tool to query hostnames & devicenames - Page 1
Forum section: electronics / general

author: legacy
author_rank: Super Contributor
timestamp: January 17, 2019, 11:36:52 am
content: so we have a lot of devices and several hosts distributed around two floors in a building (our new "temporary campus lab"), with both IP on fiber channel and IP on copper wires, a lot of IPs and MACs, and it's really a mess when you have to understand what is behind an IP.besides, guys usually behave like if it was theCCC(computer chaos campus), they come, sit here or there, plug/unplug cables and sometimes change the hostname, or the IP of a host (portable workstation or laptop), and the host table needs to be updated, otherwise, you are really lost.as a first solution, we (at DTB) have developed a tiny-toy-toolCode:# ls-hostnames 192.168.1.x192.168.1.81 open_port[]={ 21/ftp 22/ssh 80/http } @{PPC32,AppleMacMini,Debian/Linux}192.168.1.50 open_port[]={ 53/? 80/http }?@{?}192.168.1.15 open_port[]={ 22/ssh 25/hostname } kanojo@{PPC32,AppleMDD,Gentoo/Linux}192.168.1.21 open_port[]={ 22/ssh 25/hostname 80/http } komakino@{i686,IBMX61S,Fedora/Linux}192.168.1.20 open_port[]={ 22/ssh 25/hostname } monik@{HPPA2,C8000,Gentoo/Linux}192.168.1.11 open_port[]={ 22/ssh 25/hostname 80/http } akita@{ARMPXA,ZaurusC1K,Gentoo/Linux}This tool consists of a server and a client.The server needs to be installed on each machine on the subnet (so we kindly ask guys to compile and install it before they enter the lab), and simply replies with its hostname on port 25.The client "ls-hostnames" queries IPs for this, but it also reports all the open ports it finds.OK, port 25 was not a good choice because it's usually used for SMTP Mail Transfer. We used it temporarily because it was found open and unused so firewalls let it go.--A friend suggested that even net-analyzer/nmap *might* report the hostname if it's available from any service that is listeningCode:nmap -A -p 20-81 192.168.1.*Code:Nmap scan report for 192.168.1.15Host is up (0.000033s latency).Not shown: 60 closed portsPORT STATE SERVICE VERSION22/tcp open ssh OpenSSH 5.8p1 (protocol 2.0; HPN-SSH patch 13v10)| ssh-hostkey:| 1024 75:c0:5f:79:2a:4e:39:56:ac:02:f6:f5:cb:a5:48:0e (DSA)| 2048 f6:26:24:6f:d4:6a:2a:aa:ee:4f:44:d8:f1:fb:67:0f (RSA)|_ 256 c2:1b:90:58:74:25:e7:ce:0c:c3:40:d1:be:22:a2:67 (ECDSA)25/tcp open smtp?| fingerprint-strings:| NULL:| kanojo|_ \xb7it *might* report ... if any service nmap finds shows it in the banner then it'll get it from that it also guesses the OS based on responses to its probes, so with nmap you're not always guaranteed to get a hostname.But you can get all the open ports!at the end of the day, a dude *suggested* the use of SNMP!SNMP is ubiquitous and can be used to monitor many aspects of the host. Nearly every networked device including switches, routers, and access points support it, not just computers.Code:net-analyzer/net-snmpHomepage: http://net-snmp.sourceforge.net/Description: Software for generating and retrieving SNMP dataThis looks perfect to also monitor and get information from switches and routers.What do you think, guys?

author: legacy
author_rank: Super Contributor
timestamp: January 17, 2019, 12:37:14 pm
content: some guys have brought their 3d printers and they have a Linux SBC aboard so they need an RJ45 plug and an IP.Other guys do not have Linux SBC but rather embedded boards running sort of OS with a TCP/IP stack for remote controlling the printing engine and to load the gcode source.These devices need to be recognized and mapped

author: cv007
author_rank: Frequent Contributor
timestamp: January 17, 2019, 02:10:22 pm
content: I don't know if this will do what you want, and will be Windows only, but when looking for a small utility the first place to check is Nirsoft.netThey have a wireless network viewer that can also be used for a lan.http://nirsoft.net/utils/wireless_network_watcher.html

author: PA0PBZ
author_rank: Super Contributor
timestamp: January 17, 2019, 02:22:06 pm
content: How many devices are we talking about? The free version of Lansweeper can do up to 100 devices.

author: legacy
author_rank: Super Contributor
timestamp: January 17, 2019, 02:27:48 pm
content: Quote from: PA0PBZ on January 17, 2019, 02:22:06 pmumm, something between 100 and 200 units connected.

author: legacy
author_rank: Super Contributor
timestamp: January 17, 2019, 02:31:09 pm
content: Quote from: cv007 on January 17, 2019, 02:10:22 pmwe have a pretty brand new Geode (AMD-x86@500Mhz) SBC board able to run WindowsXP/Embedded(thanks to ... emm emm .... our sponsor (1))(1) borrowed without any formal authorization from the near university lab. I will give it back to them once this even is concluded.edit:I really wonder which kind of software and solution is used in events like the VCF East, which should have thousands of IPs connected

author: Nominal Animal
author_rank: Super Contributor
timestamp: January 18, 2019, 04:29:28 am
content: Quote from: legacy on January 17, 2019, 02:31:09 pmThe networks I've set up use switch port and MAC based VLANs to divide the network into zones, with DHCP servers logging MAC addresses and IP address assignments. You can write helper scripts to map MAC addresses to machines (noting that youcanspoof a MAC address as easily as IP addresses), even at specific times in the recent past (for forensics; log size limits do apply). That way, on a server, you can run a command that lists connected machines and their IP addresses, right now or at any time within dedicated logs; any unknown devices connected (and given access to the "guest" VLAN), and any suspicious devices (based on e.g. network traffic).Essentially, when a specific MAC address is connected to a specific port on a specific switch, you allow it a specific IP address. It does not mean you trust it to be a specific machine; it is just the working assumption for all non-privileged services.As I use Linux for this, I typically use what the other admins are most familiar with, but I do like dnsmasq. The rest of the stuff is homebrew, because it depends so much on the particular lab needs.(As an example, I have an Apache server configuration and administration scheme that has been in active use for fifteen years, optimized for multiple administrators who tend to change; and both common and separate projects, all separately managed. The last time I bothered to update my public documentation of it was in 2007, though; last updates I've done are from Apache 2.4 from four years back. It too has a large human component, mainly to force the server admin to think what they wish to enable, rather than just installing a package with default configuration from public repos. Involves relocating the configuration files as well.)In a typical lab, when a new machine is added, its MAC is recorded along with machine info. Connecting to any standard LAN socket always gives it the same IP address and name (via DHCP). If a machine needs a fixed IP address, that address is explicitly specified in the DHCP configuration, so it does not matter whether the machine is configured to use DHCP or a fixed IP address, because the IP always ends up the same anyway.Dedicated machines, like experiments (say, embedded machines and such) and connected to dedicated ports on a switch, and traffic only flows via that link if the machine has a specific MAC. The machines themselves are in locked cabinets, so unauthorized persons like visiting students cannot tamper with them.The most important security feature is trust. When someone is allowed access, the person is asked to thoroughly read and agree to the security policies, but that's just the bureaucratic part. The human part is more important. That involves explaining that things work this easy because we trust each other to uphold the rules, so that more draconian rules and technical limitations are not needed. That these are the tools we must take care of, so they can do the work we want them to do. If we are selfish, everyone else will become selfish too, stricter rules will have to be implemented, and all work will be that much harder to do.This works. If you've ever been a sysadmin yourself, you'll notice how most will automatically look away when others are typing in their passwords, even when they have the technical ability to change their passwords to anything they want, and back again; or perform any action as that specific user. That's the human part I'm talking about. Do not trust people who do not develop such mannerisms; they do not operate under the sort of implict human trust based rules I have described above.

author: legacy
author_rank: Super Contributor
timestamp: January 18, 2019, 06:45:40 am
content: Thanks! That looks interesting.Have you also used net-SNMP?

author: Nominal Animal
author_rank: Super Contributor
timestamp: January 18, 2019, 08:09:36 am
content: Quote from: legacy on January 18, 2019, 06:45:40 amThe command-line utilities, for the homebrew scripts. I've only managed lab-internal switches, and whatever I or my friends or family have at home.(Way back in 1999, I had a Linux server acting as a NAT, DHCP, and HTTP proxy, with another serving as a file and print server for three dozen or so Macs and Windows machines; Mars NWE, Netatalk, and Samba on the same volumes. File locking didn't always work right, but then most applications didn't even try to. Even later on, you couldn't have two different users editing a different part of the same site stored on a shared volume in Frontpage or Dreamweaver. Silly applications...)The last network setup for a lab environment I did was way back in 2004; since then, I've worked mostly in HPC cluster setups and such.My main annoyance right now is that there are no affordable home wireless routers with both 2.4 and 5 GHz support in OpenWRT/Lede; I've an Asus RT-AC51U, and latest kernels do have the drivers needed, but OpenWRT is lagging. I have some home automation stuff, like an Odroid HC1 mini file server, I'd like to configure and play with. So I am somewhat up to date on the subject in theory (as to how to set up a local network with embedded machines, trusted users, and untrusted users, I mean); the major holes in my knowledge is what existing software projects one could use and adapt for this kind of stuff.(I do have lots of anecdotal stuff from colleagues still doing this sort of stuff, especially wrt. remote maintenance and so on. I did, for example, create an internal Debian package that allows Uni users to register themselves as local users on a laptop two or three years ago, by logging in via Eduroam (provided by the University via WiFi), and verifying and storing the details (on both the user and the laptop) on a server; then creating the local user account with info matching their AD/LDAP records, and removing the package. It was used to register maybe a hundred laptops, until a more robust solution was done using the Uni-maintained Linux distribution, Cubbli, in the last year or two. I like the Linux-IT team at Uni of H here, and occasionally help out just to keep my edge.)Do note that just because I said that trusting humans is the first, most important step, does not mean it ends there. I like to go all-out paranoid, not trusting even myself. (Then again, right now I have 89 IP addresses banned by my fail2ban filters on my laptop, because they have attempted to access the machines various services during the last 24 hours or so, so I'd say that is just a healthy approach.) It seems that when I describe the paranoid cases couched in personal experiences and anecdotes saving my butt, they are much more palatable to others. Not always, and not accepted nearly as often as I'd prefer, but it seems like a good approach in general.Trust, but verify.On servers, I would have liked to implement a transparent configuration file tracker, which uses the process tree to track individual administrators (even acrosssudo su -, which I heavily discourage for forensics reasons), and records the changes on a separate machine inaccessible to most admins. (I am highly irritated by intelligent people making stupid errors -- I cannot help but expect more of them, even though I have no issues dealing with people with less skills --, and I would have liked that to do some one-on-one discussions on silly, lazy mistakes and carelessness and trying to hide the trails to escape personal blame among colleagues. Bureaucrats do not need to know, unless users' information is misused. Just QC and making admins behave sensibly, really.)If you want to talk about actual solutions, maybe need help with some maintenance/logging/utility scripts, I'm always happy to help make Linux systems more robust; feel free to email me for example. (My email should be listed in my profile, but if not, you can see ithere.)

author: legacy
author_rank: Super Contributor
timestamp: January 18, 2019, 08:53:35 am
content: using SNMP requires at least one agent, but it provides the information we needhostnameCode:snmpget -v 1 -c my -mALL 192.168.1.24 sysName.0Code:SNMPv2-MIB::sysName.0 = STRING: orangecubeOS descriptionCode:snmpget -v 1 -c my -mALL 192.168.1.24 sysDescr.0Code:SNMPv2-MIB::sysDescr.0 = STRING: Linux orangecube 2.6.39-flash-eating-bats-II-gentoo-ia32-t23 #53 PREEMPT Tue Jul 3 00:05:33 CEST 2018 i686umm, this is required to be implemented also inside embedded devices running RTOSes, but it's not a problem since SNMP can be configured to use UDP/IP, and the version1 of the protocol is enough for our needs.(routers will only use version3 with authentication)

author: westfw
author_rank: Super Contributor
timestamp: January 18, 2019, 09:10:09 am
content: QuoteHah hah. SNMP is pretty piggy. ASN.1 is obnoxious, and the supposedly-required MIBs (the data that SNMP reads) are large and annoyingly organized (with ordering of things that don't need to be ordered.)At least, this was the case last time I paid any attention. Which was quite a long time ago, and perhaps based on standards of computational power that are long obsolete.

author: Nominal Animal
author_rank: Super Contributor
timestamp: January 18, 2019, 09:48:59 am
content: If I were to implement an identifying service, I'd write a tiny little daemon in C one could use on both workstations and embedded devices.At the core, I'd probably useEd25519, with two public-private key pairs for each client. The server signs each request with that particular clients public key (with the plaintext including both sender and receiver IP addresses, and the requests plaintext limited to max. 384 bytes, to allow up to 128 bytes (1024 bits) for the signature while keeping packet payload under 512 bytes), and the client signs each request with another public key, the private part of which the server already knows. I'd keep the data itself unencrypted; it makes traffic analysis and forensics easier, and the information transferred is intended to be public, but hard to fake.Because one part of each key is on the client, and the other part on the server, with no machine having both parts, it is easier to keep the whole secure.(I don't like the idea of using the same key for messages flowing both ways, with the server using the A part of the key part, and the client using the B part. I'm no cryptologist, but when that potential risk is avoided by using a separate key pair per direction, I'd rather do that.)For RTOS devices, I'd probably have a small embedded local Linux machine as a firewall/gateway to its own LAN, in a secured cabinet like I said earlier. That way, you can do monitoring and control via that Linux machine, and do access control to the RTOS devices via e.g. SSH tunneling (so you only get access, if you have SSH access to that frontend Linux machine).In particular, if you want real-time monitoring and control, you can then use USB-connected microcontrollers rather than full-blown RTOS devices. That's what I am doing in one experiment, that requires some temperature and pressure sensors, actually. The idea is that you design the control loop to be contained in the microcontroller, so that any delay in the USB communications is irrelevant; and you only pass status/state information and new control parameters via USB.

author: legacy
author_rank: Super Contributor
timestamp: January 18, 2019, 10:33:26 am
content: Quote from: Nominal Animal on January 18, 2019, 09:48:59 amwe already have one, and it's in working condition, but since we got *suggested* not to be NIH, I am looking around for already implemented solutions.Quotethe funniest sentence "RTOS devices are leftpad, which is the ultimate antithesis to NIH" (quote)

author: Nominal Animal
author_rank: Super Contributor
timestamp: January 18, 2019, 11:13:30 am
content: Quote from: legacy on January 18, 2019, 10:33:26 amNone of the existing ones I know of are worth using, if you care about misuse. The one you have you could write in Bash, and anyone could spoof in minutes.Quote from: legacy on January 18, 2019, 10:33:26 amNo, for example Apache and Nginx are perfectly good solutions, as is dnsmasq, if configured properly. That should be proof enough that I do not suffer from NIH as you seem to imply.I am only saying that if I were you, I'd approach the problem from a different direction. The first level of security would be human; the second level would be network configuration based on VLANs and MAC addresses; and the third level, if deemed appropriate, like you seem to have deemed it, would be a small service using elliptic curve cryptography (that I'd publish under GPL and push to Debian if accepted), because no such thing exists yet, but might be useful in lab-type environments requiring lightweight network device authentication. Fourth level, involving remote access by specific admins to specific devices, would be via key-based SSH, with the machines having the private keys severely restricted and under lock and key and not on, say, sysadmins workstations. If they need access, they can login to the secure machine and do the remoteing from there. Leaves a traceable log that way, too.The transparent configuration file trackers do not exist yet on Linux either, btw. When I researched the approach,fanotifywas not available yet, so the only alternative approaches were file leases and the audit subsystem. Just because I am just an anonymous voice on a message board does not mean I do not know exactly what I'm talking about.

author: legacy
author_rank: Super Contributor
timestamp: January 18, 2019, 12:07:55 pm
content: Quote from: Nominal Animal on January 18, 2019, 11:13:30 amhow complex is it? any example around?

author: rhb
author_rank: Super Contributor
timestamp: January 18, 2019, 12:59:40 pm
content: https://www.amazon.com/Implementing-Elliptic-Cryptography-Michael-Rosing/dp/1884777694

author: Nominal Animal
author_rank: Super Contributor
timestamp: January 18, 2019, 01:04:14 pm
content: Quote from: legacy on January 18, 2019, 12:07:55 pmSeeEd25519and its exampleimplementations; the Wikipedia article onElliptic curve cryptographyfor general background, and the specific article onEd25519. The last one includes links to other implementations of it.

author: legacy
author_rank: Super Contributor
timestamp: January 18, 2019, 02:35:49 pm
content: Quote from: westfw on January 18, 2019, 09:10:09 amperhaps was v1 or v2?with v3 there are new fixes

author: legacy
author_rank: Super Contributor
timestamp: January 18, 2019, 03:26:14 pm
content: 1 year ago I implemented BlowFish in HDL (symmetric cryptography, weak), but it hasn't yet implemented in hardware, only on the HDL simulator (ModelSim) and a few modules are not complete.I still have to implement something asymmetric in C

author: Nominal Animal
author_rank: Super Contributor
timestamp: January 18, 2019, 04:13:00 pm
content: Quote from: legacy on January 18, 2019, 03:26:14 pmI do recommend the Ed25519 for digital signatures. To implement it, you need SHA512 andCurve25519elliptic curve stuff. I haven't implemented it myself, but that's what I'd go for anything asymmetric. DJB'sreference Curve25519 implementationis an excellent point to start with.

author: CJay
author_rank: Super Contributor
timestamp: January 18, 2019, 04:34:01 pm
content: I mght have missed the point spectacularly but what's wrong with nmap?

author: legacy
author_rank: Super Contributor
timestamp: January 18, 2019, 04:47:31 pm
content: Quote from: CJay on January 18, 2019, 04:34:01 pmQuoteour initial need was mapping the IP to the hostname of each remote device on a sublan.

author: CJay
author_rank: Super Contributor
timestamp: January 18, 2019, 04:56:03 pm
content: Where a hostname was available (I.E. a device had one) I've never seen it fail to report it, it can take a little command line fu (which I'm sure you have) but it has always been reliable for me.

author: legacy
author_rank: Super Contributor
timestamp: January 18, 2019, 05:50:19 pm
content: Quote from: CJay on January 18, 2019, 04:56:03 pmIndeed, whenever it's available, e.g. CISCO routers implement SNMP so they can reply, other device *might* not have anything implemented. One of the points was exactly this. It's not a common implemented service on Linux, neither what you find on embedded devices.Besides, nmap looks 10X slower than our tool at mapping a sublan; the reason is simple: our tool is focused on a simpler purpose with a small protocol that only transports the information we need, so it's also better than SNMP.Anyway, we have to rethink about the foundations of this idea concerning security and organization.

author: Gribo
author_rank: Frequent Contributor
timestamp: January 18, 2019, 07:16:29 pm
content: Did you try Fing?

author: legacy
author_rank: Super Contributor
timestamp: January 18, 2019, 11:46:34 pm
content: With Fing you can create an inventory of your devices and receive alerts when new devices have joined your campus network since your last scan; but in order to achieve it, you also need to set up an account.This gives us an idea: we *might* ask our visitors to create an account when they take their ticket at the reception, so we can then monitor their machines, with a perfect inventory of IP, os, machine description, etc, so, during periodical checks, all the machines not on the list will be easy to be labelled as "suspicious".As far as I have understood, without creating a Digital Device Inventory, Fing can only try IP addresses in batches, and relies on the underlying Linux kernel to buffer ARP replies; but this is basically whatnmap -sn(ping scan flag) does.

author: legacy
author_rank: Super Contributor
timestamp: January 19, 2019, 12:03:01 am
content: In the meanwhile, I am assembling a couple of armored cabinets for routers, and precious servers and weird stuff

author: Nominal Animal
author_rank: Super Contributor
timestamp: January 19, 2019, 03:42:26 am
content: Quote from: legacy on January 18, 2019, 11:46:34 pmYou definitely need the inventory, in some form of another.You could do what e.g. coffee shops and such do, and redirect all traffic from unknown devices to a registration page, where they type in their information, and a short key they obtain from any authorized lab worker. (The keys might be sorted in "untrusted visitor, external web access only" and "student"; "three hours", "today", "this week"; and preprinted and put in some jar not trivially accessible to guests. Anything else the admin handles.)Again, this is just the combined two first steps in the security scheme. The unknown device users have to talk to a human to get a key, and the humans have very simple and friendly criteria how to behave. Any lab worker can hand off those "guest" keys for a day, they just need to help the guest fill in the web form. (That is to ensure the guests won't just fill in asdfgfgfds. It is easy to describe/frame it as "courtesy and helping" instead of "we're suspicious of you". Trust but verify.)Quote from: legacy on January 19, 2019, 12:03:01 amStandard racks, with doors you can close and lock on all sides (even though you can pick the lock using a twig), should suffice if in-campus.For wireless routers, don't bother; just have a piece of security cable tied to keep it in place if human reachable, so it is not just trivially swipable. (Same applies to video projectors and such, by the way.)All access problems I've observed have been caused by students letting in complete strangers through locked doors (naïve, don't want to look prejudiced), or by personnel or students with an obvious drug/gambling/kleptomania problem looking for wallets to swipe. Again, the first step is making it look like it is not worth the effort of trying to obtain access without permission. So, not so much making it look impossible, just make it look too noisy and too obvious trying to break them.If you make security practices cumbersome, people will just work around it. It is important to try and make it easier to do it right, than bypass it. This is the major reason why I tend to implement home-brew scripts for monitoring and such, not NIH. There just aren't modular security component services that one could combine to fit very different needs; they all want to be the overarching framework that stuff happens under. (Yes, I am one of those who are disgusted by the awful design and implementation of the pile of crap called systemd. I don't like the approach at all.)Again, if I were to write the identifying service, I'd make it trivial to install and configure, even for embedded devices; and as simple as humanly possible. Have it just do that one thing, reliably identify the machine based on Ethernet/WiFi queries. The server side would similarly have to be modular.I very definitely subscribe toUnix philosophyand theKISS principle. I do choose the paranoid approach and overengineer the code I write, but I don't see any contradiction or real NIH symptoms in that.

author: legacy
author_rank: Super Contributor
timestamp: January 19, 2019, 11:37:45 am
content: Quote from: Nominal Animal on January 19, 2019, 03:42:26 amyeah, I meant this with humor. I bought two-second-hand racks, they arrived without doors, so I bought also the doors, and now we are assembling them.We also have a couple of HP-RP3440 rack-machines. They perfectly fit the rack

author: dmills
author_rank: Super Contributor
timestamp: January 19, 2019, 09:15:47 pm
content: Not everything even has the notion of a hostname....I know some of our kit does not, but everything on an IP network has the notion of a MAC address, and the ARP tables will have the data to map from IP address to MAC and ultimately to a particular port on a particular switch.The grown up switch vendors (Cisco, Arista, Juniper and the like) have tools to locate which switch and port is hosting a given MAC address, so providing you work on that level you can use ARP to map from IP address->MAC, then query the switching fabrics routing tables to figure out which port on your switches.It might actually be worth seeing if the NOC team from the CCC could give you any hints, after all, you only think your toy little campus lab is full of free thinking, cable fiddling, SNMP poking, exploit trying hackers, trust me, Congress has it worse (~17,000 of 'em turned up this year)!For most things with a real OS, you might find that enabling LLDP gets you what you need easily, but not everything will support lldpd, when it is available however, it is an excellent tool.Regards, Dan.

author: LapTop006
author_rank: Unknown
timestamp: January 20, 2019, 08:38:19 am
content: Quote from: dmills on January 19, 2019, 09:15:47 pmEthernet perhaps, not all IP (PPP for example has not MAC, neither does SONET IIRC)

author: legacy
author_rank: Super Contributor
timestamp: January 21, 2019, 02:30:36 pm
content: Quote from: dmills on January 19, 2019, 09:15:47 pm

author: dmills
author_rank: Super Contributor
timestamp: January 21, 2019, 05:36:14 pm
content: Quote from: legacy on January 21, 2019, 02:30:36 pmThing is, I was actually serious!The Chaos Communications Congress network operations team are about as good as it gets at making networks still work under those kinds of conditions (And they ~Mostly~ don't bite).The NOC for defcon or Blackhat might be other good options.Regards, Dan.

author: MarkR42
author_rank: Regular Contributor
timestamp: January 21, 2019, 06:39:33 pm
content: Maybe you could try to stick to modern standard protocols and use MDNS / Bonjour?The added advantage is that it should interoperate with Apple's software (And many Linux boxes use the avahi-daemon to provide MDNS too)Install avahi-daemon on your Linux box, and try avahi-browse -a

author: legacy
author_rank: Super Contributor
timestamp: January 21, 2019, 06:53:21 pm
content: Quote from: dmills on January 21, 2019, 05:36:14 pmI was laughing because I was not thinking you were serious, I mean that *they* do serious stuff with a lot of users. For sure more than 200 like in my case.but it's really a good idea, I can try to contact someone for hints

author: legacy
author_rank: Super Contributor
timestamp: January 21, 2019, 06:56:01 pm
content: Quote from: MarkR42 on January 21, 2019, 06:39:33 pmyup, we are working on a couple of Gentoo/HPPA machines just right now.Code:net-misc/lldpdHomepage: https://vincentbernat.github.com/lldpd/Description: Implementation of IEEE 802.1ab (LLDP)Code:net-dns/avahiHomepage: http://avahi.org/Description: System which facilitates service discovery on a local networkThese are now in our Catalyst profile for building a new stage4