I 117th CONGRESS 2d Session H. R. 9700 IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES December 30, 2022 Mr. Chabot introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs A BILL To clarify the legal basis for the position of the United States on sovereignty over Taiwan and distinguish such position from the People’s Republic of China’s one China principle, and for other purposes.

1. Short title This Act may be cited as the Taiwan Status Diplomacy Act . 2. Findings Congress finds the following: (1) Taiwan’s indigenous peoples have inhabited the island for over 6,000 years, with various political entities exercising control over parts of it until colonial powers conquered increasingly large swaths of the island by force, beginning in the 17th century. (2) Dutch Formosa (1636–1662) in southern Taiwan and Spanish Formosa (1626–1642) in northern Taiwan were the first colonial endeavors that exercised control over some parts of the island. (3) In 1662, Ming loyalist general Zheng Chenggong (Koxinga) ended Dutch control in Taiwan, and his independent Kingdom of Tungning ruled parts of the island until it was conquered by the Manchu Qing Empire in 1683. (4) Qing rule in western Taiwan was undeniably colonial and Taiwan was not considered a traditional province of China, becoming a province of the Qing Empire for merely 10 years beginning in 1885, and lasting until 1895. (5) On April 17, 1895, the Manchu Qing Empire signed the Treaty of Shimonoseki with the Japanese Empire and agree to cede to Japan in perpetuity and full sovereignty … the island of Formosa, together with all islands appertaining or belonging to the said island of Formosa … [and] the Pescadores Group . (6) No colonial power can claim historical rights to sovereignty over Taiwan as several colonial powers have successively administered the island from the 17th through the 20th century. (7) During the 1920s and 1930s, Chinese geographers and political figures generally considered Taiwan to be outside of China’s national territory, as is evidenced by the Chinese Communist Party’s declaration of war against Japan in December 1941, which listed the people of Taiwan separately from the Chinese. (8) On July 16, 1936, in an interview with American journalist Edgar Snow, Mao Zedong stated, it is the immediate task of China to regain all our lost territories, not merely to defend our sovereignty below the Great Wall. This means that Manchuria must be regained. We do not, however, include Korea, formerly a Chinese colony, but when we have re-established the independence of the lost territories of China, and if the Koreans wish to break away from the chains of Japanese imperialism, we will extend them our enthusiastic help in their struggle for independence. The same thing applies to Formosa . (9) The Cairo and Potsdam Declarations are legally nonbinding statements of intent regarding postwar control over Taiwan by the Republic of China (ROC), that do not make any transfer of sovereignty over Taiwan. (10) On August 17, 1945, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, General Douglas MacArthur, issued General Order No. 1, listing the island of Formosa as a separate entity from China. (11) On June 27, 1950, President Harry Truman declared that the occupation of Formosa by Communist forces would be a direct threat to the security of the Pacific area and to United States forces performing their lawful and necessary functions in that area and added, the determination of the future status of Formosa must await the restoration of security in the Pacific, a peace settlement with Japan, or consideration by the United Nations . (12) The Treaty of Peace with Japan done in San Francisco, California, on September 8, 1951, and signed by Japan along with 48 nations, remains the only legally binding agreement on Taiwan’s territorial disposition in force today and states that Japan renounces all right, title, and claim to Formosa and the Pescadores , but did not transfer sovereignty to any other party or country. (13) The Treaty of Peace between the ROC and Japan, done at Taipei, Taiwan, on April 28, 1952, recognizes Japan’s renunciation of its claims to Taiwan, but does not transfer sovereignty over the island to the ROC. (14) On February 3, 1961, the State Department’s Legal Adviser for Far Eastern Affairs, John J. Czyzak, produced a legal memo which states, the most tenable theory regarding the status of Formosa and the Pescadores is that sovereignty over the islands has not yet been finally determined … Because of differences among the Allied Powers as to who represented China, no agreement on the disposition of Formosa and the Pescadores could be reached in the Japanese Peace Treaty. That the San Francisco Peace Treaty was intended to divest Japan of its sovereignty over the islands without transferring that sovereignty to any other country is abundantly clear from the record. There does not appear to have occurred anything subsequent to the Peace Treaty which can be said to have effected a transfer of that sovereignty . (15) The People’s Republic of China (PRC) claims sovereignty over Taiwan as flowing from its sovereignty over China and PRC officials routinely state the PRC’s one China principle as, There is only one China in the world. The Government of the People’s Republic of China is the sole legal government representing the whole of China, and Taiwan is an inalienable part of China’s territory . (16) As the PRC has grown increasingly confident, it has increasingly sought to actively assert its one China principle over any other position on Taiwan’s legal status, including over the position of the United States, by waging a global campaign to persuade or force governments, international organizations, private corporations, and individuals to refer to Taiwan as a part of China. (17) Since the PRC won the Chinese civil war, it has sought to delegalize Taiwan and isolate it from participation in the international community and international organizations. (18) United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758 (1971) recognized the PRC as the rightful Government of China without defining its geographical boundaries or making mention of Taiwan under any name. However, due to PRC influence efforts, the United Nations has routinely and erroneously interpreted the resolution by referring to Taiwan as Taiwan, Province of China , presuming resolution of Taiwan’s status. (19) Taiwan has transitioned into a fully functioning democracy since 1996, when the island held its first direct Presidential election. (20) In contrast, the Chinese Communist Party has prevented the people of the PRC from developing a representative democracy. (21) An overwhelming majority of the people of Taiwan favor the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, in which Taiwan is not part of the PRC. (22) In the 3 Communiqués with the PRC issued in 1972, 1979, and 1982, the United States withheld recognition of the PRC’s territorial claims on Taiwan merely acknowledging, without affirming, the Chinese position that there is one China and Taiwan is part of China’s territory. (23) A State Department memorandum titled International Documents of a Non-Binding Character references the Shanghai Communiqué (1972) as a statement of policy, not an international legally binding commitment. (24) On January 1, 1979, the United States recognized the People’s Republic of China as the legitimate Government of China while leaving the country’s territory undefined. (25) On April 10, 1979, the Taiwan Relations Act ( Public Law 96–8 ) was enacted into law and established the policy of the United States to— (A) preserve and promote extensive, close, and friendly commercial, cultural, and other relations between the people of the United States and the people on Taiwan, as well as the people on the China mainland and all other peoples of the Western Pacific area ; (B) declare that peace and stability in the area are in the political, security, and economic interests of the United States, and are matters of international concern ; (C) make clear that the United States decision to establish diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China rests upon the expectation that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means ; (D) consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States ; (E) provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character ; and (F) maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan . (26) On July 14, 1982, President Ronald Reagan instructed his representative in Taiwan, American Institute in Taiwan Director James R. Lilley, to relay a set of assurances, which have become known as the Six Assurances, to Taiwan’s then-President Chiang Ching-kuo including the assurance that the United States has not altered its position regarding sovereignty over Taiwan . (27) In 2016, the House of Representatives and the Senate passed H. Con. Res. 88 and S. Con. Res. 38, respectively, which reaffirm the Taiwan Relations Act and the Six Assurances as cornerstones of the United States-Taiwan relations. (28) On authority of the President and without codified endorsement from Congress, the United States maintains a policy regarding the status of Taiwan, that is called its one China policy, under which the United States recognizes the People’s Republic of China as the Government of China and under which the United States takes the position that Taiwan’s legal status has not been determined and takes no position on the future status of Taiwan. (29) The one China policy of the United States is not the PRC’s one China principle. (30) The one China policy of the United States was originally developed in a Cold War context as an expedient to serve Cold War purposes and has not been updated to reflect changing conditions, the clear trend of history toward increasing democracy especially after the fall of the Soviet Union, or the democratic development of Taiwan’s polity. (31) The PRC’s one China principle does not reflect the objective state of affairs that the Government of Taiwan represents a self-governing democracy of 23,600,000 people. (32) Unlike other colonies held by imperial powers, and against the clear historical trend to grant colonies independence, the universal right to self-determination of the people of Taiwan have not been broadly considered by the international community. (33) Neither the PRC’s one China principle nor the one China policy of the United States reflect the objective state of affairs that the Government of Taiwan has attained a high degree of legitimacy and administers the territory under its control in the manner of a sovereign state and with the attributes of sovereignty such as exclusive legal jurisdiction, the printing of currency, the maintenance of armed forces, customs administration, and the conduct of foreign policy. (34) The United States is a party to the Convention on the Rights and Duties of States done at Montevideo, Uruguay, on December 26, 1933, and Taiwan meets all 4 criteria of statehood laid down therein, namely a permanent population, a defined territory, a government, and the capacity to enter into relations with other states. 3. Sense of Congress It is the sense of Congress that— (1) while the PRC claims sovereignty over Taiwan, the one China policy of the United States does not recognize that Taiwan is part of China; (2) persistent concerns regarding the impact on United States-China relations have prevented the United States from engaging in meaningful outreach to partners and allies with respect to the legal status of Taiwan, allowing the Chinese Communist Party to monopolize the information space and push its baseless one China principle; (3) the effectiveness of the Chinese Communist Party’s information campaigns regarding sovereignty over Taiwan jeopardizes peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait by preparing the information environment for the use of military force to annex Taiwan to the PRC; (4) the position of the United States on the legal status of sovereignty over Taiwan is often presented in a manner so nuanced as to be confusing in public discourse and prohibitive toward explaining the interests of the United States in Taiwan’s continued peaceful evolution; and (5) officials of the United States should seek to distinguish the one China policy from the PRC’s one China principle. 4. Policy It is the policy of the United States to— (1) make clear through public and private diplomacy the legal case for its position on Taiwan’s status; (2) call on the PRC Government to refrain from erroneously conflating the one China policy of the United States with its one China principle in public messaging; and (3) call on the United Nations to accurately interpret United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758 and not erroneously infer resolution of Taiwan’s status. 5. Legal opinion regarding Taiwan’s status (a) In general Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall issue a legal opinion detailing the reasoning supporting the position of the United States regarding the international status of sovereignty over Taiwan and its nonrecognition of the PRC’s territorial claim over Taiwan. (b) Summary In addition to the legal opinion described in subsection (a), the Secretary shall issue a memorandum that summarizes such opinion in not more than 1,200 words. (c) Consultation Before issuing the legal opinion described in subsection (a), the Secretary of State shall consult with the House Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on its contents. (d) Publication The documents listed in subsections (a) and (b) shall be published on a publicly available, Department of State internet website. 6. Diplomacy regarding Taiwan’s status (a) In general The Secretary of State, acting through subordinate officers as appropriate, shall conduct diplomatic efforts to inform and persuade countries of the legal reasoning supporting the position of the United States regarding— (1) Taiwan’s status; (2) the nonrecognition of the PRC’s territorial claim over Taiwan; (3) where appropriate, the PRC’s use of ethnonationalism to justify its claims to Taiwan; and (4) the meaning and history of United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758 and its subordinate resolutions throughout the system of the United Nations and the PRC’s efforts to distort such meaning and history. (b) Report (1) In general Not later than one year after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report describing the diplomatic efforts carried out pursuant to subsection (a). (2) Elements The report required by paragraph (1) shall include the following: (A) A description of the lines of effort used to conduct the diplomatic activities carried out pursuant to subsection (a). (B) A list of states contacted as part of such activities, with a special emphasis on countries in the Indo-Pacific. (C) An assessment of the effectiveness of such activities. (3) Form The report required by paragraph (1) shall be issued in a classified form, but may contain an unclassified annex, if appropriate. (4) Appropriate congressional committees defined In this subsection, the term appropriate congressional committees includes the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate. 7. Maps depicting Taiwan Not later than 15 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, acting through the Geographer of the Department of State, shall issue guidance to reconcile with United States policy guidelines on the procurement and production of maps that depict Taiwan by prohibiting such procurement and production of maps which depict Taiwan to be sovereign territory of the People’s Republic of China.