peace Corps should reopen its programs in as many of the Western Balkans countries as possible, including where the Peace Corps operated previously, but later suspended operations; and (3) the Peace Corps, whose mission is to promote world peace and friendship, in part by helping the people of interested countries in meeting their need for trained men and women, provides an invaluable opportunity to connect the people of the United States with the people of the Western Balkans. (b) Report Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Peace Corps shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees that includes— (1) an analysis of current opportunities for Peace Corps expansion in the Western Balkans region; and (2) a plan and timeline for implementing the outcomes described in subsection (a) to facilitate expansion of Peace Corps presence in the Western Balkans region, as appropriate. 10. Balkans Youth Leadership Initiative (a) Sense of Congress It is the sense of Congress that regular people-to-people exchange programs that bring religious leaders, journalists, civil society members, politicians, and other individuals from the Western Balkans to the United States will strengthen existing relationships and advance United States interests and shared values in the Western Balkans region. (b) Authorization The Secretary of State shall further develop and implement a program, which shall be known as the Balkans Youth Leadership Initiative (referred to in this section as BOLD ) that promotes educational and professional development for young adult leaders and professionals in the Western Balkans who have demonstrated a passion to contribute to the continued development of the Western Balkans region. (c) Conduct of initiative The goals of BOLD shall be— (1) to build the capacity of young Balkan leaders in the Western Balkans in the areas of business and information technology, cyber security and digitization, agriculture, civic engagement, and public administration; (2) to support young Balkan leaders by offering professional development, training, and networking opportunities, particularly in the areas of leadership, innovation, civic engagement, elections, human rights, entrepreneurship, good governance, and public administration; (3) to support young political, parliamentary, and civic Balkan leaders in collaboration on regional initiatives related to good governance, environmental protection, government ethics, and minority inclusion; and (4) to provide increased economic and technical assistance to young Balkan leaders to promote economic growth and strengthen ties between businesses in the United States and in the Western Balkans. (d) Fellowships Under BOLD, the Secretary of State shall award fellowships to young leaders from the Western Balkans who— (1) are between 25 and 35 years of age; (2) have demonstrated strong capabilities in entrepreneurship, innovation, public service, and leadership; (3) have had a positive impact in their communities, organizations, or institutions, including by promoting cross-regional and multiethnic cooperation; and (4) represent a cross-section of gender, regional, and ethnic diversity. (e) Public engagement center Under BOLD, the Secretary of State may seek to procure space, hire staff, and develop programming for the establishment of a flagship public engagement and leadership center in the Western Balkans that seeks— (1) to counter disinformation and malign influence; (2) to promote cross-cultural engagement; (3) to provide training for young leaders from the Western Balkans described in subsection (d); and (4) to harmonize the efforts of existing venues throughout the Western Balkans established by the Office of American Spaces. (f) Briefing on certain exchange programs (1) In general Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, acting through the Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs, shall provide a briefing to the appropriate congressional committees that describes the status of exchange programs involving the Western Balkans region. (2) Elements The briefing required under paragraph (1) shall— (A) assess the factors constraining the number and frequency of participants from Western Balkans countries in the International Visitor Leadership Program of the Department of State; (B) identify the resources that are necessary to address the factors described in subparagraph (A); and (C) describe a strategy for connecting alumni and participants of professional development exchange programs of the Department of State in the Western Balkans with alumni and participants from other countries in Europe, to enhance inter-region and intra-region people-to-people ties. (g) Authorization of appropriations There are authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary for each of the fiscal years 2024 through 2028 to carry out this section. 11. Supporting cybersecurity and cyber resilience in the Western Balkans (a) Sense of Congress It is the sense of Congress that— (1) United States support for cyber security, cyber resilience, and secure ICT infrastructure in Western Balkans countries will strengthen the region’s ability to defend itself from and respond to malicious cyber activity conducted by nonstate actors and foreign actors, including foreign governments that seek to influence the region; (2) insecure ICT networks that are vulnerable to manipulation can increase opportunities for— (A) the spread of disinformation; and (B) disrupting or disabling critical infrastructure, including energy, telecommunications, water, health, finance, and other infrastructure that provides essential services to citizens; (3) the spread of disinformation is a transnational threat; and (4) it is in the national security interest of the United States to support the cyber security and cyber resilience of Western Balkans countries. (b) Report on digital ecosystems Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a Digital Ecosystem Country Assessment for each Western Balkans country that did not undergo a Digital Ecosystem Country Assessment before the date of the enactment of this Act. (c) Interagency report on cyber security and cyber resilience in Western Balkans countries Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and other relevant Federal Government agencies, shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees that contains— (1) an overview of interagency efforts to strengthen cyber security and cyber resilience efforts in Western Balkans countries; (2) a strategy to better strengthen the cyber security and cyber resilience of each Western Balkans country; (3) a review of existing United States Government cyber security initiatives that— (A) counter disinformation in Western Balkans countries; (B) strengthen ICT infrastructure and cyber security capacity in the Western Balkans; and (C) support democracy and internet freedom in Western Balkans countries; (4) an assessment of cyber threat information sharing between the United States and Western Balkans countries; (5) an assessment of options for the United States to better support cyber security and cyber resilience in Western Balkans countries, including the posting of cyber professionals to United States diplomatic posts in Western Balkans countries and providing relevant training, such as technical capacity building and response and recovery efforts to Foreign Service Officers; and (6) a determination of United States additional support needed for the cyber security and cyber resilience Albania, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Croatia, which are NATO allies. 12. Sense of Congress regarding an interim agreement It is the sense of Congress that— (1) the Agreement on the Path to Normalization of Relations, which was agreed to by Kosovo and Serbia on February 27, 2023, with the facilitation of the European Union, is a positive step forward in advancing normalization between the 2 countries; (2) Serbia and Kosovo should seek to make immediate progress on the Implementation Annex to the agreement referred to in paragraph (1); (3) the Department of State shall provide to the appropriate congressional committees an evaluation of each country’s progress on the Implementation Annex referred to in paragraph (2); (4) the United States should not consider advancing the initiatives referred to in this Act to such country until sufficient progress has been made on the Implementation Annex; (5) once sufficient progress has been made on the Implementation Annex, the United States should consider advancing additional initiatives to strengthen bilateral relations with both countries, which could include— (A) establishing bilateral strategic dialogues; and (B) advancing concrete initiatives to deepen trade and investment with both countries; and (6) the United States should continue to support a comprehensive final agreement between Kosovo and Serbia based on mutual recognition. 13. Sunset Sections 5 and 6 of this Act shall cease to be effective on the date that is 10 years after the date of the enactment of this Act.

1. Short title; table of contents (a) Short title This Act may be cited as the Western Balkans Democracy and Prosperity Act . (b) Table of contents The table of contents for this Act is as follows: Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents. Sec. 2. Findings. Sec. 3. Sense of Congress. Sec. 4. Definitions. Sec. 5. Codification of sanctions relating to the Western Balkans. Sec. 6. Democratic and economic development and prosperity initiatives. Sec. 7. Promoting cross-cultural and educational engagement. Sec. 8. Peace Corps in the Western Balkans. Sec. 9. Young Balkan Leaders Initiative. Sec. 10. Supporting cybersecurity and cyber resilience in the Western Balkans. Sec. 11. Relations between Kosovo and Serbia. Sec. 12. Reports on Russian and Chinese malign influence operations and campaigns in the Western Balkans. 2. Findings Congress finds the following: (1) The Western Balkans countries (the Republic of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia, the Republic of Kosovo, Montenegro, the Republic of North Macedonia and the Republic of Serbia) form a pluralistic, multi-ethnic region in the heart of Europe that is critical to the peace, stability, and prosperity of that continent. (2) Continued peace, stability, and prosperity in the Western Balkans is directly tied to the opportunities for democratic and economic advancement available to the citizens and residents of those seven countries. (3) It is in the mutual interest of the United States and the seven countries of the Western Balkans to promote stable and sustainable economic growth and development in the region. (4) The reforms and integration with the European Union pursued by countries in the Western Balkans have led to significant democratic and economic progress in the region. (5) Despite economic progress, rates of poverty and unemployment in the Western Balkans remain higher than in neighboring European Union countries. (6) Out-migration, particularly of youth, is affecting demographics in each Western Balkans country, resulting in population decline in all seven countries. (7) Implementing critical economic and governance reforms could help enable investment and employment opportunities in the Western Balkans, especially for youth, and can provide powerful tools for economic development and for encouraging broader participation in a political process that increases trade and prosperity for all. (8) Existing regional economic efforts, such as the Common Regional Market, the Berlin Process, and the Open Balkan Initiative, could have the potential to improve the economic conditions in the Western Balkans, while promoting inclusion and transparency. (9) The Department of Commerce, through its Foreign Commercial Service, plays an important role in promoting and facilitating opportunities for United States trade and investment. (10) Corruption, including among key political leaders, continues to plague the Western Balkans and represents one of the greatest impediments to further economic and political development in the region. (11) Disinformation campaigns targeting the Western Balkans undermine the credibility of its democratic institutions, including the integrity of its elections. (12) Vulnerability to cyberattacks or attacks on information and communication technology infrastructure increases risks to the functioning of government and the delivery of public services. (13) United States Cyber Command, the Department of State, and other Federal agencies play a critical role in defending the national security interests of the United States, including by deploying cyber hunt forward teams at the request of partner nations to reinforce their cyber defenses. (14) Securing domestic and international cyber networks and ICT infrastructure is a national security priority for the United States, which is exemplified by offices and programs across the Federal Government that support cybersecurity. (15) Corruption and disinformation proliferate in political environments marked by autocratic control or partisan conflict. (16) Dependence on Russian sources of fossil fuels and natural gas for the countries of the Western Balkans ties their economies and politics to the Russian Federation and inhibits their aspirations for European integration. (17) Reducing the reliance of the Western Balkans on Russian natural gas supplies and fossil fuels is in the national interest of the United States. (18) The growing influence of China in the Western Balkans could also have a deleterious impact on strategic competition, democracy, and economic integration with Europe. (19) In March 2022, President Biden launched the European Democratic Resilience Initiative to bolster democratic resilience, advance anti-corruption efforts, and defend human rights in Ukraine and its neighbors in response to Russia’s war of aggression. (20) The parliamentary and local elections held in Serbia on December 17, 2023, and their immediate aftermath are cause for deep concern about the state of Serbia’s democracy, including due to the final report of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe's Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, which— (A) found unjust conditions for the election; (B) found numerous procedural deficiencies, including inconsistent application of safeguards during voting and counting, frequent instances of overcrowding, breaches in secrecy of the vote, and numerous instances of group voting ; and (C) asserted that voting must be repeated in certain polling stations. (21) The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe also noted that Serbian officials accused primarily peaceful protestors, opposition parties, and civil society of attempting to destabilize the government , a concerning allegation that threatens the safety of important elements of Serbian society. (22) Democratic countries whose values are in alignment with the United States make for stronger and more durable partnerships. 3. Sense of Congress It is a sense of Congress that the United States should— (1) encourage increased trade and investment between the United States and allies and partners in the Western Balkans; (2) expand United States assistance to regional integration efforts in the Western Balkans; (3) strengthen and expand regional economic integration in the Western Balkans, especially enterprises owned by and employing women and youth; (4) work with allies and partners committed to improving the rule of law, energy resource diversification, democratic and economic reform, and the reduction of poverty in the Western Balkans; (5) increase United States trade and investment with the Western Balkans, particularly in ways that support countries' efforts— (A) to decrease dependence on Russian energy sources and fossil fuels; (B) to increase energy diversification, efficiency, and conservation; and (C) to facilitate the transition to cleaner and more reliable sources of energy, including renewables, as appropriate; (6) continue to assist in the development, within the Western Balkans, of— (A) strong civil societies; (B) public-private partnerships; (C) independent media; (D) transparent, accountable, citizen-responsive governance, including equal representation for women and youth; (E) political stability; and (F) modern, free-market based economies. (7) support the expeditious accession of those Western Balkans countries that are not already members to the European Union and to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (referred to in this section as NATO ) for countries that desire and are eligible for such membership; (8) support— (A) maintaining the full European Union Force (EUFOR) mandate in Bosnia and Herzegovina as being in the national security interests of the United States; (B) encouraging NATO and the European Union to review their mission mandates and posture in Bosnia and Herzegovina to ensure they are playing a proactive role in establishing a safe and secure environment, particularly in the realm of defense; (C) working within NATO to encourage contingency planning for an international military force to maintain a safe and secure environment in Bosnia and Herzegovina, especially if Russia blocks reauthorization of the mission in the United Nations; and (D) a strengthened NATO headquarters in Sarajevo; (9) continue to support the European Union membership aspirations of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, North Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia by supporting meeting the benchmarks required for their accession; (10) continue to support the overarching mission of the Berlin Process and locally-driven initiatives that are inclusive of all Western Balkans countries and remains aligned with the objectives and standards laid out by the European Union as requirements for accession to the European Union; (11) continue to support the cultural heritage, and recognize the languages, of the Western Balkans; (12) coordinate closely with the European Union, the United Kingdom, and other allies and partners on sanctions designations in Western Balkans countries and work to align efforts as much as possible to demonstrate a clear commitment to upholding democratic values; (13) expand bilateral security cooperation with non-NATO member Western Balkans countries, particularly efforts focused on regional integration and cooperation, including through the Adriatic Charter, which was launched at Tirana on May 2, 2003; (14) increase efforts to combat Russian malign influence campaigns and any other destabilizing or disruptive activities targeting the Western Balkans through engagement with government institutions, political stakeholders, journalists, civil society organizations, and industry leaders; (15) develop a series of cyber resilience standards, consistent with the Enhanced Cyber Defence Policy and Readiness Action Plan endorsed at the 2014 Wales Summit of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to expand cooperation with partners and allies, including in the Western Balkans, on cyber security and ICT infrastructure; (16) articulate clearly and unambiguously the United States commitment to supporting democratic values and respect for international law as the sole path forward for the countries of the Western Balkans; and (17) prioritize partnerships and programming with Western Balkan countries that demonstrate commitment toward strengthening their democracies and show respect for human rights. 4. Definitions In this Act: (1) Appropriate congressional committees The term appropriate congressional committees means— (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate ; (B) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate ; (C) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives ; and (D) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives . (2) ICT The term ICT means information and communication technology. (3) Western balkans The term Western Balkans means the region comprised of the following countries: (A) The Republic of Albania. (B) Bosnia and Herzegovina. (C) The Republic of Croatia. (D) The Republic of Kosovo. (E) Montenegro. (F) The Republic of North Macedonia. (G) The Republic of Serbia. (4) Western balkans country The term Western Balkans country means any country listed in subparagraphs (A) through (G) of paragraph (3). 5. Codification of sanctions relating to the Western Balkans (a) In general Each person listed or designated for the imposition of sanctions under an executive order described in subsection (c) as of the date of the enactment of this Act shall remain so designated, except as provided in subsections (d) and (e). (b) Continuation of sanctions authorities Each authority to impose sanctions provided for under an executive order described in subsection (c) shall remain in effect. (c) Executive orders specified The executive orders specified in this subsection are— (1) Executive Order 13219, as amended by Executive Order 13304 ( 50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to blocking property of persons who threaten international stabilization efforts in the Western Balkans); and (2) Executive Order 14033 ( 50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to blocking property and suspending entry into the United States of certain persons contributing to the destabilizing situation in the Western Balkans), as in effect on such date of enactment. (d) Termination of sanctions The President may terminate the application of a sanction described in subsection (a) with respect to a person if the President certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that such person— (1) has not engaged in the activity that was the basis for such sanctions, if applicable, during the two-year period immediately preceding such termination date; or (2) otherwise no longer meets the criteria that was the basis for such sanctions. (e) Waiver (1) In general The President may waive the application of sanctions under this section for renewable periods not to exceed 180 days if the President— (A) determines that such a waiver is in the national security interests of the United States; and (B) not less than 15 days before the granting of the waiver, submits to the appropriate congressional committees a notice of and justification for the waiver. (2) Form The waiver described in paragraph (1) may be transmitted in classified form. (f) Exceptions (1) Humanitarian assistance Sanctions under this Act shall not apply to— (A) the conduct or facilitation of a transaction for the provision of agricultural commodities, food, medicine, medical devices, humanitarian assistance, or for humanitarian purposes; or (B) transactions that are necessary for, or related to, the activities described in subparagraph (A). (2) Compliance with international obligations and law enforcement activities Sanctions under this Act shall not apply with respect to an alien if admitting or paroling such alien is necessary— (A) to comply with United States obligations under— (i) the Agreement between the United Nations and the United States of America regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations, signed at Lake Success June 26, 1947, and entered into force November 21, 1947; (ii) the Convention on Consular Relations, done at Vienna April 24, 1963, and entered into force March 19, 1967; or (iii) any other international agreement; or (B) to carry out or assist law enforcement activity in the United States. (3) Exception for intelligence activities Sanctions under this Act shall not apply to— (A) any activity subject to the reporting requirements under title V of the National Security Act of 1947 ( 50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq. ); or (B) any authorized intelligence activities of the United States. (4) Exception relating to importation of goods (A) In general The requirement to block and prohibit all transactions in all property and interests in property under this Act shall not include the authority or a requirement to impose sanctions on the importation of goods. (B) Defined term In this paragraph, the term good means any article, natural or manmade substance, material, supply or manufactured product, including inspection and test equipment, and excluding technical data. (g) Rulemaking The President is authorized to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this section (which may include regulatory exceptions), including under section 205 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act ( 50 U.S.C. 1704 )). (h) Sunset This section shall cease to have force or effect beginning on the date that is 8 years after the date of the enactment of this Act. 6. Democratic and economic development and prosperity initiatives (a) Anti-corruption initiative The Secretary of State, through ongoing and new programs, shall develop an initiative that— (1) seeks to expand technical assistance in each Western Balkans country, taking into account local conditions and contingent on the agreement of the host country government to develop new national anti-corruption strategies; (2) seeks to share best practices with, and provide training to, civilian law enforcement agencies and judicial institutions, and other relevant administrative bodies, of the Western Balkans countries, to improve the efficiency, transparency, and accountability of such agencies and institutions; (3) strengthens existing national anti-corruption strategies— (A) to combat political corruption, particularly in the judiciary, independent election oversight bodies, and public procurement processes; and (B) to strengthen regulatory and legislative oversight of critical governance areas, such as freedom of information and public procurement, including by strengthening cyber defenses and ICT infrastructure networks; (4) includes the Western Balkans countries in the European Democratic Resilience Initiative of the Department of State, or any equivalent successor initiative, and considers the Western Balkans as a recipient of anti-corruption funding for such initiative; and (5) seeks to promote the important role of an independent media in countering corruption through engagements with governments of Western Balkan countries and providing training opportunities for journalists on investigative reporting. (b) Prioritizing cyber resilience, regional trade, and economic competitiveness (1) Sense of congress It is the sense of Congress that— (A) promoting stronger economic, civic, and political relationships among Western Balkans countries will enable countries to better utilize existing resources and maximize their economic security and democratic resilience by reinforcing cyber defenses and increasing trade in goods and services among other countries in the region; and (B) United States investments in and assistance toward creating a more integrated region ensures political stability and security for the region. (2) 5-year strategy for economic development and democratic resilience in western balkans Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State and the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, in coordination with the heads of other relevant Federal departments and agencies, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a regional economic development and democratic resilience strategy for the Western Balkans that complements the efforts of the European Union, European nations, and other multilateral financing institutions— (A) to consider the full set of tools and resources available from the relevant agencies; (B) to include efforts to ensure coordination with multilateral and bilateral partners, such as the European Union, the World Bank, and other relevant assistance frameworks; (C) to include an initial public assessment of— (i) economic opportunities for which United States businesses, or those of other like-minded partner countries, would be competitive; (ii) legal, economic, governance, infrastructural, or other barriers limiting United States trade and investment in the Western Balkans; (iii) the effectiveness of all existing regional cooperation initiatives, such as the Open Balkan initiative and the Western Balkans Common Regional Market; and (iv) ways to increase United States trade and investment within the Western Balkans; (D) to develop human and institutional capacity and infrastructure across multiple sectors of economies, including clean energy, energy efficiency, agriculture, small and medium-sized enterprise development, health, and cyber-security; (E) to assist with the development and implementation of regional and international trade agreements; (F) to support women-owned enterprises; (G) to promote government and civil society policies and programs that combat corruption and encourage transparency (including by supporting independent media by promoting the safety and security of journalists), free and fair competition, sound governance, judicial reform, environmental stewardship, and business environments conducive to sustainable and inclusive economic growth; and (H) to include a public diplomacy strategy that describes the actions that will be taken by relevant agencies to increase support for the United States relationship by citizens of Western Balkans countries. (3) Briefing Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall provide a briefing to the appropriate congressional committees that describes the progress made towards developing the strategy required under paragraph (2). (c) Regional trade and development initiative (1) Authorization The Secretary of State and the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, in coordination with the heads of other relevant Federal departments and agencies, may coordinate a regional trade and development initiative for the region comprised of each Western Balkans country and any European Union member country that shares a border with a Western Balkans country (referred to in this subsection as the Western Balkans region ) in accordance with this subsection. (2) Initiative elements The initiative authorized under paragraph (1) shall— (A) promote private sector growth and competitiveness and increase the capacity of businesses, particularly small and medium-sized enterprises, in the Western Balkans region; (B) aim to increase intraregional exports to countries in the Balkans and European Union member states; (C) aim to increase United States exports to, and investments in, countries in the Balkans; (D) support startup companies, including companies led by youth or women, in the Western Balkans region by— (i) providing training in business skills and leadership; and (ii) providing opportunities to connect to sources of capital; (E) encourage and promote inward and outward trade and investment through engagement with the Western Balkans diaspora communities in the United States and abroad; (F) provide assistance to the governments and civil society organizations of Western Balkans countries to develop— (i) regulations to ensure fair and effective investment; and (ii) screening tools to identify and deter malign investments and other coercive economic practices; (G) review existing assistance programming relating to the Western Balkans across Federal agencies— (i) to eliminate duplication; and (ii) to identify areas of potential coordination within the Western Balkans region; (H) identify areas where application of additional resources could expand successful programs to 1 or more countries in the Western Balkans region by building on the existing experience and program architecture; (I) compare existing single-country sector analyses to determine areas of focus that would benefit from a regional approach with respect to the Western Balkans region; and (J) promote intraregional trade throughout the Western Balkans region through— (i) programming, including grants, cooperative agreements, and other forms of assistance; (ii) expanding awareness of the availability of loans and other financial instruments from the United States Government; and (iii) coordinating access to existing trade instruments available through allies and partners in the Western Balkans region, including the European Union and international financial institutions. (3) Support for regional infrastructure projects The initiative authorized under paragraph (1) should facilitate and prioritize support for regional infrastructure projects, including— (A) transportation projects that build roads, bridges, railways and other physical infrastructure to facilitate travel of goods and people throughout the Western Balkans region; (B) technical support and investments needed to meet United States and European Union standards for air travel, including screening and information sharing; (C) the development of telecommunications networks with trusted providers; (D) infrastructure projects that connect Western Balkans countries to each other and to countries with which they share a border; (E) the effective analysis of tenders and transparent procurement processes; (F) investment transparency programs that will help countries in the Western Balkans analyze gaps and establish institutional and regulatory reforms necessary— (i) to create an enabling environment for trade and investment; and (ii) to strengthen protections against suspect investments through public procurement and privatization and through foreign direct investments; (G) sharing best practices learned from the United States and other international partners to ensure that institutional and regulatory mechanisms for addressing these issues are fair, nonarbitrary, effective, and free from corruption; (H) projects that support regional energy security and reduce dependence on Russian energy; (I) technical assistance and generating private investment in projects that promote connectivity and energy-sharing in the Western Balkans region; (J) technical assistance to support regional collaboration on environmental protection that includes governmental, political, civic, and business stakeholders; and (K) technical assistance to develop financing options and help create linkages with potential financing institutions and investors. (4) Requirements All programming under the initiative authorized under paragraph (1) shall— (A) be open to the participation of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia; (B) be consistent with European Union accession requirements; (C) be focused on retaining talent within the Western Balkans; (D) promote government policies in Western Balkans countries that encourage free and fair competition, sound governance, environmental protection, and business environments that are conducive to sustainable and inclusive economic growth; and (E) include a public diplomacy strategy to inform local and regional audiences in the Western Balkans region about the initiative, including specific programs and projects. (d) United States International Development Finance Corporation (1) Appointments Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, subject to the availability of appropriations, the Chief Executive Officer of the United States International Development Finance Corporation, in collaboration with the Secretary of State, should consider including a regional office with responsibilities for the Western Balkans within the Corporation’s plans to open new regional offices. (2) Joint report Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Chief Executive Officer of the United States International Development Finance Corporation and the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development shall submit a joint report to the appropriate congressional committees that includes— (A) an assessment of the benefits of providing sovereign loan guarantees to countries in the Western Balkans to support infrastructure and energy diversification projects; (B) an outline of additional resources, such as tools, funding, and personnel, which may be required to offer sovereign loan guarantees in the Western Balkans; and (C) an assessment of how the United States International Development Finance Corporation can deploy its insurance products in support of bonds or other instruments issued to raise capital through United States financial markets in the Western Balkans. 7. Promoting cross-cultural and educational engagement (a) Sense of Congress It is the sense of Congress that— (1) promoting partnerships between United States universities and universities in the Western Balkans, particularly universities in traditionally under-served communities, advances United States foreign policy goals and requires a whole-of-government approach, including the utilization of public-private partnerships; (2) such university partnerships would provide opportunities for exchanging academic ideas, technical expertise, research, and cultural understanding for the benefit of the United States; and (3) the seven countries in the Western Balkans meet the requirements under section 105(c)(4) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 ( 22 U.S.C. 2151c(c)(4) ). (b) University partnerships The President, working through the Secretary of State, is authorized to provide assistance, consistent with section 105 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 ( 22 U.S.C. 2151c ), to promote the establishment of partnerships between United States universities and universities in the Western Balkans, including— (1) supporting research and analysis on foreign policy, cyber resilience, and disinformation; (2) working with partner governments to reform policies, improve curricula, strengthen data systems, train teachers and students, including English language teaching, and to provide quality, inclusive learning materials; (3) encouraging knowledge exchanges to help provide individuals, particularly at-risk youth, women, people with disabilities, and other vulnerable, marginalized, or underserved communities, with relevant education, training, and skills for meaningful employment; (4) promoting teaching and research exchanges between institutions of higher education in the Western Balkans and in the United States; and (5) encouraging alliances and exchanges with like-minded institutions of education within the Western Balkans and the larger European continent. 8. Peace Corps in the Western Balkans (a) Sense of Congress It is the sense of Congress that the Peace Corps, whose mission is to promote world peace and friendship, in part by helping the people of interested countries in meeting their need for trained men and women, provides an invaluable opportunity to connect the people of the United States with the people of the Western Balkans. (b) Report Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Peace Corps should submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees that includes an analysis of current opportunities for Peace Corps expansion in the Western Balkans region. 9. Young Balkan Leaders Initiative (a) Sense of Congress It is the sense of Congress that regular people-to-people exchange programs that bring religious leaders, journalists, civil society members, politicians, and other individuals from the Western Balkans to the United States will strengthen existing relationships and advance United States interests and shared values in the Western Balkans region. (b) BOLD leadership program for young Balkans leaders (1) Sense of congress The Department of State, through BOLD, a leadership program for young leaders in certain Western Balkans countries, plays an important role to develop young leaders in improving civic engagement and economic development in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, and Montenegro. (2) Expansion BOLD should be expanded, subject to the availability of appropriations, to the entire Western Balkans region. (c) Authorization The Secretary of State should further develop and implement BOLD, which shall hereafter be known as the Young Balkan Leaders Initiative , to promote educational and professional development for young adult leaders and professionals in the Western Balkans who have demonstrated a passion to contribute to the continued development of the Western Balkans region. (d) Conduct of initiative The goals of the Young Balkan Leaders Initiative shall be— (1) to further build the capacity of young Balkan leaders in the Western Balkans in the areas of business and information technology, cyber security and digitization, agriculture, civic engagement, and public administration; (2) to support young Balkan leaders by offering professional development, training, and networking opportunities, particularly in the areas of leadership, innovation, civic engagement, elections, human rights, entrepreneurship, good governance, public administration, and journalism; (3) to support young political, parliamentary, and civic Balkan leaders in collaboration on regional initiatives related to good governance, environmental protection, government ethics, and minority inclusion; (4) to provide increased economic and technical assistance to young Balkan leaders to promote economic growth and strengthen ties between businesses, investors, and entrepreneurs in the United States and in Western Balkans countries; (5) to tailor such assistance to advance the particular objectives of each United States mission in the Western Balkans within the framework outlined in this subsection; and (6) to secure funding for such assistance from existing funds available to each United States Mission in the Western Balkans. (e) Fellowships Under the Young Balkan Leaders Initiative, the Secretary of State shall award fellowships to young leaders from the Western Balkans who— (1) are between 18 and 35 years of age; (2) have demonstrated strong capabilities in entrepreneurship, innovation, public service, and leadership; (3) have had a positive impact in their communities, organizations, or institutions, including by promoting cross-regional and multiethnic cooperation; and (4) represent a cross-section of geographic, gender, political, and cultural diversity. (f) Public engagement and leadership center Under the Young Balkan Leaders Initiative, the Secretary of State shall take advantage of existing and future public diplomacy facilities (commonly known as American Spaces ) to hire staff and develop programming for the establishment of a flagship public engagement and leadership center in the Western Balkans that seeks— (1) to counter disinformation and malign influence; (2) to promote cross-cultural engagement; (3) to provide training for young leaders from Western Balkans countries described in subsection (e); (4) to harmonize the efforts of existing venues throughout Western Balkans countries established by the Office of American Spaces; and (5) to annually bring together participants from the Young Balkans Leaders Initiative to provide platforms for regional networking. (g) Briefing on certain exchange programs (1) In general Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall provide a briefing to the appropriate congressional committees that describes the status of exchange programs involving the Western Balkans region. (2) Elements The briefing required under paragraph (1) shall— (A) assess the factors constraining the number and frequency of participants from Western Balkans countries in the International Visitor Leadership Program of the Department of State; (B) identify the resources that are necessary to address the factors described in subparagraph (A); and (C) describe a strategy for connecting alumni and participants of professional development exchange programs of the Department of State in the Western Balkans with alumni and participants from other countries in Europe, to enhance inter-region and intra-region people-to-people ties. 10. Supporting cybersecurity and cyber resilience in the Western Balkans (a) Sense of Congress It is the sense of Congress that— (1) United States support for cybersecurity, cyber resilience, and secure ICT infrastructure in Western Balkans countries will strengthen the region’s ability to defend itself from and respond to malicious cyber activity conducted by nonstate and foreign actors, including foreign governments, that seek to influence the region; (2) insecure ICT networks that are vulnerable to manipulation can increase opportunities for— (A) the compromise of cyber infrastructure, including data networks, electronic infrastructure, and software systems; and (B) the use of online information operations by adversaries and malign actors to undermine United States allies and interests; and (3) it is in the national security interest of the United States to support the cybersecurity and cyber resilience of Western Balkans countries. (b) Interagency report on cybersecurity and the digital information environment in Western Balkans countries Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the heads of other relevant Federal agencies, shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees that contains— (1) an overview of interagency efforts to strengthen cybersecurity and cyber resilience in Western Balkans countries; (2) a review of the information environment in each Western Balkans country; (3) a review of existing United States Government cyber and digital initiatives that— (A) counter influence operations and safeguard elections and democratic processes in Western Balkans countries; (B) strengthen ICT infrastructure and cybersecurity capacity in the Western Balkans; (C) support democracy and internet freedom in Western Balkans countries; and (D) build cyber capacity of governments who are allies or partners of the United States; (4) an assessment of cyber threat information sharing between the United States and Western Balkans countries; (5) an assessment of— (A) options for the United States to better support cybersecurity and cyber resilience in Western Balkans countries through changes to current assistance authorities; and (B) the advantages or limitations, such as funding or office space, of posting cyber professionals from other Federal departments and agencies to United States diplomatic posts in Western Balkans countries and providing relevant training to Foreign Service Officers; and (6) any additional support needed from the United States for the cybersecurity and cyber resilience of the following NATO Allies: Albania, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Croatia. 11. Relations between Kosovo and Serbia (a) Sense of Congress It is the sense of Congress that— (1) the Agreement on the Path to Normalization of Relations, which was agreed to by Kosovo and Serbia on February 27, 2023, with the facilitation of the European Union, is a positive step forward in advancing normalization between the two countries; (2) Serbia and Kosovo should seek to make immediate progress on the Implementation Annex to the agreement referred to in paragraph (1); (3) once sufficient progress has been made on the Implementation Annex, the United States should consider advancing initiatives to strengthen bilateral relations with both countries, which could include— (A) establishing bilateral strategic dialogues with Kosovo and Serbia; and (B) advancing concrete initiatives to deepen trade and investment with both countries; and (4) the United States should continue to support a comprehensive final agreement between Kosovo and Serbia based on mutual recognition. (b) Statement of policy It is the policy of the United States Government that— (1) it shall not pursue any policy that advocates for land swaps, partition, or other forms of redrawing borders along ethnic lines in the Western Balkans as a means to arbitrate disputes between nation states in the region; and (2) it should support pluralistic democracies in countries in the Western Balkans as a means to prevent a return to the ethnic strife that once characterized the region. 12. Reports on Russian and Chinese malign influence operations and campaigns in the Western Balkans (a) Reports required. Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every two years thereafter, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, the Director of National Intelligence, and the heads of other Federal departments or agencies, as appropriate, shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees regarding Russian and Chinese malign influence operations and campaigns carried out with respect to Balkan countries that seek— (1) to undermine democratic institutions; (2) to promote political instability; and (3) to harm the interests of the United States and North Atlantic Treaty Organization member and partner states in the Western Balkans. (b) Elements Each report submitted pursuant to subsection (a) shall include— (1) an assessment of the objectives of the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China regarding malign influence operations and campaigns carried out with respect to Western Balkans countries— (A) to undermine democratic institutions, including the planning and execution of democratic elections; (B) to promote political instability; and (C) to manipulate the information environment; (2) the activities and roles of the Department of State and other relevant Federal agencies in countering Russian and Chinese malign influence operations and campaigns; (3) a comprehensive list identifying— (A) each network, entity and individual, to the extent such information is available, of Russia, China, or any other country with which Russia or China may cooperate, that is supporting such Russian or Chinese malign influence operations or campaigns, including the provision of financial or operational support to activities in a Western Balkans country that may limit freedom of speech or create barriers of access to democratic processes, including exercising the right to vote in a free and fair election; and (B) the role of each such entity in providing such support; (4) the identification of the tactics, techniques, and procedures used in Russian or Chinese malign influence operations and campaigns in Western Balkans countries; (5) an assessment of the effect of previous Russian or Chinese malign influence operations and campaigns that targeted alliances and partnerships of the United States Armed Forces in the Western Balkans, including the effectiveness of such operations and campaigns in achieving the objectives of Russia and China, respectively; (6) the identification of each Western Balkans country with respect to which Russia or China has conducted or attempted to conduct a malign influence operation or campaign; (7) an assessment of the capacity and efforts of NATO and of each individual Western Balkans country to counter Russian or Chinese malign influence operations and campaigns carried out with respect to Western Balkans countries; (8) the efforts by the United States to combat such malign influence operations in the Western Balkans, including through the Countering Russian Influence Fund and the Countering People’s Republic of China Malign Influence Fund; (9) an assessment of the tactics, techniques, and procedures that the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense, determines are likely to be used in future Russian or Chinese malign influence operations and campaigns carried out with respect to Western Balkans countries; and (10) recommended authorities or activities that the Department of State and other relevant Federal agencies could enact to increase the United States Government’s capacity to counter Russian and Chinese malign influence operations and campaigns in Western Balkans countries. (c) Form Each report required under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

May 7, 2024 Reported with an amendment