II 118th CONGRESS 1st Session S. 1674 IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES May 18, 2023 Mr. Cotton (for himself, Mr. Risch , Mr. Rubio , Mr. Cramer , Mr. Scott of Florida , Mr. Barrasso , Mr. Budd , Mr. Ricketts , Mr. Hagerty , Mr. Rounds , and Mr. Cruz ) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations A BILL To provide for better security and accountability with respect to the strategic and non-strategic nuclear arsenals of the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China, and for other purposes.

1. Short title This Act may be cited as the No START Treaty Act . 2. Findings Congress makes the following findings: (1) The United States and the Russian Federation signed the New START Treaty in April 2010, and the treaty entered into force in February 2011. (2) The central limits of the New START Treaty prohibit the United States and the Russian Federation from possessing any more than 700 deployed strategic nuclear launchers, 800 deployed and non-deployed strategic nuclear launchers, and 1,550 nuclear warheads attributed to those deployed launchers. (3) The New START Treaty includes an inspection and verification regime that includes 18 on-site inspections per year, data exchanges and notifications, and a Bilateral Consultative Commission as a compliance and implementation convening body. (4) The New START Treaty allows each party the right to withdraw if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the treaty jeopardize its supreme interests. (5) The New START Treaty placed no constraints on Russia’s estimated 2,000 non-strategic nuclear weapons, which can be delivered by a variety of ground-based, air-based, and sea-based platforms. In contrast, the United States possesses only a small inventory of aircraft-deliverable non-strategic nuclear gravity bombs. (6) The New START Treaty did not constrain the arsenal of the People’s Republic of China, which is now engaged in a strategic breakout of its nuclear forces. The Department of Defense estimates that China will have about 1,000 operational nuclear warheads by 2030 and about 1,500 warheads by 2035 if it continues at its current pace. (7) The Department of Defense acknowledged in its 2022 Report on Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China that China took only two years to double its nuclear arsenal, far sooner than the Department’s 2020 estimate that it would take China until 2030 to double its nuclear arsenal. (8) Even when the Russian Federation was found compliant with the New START Treaty, it developed multiple strategic nuclear-armed systems that circumvented the spirit and intent of the treaty, such as a nuclear-powered cruise missile and nuclear-powered torpedo. (9) In March 2020, the United States and the Russian Federation mutually agreed to suspend New START Treaty inspections due to the COVID–19 pandemic. (10) On February 3, 2021, Secretary of State Antony Blinken announced the unconditional extension of the New START Treaty for an additional five years, until February 5, 2026, the maximum extension allowed by the treaty. (11) The Russian Federation refused United States requests in August 2022 to resume New START inspections and refused to engage in the Bilateral Consultative Commission with the United States in November 2022 to work towards resuming inspections. (12) Given Russia’s refusal to resume mandatory inspections and refusal to participate in the Bilateral Consultative Commission as required by the treaty, the Department of State declared in January 2023 that Russia was noncompliant with the New START Treaty. (13) In February 2023, President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin announced that Russia would suspend its participation in the New START Treaty. The New START Treaty has no provision for suspension. Russia shortly thereafter ceased providing to the United States the data on its nuclear arsenal that is required under the treaty. (14) The United States remains in compliance with the central limits of the New START Treaty and attempted in good faith to resume mutual inspections under the treaty. (15) The United States has not deployed a new nuclear-capable delivery system in over 30 years, while the Russian Federation has in that same time deployed over a dozen new nuclear-capable delivery systems. Russia also has active nuclear production facilities that enable it to produce large numbers of new warheads. (16) The United States nuclear modernization program of record does not expand the United States nuclear arsenal from current levels, while the People’s Republic of China is growing its nuclear arsenal as part of what former Commander of the United States Strategic Command, Admiral Richard, has labeled “breathtaking”. China’s deployed forces will achieve effective parity with the United States arsenal deployed under the New START Treaty by 2035, if not sooner. (17) In its resolution of advice and consent to ratification of the New START Treaty in 2010, the Senate stated that if, during the time the New START Treaty remains in force, the President determines that there has been an expansion of the strategic arsenal of any country not party to the New START Treaty so as to jeopardize the supreme interests of the United States, then the President should consult on an urgent basis with the Senate to determine whether adherence to the New START Treaty remains in the national interest of the United States . To date, the President has taken no action to consult with the Senate on this issue, even though China’s actions clearly meet this standard. (18) For deterrence to be effective, United States Strategic Command needs to be confident it can hold at risk what an adversary values most, including its nuclear forces. Therefore, the expansion of the nuclear arsenals of the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China directly impact United States deterrence requirements. 3. Sense of Congress It is the sense of Congress that— (1) arms control is not an end in and of itself, and is only useful if it strengthens the security of the United States and its allies; (2) the extension of the New START Treaty in 2021 with no conditions attached and no attempts to resolve the numerous shortcomings of the original treaty harmed United States national security and emboldened America’s adversaries; (3) the Russian Federation is in material breach of its commitments under the New START Treaty, and Russia’s suspension of the treaty represents a de facto withdrawal from the treaty; (4) Russia’s de facto withdrawal from the New START Treaty removes the treaty’s value to the national security interest of the United States and its allies of limiting strategic nuclear weapons, as the United States is now unable to confirm Russia is adhering to the central limits of the treaty; (5) China’s nuclear buildup meets the Senate criterion of an expansion of the strategic arsenal of a country not party to the New START Treaty that jeopardizes the supreme interests of the United States; (6) Due to Russia’s de facto withdrawal from the New START Treaty and China’s nuclear expansion, the New START Treaty is no longer in the United States national interest and the United States should withdraw; (7) after the New START Treaty expires or becomes defunct, any new arms control agreement or treaty that sets numerical limits on nuclear arsenals should limit the Russian Federation’s nuclear arsenal—strategic and non-strategic—and should also restrict the nuclear arsenal of the People’s Republic of China without allowing China to increase its arsenal to reach treaty limits; (8) the United States should not divest itself of, or slow or halt the development or procurement of, any nuclear-capable strategic or non-strategic delivery systems unless a new nuclear arms control treaty is ratified that similarly constrains the nuclear arsenals of both the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China; and (9) the United States should strengthen its nuclear forces, to include growing the size of its nuclear arsenal, strengthening its force posture, and acquiring additional capabilities, to account for the growth in deterrence requirements caused by the expansion of the nuclear arsenals of the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation since the New START Treaty was signed, as well as to hedge against a Russian breakout from New START Treaty limits. 4. Assessment and implementation plan for nuclear force structure improvements required (a) In general Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of State, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on United States nuclear deterrence. (b) Elements The report required under subsection (a) shall include the following elements: (1) An assessment of the adequacy of the current and planned nuclear arsenal of the United States for purposes of facing its adversaries, with a focus on the new dynamics associated with facing two major nuclear powers simultaneously in both peacetime and in conflict. The assessment shall describe— (A) the sufficiency of the size and structure of the current and planned arsenal to maintain deterrence with respect to two nuclear-peers without reduced levels of risk or redundancy; (B) the sufficiency of the size and structure of the current and planned arsenal to maintain deterrence of two nuclear-peers without reduced levels of risk or redundancy should the Russian Federation grow its nuclear forces beyond the levels allowed under the central limits of the New START Treaty and should the People’s Republic of China continue to grow its nuclear forces after reaching parity with the currently deployed United States nuclear arsenal under the New START Treaty; (C) the impact of emerging technology, such as nuclear-armed hypersonic weapons and fractional orbital bombardment systems, on United States nuclear posture and planning; and (D) the current and planned sufficiency of nuclear command, control, and communications capabilities in crisis or conflict scenarios. (2) A proposed implementation plan to address any deficiencies found in the assessment described in paragraph (1). The plan shall include— (A) needed changes to the planned nuclear force structure and force posture based on any gaps in deterrence and assurance capabilities; (B) a proposal and timeline to improve the survivability of the strategic bomber force; (C) a proposal and timeline detailing the steps necessary to return a portion of the strategic bomber force to heightened alert status; (D) a proposal and timeline detailing the steps necessary to reduce the time necessary to upload nuclear weapons to the bomber force; (E) a proposal and timeline detailing the steps necessary— (i) to upload additional warheads to the Minuteman III ICBM fleet to its full capacity; and (ii) to deploy Sentinel missiles as they come online with the maximum number of warheads that can be deployed on each missile; and (F) a proposal and timeline detailing the steps necessary to restore submarine-launched ballistic missile tubes on Ohio-class submarines that were rendered inoperable to comply with the terms of the New START Treaty. (3) The national security implications of— (A) any unilateral reductions of the United States nuclear arsenal without corresponding reductions in Russia and China’s nuclear arsenal; and (B) any unilateral reductions in the United States’ national and theater missile defense without corresponding reductions in Russia and China’s missile defense. 5. Requirements for future nuclear arms agreements (a) Requirements The President and any representative of the President shall not negotiate, sign, or otherwise agree to any treaty with the Russian Federation pertaining to nuclear weapons where the number of nuclear warheads or nuclear-capable delivery systems possessed by the Russian Federation would be numerically equal in size to, or greater than, the nuclear arsenal of the United States, unless such treaty or agreement— (1) also restricts the size of the nuclear arsenal of the People’s Republic of China without allowing China to build up to treaty limits; (2) includes an inspection regime and other verification measures to ensure with high confidence that the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China are compliant with the terms of the treaty or agreement; (3) includes an inspection regime of the relevant nuclear facilities of the People’s Republic of China that is comparable to the treaty’s or agreement’s inspection regime of the relevant nuclear facilities of the Russian Federation; (4) includes current and future Russian strategic nuclear systems of a strategic character that are not currently limited by the New START Treaty, including— (A) non-ballistic missiles of intercontinental ranges; (B) underwater unmanned systems of intercontinental ranges; and (C) hypersonic glide vehicles that can be delivered by systems of intercontinental ranges; and (5) includes current and future non-strategic nuclear weapons and delivery systems. (b) Prohibition on unilateral reductions (1) In general Except as provided in paragraph (2), the President shall not reduce the size of the United States nuclear arsenal without a nuclear arms treaty approved with the advice and consent of the Senate, pursuant to article II, section 2, clause 2 of the Constitution of the United States that satisfies the requirements described in subsection (a). (2) Exception The prohibition in paragraph (1) does not apply to the following activities: (A) The maintenance or sustainment of United States nuclear systems. (B) Ensuring the safety, security, or reliability of United States nuclear systems. (C) Facilitating the transition of existing legacy systems to modern delivery systems. (c) Prohibition on bargaining with missile defense The President shall not negotiate, sign, or otherwise agree to any agreement or treaty with the Russian Federation or the People’s Republic of China that would limit or reduce the United States national or theater missile defenses unless the United States has already ratified a treaty that satisfies the requirements described in subsection (a). (d) Withholding of funds Beginning on the date that is one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, no funds shall be expended to implement the New START Treaty, any successor agreement to the New START Treaty, or any other new or newly amended nuclear arms control treaty or agreement with the Russian Federation that limits the numbers of nuclear warheads or nuclear-capable delivery systems possessed by the United States unless— (1) such treaties or agreements satisfy the requirements described in subsection (a); or (2) a different treaty or agreement is already in effect that satisfies the requirements described in subsection (a). (e) Waiver The President may waive the prohibition in subsection (d) with respect to a particular new or newly amended agreement or treaty if— (1) two-thirds of the Senate first agrees to a joint resolution of approval in support of the new or newly amended agreement or treaty; and (2) the President certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that the agreement or treaty is in the national security interests of the United States and does not harm the deterrent capability of the United States. 6. Definitions In this Act: (1) Appropriate congressional committees The term appropriate congressional committees means— (A) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and (B) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives. (2) New START Treaty the term New START Treaty means the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, signed April 8, 2010, and entered into force February 5, 2011.