I 117th CONGRESS 2d Session H. R. 7372 IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AN ACT To amend the Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 2014 to require the President to establish a semiconductor supply chain working group in response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine and submit reports to Congress on potential future disruptions to the supply chain.

1. Short title This Act may be cited as the Protecting Semiconductor Supply Chain Materials from Authoritarians Act . 2. Amendments to the Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 2014 The Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 2014 ( 22 U.S.C. 8921 et seq. ) is amended— (1) by redesignating section 11 as section 13; and (2) by inserting after section 10 the following new sections: 11. Working Group on Semiconductor Supply Disruptions (a) In general Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this section, the President shall establish an interagency working group to address semiconductor supply chain issues caused by the Russia’s illegal and unprovoked attack on Ukraine. (b) Membership The interagency working group established pursuant to subsection (a) shall be comprised of the head, or designee of the head, of each of the following: (1) The Department of State. (2) The Department of Defense. (3) The Department of Commerce. (4) The Department of the Treasury. (5) The Office of the United States Trade Representative. (6) The Department of Interior. (7) The Department of Energy. (8) The Department of Homeland Security. (9) The Department of Labor. (10) Any other Federal department or agency the President determines appropriate. (c) Chair The Secretary of State shall serve as the chair of the working group established pursuant to subsection (a). 12. Reports on semiconductor supply chain disruptions (a) Report on impact of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this section, the Secretary of State shall submit to the committees listed in subsection (b) a report of the interagency working group that— (1) reviews and analyzes— (A) the impact of Russia’s unprovoked attack on Ukraine on the supply of palladium, neon gas, helium, and hexafluorobutadiene (C4F6); and (B) the impact, if any, on supply chains and the global economy; (2) recounts diplomatic efforts by the United States to work with other countries that mine, synthesize, or purify palladium, neon gas, helium, or hexafluorobutadiene (C4F6); (3) quantifies the actions resulting from these efforts to diversify sources of supply of these items; (4) sets forth steps the United States has taken to bolster its production or secure supply of palladium or other compounds and elements listed in paragraph (1)(A); (5) lists any other important elements, compounds, or products in the semiconductor supply chain that have been affected by Russia’s illegal attack on Ukraine; and (6) recommends any potential legislative steps that could be taken by Congress to further bolster the supply of elements, compounds, or products for the semiconductor supply chain that have been curtailed as a result of Russia’s actions. (b) Committees listed The committees listed in this subsection are— (1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House of Representatives; and (2) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate. (c) Annual report on potential future shocks to semiconductor supply chains (1) In general Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this section, and annually thereafter for 5 years, the Secretary of State shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a report of the interagency working group that— (A) outlines and plans for the most likely future geopolitical developments that could severely disrupt global semiconductor supply chains in ways that could harm the national security or economic interests of the United States; (B) forecasts the various potential impacts on the global supply chain for semiconductors, and products that use semiconductors, from the developments outlined pursuant to subparagraph (A), as well as the following contingencies— (i) an invasion of Taiwan or geopolitical instability or conflict in East Asia; (ii) a broader war or geopolitical instability in Europe; (iii) strategic competitors dominating parts of the supply chain and leveraging that dominance coercively; (iv) a future international health crisis; and (v) natural disasters or shortages of natural resources and raw materials; (C) describes the kind of continency plans that would be needed for the safe evacuation of individuals with deep scientific and technical knowledge of semiconductors and their supply chain from areas under risk from conflict or natural disaster; and (D) evaluates the current technical and supply chain work force expertise within the Federal government to carry out these assessments. .

Passed the House of Representatives April 27, 2022. Cheryl L. Johnson, Clerk.