II 117th CONGRESS 2d Session S. 4285 IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES May 19 (legislative day, May 17), 2022 Mr. Menendez (for himself, Mr. Cassidy , Mr. Kaine , Mr. Wicker , and Mr. Cardin ) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations A BILL To celebrate the 20th anniversary of the Inter-American Democratic Charter, to encourage governments in the Americas to reinforce their commitments to the principles enshrined in the Inter-American Democratic Charter, to reaffirm the role of free and fair elections as a cornerstone of democracy, to address the challenges posed by disinformation and misinformation in the Americas, and for other purposes.

1. Short title This Act may be cited as the Upholding the Inter-American Democratic Charter Act of 2022 . 2. Findings Congress makes the following findings: (1) The Inter-American Democratic Charter (referred to in this section as the Charter ), done at Lima September 11, 2001, established a set of shared democratic principles and norms among member states of the Organization of American States (referred to in this section as the OAS ), including commitments to the separation of powers and independence of the branches of government, pluralistic systems of political parties and organizations, and free, transparent, and fair elections. (2) Articles 1 and 2 of the Charter recognize, respectively, that [t]he peoples of the Americas have a right to democracy and their governments have an obligation to promote and defend it and that [t]he effective exercise of representative democracy is the basis for the rule of law and [constitutional order in OAS member states] . (3) Article 3 of the Charter asserts that access to and the exercise of power in accordance with the rule of law and the holding of periodic, free, and fair elections based on secret balloting and universal suffrage as an expression of the sovereignty of the people are essential elements of representative democracy. (4) Article 4 of the Charter states that “[t]ransparency in government activities, probity, responsible public administration on the part of governments” and “freedom of expression and of the press” are also essential for the democratic functioning of member states of the OAS. (5) Despite widespread advances in the consolidation of democratic governance in the Americas, there remain deep and concerning challenges facing democracies throughout Latin America and the Caribbean, including— (A) recurring incidents of significant electoral irregularities and manipulation; (B) the extension and elimination of presidential term limits; (C) the politicization of judicial systems and the expansion of executive powers and executive influence over the judiciary; (D) corruption and a lack of transparency, which hinders integral development in addition to weakening democratic institutions; and (E) misinformation and disinformation disseminated by foreign governments via traditional and digital media platforms that undermine faith in democratic institutions and elections. (6) Since 2016, there have been concerning levels of irregularities in several electoral processes throughout the Americas, including— (A) the 2016 and 2021 general elections in Nicaragua; (B) the 2017 general elections in Honduras; (C) the sham 2017 constituent assembly, 2018 presidential, and 2020 national legislative elections in Venezuela; (D) the 2019 presidential elections in Bolivia; and (E) the 2020 general and regional elections in Guyana. (7) The November 6, 2016, general elections in Nicaragua were characterized by severe democratic deficiencies, including widespread limitations on the participation of opposition candidates, and the November 7, 2021, general elections in Nicaragua were characterized by similar deficiencies, including the criminalization of the legitimate work of social organizations and political parties and the political imprisonment of potential opposition candidates, which consequently led the General Assembly of the OAS to pass a resolution approved by 25 countries declaring that the 2021 elections were not free, fair or transparent and have no democratic legitimacy . (8) Following the general elections in Honduras on November 26, 2017, the OAS Electoral Observation Mission reported that [t]he tight margin of the results, and the irregularities, errors and systemic problems that … surrounded [the] election [did] not allow the Mission to hold certainty about the results , leading Secretary General of the OAS Luis Almagro to subsequently issue a statement noting that the only possible way for the victor to be the people of Honduras is a new call for general elections . (9) The July 30, 2017, elections in Venezuela to establish a Constituent Assembly were widely derided as fraudulent by the international community, with Smartmatic, the company that supplied Venezuela’s voting machines, stating that the regime manipulated the results by more than 1,000,000 votes, and the May 20, 2018, presidential elections in Venezuela were similarly deemed to be fraudulent and illegitimate, leading the OAS to invoke the Charter and declare that the elections did not comply with international standards, permit the participation of all political actors, or satisfy conditions necessary to be considered a free, fair, transparent, and democratic process. (10) The Final Report of the OAS Electoral Observation Mission on the October 20, 2019, general election in Bolivia, Analysis of Electoral Integrity General Elections in the Plurinational State of Bolivia , found widespread and conclusive evidence of manipulation through secret computer servers with the capacity to modify the results and tally sheets, which made it impossible for the Mission to have confidence in the election results. (11) In the aftermath of the 2020 general elections in Guyana, international observers from the OAS and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) unanimously agreed that there was no credible result from Guyana’s general and regional elections held on March 2, 2020, which were marked by flagrant tabulation irregularities . (12) Notwithstanding challenges in the region, several countries have held free and fair elections for heads of state since 2020, including the countries of Belize, Chile, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Honduras, Peru, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Trinidad and Tobago, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, which serve as examples for other countries in the region on conducting democratic electoral processes. (13) Transparency International’s seminal 2021 report indicates that corruption, bolstered by widespread impunity and attacks against the independence of the press and the judiciary, remains a significant challenge to human rights and democratic governance in the Americas, with the region making insufficient progress in combating corruption between 2011 and 2021. (14) Additional steps are needed to strengthen confidence in a free press in Latin America, given that a study from Vanderbilt University in 2018 shows that less than 1/2 of Latin Americans trust the press, down from 2/3 in 2004. (15) The growing challenges of disinformation, misinformation, and digital election interference across the Americas, and their potential to sow social discord and lower public trust in democratic institutions, pose significant risks to democratic governance and the integrity of future elections. 3. Sense of Congress It is the sense of Congress that— (1) the 20th anniversary of the Inter-American Democratic Charter is an important hallmark in inter-American relations, and democracies in the Western Hemisphere should continue to uphold the democratic electoral norms and standards, principles, and commitments enshrined in the Charter; (2) member states of the Organization of American States should continuously work to strengthen democratic institutions and practices, as well as economic and political institutions that enable integral development, including by promoting transparency and combating corruption; (3) free, fair, and transparent elections are the foundation of representative democracy in the Americas; (4) the separation of powers and the defense of human rights, freedom of expression, and freedom of the press remain fundamental democratic principles in the Americas that must be respected; (5) member states of the Organization of American States should— (A) strengthen processes for holding free, fair, and transparent elections; (B) defend the right of all of their citizens to peacefully assemble, campaign, participate, and vote in democratic elections; and (C) actively promote the dissemination of fact-based public information while cooperating with private media to identify and discourage the propagation of misinformation and disinformation surrounding civic life; and (6) the Secretary of State should work with the Organization of American States and member states of the Organization of American States— (A) to strengthen the integrity of electoral processes in the Americas, including by modernizing electoral observation methodologies to better address the challenges posed by digital election interference; (B) to promote quality independent journalism and media while strengthening institutional capacity in the Americas to monitor and address disinformation and misinformation and the threats they pose to democratic governance, especially by the Russian Federation, the People’s Republic of China, and Iran, as well as Cuba and the regime of Nicolas Maduro in Venezuela; (C) to address the challenges posed to democratic governance and multilateral institutions in the Americas by the activities of non-democratic, nonmember states of the Organization of American States, including the Russian Federation, the People’s Republic of China, Iran, and Cuba; (D) to augment efforts to combat corruption and organized criminal activity, including by using digital tools to increase transparency in public administration, tax collection, and customs management; (E) to support the modernization of judicial systems critical to combating corruption in the Americas and efforts to strengthen the transparency, integrity, and independence of those systems; (F) to advance initiatives to strengthen the harmonization of regulatory mechanisms to facilitate increased investment and digital governance throughout the Americas; and (G) to uphold the positive advances that member states of the Organization of American States have made to strengthen the integrity of electoral processes, promote free and independent journalism, combat corruption, and modernize judicial systems, and to encourage those member states to share their experience with other member states of the Organization of American States through formal and informal mechanisms, including through the forum for democratically elected national legislatures of members states called for in section 4(a)(2) of the Organization of American States Legislative Engagement Act of 2020 ( 22 U.S.C. 290q note; Public Law 116–343 ). 4. Statement of policy It shall be the policy of the United States— (1) to promote continued adherence to the democratic principles and norms of the Inter-American Democratic Charter; and (2) to advance diplomatic initiatives in coordination with the Organization of American States and its member states to address threats to the integrity of the Inter-American Democratic Charter and to democratic institutions in the Americas. 5. Strategy for strengthening the Inter-American Democratic Charter (a) Strategy (1) In general The Secretary of State shall develop and implement a multi-year strategy to uphold and strengthen the Inter-American Democratic Charter. (2) Elements The strategy required by paragraph (1) shall include— (A) developing diplomatic initiatives to highlight past successes of the Inter-American Democratic Charter and its ongoing relevance; (B) documenting threats to democratic governance in the Western Hemisphere, including efforts to undermine civil society, the rule of law, free and fair elections, presidential term limits, or the separation of powers, and convening diplomatic forums to review and address those threats; (C) developing and implementing the plans required by sections 6, 7, and 8; and (D) fully implementing provisions of the Organization of American States Legislative Engagement Act of 2020 ( 22 U.S.C. 290q note; Public Law 116–343 ) to advance efforts to enhance the participation of democratically elected national legislatures in the Organization of American States, including— (i) promoting involvement by those legislatures in activities that advance the principles of the Inter-American Democratic Charter and the core values of the Organization of American States, as described in section 4(a)(1) of that Act; (ii) creating and supporting an annual forum to discuss issues of hemispheric importance, including corruption, as described in section 4(a)(2) of that Act; and (iii) strengthening the ability of those legislatures to make presentations, contribute information, and provide expert advice to entities of the Organization of American States, as described in section 4(a)(3) of that Act. (b) Annual report Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the Secretary of State shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives a report describing in detail— (1) the strategy required by subsection (a)(1) and efforts to implement the strategy, including the plans required by sections 6, 7, and 8 and efforts to implement the plans; (2) progress made by the United States Government toward achieving the goals of the strategy of upholding and strengthening the Inter-American Democratic Charter; (3) challenges to efforts by the United States Government and the Organization of American States to uphold and strengthen the Inter-American Democratic Charter; and (4) progress made in implementing the Organization of American States Revitalization and Reform Act of 2013 ( Public Law 113–41 ; 127 Stat. 548) and the Organization of American States Legislative Engagement Act of 2020 ( 22 U.S.C. 290q note; Public Law 116–343 ). 6. Strengthening the integrity of electoral processes in the Americas (a) In general As part of the strategy required by section 5(a)(1), the Secretary of State shall develop and implement a plan for strengthening the integrity of electoral processes in the Americas. (b) Elements The plan required by subsection (a) shall include— (1) an assessment of emerging challenges and risks to democratic elections in the Americas, including the unique threats posed by digital election interference; and (2) initiatives, in coordination with the Organization of American States and member states of the Organization of American States— (A) to ensure the integrity of elections, preserve the credibility and objectivity of electoral observation missions of the Organization of American States, and strengthen the technical capacity of those missions to investigate electoral irregularities in electoral processes; and (B) to improve election observation methodologies of the Organization of American States and strengthen the training provided to electoral observation missions of the Organization of American States to effectively monitor, report, and address the emerging threat of digital election interference. 7. Countering disinformation and misinformation in the Americas (a) Sense of Congress It is the sense of Congress that Congress supports— (1) efforts by the Secretary General of the Organization of American States to strengthen public interest media on traditional and digital media platforms, promote investigative journalism, fortify the integrity of media environments, and counter disinformation and misinformation across the Americas; and (2) plans by the Secretary General of the Organization of American States to announce the creation of the Center for Media Integrity of the Americas at the Ninth Summit of the Americas. (b) In general As part of the strategy required by section 5(a)(1), the Secretary of State shall develop and implement a plan for countering the spread and amplification of disinformation and misinformation in the Americas and strengthening vulnerable information environments. (c) Elements The plan required by subsection (b) shall include— (1) an assessment of— (A) the nature and prevalence of disinformation and misinformation activities in traditional, digital, and social media in the Americas, including— (i) the major intra-regional and extra-regional actors involved in spreading or amplifying disinformation and misinformation; (ii) the tactics those actors use; (iii) the major narratives those actors disseminate; and (iv) the extent to which the activities involve or are being coordinated by state entities or government officials; (B) the vulnerability of information environments within the Americas; (C) which countries are most targeted by campaigns to spread and amplify disinformation and misinformation and the effectiveness of those campaigns; and (D) the nature and magnitude of the threats posed by disinformation and misinformation activities to democratic governance, human rights, and other United States interests; and (2) efforts, including the multilateral diplomacy described in subsection (d), in coordination with the Organization of American States and member states of the Organization of American States— (A) to monitor and share information about disinformation and misinformation activities and the effects of those activities; (B) to convene regional summits, forums, and multi-stakeholder initiatives with engagement from governments, technology companies, media organizations, academia, and civil society groups to address the challenges posed by disinformation and misinformation and other related issues, including data privacy, shared cybersecurity standards, and platform interoperability; (C) to develop a regional code of best practices and other joint solutions to address disinformation and misinformation, including rapid alert systems and agreements on other related issues; (D) to strengthen the capacity of the Organization of American States, member states of the Organization of American States, and independent media and civil society groups to counter disinformation and misinformation and address vulnerable information environments, including by providing support for media and digital literacy, independent journalism, and fact-checking initiatives; and (E) to support and promote the creation of public interest media and investigative journalism to provide accurate, objective, and reliable local news. (d) Multilateral diplomacy The Secretary of State, acting through the United States Permanent Representative to the Organization of American States, shall use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States— (1) to establish a working group at the Organization of American States to monitor the deleterious effects that disinformation and misinformation pose to democratic governance and human rights and develop regional approaches to address those effects; and (2) to advance a resolution of the Organization of American States on condemning and countering disinformation and misinformation in the Americas. (e) Resources The Secretary of State, acting through the United States Mission to the Organization of American States, should use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States to support increased attention and resources for the General Secretariat of the Organization of American States to develop efforts to address the threat posed by disinformation and misinformation to democratic governance and human rights, including— (1) by increasing the proportion of United States voluntary contributions designated for addressing that threat; and (2) by encouraging similar efforts by other member states of the Organization of American States. 8. Addressing additional challenges to democratic governance in the Americas (a) In general As part of the strategy required by section 5(a)(1), the Secretary of State shall develop and implement a plan for addressing threats to democratic governance posed by— (1) corruption and criminality; and (2) the malign activities of nondemocratic, nonmember states of the Organization of American States, including the People’s Republic of China, the Russian Federation, Iran, and Cuba. (b) Elements The plan required by subsection (a) shall include— (1) an assessment of— (A) the major threats from, and vulnerabilities to, corruption and criminality in the Americas; and (B) how the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation have sought to exploit regional multilateral institutions to advance their goals and undermine democratic governance; and (2) efforts by the Secretary of State— (A) to propose and develop, in coordination with regional multilateral institutions, digital governance programs— (i) to strengthen transparency in public administration, tax collection, and customs management; and (ii) to reduce corruption; and (B) to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States— (i) to diminish the influence of the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation in regional multilateral institutions and call attention to how those states undermine the principles of the Inter-American Democratic Charter; and (ii) to support the creation of a special rapporteur on anti-corruption at the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights with the mandate to monitor threats from, and vulnerabilities to, corruption among member states of the Organization of American States and promote the adoption of measures to address such threats, including minimum standards for transparency and access to public records. 9. Sunset This Act shall terminate on the date that is 10 years after the date of the enactment of this Act.