II 118th CONGRESS 2d Session S. 5491 IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES December 11, 2024 Mr. Cardin introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations A BILL To mobilize United States strategic, economic, and diplomatic tools to confront the challenges posed by the People’s Republic of China and to set a positive agenda for United States economic and diplomatic efforts abroad, and for other purposes.

1. Short title; table of contents (a) Short title This Act may be cited as the Realizing Economic and Strategic Objectives while Leading with Values and Engagement Act of 2024 or the RESOLVE Act of 2024 . (b) Table of contents The table of contents for this Act is as follows: Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents. Sec. 2. Definitions. Sec. 3. Consultation and engagement with Congress. TITLE I—Investing in a competitive future Subtitle A—Combatting the PRC’s economic coercion Sec. 101. Definitions. PART I—Economic coercion determinations Sec. 105. Sense of Congress. Sec. 106. Targeted country determination. Sec. 107. Sunset. PART II—Response Sec. 111. Economic defense response teams. Sec. 112. Economic Defense Response Fund. Sec. 113. Existing authorities that may be used to respond to economic coercion. Sec. 114. Sunset. PART III—Resilience Sec. 115. Office of the Chief Economist. Sec. 116. Economic support to allies and partners. PART IV—Coordination with allies and partners Sec. 119. Coordination with Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development members on engagement from the People’s Republic of China. PART V—Implementation Sec. 121. Report on strategy and implementation. PART VI—Other matters Sec. 124. Developing economic tools to deter aggression against Taiwan. Sec. 125. Intellectual property violators list. Sec. 126. Report on subsidies provided by the Government of the People’s Republic of China. Subtitle B—Economic engagement with allies and partners PART I—Investing in economic engagement in the Global South Sec. 131. Investing in talent in Southeast Asia, the Pacific Islands, sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin America. Sec. 132. Enhancing United States-Africa trade and investment for prosperity. Sec. 133. Increasing the competitiveness of the United States in Africa. Sec. 134. Support for Bangladesh democracy and labor rights programs. Sec. 135. Support for anti-corruption programs and other programs to address impunity and justice in Sri Lanka. PART II—Aligning with partners on economic tools Sec. 141. Assistance to advance foreign investment screening of United States allies and partners to protect national interests. Sec. 142. Assistance to counter corrupt practices in foreign countries. Sec. 143. Regulatory exchanges with allies and partners. Sec. 144. Pilot program to audit barriers to commerce in developing partner countries. Sec. 145. Strategy for promoting supply chain diversification. Sec. 146. Authorization to assist United States companies with global supply chain diversification and management. Sec. 147. Enhancing transatlantic cooperation on promoting private sector finance. PART III—Countering efforts to undermine international economic organizations Sec. 151. International Monetary Fund new arrangements to borrow. Sec. 152. Participation of Taiwan in Inter-American Development Bank. Sec. 153. Increased United States cooperation with Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation. Sec. 154. Opposition of the United States to an increase in the weight of the Chinese renminbi in the Special Drawing Rights basket of the International Monetary Fund. Subtitle C—Global infrastructure and energy development Sec. 161. Department of State Infrastructure Coordination Task Force. Sec. 162. Authorization of Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment. Sec. 163. Infrastructure Transaction and Assistance Network. Sec. 164. Strategic Ports Initiative. Sec. 165. Next-generation shipping. Sec. 166. Global Strategic Infrastructure Investment Fund. Sec. 167. Modifications of requirements to become a Millennium Challenge Corporation candidate country. Sec. 168. Africa energy security and diversification. Sec. 169. Enhancing resilient critical infrastructure in the Pacific Islands. Sec. 170. Oceania Restoration and Hazards Removal Program. Sec. 171. Coordination with other Federal agencies and cooperation and participation of nongovernmental entities. Sec. 172. Findings related to the People’s Republic of China’s industrial pollution. Sec. 173. Promoting responsible development alternatives to the Belt and Road Initiative and Global Development Initiative. Sec. 174. International cooperation to secure critical mineral supply chains. Subtitle D—Digital technology and connectivity Sec. 176. Office of the Special Envoy For Critical and Emerging Technology. Sec. 177. Realigning the Regional Technology Officer Program. Sec. 178. Annual semiconductor industry monitoring report on the People’s Republic of China. Sec. 179. Combatting AI-enabled disinformation. Sec. 179A. International collaboration on research and development. Sec. 179B. Oversight of the United States-European Union Trade and Technology Council. Sec. 179C. Digital connectivity in the Pacific Islands. Sec. 179D. Cyber and digital security cooperation with respect to developing countries. Subtitle E—Countering PRC malign influence Sec. 181. Sense of Congress distinguishing the PRC Government from the Chinese people. Sec. 182. Authorization of appropriations for countering the People’s Republic of China Influence Fund. Sec. 183. Global Engagement Center. Sec. 184. Amendment to the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961. Sec. 185. Countering malign information operations in the Americas. Sec. 186. Global Peace Operations Initiative. Sec. 187. Expansion of sanctions under the Fentanyl Sanctions Act. Sec. 188. Imposition of sanctions with respect to agencies or instrumentalities of foreign states. Sec. 189. Imposition of sanctions with respect to military and intelligence facilities of the People’s Republic of China in Cuba. Sec. 190. Strategic stability dialogue and arms control. Sec. 191. Track 1.5 dialogues with the People’s Republic of China on nuclear matters. Sec. 192. Oversight of life sciences dual use research of concern. Subtitle F—Strengthening United States public diplomacy Sec. 196. Authorization of appropriations to promote United States education, exchange, cultural, and the Fulbright-Hays Program. Sec. 197. Public diplomacy training. Sec. 198. Public diplomacy efforts. Sec. 199. Supporting independent media and countering foreign information operations. Sec. 199A. Support for local media. TITLE II—Investing in alliances, partnerships, and international organizations Subtitle A—Strategic and diplomatic matters PART I—Promoting United States leadership on matters related to the Indo-Pacific Sec. 201. Sense of Congress condemning the PRC’s support for Russia’s war on Ukraine. Sec. 202. United States commitment and support for allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific. Sec. 203. Sense of Congress on cooperation with the Quad. Sec. 204. Statement of policy on enhancing United States-Taiwan partnership. Sec. 205. Expanding expertise on Taiwan matters. Sec. 206. United States-South Korea alliance. Sec. 207. Sense of Congress on United States-Japan-Republic of Korea cooperation. Sec. 208. Sense of Congress on the need for the Senate to give its advice and consent to the ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Sec. 209. Statement of policy on maritime freedom of operations in international waterways and airspace of the Indo-Pacific and on artificial land features in the South China Sea. Sec. 209A. Sense of Congress regarding universal implementation of United Nations sanctions on North Korea. Sec. 209B. Establishing a Senior Official for the Compacts of Free Association at the Department of State. PART II—Enhancing diplomatic engagement in the Global South Sec. 211. Enhancement of diplomatic support and economic engagement with Pacific Island countries. Sec. 212. Defense cooperation in Latin America and the Caribbean. Sec. 213. Support for Young African Leaders Initiative. Sec. 214. Strengthening diplomatic efforts in Africa. Sec. 215. Engagement with civil society in Latin America and the Caribbean regarding accountability, human rights, and the risks of pervasive surveillance technologies. Subtitle B—International organizations Sec. 221. Safeguarding the integrity of the United Nations system. Sec. 222. United States membership in United Nations specialized agencies and related organizations. Sec. 223. Establishment of Office on Multilateral Strategy and Personnel. Sec. 224. Authorization of appropriations to promote United States citizen employment at the United Nations and international organizations. Sec. 225. United States leadership and representation in standards-setting bodies. Subtitle C—South China and East China Sea Sanctions Act of 2024 Sec. 231. Short title. Sec. 232. Sanctions with respect to PRC persons responsible for the PRC’s activities in the South China Sea and the East China Sea. Sec. 233. Sense of Congress regarding portrayals of the South China Sea or the East China Sea as part of China. Sec. 234. Sense of Congress on 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration’s tribunal ruling on arbitration case between Philippines and People’s Republic of China. TITLE III—Investing in our values Subtitle A—Promoting human rights in People’s Republic of China PART I—Promoting human rights for citizens of the People’s Republic of China and for United States citizens in China Sec. 301. Protecting human rights in the People’s Republic of China. Sec. 302. Report on corrupt activities of senior officials of Government of the People’s Republic of China. Sec. 303. China exit bans. PART II—Matters related to Hong Kong Sec. 305. Authorization of appropriations for promotion of democracy, human rights, and civilian security in Hong Kong. Sec. 306. Development and deployment of internet freedom and circumvention tools for the people of Hong Kong. PART III—Matters related to Xinjiang Sec. 311. Sense of Congress on treatment of Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities in the Xinjiang Uyghur autonomous region. Sec. 312. Sense of Congress calling on organization of Islamic cooperation members to take action on atrocities in Xinjiang. Sec. 313. Reauthorization of the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act. Sec. 314. Imposition of sanctions with respect to systematic rape, coercive abortion, forced sterilization, or involuntary contraceptive implantation in the Xinjiang Uyghur autonomous region. PART IV—Matters related to Tibet Sec. 317. Policy with respect to Tibet. Sec. 318. United States policy and international engagement on the or reincarnation of the Dalai Lama and religious freedom of Tibetan Buddhists. Subtitle B—Promoting human rights globally Sec. 321. Removal of members of the United Nations Human Rights Council that commit human rights abuses. Sec. 322. Protecting human rights defenders at the United Nations and other multilateral bodies. Sec. 323. Inclusion of surveillance technology abuse in human rights report. Sec. 324. Strengthening public reporting on corruption. Sec. 325. Authorization of funding for public reporting on corruption and corrupt practices. TITLE IV—Modernizing the Department of State to meet the China challenge Sec. 401. Establishing an Assistant Secretary of State for Indo-Pacific Affairs. Sec. 402. Enhancing strategic competition at the Department of State. Sec. 403. Department of State professional development and rotational program related to strategic competition. Sec. 404. Refocusing international security efforts for strategic competition. TITLE V—Other matters Sec. 501. Savings provisions. Sec. 502. Rule of Construction on Maintaining One China Policy. 2. Definitions In this Act: (1) Appropriate committees of Congress The term appropriate committees of Congress means— (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; and (B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives. (2) Joint Declaration The term Joint Declaration means the Joint Declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Question of Hong Kong, done at Beijing on December 19, 1984. (3) PRC The term PRC means the People’s Republic of China. (4) Strategic infrastructure The term strategic infrastructure means infrastructure where a primary driver of United States national interest in such infrastructure is— (A) to advance United States national security or economic security interest or those of the country in which the infrastructure is located; or (B) to deny the People’s Republic of China of ownership or control over such infrastructure. 3. Consultation and engagement with Congress (a) Sense of Congress It is the sense of Congress that— (1) the strategic competition between the United States and the PRC will require the United States to marshal sustained and political will to protect its vital interests, promote its values, and advance its economic and national security objectives for decades to come; and (2) sustained prioritization of the challenge posed by the PRC requires the participation of the whole United States Government, including— (A) the President to lead and direct the entire executive branch to treat the PRC as the greatest geopolitical and economic challenge for United States foreign policy; (B) bipartisan cooperation within Congress; and (C) frequent, sustained, and meaningful collaboration and consultation between the executive branch and Congress. (b) Engagement with Congress Consistent with section 15(b) of the State Department Basic Authorities Act ( 22 U.S.C. 2680(b) ), the Department of State shall keep the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives fully and currently informed with respect to all activities and responsibilities carried out in relation to the provisions of this Act, including by regularly consulting with the appropriate committees of Congress in the development and implementation of each of the strategies called for by the provisions of this Act. I Investing in a competitive future A Combatting the PRC’s economic coercion 101. Definitions In this subtitle: (1) PRC economic coercion The term PRC economic coercion means actions, practices, or threats by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to unreasonably restrict, obstruct, or manipulate commerce or economic relations with, foreign aid to, debt of, or investment in, any United States ally or partner in a capricious, pretextual, or non-transparent manner for the purpose of threatening or causing economic harm to the United States allies or partners for the purpose of influencing, constraining or limiting such countries decision-making. (2) Target country The term targeted country is a country or entity determined by the Secretary to have been the subject of unusually adverse or acute PRC economic coercion. (3) Targeted good or service The term targeted good or service is a good or service subject to export or import by a targeted country that is significantly or adversely affected by PRC economic coercion. I Economic coercion determinations 105. Sense of Congress It is the sense of Congress that— (1) the PRC is increasingly using economic coercion to pressure, punish, and influence the United States and United States allies and partners; (2) economic coercion causes economic harm to United States allies and partners, threatens their economic security and attempts to constrain their ability to undertake sovereign political actions; (3) economic coercion is often characterized by— (A) arbitrary, abusive, or discriminatory actions that seek to interfere with sovereign actions, or violate international rules; (B) capricious, pretextual, or non-transparent actions taken without due process afforded; or (C) intimidation or threats of punitive actions; (4) existing mechanisms for trade dispute resolution and international arbitration may not apply to claims related to economic coercion, and are often inadequate for responding to economic coercion in a timely and effective manner as the PRC exploits plausible lengthy resolution processes to evade accountability; (5) the United States should provide meaningful economic and political support to foreign partners at their request and consistent with United States interests, when they are the target of PRC economic coercion that causes significant economic and political harm; (6) responding to economic coercion will be most effective when the United States provides relief to affected foreign partners in coordination with allies and like-minded countries; and (7) such coordination will further demonstrate broad resolve against economic coercion. 106. Targeted country determination (a) Secretary of State determination (1) In general The Secretary of State may determine that a country is a targeted country and may exercise the authorities described in section 111(b) and 112 with respect to that country. (2) Delegation and consultation with cabinet members To inform any determination under paragraph (1) or exercise of authority described in section 111(b) and 112, the Secretary may delegate the authorities under this section to an appropriate Senate-confirmed official at the Department of State, who should consult with other Federal agencies, as appropriate. (3) Notification and transmittal to Congress In making any determination, the Secretary shall notify the appropriate committees of Congress not later than 10 days before issuing a determination under paragraph (1) or exercising authorities described in section 111(b) and submit such determination and a justification to the appropriate committees of Congress in an unclassified form, which may include a classified annex. (b) Expiration and extension of determination (1) Expiration of initial determination Any determination made by the Secretary under subsection (a) shall expire 180 days after the date of such determination, unless the Department submits a notification to the appropriate committees of Congress pursuant to paragraph (2) that PRC economic coercion against the targeted country is ongoing and requires an additional response. (2) Extension of determination; congressional notification (A) In general The Department may extend any determination under subsection (a) for a period of one year by submitting a congressional notification to the appropriate committees of Congress for their review not later than 30 days in advance of an extension taking effect. (B) Elements Any notifications submitted to the appropriate committees of Congress pursuant to subparagraph (A) shall include— (i) a description of the status of the PRC economic coercion that led to the initial determination made under subsection (a); (ii) an assessment of the targeted country’s political and economic vulnerability to such PRC economic coercion; (iii) a description of the exercise of the authorities and activities described in section 111(b) or section 112 to date; (iv) a plan for the continued exercise of authorities under section 111(b) or section 112; (v) a description of the actions taken by the PRC against a targeted country in response to support provided to the targeted country by the United States or United States allies and partners; (vi) coordination conducted with and support provided by United States allies and partners to assist the targeted country; and (vii) a justification for why an extension is in the national interests of the United States. (C) Classification A notification under this subsection shall be submitted in unclassified form but may include a classified annex. (3) Revocation The Secretary may at any time revoke a determination made under subsection (a) or the extension of such determination made under paragraph (2). 107. Sunset The authorities under this part shall expire 8 years after the date of the enactment of this Act. II Response 111. Economic defense response teams (a) In general Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall establish, in coordination with other relevant Federal departments and agencies as appropriate, a program for the creation of economic defense response teams that can provide rapid, targeted technical assistance and high-level diplomatic support to the targeted country. Such assistance and support may include the following activities: (1) Developing and implementing bilateral or multilateral contingency plans to lessen the political and economic impact of PRC economic coercion, including by surging technical assistance, diplomatic support and economic assistance, as needed, to the targeted country. (2) Encouraging senior Department of State officials to engage with United States allies and partners, the United States private sector and other relevant interlocutors in support of the targeted country, as appropriate. (3) In coordination with the targeted country, developing plans and strategies for reducing vulnerabilities and improving resilience. (4) Deploying positive public messaging campaigns to reinforce the policy independence and resilience of the targeted country and to condemn PRC economic coercion. (b) Activation of response teams Activation of an economic defense response team to support a targeted country may involve the following elements and others as the circumstances require: (1) Identification and designation of relevant personnel to the task force, including economists, data analysts, trade experts, legal experts and foreign policy and foreign assistance personnel within the United States Government with expertise relevant to the activities described in subsection (a). (2) Negotiation of memoranda of understanding or contracting mechanisms, where appropriate, with other Federal departments and agencies and the United States private sector, as needed, to ensure access to the technical assistance identified under subsection (a)(1) and expertise identified under paragraph (1). (3) Clear direction to United States diplomatic missions on the rapid and effective activation of such teams, and the establishment of appropriate liaison relationships, as appropriate, with local public and private sector officials and entities. 112. Economic Defense Response Fund (a) In general There is hereby established an Economic Defense Response Fund within the Department of State (in this section referred to as the Fund ) to provide support, including the provision of assistance or the provision of loans to facilitate the purchase or redirection of targeted goods, in particular goods of a strategic, time-sensitive, or perishable nature, in the targeted country. (b) Authorization of appropriations There is authorized to be appropriated not less than $25,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2025 through 2029 for the establishment and operation of the Fund. The Fund shall be solely administered by the Secretary of State or the Secretary’s designee, in consultation with the heads of other Departments and agencies, as appropriate. (c) Use of loans The Economic Defense Response Fund may be used to support loan programs to underwrite purchases by third parties to redirect targeted goods or services. 113. Existing authorities that may be used to respond to economic coercion The Secretary of State should use the following authorities to respond to economic coercion against a targeted country, as appropriate: (1) Requesting appropriations for foreign aid to the targeted country. (2) Requesting the necessary authority and appropriations for sovereign loan guarantees to the targeted country. (3) The waiver of policy requirements (other than policy requirements mandated by an Act of Congress) to facilitate the provision of financing to the targeted country. (4) Requesting appropriations for loan loss reserves to facilitate the provision of financing to support United States exports to the targeted country. (5) Providing technical assistance and legal expertise to support a targeted country’s response to and redress of an act or acts of PRC economic coercion. (6) Other authorities that could benefit the targeted country and that require coordination and consultation with the relevant Federal departments and agencies. 114. Sunset The authorities under this part shall expire 8 years after the date of the enactment of this Act. III Resilience 115. Office of the Chief Economist (a) In general There is established at the Department of State an Office of the Chief Economist. (b) Duties The Office will be led by the Chief Economist of the Department of State, at the Senior Executive Service or equivalent level, and shall be responsible for— (1) conducting economic research, collecting and analyzing data, and preparing reports and assessments and policy recommendations to senior Department leadership on international economic trends, opportunities, and challenges and unanticipated global developments with economic impacts; and (2) providing economic analysis to inform policy making, including related to— (A) international trade and trade policy; (B) international macroeconomics and finance; (C) economic development; (D) competition and industrial strategy; (E) economic sanctions development and implementation, and sanctions evasion; and (F) capacity building; (3) coordinating with allies and partners, other relevant agencies, departments, and stakeholders on international economic matters; (4) identifying countries vulnerable to PRC economic coercion, and analyzing commodities, products, services, and other economic linkages of each such country that may be vulnerable targets for PRC economic coercion, including examining risk factors such as— (A) perishability; (B) strategic or political value, or to regional or global supply chains; (C) proportion of the total export value for the exporting country of the product being exported to a country engaged in economic coercion; (D) potential exposure of the product to arbitrary or excessive regulatory, phytosanitary, or other safety or inspection requirements; and (E) reliance of a country on the import of such commodities, product, or services; and (5) analyzing and monitoring economic linkages to identify goods and commodities with respect to which United States allies and partners may be vulnerable to economic coercion that is informed by— (A) current market data; (B) information, including United States intelligence, on economic coercion strategies; (C) relevant data from before, during and after past instances of economic coercion; and (D) any other relevant information needed to support economic analysis and policy recommendations, including access to information technology systems which integrate and synthesize economic and related data. (c) Personnel In addition to a qualified professional Chief Economist, the Secretary of State is authorized to employ sufficient full-time equivalent individuals to fully execute the Office of the Chief Economist, including— (1) a Deputy Chief Economist, who must be a qualified professional economist; (2) at least four qualified professional economists at the GS–15 level; (3) a Chief Data Officer; (4) a Chief of Staff; (5) research economists; (6) career members of the foreign service, including program support staff; and (7) temporary staff, including fellows. (d) Authorization of appropriations There is authorized to be appropriated $5,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2025 through 2029 for the Office for personnel costs, project and data services, and limited travel funds. 116. Economic support to allies and partners (a) In general Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Undersecretary of State for Economic Growth, Energy, and the Environment, using the economic analysis as described in section 115, shall coordinate with other relevant Federal departments and agencies, as appropriate, to develop and implement a strategy to provide proactive support to partners and allies at risk of becoming target countries for PRC economic coercion. Such support may include the following activities: (1) Data and information sharing on economic risks and vulnerabilities, including specific sectors. (2) Technical support to establish proactive action plan and contingency plans to reduce the partner country’s vulnerability to coercive economic practices and limit the damage of economic coercion. (3) Implementing any bilateral or multilateral contingency plans for responding to the threat or use of PRC economic coercion. (4) Providing technical assistance to partner countries in screening foreign sovereign investment in physical and digital infrastructure, and foreign investment in other strategic sectors that may increase the partner country’s vulnerability to PRC economic coercion. (5) Funding non-governmental entities to support public conferences and reports on the use of economic coercion and options for response efforts. (b) Authorization of appropriations Of the $25,000,000 authorized in section 112(b), $5,000,000 may be allocated to the Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs to resource, staff, and implement the strategy in subsection (a). IV Coordination with allies and partners 119. Coordination with Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development members on engagement from the People’s Republic of China The Secretary of State shall coordinate with willing Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development member countries— (1) to study the effects of coercive economic practices associated with the PRC, such as those through the Belt and Road Initiative, the Digital Silk Road, and the Global Development Initiative, which may include the extent to which such practices— (A) are predatory or usurious; (B) are inconsistent with internally accepted banking and accounting practices; (C) result in low quality infrastructure that does not meet international standards; (D) incorporate conditions intended to limit transparency, including lending with conditional restrictions on debt reporting, inconsistent with the borrower’s obligations to the International Monetary Fund; and (E) provide the PRC with undue influence over the borrower in the event of the borrower’s default; (2) to create a shared set of metrics to enable evaluation of whether the PRC is engaging in the practices referred to in paragraph (1) on particular initiatives or projects, and promote transparency with respect to those actions, including a joint analysis of— (A) the PRC’s distortive economic practices, such as subsidies provided by the PRC as it pertains to state-owned enterprises and other forms of market-distorting state intervention in the PRC’s economy; and (B) the potential negative global spillovers from such practices; (3) to establish— (A) a program or plan of action for future dialogues on the PRC’s unfair economic practices; and (B) a clear understanding of common concerns and priorities among member countries with respect to such practices; and (4) to issue joint informational reports that contain the results of the data gathering efforts described in this section. V Implementation 121. Report on strategy and implementation (a) Strategy and implementation (1) In general Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on activities under this subtitle. (2) Elements The report required under paragraph (1) shall include the following elements: (A) A description of the establishment of the program authorized by section 111(a) describing the development of the program, the major elements of the program, the personnel and institutions involved, and specifics on how the program incorporates the elements described in section 111(a). (B) A description of the development and implementation of the strategy described in section 116, including— (i) the development and use of data and analytical tools by the Office of the Chief Economist in assessing potential interventions that could be pursued to address identified vulnerabilities to economic coercion in advance of such coercion or in preparation for such coercion; (ii) a strategy for public engagement before, during and after instances of economic coercion to build resilience, domestic and international support to counter such coercion; and (iii) how the Secretary of State will work with interagency stakeholders to implement the strategy required under section 116, and the potential contributions of other Federal departments and agencies to programs, initiatives, and activities that complement the Economic Defense Response Fund authorized in section 112. (b) Economic Defense Response Team reports (1) In general Not later than 90 days after the activation of an economic defense response team pursuant to section 111(b), and annually thereafter for so long as such team is active, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report describing the operations of the team with respect to the targeted country and an assessment of its effectiveness in countering the negative impact to the targeted country of PRC economic coercion. (2) Classification the report required under paragraph (1) shall be unclassified but may include a classified annex. VI Other matters 124. Developing economic tools to deter aggression against Taiwan (a) Sense of Congress It is the sense of Congress that the United States must be prepared to take immediate action to sanction any military or non-military entities owned, controlled, or acting at the direction of the Government of the PRC or the Chinese Communist Party that are supporting actions by the Government of the PRC or the Chinese Communist Party to— (1) overthrow or dismantle the governing institutions in Taiwan; (2) occupy any territory controlled or administered by Taiwan; or (3) take significant action against Taiwan, or territory controlled or administered by Taiwan, including conducting a naval blockade, seizing Taiwan’s outlying islands, or perpetrating a significant cyberattack on Taiwan. (b) Task force Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Office of the Sanctions Coordinator of the Department of State and the Office of Foreign Assets Control of the Department of the Treasury shall establish an interagency task force to identify military or non-military entities that could be sanctioned immediately following any action taken by the PRC that demonstrates an attempt to achieve or has the significant effect of achieving the physical or political control of Taiwan, including by— (1) overthrowing or dismantling the governing institutions in Taiwan; (2) occupying any territory controlled or administered by Taiwan as of the date of the enactment of this Act; or (3) taking significant action against Taiwan, or territory controlled or administered by Taiwan, including— (A) the creation of a naval blockade of Taiwan; (B) the seizure of the outlying islands of Taiwan; or (C) the initiation of a significant cyberattack that threatens civilian or military infrastructure of Taiwan. (c) Strategy Not later than 180 days following the establishment of the task force required under subsection (b), the task force shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a strategy for identifying targets that— (1) assesses how existing sanctions programs could be used following any action taken by the PRC that demonstrates an attempt to achieve, or has the significant effect of achieving, the physical or political control of Taiwan as described in subsection (b); (2) develops or proposes, as appropriate, new sanctions authorities that might be required to impose sanctions on targets identified under this section; (3) analyzes the potential economic consequences to the United States, and to allies and partners of the United States, of various types of such sanctions and to assess measures that could be taken to mitigate such consequences, including through the use of licenses, exemptions, carve-outs, and other approaches; (4) includes coordination with allies and partners to— (A) leverage sanctions and other economic tools to deter or respond to aggression against Taiwan; (B) identify and resolve potential impediments to coordinating sanctions-related efforts; and (C) identify industries, sectors, or goods and services where the United States and allies and partners can take coordinated action through sanctions, or other economic tools that will have a significant negative impact on the economy of the PRC; (5) assesses the resource gaps and needs at the Department of State and the Department of the Treasury, and other Federal departments and agencies, as appropriate, to most effectively use sanctions and other economic tools to respond to the threat posed by the PRC; (6) recommends how best to target sanctions and other economic tools against individuals, entities, and economic sectors in the PRC, taking into account the role of such targets in supporting Government of the PRC or Chinese Communist Party policies and activities that pose a threat to the national security or foreign policy interests of the United States, the negative economic implications for the PRC, including its ability to achieve its objectives with respect to Taiwan, and the potential impact of such sanctions on the stability of the global financial system, including with regard to— (A) state-owned enterprises; (B) government officials; (C) financial institutions associated with the government; and (D) PRC companies not formally designated by the Government of the PRC as state-owned enterprises; (7) identifies any foreign military or non-military entities that would likely be used by the PRC in any action taken that demonstrates an attempt to achieve any, or has the significant effect of achieving, the physical or political control of Taiwan, as described in subsection (b), including entities in— (A) shipping; (B) logistics; (C) energy, including oil and gas; (D) aviation; (E) ground transportation; and (F) technology; (8) describes policies, to be applied in the event of any PRC coercive action, including an invasion by the PRC that fringes upon the territorial sovereignty of Taiwan by preventing access to international waterways, airspace, or telecommunications networks, to— (A) restrict the access of the People’s Liberation Army to oil, natural gas, munitions, and other supplies needed to conduct military operations against Taiwan, United States facilities in the Indo-Pacific and Indian Oceans, and allies and partners of the United States in the region; (B) diminish the capacity of the industrial base of the PRC to manufacture and deliver defense articles to replace those lost in operations of the People’s Liberation Army against Taiwan, the United States, and allies and partners of the United States; and (C) inhibit the ability of the PRC to evade United States and multilateral sanctions through third parties, including through secondary sanctions; and (9) identifies tactics used by the Government of the PRC to influence the public in the United States and Taiwan through propaganda and disinformation campaigns, including such campaigns focused on delegitimizing Taiwan or legitimizing a forceful action by the PRC against Taiwan. (d) Report (1) In general Not later than 180 days after the submission of the strategy required under subsection (c), the President shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on potential sources of leverage against the PRC and recommendations to reduce United States vulnerabilities. The report shall— (A) identify goods and services from the United States that are relied on by the PRC such that reliance presents a strategic opportunity and source of leverage against the PRC, including during a conflict; (B) identify procurement practices of the United States Government, and critical sectors within the United States economy, that are reliant on trade with the PRC and other inputs from the PRC (including drugs and active pharmaceutical ingredients, critical minerals, and metallurgical inputs) such that those sectors present a strategic vulnerability and source of leverage that the Chinese Communist Party or the PRC could exploit, including during a conflict; and (C) includes recommendations to Congress on steps that can be taken to reduce the sources of leverage described in subparagraph (B), including through— (i) provision of economic incentives and making other trade and contracting reforms to support United States industry in critical sectors and to indigenize production of critical resources; and (ii) policies to facilitate near- or friend-shoring , or otherwise developing strategies to facilitate that process with allies and partners of the United States, in other sectors for which domestic reshoring would prove infeasible for any reason. (2) Form The report submitted under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in an unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. 125. Intellectual property violators list (a) In general Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, and not less frequently than annually thereafter for 8 years, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the heads of other Federal departments and agencies as the President determines appropriate, shall create a list (referred to in this section as the intellectual property violators list ) that identifies— (1) all state-owned enterprises incorporated in the PRC that have benefitted from— (A) a significant act or series of acts of intellectual property theft that caused significant harm to an economic sector of the United States or a company, partnership or entity incorporated or organized in the United States or group or association of such entities; or (B) an act or government policy of involuntary or coerced technology transfer of intellectual property owned by an entity identified company incorporated in the United States; and (2) any foreign person with operational control of an entity described in paragraph (1), including senior corporate officers and principal shareholders of the entity. (b) Rules for identification To determine whether there is a credible basis for determining that an entity should be included on the intellectual property violators list, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the departments and agencies specified in subsection (a) shall consider— (1) any final adjudication by a court of competent authority in the United States that the entity has violated relevant United States laws intended to protect intellectual property rights; or (2) substantial and credible information received from any entity described in subsection (c) or other interested persons. (c) Consultation In carrying out this section, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the departments and agencies specified in subsection (a), may consult, as necessary and appropriate, with— (1) other Federal agencies, including independent agencies; (2) entities in the private sector, including trade associations; (3) civil society organizations with relevant expertise; and (4) allies and partners of the United States. (d) Reports (1) In general Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 8 years, the Secretary of State shall publish in the Federal Register a report that— (A) lists the entities identified pursuant to subsection (a)(1) and the corporate officers of such entities identified pursuant to subsection (a)(2); (B) describes the circumstances surrounding acts or policies described in subsection (a)(1), including any role of the Government of the PRC; (C) assesses, to the extent practicable, the economic advantage derived by the entities identified pursuant to subsection (a)(1); and (D) assesses whether each entity described in subsection (a)(1) is using or has used stolen intellectual property in commercial activity within the sovereign jurisdiction of the United States. (2) Classified report Concurrent with publication of the reports required under paragraph (1), the Secretary of State shall submit to the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate and the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives a classified version of the report that includes greater detail and intelligence about the information specified in subparagraphs (A) through (D) of paragraph (1). (e) Requirement To protect confidential business information (1) In general The Secretary of State and the head of any other Federal agency involved in the production of the intellectual property violators list shall protect from disclosure any proprietary information submitted by a private sector party and marked as confidential business information, unless the party submitting the information— (A) had notice, at the time of submission, that such information would be disclosed by the Secretary; (B) subsequently consents to the disclosure of such information; or (C) is an entity listed on the intellectual property violators list. (2) Inclusion in classified version of report If confidential business information is provided by a private sector party in connection with the production of the intellectual property violators list, the Secretary of State shall include such information in the classified version of the report under subsection (d)(2). (3) Treatment as trade secrets Proprietary information submitted by a private sector party (except an entity listed on the intellectual property violators list) under this section— (A) shall be considered to be trade secrets and commercial or financial information exempt under subsection (b)(4) of section 552 of title 5, United States Code, from being made available to the public under subsection (a) of that section; and (B) shall be exempt from disclosure without the express approval of the party. 126. Report on subsidies provided by the Government of the People’s Republic of China (a) Report Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 10 years, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the United States Trade Representative and the Secretary of Commerce, shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report that identifies— (1) patterns of direct and indirect subsidies provided by the central, provincial, or local governments of the PRC to state-owned enterprises and private entities under the direction or control of the Government of the PRC operating in economic sectors deemed by the Government of the PRC to be strategic sectors, including by identifying such sectors in major policy initiatives or by inclusion in the Chinese Communist Party’s five-year plans; (2) discriminatory, non-market treatment favoring state-owned and private enterprises in the PRC and disadvantaging foreign market participants; (3) any impacts that the activities outlined in paragraphs (1) and (2) have on United States national security and economic competitiveness; and (4) any coordination with foreign allies and partners to address the impacts of the activities outlined in paragraphs (1) and (2). (b) Elements of report In compiling the report under subsection (a), the Secretary of State shall consider— (1) regulatory and other policies enacted or promoted by the central government of the PRC that— (A) discriminate in favor of enterprises in the PRC that disadvantage foreign market participants; (B) shield centrally administered, state-owned enterprises from competition; or (C) otherwise suppress market-based competition; (2) financial subsidies, including subsidized loans or below-market lending terms, from or promoted by the central, provincial, or local governments of the PRC or state-owned enterprises in the PRC that materially benefit enterprises in the PRC over foreign market participants in contravention of generally accepted market principles; (3) any subsidy that meets the definition of subsidy under article 1 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures referred to in section 101(d)(12) of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act ( 19 U.S.C. 3511(d)(12) ); (4) any impacts that the activities outlined in paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) have on United States national security and economic competitiveness; and (5) any coordination with foreign allies and partners to address the impacts of the activities outlined in paragraphs (1), (2), and (3). (c) Form of report Each report required by subsection (a) may be submitted in classified form. (d) Consultation In carrying out this section, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Commerce and the United States Trade Representative, may, as necessary and appropriate, consult with— (1) other Federal agencies, including independent agencies; (2) the private sector; and (3) civil society organizations with relevant expertise. B Economic engagement with allies and partners I Investing in economic engagement in the Global South 131. Investing in talent in Southeast Asia, the Pacific Islands, sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin America (a) Definitions In this section: (1) Latin America and the Caribbean In this section, the term Latin America and the Caribbean does not include Cuba, Nicaragua, or Venezuela. (2) Pacific Islands The term Pacific Islands means the nations of Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Republic of Marshall Islands, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu. (3) Southeast Asia The term Southeast Asia means the nations of Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, and Timor-Leste. (4) Sub-Saharan Africa The term sub-Saharan Africa means a country or successor political entity defined in section 107 of the African Growth and Opportunity Act ( 19 U.S.C. 3706 ). (b) Establishment of centers of excellence The Secretary of State, in coordination with the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development and, as appropriate, the heads of other relevant Federal departments and agencies, is authorized to enter into public-private partnerships and establish centers of excellence located in countries in Southeast Asia, Pacific Islands, sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin America and the Caribbean to build and enhance the technical capacity of officials, emerging leaders, and other qualified persons from countries in those regions. (c) Priority areas for technical assistance and capacity building The centers of excellence established under subsection (b) shall provide technical assistance and capacity building in areas, such as the following: (1) Domestic resource mobilization. (2) Regulatory management. (3) Procurement processes, including tendering, bidding, and contract negotiation. (4) Budget management and oversight. (5) Management of key economic sectors, including energy, digital economy, and infrastructure. (6) Project appraisal. (7) Sovereign financial management. (d) Terms and conditions The program authorized under this section shall— (1) leverage existing United States programs and activities in Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin America, which may include assistance provided under— (A) future leaders initiatives, such as the Young Southeast Asia Leaders Initiative and the Young Pacific Leaders Program; (B) the United States Agency for International Development’s American Schools and Hospitals Abroad (USAID/AHSA) initiative; (C) the Millennium Challenge Act of 2003 ( 22 U.S.C. 7701 et seq. ); (D) U.S.-Support for Economic Growth in Asia (US–SEGA); (E) programs related to the Asia-Pacific Economic Community (APEC); (F) the Young African Leaders Initiative; (G) the Young Leaders of the Americas Initiative; and (H) other relevant education or scholarship programs; (2) be supported by instructors that— (A) (i) currently serve in relevant areas of the United States Government with a rank of not less than 14 on the GS scale; or (ii) possess at least ten years of experience relevant to the areas of instruction identified in subsection (c); (B) meet high professional standards within their fields; and (C) (i) are contracted by any center of excellence established pursuant to subsection (b); or (ii) are deployed or detailed directly from a Federal Government agency; (3) seek to attract participants who— (A) (i) are currently senior or mid-career officials in key technical ministries of participating countries in Southeast Asia, the Pacific Islands, sub-Saharan Africa, or Latin America and the Caribbean; (ii) have demonstrated leadership potential and direct responsibility for crafting or implementing policies relevant to the areas of instruction described under subsection (c); or (iii) demonstrate an intent to return to government service after completing the program outlined in this section; or (B) are currently employed in utilities, publicly or privately owned companies, or other non-government entities with responsibility for implementing policy and regulation or supporting government functions in the areas of instruction described under subsection (c); and (4) require financial or in-kind contributions from participating governments, commensurate with the gross domestic product of the countries. (e) Authorization To enter agreements and non-Binding instruments To fulfill the terms and conditions specified by subsection (d), the Secretary of State is authorized to enter agreements and non-binding instruments with participating governments to determine what financial or in-kind contributions will be made by the United States and what financial or in-kind contributions will be made by the participating government with respect to the activities described in this section. (f) Authorization of appropriations There is authorized to be appropriated $45,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2025 through 2029 to carry out this section. 132. Enhancing United States-Africa trade and investment for prosperity (a) Statement of policy It is the policy of the United States to increase United States investment in Africa and to promote and facilitate trade between the United States and Africa, focused on key countries and sectors, that supports mutual economic growth and development outcomes, long-term development of markets, and the strategic interests of the United States. (b) Office To coordinate policy (1) Establishment The President shall establish an office, to be known as the Prosper Africa Office, and assign it to a bureau within the United States Agency for International Development to coordinate the activities of the United States Government related to increasing trade and investment between the United States and Africa, which should include representation from relevant agencies as designated by the President. (2) Duties The office established pursuant to paragraph (1) shall— (A) identify priority countries or sectors as appropriate for United States foreign investment in countries in Africa and sectors and countries that support United States economic growth and promotes trade based on the analysis required under subsection (c); (B) coordinate activities and implementing mechanisms, including at United States embassies in Africa, to carry out the policy set forth in subsection (a), including by— (i) providing program support and guidance to implement the policy in subsection (a); (ii) providing information and analysis to United States companies and investors in countries and sectors identified in subparagraph (A); and (iii) serving, as needed, as an information clearinghouse for the United States Government for businesses, investors, and civic organizations, and others in the United States seeking information related to investing in Africa, and connecting them with teams at United States embassies overseas; and (C) identify barriers to trade and investment in priority countries and sectors, and identify concrete actions to address them, including strengthening programs and activities aimed at improving the enabling environment in those countries. (3) Organization (A) In general The office established under paragraph (1) shall be led by an Executive Director who shall be designated by the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, and who shall— (i) coordinate interagency efforts related to paragraph (2); (ii) identify, not later than 90 days after the release of the analysis required under subsection (c), a list of priority countries for the purposes of carrying out this section; (iii) plan, coordinate, and oversee the policies, activities, and programs of United States Government agencies, in the United States and in overseas missions, involved in promoting or facilitating trade and investment activities between the United States and Africa and development and coordination of relevant activities meant to improve the enabling environment; (iv) identify and provide information about investment opportunities, market information, and United States Government programs to support trade and investment activities in priority countries and sectors identified pursuant to paragraph (2)(A); and (v) not less than 4 times per year, convene a committee consisting of the directors from each agency designated under subparagraph (B) to provide strategic guidance and coordination for the policy, programs, and activities of the office. (B) Designation of agencies The President shall designate Federal departments and agencies to participate in support of the policy set forth in subsection (a), and direct the head of each designated agency to— (i) designate an employee to serve as a focal point for the agency’s respective activities related to subsection (a), who shall coordinate the relevant activities of the agency and liaise with the Executive Director designated pursuant to subparagraph (A); and (ii) designate an employee to serve at United States embassies in priority countries identified pursuant to subsection (b)(2)(A). (4) Staffing In order to carry out this section— (A) the Executive Director shall have the authority, as appropriate, to hire employees and contractors in a manner that is consistent with existing hiring authorities of USAID to support the execution of efforts described in paragraph (3)(A), and shall be supported, as appropriate, by staff detailed from any Federal department or agency designated pursuant to paragraph (3)(B); and (B) the Chief of Mission in relevant Sub-Saharan and North Africa countries— (i) shall take an active and direct leadership role in promoting, supporting, and facilitating activities pursuant to this section; (ii) shall designate a Foreign Service Officer, Foreign Commercial Service Officer, or other direct hire person under Chief of Mission authority to lead an interagency team to support activities pursuant to this section, who shall— (I) conduct assessments of market conditions and business operating environments; (II) identify investment opportunities; (III) foster relationships and communications between United States investors and businesses and African businesses and individuals within their country of responsibility; and (IV) carry out other duties as necessary; and (iii) is authorized to hire locally employed staff with relevant experience to support the activities of the office established pursuant to this subsection. (c) Market and sector analysis (1) In general Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 4 years thereafter until 2031, the Executive Director shall commission and publish a study every 4 years of the investment environment in Africa that incorporates the following elements: (A) An analysis of which markets are the most promising for private investment. (B) An analysis of African markets that identifies which industries and sectors United States firms have an advantage in comparison to other sources of foreign direct investment. (C) An analysis of perceived and actual barriers to United States private investment, including— (i) significant legal and regulatory constraints to foreign investment and business operating environments; (ii) reputational risks; (iii) investor information gaps; and (iv) access to and affordability of capital, labor markets, currency volatility, and infrastructure. (2) Authority To produce the study required under paragraph (1), the Executive Director is authorized to engage the services of a qualified United States private sector consultant or subject matter expert. (3) Submission and publication The Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development shall submit each study required under paragraph (1) to the appropriate committees of Congress and shall make the study publicly available. (4) Determination of priority countries The Executive Director shall determine the priority countries and sectors for purposes of subsection (b)(2)(A)(i) based on the findings of the report required under this subsection. (d) Small and medium enterprises The office shall, to the extent practicable, promote and facilitate investments in small and medium enterprises, including by establishing and supporting relationships between United States Government institutions, philanthropic institutions, and private lenders to mobilize blended finance for small and medium enterprises in Africa. (e) Support for diaspora investment The office shall seek to support and facilitate investments in Africa by United States citizens and residents who identify as members of the African diaspora. (f) President’s Advisory Council on Africa Diaspora Engagement in the United States (1) In general The Executive Director shall consult with the President’s Advisory Council on African Diaspora Engagement in the United States (referred to in this subsection as the Council ) established by Executive Order 14089 on issues relating to increasing, developing, and sustaining investments in Africa by United States members of the African diaspora. (2) Membership The Executive Director shall consult with the Chairman and Ranking Member of the appropriate committees of Congress in developing recommendations to the President of not less than 3 persons for appointment to the Council who have significant relevant experience in the fields of trade, private investment, economics, international development, or other relevant fields. (3) Duties The Council shall publish an annual report on investment in Africa by United States members of the African diaspora and barriers to increased investment by the diaspora. (4) Diaspora business forums The Executive Director shall organize public meetings throughout the United States with members of the African diaspora community that— (A) provide a forum for communication, education, and information about investment opportunities; and (B) as appropriate, may be coordinated with local civic, community, and business organizations. (g) Business-Enabling environment The Executive Director, in coordination with the respective Chiefs of Mission at designated United States embassies, shall seek to strengthen the business-enabling environment in Africa by— (1) identifying barriers to United States investment on a country-by-country basis; (2) identifying existing development and technical assistance programs that can serve to eliminate the barriers identified under paragraph (1); (3) ensuring Country Development Cooperation Strategies and Regional Development Cooperation Strategies incorporate programs and activities focused on addressing specific barriers to private sector investment identified under paragraph (1); and (4) providing policy advice and technical assistance to select African countries to develop and improve regulatory and legal structures, taxation and customs regimes, policy frameworks, and other relevant structures and practices to improve the operating environments for businesses and eliminate other barriers to competition. 133. Increasing the competitiveness of the United States in Africa The Comptroller General of the United States shall— (1) conduct a review of the number of Foreign Commercial Service Officers and Department of State Economic Officers at United States embassies in sub-Saharan Africa; and (2) develop and submit to the appropriate committees of Congress an assessment of whether human resource capacity in such embassies is adequate to meet the goals of the various trade and economic programs and initiatives in Africa, including the African Growth and Opportunity Act ( 19 U.S.C. 3701 et seq. ) and Prosper Africa. 134. Support for Bangladesh democracy and labor rights programs (a) In general The Secretary of State is authorized to provide assistance under the Foreign Assistance Act to support and develop programs in Bangladesh that promote or expand— (1) freedom of expression, including in the media, by— (A) supporting media personnel who are victims of arbitrary arrests and legal harassment about educating them about their rights and resources under Bangladeshi law; and (B) education and training for media personnel on how to promote democratic values in a restrictive environment; (2) access to labor rights, including— (A) strengthened legal and policy frameworks to protect workers seeking redress for gender-based violence; and (B) strengthened legal and policy frameworks for migrant workers; and (3) improved working conditions, including in Bangladesh’s Ready Made Garment (RMG) sector. (b) Authorization of appropriations There is authorized to be appropriated $10,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2025 through 2027 for the Secretary of State to carry out this section, which upon appropriation shall remain available until expended. 135. Support for anti-corruption programs and other programs to address impunity and justice in Sri Lanka (a) Sense of Congress It is the sense of Congress that— (1) democracy, respect for human rights, justice and reconciliation, and economic prosperity in Sri Lanka are critical for the Sri Lankan people and to safeguard United States interests in the Indo-Pacific; (2) numerous factors contributed to Sri Lanka’s economic crisis, including government corruption, financial mismanagement, and disproportionate military expenditures at the expense of other public policy priorities; and (3) despite being a recipient of 16 International Monetary Fund loans, the Government of Sri Lanka has failed to address their governance and economic issues given their predatory lending, inability to tackle corruption, government impunity for atrocities and justice for victims of atrocities, and other abuses of human rights. (b) Statement of policy It shall be the policy of the United States to— (1) support the peaceful, democratic, and economic aspirations of the people of Sri Lanka; and (2) call on the Government of Sri Lanka to address the recommendations of the International Monetary Fund of the need to address corruption and to hold officials accountable for past behaviors in order to address the dire governance and economic concerns in Sri Lanka. (c) Authorization The Secretary of State is authorized to provide assistance to support and develop programs in Sri Lanka to address public sector corruption, support accountability for those responsible for atrocities, and promote justice for victims of atrocities. (d) Authorization of appropriations There is authorized to be appropriated $5,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2025 through 2027 for the Secretary of State to carry out this section, which shall remain available until expended. II Aligning with partners on economic tools 141. Assistance to advance foreign investment screening of United States allies and partners to protect national interests (a) Technical assistance to foreign partners The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury and, as appropriate, the heads of other Federal departments and agencies as the President determines appropriate, shall offer to provide technical assistance to the governments of countries that are allies and partners of the United States in establishing or improving legislative and regulatory frameworks to screen foreign investment for national security risks that are, to the extent possible, similar to the frameworks set forth in section 721 of the Defense Production Act of 1950 ( 50 U.S.C. 4565 ). (b) Engagement with foreign partners In carrying out subsection (a), the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury and, as appropriate, the heads of other Federal departments and agencies, shall actively encourage the government of each country that is an ally or partner of the United States— (1) to establish transparent protocols for screening foreign investment that protect the national security interests of such country; and (2) to make decisions on the basis of the potential national security risk of such investments. (c) Diplomatic engagement In providing the technical assistance described in subsection (b), the Secretary of State shall— (1) consult closely with the intended recipient of such assistance to reach a mutual understanding regarding the scope and nature of the country’s particular national security needs with respect to investment screening and the appropriate response to meet those needs, and take all reasonable care to ensure any screening process is transparent and national security-focused; (2) encourage governments of countries receiving technical assistance to establish or improve the regulatory and legislative frameworks to screen foreign investment as described in subsection (b) to meet the security identified pursuant to paragraph (1); and (3) prioritize the conduct of diplomatic engagement with government officials, including legislators, from countries whose cooperation in foreign investment screening is deemed by the Secretary to be critical to the interests of the United States. (d) Authorization of appropriations There is authorized to be appropriated to the Department of State for fiscal year 2025 $10,000,000 to carry out this section, which may be administered either by the Department of State or the United States Agency for International Development. 142. Assistance to counter corrupt practices in foreign countries The Secretary of State, in consultation with the heads of other Federal departments and agencies as appropriate, shall offer to provide technical assistance to help establish and implement regulatory and legislative frameworks to combat the bribery of foreign public officials consistent with the principles of the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, adopted by the Negotiating Conference of the Council of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development on November 21, 1997, to the government of any country— (1) that is an ally or partner of the United States; (2) that has demonstrated a will to responsibly combat corrupt practices in such country; and (3) for which technical assistance will likely achieve measurable results within five years. 143. Regulatory exchanges with allies and partners (a) In general The Secretary of State, in coordination with the heads of other participating Federal agencies, shall establish and develop a program to facilitate and encourage regular dialogues between United States Government regulatory and technical agencies and their counterpart organizations in allied and partner countries, both bilaterally and in relevant multilateral institutions and organizations— (1) to promote best practices in regulatory formation and implementation; (2) to collaborate to achieve optimal regulatory outcomes based on scientific, technical, and other relevant principles; (3) to seek better harmonization and alignment of regulations and regulatory practices; (4) to build consensus around industry and technical standards in emerging sectors that will drive future global economic growth and commerce; and (5) to promote United States standards regarding environmental, labor, and other relevant protections in regulatory formation and implementation, in keeping with the values of free, open, and democratic societies, including the rule of law. (b) Prioritization of activities In facilitating expert exchanges under subsection (a), the Secretary shall prioritize— (1) bilateral coordination and collaboration with countries where greater regulatory coherence, harmonization of standards, or communication and dialogue between technical agencies is achievable and best advances the economic and national security interests of the United States; (2) multilateral coordination and collaboration where greater regulatory coherence, harmonization of standards, or dialogue on other relevant regulatory matters is achievable and best advances the economic and national security interests of the United States, including with the members of— (A) the European Union; (B) the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation; (C) the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN); (D) the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD); (E) the Pacific Alliance; and (F) multilateral development banks; and (3) regulatory practices and standards-setting bodies focused on key economic sectors and emerging technologies. (c) Participation by nongovernmental entities With regard to the program described in subsection (a), the Secretary of State may facilitate, including through the use of amounts authorized for such purposes pursuant to subsection (d), the participation of relevant organizations and individuals with relevant expertise, as appropriate and to the extent that such participation advances the goals of such program. (d) Authorization of appropriations There is authorized to be appropriated $2,500,000 for each of fiscal years 2025 through 2029 to carry out this section. 144. Pilot program to audit barriers to commerce in developing partner countries (a) Establishment The Secretary of State, in coordination with the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, shall establish a pilot program— (1) to identify and evaluate barriers to commerce in developing countries that are allies and partners of the United States; and (2) to provide assistance to promote economic development and commerce to those countries. (b) Purposes Under the pilot program established under subsection (a), the Secretary shall, in partnership with the countries selected under subsection (c)(1)— (1) identify barriers in those countries to enhancing international commerce with the goal of setting priorities for the efficient use of United States trade-related assistance; (2) focus United States trade-related assistance on building self-sustaining institutional capacity for expanding commerce with those countries, consistent with their international obligations and commitments; and (3) further the national interests of the United States by— (A) expanding prosperity through the elimination of foreign barriers to commercial exchange; (B) assisting such countries to identify and reduce barriers through the provision of foreign assistance to increase— (i) international commerce; and (ii) foreign investment; (C) assisting each such country in undertaking reforms that will promote economic development, and promote conditions favorable for business and commercial development and job growth in the country; and (D) assisting private sector entities in those countries to engage in reform efforts and enhance productive global supply chain partnerships with the United States and allies and partners of the United States. (c) Selection of countries (1) In general The Secretary shall select countries for participation in the pilot program established under subsection (a) from among countries— (A) that are developing countries and allies and partners of the United States; (B) the governments of which have clearly demonstrated a willingness to make appropriate legal, policy, and regulatory reforms that are proven to stimulate economic growth and job creation, consistent with international trade rules and practices; and (C) that meet such additional criteria as may be established by the Secretary, in consultation with, as appropriate, the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development and any other agency. (2) Considerations for additional criteria In establishing additional criteria under paragraph (1)(C), the Secretary and the Administrator shall— (A) identify and address structural weaknesses, systemic flaws, or other impediments within countries that may be considered for participation in the pilot program under subsection (a) that impact the effectiveness of United States assistance to and make recommendations for addressing those weaknesses, flaws, and impediments; (B) set priorities for commercial development assistance building to focus resources on countries where the provision of such assistance can deliver the best value in identifying and eliminating barriers to trade and investment, including by fostering adherence to international trade obligations; (C) developing appropriate performance measures and establishing annual targets to monitor and assess progress toward those targets, including measures to be used to terminate the provision of assistance determined to be ineffective; and (D) ensure representation from across multiple geographic regions. (3) Number and deadline for selections (A) In general Not later than 270 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 3 years, the Secretary, with the concurrence of the Administrator, shall select countries under paragraph (1) for participation in the pilot program under subsection (a). (B) Number The Secretary shall select for participation in the pilot program under subsection (a)— (i) not fewer than 5 countries during the one-year period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act; and (ii) not fewer than 15 countries during the 5-year period beginning on such date of enactment. (4) Prioritization based on recommendations from chiefs of mission In selecting countries under paragraph (1) for participation in the pilot program under subsection (a), the Secretary shall prioritize— (A) countries recommended by chiefs of mission and other agencies present at the missions, such as the United States Agency for International Development— (i) that will be able to substantially benefit from expanded commercial development assistance; and (ii) the governments of which have demonstrated the political will to effectively and sustainably implement such assistance; or (B) groups of countries, including groups of geographically contiguous countries, including as recommended by chiefs of mission, that meet the criteria under subparagraph (A) and as a result of expanded United States commercial development assistance, will contribute to greater intra-regional commerce or regional economic integration. (d) Plans of action (1) In general The Secretary, in consultation with the Administrator, as appropriate, shall lead in engaging relevant officials of each country selected under subsection (c)(1) to participate in the pilot program under subsection (a) with respect to the development of a plan of action to identify and evaluate barriers to economic and commercial development that then informs United States assistance. (2) Analysis required The development of a plan of action under paragraph (1) shall include a comprehensive analysis of relevant legal, policy, and regulatory constraints to economic and job growth in that country. (3) Elements A plan of action developed under paragraph (1) for a country shall include the following: (A) Priorities for reform agreed to by the government of that country and the United States. (B) Clearly defined policy responses, including regulatory and legal reforms, as necessary, to achieve improvement in the business and commercial environment in the country. (C) Identification of the anticipated costs to establish and implement the plan. (D) Identification of appropriate sequencing and phasing of implementation of the plan to create cumulative benefits, as appropriate. (E) Identification of best practices and standards. (F) Considerations with respect to how to make the policy reform investments under the plan long-lasting. (G) Appropriate consultation with affected stakeholders in that country and in the United States. (e) Termination The pilot program established under subsection (a) shall terminate on the date that is 8 years after the date of the enactment of this Act. 145. Strategy for promoting supply chain diversification (a) Strategy The Secretary of State, in consultation with the heads of other relevant Federal agencies, as determined by the Secretary, shall develop, implement, and submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a strategy to increase supply chain resiliency and security by promoting and strengthening efforts to incentivize the relocation of supply chains from the PRC. (b) Elements The strategy required under subsection (a) shall— (1) be informed by consultations with the governments of allies and partners of the United States; (2) provide a description of how supply chain diversification can be pursued in a complementary fashion to strengthen the national interests of the United States; (3) include an assessment of— (A) the status and effectiveness of current efforts by governments, multilateral development banks, and the private sector to attract investment by private entities who are seeking to diversify from reliance on the PRC; (B) major challenges hindering those efforts; and (C) how the United States can strengthen the effectiveness of those efforts; (4) identify United States allies and partners with comparative advantages for sourcing and manufacturing critical goods and countries with the greatest opportunities and alignment with United States values; (5) identify how activities by the United States Agency for International Development, the United States Trade and Development Administration, and the United States International Development Finance Corporation can effectively be leveraged to strengthen and promote supply chain diversification, including nearshoring to Latin America and the Caribbean as appropriate; (6) advance diplomatic initiatives to secure specific national commitments by governments in Latin America and the Caribbean to undertake efforts to create favorable conditions for nearshoring in the region, including commitments— (A) to develop formalized national strategies to attract United States investment; (B) to address corruption and rule of law concerns; (C) to modernize digital and physical infrastructure; (D) to lower trade barriers; (E) to improve ease of doing business; and (F) to finance and incentivize nearshoring initiatives; (7) advance diplomatic initiatives towards mutual recognition of standards and regulations, expedite customs operations, and facilitate economic integration and the World Trade Organization Trade Facilitation Agreement; and (8) develop and implement programs to finance, incentivize, or otherwise promote supply chain diversification in accordance with the assessments and identifications made pursuant to paragraphs (3), (4), and (5), including, at minimum, programs— (A) to develop physical and digital infrastructure; (B) to promote transparency in procurement processes; (C) to provide technical assistance in implementing national nearshoring strategies; (D) to mobilize private investment; and (E) to secure commitments by private sector entities to relocate supply chains from the PRC. (c) Coordination with multilateral development banks In implementing the strategy required under subsection (a), the Secretary of State and the heads of other relevant Federal agencies, as determined by the Secretary, should, as appropriate, coordinate with the United States Executive Director to the World Bank Group and the United States executive directors to regional development banks. 146. Authorization to assist United States companies with global supply chain diversification and management (a) Authorization To contract services The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Commerce, is authorized to establish a program to facilitate contracting by the Department of State for the professional services of qualified experts, on a reimbursable fee-for-service basis, to assist interested United States persons, including business entities, with supply chain management issues related to the PRC, including— (1) exiting from the market of the PRC or relocating certain production facilities to locations outside the PRC; (2) diversifying sources of inputs and other efforts to diversify supply chains to locations outside of the PRC; (3) navigating legal, regulatory, or other challenges in the course of activities described in paragraphs (1) and (2); and (4) identifying alternative markets for production or sourcing outside of the PRC, including through providing market intelligence, facilitating contact with reliable local partners as appropriate, and other services. (b) Chief of Mission oversight An individual hired to perform services described in subsection (a) shall— (1) be under the authority of the United States chief of mission in the country in which the individual is hired, in accordance with existing United States laws; (2) coordinate with officers of the Department of State and the Department of Commerce; and (3) coordinate with United States missions and relevant local partners in other countries as needed to provide those services. (c) Prioritization of micro-, small-, and medium-Sized enterprises In carrying out the program authorized under subsection (a), the Secretary shall prioritize the provision of services described in that subsection to assist micro-, small-, and medium-sized enterprises with supply chain management issues described in that subsection. (d) Authorization of appropriations There is authorized to be appropriated to the Department of State $15,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2025 through 2029 for the purposes of carrying out this section. (e) Prohibition on access to assistance by the PRC (1) In general None of the funds appropriated pursuant to the authorization of appropriations under subsection (d) may be provided to an entity— (A) under the foreign ownership, control, or influence of the Government of the PRC or the Chinese Communist Party; (B) determined to have beneficial ownership from foreign individuals subject to the jurisdiction, direction, or influence of the PRC; or (C) that, at the time any of such funds would be provided, has a contract in effect, or has had a contract in effect in the preceding year, with— (i) the Government of the PRC; (ii) the Chinese Communist Party; (iii) the Chinese military; (iv) an entity majority-owned, majority-controlled, or majority-financed by the Government of the PRC, the Chinese Communist Party, or the Chinese military; or (v) a parent, subsidiary, or affiliate of an entity specified in any of clauses (i) through (iv). (2) Foreign ownership, control, or influence defined In this subsection, the term foreign ownership, control, or influence has the meaning given that term in the National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual (DOD 5220.22–M), or a successor document, part 117 of title 32, Code of Federal Regulations (or a successor regulation). 147. Enhancing transatlantic cooperation on promoting private sector finance (a) In general The President should work with transatlantic partners to enhance coordination that fosters private sector-led development and provides market-based alternatives to state-directed financing in emerging markets, particularly as related to the PRC’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Global Development Initiative (GDI), including by supporting efforts, including— (1) the 2023 MOU between the Development Finance Corporation and the European Investment Bank; (2) the European Union Strategy on Connecting Europe and Asia; (3) the Three Seas Initiative and Three Seas Initiative Investment Fund; (4) a European Union-Japan initiative that has leveraged $65,000,000,000 for infrastructure projects and emphasizes transparency standards; (5) the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment; and (6) cooperation with multilateral development banks and international financial institutions, including the World Bank, International Finance Corporation, Asian Development Bank, Inter-American Development Bank, and other regional multilateral development banks. (b) Cooperation at the United Nations The United States should coordinate efforts with the European Union and European countries to address the Government of the PRC’s use of the United Nations to advance and legitimize BRI as a global good, including the proliferation of memoranda of understanding between the PRC and United Nations funds and programs on BRI implementation. (c) Standards The United States and the European Union should coordinate and develop a strategy to enhance transatlantic cooperation with the OECD and the Paris Club to provide alternatives to BRI projects for the development of critical infrastructure, including by enabling developing countries to negotiate more favorable terms that meet international performance and transparency standards. III Countering efforts to undermine international economic organizations 151. International Monetary Fund new arrangements to borrow Section 17(a)(6) of the Bretton Woods Agreements Act ( 22 U.S.C. 286e–2(a)(6) ) is amended by striking December 31, 2025 and inserting December 31, 2030 . 152. Participation of Taiwan in Inter-American Development Bank (a) Sense of Congress It is the sense of Congress that— (1) the United States fully supports Taiwan’s participation in, and contribution to, international organizations and underscores the importance of the relationship between Taiwan and the United States; (2) diversifying the Inter-American Development Bank’s donor base and increasing ally engagement in the Western Hemisphere reinforces United States national interests; (3) Taiwan’s significant contribution to the development and economies of Latin America and the Caribbean demonstrate that Taiwan’s membership in the Inter-American Development Bank as a non-borrowing member would benefit the Bank and the entire Latin American and Caribbean region; and (4) non-borrowing membership in the Inter-American Development Bank would allow Taiwan to substantially leverage and channel the immense resources Taiwan already provides to Latin America and the Caribbean to reach a larger number of beneficiaries. (b) Plan for the participation of Taiwan in the Inter-American Development Bank The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, as appropriate, is authorized— (1) to initiate a United States plan to endorse non-borrowing membership in the Inter-American Development Bank for Taiwan, including by advancing amendments, as necessary, to the Agreement Establishing the Inter-American Development Bank, done at Washington April 8, 1959 (10 UST 3029); and (2) to instruct the United States Governor of the Bank to work with the Board of Governors of the Bank to admit Taiwan as a non-borrowing member of the Bank, including by advancing amendments, as necessary, to that Agreement. 153. Increased United States cooperation with Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation The Secretary of State should pursue the following objectives at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum: (1) Improving efficiency in supply chains, particularly semiconductor supply chains. (2) Encouraging continued public-private dialogues with policymakers and promoting a common set of technology standards. (3) Promoting the development and use of policy recommendations for governments— (A) to adopt clean energy standards; and (B) to support research and development of clean energy, both renewable and non-renewable. (4) Advancing cooperation that reduces barriers to cross-border investment and creates opportunities for United States small- and medium-sized enterprises to access APEC emerging and growing markets. (5) Improving cybersecurity in the Asia-Pacific region and developing tools for governments to combat cyber threats, including ransomware, disinformation, and cyber hacks. (6) Increasing coordination in prohibiting and preventing the facilitation of trade in goods produced using forced labor. (7) Confronting issues such as intellectual property theft and counterfeit goods. (8) Enhancing sufficient and sustainable food security by promoting the development of advanced agricultural technologies and farming practices. (9) Expanding the economic opportunities for women to fully and meaningfully engage in a business environment that promotes women’s economic participation. 154. Opposition of the United States to an increase in the weight of the Chinese renminbi in the Special Drawing Rights basket of the International Monetary Fund (a) In general The Secretary of the Treasury shall instruct the United States Governor of, and the United States Executive Director at, the International Monetary Fund (in this section referred to as the Fund ) to use the voice and vote of the United States to oppose any increase in the weight of the Chinese renminbi in the basket of currencies used to determine the value of Special Drawing Rights, unless the Secretary of the Treasury has submitted to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives a written report that includes an assessment that— (1) in the 12 months preceding submission of the report— (A) the PRC does not appear, based on publicly available data, to have been in violation of its obligations under Article VIII of the Articles of Agreement of the Fund; (B) the Secretary of the Treasury has not determined under section 3004 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 ( 22 U.S.C. 5304 ) that the PRC has manipulated the rate of exchange between its currency and the United States dollar for purposes of preventing effective balance of payments adjustments or gaining unfair competitive advantage in international trade; and (C) the President, through the Secretary of the Treasury, has not taken an action against the PRC pursuant to section 701 of the Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015 ( 19 U.S.C. 4421 ) for failing to adopt appropriate policies following enhanced bilateral engagement conducted pursuant to that section; (2) the renminbi is freely usable (within the meaning of Article XXX(f) of the Articles of Agreement of the Fund); and (3) the PRC provides financing assurances and debt treatments consistent with debt sustainability analyses of the Fund for countries participating in the Common Framework for Debt Treatments beyond the Debt Service Suspension Initiative (commonly known as the Common Framework ) and debt treatments outside the Common Framework. (b) Waiver The Secretary of the Treasury may waive any of the conditions described in paragraph (1), (2), or (3) of subsection (a) upon certifying to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives that such a waiver is in the national interest of the United States. (c) Sunset Subsection (a) shall have no force or effect on or after the date that is 8 years after the date of the enactment of this Act. C Global infrastructure and energy development 161. Department of State Infrastructure Coordination Task Force (a) Establishment There is established at the Department of State a task force, to be known as the Infrastructure Coordination Task Force , which shall be led by an appropriate Senate-confirmed official at the Department of State. If the leader of the Task Force is not the Under Secretary of State for Economic Growth, Energy and the Environment, then the leader of the task force shall coordinate with such Under Secretary on matters related to the task force. (b) Duties The Infrastructure Coordination Task Force shall— (1) coordinate international infrastructure policies and projects supported by the United States Government, with participation by the relevant Federal departments and agencies; (2) engage international partners such as the Group of Seven (G7), multilateral development banks, international financial institutions, the United States private sector, multinational corporations and banks, nongovernmental organizations, and other partners in industrialized countries; (3) advance United States objectives through initiatives such as the Blue Dot Network, Infrastructure Transaction Assistance Network, the Transaction Advisory Fund, and the Strategic Ports Initiative; and (4) produce strategic guidance that identifies international infrastructure projects. 162. Authorization of Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (a) Establishment There shall be an office at the Department of State to support the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment, or a successor entity (hereafter, the Office ). The Office shall be led by a Coordinator for Global Infrastructure and Investment (hereafter, the Coordinator ) who shall be an official serving in a position to which the individual was appointed by the President, with the advice and consent of the United States Senate. (b) Authority The Coordinator shall have the authority to convene the interagency on matters relating to its policy remit. The Office is authorized to deploy United States public and private sector capital and expertise for the purpose of mobilizing foreign public and private sector capital and expertise— (1) to help identify and meet the strategic infrastructure needs of countries that are allies and partners of the United States; and (2) to provide allies and partners of the United States with mutually beneficial strategic infrastructure investment solutions that are alternatives to exploitative, coercive, or harmful foreign infrastructure investments. (c) Prioritization In evaluating proposals for strategic infrastructure projects funded through the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment, the Secretary of State, in consultation with other departments and agencies as appropriate, should prioritize— (1) projects that have the highest strategic value to the United States; and (2) projects related to— (A) strategic transport infrastructure, including ports, airports, intermodal transfer facilities, railroads, and highways; (B) energy infrastructure, technology, and supply chains, critical minerals, and related areas that align with the energy needs of partner countries and with the objective of maximizing such countries’ energy access, energy security, energy transition and modernization, and resilience needs. (C) secure information and communications technology systems, networks, and infrastructure to strengthen the potential for economic growth and promote an open, interoperable, reliable, and secure Internet; and (D) global health security, including through infrastructure projects that increase the availability, accessibility, and affordability of health care in partner countries. (d) Standards In carrying out the purposes described in subsection (b), the Secretary of State shall adhere to standards for sustainable, transparent, and quality infrastructure investment and ensure interventions include opportunities to advance economic growth priorities in relevant sectors in the partner country and support good governance and the rule of law. (e) Projects in high-Income countries Support provided by the United States under the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment shall not be provided in countries with high-income economies (as those terms are defined by the World Bank) unless the Secretary certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that such support— (1) is necessary to attempt to preempt or counter efforts by a strategic competitor of the United States to secure significant political or economic leverage or acquire national security-sensitive technologies or infrastructure in a country that is an ally or partner of the United States; and (2) includes cost-sharing arrangements with partner countries to ensure effective burden-sharing and long-term sustainability, including through the involvement of private sector investments. (f) Report (1) In general Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for a period of two years, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Administrator for the United States Agency for International Development and the heads of other Federal departments and agencies, as appropriate, shall submit a report to the appropriate committees of Congress that— (A) identifies all current infrastructure projects supported by the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment; (B) describes how the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment supported each project; (C) explains the rationale of the United States and partner country interests served by the United States providing support to such projects, including as it relates to the priorities described in subsection (c); (D) describes how the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment cooperates with other entities in the United States Government that support infrastructure, including de-confliction of efforts; and (E) to the extent possible, describes the estimated timeline for completion of the projects supported by the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment. (2) Form of report The report required under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. 163. Infrastructure Transaction and Assistance Network (a) Authority There is established an initiative, to be known as the Infrastructure Transaction and Assistance Network , under which the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development and the heads of other relevant Federal agencies, as appropriate, shall carry out programs to advance the development of sustainable, transparent, and quality infrastructure globally in countries that are eligible for foreign assistance, by— (1) strengthening the capacities of United States allies and partners to improve infrastructure project evaluation processes, regulatory and procurement environments, and infrastructure project preparation; (2) providing transaction advisory services and project preparation assistance to support sustainable infrastructure; and (3) coordinating the provision of United States assistance for the development of infrastructure, including infrastructure that utilizes United States-manufactured goods and services, and catalyzing investment led by the private sector. (b) Transaction Advisory Fund As part of the Infrastructure Transaction and Assistance Network described under subsection (a), the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, and in consultation, as appropriate, with other Federal departments and agencies, shall provide support, including through the Transaction Advisory Fund, for advisory services to help boost the capacity of partner countries globally to evaluate contracts in line with international standards, including through providing services such as— (1) legal services, including with the objectives of— (A) minimizing opportunities for corrupt practices; and (B) ensuring agreements are transparent, clear, and enforceable; (2) project preparation and feasibility studies; (3) debt sustainability analyses; (4) bid or proposal evaluation; and (5) other services relevant to advancing the development of sustainable, transparent, and quality infrastructure. (c) Indo-Pacific Strategic Infrastructure Fund (1) In general As part of the Infrastructure Transaction and Assistance Network described under subsection (a), the Secretary of State is authorized to provide support, including through the Indo-Pacific Strategic Infrastructure Fund, for technical assistance, project preparation, development, and execution, and other infrastructure project support in the countries of the Indo-Pacific region. (2) Joint infrastructure projects Funds authorized for the Indo-Pacific Strategic Infrastructure Fund should be used in coordination with the Department of Defense, the International Development Finance Corporation, the Export-Import Bank of the United States, the United States Trade and Development Agency, like-minded donor partners, and multilateral banks, as appropriate, to support joint infrastructure projects in the Indo-Pacific region. (3) Strategic infrastructure projects Funds authorized for the Indo-Pacific Strategic Infrastructure Fund should be used to support strategic infrastructure projects. (d) Authorization of appropriations There is authorized to be appropriated, for each of fiscal years 2025 through 2029, $50,000,000 for the Transaction Advisory Fund and $100,000,000 for the Indo-Pacific Strategic Infrastructure Fund. 164. Strategic Ports Initiative (a) In general The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, the Chief Executive Officer of United States International Development Finance Corporation, the Trade and Development Agency, and other relevant Federal departments and agencies, as appropriate, shall carry out a program entitled the Strategic Ports Initiative for the following purposes: (1) To provide training and technical assistance to partner country officials and institutions, and others, as appropriate, responsible for building, managing, and securing seaports, airports, and related infrastructure abroad. (2) To identify ports and airports vulnerable to ownership or other forms of control by strategic competitors, including the PRC, and make recommendations for United States Government action. (3) To contribute to United States Government diplomatic engagements and other efforts with partner countries and economies, and relevant and trusted private sector entities with respect to ownership or control of seaports and airports by strategic competitors, including the PRC. (4) To generate priority countries and projects for United States assistance and investment, including through coordination with the Infrastructure Coordination Task Force established pursuant to section 161. (5) To ensure that all Department of State initiatives, activities, and funding related to seaports and airports align with the national security interests of the United States and account for the vulnerabilities, technical constraints, and other national security implications of seaport and airport infrastructure to construction, ownership, operation, or other forms of direct and indirect control by strategic competitors, including the PRC. (6) To ensure, to the greatest extent practicable, that projects supported by the United States use local labor and professional capacities, in contrast to infrastructure projects carried out by the PRC. (7) To assist in identifying and promoting alternatives for port logistics data management systems currently offered by strategic competitors, including the PRC. (b) Authorization of appropriations There is authorized to be appropriated, for each of fiscal years 2025 through 2029, $6,000,000 to carry out the purposes of the Strategic Ports Initiative. 165. Next-generation shipping (a) In general The Secretary of State is authorized to carry out the following activities to support the development of next-generation shipping corridors or green shipping corridors: (1) Conduct analysis to determine United States priorities for cooperation with partner countries on next-generation shipping corridors or green shipping corridors. (2) Support research and development initiatives and technical assistance, as appropriate, in the following areas: (A) Next-generation port design, engineering, and architecture. (B) Hydrogen fuel production and hydrogen fuel storage and utilization capacities at ports. (C) Commercial-scale high-speed electric vehicle trucking fleet charging infrastructure. (D) Logistics and shipping corridor planning. (E) Hydrogen pipelines. (F) Liquid hydrogen power vessels, and other next-generation marine propulsion systems, design and manufacturing, including both new vessels and retrofit and refurbishment of existing vessels. (3) Support private sector investment in next-generation shipping infrastructure in partner countries with strong or emerging commercial ties with the United States that— (A) are strategically or centrally located markets in international commerce; or (B) face growing or concerning financial entanglements with malign foreign governments. (b) Parameters In carrying out activities authorized under subsection (a), the Secretary of State shall ensure that all activities align with the national security interests of the United States and the purposes of the Strategic Ports Initiative authorized pursuant to section 164. (c) International Maritime Organization The United States shall use its voice, vote, and influence in the International Maritime Organization to– (1) counter any attempts by the PRC or other strategic competitors to advance or advocate for policies, regulations, or technical standards that unfairly benefit particular countries and their domestic industries and products to the detriment of free and fair markets; (2) advocate for the adoption of next-generation shipping industry technologies and infrastructure standards, policies, regulations and cooperation initiatives that advance United States national and economic security interests; (3) participate in the International Maritime Organization’s global technical cooperation projects to support growing the capacity of parties to develop and modernize global shipping industries technologies and infrastructure; and (4) represent the interests of United States stakeholders impacted by International Maritime Organization initiatives. (d) Limitation Prior to providing funding for activities to support the establishment and development of next-generation shipping corridors or green shipping corridors, the Department of State shall obtain commitments from participating countries in the following areas: (1) Prohibiting exclusivity or preferences for specific international shipping routes, including exclusive access for specific vessels, fleets, or maritime shipping companies of the PRC. (2) Preventing the sale, lease, or operational control of port operations, or any subsidiary operations, including security, communications and information technology, or energy suppliers to entities owned or controlled by the PRC. (3) Prohibiting the use of, or contracts with communications, survey, and logistics management providers owned or controlled by the PRC. (4) Maintaining transparent and accountable security operations that are not contracted to entities owned or controlled by the PRC. (5) Ensuring that ports do not serve as ports of call for PRC military or research vessels. (6) Ensuring that ports are operated in a transparent and accountable manner, consistent with domestic and applicable international law. (e) Authorization of appropriations There is authorized to be appropriated $120,000,000 over the next three fiscal years to carry out activities under this section. 166. Global Strategic Infrastructure Investment Fund (a) Strategic Infrastructure Investment Fund (1) Establishment There is established in the Treasury of the United States a fund to be known as the Global Strategic Infrastructure Fund (in this section referred to as the Fund ) for the Secretary of State to provide for assistance, including through contributions for strategic infrastructure projects globally as authorized under this section. (2) Appropriations In addition to amounts otherwise available for such purposes, there is appropriated to the Fund established in subsection (a)(1), out of amounts in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated— (A) for fiscal year 2025, $400,000,000, to remain available until expended; (B) for fiscal year 2026, $400,000,000, to remain available until expended; (C) for fiscal year 2027, $400,000,000, to remain available until expended; (D) for fiscal year 2028, $400,000,000, to remain available until expended; and (E) for fiscal year 2029, $400,000,000, to remain available until expended. (3) Transfer authority Amounts in the Fund shall be transferred and merged with accounts within the Department of State, the United States Agency for International Development, the Export-Import Bank of the United States, the United States International Development Finance Corporation, the Millennium Challenge Corporation, and the United States Trade and Development Agency, as appropriate, to be used for such purposes. (4) Consultation The Secretary of State shall consult with the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development on the allocations of the Fund. (5) Loans and loan guarantees Amounts transferred from the Fund to the Export-Import Bank and the United States International Development Finance Corporation, among other purposes, may be made available for the costs of direct loans and loan guarantees, including the cost of modifying such loans and loan guarantees, as defined in section 502 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 ( 2 U.S.C. 661a ). (b) Prioritization In evaluating proposals for strategic infrastructure projects funded pursuant to subsection (a), the Secretary of State shall prioritize— (1) projects that have the highest strategic value to the United States; and (2) projects related to— (A) strategic transport infrastructure, including ports, airports, railroads, and highways; (B) energy infrastructure, technology, and supply chains, critical minerals, and related areas that align with the officially conveyed energy needs of partner countries and with the objective of maximizing such countries’ energy access, energy security, energy transition, and resilience needs; (C) secure information and communications technology networks and infrastructure to strengthen the potential for economic growth and to promote an open, interoperable, reliable, and secure internet; and (D) global health security, including through infrastructure projects that increase the availability, accessibility, and affordability of health care in partner countries. (c) Standards In evaluating proposals for strategic infrastructure projects funded pursuant to subsection (a), the Secretary of State shall adhere to standards for sustainable, transparent, and quality infrastructure investment and ensure projects include opportunities to advance economic growth priorities in the partner country and support good governance and the rule of law. (d) Projects in High Income Countries Support provided under the Fund shall not be provided in countries with high-income economies (as those terms are defined by the World Bank) unless the President certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that such support— (1) is necessary to preempt or counter efforts by a strategic competitor of the United States to secure significant political or economic leverage or acquire national security-sensitive technologies or infrastructure in a country that is an ally or partner of the United States; and (2) includes cost-sharing arrangements with partner countries to ensure effective burden-sharing and long-term sustainability. 167. Modifications of requirements to become a Millennium Challenge Corporation candidate country (a) Candidate country qualifications Section 606 of the Millennium Challenge Act of 2003 ( 22 U.S.C. 7705 ) is amended to read as follows: 606. Candidate countries (a) In general A country shall be a candidate country for purposes of eligibility to receive assistance under section 605 if— (1) the per capita income of the country in a fiscal year is equal to or less than the World Bank threshold for initiating the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development graduation process for the fiscal year; and (2) subject to subsection (b), the country is not ineligible to receive United States economic assistance under part I of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 ( 22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq. ) by reason of the application of any provision of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 or any other provision of law. (b) Rule of construction For the purposes of determining whether a country is eligible, pursuant to subsection (a)(2), to receive assistance under section 605, the exercise by the President, the Secretary of State, or any other officer or employee of the United States Government of any waiver or suspension of any provision of law referred to in subsection (a)(2), and notification to the appropriate congressional committees in accordance with such provision of law, shall be construed as satisfying the requirements under subsection (a). (c) Determination by the Board The Board shall determine whether a country is a candidate country for purposes of this section. . (b) Conforming amendments (1) Amendment to report identifying candidate countries Section 608(a)(1) of the Millennium Challenge Act of 2003 ( 22 U.S.C. 7707(a)(1) ) is amended by striking section 606(a)(1)(B) and inserting section 606(a)(2) . (2) Amendment to Millennium Challenge Compact authority Section 609(b)(2) of such Act ( 22 U.S.C. 7708(b)(2) ) is amended— (A) by amending the paragraph heading to read as follows: Country contributions ; and (B) by striking with respect to a lower middle income country described in section 606(b), . (3) Amendment to authorization to provide assistance for candidate countries Section 616(b)(1) of such Act ( 22 U.S.C. 7715(b)(1) ) is amended by striking subsection (a) or (b) of section 606 and inserting section 606(a) . (c) Modification to factors in determining eligibility Section 607(c)(2) of the Millennium Challenge Act of 2003 ( 22 U.S.C. 7706(c)(2) ) is amended in the matter preceding subparagraph (A), by striking consider and inserting prioritize need and impact by considering . 168. Africa energy security and diversification Section 3 of the Electrify Africa Act of 2015 ( Public Law 114–121 ; 22 U.S.C. 2293 note) is amended— (1) in paragraph (8), by striking ; and and inserting a semicolon; (2) in paragraph (9), by striking the period at the end and inserting a semicolon; and (3) by inserting after paragraph (9) the following new paragraphs: (10) advance United States foreign policy and development goals by assisting African countries to reduce their dependence on countries that use energy dependence for political influence, such as the Russian Federation or the People’s Republic of China, which have used energy and financial resources to influence other countries; (11) promote the energy security and domestic energy resource mobilization of allies and partners of the United States in Africa by— (A) encouraging the development of accessible, transparent, and competitive energy markets that provide diversified sources and reliable and affordable power, including civil nuclear energy; (B) promoting domestic energy resource mobilization, advancing regulatory reforms in the energy sector, and supporting grid modernization and energy storage deployment efforts; and (C) facilitating the efforts of partner countries to meet their goals and commitments related to energy resource production and consumption; (12) encourage United States public and private sector investment in African energy infrastructure projects to bridge the gap between energy security requirements and commercial demand in a way that is consistent with the region’s capacity and the goals and commitments of partner countries; and (13) help facilitate the trade and cooperation on energy production, advance energy technology development and deployment, and provide technical assistance to build capacities on regulatory improvements and greater expertise on global markets in a way that benefits the energy security of allies and partners of the United States, including in Africa. . 169. Enhancing resilient critical infrastructure in the Pacific Islands (a) Program (1) In general The Secretary of State, in coordination with the heads of other relevant Federal departments and agencies, as appropriate, shall develop and implement a strategy for the expansion, improvement, and protection of resilient critical infrastructure in the Pacific Islands. (2) Elements The strategy and related programming under paragraph (1) shall— (A) consider the— (i) current and forecasted gaps in functionality of, and threats to, critical infrastructure in the Pacific Islands, including— (I) for disaster preparedness and response, transport connectivity, operability of health systems, information and communications technology, food security, coastal zone management, marine and water resource management, and energy security and access to electricity; and (II) to the extent practicable, the rates, severity and drivers of deterioration, structural deficiencies, and most pressing threats to public safety from aging, at-risk, and failing infrastructure; (ii) United States national security risks posed by weak, outdated, at-risk, and failing critical infrastructure in the Pacific Islands, with particular consideration for the interconnectedness of supply chains, interconnected transportation networks, technology, communications, and financial systems; and (iii) the policy-enabling environment for public and private sector investment in critical infrastructure in the Pacific Islands, including through local resource mobilization, early stage project preparation, development finance, and foreign direct investment; (B) seek to enhance the ability of Pacific Islanders, including governments at the national and local levels, civil society leaders, and private sector partners, to attract and effectively manage public and private investment in critical infrastructure while resisting predatory lending and resource extraction deals by malign actors; (C) identify priorities for critical infrastructure improvement, reinforcement, re-engineering, or replacement based on the significance of such infrastructure to ensuring public health, safety, and economic growth; (D) support investment and improvement in natural resource management and conservation; (E) include recommendations for policy and governance reforms in the Pacific Islands, as necessary and appropriate, to strengthen critical infrastructure resilience; and (F) support trainings and information sharing, technology exchanges, reverse trade missions, and pilot projects that provide Pacific Islanders with access to proven, cost-effective solutions for mitigating the risks associated with critical infrastructure vulnerabilities and related interdependencies. (b) Coordination The program developed under this section should be coordinated with like-minded allies, partners, and regional and international organizations to encourage alignment of efforts and to avoid duplicative investments and programming. (c) Disaster preparedness The Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, in consultation with the relevant Federal departments and agencies with technical and practical expertise, shall work with Pacific Island countries to— (1) provide technical assistance, education, and training, including through grants and cooperative agreements for qualified United States and local nongovernmental organizations, to enhance early warning systems, emergency management and preparedness procedures, and post-disaster relief and recovery; and (2) enhance coordination of existing disaster mitigation and response plans in the Pacific Islands region, including by United States allies and partners in the region. (d) International financial institutions The Secretary of the Treasury shall direct the representatives of the United States to the World Bank Group, the International Monetary Fund, and the Asian Development Bank to use the voice and vote of the United States to support sustainable, resilient, and high quality infrastructure projects in the Pacific Islands. 170. Oceania Restoration and Hazards Removal Program (a) In general The Secretary of State shall establish an Oceania Restoration and Hazards Removal Program (in this section referred to as the Program ). (b) Purpose The purpose of the Program is— (1) to coordinate with the countries of Oceania— (A) to support survey and clearance operations of buried and abandoned bombs, mortars, artillery shells, and unexploded ordnance from battlefields of World War II; and (B) to identify, isolate, and where appropriate, mitigate environmental risks associated with submerged maritime vessels that pose a threat to public health or marine resources because of the presence of oil, fuel, corrosive metals, or other toxins; and (2) to build the national capacity of the countries of Oceania to identify, isolate, and mitigate risks related to explosive ordnance hazards, submerged maritime vessels, or related hazardous marine debris through survey and disposal training, funding to relevant nongovernmental organizations, and support to regional cooperation initiatives with countries that are allies and partners of the United States, including Australia, France, Japan, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, and the United Kingdom. (c) Authorization of appropriations There is authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary of State $1,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2025 through 2029 to carry out this section. 171. Coordination with other Federal agencies and cooperation and participation of nongovernmental entities The Federal officials responsible for carrying out policies and actions under sections 168 and 169 should, as appropriate— (1) coordinate with existing programs and efforts of relevant agencies of the United States Government, including with regard to the Republic of the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, and the Republic of Palau; (2) seek the cooperation and participation of United States private sector, United States nongovernmental organizations, and United States institutions of higher education; and (3) work with civil society organizations and other relevant stakeholders in Pacific Island countries, as appropriate. 172. Findings related to the People’s Republic of China’s industrial pollution Congress makes the following findings: (1) State-owned enterprises of the PRC are subject to the direction of both the state and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and the CCP strives to increase their influence over the global economy by pursuing predatory and exploitative trade, economic, and industrial practices designed to out-compete the United States and other market economies. (2) The PRC’s control of key components of critical global supply chains, including critical minerals, semiconductors, batteries, solar panels, and pharmaceuticals, as outlined in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence’s February 2023 Annual Threat Assessment , represents a direct threat to United States national security and harms global economic competition. (3) The CCP’s industrial strategy, as articulated in the Made in China 2025 plan, aims to dominate global manufacturing in crucial energy technologies, including advanced materials, batteries, and power equipment. (4) The PRC, by far the world’s largest polluter, accounts for approximately 1/3 of global carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) emissions according to the International Energy Administration and subsidizes its industries, manufacturers, and exports by neither implementing nor enforcing adequate environmental or labor protection standards. (5) The PRC’s industrial sectors like agriculture, mining, automotive production, and computer and electronics manufacturing emit 3 times more carbon dioxide as compared to the United States’ same industrial sectors, and nearly 2 times more carbon dioxide than the global average of the production of comparable goods in other foreign countries, according to industry tracking data from the International Energy Agency. (6) The CCP seeks to utilize the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Global Development Initiative (GDI) to increase the dependence of low-income and lower-middle income countries in Asia, Africa, Europe, and the Americas on the PRC at the expense of trapping such countries in long-term, high-polluting, debt-ridden, low-quality infrastructure projects that undermine developing countries’ efforts to sustainably grow and industrialize their economies to maximize benefits and participation for their citizenry, while increasing global pollution. (7) The United States— (A) has adopted many environmental protections, including the Clean Air Act ( 42 U.S.C. 7401 et seq. ), the Federal Water Pollution Control Act ( 33 U.S.C. 1251 et seq. ), the Toxic Substances Control Act ( 15 U.S.C. 2601 et seq. ), and more than 15 other major environmental protection laws that— (i) add costs to the production of goods in order to secure the benefits of environmental protection and conservation efforts; and (ii) serve to meaningfully decrease greenhouse gases such as carbon dioxide (CO 2 ), methane (CH 4 ), nitrous oxide (N 2 O), sulfur hexafluoride (SF 6 ), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs), and other fluorinated greenhouse gases; (B) is the world’s largest consumer market and its economy is highly integrated into the world; and (C) bears responsibility to ensure that the United States market does not incentivize forum shopping for the production of goods to jurisdictions with low environmental standards to obtain a competitive cost advantage while undermining efforts to address transnational environmental and resource challenges as well as global public health. (8) Any realistic pathway to substantially reduce global carbon emissions will require the PRC to be held accountable for its role as the world’s largest polluter. 173. Promoting responsible development alternatives to the Belt and Road Initiative and Global Development Initiative (a) In general The President should seek opportunities to partner with multilateral development finance institutions to develop financing tools based on shared development finance criteria and mechanisms to support investments in developing countries that— (1) support low carbon economic development; and (2) promote resiliency and adaptation to environmental changes. (b) Partnership The Chief Executive Officer of the United States International Development Finance Corporation should seek to partner with other multilateral development finance institutions and development finance institutions to leverage the respective available funds to support low carbon economic development, which may include nuclear energy projects, environmental adaptation, and resilience activities in developing countries. (c) Joint cooperation on infrastructure projects (1) Joint support Subject to paragraph (2), the Secretary of State, the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, and other relevant agency heads may co-finance, or provide joint support for, infrastructure projects that advance the development of the United States overseas and provide viable alternatives to projects that would otherwise be included within the PRC’s Belt and Initiative and Global Development Initiative. (2) Conditions Co-financing agreements and arrangements authorized pursuant to paragraph (1) may not be approved unless— (A) the projects to be financed— (i) promote the public good; and (ii) will have substantially lower environmental impact than the proposed Belt and Road Initiative and Global Development Initiative alternative; and (B) the appropriate committees of Congress are notified not later than 15 days in advance of entering into such co-financing arrangements. 174. International cooperation to secure critical mineral supply chains (a) Statement of policy on critical mineral supply chains It is the policy of the United States— (1) to collaborate with allies and partners of the United States to build secure and resilient critical minerals supply chains, including in the mining, processing, and valuation of critical minerals, as well as with respect to advanced manufacturing that includes critical minerals; (2) to prioritize the development and production of critical minerals domestically, both to supply domestic needs and for export to allies and partners that participate in secure and resilient supply chains for critical minerals; (3) to reduce or eliminate reliance and dependence on critical mineral supply chains controlled by the PRC, the Russian Federation, Iran, or any other adversary of the United States; (4) to work with allies and partners on enhancing evaluation capability and technology in trusted countries that produce critical minerals to avoid the export of mined and processed critical minerals to adversaries of the United States; (5) to identify and implement market-based incentives for the purposes of facilitating the creation and maintenance of secure and resilient critical mineral supply chains in collaboration with allies and partners; (6) to prioritize securing critical mineral supply chains in United States foreign policy, including through the use of economic tools to invest responsibly in projects in partner countries in a manner that both benefits local populations and bolsters the supply of critical minerals to the United States and allies and partners of the United States; and (7) that collaboration with allies and partners to build secure and resilient critical mineral supply chains shall not replace United States efforts to increase domestic development and production of critical minerals. (b) International negotiations relating to protecting critical mineral supply chains (1) In general The President is authorized to negotiate an agreement with international partners for the purposes of establishing a coalition— (A) to facilitate— (i) the mining, processing, and supply of critical minerals; and (ii) advanced manufacturing that includes critical minerals; and (B) to secure an adequate supply of critical minerals and relevant products, manufacturing inputs, and components that are heavily dependent on critical mineral resources for the United States and other members of the coalition (in this subsection referred to as member countries ). (2) Negotiating objectives The overall objectives for negotiating an agreement described in paragraph (1) should be— (A) to establish mechanisms for member countries to build secure and resilient supply chains for critical minerals, including in— (i) the mining, refinement, processing, and valuation of critical minerals; and (ii) advanced manufacturing of products, components, and materials that are dependent on critical minerals; (B) to improve economies of scale and joint cooperation with international partners in securing access and means of production throughout the supply chains of critical minerals and manufacturing processes dependent on critical minerals; (C) to establish mechanisms, with appropriate market-based disciplines, that provide and maintain opportunities among member countries for creating industry economies of scale to attract joint investment among those countries, including— (i) cooperation on joint projects, including cost-sharing on building appropriate infrastructure to access deposits of critical minerals; and (ii) creation or enhancement of national and international programs to support the development of robust industries by providing appropriate sector-specific incentives, such as political risk and other insurance opportunities, financing, and other support, for— (I) mining and processing critical minerals; (II) manufacturing of products, components, and materials that are dependent on critical minerals and are essential to consumer technology products or have important national security implications; and (III) associated transportation needs that are tailored to the handling, movement, and logistics management of critical minerals and products, components, and materials that are dependent on critical minerals; (D) to establish market-based rules for member countries regarding adoption of qualifying tax and other incentives to stimulate investment, as balanced by market-based disciplines to ensure a fair playing field among those countries; (E) to establish recommended best practices to protect— (i) labor rights; (ii) the natural environment and ecosystems near critical mineral industrial sites; and (iii) safety of communities near critical mineral industrial activities; (F) to advance economic growth in developing countries with critical mineral reserves, including for the benefit of the citizens of those countries; (G) to establish rules allowing for the establishment of a consortium that is resourced and empowered to bid and compete in acquiring and securing potential deposits of critical minerals in countries that are not members of the coalition described in paragraph (1) (in this subsection referred to as nonmember countries ); (H) to establish a mechanism for joint resource mapping with procedures for equitable sharing of information on potential deposits of critical minerals not less frequently than annually; (I) to establish appropriate mechanisms for the recognition and enforcement by a member country of judgments relating to environmental and related harms caused by mining operations within such member country in contravention of that country’s laws; and (J) to improve supply chain security among member countries by providing for national treatment investment protections among those countries that are equal to, or better than, the standards in the United States model bilateral investment treaty. (c) Minerals Security Partnership authorization (1) In general The Secretary of State, acting through the Under Secretary of State for Economic Growth, Energy, and the Environment, is authorized to lead United States participation in the Minerals Security Partnership , for the following purposes: (A) To identify and support investment and advocate for commercial critical mineral mining, processing, and refining projects that enable robust and secure critical mineral supply chains, in consultation with other Federal agencies, as appropriate. (B) To coordinate with relevant regional bureaus to develop regional diplomatic engagement strategies related to critical minerals projects and to identify projects that are priorities. (C) To coordinate with United States missions abroad on projects, programs, and investments that enable robust and secure critical mineral supply chains. (D) To coordinate with current and prospective members of the Minerals Security Partnership. (E) To establish a mechanism for information-sharing with members of the Minerals Security Partnership. (F) To establish policies and procedures, and if necessary, to provide funding to facilitate cooperation on joint projects with members of the Minerals Security Partnership and the Mineral Security Forum, including those related to cost-sharing agreements, political risk insurance, financing, equity investments, and other support, in coordination with other Federal agencies, as appropriate. (G) If an agreement described in subsection (b) is entered into, to support the establishment of the coalition described in that subsection. (2) Database As part of the Minerals Security Partnership, the Secretary, acting through the Under Secretary, is authorized to establish and maintain a database of critical mineral projects for the purpose of providing high quality and up-to-date information to the private sector in order to spur greater investment, increase the resilience of global critical minerals supply chains, and boost United States supply. (3) Qualifications for personnel With respect to staffing personnel to carry out the Minerals Security Partnership, the Secretary shall prioritize individuals with the following qualifications: (A) Substantive knowledge and experience in issues related to critical minerals supply chain and their application to strategic industries, including in the defense, energy, and technology sectors. (B) Substantive knowledge and experience in large-scale multi-donor project financing and related technical and diplomatic arrangements, international coalition-building, and project management. (C) Substantive knowledge and experience in trade and foreign policy, defense-industrial base policy, or national security-sensitive supply chain issues. (4) Private sector coordination The Secretary of State shall ensure close coordination between the Department of State, the private sector, and relevant civil society groups on the implementation of this subsection. (5) Project selection (A) In general The United States, through its participation in the Minerals Security Partnership, shall prioritize projects that advance the national and economic security interests of the United States and allies and partners of the United States. (B) Criteria requirements The United States should advocate for the Minerals Security Partnership to use environmental, social, or governance standards, including as criteria for project selection, that are consistent with United States law or international agreements approved by Congress. (d) United states membership in the International Nickel Study Group (1) United States membership The President is authorized to accept the Terms of Reference of and maintain membership of the United States in the International Nickel Study Group (INSG). (2) Payments of assessed contributions For fiscal year 2024 and thereafter, the United States assessed contributions to the INSG may be paid from funds appropriated for Contributions to International Organizations . (e) Critical mineral defined In this section, the term critical mineral — (1) has the meaning given the term in section 7002 of the Energy Act of 2020 ( 30 U.S.C. 1606 ); and (2) includes any other mineral or mineral material determined by the Secretary of State— (A) to be essential to the economic or national security of the United States; and (B) to have a supply chain vulnerable to disruption. (f) Authorization of appropriations There is authorized to be appropriated to the Department of State $75,000,000 for fiscal year 2025 to enhance critical mineral supply chain security, including to implement this section. D Digital technology and connectivity 176. Office of the Special Envoy For Critical and Emerging Technology (a) Establishment The Secretary shall establish an Office of the Special Envoy for Critical and Emerging Technology (referred to in this section as the Office ), which may be located within the Bureau for Cyberspace and Digital Policy. (b) Leadership (1) Special envoy The Office shall be headed by a Special Envoy for Critical and Emerging Technology, who shall— (A) be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate; (B) have the rank and status of ambassador; and (C) report to the Ambassador-at-Large for Cyberspace and Digital Policy. (c) Membership The Office may include representatives or expert detailees from other key Federal agencies or research and technology-focused fellowship programs, as determined by the Special Envoy for Critical and Emerging Technology and with the consent of the Ambassador-at-Large for Cyberspace and Digital Policy, in coordination with relevant Department stakeholders and appropriate senior officials of the Department of State and such agencies. (d) Purposes The purposes of the Office are to assist the Secretary of State in the coordination of Department and interagency action in support of the functions described in subsection (e). (e) Critical and emerging functions The Secretary of State shall— (1) establish, in coordination with relevant bureaus, offices and other Federal agencies, an interagency security review process for proposals regarding United States Government-funded international collaboration on certain critical and emerging technologies and associated research; (2) establish and coordinate an interagency strategy to facilitate international cooperation with United States allies and partners regarding the development, use, and deployment of certain critical and emerging technologies and associated standards and safeguards for research security, intellectual property protection, and illicit knowledge transfer; (3) facilitate technology partnerships with countries and relevant political and economic unions that are committed to— (A) the rule of law and respect for human rights, including freedom of speech, and expression; (B) the safe and responsible development and use of certain critical and emerging technologies and the establishment of related norms and standards, including for research security and the protection of sensitive data and technology; (C) a secure internet architecture governed by a multi-stakeholder model instead of centralized government control; (D) robust international cooperation to promote open and interoperable technological products and services that are necessary to freedom, innovation, transparency, and privacy; and (E) strengthening multilateral coordination on certain critical and emerging technologies, as defined in subsection (f), in coordination with relevant Department stakeholders and bureaus, including through diplomatic initiatives, information sharing, and other activities, to defend the principles described in subparagraphs (A) through (D) against efforts by state and non-state actors to undermine them; (4) support efforts to harmonize critical and emerging technology governance regimes with partners, coordinating on basic and pre-competitive research and development initiatives, and collaborating to pursue such opportunities in certain critical and emerging technologies; (5) coordinate with other technology partners on export control policies for certain critical and emerging technologies, as defined in subsection (g), including countering illicit knowledge and data transfer related to certain critical and emerging technologies research and use; (6) conduct or support diplomatic engagement, in coordination with other relevant Department stakeholders and bureaus, offices, and relevant Federal departments and agencies, with allies and partners to develop standards and coordinate policies designed to counter illicit knowledge and data transfer in academia related to certain critical and emerging technology research; (7) coordinate with allies, partners, and other relevant Federal agencies, with the concurrence of other relevant Department stakeholders and bureaus, to prevent the exploitation of research partnerships related to certain critical and emerging technologies; (8) share information regarding the threat posed by the transfer of certain critical and emerging technologies to authoritarian governments, including the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation, and the ways in which autocratic regimes are utilizing technology to erode individual freedoms and other foundations of open, democratic societies; and (9) collaborate with private companies, trade associations, and think tanks to realize the purposes described in paragraphs (1) through (8), in coordination with relevant Department stakeholders and bureaus. (f) Report Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for the following 3 years, the Secretary, in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence and the heads of other relevant Federal agencies, as appropriate, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees an unclassified report, with a classified index, if necessary, regarding— (1) the activities of the Office related to paragraphs (1) through (9) of subsection (e), including any cooperative initiatives and partnerships pursued with United States allies and partners, and the results of such activities, initiatives, and partnerships; (2) the activities of the Government of the People’s Republic of China, the Chinese Communist Party, and the Russian Federation in sectors related to certain critical and emerging technologies and the threats they pose to the United States; and (3) an inventory of all international research and development programs for certain critical and emerging technologies funded by the Department or USAID that include participation by institutions or organizations that are affiliated with, or receive support from, the Government of the People’s Republic of China or the Government of the Russian Federation. (g) Critical and emerging technologies In this section, the term certain critical and emerging technologies means technologies determined by the Secretary from the critical and emerging technologies list published by the National Science and Technology Council (NSTC) at the Office of Science and Technology Policy, as amended by subsequent updates to the list issued by the NSTC. 177. Realigning the Regional Technology Officer Program Section 9508(a)(1) of the Department of State Authorizations Act of 2022 (division I of Public Law 117–263 ; 22 U.S.C. 10305(a)(1) ) is amended by inserting , and shall be administered by the Bureau for Cyberspace and Digital Policy before the period at the end. 178. Annual semiconductor industry monitoring report on the People’s Republic of China (a) Report required Not later than May 1, 2025, and annually thereafter for 5 years, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the heads other Federal departments and agencies as appropriate, shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on the advanced semiconductor manufacturing capabilities of the PRC. (b) Contents The report required by subsection (a) shall include— (1) the domestic semiconductor manufacturing capabilities of the PRC; (2) year-by-year technological development efforts by the PRC in the fields of advanced semiconductor manufacturing and artificial intelligence chipmaking, including relevant government plans and initiatives; (3) engagement between the PRC and other foreign countries with respect to advanced semiconductor manufacturing equipment capabilities; (4) an analysis of the impact of United States and allied and partner export controls on covered items related to the development of advanced semiconductor manufacturing in the PRC; and (5) an assessment of whether such export controls remain effective in curbing the development of advanced semiconductor manufacturing equipment capabilities in the PRC and recommendations for enhancing effectiveness of such controls. (c) Form (1) In general The report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form and shall include a classified annex, providing additional details and supporting intelligence, as available. (2) Public availability The unclassified portion or a synopsis of the report required under subsection (a) shall be made available on a publicly accessible internet website of the Federal Government. 179. Combatting AI-enabled disinformation (a) Sense of Congress It is the sense of Congress that— (1) the rapid development of publicly available, affordable generative artificial intelligence (AI) technology, including the use of large language models (LLM) to fuel natural language processing applications, has the potential to fundamentally alter the nature of disinformation and propaganda campaigns by enabling finely tailored, auto-generated disinformation swiftly, in any language, at scale, and at low-costs; (2) academia and private industry, including social media platforms, play a critical role in establishing safeguards for powerful, publicly available tools for producing AI-generated content, and it is in the United States national security interest to ensure that these technologies are not misused by foreign malign actors to enhance influence operations abroad; (3) the ability to identify, track, and label original text, audio, and visual content is becoming increasingly vital to United States national interests as sophisticated AI-generated content creation becomes increasingly available to the public at low costs; (4) coalitions such as the content authenticity initiative (CAI) and the coalition for content provenance and authority (C2PA) play important roles in establishing open industry standards for content authenticity and digital content provenance; and (5) the Department, as the lead agency for United States foreign affairs, including public diplomacy, should work within the interagency process to develop a common approach to United States international engagement on issues related to AI-enabled disinformation. (b) Statement of policy it shall be the policy of the United States— (1) to share knowledge with allies and partners of instances when foreign state and non-state actors have leveraged generative AI to augment disinformation campaigns or propaganda; (2) to work with private industry and academia, as appropriate, to mitigate the risks associated with public research on generative AI technologies; and (3) to support efforts in developing digital content provenance detection techniques and technologies in line with United States national security interests. (c) Establishment of Countering AI-Enabled Disinformation Task Force (1) Establishment Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall establish within the Department a Countering AI-Enabled Disinformation Task Force (referred to in this section as the Task Force ) to— (A) identify potential responses to the growing threat of AI-enabled disinformation and its use by foreign state and non-state actors to augment influence operations and disinformation campaigns; (B) work closely with private industry and academia to identify and coordinate efforts in developing digital content provenance detection techniques and technologies; (C) develop the department’s internal coordination across regional and functional bureaus on the issue of AI-enabled disinformation; (D) develop a unified approach to international coordination on— (i) establishing standards around digital content provenance techniques and technologies, specifically as it relates to countering AI-enabled disinformation campaign; and (ii) assessing the potential for establishing frameworks around the proliferation of tools that facilitate AI-enabled disinformation; and (E) identify any additional tools or resources necessary to enhance the Department’s ability to— (i) detect AI-enabled foreign disinformation and propaganda; (ii) rapidly produce original counter-messaging to address AI-enabled disinformation campaigns; (iii) expand digital literacy programming abroad to include education on how media consumers in recipient countries can identify and inoculate themselves from synthetically produced media; and (iv) coordinate and collaborate with other governments, international organizations, civil society, the private sector, and others, as necessary. (2) Membership The Task Force shall be comprised of a representative from relevant offices, as determined by the Secretary, which may include— (A) the Bureau of Cyberspace and Digital Policy; (B) the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs; (C) the Global Engagement Center; (D) the Center for Analytics of the Office of Management Strategy and Solutions; (E) appropriate offices and Bureaus at the United States Agency for International Development; and (F) any other officials or offices the Secretary determines appropriate. (d) Definitions In this section: (1) Artificial intelligence The term artificial intelligence has the meaning given that term in section 238(g) of the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 ( Public Law 115–232 ; 10 U.S.C. 4001 note). (2) Digital content provenance The term digital content provenance means the verifiable chronology of the origin and history of a piece of digital content, such as an image, video, audio recording, or electronic document. 179A. International collaboration on research and development (a) Findings Congress makes the following findings: (1) Innovation in artificial intelligence and other emerging technology domains has become increasingly global. According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, worldwide spending on research and development more than tripled between 2000 and 2020. The United States accounted for almost 70 percent of such spending in 1960, but less than 1/3 in 2018. (2) Many allies and partners of the United States are technological powers in their own right, with robust research and development activities and world-leading capabilities in fields such as artificial intelligence, semiconductors, robotics, and biotechnology. (3) Adversaries of the United States, including the PRC, the Russian Federation, and the Islamic Republic of Iran, also emphasize technology and innovation in their geopolitical strategies. In particular, the Chinese Communist Party believes innovation is essential to its continued rule and is investing heavily in research and development as part of a strategy to leapfrog the United States into global leadership. (4) The United States and its allies and partners collectively control a much larger share of research and development activity than the PRC. Together, the United States and six like-minded countries, namely, Japan, Germany, the Republic of Korea, India, France, and the United Kingdom, account for more than ½ of global spending on research and development, while the PRC accounts for approximately ¼. (5) The National Science Board’s Vision 2030 report, issued in May 2020, states, Staying at the frontiers of discovery requires leaning into internationalism, particularly given the nation’s falling share of global knowledge production, paired with the rising importance and impact of international collaboration and knowledge- and technology-intensive industries. . (6) Previously, in 2008, the National Science Board reported, The U.S. Government could play a more effective role in supporting international S&E (science and engineering) partnerships by developing a coherent international S&E strategy to coordinate the activities and objectives of the various Federal agencies that play a role in such partnerships. … No single U.S. agency is responsible for coordinating or supporting international S&E partnerships, and few U.S. agencies that do S&E work have explicit missions in international relations. . (7) Numerous Federal departments and offices administer joint research and development activities with international partners, including the Office of International Science and Engineering within the National Science Foundation, the Division of International Relations within the National Institutes of Health, and the Office of International Science & Technology Cooperation within the Department of Energy. (b) Sense of Congress It is the sense of Congress that— (1) international collaboration on research and development is critical to maintaining United States leadership in artificial intelligence and other critical technologies; (2) Federal initiatives related to international collaboration on research and development should— (A) be consistently and adequately funded; (B) be coordinated across agencies to increase impact, minimize undue duplication, and ensure alignment with policies and strategic objectives of the United States; and (C) incorporate national security safeguards, including vetting processes, to protect against exploitation by strategic competitors of the United States; (3) implement data privacy regimes, including with respect to data sharing agreements between the United States and its partners; (4) the United States should work expeditiously with its allies and partners to resolve issues related to data privacy; and (5) the United States, and Federal departments and agencies must adopt rigorous safeguards and countermeasures to protect research institutions, key science and technological research data, and national security-sensitive knowledge from efforts by United States adversaries to gain access to such information, including by exploiting international research collaboration. 179B. Oversight of the United States-European Union Trade and Technology Council (a) In general Not later than December 1, 2024, and annually thereafter for a period of 3 years, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Commerce, and the United States Trade Representative shall jointly submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on the United States-European Union Trade and Technology Council (TTC), including a description of— (1) the goals of the Council, its achievements to date, and opportunities for cooperation in key areas; (2) a status update on deliverables of the TTC, particularly those itemized in public statements and fact sheets published by the United States Government; (3) the expected impact of the progress made on each deliverable on growing two-way trade, achieving mutual recognition of relevant regulatory standards, and increasing the ease of doing business, including quantitative assessments; (4) the expected impact of deliverables on national security, including technology security; (5) a description of any trade or technology topics that the United States has sought to incorporate into the TTC; (6) a description of engagements during the reporting period with the private sector on issues addressed in the TTC, and the results of those engagements; and (7) other relevant updates with respect to the work of the TTC’s working groups. (b) First report The first report submitted pursuant to subsection (a) shall cover progress from the first TTC ministerial on September 29, 2021, through June 1, 2024. (c) Subsequent reports All subsequent reports submitted shall cover the previous year. (d) Form of report The reports required under this section shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. 179C. Digital connectivity in the Pacific Islands (a) In general The Secretary of State and the Administrator for the United States Agency for International Development, in coordination with other relevant Federal departments and agencies, shall develop and implement a digital connectivity initiative specific to Pacific Island countries. (b) Elements and conduct of Pacific Islands digital connectivity initiative The initiative developed pursuant to subsection (a) shall— (1) include an assessment of opportunities to coordinate with regional allies, including through the United States-Japan Global Digital Connectivity Partnership and the United States-Japan-Australia Trilateral Infrastructure Partnership; (2) identify and address country-driven digital transformation priorities; (3) conduct an assessment of the digital ecosystem of Pacific Island countries, such as through the United States Agency for International Development’s (USAID) Digital Ecosystem Country Assessments, to identify opportunities and risks; (4) seek to develop human and institutional capacity and infrastructure to catalyze private sector investments in Pacific Island countries’ digital ecosystem; (5) assist in the development of digital policy and regulatory schemes in Pacific Island countries, including information and communications technology (ICT) regulations and procurement best practices and relevant reforms; (6) advance digital platforms and solutions for the delivery of public services and enhance digital skills and literacy; (7) seek to expand access to open, interoperable, reliable, and secure internet for Pacific Island communities; (8) identify roles that digital technologies can play in addressing important challenges for Pacific Island countries, including the environment, sustainable fishing, readiness, including in response to tsunami warnings; (9) identify ways to support women-owned enterprises in the digital ecosystem of Pacific Island countries; (10) seek to expand the availability of and access to secure and reliable subsea cable systems; (11) regularly assess opportunities for which United States businesses, or those of other like-minded partners, would be competitive; (12) promote exports of United States ICT goods and services to advance a secure ICT supply chain and increase United States company market share in Pacific Island digital markets; (13) support the development and expand availability of telehealth services for Pacific Island country communities; and (14) build digital connectivity among educational institutions within the region as well as with educational institutions in the United States. (c) Pacific Island countries defined In this section, the term Pacific Island countries means the Cook Islands, the Republic of Fiji, the Republic of Kiribati, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, the Republic of Nauru, Niue, the Republic of Palau, the Independent State of Papua New Guinea, the Independent State of Samoa, the Solomon Islands, the Kingdom of Tonga, Tuvalu, and the Republic of Vanuatu. (d) Authorization of appropriations There is authorized to be appropriated $3,500,000 for each of fiscal years 2025 through 2029 to carry out this section. 179D. Cyber and digital security cooperation with respect to developing countries (a) Interagency working group To counter PRC cyber and digital security activities in developing countries The Secretary of State shall establish an interagency Working Group, which shall include the National Cyber Director and representatives from the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the United States Agency for International Development, and such other agencies of the United States Government as the Secretary considers appropriate, on means to counter PRC cyber and digital security activities in developing countries, which could coordinate, as appropriate, with other related interagency mechanisms. (b) Duties The Working Group established pursuant to this section shall develop and submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a set of recommendations for— (1) bolstering the capacity of governments in governments in Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the Caribbean to ensure the integrity of their data networks and critical infrastructure, where applicable; (2) providing alternatives to Huawei and other untrusted vendors of cyber and digital security technology; and (3) an action plan for United States embassies to assist host-country governments with respect to protecting their vital digital networks and infrastructure from the PRC. E Countering PRC malign influence 181. Sense of Congress distinguishing the PRC Government from the Chinese people (a) Findings Since the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, the Chinese people have attempted to highlight the abuses of the Communist Party of China, including in 1989 with the Tiananmen Square protests and resulting massacre, and most recently through mass demonstrations in November 2022, known as the White Paper Movement to protest censorship and the harsh zero-COVID policy, but the efforts of the Chinese people have consistently been met with brutal suppression by CCP authorities and further efforts to monitors, control, and politically indoctrinate Chinese citizens. (b) Sense of congress It is the sense of Congress that— (1) the challenges and threats posed by the PRC stem primarily from the actions and behavior of the CCP and the PRC government, not the people of China or people of Chinese descent; (2) the United States Government should seek to support the aspirations of the Chinese people, and other peoples suffering in oppressive, authoritarian regimes, by promoting human rights and supporting their ability to express their own opinions and views about their government; (3) the United States is a diverse nation, and the strength and vibrancy of the United States is enhanced by the diverse ethnic backgrounds and tolerance of its citizens, including Asian Americans and people of Chinese descent; and (4) the United States Government and governments around the world must actively oppose racism and intolerance in all forms, and use all available and appropriate tools to combat the spread of anti-Asian racism and discrimination. 182. Authorization of appropriations for countering the People’s Republic of China Influence Fund (a) Countering the People’s Republic of China influence fund There is authorized to be appropriated $600,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2025 through 2029 for the Countering the People’s Republic of China Influence Fund to counter PRC malign influence. Amounts appropriated pursuant to this authorization are authorized to remain available until expended and shall be in addition to amounts otherwise authorized to be appropriated to counter such influence. (b) Policy guidance, coordination, and approval (1) Coordinator The Secretary of State shall designate an existing senior official as the Coordinator for the Countering the People’s Republic of China Influence Fund (in this section referred to as Coordinator ) to provide policy guidance, coordination within the Department and the interagency as appropriate, and recommendations for the obligation of funds authorized pursuant to subsection (a). (2) Duties The Coordinator designated pursuant to paragraph (1) shall be responsible for— (A) on an annual basis, the identification of specific strategic priorities for using the funds authorized to be appropriated under subsection (a), such as geographic areas of focus or functional categories of programming that funds are to be concentrated within, consistent with the national interests of the United States and the purposes of this section; (B) the coordination and approval of all programming conducted using the funds authorized to be appropriated under subsection (a), based on an assessment that such programming directly counters PRC malign influence, including specific activities or policies advanced by such influence, pursuant to the strategic objectives of the United States; (C) ensuring that all programming approved bears a sufficiently direct nexus to countering PRC malign influence and adheres to the requirements outlined in subsection (d); (D) conducting oversight, monitoring, and evaluation of the effectiveness of all programming conducted using the funds authorized to be appropriated under subsection (a) to ensure that it advances United States interests and degrades the ability of the Government of the PRC, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), or entities acting on their behalf, to advance the activities described in subsection (c); and (E) ensuring, to the maximum extent practicable, that all approved programming under subsection (a) is carried out in coordination with other Federal activities to counter the malign influence and activities of the Government of the PRC, the CCP, or entities acting on their behalf. (3) Assistant Coordinator The Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development shall designate an official with direct responsibility for policy with respect to the PRC to assist the Coordinator designated pursuant to paragraph (1), particularly with respect to such assistance handled by the United States Agency for International Development. (c) PRC malign influence defined In this section, the term PRC malign influence means influence of the Government of the PRC and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) or entities acting on their behalf globally that— (1) undermines a free and open international order; (2) advances an alternative, repressive international order that bolsters the PRC or the Chinese Communist Party’s hegemonic ambitions and is characterized by coercion and dependency; (3) undermines the national security, territorial integrity, or sovereignty of the United States or other countries; or (4) undermines the political and economic security of the United States or other countries, including by promoting corruption or elite capture, and advancing coercive economic practices. (d) Activities To counter PRC malign influence In this section, countering malign influence through the use of funds authorized to be appropriated by subsection (a) include efforts— (1) to promote transparency and accountability, and reduce corruption, including in governance structures targeted by the malign influence of the Government of the PRC or the CCP; (2) to support civil society and independent media to raise awareness of and increase transparency regarding the negative impact of activities and initiatives of the Government of the PRC and the CCP, or entities acting on their behalf, including the Belt and Road Initiative and other initiatives that lack transparency, fail to meet international standards, and are associated with coercive economic practices; (3) to counter transnational criminal networks that benefit, or benefit from, the malign influence of the Government of the PRC, the CCP, or entities acting on their behalf; (4) to encourage economic development structures that help protect against predatory lending schemes, including support for market-based alternatives in key economic sectors, such as digital economy, energy, and infrastructure; (5) to counter activities that provide undue influence to the security forces of the PRC; (6) to expose foreign influence operations and propaganda of the Government of the PRC, the CCP, or entities acting on their behalf; (7) to counter efforts by the Government of the PRC, the CCP, or entities acting on their behalf to legitimize or promote authoritarian ideology and governance models, including its model of a state-dominated cyber and digital ecosystem; (8) to counter efforts by the Government of the PRC, the CCP, or entities acting on their behalf, to silence, intimidate, or exact reprisal against individuals outside of their sovereign borders, including members of diaspora populations such as political opponents, repressed religious or spiritual practitioners, marginalized ethnic community members, civil society activists, human rights defenders, researchers, and journalists; (9) to provide alternatives to problematic PRC technology offerings, which could provide the Government of the PRC undue access to or influence over global data flows or sensitive information, and compete with problematic PRC efforts to leverage or make gains in the development of advanced and emerging technologies; (10) to counter PRC activities that directly enable critical supply chain monopolization or other monopolistic practices; (11) to counter aggressive PRC efforts to make inroads into the nuclear energy sectors of countries to the detriment of United States national security, strategic, and nonproliferation interests; and (12) to counter efforts by the Government of the PRC, the CCP, or entities acting on their behalf, to undermine the democratic processes and institutions of United States allies and partners. 183. Global Engagement Center (a) Extension Section 1287(j) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 ( 22 U.S.C. 2656 note) is amended by striking the date that is 8 years after the date of the enactment and inserting the date that is 13 years after the date of the enactment . (b) Amendments Section 1287 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 ( 22 U.S.C. 2656 note) is amended— (1) in subsection (a)(2), by striking foreign state and foreign non-state propaganda and disinformation efforts, and inserting foreign state and non-state influence operations ; (2) in subsection (b)— (A) in paragraph (3)— (i) by striking propaganda and disinformation, and inserting foreign influence operations ; and (ii) inserting , including by working directly with United States embassies and consulates before the period at the end; (B) in paragraph (4), by striking refute foreign propaganda and disinformation, and inserting counter foreign influence operations ; and (C) in paragraph (8)— (i) by striking propaganda and disinformation, and inserting foreign influence operations, ; and (ii) by striking propaganda and disinformation is and inserting foreign influence operations are . (c) Sense of Congress It is the sense of Congress that the Secretary of State should empower the Global Engagement Center to expand its coordinating capacity, including through the exchange of liaison officers with Federal departments and agencies that manage aspects of identifying and countering foreign influence operations. (d) Complementing United States Embassy operations In carrying out its mandate as outlined in section 1287 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, the Global Engagement Center should ensure its efforts complement United States Embassy operations where applicable, including— (1) working with key posts to equip and support officers tasked with countering foreign influence operations; (2) supporting posts in developing country-specific programs to counter foreign influence operations; and (3) working with regional bureaus to ensure effective coordination and mutual visibility and input into regional strategies and activities related to foreign influence operations. (e) Authorization of appropriations There is authorized to be appropriated $150,000,000 for fiscal year 2025 for the Global Engagement Center to counter foreign state and non-state influence operations. 184. Amendment to the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961 Section 108A(a)(1) of the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961 ( 22 U.S.C. 2458a ) is amended— (1) in subparagraph (B), by striking ; and and inserting a semicolon; (2) in subparagraph (C), by striking the semicolon and inserting and, ; and (3) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph: (D) which is not an exchange with the People’s Republic of China, unless the Secretary of State has determined and certified to the appropriate committees of Congress that participation by Federal employees in the exchange is in the national security interest of the United States. . 185. Countering malign information operations in the Americas (a) Sense of Congress It is the sense of Congress that— (1) foreign influence operations pose serious threats to national sovereignty, democratic governance and human rights; (2) foreign influence operations in Latin America and the Caribbean— (A) have been carried out by the Maduro regime and other foreign state actors, including the PRC, the Republic of Cuba, the Russian Federation, and the Islamic Republic of Iran; and (B) have undermined United States national interests, including by— (i) undermining democratic electoral processes; (ii) exacerbating political polarization; and (iii) spreading false narratives contrary to the interests of the United States and its allies; and (3) the United States Government should ensure sufficient attention and resources are allocated to efforts to protect independent media spaces, strengthen transparency of links between local media ecosystems and foreign actors, and counter Spanish-language and other non-English language foreign influence operations in Latin America and the Caribbean, including through Global Engagement Center research, grants, and programs. (b) Strategy The Secretary of State shall develop and implement a strategy for protecting independent media spaces and countering the creation and amplification of foreign state and nonstate influence operations in Latin America and the Caribbean and to identify initiatives in Latin America and the Caribbean to counter efforts by the Governments of the PRC and the Russian Federation to undermine sovereignty, territorial integrity, and democratic processes and institutions in the region. (c) Multilateral diplomacy The Secretary of State should convene summits, forums, and multi-stakeholder initiatives to address global threats to independent media ecosystems and develop solutions to the challenges posed by foreign influence operations, which could include— (1) a Latin America and Caribbean Tech Challenge that is— (A) sponsored by the Global Engagement Center; and (B) aimed at advancing the development of innovative solutions to counter disinformation and propaganda across Latin America and the Caribbean; and (2) a high-level, multi-stakeholder summit convened by the Secretary of State in Latin America and the Caribbean that seeks to— (A) strengthen information sharing and other cooperation among regional governments, independent media, academia, tech companies, and civil society organizations in Latin America and the Caribbean for purposes of developing joint solutions to counter disinformation; (B) counter efforts by the PRC and Russia to undermine the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and democratic processes and institutions of United States allies and partners; and (C) promote efforts to protect the sustainability of independent media and freedom of the press. 186. Global Peace Operations Initiative Section 552 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 ( 22 U.S.C. 2348a ) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection: (e) Restriction related to People’s Republic of China None of the funds authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made available to carry out this chapter, including for the Global Peace Operations Initiative of the United States Department of State, may be used to train or support foreign military forces in peacekeeping training exercises by the Government of the People’s Republic of China or the People’s Liberation Army unless, by not later than October 1 of each year, the Secretary of State certifies to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives that such training or support is important to the national security interests of the United States. . 187. Expansion of sanctions under the Fentanyl Sanctions Act Section 7212 of the Fentanyl Sanctions Act ( 21 U.S.C. 2312 ) is amended— (1) in paragraph (1), by striking ; or and inserting a semicolon; (2) in paragraph (2), by striking the period at the end and inserting a semicolon; and (3) by adding at the end the following new paragraphs: (3) the President determines has knowingly engaged in, on or after the date of enactment of this paragraph, a significant activity or financial transaction that has materially contributed to, foreign opioid trafficking; or (4) the President determines— (A) has received any property or interest in property that the foreign person knows— (i) constitutes or is derived from the proceeds of an activity or transaction described in paragraph (3); or (ii) was used or intended to be used to commit or to facilitate such an activity or transaction; (B) has knowingly provided significant financial, material, or technological support for, including through the provision of goods or services in support of— (i) any activity or transaction described in paragraph (3); or (ii) any foreign person described in paragraph (3); (C) is or has been owned, controlled, or directed by, or has knowingly acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, any foreign person described in paragraph (3) or subparagraph (A) or (B). . 188. Imposition of sanctions with respect to agencies or instrumentalities of foreign states The President shall— (1) impose one or more of the sanctions described in section 7213 of the Fentanyl Sanctions Act ( 21 U.S.C. 2313 ) with respect to each agency or instrumentality of a foreign state (as defined in section 1603(b) of title 28, United States Code) that the President determines— (A) has engaged in, on or after the date of enactment of this section, a significant activity or transaction that has materially contributed to opioid trafficking; or (B) has provided, or attempted to provide, financial, material, or technological support for, including through the provision of goods or services in support of, any activity or transaction described in subparagraph (A); or (2) impose the sanction described in subsection (a)(6) of such section 7213 on each foreign person that the President determines— (A) is a senior official of an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state described in paragraph (1); or (B) that the President determines is or has been owned, controlled, or directed by, or has knowingly acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state described in paragraph (1). 189. Imposition of sanctions with respect to military and intelligence facilities of the People’s Republic of China in Cuba (a) In general The President shall impose the sanctions described in subsection (b) with respect to any foreign person that the President determines has engaged in, after the date of enactment of this Act, a significant transaction or transactions, or any significant dealings with, or, after the date of enactment of this Act, has provided significant material support to or for a military or intelligence facility of the PRC in Cuba. (b) Sanctions described The sanctions described in this subsection with respect to a foreign person are the following: (1) Asset blocking The exercise of all powers granted to the President by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act ( 50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq. ) to the extent necessary to block and prohibit all transactions in all property and interests in property of the foreign person if such property and interests in property are in the United States, come within the United States, or are or come within the possession or control of a United States person. (2) Exclusion from the United States and revocation of visa or other documentation In the case of a foreign person who is an alien, denial of a visa to, and exclusion from the United States of, the alien, and revocation in accordance with section 221(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act ( 8 U.S.C. 1201(i) ), of any visa or other documentation of the alien. (c) Implementation; penalties (1) Implementation The President shall exercise authorities provided under sections 203 and 205 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702 and 1704) to carry out this section. (2) Penalties A person that knowingly violates, attempts to violate, conspires to violate, or causes a violation of subsection (b)(1) or any regulation, license, or order issued to carry out that subsection shall be subject to the penalties set forth in subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act ( 50 U.S.C. 1705 ) to the same extent as a person that commits an unlawful act described in subsection (a) of that section. (d) Exceptions (1) Importation of goods (A) In general The authorities and requirements to impose sanctions authorized under this section shall not include the authority or a requirement to impose sanctions on the importation of goods. (B) Good defined In this paragraph, the term good means any article, natural or manmade substance, material, supply, or manufactured product, including inspection and test equipment, and excluding technical data. (2) Compliance with United Nations Headquarters Agreement Sanctions under subsection (b)(2) shall not apply to an alien if admitting the alien into the United States is necessary to permit the United States to comply with the Agreement regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations, signed at Lake Success June 26, 1947, and entered into force November 21, 1947, between the United Nations and the United States, or other applicable international obligations. (e) National security waiver The President may waive the imposition of sanctions under this section with respect to a foreign person on a case-by-case basis if the President submits to the appropriate committees of Congress a determination that the waiver is in the national interests of the United States. (f) Termination of sanctions Notwithstanding any other provision of law, this section shall terminate on the date that is 30 days after the date on which the President determines and certifies to the appropriate committees of Congress (and Congress has not enacted legislation disapproving the determination within that 30-day period) that all military or intelligence facilities of the PRC in Cuba have been closed. (g) Definitions In this section: (1) Alien The term alien has the meaning given that term in section 101 of the Immigration and Nationality Act ( 8 U.S.C. 1101 ). (2) Foreign person The term foreign person means a person that is not a United States person. (3) Person The term person means an individual or entity. (4) United States person The term United States person means— (A) an individual who is a United States citizen or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence to the United States; (B) an entity organized under the laws of the United States or any jurisdiction within the United States, including a foreign branch of such an entity; or (C) any person in the United States. 190. Strategic stability dialogue and arms control (a) Findings Congress makes the following findings: (1) The United States and the PRC have both made commitments to advancing strategic security through enforceable arms control and non-proliferation agreements as states parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968. (2) The United States has long taken tangible steps to seek effective, verifiable, and enforceable arms control and non-proliferation agreements that support United States and allied security by— (A) controlling the spread of nuclear materials and technology; (B) placing limits on the production, stockpiling, and deployment of nuclear weapons; (C) decreasing the risk of misperception and miscalculation; and (D) avoiding the destabilizing effects of nuclear arms competition. (3) The PRC’s current nuclear expansion, part of a massive modernization of the PLA that is expected to be completed by 2035, combined with the PLA’s aggressive actions, has increasingly destabilized the Indo-Pacific region. (4) The long-planned United States nuclear modernization program will not increase the United States nuclear weapons stockpile, predates China’s conventional military and nuclear expansion, and is not an arms race against China. (5) The United States extended nuclear deterrence— (A) provides critical strategic security around the world; (B) is an essential element of United States military alliances; and (C) serves a vital non-proliferation function. (6) The United States has, on numerous occasions, called on the PRC to participate in strategic arms control negotiations, and has sought to engage the PRC in a strategic stability dialogue, but the PRC has so far declined. Such negotiations and dialogue would benefit the entire world by developing guardrails to ensure that competition does not veer into conflict. (7) Provocations such as the balloon incident in 2023 and the inability of United States officials to reach PRC counterparts via deconfliction lines underscore the need for further engagement on risk reduction, including through near-term dialogue and eventual arms control negotiations. (8) The Governments of Japan, the United Kingdom, Poland, Slovenia, Denmark, Norway, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, the Netherlands, Romania, Austria, Montenegro, Ukraine, Slovakia, Spain, North Macedonia, Sweden, the Czech Republic, Croatia, and Albania, as well as the Deputy Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, have all encouraged the PRC to join arms control discussions. (b) Report on the future of United States-PRC interactions on nuclear and strategic issues (1) In general Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Energy, shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report that outlines the strategy and objectives in engaging the Government of the PRC on nuclear and strategic issues, which shall include— (A) areas of potential dialogue between the Governments of the United States and the PRC, including the interplay of ballistic, hypersonic glide, and cruise missiles, conventional forces, nuclear, space, artificial intelligence and cyberspace issues, as well as other new strategic domains, which could reduce the likelihood of war, limit escalation if a conflict were to occur, and constrain a destabilizing arms race in the Indo-Pacific region; (B) the types of strategic military capabilities of the PRC that the United States Government is most interested in limiting; (C) an assessment of whether additional crisis consultation mechanisms should be developed to avoid, manage, or control inadvertent nuclear, conventional, and unconventional military escalation between the United States and the PRC; (D) the personnel and expertise required to effectively engage the PRC in strategic stability and arms control dialogues; and (E) opportunities and methods to encourage transparency and predictability from the PRC with regard to the growth and purpose of its nuclear and related strategic forces. (2) Form of report The report required under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. 191. Track 1.5 dialogues with the People’s Republic of China on nuclear matters Not later than 15 days before any United States Government official participates in a Track 1.5 dialogue on nuclear policy with any institution under the direct control of the PRC or the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defense, or the People’s Liberation Army of the PRC, the Secretary of State shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Relations in the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs in the House of Representatives a notification of such United States official participation and a justification for such participation, including how— (1) the Track 1.5 dialogue supports official talks between the United States and the Peoples Republic of China on arms control, crisis stability, or other dialogues related to nuclear policy; and (2) United States Government official participation in the Track 1.5 dialogue directly supports the national security interests of the United States. 192. Oversight of life sciences dual use research of concern (a) Definitions In this section: (1) Biological Weapons Convention The term Biological Weapons Convention means the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, done at Washington, London, and Moscow, April 10, 1972. (2) Life sciences dual use research of concern The term life sciences dual use research of concern means life sciences research that— (A) involves the Peoples Republic of China; and (B) based on current understanding can be reasonably anticipated to provide knowledge, information, products, or technologies that could be misapplied to do harm with no, or only minor, modification to pose a significant threat with potential consequences to public health and safety, agricultural crops and other plants, animals, the environment, materiel, or national security. (b) Statement of policy It is the policy of the United States to— (1) conduct rigorous scrutiny of, and regularly review, collaboration on international biological, bacteriological, virological, and other relevant research that could be weaponized or could reasonably be considered life sciences dual-use research of concern, and incorporate national security and nonproliferation considerations and country-specific conditions into decisions regarding such collaboration; (2) ensure that, in the search for solutions to pressing global health challenges, United States Government support for public health research and other actions does not advance the capabilities of the PRC in the area of life sciences dual use research of concern or inadvertently contribute to the proliferation of biological weapons technologies; and (3) declassify, to the maximum extent possible, all intelligence relevant to the PRC’s compliance or lack of compliance with its obligations under the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), and other national security concerns regarding PRC biological, bacteriological, virological, and other relevant research that could be weaponized or could reasonably be considered life sciences dual use research of concern that may be outside the scope of the BWC. (c) Oversight of life sciences dual use research of concern (1) Secretary of State The Secretary of State shall— (A) ensure robust and consistent Department of State participation in interagency processes and review mechanisms related to oversight of life sciences dual-use research of concern; (B) participate in interagency working groups and task forces related to vetting United States Government funding related to international cooperation in nonproliferation, life sciences, high containment laboratories, and infectious diseases, to develop policies and processes for post-award oversight of grants and funding for life sciences dual use research of concern, including as aligned with current laws and regulations and for grants or funding from other Federal departments and agencies, in order to keep apprised of any national security or foreign policy concerns that may arise with respect to an international project or a project involving a foreign partner, funded by another Federal department or agency; (C) conduct periodic reviews of the adequacy of consultative mechanisms with other Federal Departments and agencies with respect to oversight of life sciences dual use research of concern, especially consultative mechanisms mandated in United States law, and identify recommendations for improving such consultative mechanisms; (D) direct Chiefs of Mission to ensure Country Team Assessments are submitted to the Department of State and the head of the Federal department or agency proposing to sponsor a program or collaboration to assess whether such program or collaboration involves life sciences dual use research of concern, and ensure that such Assessments are integrated into relevant interagency processes; and (E) direct Chiefs of Mission to increase embassy reporting on life sciences dual use research of concern, biosecurity hazards trends in the development of synthetic biology and biotechnology, and other related matters. (2) Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development The Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development shall report to and consult with the Department of State on any proposed programs, projects, initiatives, or funding for life sciences dual use research of concern. (d) United Nations agencies, programs, and funds (1) Requirement The Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations should use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the United Nations to block representatives from any country listed in paragraph 2 from serving in leadership positions within any United Nations organ, fund, program, or related specialized agency with responsibility for global health security (including animal health), biosecurity, atomic, biological or chemical weapons, or food security and agricultural development. (2) List of countries specified The countries described in paragraph (1) are— (A) the People’s Republic of China; (B) the Russian Federation; (C) the Islamic Republic of Iran; (D) the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea; (E) the Assad Regime of Syria; and (F) any other country specified in the report required by section 403(a) of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act ( 22 U.S.C. 2593a(a) ) in the relevant calendar year. (3) Sunset This section shall terminate on the date that is 5 years after the date of the enactment of this Act. F Strengthening United States public diplomacy 196. Authorization of appropriations to promote United States education, exchange, cultural, and the Fulbright-Hays Program There is authorized to be appropriated, for each year of the 5-year period beginning on October 1, 2025, $20,000,000, to promote education, training, research, and foreign language skills through the Fulbright-Hays Program, in accordance with section 102(b) of the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961 ( 22 U.S.C. 2452(b) ). 197. Public diplomacy training (a) Sense of Congress It is the sense of Congress that— (1) the PRC has invested heavily in public diplomacy efforts that promote positive narratives of the PRC while obfuscating the nefarious actions of the government against its own people, its use of threats and coercive diplomacy to demand deference from other countries, its use of United Front Work Department, affiliated organizations, and other tools and tactics to conduct malign influence operations and undermine democratic values in other countries, and its anti-competitive economic practices; (2) these include huge state-sponsored investments into media outlets throughout the world, advancement of censorship, and the establishment of cultural centers; and (3) the United States must respond with investment, training, and personnel to effectively counter these public diplomacy efforts. (b) Hiring The Secretary of State should prioritize increasing recruitment, hiring of, and the placement of public diplomacy officers for the purposes of strategic competition. (c) Training The Secretary of State shall require all Foreign Service Officers to regularly complete public diplomacy training courses through the Foreign Service Institute or other Department-approved professional development training in public diplomacy, including preparing them to— (1) counter foreign malign influence, especially the effective use by the PRC, Russia, and other relevant countries of tools to influence and manipulate foreign audiences, present narratives favorable to their regimes, undermine democratic values and fundamental freedoms, and obfuscate harmful or coercive policies and practices; (2) understand foreign media landscapes to understand how United States public diplomacy efforts can be most effective; and (3) partner with local organizations focused on countering malign foreign influence, including through disinformation, public influence campaigns, and other means. (d) Developing Department-Wide guidance The Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy shall, in consultation with United States missions abroad, develop Department-wide guidance for public diplomacy officers and senior officers at posts to enable them to better counter foreign malign influence, as described in subsection (c). (e) Form of guidance The guidance required under subsection (d) may take the form of— (1) regularly updated cables; (2) a handbook for the development of public diplomacy efforts at post to counter foreign malign influence; and (3) other forms of guidance as determined appropriate by the Under Secretary. 198. Public diplomacy efforts (a) Sense of Congress It is the sense of Congress that— (1) the Peoples’ Republic of China, Russia, and other strategic competitors vastly overshadow the United States in efforts to shape global public opinion in favor of their own narrow political, commercial, and economic interests, including through promoting disinformation and propaganda as well as investing in exchange programs, scholarships, cultural diplomacy, and other programs; (2) the United States must utilize its full spectrum of public diplomacy tools to promote United States interests and security as well as combat Russian and PRC disinformation; and (3) the Department of State should ensure that adequate resources are available for posts to generate locally tailored public diplomacy programming that advances United States national security objectives. (b) Strategy Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a strategy to modernize and increase the operational and programming capacity of American Spaces, American Corners, and American Centers throughout the world, including on— (1) leveraging public private partnerships; (2) options for United States Government stipends or additional pay to augment the current salaries of local staff at partner organizations hosting American Spaces to locally employed staff of American Spaces and American Corners; and (3) opportunities for United States businesses and nongovernmental organizations to better utilize American Spaces in alignment with overall United States Government priorities. 199. Supporting independent media and countering foreign information operations (a) Findings Congress finds that the PRC is increasing its spending on public diplomacy, including influence campaigns, advertising, and investments into state-sponsored media publications outside of the PRC. This includes, for example, more than $10,000,000,000 in foreign direct investment in communications infrastructure, platforms, and properties, as well as bringing journalists to the PRC for training programs. (b) The United States Agency for Global Media The United States Agency for Global Media (USAGM) and affiliate Federal and non-Federal entities shall, consistent with the other executive branch undertakings in this Act led by the President or the Secretary of State, and in accordance with the highest standards of journalism, undertake the following actions to support independent journalism, counter foreign malign influence, and combat surveillance in countries where the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and other malign actors are promoting foreign information operations, propaganda, and manipulated media markets: (1) Radio Free Asia (RFA) and Voice of America (VOA) shall expand coverage and digital programming in China for all China services and other affiliate language broadcasting services. (2) All USAGM operating entities shall seek to increase coverage on CCP influence in their coverage regions, including RFA in Asia, RFE/RL in Central Asia, MBN in the Middle East, Office of Cuba Broadcasting in Cuba, and Voice America globally. (3) Radio Free Asia (RFA) shall expand its Mandarin-language Asia Fact Check Lab to expose and analyze false narratives on social media by pro-Beijing influencers and content creators. (4) Voice of America shall continue the bilingual Asia Fact Check Lab, established in 2022, and expand on the Jiehuang Pindao initiative to continue identifying and exposing PRC information operations. (5) Middle East Broadcasting Networks, Inc. (MBN) shall expand coverage of the PRC’s influence in the Middle East and North Africa, a topic that is void on indigenous media in the region. (6) USAGM shall expand existing training and partnership programs that promote journalistic standards, investigative reporting, cybersecurity, and digital analytics to help expose and counter false CCP narratives. (7) The Open Technology Fund shall continue its work to support applied research, and the development and deployment of tools and technologies to circumvent censorship and surveillance by the CCP, both inside the PRC as well as abroad where the PRC has exported these technologies. (8) Voice of America shall continue its mission of providing accurate, objective, and comprehensive news as well as presenting the policies of the United States clearly and effectively. (9) The Office of Cuba Broadcasting (OCB) shall continue its work promoting freedom and democracy by providing the people of Cuba with objective news and information, including exposing and reporting on Chinese disinformation and malign influence for its Cuban and Latin American audiences. (10) RFE/RL shall establish an investigative unit dedicated to working across Central Asia to develop multimedia responses to local information operation efforts by the CCP and other malign actors. (11) All USAGM operating units may establish or further develop investigative units. (12) The networks and grantees of the United States Agency for Global Media shall continue their mission of providing credible and timely news coverage, including on the PRC's malign behavior and activities across the world. (c) Authorizations of appropriations (1) USAGM There is authorized to be appropriated, for each of fiscal years 2025 through 2029 for the United States Agency for Global Media, $1,500,000. (2) Media support There is authorized to be appropriated, for each of fiscal years 2025 through 2029, $250,000,000 for ongoing and new programs to support local media, build independent media, combat PRC information operations inside and outside of China, invest in technology to subvert censorship, and monitor and evaluate these programs. Such funds shall be directed to— (A) RFA to expand— (i) its China language services (including Mandarin, Cantonese, Uyghur, and Tibetan); (ii) its coverage in Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands to counter the Chinese Communist Party’s propaganda; (iii) its Global Mandarin digital brand WHYNOT/Wainao, which engages Chinese-speaking populations both inside China and around the world; (iv) its investigative unit, which probes PRC influence and relevant issues including transnational repression and cross-border crime in Asia, the Pacific, and globally; and (v) its Asia Fact Check Lab, which counters and analyzes PRC disinformation and malign influence in the information space. (B) RFE/RL to increase Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Tajik, Turkmen, and Uzbek language services; (C) the Open Technology Fund for censorship circumvention and privacy enhancing technologies which contribute to— (i) enabling Chinese citizens to safely access independent news and information; and (ii) countering Chinese information control technologies in authoritarian countries where they are being exported and adopted; (D) MBN to increase coverage of China’s influence in the region through its award-winning investigative reporting, including expansion of its digital series Did it Really Happen? to counter false narratives being spread by the PRC through social media; (E) OCB to increase efforts to expose and counter China’s active propaganda and disinformation machine within Cuba, including expanded fact-checking, journalistic training, and investments in technology; and (F) Voice of America to expand— (i) its coverage addressing China’s malign influences within China and across Africa, Latin America, Asia, and Eurasia; (ii) direct reporting in key regions, including Taiwan and the Pacific Islands, including establishing a Mongolian Service; and (iii) Open-Source Intelligence journalism, to leverage data mining capabilities to uncover insights into China’s domestic developments and its global activities. (d) Report to Congress Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, USAGM shall submit to Congress a report on the audience size and partnerships developed in furtherance of its efforts to counter CCP's malign influence. 199A. Support for local media (a) In general The Secretary of State, acting through the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy, the Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor and in coordination with the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, shall support civil society and foreign media organizations in the implementation of programs to train foreign media personnel on investigative techniques, provide journalist protection, improve media literacy among the school-aged and general populations, boost access to accurate and reliable news and information generally, as well as other media-related activities in order to ensure public accountability related to the Belt and Road Initiative and the Global Development Initiative, the PRC’s use of and export of surveillance and other technologies, and other influence operations abroad direct or directly supported by the Chinese Communist Party or the Government of the PRC. (b) Authorization of appropriations There is authorized to be appropriated to the Department of State, for each of fiscal years 2025 through 2029, $100,000,000 in support of the activities outlined in subsection (a), including for ongoing and new programs in support of press freedom, training, media literacy, and protection of journalists. II Investing in alliances, partnerships, and international organizations A Strategic and diplomatic matters I Promoting United States leadership on matters related to the Indo-Pacific 201. Sense of Congress condemning the PRC’s support for Russia’s war on Ukraine It is the sense of Congress that— (1) the PRC and the Russian Federation are strengthening their relationship to advance their mutual interests, including in creating divisions between the United States and its allies and partners; (2) the PRC is supporting Russia’s unprovoked, full-scale, and brutal invasion of Ukraine, including through increasing trade with Russia by 30 percent in 2022, and another 26.3 percent in 2023, purchasing 2,140,000 barrels of Russian crude oil per day in 2023 under embargo by the transatlantic alliance, selling high-precision machinery, electronics, base metals, textiles and apparel, vehicles, ships, aircraft to Russia, abetting sanctions evasion in countries on Russia’s borders, and amplifying Russian propaganda and false information; (3) the PRC has explored providing weapons and ammunition to the Russian Federation in order to support that country’s unlawful, imperialist war of aggression against Ukraine; (4) the Government of the PRC is not taking sufficient action to prevent PRC-based companies from exporting lethal equipment to the Russian Federation, as revealed by the credible evidence that PRC companies and entities have— (A) shipped unmanned aerial vehicles to Russia that were designated on customs forms as being for use in the special military operation. ; (B) supplied Iran with drone parts that were later used by Russian forces in Ukraine; (C) sent Tiger armored personnel carriers to Chechen forces, raising the possibility that these vehicles being could be deployed to Ukraine; (D) shipped tens of thousands of kilograms of smokeless gunpowder to a munitions factory in Russia; (E) provided Russia with optical parts used in tanks and armored vehicles; (F) provided nitrocellulose used in gunpowder; and (G) allowed the shipment of dual use engines for missiles and drones to Russia; (5) because of the PRC’s ongoing support for Russia’s war against Ukraine, the United States has sanctioned numerous PRC and Hong Kong-based entities; (6) the PRC’s support for Russia’s war against Ukraine threatens European stability and security, including that of those countries that the United States is committed to defend under the terms of the North Atlantic Treaty; (7) the United States, the European Union, and European countries must continue and increase implementation of sanctions and other appropriate economic tools against PRC firms supporting the Russian Federation’s war against Ukraine, including those supporting Russian paramilitary organizations; (8) the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO’s) 2022 Strategic Concept correctly recognizes the need to prepare for, and respond to, the threats posed by the PRC to Euro-Atlantic security, including threats derived from its relationship with the Russian Federation and its efforts to divide United States and European allies; (9) NATO members must work to implement and build on steps identified in NATO’s Strategic Concept, including building greater NATO expertise on the PRC and its military and intelligence apparatuses, using NATO summits as an opportunity to check progress and update priorities, and making any needed adjustments to NATO’s operational plans to account for the ownership or involvement of PRC state-owned enterprises and other entities in space, key seaports, communications nodes, and airports; (10) the Government of the PRC has been clear about its desire to be included in diplomatic discussions about ending Russia’s war in Ukraine, including through the February 2023 publication of a 12-point position paper on the political settlement of the Ukraine crisis and the appointment of a Special Envoy for Eurasian Affairs; (11) the Government of the PRC has done nothing to deliver tangible outcomes on the elements of its position paper beyond symbolic actions; (12) although the PRC’s position paper calls for the full implementation of the July 2022 United Nations-brokered Black Sea Grain Initiative as a means to maintain global food security, and despite Xi Jinping’s emphasis on food security for his own country, the Government of the PRC did nothing to pressure the Russian Federation to return to the deal, which it abrogated in July 2023; (13) President Joseph R. Biden rightly dismissed the PRC’s peace plan (referring to the 12-point position paper) as something that would not help anyone other than Russia, as he stated in February 2023; (14) the United States should remain wary of PRC engagement in Ukraine and instead focus its efforts on strengthening the coalition of like-minded partners in support of Ukraine’s full sovereignty and territorial integrity; (15) given the PRC’s significant support for Russia, Xi Jinping and the Government of the PRC should not be viewed as impartial brokers that will bring this war to an end on terms that will be positive for Ukraine, its independence, and the security of Europe; (16) although Russia and the PRC have disagreements, both countries assess that their partnership is critical to countering the United States; (17) PRC diplomatic involvement in Ukraine would lead to greater PRC involvement in European security issues, while also presenting the PRC as a responsible party to the international community; (18) it is of vital importance that the United States and Europe remain united in confronting the security and economic risks posed by a significant PRC role in diplomatic efforts to end Russia’s war in Ukraine, executing policies that account for greater Sino-Russian alignment, and working together closely on planning ahead for reconstruction of Ukraine; (19) as earlier PRC investments in Ukraine targeted strategic sectors, any post-war PRC investments in Ukraine would give the PRC access to valuable military technology and know-how, as Ukraine inherited roughly one-third of the Soviet Union’s defense-industrial base and 15 percent of Soviet military research and development facilities, and during its war against Russia, has made great strides in the development of certain defense items; and (20) given the PRC’s documented track record on corruption, a role for the PRC in Ukraine’s reconstruction would likely undercut extensive ongoing United States and European efforts to align Ukrainian governance and anti-corruption standards with those of Western institutions, as well as the European Union’s (EU) progress in helping Ukraine adhere to the standards required for its eventual entry into the EU. 202. United States commitment and support for allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific (a) Sense of Congress It is the sense of Congress that— (1) the United States alliances in the Indo-Pacific provide a unique strategic advantage to the United States and are among the United States’ most vital relationships, enabling the United States Government to advance its vital national interests, defend its territory, expand its economy through international trade and commerce, establish enduring cooperation among like-minded countries, prevent the domination of the Indo-Pacific by a hostile power or powers, and ensure the region’s sea, skies, and other shared domains remain free and open and are lawfully governed; (2) the United States, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand are critical allies in advancing a free and open order in the Indo-Pacific region and tackling challenges with unity of purpose, and have a strong record of collaboration on shared interests in areas such as defense and security, economic prosperity, infrastructure connectivity, and fundamental freedoms; (3) the United States greatly values other partnerships in the Indo-Pacific region, including with India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, New Zealand, Taiwan, and Vietnam as well as regional architecture such as the Quad, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), which are essential to further shared interests; (4) the security environment in the Indo-Pacific region demands consistent United States and allied commitment to strengthening and advancing our alliances so that they are postured to meet key challenges, and will require sustained political will, concrete partnerships, economic, commercial, and technological cooperation, consistent and tangible commitments, high-level and extensive consultations on matters of mutual interest, mutual and shared cooperation in the acquisition of key capabilities important to allied defenses, and unified mutual support in the face of political, economic, or military coercion; (5) fissures in the United States alliance relationships and partnerships benefit United States adversaries and weaken collective ability to advance shared interests; (6) the United States must work with allies to prioritize human rights, good governance, and anti-corruption throughout the Indo-Pacific region; (7) the Indo-Pacific region is vulnerable to natural shocks and stresses, making humanitarian and disaster relief, stewardship of natural resources, and food and water security important areas of cooperation between the United States and partner countries; and (8) the United States should continue to engage and deepen cooperation with allies and partners of the United States in the Indo-Pacific region, in the areas of— (A) disaster risk reduction, including efforts to enhance effective forecasting, reduce vulnerability, and build resilience to natural shocks and stresses; (B) disaster response and early recovery; (C) humanitarian assistance and food security; (D) sustainable uses of forest and water resources with the goal of promoting economic security while preserving biodiversity and access to safe drinking water; and (E) fisheries and marine resource conservation. (b) Statement of policy It shall be the policy of the United States— (1) to deepen diplomatic, economic, and security cooperation between and among the United States, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand, including, as appropriate, through diplomatic engagement, regional development, energy security and development, scientific and health partnerships, educational and cultural exchanges, missile defense, intelligence-sharing, space, cyber, and other diplomatic and defense-related initiatives; (2) to uphold United States multilateral and bilateral treaty obligations, including— (A) defending Australia under article IV of the Australia, New Zealand, and United States Security Treaty (ANZUS); (B) defending Japan, including territories under the administration of Japan, under article V of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between the United States of America and Japan; (C) defending the Republic of Korea under article III of the Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of Korea; (D) defending the Philippines under Article IV of the Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of the Philippines; and (E) defending Thailand under Article IV of the 1954 Manila Pact and the Thanat-Rusk communique of 1962; (3) to strengthen and deepen the United States regional and multilateral partnerships, including with ASEAN, and to support ASEAN centrality in the region; (4) to cooperate with Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand to promote human rights bilaterally and multilaterally, including through regional fora; (5) to support the continued development and implementation of an enhanced trilateral security partnership between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States under the auspices of AUKUS ; and (6) to strengthen and advance diplomatic, economic, and security cooperation with regional partners, such as India, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, Taiwan, and Vietnam. 203. Sense of Congress on cooperation with the Quad It is the sense of Congress that— (1) the United States should continue to reaffirm its commitment to quadrilateral cooperation among Australia, India, Japan, and the United States (the Quad ) to enhance and implement a shared vision to meet shared regional challenges and to promote a free, open, inclusive and resilient Indo-Pacific that is characterized by democracy, rule of law, and market-based economic growth, and is free from undue influence and coercion; (2) the United States should seek to expand collaboration with Quad partners to bring concrete benefits to the Indo-Pacific region, including benefits with respect to the rule of law, freedom of navigation and overflight, peaceful resolution of disputes, democratic values, economic prosperity and security, infrastructure development, energy access and security, technological advancement, territorial integrity, peace and prosperity, and democratic resilience; (3) the United States should seek to expand avenues of cooperation with the Quad, including more coordinated policies related to such shared interests as protecting cyberspace and advancing maritime security; (4) the cooperation under the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness, announced at the fourth Quad leaders meeting on May 24, 2022, will contribute to the region’s shared maritime domain awareness picture, which is a critical component to achieving peace, stability, and prosperity in the maritime domain; (5) Quad commitments to address shared challenges in new areas such as resilience in the Pacific Islands region, space, cyberspace, and critical and emerging technologies, and to continue to work to address pandemic preparedness, to provide quality infrastructure investment, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief, and to enhance people-to-people ties, including through the announcement of a Quad Fellowship in September 2021, further advance the important cooperation among Quad nations that is so critical to the Indo-Pacific region; (6) the United States and other Quad nations, including through partnerships with multilateral development banks, should work together to finance and otherwise cooperate on development and infrastructure projects in the Indo-Pacific region that are sustainable and offer a viable alternative to the investments of the PRC in that region under the Belt and Road Initiative and the Global Development Initiative; and (7) in consultation with other Quad countries, the President should continue to prioritize clear, concrete deliverables related to Quad priorities, particularly for leader-level working groups, to increase the Quad’s operational effectiveness and strategic value by demonstrating that the Quad can deliver tangible results while remaining agile enough to adjust as needs and conditions change. 204. Statement of policy on enhancing United States-Taiwan partnership It is the policy of the United States— (1) to recognize Taiwan as a vital part of the United States Indo-Pacific strategy; (2) to advance the security of Taiwan and its democracy as key elements for the continued peace and stability of the greater Indo-Pacific region, and a vital national security interest of the United States; (3) to secure United States interests and preserve the ability of the people of Taiwan to determine their own future, and to strenuously oppose any action by the PRC to use force to change the status quo of Taiwan; (4) to strengthen cooperation with the military of Taiwan under the framework of the Taiwan Relations Act ( Public Law 96–8 ; 22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq. ) and the Six Assurances, with consideration of the ongoing military buildup in the PRC and the military balance in the Taiwan Strait, and to transfer defense articles to Taiwan to enhance its capabilities, including to advance its ability to contribute to denying the PRC coercion and potential invasion; (5) to support Taiwan’s implementation of its asymmetric defense strategy; (6) to encourage Taiwan to continue increasing its defense spending and undertaking defense reforms that enable the full resourcing and effectiveness of its defense strategy; (7) to support Taiwan’s vibrant democracy and free and fair elections, and promote dignity and respect for the democratically elected leaders of Taiwan, who represent more than 23,000,000 people, by using the full range of diplomatic and other appropriate tools available to promote Taiwan’s international space; (8) to advocate and actively advance Taiwan’s meaningful participation in the United Nations and its specialized agencies, the World Health Assembly, the International Criminal Police Organization, and other international bodies as appropriate; (9) to advocate for information sharing with Taiwan in the International Agency for Research on Cancer; (10) to promote meaningful cooperation among the United States, Taiwan, and other like-minded partners; (11) to enhance bilateral trade, including through new agreements and the United States-Taiwan 21st Century Trade Initiative; (12) to include Taiwan as a partner in the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework; (13) to actively engage in negotiations in pursuance of a bilateral free trade agreement and tax agreement to avoid double taxation and promote trade and investment; (14) to expand bilateral economic and technological cooperation, including improving supply chain security; (15) to support United States educational and exchange programs with Taiwan, including by promoting the study of Chinese language, culture, history, and politics in Taiwan; (16) to expand people-to-people exchanges between the United States and Taiwan; (17) to ensure that distinctions in practice regarding United States relations with Taiwan are consistent with the longstanding, comprehensive, strategic, and values-based relationship the United States shares with Taiwan, and contribute to the peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues; and (18) to further enhance United States relations with Taiwan by forming a robust partnership that— (A) meets current geopolitical challenges; (B) fully accounts for Taiwan’s democratic status; and (C) remains faithful to United States principles and values, consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act and the Six Assurances. 205. Expanding expertise on Taiwan matters (a) Permanent personnel realignment Not later than the end of fiscal year 2024, the Secretary of State shall realign up to twelve full-time equivalent personnel to the American Institute in Taiwan. (b) Additional personnel (1) American Institute in Taiwan The American Institute in Taiwan should increase staffing by not less than four additional full-time equivalent personnel at the American Institute in Taiwan in Washington. (2) Office of Taiwan coordination There is authorized to be appropriated $800,000 for four additional full-time equivalent personnel at the Office of Taiwan Coordination at the Department of State. (c) Notification Not later than 30 days after the Secretary of State carries out the requirement in subsection (a), the Secretary shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a notification that includes a description of the role of each realigned full-time equivalent personnel and how such realignment addresses gaps in the American Institute in Taiwan’s ability to advance United States interests with respect to Taiwan. 206. United States-South Korea alliance (a) Findings Congress makes the following findings: (1) On October 1, 1953, the United States and the Republic of Korea signed the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of Korea. (2) First agreed to in 1991, the Agreement between the United States of America and the Republic of Korea Concerning Special Measures Relating to Article V of the Agreement under Article IV of the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States of America and the Republic of Korea Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces in the Republic of Korea (referred to in this section as the SMA ), established the sharing of non-personnel stationing costs associated with the presence of United States forces in the Republic of Korea. (3) After eight rounds of consultations, the United States and the Republic of Korea reached consensus on ad ref texts for a renewed SMA on October 3, 2024. (4) The renewed SMA and the accompanying Implementing Arrangement for the Special Measures Agreement ( SMA IA ) were signed in Seoul, South Korea, on November 4, 2024, becoming the 12th iteration of the SMA. (5) Under the renewed SMA and consistent with United States objectives, the United States and the Republic of Korea agreed to a topline 8.3 percent increase in the contribution from the Republic of South Korea as compared to the calendar year 2025 contribution. (6) The renewed SMA meets additional United States priority objectives, including maintaining the United States position of protecting the authority of the United States Forces Korea (USFK) Commander to allocate funds within and between the three cost categories in accordance with operational and mission requirements. (7) The renewed SMA and IA entered into force on November 29, 2024, following notification in writing by the United States and the Republic of South Korea that their respective domestic procedures necessary for the agreement's entry into force had been completed. (b) Statement of policy It is the policy of the United States to uphold and reinforce the United States alliance with the Republic of Korea, including by— (1) maintaining the presence of approximately 28,500 members of the United States Armed Forces deployed to the Republic of Korea; (2) affirming the United States extended deterrence commitment using the full range of United States defense capabilities, consistent with the Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of Korea, signed at Washington, October 1, 1953, in support of the shared objective of a peaceful and stable Korean Peninsula; and (3) upholding the renewed SMA agreement reached and signed on November 4, 2024, between the United States and the Republic of Korea. 207. Sense of Congress on United States-Japan-Republic of Korea cooperation It is the sense of Congress that it is in the national interest of the United States— (1) to support Japan and the Republic in Korea (ROK) in building on the steps taken to address major issues in their bilateral relations, including the ROK’s plan to resolve a World War II forced labor dispute announced in March 2023 and follow-on bilateral leaders summit; (2) to encourage Japan and the ROK to increase engagement in security cooperation on a bilateral and trilateral basis with the United States; (3) to emphasize the shared threats that Japan and the ROK face as the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) accelerates its provocative missile tests with a tempo and diversity of missiles that suggests it is simulating wartime use to signal to United States allies that it can control escalation in a conflict; (4) to prioritize the exchange of information among the three militaries, particularly in the area of theater missile defense; (5) to encourage Japan and the ROK to resolve their history-related disputes with mutually acceptable and durable solutions that allow cooperation to continue without interruption; (6) to encourage and facilitate Japan and the ROK deepening cooperation on cyber defense, including through the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE), which Japan joined in 2018 and the ROK joined in 2022; (7) to participate in trilateral inter-parliamentary exchanges with Japan and the ROK, including through efforts like the Japan-U.S. Friendship Commission Thomas S. Foley Legislative Exchange program; and (8) to promote trilateral development and humanitarian assistance cooperation to collectively enhance the stability, security, and democratic norms of partner countries through an affirmative and sovereign development model. 208. Sense of Congress on the need for the Senate to give its advice and consent to the ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea It is the sense of Congress that— (1) it is in the national interest for the United States to become a formal signatory of the United Nations Convention on the law of the Sea (UNCLOS), done at Montego Bay December 10, 1982; (2) the United States Senate should promptly give its advice and consent to the ratification of the UNCLOS; and (3) joining the UNCLOS should remain a top priority for the United States, the importance of which was most recently underscored by the strategic challenges the United States faces in the Indo-Pacific, the Arctic, and the Black Sea regions. 209. Statement of policy on maritime freedom of operations in international waterways and airspace of the Indo-Pacific and on artificial land features in the South China Sea (a) Sense of Congress Congress— (1) condemns coercive and threatening actions or the use of force by the PRC to impede operations or freedom of overflight in international airspace by military or civilian aircraft, to alter the status quo, or to destabilize the Indo-Pacific region; (2) urges the Government of the PRC to refrain from implementing the declared East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), or an ADIZ in the South China Sea, and to refrain from taking similar provocative actions elsewhere in the Indo-Pacific region; (3) reaffirms that the 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration decision is final and legally binding on both the Philippines and the PRC and that the PRC’s claims to offshore resources across most of the South China Sea are unlawful; and (4) urge the PRC to abide by the 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling, despite the PRC’s obligations as a state party to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. (b) Statement of policy It shall be the policy of the United States to— (1) reaffirm its commitment and support for allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific region, including longstanding United States policy regarding Article IV of the United States-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty, and restate its position that the Japanese-administered Senkaku Islands fall within the scope of Article V of the United States-Japan Mutual Defense Treaty; (2) oppose claims that impinge on lawful use of the sea, or the airspace above it, and oppose the militarization of new and reclaimed land features in the South China Sea; (3) continue certain policies with respect to the PRC’s claims in the South China Sea, namely— (A) that the PRC claims in the South China Sea, including claims to offshore resources across most of the South China Sea, are unlawful; (B) that the PRC cannot lawfully assert a maritime claim vis-a-vis the Philippines in areas that the Permanent Court of Arbitration found to be in the Philippines’ Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) or on its continental shelf; (C) to reject any claim by the PRC to waters beyond a 12-nautical mile territorial sea derived from islands it claims in the Spratly Islands; and (D) that the PRC has no lawful territorial or maritime claim to James Shoal; (4) urge all parties to refrain from engaging in destabilizing activities, including occupation or efforts to unlawfully assert administration over areas subject to disputed claims; (5) encourage disputes to be managed without intimidation, coercion, or force; (6) call on all claimants to clarify or adjust claims in accordance with international law; (7) uphold the principle that territorial and maritime claims, including claims to territorial waters or territorial seas, must be derived from land features and otherwise comport with international law; (8) oppose the imposition of unilateral fishing regulations covering disputed areas in the South China Sea, regulations which have raised tensions in the region; (9) support a Code of Conduct only if that Code of Conduct reflects the interests of Southeast Asian claimant states and does not serve as a vehicle for the PRC to advance its unlawful maritime claims and keep the United States out of the Indo-Pacific region; (10) reaffirm that an existing body of international rules and guidelines, including the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, done at London October 12, 1972 (COLREGs), is sufficient to ensure the safety of navigation between the United States Armed Forces and the forces of other countries, including the PRC; (11) support the development of regional institutions and bodies, including the ASEAN Regional Forum, the ASEAN Defense Minister’s Meeting Plus, the East Asia Summit, and the expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum, to increase practical cooperation in the region and reinforce the role of international law; (12) encourage the deepening of partnerships with other countries in the region for maritime domain awareness and capacity building, as well as efforts by the United States Government to explore the development of appropriate multilateral mechanisms for a common operating picture in the South China Sea among Southeast Asian countries that would serve to help countries protect their sovereignty in a manner consistent with international law and deter risky and dangerous activities; (13) oppose actions by any country to prevent another country from lawfully exercising its sovereign rights related to the resources of its exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and continental shelf by making claims to those areas in the South China Sea that are not consistent with international law; and (14) assure the continuity of operations by the United States in the Indo-Pacific region, including, when appropriate, operations in cooperation with partners and allies, to reaffirm the principle of freedom of operations in international waters and airspace in accordance with established principles and practices of international law. 209A. Sense of Congress regarding universal implementation of United Nations sanctions on North Korea (a) Sense of Congress Congress— (1) condemns Russia’s March 2024 veto of, and the PRC’s abstention on, the United Nations Security Council Resolution renewing the mandate of the Panel of Experts tasked with monitoring United Nations sanctions against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) as irresponsible and dangerous actions that undermine international efforts to counter the threat posed by the DPRK’s unlawful nuclear and ballistic missile program; (2) despite the expiration of the mandate of the Panel of Experts, remains committed to working with relevant United Nations agencies, members of the Security Council, and all United Nations Member States, to uphold the United Nations sanctions regime against the DPRK’s unlawful nuclear and ballistic missile program, and to advance the global nonproliferation regime; and (3) supports the establishment of new multilateral mechanisms to monitor United Nations Member State implementation of United Nations Security Council resolutions targeting the DPRK to shine a light on Member States who are evading sanctions and abetting the DPRK regime’s unlawful weapons program. (b) Statement of policy It is the policy of the United States to sustain economic pressure on the Government of the DPRK until the regime undertakes actions toward complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization, including by— (1) pressing all nations, including the PRC, to implement and enforce existing United Nations sanctions with regard to the DPRK and its nuclear and missile programs; (2) pressing all nations, including the PRC, and in accordance with United Nations Security Council resolutions, to end the practice of hosting DPRK citizens as guest workers, recognizing that such workers are demonstrated to constitute an illicit source of revenue for the DPRK regime and its nuclear ambitions; (3) pressing all nations, including the PRC, to pursue rigorous interdiction of shipments to and from the DPRK, including ship-to-ship transfers, consistent with United Nations Security Council resolutions; (4) pressing the PRC and PRC entities— (A) to cease business activities with United Nations-designated entities and their affiliates in the DPRK; and (B) to expel from the PRC individuals who enable the DPRK to acquire materials for its nuclear and ballistic missile programs; (5) working with likeminded partners, think tanks, research organizations, and civil society to develop and implement alternative, independent mechanisms to monitor United Nations Member State adherence to United Nations sanctions targeting the unlawful DPRK weapons program and publicly shine a light on Member States that evade and violate those sanctions; and (6) implementing and enforcing United Nations Security Council resolutions with respect to the DPRK and United States sanctions, including those pursuant to the North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016 ( Public Law 114–122 ), the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act ( Public Law 115–44 ), the Otto Warmbier North Korea Nuclear Sanctions and Enforcement Act of 2019 (title LXXI of Public Law 116–92 ), and relevant United States executive orders. 209B. Establishing a Senior Official for the Compacts of Free Association at the Department of State (a) In general The Secretary shall designate a senior official at the Department of State responsible for administering the Compacts of Free Association at the Department of State (in this section referred to as the Senior Official ). The Senior Official shall report to the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs. (b) Duties The Senior Official shall— (1) be responsible for the conduct of United States foreign policy with respect to the countries affiliated with the United States Government under the Compacts of Free Association (in this section referred to as the Compacts ), namely the freely associated states of— (A) the Republic of Palau; (B) the Marshall Islands; and (C) the Federated States of Micronesia; (2) assist the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs in providing overall direction, coordination, and supervision of interdepartmental activities of the United States Government in these countries, including ensuring the timely transfer of assistance and provision of benefits through the United States Department of the Interior, as laid out in the Compacts; (3) oversee and evaluate the adequacy and effectiveness of United States policy with respect to these countries as well as of the plans, programs, resources, and performance for implementing that policy, including programs and other activities implemented by the Department of the Interior; (4) directly supervise the policy and operations of the Compacts and provide guidance to relevant United States missions within the Indo-Pacific region; (5) ensure the provision of an adequate, regular flow of information to posts abroad on United States Government policies, policy deliberations, and diplomatic exchanges in Washington, DC; and (6) ensure the continuity of implementation of commitments and Compact obligations and benefits, consistent with United States national interests in the Indo-Pacific region. (c) Authorization of appropriations There is authorized to be appropriated $250,000 to support the Senior Official in the conduct and discharge of the duties described in subsection (b). II Enhancing diplomatic engagement in the Global South 211. Enhancement of diplomatic support and economic engagement with Pacific Island countries (a) Authority The Secretary of State and the Secretary of Commerce are authorized to hire Locally Employed Staff in Pacific Island countries for the purpose of providing increased diplomatic support and promoting increased economic and commercial engagement between the United States and Pacific Island countries. (b) Availability of funds There is authorized to be appropriated to the Department of State and the Department of Commerce for fiscal year 2025, not more than $10,000,000 to each agency to carry out the purposes of this section. (c) Exception for American Samoa The Secretary of State may, as appropriate, treat the territory of American Samoa as a foreign country for purposes of carrying out this section. 212. Defense cooperation in Latin America and the Caribbean (a) In general There is authorized to be appropriated to the Department of State $12,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2025 through 2029 for the International Military Education and Training Program for Latin America and the Caribbean. (b) Modernization The Secretary of State shall take steps to modernize and strengthen the programs receiving funding pursuant to subsection (a) to ensure that such programs are rigorous, substantive, and the preeminent choice for international military education and training for Latin American and Caribbean partners. (c) Required elements The programs referred to in subsection (a) shall— (1) provide training and capacity-building opportunities to Latin American and Caribbean security services; (2) provide practical skills and frameworks for— (A) improving the functioning and organization of security services in Latin America and the Caribbean; (B) creating a better understanding of the United States and its values; and (C) using technology for maximum strategic impact and effective operations; and (3) promote and ensure that security services in Latin America and the Caribbean respect civilian authority and operate in compliance with international human rights law and international humanitarian law. (d) Limitation Security assistance under this section is subject to the limitations of section 620M of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 ( 22 U.S.C. 2378d ). 213. Support for Young African Leaders Initiative (a) Sense of congress It is the sense of Congress that— (1) the Young African Leaders Initiative, launched in 2010, is a signature effort to invest in the next generation of African leaders; (2) Africa is a continent of strategic importance and it is vital for the United States to support strong and enduring partnerships with the next generation of African leaders; (3) the United States Government should prioritize investments to build the capacity of emerging young African leaders in sub-Saharan Africa, including through efforts to— (A) enhance leadership skills; (B) encourage entrepreneurship; (C) strengthen public administration and the role of civil society; (D) enhance peace and security in their respective countries of origin and across Africa; and (E) connect young African leaders continentally and globally across the private, civic, and public sectors; (4) youth in Africa have a positive impact on efforts to foster economic growth, improve public sector transparency and governance, and counter extremism, and should be an area of focus for United States outreach on the African continent; and (5) the Secretary of State should increase the number of fellows from Africa participating in the Mandela Washington Fellowship above the estimated 700 fellows who participated during fiscal year 2021. (b) Young African Leaders Initiative (1) In general There is established the Young African Leaders Initiative, ( YALI ). (2) Purpose YALI shall seek to build the capacity of young African leaders in sub-Saharan Africa in the areas of business and entrepreneurship, civic leadership, or public administration, including through efforts to— (A) support young African leaders by offering professional development, training, and networking opportunities, particularly in the areas of leadership, innovation, civic engagement, elections, human rights, entrepreneurship, good governance, peace and security, and public administration; (B) provide increased training to young African leaders to promote economic growth, strengthen ties between United States and African businesses, build resilience to predatory lending practices, and improve capacity in strategic sectors, including critical minerals extraction, technology and media; and (C) identify additional ways to connect all YALI alumni to United States public and private resources and institutions. (3) Fellowships (A) In general YALI shall support the participation in the United States in the Mandela Washington Fellowship for Young African Leaders of fellows from Africa who— (i) are between 25 and 35 years of age; (ii) have demonstrated strong capabilities in entrepreneurship, innovation, public service, and leadership; and (iii) have had a positive impact in their communities, organizations, or institutions. (B) Oversight The fellowships described in paragraph (1) shall be overseen by the Secretary of State through the Bureau of Education and Cultural Affairs. (C) Eligibility The Secretary of State shall establish and publish— (i) eligibility criteria for participation as a fellow under paragraph (1); and (ii) criteria for determining which eligible applicants will be selected. (4) Reciprocal exchanges Subject to the approval of the Secretary of State, United States citizens may— (A) engage in reciprocal exchanges with alumni of the fellowship described in paragraph (3); and (B) collaborate on projects with such fellowship alumni. (5) Yali regional leadership centers and networks The Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development shall establish not fewer than 4 regional leadership centers in sub-Saharan Africa to offer in-person and online training throughout the year on business and entrepreneurship, civic leadership, and public management to young African leaders between 18 and 35 years of age who have demonstrated strong capabilities in entrepreneurship, innovation, public service and leadership, and peace-building and conflict resolution, and who have had a positive impact in their communities, organizations, or institutions. (6) Activities (A) United states-based activities The Secretary of State, in coordination with the heads of relevant Federal departments and agencies, shall oversee all United States-based activities carried out under YALI, including— (i) the participation of Mandela Washington Fellows in a six-week Leadership Institute at a United States educational institution in business, civic engagement, or public management, including academic sessions, site visits, professional networking opportunities, leadership training, community service, and organized cultural activities; and (ii) the participation by Mandela Washington Fellows in an annual Mandela Washington Fellowship Summit, to provide such Fellows the opportunity to meet with United States leaders from the private, public, and non-profit sectors. (B) Africa-based activities The Administrator for the United States Agency for International Development, in coordination with the Secretary of State and the heads of other relevant Federal departments and agencies, should continue to oversee and support YALI activities in sub-Saharan Africa, including— (i) continued leadership training and other professional development opportunities for Mandela Washington Fellowship for Young African Leaders alumni upon their return to their home countries, including online courses, training, and access to funding; (ii) training for young African leaders at regional leadership centers established in accordance with paragraph (5), and through online and in-person courses offered by such centers; and (iii) opportunities for networking and engagement with— (I) alumni of the Mandela Washington Fellowship for Young African Leaders; (II) alumni of programs at regional leadership centers established in accordance with paragraph (5); (III) United States and like-minded diplomatic missions, business leaders, the diaspora, and others as appropriate; and (IV) where practicable and appropriate, other United States-funded regional leadership programs, including the Young Southeast Asian Leaders Initiative (YSEALI), the Young Leaders of the Americas Initiative (YLAI), the Young Pacific Leaders (YPL), and the Young Transatlantic Innovation Leaders Initiative (YTILI), and through Department of State programs such as the Community Engagement Exchange Program and other initiatives. (C) Implementation To carry out this subsection, the Secretary of State and the Administrator for the United States Agency for International Development, in coordination with the heads of other relevant Federal departments and agencies, shall seek to partner with the private sector to pursue public-private partnerships, leverage private sector expertise, expand networking opportunities, and identify funding opportunities as well as fellowship and employment opportunities for YALI. 214. Strengthening diplomatic efforts in Africa (a) Bolstering United States diplomatic Presence in Africa (1) In general Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a plan to strengthen United States diplomatic presence in Africa, including to ensure that United States embassies in Africa have sufficient personnel to focus on the activities, policies, and investments of the PRC. (2) Elements The plan required under subsection (a) shall include the following elements: (A) A review of the incentives available for United States diplomatic personnel who serve in posts in Africa, which includes proposals to provide additional incentives for hard-to-fill posts in Africa, including those that leverage relevant talent in the Department, including talent within the civil service, and which addresses requirements for promotions and onward assignment for the Foreign Service. (B) An identification of— (i) the number and average duration over the last 5 years of vacancies in the political and economic sections of United States embassies relative to the full-time equivalent positions allocated for the economic and political sections in such embassies; and (ii) the number of Foreign Service Officers who are working in stretch positions in the political and economic sections of United States embassies in Africa and a list of proposals to reduce those vacancies and stretch positions. (C) An assessment of whether United States embassies in Africa have adequate staff to implement initiatives such as Prosper Africa and those emanating from the African Leaders Summit and a proposal to better meet the staffing needs to implement those and other high-priority initiatives. (b) Africa Heads of State Summit (1) In general Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, and biennially thereafter, the President shall convene a United States-Africa Leaders Summit (in this subsection referred to as the Summit ) in order to establish stronger bilateral and multilateral diplomatic, economic, security, and cultural ties between the United States and African countries. (2) Participation Each Summit convened pursuant to this subsection shall have participation, including in meetings with United States officials, from— (A) leaders of civilian-led governments of African countries in good standing with the African Union, each of which the President has determined— (i) has held a credible election associated with the current head of government or state; or (ii) is the head of a transitional government, is implementing a roadmap to hold credible elections, and is unaffiliated with actions that were related to an unconstitutional change of administration; and (B) civil society from each of the African countries represented at the Summit. (3) Unit to plan and implement (A) In general The Secretary of State shall establish a dedicated unit within the Bureau of African Affairs of the Department of State to coordinate, plan, and implement the Summit on a biennial basis, which should include robust interagency consultation and may include, on a temporary basis, personnel seconded from the United States Agency for International Development and other Federal agencies as appropriate, and which shall be led by an individual who has previously been appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. (B) Planning efforts The unit established under this paragraph shall— (i) use lessons learned from the 2022 African Leaders Summit and subsequent Summits to inform planning of future Summits; (ii) lead interagency efforts to provide guidance to United States embassies in African countries related to planning each Summit and engagement with governments and civil society in advance of each Summit; (iii) lead efforts to implement commitments made at previous Summits; and (iv) consult regularly with the appropriate committees of Congress on the planning in advance of, and follow-up for, each Summit. 215. Engagement with civil society in Latin America and the Caribbean regarding accountability, human rights, and the risks of pervasive surveillance technologies (a) Sense of Congress It is the sense of Congress that— (1) the Government of the PRC is exporting its model for internal security and state control of society through advanced technology and artificial intelligence; and (2) the inclusion of communication networks and communications supply chains with equipment and services from companies with close ties to or that are susceptible to pressure from the Government of the PRC or security services without reliable legal checks on governmental powers can lead to breaches of citizens’ private information, increased censorship, violations or abuses of human rights, and harassment of political opponents. (b) Internet freedom programs The Chief Executive Officer of the United States Agency for Global Media, working through the Open Technology Fund, and the Secretary of State, working through the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, shall expand and prioritize efforts to provide anti-censorship and anti-surveillance technology and services to journalists in Latin America and the Caribbean, in order to enhance their ability to safely access or share digital news and information. (c) Support for civil society The Secretary of State, through the Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, and in coordination with the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, shall work with civil society partners to— (1) support and promote programs that support internet freedom and the free flow of information online in Latin America and the Caribbean; (2) protect open, interoperable, secure, and reliable access to internet in Latin America and the Caribbean; (3) provide integrated support to civil society for digital safety and related technology programs in Latin America and the Caribbean; (4) train journalists and civil society leaders in Latin America and the Caribbean on investigative techniques necessary to ensure public accountability and prevent government overreach in the digital sphere; (5) assist independent media outlets and journalists in Latin America and the Caribbean to build their own capacity and develop high-impact, in-depth news reports covering governance and human rights topics; (6) provide training for journalists and civil society leaders on investigative techniques necessary to improve transparency and accountability in government and the private sector; (7) provide training on investigative reporting of incidents of corruption, unfair trade, and coercive and anti-competitive business and commercial practices perpetrated by the PRC, including the role of the Government of the PRC in such practices; (8) assist civil society organizations to strengthen their capacity to monitor the activities described in paragraph (7); and (9) identify local organizations to support the activities to be carried out under this subsection. B International organizations 221. Safeguarding the integrity of the United Nations system (a) Sense of Congress It is the sense of the Congress that— (1) the United Nations system is critical to advancing peace and security, human rights, and development; (2) the United States benefits from opportunities at the United Nations to engage in multilateral diplomacy to advance its own interests and to work with other members of the international community to address complex and shared challenges; and (3) the United States therefore has an interest in safeguarding the integrity the United Nations System. (b) Prioritizing the United Nations system The Secretary of State, in coordination with the United States Ambassador to the United Nations as appropriate, shall prioritize and instruct the senior leadership of the United States Mission to the United Nations and other United States Missions to the United Nations to— (1) promote United States participation in the United Nations System, and that of United States allies and partners who are committed to upholding the integrity of the United Nations; (2) ensure that United Nations employees are held accountable to their obligation to uphold the United Nations charter, rules, and regulations; (3) hold United States citizens and lawful permanent residents serving within the United Nations accountable for conduct, or conspiring or attempting to engage in conduct, outside of the United States that would constitute a crime if the conduct had occurred within the United States; (4) monitor and counter undue influence, especially by authoritarian governments, within the United Nations System; (5) promote meaningful participation and inclusion of Taiwan throughout the United Nations System and its affiliated agencies and bodies; and (6) advance other priorities deemed relevant by the Secretary of State and the United States Representative to the United Nations to safeguard the integrity of the United Nations System. 222. United States membership in United Nations specialized agencies and related organizations (a) Findings Congress makes the following findings: (1) Congress and the executive branch share responsibility for the foreign relations of the United States pursuant to Article I and Article II of the Constitution of the United States. (2) While the executive branch has a unique role in speaking for the United States with other governments, it is not unconstrained under United States law in doing so. (3) The Senate has a constitutional role in the treaty-making process, and when the Senate expressly imposes limitations or requirements that the executive branch must satisfy before withdrawing from or terminating a treaty relationship, the executive branch must adhere to those limitations or requirements. (4) The Senate has provided advice and consent to ratification of various agreements for the United States to join United Nations bodies, and Congress has authorized United States participation in other United Nations bodies where treaty ratification was not required, including the World Health Organization. (5) Congress therefore has a clear role—consistent with its constitutional responsibilities in foreign affairs, advice, and consent to ratification of treaties, and the making of Federal law—in whether and how the United States participates in the United Nations, including whether it seeks to withdraw from such participation. (6) Robust United States engagement in international organizations, including the World Health Organization, is critical in countering efforts by the PRC to bolster its influence around the world. (b) Withdrawal from World Health Organization Section 4 of the Joint Resolution entitled, Providing for membership by the United States in the World Health Organization and authorizing an appropriation therefor, approved June 14, 1948 ( 22 U.S.C. 290c ), is amended by inserting before the period at the end the following : Provided further, That not less than 180 days before providing notice to withdraw the United States from the World Health Organization, the President and Secretary of State shall jointly submit to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives a notification that such withdrawal is in the national interests of the United States . (c) Withdrawal from other specialized agencies or related organizations of the United Nations Not less than 180 days before taking formal action to initiate the United States withdrawal from a United Nations specialized agency or related organization, the President and Secretary of State shall jointly submit to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives a notification that such withdrawal is in the national interests of the United States. 223. Establishment of Office on Multilateral Strategy and Personnel There is established within the Bureau of International Organizations of the Department of State an Office on Multilateral Strategy and Personnel (MSP) with the following responsibilities: (1) Developing, coordinating, and maintaining a whole-of-government strategy to strengthen United States engagement and leadership with multilateral institutions and international organizations, to include managing efforts to counter third-countries seeking to undermine the integrity of the United Nations. (2) Coordinating whole-of-government efforts related to the United Nations Junior Professional Officer (JPO) program, including— (A) recruiting qualified individuals who represent the rich diversity of the United States to apply for United States-sponsored JPO positions; (B) collecting and collating information about United States-sponsored JPOs from across the United States Government; (C) establishing and providing orientation and other training materials with United States agencies sponsoring JPOs; (D) maintaining regular contact with current and former United States-sponsored JPOs, including providing career and professional advice to United States-sponsored JPOs; (E) making, informing, and advising on strategic decisions, including about the location and duration of United States-sponsored JPO positions to strengthen United States national security interests and the competitive advantage of United States-sponsored JPOs for future employment; and (F) sponsoring events, including representational events as appropriate, to support United States-sponsored JPOs. (3) Coordinating and overseeing a whole-of-government United States strategy and efforts in relation to promoting qualified United States candidates for elected or appointed senior positions at multilateral institutions and international organizations, including— (A) creating a whole-of-government strategy that identifies and prioritizes upcoming openings of leadership positions at multilateral institutions and international organizations; (B) developing and executing processes to identify and recruit qualified candidates to apply or run for these offices; (C) consulting across the Department and interagency as they implement selection processes; and (D) creating and implementing a strategy to obtain the support necessary for United States candidates for priority leadership positions including— (i) liaising and coordinating with international partners to promote United States candidates; and (ii) working with embassies to engage officials and other entities needed to support relevant United States candidates. (4) Promoting detail and transfer opportunities for qualified United States personnel to multilateral organizations including by— (A) liaising with multilateral institutions to promote and identify detail and transfer opportunities; (B) developing and maintaining a database of detail and transfer opportunities to multilateral organizations; (C) promoting these detail and transfer opportunities within the United States Government and making the database available to those eligible for details and transfers; and (D) facilitating any relevant orientation, trainings, or materials for detailees and transferees, including debriefing detailees and transferees upon their return to the United States Government. (5) Promoting internship and volunteer opportunities at multilateral institutions and international organizations and coordinating orientation and career development opportunities, as relevant. (6) Promoting and entering into partnership arrangements with multilateral institutions and international organizations to encourage United States nationals participation in such organizations. 224. Authorization of appropriations to promote United States citizen employment at the United Nations and international organizations (a) In general The President should direct United States departments and agencies to, in coordination with the Secretary of State— (1) fund and recruit Junior Professional Officers for positions at the United Nations and related specialized and technical organizations; and (2) facilitate secondments, details, and transfers to agencies and specialized and technical bodies of the United Nations. (b) Authorization of appropriations There is authorized to be appropriated an additional $50,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2025 through 2031 for the Secretary of State to support Junior Professional Officers, details, transfers, volunteers, and interns that advance United States interests at multilateral institutions and international organizations, including to recruit, train, and host events related to such positions, and to promote United States citizen candidates for employment and leadership positions at multilateral institutions and international organizations. 225. United States leadership and representation in standards-Setting bodies (a) Enhancing representation and leadership of United States at international standards-Setting bodies The President shall— (1) establish an interagency working group to provide assistance and technical expertise to enhance the representation and leadership of the United States at international bodies that set standards for equipment, systems, software, and virtually defined networks that support 5th and future generation mobile telecommunications systems and infrastructure, such as the International Telecommunication Union and the 3rd Generation Partnership Project; and (2) work with allies, partners, and the private sector to increase productive engagement with respect to the standards described in paragraph (1). (b) Interagency working group The interagency working group described in subsection (a) shall— (1) be chaired by the Secretary of Commerce or a designee of the Secretary at the Deputy Assistant Secretary level or above; (2) be vice-chaired by the Secretary of State or a designee of the Secretary at the Deputy Assistant Secretary level or above to focus on cooperation with allies and partners with respect to international standards-setting bodies; and (3) consist of the head (or designee) of each Federal department or agency the President determines appropriate. C South China and East China Sea Sanctions Act of 2024 231. Short title This part may be cited as the South China Sea and East China Sea Sanctions Act of 2024 . 232. Sanctions with respect to PRC persons responsible for the PRC’s activities in the South China Sea and the East China Sea (a) Initial imposition of sanctions On and after the date that is 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President may impose the sanctions described in subsection (b) with respect to any PRC person, including any senior official of the Government of the PRC, that the President determines— (1) is responsible for or significantly contributes to large-scale reclamation, construction, militarization, or ongoing supply of outposts in disputed areas of the South China Sea; (2) is responsible for or significantly contributes to, or has engaged in, directly or indirectly, actions, including the use of coercion, to inhibit another country from protecting its sovereign rights to access offshore resources in the South China Sea, including in such country’s exclusive economic zone, consistent with such country’s rights and obligations under international law; (3) is responsible for or complicit in, or has engaged in, directly or indirectly, actions that significantly threaten the peace, security, or stability of disputed areas of the South China Sea or areas of the East China Sea administered by Japan or the Republic of Korea, including through the use of vessels and aircraft by the PRC to occupy or conduct extensive research or drilling activity in those areas; (4) has materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to, or in support of, any person subject to sanctions pursuant to paragraph (1), (2), or (3); or (5) is owned or controlled by, or has acted for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, any person subject to sanctions pursuant to paragraph (1), (2), or (3). (b) Sanctions described The sanctions that may be imposed with respect to a person described in subsection (a) are the following: (1) Blocking of property The President may, in accordance with the International Emergency Economic Powers Act ( 50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq. ), block and prohibit all transactions in all property and interests in property of the person if such property and interests in property are in the United States, come within the United States, or are or come within the possession or control of a United States person. (2) Ineligibility for visas, admission, or parole (A) Visas, admission, or parole In the case of an alien, the alien may be— (i) inadmissible to the United States; (ii) ineligible to receive a visa or other documentation to enter the United States; and (iii) otherwise ineligible to be admitted or paroled into the United States or to receive any other benefit under the Immigration and Nationality Act ( 8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq. ). (B) Current visas revoked (i) In general An alien described in subparagraph (A) may be subject to revocation of any visa or other entry documentation regardless of when the visa or other entry documentation is or was issued. (ii) Immediate effect A revocation under clause (i) may— (I) take effect immediately in accordance with section 221(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act ( 8 U.S.C. 1201(i) ); and (II) cancel any other valid visa or entry documentation that is in the alien’s possession. (3) Exclusion of corporate officers The President may direct the Secretary of State to deny a visa to, and the Secretary of Homeland Security to exclude from the United States, any alien that the President determines is a corporate officer or principal of, or a shareholder with a controlling interest in, the person. (4) Export sanction The President may order the United States Government not to issue any specific license and not to grant any other specific permission or authority to export any goods or technology to the person under— (A) the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 ( 50 U.S.C. 4801 et seq. ); or (B) any other statute that requires the prior review and approval of the United States Government as a condition for the export or reexport of goods or services. (5) Inclusion on entity list The President may include the entity on the entity list maintained by the Bureau of Industry and Security of the Department of Commerce and set forth in Supplement No. 4 to part 744 of the Export Administration Regulations, for activities contrary to the national security or foreign policy interests of the United States. (6) Ban on investment in equity or debt of sanctioned person The President may, pursuant to such regulations or guidelines as the President may prescribe, prohibit any United States person from investing in or purchasing equity or debt instruments of the person. (7) Banking transactions The President may, pursuant to such regulations as the President may prescribe, prohibit any transfers of credit or payments between financial institutions or by, through, or to any financial institution, to the extent that such transfers or payments are subject to the jurisdiction of the United States and involve any interest of the person. (8) Correspondent and payable-through accounts In the case of a foreign financial institution, the President may prohibit the opening, and prohibit or impose strict conditions on the maintaining, in the United States of a correspondent account or a payable-through account by the foreign financial institution. (c) Implementation; penalties (1) Implementation The President may exercise all authorities provided under sections 203 and 205 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702 and 1704) to carry out this section. (2) Penalties The penalties provided for in subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act ( 50 U.S.C. 1705 ) shall apply to a person that violates, attempts to violate, conspires to violate, or causes a violation of regulations prescribed under subsection (b)(1) to the same extent that such penalties apply to a person that commits an unlawful act described in subsection (a) of such section 206. (d) Exceptions (1) Inapplicability of national emergency requirement The requirements of section 202 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act ( 50 U.S.C. 1701 ) shall not apply for purposes of subsection (b)(1). (2) Exception for intelligence, law enforcement, and national security activities Sanctions under this section shall not apply to any authorized intelligence, law enforcement, or national security activities of the United States. (3) Compliance with international agreements Paragraphs (2) and (3) of subsection (b) shall not apply if admission of an alien to the United States is necessary to permit the United States to comply with the Agreement regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations, signed at Lake Success, June 26, 1947, and entered into force, November 21, 1947, between the United Nations and the United States and other international obligations of the United States. (4) Exception relating to importation of goods (A) In general The authority or a requirement to impose sanctions under this section shall not include the authority or a requirement to impose sanctions on the importation of goods. (B) Good defined In this paragraph, the term good means any article, natural or manmade substance, material, supply, or manufactured product, including inspection and test equipment, and excluding technical data. (e) Definitions In this section: (1) Account; correspondent account; payable-through account The terms account , correspondent account , and payable-through account have the meanings given those terms in section 5318A of title 31, United States Code. (2) Alien The term alien has the meaning given that term in section 101(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act ( 8 U.S.C. 1101(a) ). (3) PRC person The term PRC person means— (A) an individual who is a citizen or national of the PRC; or (B) an entity organized under the laws of the PRC or otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of the Government of the PRC. (4) Financial institution The term financial institution means a financial institution specified in subparagraph (A), (B), (C), (D), (E), (F), (G), (H), (I), (J), (K), (M), (N), (P), (R), (T), (Y), or (Z) of section 5312(a)(2) of title 31, United States Code. (5) Foreign financial institution The term foreign financial institution has the meaning given that term in section 1010.605 of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations (or any corresponding similar regulation or ruling). (6) Person The term person means any individual or entity. (7) United States person The term United States person means— (A) a United States citizen or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence to the United States; (B) an entity organized under the laws of the United States or of any jurisdiction within the United States, including a foreign branch of such an entity; or (C) any person in the United States. 233. Sense of Congress regarding portrayals of the South China Sea or the East China Sea as part of China It is the sense of Congress that the Government Publishing Office should not publish any map, document, record, electronic resource, or other paper of the United States (other than materials relating to hearings held by committees of Congress or internal work product of a Federal agency) portraying or otherwise indicating that it is the position of the United States that any part of the territory or airspace in the South China Sea that is disputed among two or more parties, or of the territory or airspace of areas administered by Japan or the Republic of Korea, including in the East China Sea, is part of the territory or airspace of the PRC. 234. Sense of Congress on 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration’s tribunal ruling on arbitration case between Philippines and People’s Republic of China (a) Finding Congress finds that on July 12, 2016, a tribunal of the Permanent Court of Arbitration found in the arbitration case between the Philippines and the PRC under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea that the PRC’s claims, including those to offshore resources and historic rights , were unlawful, and that the tribunal’s ruling is final and legally binding on both parties. (b) Sense of Congress It is the sense of Congress that— (1) the United States and the international community should reject the unlawful claims of the PRC within the exclusive economic zone or on the continental shelf of the Philippines, as well as the maritime claims of the PRC beyond a 12-nautical-mile territorial sea from the islands it claims in the South China Sea; (2) the provocative behavior of the PRC, including coercing other countries with claims in the South China Sea and preventing those countries from accessing offshore resources, undermines peace and stability in the South China Sea; (3) the international community should— (A) support the ruling described in subsection (a) in compliance with international law; and (B) take all necessary steps to support the rules-based international order in the South China Sea; and (4) all claimants in the South China Sea should— (A) refrain from engaging in destabilizing activities, including illegal occupation or efforts to unlawfully assert control over disputed claims; (B) ensure that disputes are managed without intimidation, coercion, or force; (C) clarify or adjust claims in accordance with international law; and (D) uphold the principle that territorial and maritime claims, including over territorial waters or territorial seas, must be derived from land features and otherwise comport with international law. III Investing in our values A Promoting human rights in People’s Republic of China I Promoting human rights for citizens of the People’s Republic of China and for United States citizens in China 301. Protecting human rights in the People’s Republic of China (a) In general The Secretary shall carry out programs, including through nongovernmental organizations, that prioritize the protection and advancement of the freedoms of association, assembly, religion, and expression for, democracy and human rights activists, women, and ethnic and religious minorities in the PRC. (b) Consultation requirement In carrying out this section, the Assistant Secretary of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor shall consult with the appropriate committees of Congress regarding— (1) strengthening the capacity of the organizations referred to in subsection (a); (2) protecting members of the groups referred to in subsection (a) who have been targeted for arrest, harassment, forced sterilizations, coercive abortions, forced labor, intimidation, or subject to transnational repression, including members residing outside of the PRC; and (3) messaging efforts to reach the broadest possible audiences within the PRC about United States Government efforts to protect freedom of association, expression, assembly, and the rights of women and ethnic and religious minorities. 302. Report on corrupt activities of senior officials of Government of the People’s Republic of China (a) Annual report required (1) In general Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter through 2028, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury and any other relevant United States Government official, shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report identifying those senior PRC officials who are responsible for, or complicit in, or who have directly or indirectly engaged in, significant corruption. (2) Elements (A) In general The report required under paragraph (1) shall include the following elements: (i) A general description of the corrupt sources of wealth of senior PRC officials. (ii) A description of corruption, including activities taking place outside of China, engaged in by senior PRC officials. (iii) A description of any gaps in the ability of the intelligence community to collect information described in clauses (i) and (ii). (iv) The names of other individuals and entities who facilitate or benefit from significant corruption by senior PRC officials, both inside and outside of the PRC. (B) Scope of reports The first report submitted under paragraph (1) shall include comprehensive information on the matters described in subparagraph (A). Each succeeding report submitted under paragraph (1) may consist of an update or supplement to the preceding report submitted under that paragraph. (3) Form The report required under paragraph (1) shall include an unclassified executive summary of the elements described in clauses (i) and (ii) of paragraph (2)(A), and may include a classified annex. (4) Assessment of applicability of sanctions (A) In general Not later than 180 days after submission of each report required by paragraph (1), the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of the Treasury, as appropriate, shall— (i) evaluate whether any foreign person identified under this section may meet the criteria for the potential imposition of sanctions under existing sanctions authorities, including— (I) the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act ( 22 U.S.C. 10101 et seq. ); and (II) section 7031(c) of the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2023 (division K of Public Law 117–328 ; 8 U.S.C. 1182 note); and (ii) submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report, in writing, setting forth the results of that assessment. (B) Form The report required by subparagraph (A)(ii) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. (b) Sense of Congress It is the sense of Congress that the United States should undertake every effort and pursue every opportunity to expose the corruption and related practices of senior PRC officials, including General Secretary of the Communist Party and President Xi Jinping. (c) Corruption defined In this section the term corruption includes, among other activities— (1) the misappropriation of state assets; (2) the expropriation of private assets for personal gain; (3) abuse of an official position related to government contracts or the extraction of natural resources; and (4) bribery. 303. China exit bans (a) In general The Secretary of State shall collect and analyze available information on the application of exit bans by the PRC, including trends with respect to the application of such exit bans to United States nationals. Such data shall be— (1) used to update of travel warnings as appropriate, and in disseminating such information to relevant State and local authorities, with a special emphasis on domestic jurisdictions with large numbers of at-risk populations; (2) shared, as appropriate, with allies and partner nations about potential risks and vulnerabilities their citizens may face in traveling to the PRC; (3) used to inform United States actions to hold the PRC accountable for these actions; and (4) submitted to the appropriate committees of Congress. (b) Exit ban defined In this section the term exit ban means a restriction imposed by the Government of the PRC that prevents foreign nationals, including United States nationals, including legal permanent residents of the United States, from leaving the PRC without a fair and transparent legal cause or recourse for the impacted party. II Matters related to Hong Kong 305. Authorization of appropriations for promotion of democracy, human rights, and civilian security in Hong Kong (a) Authorization of appropriations There is authorized to be appropriated $5,000,000 for fiscal year 2025 for the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor of the Department of State to promote democracy, human rights, and civilian security in Hong Kong. (b) Administration The Secretary of State shall designate an office within the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor to administer and coordinate the provision of the funds described in subsection (a) within the Department of State and across the United States Government. 306. Development and deployment of internet freedom and circumvention tools for the people of Hong Kong (a) Findings Congress makes the following findings: (1) The PRC has repeatedly violated its obligations under the Joint Declaration by suppressing the basic rights and freedoms of Hong Kongers. (2) On June 30, 2020, the National People’s Congress passed a National Security Law that further erodes Hong Kong’s autonomy and enables authorities to suppress dissent. (3) The PRC continues to utilize the National Security Law to undermine the fundamental rights of the people of Hong Kong through suppression of the freedom of speech, assembly, religion, and the press. (4) Article 9 of the National Security Law authorizes unprecedented regulation and supervision of internet activity in Hong Kong, including expanded police powers to force internet service providers to censor content, hand over user information, and block access to platforms. (5) On January 13, 2021, the Hong Kong Broadband Network blocked public access to HK Chronicles, a website promoting pro-democracy viewpoints, under the authorities of the National Security Law. (6) On February 12, 2021, internet service providers blocked Hong Kong users’ access to the Taiwan Transitional Justice Commission website in Hong Kong. (7) Major tech companies, including Facebook, Twitter, WhatsApp, and Google have stopped reviewing requests for user data from Hong Kong authorities. (8) On February 28, 2021, 47 pro-democracy activists in Hong Kong were arrested and charged under the National Security Law on the charge of conspiracy to commit subversion . (b) Sense of Congress It is the sense of Congress that the United States should— (1) support the ability of the people of Hong Kong to maintain their freedom to access information online; and (2) focus on investments in technologies that facilitate the unhindered exchange of information in Hong Kong in advance of any future efforts by the Chinese Communist Party— (A) to suppress internet access; (B) to increase online censorship; or (C) to inhibit online communication and content-sharing by the people of Hong Kong. (c) Hong Kong Internet Freedom Program (1) In general The Secretary of State shall establish a Hong Kong Internet Freedom Program in the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor of the Department of State which shall include a working group dedicated to developing a strategy to bolster internet resiliency and online access in Hong Kong (in this subsection, the Program ). The working group shall consist of— (A) the Under Secretary of State for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights; (B) the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs; (C) the Chief Executive Officer of the United States Agency for Global Media; (D) the President of the Open Technology Fund; (E) the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development; and (F) the Ambassador-at-large for Cyberspace and Digital Policy; (2) Independence During the period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act and ending on September 30, 2027, the Program shall be carried out independent from internet freedom programs focused on the rest of the PRC. (3) Consolidation of Department of State program Beginning on October 1, 2026, the Secretary of State may— (A) consolidate the Program with the mainland China initiatives in the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor; or (B) continue to carry out the Program in accordance with paragraph (2). (d) Support for internet freedom technology programs (1) Grants authorized The Secretary of State, working with the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development and the President of the Open Technology fund as appropriate, are authorized to award grants and contracts to private organizations to support and develop programs in Hong Kong that promote or expand— (A) open, interoperable, reliable, and secure internet; and (B) the online exercise of human rights and fundamental freedoms of individual citizens, activists, human rights defenders, independent journalists, civil society organizations, and marginalized populations in Hong Kong. (2) Goals The goals of the programs developed with grants authorized under paragraph (1) should be— (A) to support unrestricted access to the internet in Hong Kong; (B) to increase the availability of internet freedom tools in Hong Kong; (C) to scale up the distribution of such technologies and tools throughout Hong Kong; (D) to prioritize the development of tools, components, code, and technologies that are fully open-source, to the extent practicable; (E) to conduct research on repressive tactics that undermine internet freedom in Hong Kong; (F) to ensure information on digital safety is available to human rights defenders, independent journalists, civil society organizations, and marginalized populations in Hong Kong; and (G) to engage private industry, including e-commerce firms and social networking companies, on the importance of preserving unrestricted internet access in Hong Kong. (3) Grant recipients Grants authorized under this subsection shall be distributed to multiple vendors and suppliers through an open, fair, competitive, and evidence-based decision process— (A) to diversify the technical base; and (B) to reduce the risk of misuse by bad actors. (4) Security audits New technologies developed using grants authorized under this subsection shall undergo comprehensive security audits to ensure that such technologies are secure and have not been compromised in a manner detrimental to the interests of the United States or to individuals or organizations benefitting from programs supported by these funds. (e) Authorization of appropriations (1) Open technology fund There is authorized to be appropriated to the Open Technology Fund $2,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2025 through 2029 to carry out this section. This funding is in addition to the funds authorized for the Open Technology Fund pursuant to section 309A of United States International Broadcasting Act of 1994 ( 22 U.S.C. 6208a ). (2) Bureau of democracy, human rights, and labor In addition to the funds authorized to be made available pursuant to paragraph (1), there is authorized to be appropriated to the Office of Internet Freedom Programs in the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor of the Department of State $2,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2025 through 2029 to carry out this section. III Matters related to Xinjiang 311. Sense of Congress on treatment of Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities in the Xinjiang Uyghur autonomous region (a) Findings Congress makes the following findings: (1) Uyghurs are one of several predominantly Muslim Turkic groups living in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) in the northwest of the PRC. (2) Following Uyghur demonstrations and unrest in 2009 and clashes with government security personnel and other violent incidents in subsequent years, PRC leaders began a campaign of large-scale atrocities in the XUAR including arrests and extreme security measures, under the pretext of combatting alleged terrorism, religious extremism, and ethnic separatism. (3) In May 2014, the PRC launched its Strike Hard Against Violent Extremism campaign, which resulted in additional human rights violations against minorities in the XUAR under the pretext of fighting terrorism. (4) In August 2016, Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Politburo member Chen Quanguo, former Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) Party Secretary, known for overseeing intensifying security operations and human rights abuses in the TAR, was appointed as Party Secretary of the XUAR. (5) Beginning in 2017, XUAR authorities sought to forcibly assimilate Uyghurs and other Turkic minorities into Chinese society through a policy of cultural erasure known as Sinicization . (6) Since 2018, credible reporting, including from the BBC, France24, and the New York Times, has shown that the Government of the PRC has built mass internment camps in the XUAR, which it calls vocational training centers, and detained Uyghurs and other groups in them and other facilities. (7) Since 2015, XUAR authorities have arbitrarily detained an estimated 1,500,000 Uyghurs—12.5 percent of the XUAR’s official Uyghur population of 12,000,000—and a smaller number of other ethnic minorities in the vocational training centers and other detention and pre-detention facilities. (8) In 2017, the XUAR accounted for less than two percent of the PRC’s total population but 21 percent of all arrests in China. (9) The Atlantic, Radio Free Asia, and other sources have revealed that detainees are forced to renounce many of their Islamic beliefs and customs and repudiate Uyghur culture, language, and identity. (10) Investigations by Human Rights Watch and other human rights organizations have documented how detainees are subject to political indoctrination, forced labor, crowded and unsanitary conditions, involuntary biometric data collection, both medical neglect and intrusive medical interventions, food and water deprivation, beatings, sexual violence, and torture. (11) Research by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute suggests that, since late 2019, many detainees have been placed in higher security facilities and convicted of formal crimes. (12) Human Rights Watch has reported that the PRC uses data collection programs, including facial recognition technology, to surveil Uyghurs in the XUAR and to identify individuals whom authorities may detain. (13) PRC authorities have placed countless children whose parents are detained or in exile in state-run institutions and boarding schools without the consent of their parents. (14) New York Times reporting revealed that numerous local PRC officials who did not agree with the policies carried out in XUAR have been fired and imprisoned. (15) Associated Press reporting documented widespread and systemic efforts by PRC authorities to force Uyghur women to take contraceptives or to subject them to sterilization or abortion, threatening to detain those who do not comply. (16) PRC authorities prohibit family members and advocates inside and outside China from having regular communications with relatives and friends imprisoned in the XUAR, such as journalist and entrepreneur Ekpar Asat. (17) PRC authorities have imposed pervasive restrictions on the peaceful practice of Islam in the XUAR, to the extent that Human Rights Watch asserts the PRC has effectively outlawed the practice of Islam . (18) Individuals who are not detained in camps have been forced to attend political indoctrination sessions, subjected to movement restrictions, mass surveillance systems, involuntary biometric data collection, and other human rights abuses. (19) International media, nongovernmental organizations, scholars, families, and survivors have reported on the systemic nature of many of these abuses. (20) On June 26, 2020, a group of 50 independent United Nations experts jointly expressed alarm over China’s deteriorating human rights record, including its repression in Xinjiang, and called on the international community to act collectively and decisively to ensure China respects human rights and abides by its international obligations . (21) On October 6, 2020, 39 United Nations member countries issued a public statement condemning human rights violations by PRC authorities and calling on the PRC to allow the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights unfettered access to Xinjiang. (22) United States Congress passed the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act of 2020 ( Public Law 116–145 ). (23) United States Congress passed the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (subtitle F of title XII of Public Law 114–328 ; 22 U.S.C. 2656 note), which has been used to sanction PRC officials and entities for their activities in the XUAR. (24) United States Congress passed the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act ( Public Law 117–78 .) (25) The United States Government has implemented additional targeted restrictions on trade with Xinjiang and imposed visa and economic sanctions on PRC officials and entities for their activities in the XUAR. (26) The United States Government has documented human rights abuses and violations of individual freedoms in the XUAR, including in the 2019 Department of State Report on International Religious Freedom. (27) On January 19, 2021, then-Secretary of State Michael Pompeo determined that the PRC, under the direction and control of the CCP, has committed crimes against humanity, genocide against the predominantly Muslim Uyghurs and other ethnic and religious minority groups in Xinjiang and that these crimes are ongoing. (28) On January 19, 2021, during his confirmation hearing, Secretary of State Antony Blinken testified that forcing men, women, and children into concentration camps, trying to in effect reeducate them to be adherents to the Chinese Communist Party—all of that speaks to an effort to commit genocide . (29) On January 19, 2021, Secretary of the Treasury Janet L. Yellen, during her confirmation hearing, publicly stated that China is guilty of horrendous human rights abuses . (30) On January 27, 2021, in response to a question from the press regarding the Uyghurs, Secretary Blinken stated that his judgement remains that genocide was committed against the Uyghurs . (31) On March 10, 2021, in response to a question on Xinjiang during his testimony before the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, Secretary Blinken reiterated, We’ve been clear, and I’ve been clear, that I see it as genocide, other egregious abuses of human rights, and we’ll continue to make that clear. (32) The 2020 Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: China states that [g]enocide and crimes against humanity occurred during the year against the predominantly Muslim Uyghurs and other ethnic and religious minority groups in Xinjiang . (33) United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet traveled to China in May 2022 and during this mission visited the XUAR, but the PRC did not provide her with the unfettered and unmonitored access that would have been needed to make a fulsome assessment of the conditions and experiences of those most affected by the PRCs repressive policies. (34) On August 31, 2022, the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights (OHCHR) issued its Assessment of the Human Rights Concerns in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, People’s Republic of China and in this report noted that the human rights abuses being committed against the Uyghurs and other predominantly Muslim groups in the XUAR may constitute international crimes, in particular crimes against humanity . (b) Sense of Congress It is the sense of Congress that— (1) the atrocities, including genocide, committed by the PRC against Uyghurs and other predominantly Muslim Turkic groups in Xinjiang, including forced labor, sexual violence, the internment of over 1,000,000 individuals, and other horrific abuses must be condemned; (2) the President, the Secretary of State, and the United States Ambassador to the United Nations should speak publicly about the ongoing atrocities in the XUAR, including in formal speeches at the United Nations and other international fora; (3) the President, the Secretary of State, and the United States Ambassador to the United Nations should appeal to the United Nations Secretary-General to take a more proactive and public stance on the situation in the XUAR, including by supporting calls for an investigation and accountability for individuals and entities responsible for abuses against the people of the XUAR; (4) the United States should continue to use targeted sanctions and all diplomatic tools, including the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act and the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act, available to promote accountability for those responsible for the atrocities in Xinjiang; (5) United States agencies engaged with China on trade, climate, defense, or other bilateral issues should include human rights abuses in the XUAR as a consideration in developing United States policy; (6) the United States supports Radio Free Asia Uyghur, the only Uyghur-language news service in the world independent of PRC government influence; (7) United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Bachelet’s visit to China in May 2022 may have inadvertently lent credence to the PRC’s narrative that its actions in the XUAR were part of a legitimate counter-terrorism operation given the PRC; (8) in any future visits to China senior United Nations officials, and in particular the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, should insist on unfettered and unmonitored access, including to XUAR; and (9) the Secretary of State, working with the United States Ambassador to the United Nations, and the United States Ambassador-at-Large for Global Criminal Justice should outline a strategy to work with international partners to promote justice for the PRC’s crimes in the XUAR and investigate the atrocity crimes and other human rights abuses that have taken place in the XUAR, collect, preserve, and analyze this evidence, so that it can be used by a future competent court to adjudicate these cases. 312. Sense of Congress calling on organization of Islamic cooperation members to take action on atrocities in Xinjiang It is the sense of Congress that— (1) the United States is committed to the right to freedom of religion or belief and the principle that all persons should be free to practice or not practice the religion or belief of their choice without fear of persecution; (2) the international community plays an important role elevating awareness when countries are discriminating against, persecuting, or committing atrocities, including genocide, or other abuses against persons based on their religion or ethnicity; (3) countries that are home to significant populations of religious communities being persecuted and abused elsewhere are uniquely positioned to take a leadership role in exerting diplomatic pressure and promoting accountability with respect to such abuses; and (4) the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and its member states should, as The Collective Voice of the Muslim World , which endeavors to safeguard and protect the interests of the Muslim world in the spirit of promoting international peace and harmony among various people of the world, be the leading global voice in— (A) advocating, including with respect to Uyghurs and other ethnic and religious minorities in the PRC, for Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which provides, Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and freedom, either individually or in community with others and in public or private to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice, and teaching. ; (B) seeking to raise awareness about the plight of the Uyghurs and other ethnic and religious minorities in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region and elsewhere in the PRC; (C) calling on the PRC to stop committing atrocities, including genocide, against Muslims and other religious and ethnic minorities in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region and elsewhere in the PRC; (D) taking action to support justice for Uyghurs and other ethnic and religious minorities in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region and elsewhere in the PRC; and (E) safeguarding against the refoulement of Uyghurs and other ethnic and religious minorities back to the PRC. 313. Reauthorization of the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act Section 6(h) of the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act of 2020 ( Public Law 116–145 ; 22 U.S.C. 6901 note) is amended by striking 5 years after and inserting 10 years after . 314. Imposition of sanctions with respect to systematic rape, coercive abortion, forced sterilization, or involuntary contraceptive implantation in the Xinjiang Uyghur autonomous region (a) In general Section 6(a)(1) of the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act of 2020 ( Public Law 116–145 ; 22 U.S.C. 6901 note) is amended— (1) by redesignating subparagraph (F) as subparagraph (G); and (2) by inserting after subparagraph (E) the following new subparagraph: (F) Systematic rape, coercive abortion, forced sterilization, or involuntary contraceptive implantation policies and practices. . (b) Effective date; applicability The amendment made by subsection (a)— (1) takes effect on the date of the enactment of this Act; and (2) applies with respect to each report required by section 6(a)(1) of the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act of 2020 submitted after such date of enactment. IV Matters related to Tibet 317. Policy with respect to Tibet (a) Rank of United States Special Coordinator for Tibetan issues (1) In general Section 621 of the Tibetan Policy Act of 2002 (subtitle B of title VI of Public Law 107–228 ; 22 U.S.C. 6901 note) is amended— (A) by redesignating subsections (b), (c), and (d), as subsections (c), (d), and (e), respectively; and (B) by inserting after subsection (a) the following new subsection: (b) Rank The Special Coordinator shall either be appointed by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, or shall be an individual holding the rank of Under Secretary of State or higher. . (2) Conforming amendment Section 616(e)(2) of the Tibetan Policy Act of 2002 is amended by striking section 621(d) and inserting section 621(e) . (b) Tibet unit at United States embassy in Beijing (1) In general The Secretary of State shall establish a Tibet Unit in the Political Section of the United States Embassy in Beijing, People’s Republic of China. (2) Operation The Tibet Unit established under paragraph (1) shall operate until such time as the PRC permits— (A) the United States Consulate General in Chengdu, People’s Republic of China, to reopen; or (B) a United States Consulate General in Lhasa, Tibet, to open. (3) Staff (A) In general The Secretary should assign not fewer than 2 United States direct-hire personnel to the Tibet Unit established under paragraph (1). (B) Language training The Secretary shall make Tibetan language training available to the personnel assigned under subparagraph (A), consistent with the Tibetan Policy Act of 2002 (subtitle B of title VI of Public Law 107–228 ; 22 U.S.C. 6901 note). 318. United States policy and international engagement on the or reincarnation of the Dalai Lama and religious freedom of Tibetan Buddhists (a) Reaffirmation of policy It is the policy of the United States, as provided under section 342(b) of division FF of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 ( Public Law 116–260 ), that any interference by the Government of the PRC or any other government in the process of recognizing a successor or reincarnation of the 14th Dalai Lama and any future Dalai Lamas would represent a clear abuse of the right to religious freedom of Tibetan Buddhists and the Tibetan people . (b) International efforts To protect religious freedom of Tibetan Buddhists The Secretary of State should engage with United States allies and partners— (1) to support Tibetan Buddhist religious leaders’ sole religious authority to identify and install the 15th Dalai Lama; (2) to oppose claims by the Government of the PRC that the PRC has the authority to decide for Tibetan Buddhists the 15th Dalai Lama; and (3) to reject interference by the Government of the PRC in the religious freedom of Tibetan Buddhists. B Promoting human rights globally 321. Removal of members of the United Nations Human Rights Council that commit human rights abuses The President shall direct the Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States to— (1) reform the process for suspending rights of membership in the United Nations Human Rights Council for states that commit gross and systematic violations of human rights, including— (A) ensuring information detailing the member country’s human rights record is publicly available before a vote on suspension of the rights of membership; and (B) making the vote of each country on the suspension of rights of membership from the United Nations Human Rights Council publicly available; (2) reform the rules on electing members to the United Nations Human Rights Council to seek to ensure United Nations members that have committed gross and systematic violations of human rights are not elected to the Human Rights Council; and (3) oppose the election to the Human Rights Council of any United Nations member— (A) currently assessed to engage in a consistent pattern of gross violations of human rights pursuant to section 116 or section 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 ( 22 U.S.C. 2151n , 2304); (B) currently designated as a state sponsor of terrorism; (C) currently designated as a Tier 3 country under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 ( 22 U.S.C. 7101 et seq. ); (D) the government of which is identified on the list published by the Secretary of State pursuant to section 404(b) of the Child Soldiers Prevention Act of 2008 ( 22 U.S.C. 2370c–1(b) ) as a government that recruits and uses child soldiers; or (E) the government of which the United States determines to have committed genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, or ethnic cleansing. 322. Protecting human rights defenders at the United Nations and other multilateral bodies The Secretary of State and the United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations shall use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the United Nations and other multilateral bodies— (1) to oppose efforts by the PRC and other authoritarian actors to prevent the full participation of civil society actors, including human rights defenders, and block the accreditation of non-governmental organizations at the United Nations and other multilateral bodies; (2) to ensure that the United Nations bolsters the protection and safe participation of civil society actors who are subject to transnational repression, state-sponsored harassment, and reprisals by the PRC and other governments; (3) to increase monitoring and reporting to identify and track reprisals against human rights defenders, who engage with the United Nations and other multilateral bodies; (4) to oppose efforts by the PRC and other authoritarian actors to sponsor the participation of government-organized nongovernmental organizations in the Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations of United Nations Economic and Social Council, which organizations are used as instruments of the state, including to repress participation and debate by legitimate civil society actors; (5) to support the use of targeted sanctions, censure of member states, and all diplomatic tools, including working with other foreign governments, available to hold accountable persons that engage in reprisals against human rights defenders; and (6) to oppose efforts by the PRC to reduce funding for human rights monitoring and civilian protection posts within Security Council approved United Nations peacekeeping missions. 323. Inclusion of surveillance technology abuse in human rights report The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 ( 22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq. ) is amended— (1) in section 116 ( 22 U.S.C. 2151n ), by adding at the end the following new subsection: (h) Surveillance technology (1) In general The report required under subsection (d) shall to the extent feasible include a description of the use of foreign commercial spyware by the government of each country in which there are systematic acts of political repression, to conduct surveillance, including passive or active monitoring, against activists, journalists, opposition politicians, or other individuals for the purposes of suppressing dissent or intimidating critics. (2) Defined term In this subsection, the term foreign commercial spyware means the term referred to in section 6318 of the James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 ( Public Law 117–263 ). ; and (2) in section 502B ( 22 U.S.C. 2304 )— (A) by redesignating the second subsection designated subsection (i) as subsection (j); and (B) by adding at the end the following new subsection: (k) Surveillance technology (1) In general The report required under subsection (b) shall to the extent feasible include a description of the use of foreign commercial spyware by the government of each country in which there are systematic acts of political repression, to conduct surveillance, including passive or active monitoring, against activists, journalists, opposition politicians, or other individuals for the purposes of suppressing dissent or intimidating critics. (2) Defined term In this subsection, the term foreign commercial spyware means the term referred to in section 6318 of the James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 ( Public Law 117–263 ). . 324. Strengthening public reporting on corruption It is the sense of the Congress that— (1) the PRC and its representatives are engaged in corruption across the globe, targeting public sector officials with the goal of inducing them to make official decisions that suit the interests of the PRC in exchange for personal financial gain; (2) people across the globe do not want leaders who make deals to enrich themselves and their families in exchange for their country’s natural resources or agreeing to take on onerous national debts and loans, which the nation will be forced to pay back; and (3) uncovering and bringing to light evidence of this sort of corruption serves the objective of empowering people everywhere to bring such practices to end. 325. Authorization of funding for public reporting on corruption and corrupt practices (a) In general The Secretary of State shall support and strengthen media and civil society initiatives to uncover and report on evidence of corruption, with a goal of bringing to light the corrupt practices of the PRC and its representatives in every region, and the local leaders who are accepting these payments. (b) Authorization of appropriations There is authorized to be appropriated an additional $3,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2025 through 2029 for the Secretary of State to carry out this section. IV Modernizing the Department of State to meet the China challenge 401. Establishing an Assistant Secretary of State for Indo-Pacific Affairs (a) Repeal Section 122 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993 ( 22 U.S.C. 2652b ) is repealed. (b) Authorization The Secretary of State is authorized to establish a Bureau for Indo-Pacific Affairs, to be headed by an Assistant Secretary for Indo-Pacific Affairs appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. The Assistant Secretary shall report to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs. (c) Duties The Assistant Secretary for Indo-Pacific Affairs shall— (1) be responsible for overseeing and coordinating diplomatic efforts related to the Indo-Pacific region, and to advance United States interests, promote regional stability, and foster economic growth and development through diplomatic engagement, public affairs, policy coordination, and strategic partnerships within the Indo-Pacific region; (2) advance United States interests with respect to the PRC, especially by advancing a policy of strategic competition to contend with the threats and challenges posed by the PRC to the United States, its allies, and other partners in the Indo-Pacific region; (3) assist the Secretary of State in providing overall direction and coordination of interdepartmental activities of the United States Government in the countries within the Indo-Pacific region, including directing United States policies for Indo-Pacific countries, directing and overseeing the effectiveness of the applicable strategies, plans, programs, resources, and performance for implementing that policy, and monitoring for and indications of developing crises and initiating appropriate action in a timely manner; (4) provide active direction to chiefs of mission (COMs) in carrying out their official duty to implement U.S. foreign policy and lead their missions effectively, and facilitate supported needed by COMs at their missions; (5) directly supervise the policy and operations of the bureau and provide overall guidance to the United States missions within the region; (6) direct and oversee the provision of an adequate, regular flow of information to posts abroad on United States Government policies, policy deliberations, and diplomatic exchanges, especially on matters that may result in negotiations, initiatives, policy actions, or other official representations of Department policy abroad; and (7) other responsibilities, as determined by the Secretary, related to the advancement of United States foreign policy and national security in the Indo-Pacific. (d) Realignment The Secretary of State is authorized to realign bureaus and offices within the Department of State to implement this provision. (e) Definitions The terms Indo-Pacific and Indo-Pacific region mean the following 39 countries and their surrounding waterways: Australia, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Brunei, Burma, Cambodia, the People’s Republic of China, Cook Islands, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Fiji, India, Indonesia, Japan, Kiribati, Laos, Malaysia, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Mongolia, Nauru, Nepal, New Zealand, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Samoa, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, and Vietnam. The terms also include Taiwan and its surrounding waterway. 402. Enhancing strategic competition at the Department of State (a) Statement of policy It is the policy of the United States— (1) to pursue a strategy of strategic competition with the PRC in the political, diplomatic, economic, development, military, informational, and technological realms that maximizes the United States strengths and increases the costs for the PRC of harming United States interests and the values of United States allies and partners; (2) to lead a free, open, and secure international system characterized by freedom from coercion, rule of law, open markets and the free flow of commerce, and a shared commitment to security and peaceful resolution of disputes, human rights, and good and transparent governance; (3) to strengthen and deepen United States alliances and partnerships, prioritizing the Indo-Pacific and Europe, by pursuing greater bilateral and multilateral cooperative initiatives that advance shared interests and values and bolster the confidence of partner countries that the United States is and will remain a strong, committed, and constant partner; (4) to encourage and collaborate with United States allies and partners in boosting their own capabilities and resiliency to pursue, defend, and protect shared interests and values, free from coercion and external pressure; (5) to pursue fair, reciprocal treatment and healthy competition in United States-China economic relations by— (A) advancing policies that harden the United States economy against unfair and illegal commercial or trading practices and the coercion of United States businesses; and (B) tightening United States laws and regulations as necessary to prevent the PRC’s attempts to harm United States economic competitiveness; (6) to demonstrate the value of private sector-led growth in emerging markets around the world, including through the use of United States Government tools that— (A) support greater private sector investment and advance capacity-building initiatives that are grounded in the rule of law; (B) promote open markets; (C) establish clear policy and regulatory frameworks; (D) improve the management of key economic sectors; (E) combat corruption; and (F) foster and support greater collaboration with and among partner countries and the United States private sector to develop secure and sustainable infrastructure; (7) to lead in the advancement of international rules and norms that foster free and reciprocal trade and open and integrated markets; (8) to conduct vigorous commercial diplomacy in support of United States companies and businesses in partner countries that seek fair competition; (9) to ensure that the United States leads in the innovation of critical and emerging technologies, such as next-generation telecommunications, artificial intelligence, quantum information science, semiconductors, and biotechnology, by— (A) providing necessary investment and concrete incentives for the private sector and the United States Government to accelerate development of such technologies; (B) modernizing export controls and investment screening regimes and associated policies and regulations; (C) enhancing United States leadership in technical standards-setting bodies and avenues for developing norms regarding the use of emerging critical technologies; (D) reducing United States barriers and increasing incentives for collaboration with allies and partners on the research and co-development of critical technologies; (E) collaborating with allies and partners to protect critical technologies by— (i) crafting multilateral export control measures; (ii) building capacity for defense technology security; (iii) safeguarding chokepoints in supply chains; and (iv) ensuring diversification; and (F) designing major defense capabilities for export to allies and partners; (10) to collaborate with advanced democracies and other willing partners to promote ideals and principles that— (A) advance a free and open international order; (B) strengthen democratic institutions; (C) protect and promote human rights; and (D) uphold a free press and fact-based reporting; (11) to develop comprehensive and holistic strategies and policies to counter PRC disinformation campaigns; (12) to demonstrate effective leadership at the United Nations, its associated agencies, and other multilateral organizations and defend the integrity of these organizations against co-optation by illiberal and authoritarian nations; (13) to prioritize the defense of fundamental freedoms and human rights in the United States relationship with the PRC; (14) to cooperate with allies, partners, and multilateral organizations, leveraging their significant and growing capabilities to build a network of like-minded states that sustains and strengthens a free and open order and addresses regional and global challenges to hold the Government of the PRC accountable for— (A) violations and abuses of human rights; (B) restrictions on religious practices; and (C) undermining and abrogating treaties, other international agreements, and other international norms related to human rights; (15) to expose the PRC’s use of corruption, repression, and other malign behavior to attain unfair economic advantages and to pressure other nations to defer to its political and strategic objectives; (16) to maintain United States access to the Western Pacific, including by— (A) increasing United States forward-deployed forces in the Indo-Pacific region; (B) modernizing the United States military through investments in existing and new platforms, emerging technologies, critical in-theater force structure and enabling capabilities, joint operational concepts, and a diverse, operationally resilient and politically sustainable posture; and (C) operating and conducting exercises with allies and partners— (i) to mitigate the Peoples Liberation Army’s ability to project power and establish contested zones within the First and Second Island Chains; (ii) to diminish the ability of the People’s Liberation Army to coerce its neighbors; (iii) to maintain open sea and air lanes, particularly in the Taiwan Strait, the East China Sea, and the South China Sea; and (iv) to project power from the United States and its allies and partners to demonstrate the ability to conduct contested logistics; (17) to deter the PRC from— (A) coercing Indo-Pacific nations, including by developing more combat-credible forces that are integrated with allies and partners in contact, blunt, and surge layers and able to defeat any PRC theory of victory in the First or Second Island Chains of the Western Pacific and beyond, as called for in the 2018 National Defense Strategy; (B) using grey-zone tactics below the level of armed conflict; or (C) initiating armed conflict; (18) to strengthen United States-PRC military-to-military communication and improve de-escalation procedures to de-conflict operations and reduce the risk of unwanted conflict, including through high-level visits and recurrent exchanges between civilian and military officials and other measures, in alignment with United States interests; and (19) to cooperate with the PRC if interests align, including through bilateral or multilateral means and at the United Nations, as appropriate. (b) Establishing and expanding the Regional China Officer program (1) In general There is authorized to be established at the Department of State a Regional China Officer (RCO) program to support regional posts and officers with reporting, information, and policy tools, and to enhance expertise related to strategic competition with the PRC. (2) Authorization There is authorized to be appropriated $2,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2025 through 2029 to the Department of State to expand the RCO program, including for— (A) the placement of Regional China Officers at United States missions to the United Nations and United Nations affiliated organizations; (B) the placement of additional Regional China Officers in Africa; (C) the hiring of locally employed staff to support Regional China Officers serving abroad; and (D) the establishment of full-time equivalent positions to assist in managing and facilitating the RCO program. (3) Program funds There is authorized to be appropriated $50,000 for each of fiscal years 2025 through 2029 for each Regional China Officer to support programs and public diplomacy activities of the Regional China Officer. (c) Sense of Congress on data-Driven policy making It is the sense of Congress that— (1) the Office for China Coordination should employ at least one full-time equivalent Data Officer, who shall not be dual-hatted, focused on strategic competition with the PRC; and (2) the Department should, to the extent possible within existing authorities, prioritize access for the Office for China Coordination to databases, commercial software, and other data to support policy-making related to strategic competition with the PRC. 403. Department of State professional development and rotational program related to strategic competition (a) In general The Secretary shall promote policies that enable greater opportunities for the Department of State workforce to acquire skills, education, training, and work experience relevant to strategic competition with the PRC and to promote the increased effectiveness of the workforce. (b) Professional development The Secretary shall, to the extent possible and consistent with existing authorities, expand educational and professional development opportunities for the workforce of the Department related to strategic competition with the PRC. (c) Rotational program (1) In general The Secretary shall, consistent with existing authorities and in order to improve the Department’s coordination with other Federal departments and agencies with a significant role in the economic, technological, defense, public diplomacy, information, intelligence, and law enforcement aspects of United States competition with the PRC, establish an interagency rotational program at the Department. (2) Skills and experience objectives The rotational program shall facilitate rotations for Department personnel to other relevant Federal departments and agencies to acquire skills and experience related to— (A) PRC malign influence operations, including activities and polices designed to subvert or undermine open societies, repress fundamental freedoms in other countries, engage in information operations, shape narratives favorable to the Chinese Communist Party, or suppress narratives unfavorable to it, and otherwise use coercive, covert, or corrupt methods to exert improper influence on governments, private sector, civil society, universities and other academic institutions, State and local legislators, and other relevant actors in the United States and abroad; (B) economic tools relevant to national security, including sanctions, export controls, and investment screening; (C) trade and investment in partner countries; (D) commercial diplomacy and advocacy for United States businesses in emerging markets; (E) energy security; (F) security cooperation; (G) cyber and technology; (H) space; (I) critical minerals and other strategic sectors where the PRC is dominant; (J) supply chain security and cooperation; (K) development and foreign assistance, including executing high-standard infrastructure development, especially in the transport, energy, and digital sectors; (L) development finance; and (M) other issue areas that the Secretary determines necessary for the Department workforce to develop for the purposes of strategic competition with the PRC. (3) Program design, monitoring, and evaluation (A) Rotations and secondments In designing the rotational program required under this subsection, the Secretary may, if appropriate and consistent with existing authorities, include rotations or secondments for Department personnel to international organizations, private sector entities, or to the governments agencies of United States partners and allies. (B) Data tracking The Secretary shall collect and analyze data related to the rotational program required under this subsection, including to track the— (i) number of personnel who participate; (ii) the duration of the rotations; (iii) the grade and job series and sending bureau or office; (iv) the receiving department or agency, bureau, and office; (v) information as to whether the rotation was reciprocal between the sending and receiving bureau or offices; (vi) information regarding whether a backfill was acquired, and if so, through what mechanism; and (vii) any other information that the Secretary deems necessary to inform adjustments to program design to meet the objectives described in subsection (a). 404. Refocusing international security efforts for strategic competition (a) Sense of Congress It is the sense of Congress that— (1) the size of the United States diplomatic corps and Department of State civil service personnel must be sufficient to meet the current and emerging security challenges of the 21st century, particularly those posed by the PRC and Russia; (2) an increased focus on the PRC in the international security sphere is necessary to achieve Department of State objectives in strategic affairs and nonproliferation; (3) this effort must be implemented with a focus on increasing the number of Foreign Service Officers and civil servants at the Department of State to— (A) ensure the Department is resourced at sufficient levels to ensure that diplomatic tools remain central to the implementation of a long-term competitive strategy with the PRC; and (B) coordinate with allies and partners efforts to improve the security of United States and allied interests in the face of the PRC’s military modernization and expansion; (4) emerging technologies such as cyber, artificial intelligence, quantum technologies, space, hypersonic missiles, fractional orbit bombardment system and advances in missile defense systems will increasingly impact the strategic balance between the United States and its great power adversaries; and (5) strategic threats will be increasingly addressed through risk reduction measures such as the promotion of international norms in multilateral forums, increasing communication and fostering predictability with adversaries, and close cooperation and security integration with allies and partners. (b) Statement of policy It shall be the policy of the United States— (1) to ensure Department of State funding levels for international security reflect the importance and significance of the Indo-Pacific region to the political, economic, and security interests of the United States; and (2) to increase funding and the proportion of personnel dedicated to the Indo-Pacific region respective to the Department of State’s International Security budget. (c) Action plan Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall provide to the appropriate committees of Congress an action plan with the following elements: (1) Identification of requirements to advance United States international security objectives in the Indo-Pacific and the personnel and budgetary resources needed to meet them, assuming an unconstrained resource environment. (2) Identification of offices responsible for managing bilateral and multilateral arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament agreements that are expired, are expiring, or that have not been implemented since calendar year 2021 with the objective of revising their mission to focus on competitive strategies and risk reduction initiatives in the Indo-Pacific region. (3) A plan to increase the size of the Department’s international security budget. (4) Budgeting dedicated to the Indo-Pacific, including the reallocation of personnel and resources, with a focus on the threat posed by PRC military modernization and expansion. (5) A plan to increase the number of positions in bureaus that report to the Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security and overseas missions with responsibility for the Indo-Pacific region, including a description of increases and a description of how such increases in personnel will advance United States objectives in the Indo-Pacific region. (6) Defined concrete and annual benchmarks that the Department will meet in implementing the action plan. (7) A description of any barriers to implementing the action plan. (d) Updates to action plan Not later than 180 days after submitting the action plan required under subsection (c), and every 180 days thereafter for 2 years, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress an update on the implementation of the action plan, including supporting data and a detailed assessment of benchmarks reached. V Other matters 501. Savings provisions (a) Consultation and notification required The obligation of any funds authorized to be appropriated by the provisions of this Act shall be subject to prior consultation with, and consistent with section 634A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 ( 22 U.S.C. 2394–1 ), the regular notification procedures of— (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives. (b) Qualifying non-Binding instruments Any nonbinding instrument related to the provisions of this Act shall be considered a qualifying non-binding instrument for purposes of section 112b of title 1, United States Code. 502. Rule of Construction on Maintaining One China Policy Nothing in this Act may be construed as a change to the one China policy of the United States, which is guided by the Taiwan Relations Act ( 22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq. ), the three United States-People’s Republic of China Joint Communiques, and the Six Assurances.