II Calendar No. 374 118th CONGRESS 2d Session S. 3235 IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES November 7, 2023 Mr. Risch (for himself, Mr. Rubio , Mr. Moran , Mr. Crapo , Mr. Scott of Florida , Mr. Hagerty , Mrs. Blackburn , Mr. Barrasso , Mr. Budd , Mr. Cassidy , Mrs. Britt , Mr. Grassley , Mr. Braun , Mr. Kennedy , Mr. Hoeven , and Mr. Ricketts ) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations May 7, 2024 Reported by Mr. Cardin , with an amendment Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert the part printed in italic A BILL To require a strategy to counter the role of the People's Republic of China in evasion of sanctions imposed by the United States with respect to Iran, and for other purposes.

1. Short title This Act may be cited as the End Iranian Terrorism Act of 2023 . 2. Sense of Congress It is the sense of Congress that— (1) the Islamic Republic of Iran has long provided hundreds of millions of dollars in material support to Hamas and other terrorist groups, such as Palestinian Islamic Jihad, that directly threaten Israel; (2) Iran poses a threat to regional and global security and has earned approximately $80,000,000,000 in oil revenues since 2021; (3) the People’s Republic of China, seeking to secure reliable sources of Middle Eastern energy, has purchased roughly $47,000,000,000 in Iranian petroleum products since 2021 and is undercutting the enforcement of sanctions imposed by the United States with respect to Iran; (4) illicit purchases of Iranian petroleum products by the People's Republic of China and other countries fund the Iranian regime’s suppression of human rights in Iran, provide valuable resources for Iran’s terrorist proxies, and provide additional resources for support by Iran for the Russian Federation in its unprovoked war in Ukraine, contrary to United States policy; (5) lack of sanctions and sanctions enforcement directly undercuts United States policy objectives in the Indo-Pacific region, Europe, the Middle East, and beyond; (6) increasing encroachment by the People's Republic of China in the Middle East and North Africa, include involvement of the People's Republic of China in illicit oil trade, runs counter to the national security interests of the United States; and (7) the United States should immediately enforce existing sanctions, including sanctions provided for in Executive Order 13846 ( 50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to reimposing certain sanctions with respect to Iran), and expand sanctions designations to include persons that store Iranian oil, ship-to-ship oil transfer operators, ports and port operators, refineries and refinery operators, and other individuals and entities, particularly in the People's Republic of China, dealing in Iranian-origin oil and petrochemicals. 3. Appropriate congressional committees defined In this Act, the term appropriate congressional committees means— (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate; and (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives. 4. Strategy to counter role of the People's Republic of China in evasion of sanctions with respect to Iran (a) In general Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the heads of other appropriate Federal agencies, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a written strategy, and provide to those committees an accompanying briefing, on the role of the People's Republic of China in evasion of sanctions imposed by the United States with respect to Iranian-origin petroleum products that includes an assessment of options— (1) to strengthen the enforcement of such sanctions; and (2) to expand sanctions designations targeting the involvement of the People's Republic of China in the production, transportation, storage, refining, and sale of Iranian-origin petroleum products. (b) Elements The strategy required by subsection (a) shall include— (1) a description of the use of sanctions in effect before the date of the enactment of this Act to target individuals and entities of the People's Republic of China that are directly or indirectly associated with smuggling of Iranian-origin petroleum products; (2) an assessment of— (A) the People's Republic of China’s petroleum refining capabilities; (B) which of the People's Republic of China's refineries are at high risk of processing Iranian-origin petroleum products and why; (C) Iranian-owned entities operating in the People's Republic of China and involved in petroleum refining supply chains; (D) the People's Republic of China’s role in global petroleum refining supply chains; (E) how the People's Republic of China leverages its role in global petroleum supply chains to achieve political objectives; (F) the People's Republic of China’s petroleum importing and exporting partners; (G) what percent of the People's Republic of China’s energy consumption is linked to illegally imported Iranian-origin petroleum products; (H) the amount of money the People's Republic of China saves by illegally importing discounted Iranian-origin petroleum products rather than paying market price; (I) what level of influence the Chinese Communist Party holds over non-state, semi-independent teapot refineries; and (J) the challenges limiting the ability of the United States to impose or enforce sanctions with respect to such refineries, including— (i) Lawen Namu Petroleum Trading Company; (ii) Qihang Energy; and (iii) Shangang Guomao; (3) a detailed plan for— (A) monitoring the maritime domain for smuggling of Iranian-origin petroleum products in violation of sanctions imposed by the United States, including through— (i) automatic identification system monitoring; (ii) satellite imagery; (iii) vessel comparison and tanker classification; (iv) receiving tips from operators; and (v) creating a database of reported potential sanctions violations; (B) identifying the individuals, entities, and vessels responsible for such smuggling, including— (i) vessels— (I) operated by the National Iranian Tanker Company or any other Chinese or Iranian entity subject to sanctions imposed by the United States; (II) transporting petrochemicals subject to sanctions; (III) conducting ship-to-ship transfers of such petrochemicals; (IV) with deactivated automatic identification systems; or (V) that engage in flag hopping by changing national registries; (ii) individuals or entities— (I) storing petrochemicals subject to sanctions; or (II) refining or otherwise processing such petrochemicals; and (iii) through the use of port entry and docking permission of vessels subject to sanctions; (C) assessing the viability of seizing targets identified as belonging to entities smuggling Iranian-origin petroleum products in violation of sanctions imposed by the United States, including— (i) location; (ii) origin and destination; (iii) seaworthiness; and (iv) asset value; (D) seizing, prosecuting, and, if appropriate, liquidating viable targets identified as belonging to entities involved in such smuggling; (E) deterring individuals and entities from violating sanctions by educating and engaging— (i) insurance providers; (ii) parent companies; and (iii) vessel operators; (F) collaborating with allies and partners of the United States engaged in the Arabian Peninsula, including through standing or new maritime task forces, to build sanctions enforcement capacity through assistance and training to defense and law enforcement services; and (G) using public communications and global diplomatic engagements to highlight the role of petroleum product smuggling in supporting Iran’s human rights abuses and destabilizing terrorism activities; and (4) an assessment of— (A) the total number of vessels smuggling Iranian-origin petroleum products; (B) the total number of vessels smuggling such petroleum products destined for the People's Republic of China; (C) the number of vessels smuggling such petroleum products specifically from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps; (D) the most strategic locations for intercepting smuggled Iranian-origin petroleum products destined for the People's Republic of China; (E) interference from the People's Republic of China in attempts by the United States to investigate or enforce sanctions on Iranian petroleum product exports; (F) the effectiveness of the use of sanctions with respect to insurers of entities that own or operate vessels involved in smuggling Iranian-origin petroleum products; (G) the distinction between the total number of suspected violations of sanctions related to smuggling of Iranian-origin petroleum products and the number of vessels legally viable to seize and prosecute in litigation, if any, and an accompanying explanation for each; (H) the personnel and resources needed to enforce sanctions with respect to Iranian-origin petroleum products; and (I) the impact of smuggled Iranian-origin petroleum products on global energy markets. (c) Form The strategy required by subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified index. 5. Imposition of sanctions (a) In general Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall— (1) identify each foreign entity, including any member of the Chinese Communist Party or an entity organized under the laws of the People's Republic of China or otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of the People's Republic of China, that the President determines meets the criteria for the imposition of sanctions under— (A) the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 ( Public Law 104–172 ; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note); (B) the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 ( 22 U.S.C. 8501 et seq. ); (C) section 1245 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 ( 22 U.S.C. 8513a ); (D) the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 ( 22 U.S.C. 8701 et seq. ); (E) the Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act of 2012 ( 22 U.S.C. 8801 et seq. ); (F) title I of the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act ( 22 U.S.C. 9401 et seq. ); (G) any Executive order imposing sanctions with respect to Iran issued under the authority provided by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act ( 50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq. ); or (H) any other provision of law imposing sanctions with respect to Iran; and (2) impose sanctions applicable under existing law with respect to each such entity. (b) Report required Not later than 30 days after the imposition of sanctions under subsection (a) with respect to a foreign entity, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the sanctions imposed.

1. Short title This Act may be cited as the End Iranian Terrorism Act of 2024 . 2. Sense of Congress It is the sense of Congress that— (1) the Islamic Republic of Iran has long provided hundreds of millions of dollars in material support to Hamas and other terrorist groups, such as Palestinian Islamic Jihad, that directly threaten Israel; (2) Iran poses a threat to regional and global security and has earned approximately $80,000,000,000 in oil revenues since 2021; (3) the People’s Republic of China, seeking to secure reliable sources of Middle Eastern energy, has purchased roughly $47,000,000,000 in Iranian petroleum products since 2021 and is undercutting the enforcement of sanctions imposed by the United States with respect to Iran; (4) illicit purchases of Iranian petroleum products by the People's Republic of China and other countries fund the Iranian regime’s suppression of human rights in Iran, provide valuable resources for Iran’s terrorist proxies, and provide additional resources for support by Iran for the Russian Federation in its unprovoked war in Ukraine, contrary to United States policy; (5) lack of sanctions and sanctions enforcement directly undercuts United States policy objectives in the Indo-Pacific region, Europe, the Middle East, and beyond; (6) increasing encroachment by the People's Republic of China in the Middle East and North Africa, including involvement of the People's Republic of China in illicit oil trade, runs counter to the national security interests of the United States; and (7) the United States should immediately enforce existing sanctions, including sanctions provided for in Executive Order 13846 ( 50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to reimposing certain sanctions with respect to Iran), and expand sanctions designations to include persons that store Iranian oil, ship-to-ship oil transfer operators, ports and port operators, refineries and refinery operators, and other individuals and entities, particularly in the People's Republic of China, dealing in Iranian-origin oil and petrochemicals. 3. Appropriate congressional committees defined In this Act, the term appropriate congressional committees means— (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate; and (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives. 4. Strategy to counter role of the People’s Republic of China in evasion of sanctions with respect to Iran (a) In general Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the heads of other appropriate Federal agencies, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a written strategy, and provide to those committees an accompanying briefing, on the role of the People’s Republic of China in evasion of sanctions imposed by the United States with respect to Iranian-origin petroleum products that includes an assessment of options— (1) to strengthen the enforcement of such sanctions; and (2) to expand sanctions designations targeting the involvement of the People’s Republic of China in the production, transportation, storage, refining, and sale of Iranian-origin petroleum products. (b) Elements The strategy required by subsection (a) shall include— (1) a description and assessment of the use of sanctions in effect before the date of the enactment of this Act to target individuals and entities of the People’s Republic of China that are directly or indirectly associated with smuggling of Iranian-origin petroleum products; (2) an assessment of— (A) Iranian-owned entities operating in the People’s Republic of China and involved in petroleum refining supply chains; (B) the People’s Republic of China’s role in global petroleum refining supply chains; (C) how the People’s Republic of China leverages its role in global petroleum supply chains to achieve political objectives; (D) the People’s Republic of China’s petroleum importing and exporting partners; (E) what percent of the People’s Republic of China’s energy consumption is linked to illegally imported Iranian-origin petroleum products; and (F) what level of influence the Chinese Communist Party holds over non-state, semi-independent teapot refineries; (3) a detailed plan for— (A) monitoring the maritime domain for sanctionable activity related to smuggling of Iranian-origin petroleum products; (B) identifying the individuals, entities, and vessels engaging in sanctionable activity related to Iranian-origin petroleum products, including— (i) vessels— (I) transporting petrochemicals subject to sanctions; (II) conducting ship-to-ship transfers of such petrochemicals; (III) with deactivated automatic identification systems; or (IV) that engage in flag hopping by changing national registries; (ii) individuals or entities— (I) storing petrochemicals subject to sanctions; or (II) refining or otherwise processing such petrochemicals; and (iii) through the use of port entry and docking permission of vessels subject to sanctions; (C) deterring individuals and entities from violating sanctions by educating and engaging— (i) insurance providers; (ii) parent companies; and (iii) vessel operators; (D) collaborating with allies and partners of the United States engaged in the Arabian Peninsula, including through standing or new maritime task forces, to build sanctions enforcement capacity through assistance and training to defense and law enforcement services; and (E) using public communications and global diplomatic engagements to highlight the role of illicit petroleum product smuggling in bolstering Iran’s support for terrorism and its nuclear program; and (4) an assessment of— (A) the total number of vessels smuggling Iranian-origin petroleum products; (B) the total number of vessels smuggling such petroleum products destined for the People’s Republic of China; (C) the number of vessels smuggling such petroleum products specifically from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps; (D) interference by the People’s Republic of China with attempts by the United States to investigate or enforce sanctions on illicit Iranian petroleum product exports; (E) the effectiveness of the use of sanctions with respect to insurers of entities that own or operate vessels involved in smuggling Iranian-origin petroleum products; (F) the personnel and resources needed to enforce sanctions with respect to Iranian-origin petroleum products; and (G) the impact of smuggled illicit Iranian-origin petroleum products on global energy markets. (c) Form The strategy required by subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified index. 5. Imposition of sanctions (a) In general Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall— (1) identify each foreign entity, including any member of the Chinese Communist Party or any entity organized under the laws of the People's Republic of China or otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of the People's Republic of China, that the President determines meets the criteria for the imposition of sanctions under— (A) the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 ( Public Law 104–172 ; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note); (B) the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 ( 22 U.S.C. 8501 et seq. ); (C) section 1245 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 ( 22 U.S.C. 8513a ); (D) the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 ( 22 U.S.C. 8701 et seq. ); (E) the Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act of 2012 ( 22 U.S.C. 8801 et seq. ); (F) title I of the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act ( 22 U.S.C. 9401 et seq. ); (G) any Executive order imposing sanctions with respect to Iran issued under the authority provided by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act ( 50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq. ); or (H) any other provision of law imposing sanctions with respect to Iran; and (2) impose sanctions applicable under existing law with respect to each such entity. (b) Report required Not later than 30 days after the imposition of sanctions under subsection (a) with respect to a foreign entity, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the sanctions imposed. (c) Waiver (1) In general The President may waive the application of sanctions under this section for renewable periods not to exceed 180 days if the President— (A) determines that such a waiver is in the national security interests of the United States; and (B) not less than 15 days before the granting of the waiver, submits to the appropriate congressional committees a notice of and justification for the waiver. (2) Form A notice described in paragraph (1)(B) may be submitted in classified form. 6. Report on impacts on the Islamic Republic of Iran of sanctions imposed by the United States (a) In general Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury and drawing on subject-matter experts including economists and statisticians from the Department of State and the Department of the Treasury, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the impacts on the Islamic Republic of Iran of sanctions imposed by the United States. (b) Elements The report required by subsection (a) shall include an assessment of the following: (1) The impact of sanctions imposed by the United States on the following: (A) Problematic activities and policies of the Islamic Republic of Iran, including ballistic missile development, proliferation of Iranian drones and missiles to state and non-state actors, uranium enrichment, and funding of terrorist groups in the Axis of Resistance , and how sanctions have meaningfully impacted the ability of such groups to operate. (B) Key officials of the Iranian regime, including their access to alternative financial markets, their standard of living, and impacts to their personal wealth. (C) The operations of independent civil society organizations in Iran, including the ability of such organizations to access products that would allow them to document and share human rights abuses, promote democratic norms, and engage in political dissent. (D) The efficacy of licensing actions aimed at ensuring the people of Iran have access to circumvention technologies around Iranian regime firewalls and censors to promote internet freedom, including General License D-2 of the Department of the Treasury. (E) The standard of living of the people of Iran, including— (i) the impact on the purchasing power of the people of Iran and their ability to afford and acquire food and medicine; and (ii) changes in the size of the working and middle classes in Iran, including impacts to the poverty rate in Iran. (F) The growth of unofficial economies controlled by officials of the Iranian regime and members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. (2) What industries in Iran remain unaffected by such sanctions. 7. Exceptions (a) Exception relating to importation of goods (1) In general A requirement to block and prohibit all transactions in all property and interests in property under this Act shall not include the authority or a requirement to impose sanctions on the importation of goods. (2) Good In this subsection, the term good means any article, natural or manmade substance, material, supply, or manufactured product, including inspection and test equipment, and excluding technical data. (b) Exception to comply with united nations headquarters agreement and law enforcement activities Sanctions under this Act shall not apply with respect to the admission of an alien to the United States if admitting or paroling the alien into the United States is necessary— (1) to permit the United States to comply with the Agreement regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations, signed at Lake Success June 26, 1947, and entered into force November 21, 1947, between the United Nations and the United States, or other applicable international obligations of the United States; or (2) to carry out or assist authorized law enforcement activity in the United States. (c) Exception to comply with intelligence activities Sanctions under this Act shall not apply to any activity subject to the reporting requirements under title V of the National Security Act of 1947 ( 50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq. ) or any authorized intelligence activities of the United States. (d) Humanitarian assistance (1) In general Sanctions under this Act shall not apply to— (A) the conduct or facilitation of a transaction for the provision of agricultural commodities, food, medicine, medical devices, humanitarian assistance, or for humanitarian purposes; or (B) transactions that are necessary for or related to the activities described in subparagraph (A). (2) Definitions In this subsection: (A) Agricultural commodity The term agricultural commodity has the meaning given that term in section 102 of the Agricultural Trade Act of 1978 ( 7 U.S.C. 5602 ). (B) Medical device The term medical device has the meaning given the term device in section 201 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act ( 21 U.S.C. 321 ). (C) Medicine The term medicine has the meaning given the term drug in section 201 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act ( 21 U.S.C. 321 ). (e) Report on exceptions Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that describes each activity that would be subject to sanctions under this Act if not excepted pursuant to subsection (b) or (c).

May 7, 2024 Reported with an amendment