I 118th CONGRESS 2d Session H. R. 3202 IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AN ACT To prohibit any official action to recognize or normalize relations with any Government of Syria that is led by Bashar al-Assad, and for other purposes.

1. Short title This Act may be cited as the Assad Regime Anti-Normalization Act of 2023 . 2. Modifications to the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act (a) Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act Section 7412 of the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act of 2019 (title LXXIV of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020; 22 U.S.C. 8791 note) is amended— (1) in subsection (a)— (A) in paragraph (1), by striking the President shall impose and all that follows through the end of the paragraph and inserting the President— (A) shall impose the sanctions described in subsection (b) with respect to a foreign person that the President determines— (i) knowingly engages, on or after such date of enactment, in an activity described in paragraph (2); (ii) is an adult family member of a foreign person described in clause (i), unless the President determines there is clear and convincing evidence that such adult family member has disassociated themselves from the foreign person described in such clause and has no history of helping such foreign person conceal assets; or (iii) is owned or controlled by a foreign person described in clause (i) or (ii); and (B) may impose the sanctions described in subsection (b) with respect to a foreign person that the President determines knowingly provides, on or after such date of enactment, significant financial, material, or technological support to a foreign person engaging in an activity described in any of subparagraphs (B) through (H) of paragraph (2); . (B) in paragraph (2)— (i) in subparagraph (A)— (I) by amending clause (i) to read as follows: (i) the Government of Syria (including any entity owned or controlled by the Government of Syria), a senior political figure of the Government of Syria, a member of the People’s Assembly of Syria, or a senior foreign political figure (as such term is defined in section 101.605 of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations) of the Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party of Syria, including any such senior foreign political figure who is— (I) a member of the Central Command, Central Committee, or Auditing and Inspection Committee of such Party; or (II) a leader of a local branch of such Party; ; (II) in clause (ii), by striking ; or and inserting a semicolon; (III) in clause (iii), by striking the semicolon and inserting ; or ; and (IV) by adding at the end the following new clause: (iv) Syria Arab Airlines, Cham Wings, or any foreign person owned or controlled by Syria Arab Airlines or Cham Wings; ; (ii) by amending subparagraph (C) to read as follows: (C) knowingly sells or provides aircraft or spare aircraft parts— (i) to the Government of Syria; or (ii) for or on behalf of the Government of Syria to any foreign person operating in an area directly or indirectly controlled by the Government of Syria or foreign forces associated with the Government of Syria; ; (iii) in subparagraph (D), by striking ; or and inserting a semicolon; (iv) in subparagraph (E)— (I) by striking construction or engineering services and inserting construction, engineering, or commercial financial services ; and (II) by striking the closing period and inserting a semicolon; and (v) by adding at the end the following new subparagraphs: (F) purposefully engages in or directs— (i) the diversion of goods (including agricultural commodities, food, medicine, and medical devices), or any international humanitarian assistance, intended for the people of Syria; or (ii) the dealing in proceeds from the sale or resale of such diverted goods or international humanitarian assistance, as the case may be; (G) knowingly, directly or indirectly, engages in or attempts to engage in, the seizure, confiscation, theft, or expropriation for personal gain or political purposes of property, including real property, in Syria or owned by a citizen of Syria; (H) knowingly, directly or indirectly, engages in or attempts to engage in a transaction or transactions for or with such seized, confiscated, stolen, or expropriated property described in subparagraph (G); or (I) knowingly provides significant financial, material, or technological support to a foreign person engaging in an activity described in subparagraph (A). ; and (C) by adding at the end the following new paragraphs: (4) Transaction defined For purposes of the determination required by subparagraph (a)(2)(A), the term transaction includes in-kind transactions. (5) Additional definitions In this section: (A) Commercial financial services The term commercial financial services means any transaction between the Government of Syria and a foreign bank or foreign financial institution operating in an area under the control of the Government of Syria that has a valuation of more than $5,000,000. (B) Financial institution The term financial institution means a financial institution specified in any of subparagraphs (A) through (K), (M), (N), (P), (R), (T), (Y), or (Z) of section 5312(a)(2) of title 31, United States Code. (6) Significant transaction clarified In this section, the term ‘significant transaction’ includes any natural gas, electricity, or other energy-related transaction. ; and (2) by adding at the end the following new subsection: (c) Congressional requests Not later than 120 days after receiving a request from the chairman and ranking member of one of the appropriate congressional committees with respect to whether a foreign person knowingly engages in an activity described in subsection (a)(2) the President shall— (1) make the determination specified in subsection (a)(1) with respect to that foreign person; and (2) submit to such chairman and ranking member that submitted the request a report with respect to such determination that includes a statement of whether the President has imposed or intends to impose the sanctions described in subsection (b) with respect to that foreign person. . (b) Extension of sunset Section 7438 of the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act of 2019 is amended by striking the date that is 5 years after the date of the enactment of this Act and inserting December 31, 2032 . (c) Determinations with respect to Syria Trust for Development (1) Determinations Not later than 120 days after the enactment of this Act, the President shall— (A) determine whether the nonprofit organization chaired by Asma Al-Assad, the First Lady of Syria, known as the Syria Trust for Development meets the criteria for the imposition of sanctions— (i) under section 7412(a) of the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act of 2019, as amended by subsection (a); (ii) under Executive Order No. 13894 (84 Fed. Reg. 55851; relating to blocking property and suspending entry of certain persons contributing to the situation in Syria); or (iii) by nature of being owned or controlled by a person designated under any executive order or regulation administered by the Office of Foreign Assets Control; and (B) submit to the appropriate congressional committees each such determination, including a justification for the determination. (2) Form The determination under paragraph (1)(B) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but the justification specified in such paragraph may be included in a classified annex. The unclassified determination shall be made available on a publicly available website of the Federal government. (3) Sanctions relating to importation of goods unchanged Paragraph (1) may not be construed to create any new authorities or requirements to impose sanctions on the importation of goods. (4) Appropriate congressional committees defined In this section, the term appropriate congressional committees means— (A) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives; and (B) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate. (d) Findings on applicability with respect to Syrian Arab Airlines, Cham Wings Airlines, and related entities Congress finds the following: (1) In 2013, the President identified Syrian Arab Airlines as a blocked instrumentality or controlled entity of the Government of Syria and concurrently sanctioned Syrian Arab Airlines pursuant to Executive Order No. 13224 for acting for or on behalf of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force of Iran. (2) In 2016, the President sanctioned Syria-based Cham Wings Airlines pursuant to Executive Order No. 13582 for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services in support of, the Government of Syria and Syrian Arab Airlines. (3) Section 7412(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act of 2019 ( 22 U.S.C. 8791 note) mandates the application of sanctions against any foreign person that knowingly provides significant financial, material, or technological support to, or knowingly engages in a significant transaction with * * * a foreign person subject to sanctions pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act ( 50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq. ) with respect to Syria or any other provision of law that imposes sanctions with respect to Syria, , which applies to airport service providers outside of Syria. (e) Severability If any provision of this Act, or the application of such provision to any person or circumstance, is found to be unconstitutional, the remainder of this Act, or the application of that provision to other persons or circumstances, shall not be affected. 3. Prohibition of recognition of Assad regime (a) Statement of policy It is the policy of the United States— (1) not to recognize or normalize relations with any Government of Syria that is led by Bashar al-Assad due to the Assad regime’s ongoing crimes against the Syrian people, including failure to meet the criteria outlined in section 7431(a) of the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act of 2019; (2) to actively oppose recognition or normalization of relations by other governments with any Government of Syria that is led by Bashar Al-Assad, including by fully implementing the mandatory primary and secondary sanctions in the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act of 2019 and Executive Order No. 13894; and (3) to use the full range of authorities, including those provided under the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act of 2019 and Executive Order No. 13894, to deter reconstruction activities in areas under the control of Bashar al-Assad. (b) Prohibition In accordance with subsection (a), no Federal official or employee may take any action, and no Federal funds may be made available, to recognize or otherwise imply, in any manner, United States recognition of Bashar al-Assad or any Government in Syria that is led by Bashar al-Assad. 4. Interagency strategy to counter normalization with Assad regime (a) Report and strategy required (1) Submission Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 5 years, the Secretary of State (in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, the Administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration, and the heads of other appropriate Federal departments and agencies) shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report and strategy to describe and counter actions taken or planned by foreign governments to normalize, engage with, or upgrade political, diplomatic, or economic ties with the regime led by Bashar al-Assad in Syria (in this section referred to as the Assad regime ). (2) Elements The elements of the report under paragraph (1) shall include— (A) a description of violations of international law and human rights abuses committed by Bashar al-Assad, the Government of the Russian Federation, or the Government of Iran and progress towards justice and accountability for the Syrian people; (B) a full list of diplomatic meetings at the Ambassador level or above, between the Syrian regime and any representative of the Governments of Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, Oman, Bahrain, Kuwait, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, Libya, or Lebanon, respectively; (C) a list including an identification of— (i) any single covered transaction exceeding $500,000; and (ii) any combination of covered transactions by the same source that, in aggregate, exceed $500,000 and occur within a single year; (D) for each identified single transaction or aggregate transactions, as the case may be, included in the list described in subparagraph (C), a determination of whether such transaction subjects any of the parties to the transaction to sanctions under the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act of 2019, as amended by section 2; (E) a description of the steps the United States is taking to actively deter recognition or normalization of relations by other governments with the Assad regime, including specific diplomatic engagements and use of economic sanctions authorized by statutes or implemented through Executive orders, including— (i) the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act of 2019 ( 22 U.S.C. 8791 note); (ii) the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act ( 22 U.S.C. 2151 note); (iii) the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 ( 22 U.S.C. 8501 et seq. ); (iv) Executive Order No. 13894 (84 Fed. Reg. 55851; relating to blocking property and suspending entry of certain persons contributing to the situation in Syria); (v) the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act ( 22 U.S.C. 10101 et seq. ); (vi) the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act ( 22 U.S.C. 9401 et seq. ); and (vii) the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act ( 21 U.S.C. 1901 et seq. ); and (F) an assessment of how recognition or normalization of relations by other governments with the Assad regime impacts the national security of the United States, prospects for implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 2254, prospects for justice and accountability for war crimes in Syria, and the benefits derived by the Government of the Russian Federation or the Government of Iran. (b) Scope The initial report required by subsection (a) shall address the period beginning on January 1, 2021, and ending on the date of the enactment of this Act, and each subsequent report shall address the one-year period following the conclusion of the scope of the prior report. (c) Form Each report under subsection (a) shall be submitted in an unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex. The unclassified section of such a report shall be made publicly available on a website of the United States Federal Government. (d) Appropriate congressional committees In this section, the term appropriate congressional committees means— (1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on the Judiciary, the Committee on Financial Services, the Committee on Appropriations, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives; and (2) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on the Judiciary, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee on Appropriations, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate. (e) Covered transaction defined In this section, the term covered transaction means a transaction, including an investment, grant, contract, or donation (including a loan or other extension of credit)— (1) by a foreign person located in Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, Oman, Bahrain, Kuwait, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, Libya, or Lebanon; to (2) a recipient in any area of Syria held by the Assad regime. 5. Reports on manipulation of United Nations by Assad regime in Syria Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 5 years, the Secretary of State, shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a report on the manipulation of the United Nations by the regime led by Bashar al-Assad in Syria (in this section referred to as the Assad regime ), including— (1) a description of conditions, both explicit and implicit, set by the Assad regime with respect to United Nations operations in Syria including with respect to implementing partners, hiring practices, allocation of grants and contracts, and procurement of goods and services; (2) a description of the extent to which the United Nations has rejected or otherwise opposed any of the conditions described in paragraph (1); (3) an identification of officials or employees of the United Nations (including funds, programs and specialized agencies of the United Nations) with ties to the Assad regime, including family ties, or persons designated for sanctions by United Nations donor countries; (4) a full account of access restrictions imposed by the Assad regime and the overall impact on the ability of the United Nations to deliver international assistance to target beneficiaries in areas outside regime control; (5) a description of ways in which United Nations aid improperly benefits the Assad regime and its associates in defiance of basic humanitarian principles; (6) a description of the due diligence mechanisms and vetting procedures in place to ensure entities contracted by the United Nations to ensure goods, supplies, or services provided to Syria do not have links to the Assad regime, known human rights abusers, or persons designated for sanctions by United Nations donor countries; (7) an identification of entities affiliated with the Assad regime, including the Syria Trust for Development and the Syrian Arab Red Crescent, foreign government ministries, and private corporations owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the Assad regime, that have received United Nations funding, contracts, or grants or have otherwise entered into a formalized partnership with the United Nations; (8) an assessment of how the Assad regime sets arbitrary or punitive exchange rates to extract funding from the United Nations, as well as the total amount extracted by such means; (9) an assessment of the degree to which the various forms of manipulation described in this section has resulted in compromises of the humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality, and independence of the United Nations; and (10) a strategy to reduce the ability of the Assad regime to manipulate or otherwise influence the United Nations and other aid operations in Syria and ensure United States and international aid is delivered in a neutral and impartial manner consistent with basic humanitarian principles.

Passed the House of Representatives February 14, 2024. Cheryl L. Johnson, Clerk.