III 117th CONGRESS 2d Session S. RES. 611 IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES May 3, 2022 Mr. Menendez submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations RESOLUTION Expressing the sense of Congress that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) continues to make an invaluable contribution to the United States and international security, and recognizing that the United States will seek a successful Ninth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

Whereas the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) opened for signature 53 years ago on July 1, 1968, and entered into force in 1970; Whereas the NPT is a cornerstone of the global nuclear nonproliferation regime and has grown to include 191 States Parties; Whereas the United States remains committed to upholding the three pillars of the NPT, which include— (1) non-proliferation; (2) disarmament; and (3) the peaceful use of nuclear energy; Whereas Article III of the NPT obligates each nonnuclear weapon state to the NPT to conclude a Safeguards Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to verify treaty compliance, 174 of which are Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements crafted to detect the diversion of nuclear materials from peaceful to non-peaceful uses; Whereas the IAEA strengthens the global nuclear and security framework and helps promote international nuclear cooperation, and IAEA safeguards are a requirement for United States bilateral nuclear cooperation; Whereas the United States was the first country to conclude a safeguards agreement with the IAEA; Whereas the 2018 Department of Defense Nuclear Posture Review affirms, The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is a cornerstone of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. It plays a positive role in building consensus for non-proliferation and enhances international efforts to impose costs on those that would pursue nuclear weapons outside the Treaty. ; Whereas the success of the NPT has and will continue to depend upon the full implementation by all States Parties of the NPT's three mutually reinforcing pillars; Whereas, over the past half century, the United States has exhibited leadership in strengthening each of the NPT’s three pillars for the global good, including— (1) reducing its nuclear weapons stockpile by 88 percent from its maximum in 1967 of 31,225 in parallel with equally massive reductions of the Russian Federation’s stockpile through bilateral coordination; (2) cooperating with former Soviet States to facilitate the surrender of nuclear weapons on their soil after the fall of the Soviet Union; (3) providing voluntary contributions to the IAEA to promote peaceful nuclear activities exceeding $378,000,000 since 2010, including activities that help in the treatment of cancer and other life-saving applications; and (4) extending deterrence to United States allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Australia, which is an unmistakable demonstration of the United States commitment to collective security; Whereas the United States calls on the Islamic Republic of Iran to comply with its obligations under the NPT, which it ratified in 1970, abide by its 1974 comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA, and fully and permanently implement the Additional Protocol to its IAEA safeguards agreement in refraining to obtain or produce nuclear weapons; Whereas heightened geopolitical tensions in recent years have made cooperation on nonproliferation and arms control issues with the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China more challenging; Whereas recent harmful actions by the Government of the Russian Federation have led to a further a deterioration in bilateral relations with the United States, including Russia’s illegal occupation of Crimea, its 2014 invasion of Eastern Ukraine, and its 2022 invasion into all of Ukraine, its brazen interference in the 2016 and 2020 United States presidential elections, its violation of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, signed at Washington December 8, 1987, and entered into force June 1, 1988 (commonly referred to as the INF Treaty ), its use of chemical nerve agents in assassination attempts in the United Kingdom and against Aleksei A. Navalny, and its destabilizing actions in Syria; Whereas concerning actions by the People’s Republic of China have also strained bilateral relations with the United States, including a sustained build-up of nuclear forces, threatening military activities toward Taiwan, and the transfer by Chinese entities of proliferation and missile technology transfers to States such as the Islamic Republic of Iran, North Korea, Syria, and Pakistan; Whereas, despite these challenges, the United States remains committed to a stable strategic relationship with the Governments of the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China and especially in the field of nonproliferation and arms control; Whereas United States efforts to reduce dangers associated with nuclear arsenals through ambitious arms control agreements with both the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China would advance United States and global security, adding to the benefits of stability and transparency provided by existing agreements; Whereas President Joseph R. Biden’s decision to extend the New START Treaty between the United States and the Russian Federation for five years places verifiable legally binding limits on Russian ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers until February 5, 2026; Whereas the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC) continues to be the appropriate forum for the Parties to engage constructively on any New START Treaty implementation issues that arise; Whereas the Ninth Review Conference of the States Parties to the NPT will take place in August of 2022 in New York, having been rescheduled due to restrictions brought on by the COVID–19 pandemic; and Whereas the Ninth Review Conference presents an opportunity to refocus States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons on the danger that the spread of nuclear weapons poses, to discuss potential ways to deal with countries that continue to pose a nuclear security threat, and to find common solutions so as to further reduce the number of nuclear weapons in the world and enable increased use of nuclear energy while improving safeguards to ensure that illicit nuclear programs are not occurring: Now, therefore, be it

That it is the sense of Congress that— (1) the United States should continue to encourage all States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) to comply fully with the terms and the spirit of the Treaty; (2) the United States should— (A) maintain support for the IAEA through its assessed and voluntary contributions and seek to pay its dues at the beginning of the IAEA’s fiscal year and through advocating for all countries to enter into the Additional Protocols with the IAEA; (B) pursue a verifiable and comprehensive arms control agreement with the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China to capture strategic and nonstrategic nuclear weapons capabilities, which would enhance United States and global security by building upon other treaties, agreements, and transparency measures that reduce nuclear risk; (C) continue to encourage opportunities with other nuclear weapon-possessing States to reduce the reliance upon, role, and number of nuclear weapons in their national military strategies; and (D) advance critical United States security partnerships like the one among Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States (commonly known as AUKUS ) consistent with IAEA safeguards, to provide Australia with naval nuclear propulsion technology to better deter against military aggression in the Indo-Pacific; and (3) the President is encouraged to work with other States Parties to the NPT to strengthen compliance and enforcement mechanisms and develop collective responses in the United Nations Security Council and in any other relevant multilateral fora to any notification of withdrawal from the Treaty.