III 117th CONGRESS 2d Session S. RES. 763 IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES September 14, 2022 Mr. Hawley submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Rules and Administration RESOLUTION Establishing a Senate Select Committee on the United States withdrawal from Afghanistan.

1. Short title This resolution may be cited as the Senate Select Committee on the Afghanistan Withdrawal Resolution . 2. Establishment of Senate Select Committee There is established a select committee of the Senate, to be known as the Select Committee on the United States Withdrawal from Afghanistan (referred to in this resolution as the Senate Select Committee ), to investigate and report on the United States withdrawal from Afghanistan. 3. Membership (a) In general The Senate Select Committee shall be composed of 20 Members of the Senate appointed according to the following: (1) The majority leader of the Senate shall appoint 2 members. (2) The minority leader of the Senate shall appoint 2 members. (3) The chairman of the Committee on Armed Services shall appoint 2 members. (4) The ranking member of the Committee on Armed Services shall appoint 2 members. (5) The chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations shall appoint 2 members. (6) The ranking member of the Committee on Foreign Relations shall appoint 2 members. (7) The chairman of the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs shall appoint 2 members. (8) The ranking member of the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs shall appoint 2 members. (9) The chairman of the Select Committee on Intelligence shall appoint 2 members. (10) The ranking member of the Select Committee on Intelligence shall appoint 2 members. (b) Appointment of Co-Chairs The majority leader and the minority leader of the Senate shall each appoint 1 co-chair of the Senate Select Committee from the members appointed to the Senate Select Committee. (c) Date Members of the Senate Select Committee shall be appointed not later than 14 calendar days after the date on which the Senate agrees to this resolution. (d) Period of appointment Members of the Senate Select Committee shall be appointed for the life of the Senate Select Committee. (e) Vacancies A vacancy in the Senate Select Committee— (1) shall not affect the powers of the Senate Select Committee; and (2) shall be filled in the same manner as the original appointment. 4. Investigation and report (a) In general The Senate Select Committee shall investigate and, not later than 1 year after the date of agreement to this resolution, shall submit a report to the Senate on the United States withdrawal from Afghanistan. (b) Elements The report required under subsection (a) shall address the following: (1) Intelligence products available to the United States Government over the course of the withdrawal, including as related to— (A) anticipated timelines for a Taliban takeover of Afghanistan, especially as the Taliban seized control of Afghanistan districts and provinces, often without fighting, in early to mid 2021; (B) the ability of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces to prevent a Taliban takeover of Afghanistan after the withdrawal of the United States Armed Forces and associated combat, logistical, and other support; (C) the willingness of then-President of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Ashraf Ghani and other Afghan political leaders to remain in Afghanistan as the military situation deteriorated, including any plans such leaders may have made to escape Afghanistan as the Taliban advanced; (D) any other intelligence that may have informed decisions by the United States Government regarding the timeline for the withdrawal of its forces, moving of its embassy in Kabul, initiation of a noncombatant evacuation operation, force requirements for a noncombatant evacuation operation, or related matters; and (E) any dissenting views shared in writing or other formats, including verbally, by United States diplomats, military commanders, or other government officials regarding the topics described in subparagraphs (A) through (D). (2) The failure to secure Hamid Karzai International Airport, relocate the United States Embassy in Kabul, and initiate a noncombatant evacuation operation prior to Kabul’s imminent collapse, despite warnings by military commanders on the ground that such a collapse was increasingly likely and could occur rapidly, including— (A) the failure by the United States Government to accelerate the fortification of the Hamid Karzai International Airport, the relocation of the United States Embassy in Kabul, or the initiation of the noncombatant evacuation operation in response to warnings that the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan was increasingly likely to collapse and could do so rapidly; (B) the development of a trigger assessment tool or other conditions-based planning aids to support monitoring of and timely response to the deteriorating security environment in Afghanistan, including use of such aids by Department of Defense and Department of State officials in Afghanistan; (C) table-top exercises or other planning events held at agency or interagency levels, with particular focus on planning assumptions, associated timelines, and participant reactions to the planning events; (D) any decision by the Department of State or other Federal agency to delay or deprioritize planning for a noncombatant evacuation operation, including for the purpose of demonstrating confidence in the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan; (E) any suggestion by Department of State or other United States Government officials that executing a noncombatant evacuation operation would constitute failure for the United States in Afghanistan, as reported by the United States Central Command investigation of the Abbey Gate bombing; and (F) any orders, instructions, or other guidance provided to Department of Defense officials to prevent such officials from planning for a noncombatant evacuation operation with multinational partners, as reported by the United States Central Command investigation of the Abbey Gate bombing. (3) The decision to prioritize evacuating as many individuals as possible over protecting members of the United States Armed Forces and thoroughly vetting all prospective evacuees, as reported by the United States Central Command investigation of the Abbey Gate bombing, including— (A) force protection measures, including obstacles, barriers, and other measures, implemented at the Hamid Karzai International Airport prior to and during execution of the noncombatant evacuation operation; and (B) force protection measures not implemented at the Hamid Karzai International Airport, with an explanation for why such force protection measures were not implemented and implications of the failure to implement such measures for risk to force during execution of the noncombatant evacuation operation. (4) Threat reporting prior to the suicide bombing at Abbey Gate, additional force protection measures implemented in response to such threat reporting, and additional force protection measures not implemented in response to such threat reporting, with an assessment of why certain additional force protection measures were not taken. (5) The failure to thoroughly vet evacuees prior to their transfer to United States territory, military installations, or other locations outside of Afghanistan, including detailed descriptions of— (A) any delays by the Department of State to send adequate numbers of consular officials to Hamid Karzai International Airport to facilitate thorough vetting of prospective evacuees; (B) any changes to guidance issued by the Department of State regarding the vetting of prospective evacuees over the course of the noncombatant evacuation operation; (C) any guidance issued by the President or other United States Government officials to reduce standards for or expedite vetting of prospective evacuees prior to their removal from Afghanistan; (D) any failure by the United States Government to utilize all existing biometric databases or proper identification standards when processing individuals to be removed from Afghanistan; and (E) any criminal incidents involving evacuees following their transfer to United States territory. (6) The total number of United States nationals left in Afghanistan following the United States withdrawal from Afghanistan, and the knowledge on the part of United States Government officials of the total number of United States nationals left in Afghanistan when such officials informed Congress that the United States Government had not left Americans behind in Afghanistan. (7) Equipment provided by the United States to the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces and recovered by the Taliban following the collapse of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces, including the type and amount of such equipment recovered by the Taliban as well as the manner in which the Taliban has been able to use such equipment. (8) Detailed descriptions of— (A) orders issued by the President related to the United States withdrawal from Afghanistan, including with regard to the relocation of the United States Embassy in Kabul and the initiation and execution of the noncombatant evacuation operation; (B) analysis or recommendations provided by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Commander of United States Central Command, and other national security leaders related to the United States withdrawal from Afghanistan, including as related to— (i) the deteriorating military situation in Afghanistan; and (ii) the consequent need to accelerate the relocation of the United States Embassy in Kabul and the initiation of the noncombatant evacuation operation; and (C) requests for forces or other requests for additional authorities or resources made to the President by the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, or other national security leaders during the United States withdrawal from Afghanistan, and the President’s responses to any such requests. (9) Any other matters identified by members of the Senate Select Committee. (c) Form The report required under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may contain a classified annex. 5. Meetings, hearings, and access to information (a) Meetings (1) In general The Senate Select Committee shall meet at the call of the co-chairs or at the request of at least 3 members. (2) Quorum Half of the members of the Senate Select Committee shall constitute a quorum. (3) Voting Proxy voting shall be allowed on behalf of the members of the Senate Select Committee. (b) Hearings (1) In general The Senate Select Committee shall, for the purposes described in section 4, hold such hearings, compel attendance of such witnesses, take or compel such testimony, receive or compel such evidence, and administer such oaths as the Senate Select Committee considers advisable. (2) Frequency The Senate Select Committee shall hold an open hearing no less frequently than once per month until it has received open testimony from all of the witnesses listed in paragraph (3). (3) Witnesses The co-chairs shall hear testimony from the following before the Senate Select Committee in open session, even if the person holds a different public office or no longer holds public office at the time of the hearing: (A) Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Jake Sullivan. (B) Secretary of State Antony Blinken. (C) Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin. (D) Secretary of Homeland Security Alejandro Mayorkas. (E) Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines. (F) Director of the Central Intelligence Agency William Burns. (G) Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark Milley. (H) Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Colin Kahl. (I) Former United States Ambassador to Afghanistan Ambassador John Bass. (J) Former United States Ambassador to Afghanistan Ambassador Ross Wilson. (K) Former Commander of United States Forces Afghanistan—Forward Rear Admiral Peter Vasely. (L) Former Commanding General of Joint Task Force—Crisis Response Brigadier General Farrell J. Sullivan. (M) Former Commanding General of 82nd Airborne Division Lieutenant General Christopher T. Donahue. (N) Any other individuals, including former United States Government officials, identified by the co-chairs or a group of 3 members of the Senate Select Committee. (4) Transparency The Senate Select Committee may receive classified testimony in a closed session, but any witnesses questioned in a closed session shall also testify in an open session, in the interest of public transparency. (5) Questioning Co-chairs shall permit members of the Senate Select Committee to question witnesses at a hearing for periods longer than 5 minutes or multiple periods of 5 minutes, at the request of a member. (6) Procedures (A) Announcement The co-chairs of the Senate Select Committee shall make a public announcement of the date, time, place, and subject matter of any hearing to be conducted, not less than 7 days in advance of such hearing, unless the co-chairs determine that there is good cause to begin such hearing at any earlier date. (B) Written statement A witness appearing before the Senate Select Committee shall file a written statement of proposed testimony and respond in writing to any advance questions from the Senate Select Committee at least 2 calendar days before the appearance of the witness unless the requirement is waived by the co-chairs. (c) Cooperation from Federal agencies (1) Technical assistance Upon written request of the co-chairs, a Federal agency shall provide technical assistance to the Senate Select Committee in order for the Senate Select Committee to carry out its duties. (2) Provision of information The National Security Council, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Director of National Intelligence, the heads of the elements of the intelligence community, and the heads of other relevant Federal agencies shall expeditiously provide information requested by the Senate Select Committee related to the investigation and report under required under section 4, and in no case later than 3 weeks after a request by a member of the Senate Select Committee. (3) Limitation on exclusions Federal agencies shall not withhold information from the Senate Select Committee, including for reasons of classification, executive privilege, or attorney-client privilege. (d) Subpoena authority Members of the Senate Select Committee are authorized to— (1) compel by subpoena the furnishing of information by United States Government officials and other individuals, including former United States Government officials; and (2) take or order the taking of depositions, including pursuant to subpoena, in the same manner as a standing committee of the Senate. 6. Administration (a) Funding There shall be paid, out of the contingent fund of the Senate from the appropriations account Miscellaneous Items, such sums as may be necessary for the expenses of the Senate Select Committee, subject to the rules and regulations of the Senate. (b) Expenses In carrying out its functions, the Senate Select Committee is authorized to incur expenses in the same manner and under the same conditions as the Joint Economic Committee is authorized under section 11 of the Employment Act of 1946 ( 15 U.S.C. 1024 ). (c) Staffing (1) Staff director The co-chairs, acting jointly, shall hire the staff director of the Senate Select Committee. (2) Other staff The co-chairs, acting jointly, may employ such additional staff as they determine necessary for the Senate Select Committee to carry out its duties. (3) Compensation The co-chairs, acting jointly, may appoint and fix the compensation of the staff director and additional staff as they determine necessary, within the guidelines for employees of the Senate and following all applicable rules and employment requirements of the Senate. (4) Ethical standards Members and staff of the Senate Select Committee shall comply with the ethics rules of the Senate. (d) Facilities The Senate Select Committee shall have priority access to— (1) rooms of the Senate for purposes of meetings, hearings, and other Senate Select Committee functions; and (2) secure facilities for purpose of receiving classified testimony and handling other classified materials. (e) Termination The Senate Select Committee shall terminate on the later of the following: (1) 30 days after the submission of the report required under section 4(a). (2) 30 days after the Senate Select Committee has held open hearings with all of the witnesses listed under section 5(b)(3). (3) The expiration of the Congressional session during which the Senate agrees to this resolution. (f) Disposition of records Upon the termination of the Senate Select Committee, the records of the Senate Select Committee shall become the records of the Committee on Armed Services.