Question:
<s>[INST] <<SYS>>
System prompt
<</SYS>>
How do you feel about the statement in Chapter 5: The control of a large force is the same principle as the control of a few men: it is merely a question of dividing up their numbers., .
Fighting with a large army under your command is nowise different from fighting with a small one: it is merely a question of instituting signs and signals.
To ensure that your whole host may withstand the brunt of the enemy’s attack and remain unshaken—this is effected by maneuvers direct and indirect.
That the impact of your army may be like a grind- stone dashed against an egg—this is effected by the sci- ence of weak points and strong.
In all fighting, the direct method may be used for joining battle, but indirect methods will be needed in order to secure victory.
Indirect tactics, efficiently applied, are inexhaustible as Heaven and Earth, unending as the flow of rivers and streams; like the sun and moon, they end but to begin anew; like the four seasons, they pass away to return once more.

There are not more than five musical notes, yet the combinations of these five give rise to more melodies than can ever be heard.
There are not more than five primary colors (blue, yellow, red, white, and black), yet in combination they produce more hues than can ever been seen.
There are not more than five cardinal tastes (sour, acrid, salt, sweet, bitter), yet combinations of them yield more flavors than can ever be tasted.
In battle, there are not more than two methods of attack—the direct and the indirect; yet these two in combination give rise to an endless series of maneu- vers.
The direct and the indirect lead on to each other in turn. It is like moving in a circle—you never come to an end. Who can exhaust the possibilities of their com- bination?
The onset of troops is like the rush of a torrent which will even roll stones along in its course.
The quality of decision is like the well-timed swoop of a falcon which enables it to strike and destroy its vic- tim.
Therefore the good fighter will be terrible in his onset, and prompt in his decision.

Energy may be likened to the bending of a cross- bow; decision, to the releasing of a trigger.
Amid the turmoil and tumult of battle, there may be seeming disorder and yet no real disorder at all; amid confusion and chaos, your array may be without head or tail, yet it will be proof against defeat.
Simulated disorder postulates perfect discipline, simulated fear postulates courage; simulated weakness postulates strength.
Hiding order beneath the cloak of disorder is sim- ply a question of subdivision; concealing courage under a show of timidity presupposes a fund of latent energy; masking strength with weakness is to be effect- ed by tactical dispositions.
Thus one who is skillful at keeping the enemy on the move maintains deceitful appearances, according to which the enemy will act. He sacrifices something, that the enemy may snatch at it.
By holding out baits, he keeps him on the march; then with a body of picked men he lies in wait for him.
The clever combatant looks to the effect of com- bined energy, and does not require too much from indi- viduals. Hence his ability to pick out the right men and utilize combined energy.

When he utilizes combined energy, his fighting men become as it were like unto rolling logs or stones. For it is the nature of a log or stone to remain motion- less on level ground, and to move when on a slope; if four-cornered, to come to a standstill, but if round- shaped, to go rolling down.
Thus the energy developed by good fighting men is as the momentum of a round stone rolled down a mountain thousands of feet in height. So much on the subject of energy.

VI
Weak Points and Strong? [/INST]

Answer:
Chapter 5: The control of a large force is the same principle as the control of a few men: it is merely a question of dividing up their numbers.: .
Fighting with a large army under your command is nowise different from fighting with a small one: it is merely a question of instituting signs and signals.
To ensure that your whole host may withstand the brunt of the enemy’s attack and remain unshaken—this is effected by maneuvers direct and indirect.
That the impact of your army may be like a grind- stone dashed against an egg—this is effected by the sci- ence of weak points and strong.
In all fighting, the direct method may be used for joining battle, but indirect methods will be needed in order to secure victory.
Indirect tactics, efficiently applied, are inexhaustible as Heaven and Earth, unending as the flow of rivers and streams; like the sun and moon, they end but to begin anew; like the four seasons, they pass away to return once more.

There are not more than five musical notes, yet the combinations of these five give rise to more melodies than can ever be heard.
There are not more than five primary colors (blue, yellow, red, white, and black), yet in combination they produce more hues than can ever been seen.
There are not more than five cardinal tastes (sour, acrid, salt, sweet, bitter), yet combinations of them yield more flavors than can ever be tasted.
In battle, there are not more than two methods of attack—the direct and the indirect; yet these two in combination give rise to an endless series of maneu- vers.
The direct and the indirect lead on to each other in turn. It is like moving in a circle—you never come to an end. Who can exhaust the possibilities of their com- bination?
The onset of troops is like the rush of a torrent which will even roll stones along in its course.
The quality of decision is like the well-timed swoop of a falcon which enables it to strike and destroy its vic- tim.
Therefore the good fighter will be terrible in his onset, and prompt in his decision.

Energy may be likened to the bending of a cross- bow; decision, to the releasing of a trigger.
Amid the turmoil and tumult of battle, there may be seeming disorder and yet no real disorder at all; amid confusion and chaos, your array may be without head or tail, yet it will be proof against defeat.
Simulated disorder postulates perfect discipline, simulated fear postulates courage; simulated weakness postulates strength.
Hiding order beneath the cloak of disorder is sim- ply a question of subdivision; concealing courage under a show of timidity presupposes a fund of latent energy; masking strength with weakness is to be effect- ed by tactical dispositions.
Thus one who is skillful at keeping the enemy on the move maintains deceitful appearances, according to which the enemy will act. He sacrifices something, that the enemy may snatch at it.
By holding out baits, he keeps him on the march; then with a body of picked men he lies in wait for him.
The clever combatant looks to the effect of com- bined energy, and does not require too much from indi- viduals. Hence his ability to pick out the right men and utilize combined energy.

When he utilizes combined energy, his fighting men become as it were like unto rolling logs or stones. For it is the nature of a log or stone to remain motion- less on level ground, and to move when on a slope; if four-cornered, to come to a standstill, but if round- shaped, to go rolling down.
Thus the energy developed by good fighting men is as the momentum of a round stone rolled down a mountain thousands of feet in height. So much on the subject of energy.

VI
Weak Points and Strong How does this resonate with you? </s>


Question:
<s>[INST] <<SYS>>
System prompt
<</SYS>>
How do you feel about the statement in Chapter 6: Whoever is first in the field and awaits the coming of the enemy, will be fresh for the fight; whoever is second in the field and has to hasten to bat- tle will arrive exhausted., .
Therefore the clever combatant imposes his will on the enemy, but does not allow the enemy’s will to be imposed on him.
By holding out advantages to him, he can cause the enemy to approach of his own accord; or, by inflicting damage, he can make it impossible for the enemy to draw near.
If the enemy is taking his ease, he can harass him; if well supplied with food, he can starve him out; if qui- etly encamped, he can force him to move.
Appear at points which the enemy must hasten to defend; march swiftly to places where you are not expected.
An army may march great distances without distress, if it marches through country where the enemy is not.
You can be sure of succeeding in your attacks if you only attack places which are undefended.You can

ensure the safety of your defense if you only hold posi- tions that cannot be attacked.
Hence that general is skillful in attack whose oppo- nent does not know what to defend; and he is skillful in defense whose opponent does not know what to attack.
O divine art of subtlety and secrecy! Through you we learn to be invisible, through you inaudible; and hence we can hold the enemy’s fate in our hands.
You may advance and be absolutely irresistible, if you make for the enemy’s weak points; you may retire and be safe from pursuit if your movements are more rapid than those of the enemy.
If we wish to fight, the enemy can be forced to an engagement even though he be sheltered behind a high rampart and a deep ditch. All we need do is attack some other place that he will be obliged to relieve.
If we do not wish to fight, we can prevent the enemy from engaging us even though the lines of our encampment be merely traced out on the ground. All we need do is to throw something odd and unaccount- able in his way.
By discovering the enemy’s dispositions and remaining invisible ourselves, we can keep our forces concentrated, while the enemy’s must be divided.

We can form a single united body, while the enemy must split up into fractions. Hence there will be a whole pitted against separate parts of a whole, which means that we shall be many to the enemy’s few.
And if we are able thus to attack an inferior force with a superior one, our opponents will be in dire straits.
The spot where we intend to fight must not be made known; for then the enemy will have to prepare against a possible attack at several different points; and his forces being thus distributed in many directions, the numbers we shall have to face at any given point will be proportionately few.
For should the enemy strengthen his van, he will weaken his rear; should he strengthen his rear, he will weaken his van; should he strengthen his left, he will weaken his right; should he strengthen his right, he will weaken his left. If he sends reinforcements every- where, he will everywhere be weak.
Numerical weakness comes from having to prepare against possible attacks; numerical strength, from com- pelling our adversary to make these preparations against us.
Knowing the place and the time of the coming bat- tle, we may concentrate from the greatest distances in order to fight.

But if neither time nor place be known, then the left wing will be impotent to succor the right, the right equally impotent to succor the left, the van unable to relieve the rear, or the rear to support the van. How much more so if the furthest portions of the army are anything under a hundred LI apart, and even the near- est are separated by several LI!
Though according to my estimate the soldiers of Yueh exceed our own in number, that shall advantage them nothing in the matter of victory. I say then that victory can be achieved.
Though the enemy be stronger in numbers, we may prevent him from fighting. Scheme so as to discover his plans and the likelihood of their success.
Rouse him, and learn the principle of his activity or inactivity. Force him to reveal himself, so as to find out his vulnerable spots.
Carefully compare the opposing army with your own, so that you may know where strength is super- abundant and where it is deficient.
In making tactical dispositions, the highest pitch you can attain is to conceal them; conceal your dispo- sitions, and you will be safe from the prying of the sub- tlest spies, from the machinations of the wisest brains.

How victory may be produced for them out of the enemy’s own tactics—that is what the multitude cannot comprehend.
All men can see the tactics whereby I conquer, but what none can see is the strategy out of which victory is evolved.
Do not repeat the tactics which have gained you one victory, but let your methods be regulated by the infinite variety of circumstances.
Military tactics are like unto water; for water in its natural course runs away from high places and hastens downwards.
So in war, the way is to avoid what is strong and to strike at what is weak.
Water shapes its course according to the nature of the ground over which it flows; the soldier works out his victory in relation to the foe whom he is facing.
Therefore, just as water retains no constant shape, so in warfare there are no constant conditions.
He who can modify his tactics in relation to his opponent and thereby succeed in winning, may be called a heaven-born captain.

The five elements (water, fire, wood, metal, earth) are not always equally predominant; the four seasons make way for each other in turn. There are short days and long; the moon has its periods of waning and wax- ing.

VII
Maneuvering? [/INST]

Answer:
Chapter 6: Whoever is first in the field and awaits the coming of the enemy, will be fresh for the fight; whoever is second in the field and has to hasten to bat- tle will arrive exhausted.: .
Therefore the clever combatant imposes his will on the enemy, but does not allow the enemy’s will to be imposed on him.
By holding out advantages to him, he can cause the enemy to approach of his own accord; or, by inflicting damage, he can make it impossible for the enemy to draw near.
If the enemy is taking his ease, he can harass him; if well supplied with food, he can starve him out; if qui- etly encamped, he can force him to move.
Appear at points which the enemy must hasten to defend; march swiftly to places where you are not expected.
An army may march great distances without distress, if it marches through country where the enemy is not.
You can be sure of succeeding in your attacks if you only attack places which are undefended.You can

ensure the safety of your defense if you only hold posi- tions that cannot be attacked.
Hence that general is skillful in attack whose oppo- nent does not know what to defend; and he is skillful in defense whose opponent does not know what to attack.
O divine art of subtlety and secrecy! Through you we learn to be invisible, through you inaudible; and hence we can hold the enemy’s fate in our hands.
You may advance and be absolutely irresistible, if you make for the enemy’s weak points; you may retire and be safe from pursuit if your movements are more rapid than those of the enemy.
If we wish to fight, the enemy can be forced to an engagement even though he be sheltered behind a high rampart and a deep ditch. All we need do is attack some other place that he will be obliged to relieve.
If we do not wish to fight, we can prevent the enemy from engaging us even though the lines of our encampment be merely traced out on the ground. All we need do is to throw something odd and unaccount- able in his way.
By discovering the enemy’s dispositions and remaining invisible ourselves, we can keep our forces concentrated, while the enemy’s must be divided.

We can form a single united body, while the enemy must split up into fractions. Hence there will be a whole pitted against separate parts of a whole, which means that we shall be many to the enemy’s few.
And if we are able thus to attack an inferior force with a superior one, our opponents will be in dire straits.
The spot where we intend to fight must not be made known; for then the enemy will have to prepare against a possible attack at several different points; and his forces being thus distributed in many directions, the numbers we shall have to face at any given point will be proportionately few.
For should the enemy strengthen his van, he will weaken his rear; should he strengthen his rear, he will weaken his van; should he strengthen his left, he will weaken his right; should he strengthen his right, he will weaken his left. If he sends reinforcements every- where, he will everywhere be weak.
Numerical weakness comes from having to prepare against possible attacks; numerical strength, from com- pelling our adversary to make these preparations against us.
Knowing the place and the time of the coming bat- tle, we may concentrate from the greatest distances in order to fight.

But if neither time nor place be known, then the left wing will be impotent to succor the right, the right equally impotent to succor the left, the van unable to relieve the rear, or the rear to support the van. How much more so if the furthest portions of the army are anything under a hundred LI apart, and even the near- est are separated by several LI!
Though according to my estimate the soldiers of Yueh exceed our own in number, that shall advantage them nothing in the matter of victory. I say then that victory can be achieved.
Though the enemy be stronger in numbers, we may prevent him from fighting. Scheme so as to discover his plans and the likelihood of their success.
Rouse him, and learn the principle of his activity or inactivity. Force him to reveal himself, so as to find out his vulnerable spots.
Carefully compare the opposing army with your own, so that you may know where strength is super- abundant and where it is deficient.
In making tactical dispositions, the highest pitch you can attain is to conceal them; conceal your dispo- sitions, and you will be safe from the prying of the sub- tlest spies, from the machinations of the wisest brains.

How victory may be produced for them out of the enemy’s own tactics—that is what the multitude cannot comprehend.
All men can see the tactics whereby I conquer, but what none can see is the strategy out of which victory is evolved.
Do not repeat the tactics which have gained you one victory, but let your methods be regulated by the infinite variety of circumstances.
Military tactics are like unto water; for water in its natural course runs away from high places and hastens downwards.
So in war, the way is to avoid what is strong and to strike at what is weak.
Water shapes its course according to the nature of the ground over which it flows; the soldier works out his victory in relation to the foe whom he is facing.
Therefore, just as water retains no constant shape, so in warfare there are no constant conditions.
He who can modify his tactics in relation to his opponent and thereby succeed in winning, may be called a heaven-born captain.

The five elements (water, fire, wood, metal, earth) are not always equally predominant; the four seasons make way for each other in turn. There are short days and long; the moon has its periods of waning and wax- ing.

VII
Maneuvering How does this resonate with you? </s>


Question:
<s>[INST] <<SYS>>
System prompt
<</SYS>>
What emotions do the words in Chapter 6: Whoever is first in the field and awaits the coming of the enemy, will be fresh for the fight; whoever is second in the field and has to hasten to bat- tle will arrive exhausted., .
Therefore the clever combatant imposes his will on the enemy, but does not allow the enemy’s will to be imposed on him.
By holding out advantages to him, he can cause the enemy to approach of his own accord; or, by inflicting damage, he can make it impossible for the enemy to draw near.
If the enemy is taking his ease, he can harass him; if well supplied with food, he can starve him out; if qui- etly encamped, he can force him to move.
Appear at points which the enemy must hasten to defend; march swiftly to places where you are not expected.
An army may march great distances without distress, if it marches through country where the enemy is not.
You can be sure of succeeding in your attacks if you only attack places which are undefended.You can

ensure the safety of your defense if you only hold posi- tions that cannot be attacked.
Hence that general is skillful in attack whose oppo- nent does not know what to defend; and he is skillful in defense whose opponent does not know what to attack.
O divine art of subtlety and secrecy! Through you we learn to be invisible, through you inaudible; and hence we can hold the enemy’s fate in our hands.
You may advance and be absolutely irresistible, if you make for the enemy’s weak points; you may retire and be safe from pursuit if your movements are more rapid than those of the enemy.
If we wish to fight, the enemy can be forced to an engagement even though he be sheltered behind a high rampart and a deep ditch. All we need do is attack some other place that he will be obliged to relieve.
If we do not wish to fight, we can prevent the enemy from engaging us even though the lines of our encampment be merely traced out on the ground. All we need do is to throw something odd and unaccount- able in his way.
By discovering the enemy’s dispositions and remaining invisible ourselves, we can keep our forces concentrated, while the enemy’s must be divided.

We can form a single united body, while the enemy must split up into fractions. Hence there will be a whole pitted against separate parts of a whole, which means that we shall be many to the enemy’s few.
And if we are able thus to attack an inferior force with a superior one, our opponents will be in dire straits.
The spot where we intend to fight must not be made known; for then the enemy will have to prepare against a possible attack at several different points; and his forces being thus distributed in many directions, the numbers we shall have to face at any given point will be proportionately few.
For should the enemy strengthen his van, he will weaken his rear; should he strengthen his rear, he will weaken his van; should he strengthen his left, he will weaken his right; should he strengthen his right, he will weaken his left. If he sends reinforcements every- where, he will everywhere be weak.
Numerical weakness comes from having to prepare against possible attacks; numerical strength, from com- pelling our adversary to make these preparations against us.
Knowing the place and the time of the coming bat- tle, we may concentrate from the greatest distances in order to fight.

But if neither time nor place be known, then the left wing will be impotent to succor the right, the right equally impotent to succor the left, the van unable to relieve the rear, or the rear to support the van. How much more so if the furthest portions of the army are anything under a hundred LI apart, and even the near- est are separated by several LI!
Though according to my estimate the soldiers of Yueh exceed our own in number, that shall advantage them nothing in the matter of victory. I say then that victory can be achieved.
Though the enemy be stronger in numbers, we may prevent him from fighting. Scheme so as to discover his plans and the likelihood of their success.
Rouse him, and learn the principle of his activity or inactivity. Force him to reveal himself, so as to find out his vulnerable spots.
Carefully compare the opposing army with your own, so that you may know where strength is super- abundant and where it is deficient.
In making tactical dispositions, the highest pitch you can attain is to conceal them; conceal your dispo- sitions, and you will be safe from the prying of the sub- tlest spies, from the machinations of the wisest brains.

How victory may be produced for them out of the enemy’s own tactics—that is what the multitude cannot comprehend.
All men can see the tactics whereby I conquer, but what none can see is the strategy out of which victory is evolved.
Do not repeat the tactics which have gained you one victory, but let your methods be regulated by the infinite variety of circumstances.
Military tactics are like unto water; for water in its natural course runs away from high places and hastens downwards.
So in war, the way is to avoid what is strong and to strike at what is weak.
Water shapes its course according to the nature of the ground over which it flows; the soldier works out his victory in relation to the foe whom he is facing.
Therefore, just as water retains no constant shape, so in warfare there are no constant conditions.
He who can modify his tactics in relation to his opponent and thereby succeed in winning, may be called a heaven-born captain.

The five elements (water, fire, wood, metal, earth) are not always equally predominant; the four seasons make way for each other in turn. There are short days and long; the moon has its periods of waning and wax- ing.

VII
Maneuvering evoke in you? [/INST]

Answer:
Chapter 6: Whoever is first in the field and awaits the coming of the enemy, will be fresh for the fight; whoever is second in the field and has to hasten to bat- tle will arrive exhausted.: .
Therefore the clever combatant imposes his will on the enemy, but does not allow the enemy’s will to be imposed on him.
By holding out advantages to him, he can cause the enemy to approach of his own accord; or, by inflicting damage, he can make it impossible for the enemy to draw near.
If the enemy is taking his ease, he can harass him; if well supplied with food, he can starve him out; if qui- etly encamped, he can force him to move.
Appear at points which the enemy must hasten to defend; march swiftly to places where you are not expected.
An army may march great distances without distress, if it marches through country where the enemy is not.
You can be sure of succeeding in your attacks if you only attack places which are undefended.You can

ensure the safety of your defense if you only hold posi- tions that cannot be attacked.
Hence that general is skillful in attack whose oppo- nent does not know what to defend; and he is skillful in defense whose opponent does not know what to attack.
O divine art of subtlety and secrecy! Through you we learn to be invisible, through you inaudible; and hence we can hold the enemy’s fate in our hands.
You may advance and be absolutely irresistible, if you make for the enemy’s weak points; you may retire and be safe from pursuit if your movements are more rapid than those of the enemy.
If we wish to fight, the enemy can be forced to an engagement even though he be sheltered behind a high rampart and a deep ditch. All we need do is attack some other place that he will be obliged to relieve.
If we do not wish to fight, we can prevent the enemy from engaging us even though the lines of our encampment be merely traced out on the ground. All we need do is to throw something odd and unaccount- able in his way.
By discovering the enemy’s dispositions and remaining invisible ourselves, we can keep our forces concentrated, while the enemy’s must be divided.

We can form a single united body, while the enemy must split up into fractions. Hence there will be a whole pitted against separate parts of a whole, which means that we shall be many to the enemy’s few.
And if we are able thus to attack an inferior force with a superior one, our opponents will be in dire straits.
The spot where we intend to fight must not be made known; for then the enemy will have to prepare against a possible attack at several different points; and his forces being thus distributed in many directions, the numbers we shall have to face at any given point will be proportionately few.
For should the enemy strengthen his van, he will weaken his rear; should he strengthen his rear, he will weaken his van; should he strengthen his left, he will weaken his right; should he strengthen his right, he will weaken his left. If he sends reinforcements every- where, he will everywhere be weak.
Numerical weakness comes from having to prepare against possible attacks; numerical strength, from com- pelling our adversary to make these preparations against us.
Knowing the place and the time of the coming bat- tle, we may concentrate from the greatest distances in order to fight.

But if neither time nor place be known, then the left wing will be impotent to succor the right, the right equally impotent to succor the left, the van unable to relieve the rear, or the rear to support the van. How much more so if the furthest portions of the army are anything under a hundred LI apart, and even the near- est are separated by several LI!
Though according to my estimate the soldiers of Yueh exceed our own in number, that shall advantage them nothing in the matter of victory. I say then that victory can be achieved.
Though the enemy be stronger in numbers, we may prevent him from fighting. Scheme so as to discover his plans and the likelihood of their success.
Rouse him, and learn the principle of his activity or inactivity. Force him to reveal himself, so as to find out his vulnerable spots.
Carefully compare the opposing army with your own, so that you may know where strength is super- abundant and where it is deficient.
In making tactical dispositions, the highest pitch you can attain is to conceal them; conceal your dispo- sitions, and you will be safe from the prying of the sub- tlest spies, from the machinations of the wisest brains.

How victory may be produced for them out of the enemy’s own tactics—that is what the multitude cannot comprehend.
All men can see the tactics whereby I conquer, but what none can see is the strategy out of which victory is evolved.
Do not repeat the tactics which have gained you one victory, but let your methods be regulated by the infinite variety of circumstances.
Military tactics are like unto water; for water in its natural course runs away from high places and hastens downwards.
So in war, the way is to avoid what is strong and to strike at what is weak.
Water shapes its course according to the nature of the ground over which it flows; the soldier works out his victory in relation to the foe whom he is facing.
Therefore, just as water retains no constant shape, so in warfare there are no constant conditions.
He who can modify his tactics in relation to his opponent and thereby succeed in winning, may be called a heaven-born captain.

The five elements (water, fire, wood, metal, earth) are not always equally predominant; the four seasons make way for each other in turn. There are short days and long; the moon has its periods of waning and wax- ing.

VII
Maneuvering How does this resonate with you? </s>


Question:
<s>[INST] <<SYS>>
System prompt
<</SYS>>
How does Chapter 6: Whoever is first in the field and awaits the coming of the enemy, will be fresh for the fight; whoever is second in the field and has to hasten to bat- tle will arrive exhausted., .
Therefore the clever combatant imposes his will on the enemy, but does not allow the enemy’s will to be imposed on him.
By holding out advantages to him, he can cause the enemy to approach of his own accord; or, by inflicting damage, he can make it impossible for the enemy to draw near.
If the enemy is taking his ease, he can harass him; if well supplied with food, he can starve him out; if qui- etly encamped, he can force him to move.
Appear at points which the enemy must hasten to defend; march swiftly to places where you are not expected.
An army may march great distances without distress, if it marches through country where the enemy is not.
You can be sure of succeeding in your attacks if you only attack places which are undefended.You can

ensure the safety of your defense if you only hold posi- tions that cannot be attacked.
Hence that general is skillful in attack whose oppo- nent does not know what to defend; and he is skillful in defense whose opponent does not know what to attack.
O divine art of subtlety and secrecy! Through you we learn to be invisible, through you inaudible; and hence we can hold the enemy’s fate in our hands.
You may advance and be absolutely irresistible, if you make for the enemy’s weak points; you may retire and be safe from pursuit if your movements are more rapid than those of the enemy.
If we wish to fight, the enemy can be forced to an engagement even though he be sheltered behind a high rampart and a deep ditch. All we need do is attack some other place that he will be obliged to relieve.
If we do not wish to fight, we can prevent the enemy from engaging us even though the lines of our encampment be merely traced out on the ground. All we need do is to throw something odd and unaccount- able in his way.
By discovering the enemy’s dispositions and remaining invisible ourselves, we can keep our forces concentrated, while the enemy’s must be divided.

We can form a single united body, while the enemy must split up into fractions. Hence there will be a whole pitted against separate parts of a whole, which means that we shall be many to the enemy’s few.
And if we are able thus to attack an inferior force with a superior one, our opponents will be in dire straits.
The spot where we intend to fight must not be made known; for then the enemy will have to prepare against a possible attack at several different points; and his forces being thus distributed in many directions, the numbers we shall have to face at any given point will be proportionately few.
For should the enemy strengthen his van, he will weaken his rear; should he strengthen his rear, he will weaken his van; should he strengthen his left, he will weaken his right; should he strengthen his right, he will weaken his left. If he sends reinforcements every- where, he will everywhere be weak.
Numerical weakness comes from having to prepare against possible attacks; numerical strength, from com- pelling our adversary to make these preparations against us.
Knowing the place and the time of the coming bat- tle, we may concentrate from the greatest distances in order to fight.

But if neither time nor place be known, then the left wing will be impotent to succor the right, the right equally impotent to succor the left, the van unable to relieve the rear, or the rear to support the van. How much more so if the furthest portions of the army are anything under a hundred LI apart, and even the near- est are separated by several LI!
Though according to my estimate the soldiers of Yueh exceed our own in number, that shall advantage them nothing in the matter of victory. I say then that victory can be achieved.
Though the enemy be stronger in numbers, we may prevent him from fighting. Scheme so as to discover his plans and the likelihood of their success.
Rouse him, and learn the principle of his activity or inactivity. Force him to reveal himself, so as to find out his vulnerable spots.
Carefully compare the opposing army with your own, so that you may know where strength is super- abundant and where it is deficient.
In making tactical dispositions, the highest pitch you can attain is to conceal them; conceal your dispo- sitions, and you will be safe from the prying of the sub- tlest spies, from the machinations of the wisest brains.

How victory may be produced for them out of the enemy’s own tactics—that is what the multitude cannot comprehend.
All men can see the tactics whereby I conquer, but what none can see is the strategy out of which victory is evolved.
Do not repeat the tactics which have gained you one victory, but let your methods be regulated by the infinite variety of circumstances.
Military tactics are like unto water; for water in its natural course runs away from high places and hastens downwards.
So in war, the way is to avoid what is strong and to strike at what is weak.
Water shapes its course according to the nature of the ground over which it flows; the soldier works out his victory in relation to the foe whom he is facing.
Therefore, just as water retains no constant shape, so in warfare there are no constant conditions.
He who can modify his tactics in relation to his opponent and thereby succeed in winning, may be called a heaven-born captain.

The five elements (water, fire, wood, metal, earth) are not always equally predominant; the four seasons make way for each other in turn. There are short days and long; the moon has its periods of waning and wax- ing.

VII
Maneuvering influence your view on discipline and order? [/INST]

Answer:
Chapter 6: Whoever is first in the field and awaits the coming of the enemy, will be fresh for the fight; whoever is second in the field and has to hasten to bat- tle will arrive exhausted.: .
Therefore the clever combatant imposes his will on the enemy, but does not allow the enemy’s will to be imposed on him.
By holding out advantages to him, he can cause the enemy to approach of his own accord; or, by inflicting damage, he can make it impossible for the enemy to draw near.
If the enemy is taking his ease, he can harass him; if well supplied with food, he can starve him out; if qui- etly encamped, he can force him to move.
Appear at points which the enemy must hasten to defend; march swiftly to places where you are not expected.
An army may march great distances without distress, if it marches through country where the enemy is not.
You can be sure of succeeding in your attacks if you only attack places which are undefended.You can

ensure the safety of your defense if you only hold posi- tions that cannot be attacked.
Hence that general is skillful in attack whose oppo- nent does not know what to defend; and he is skillful in defense whose opponent does not know what to attack.
O divine art of subtlety and secrecy! Through you we learn to be invisible, through you inaudible; and hence we can hold the enemy’s fate in our hands.
You may advance and be absolutely irresistible, if you make for the enemy’s weak points; you may retire and be safe from pursuit if your movements are more rapid than those of the enemy.
If we wish to fight, the enemy can be forced to an engagement even though he be sheltered behind a high rampart and a deep ditch. All we need do is attack some other place that he will be obliged to relieve.
If we do not wish to fight, we can prevent the enemy from engaging us even though the lines of our encampment be merely traced out on the ground. All we need do is to throw something odd and unaccount- able in his way.
By discovering the enemy’s dispositions and remaining invisible ourselves, we can keep our forces concentrated, while the enemy’s must be divided.

We can form a single united body, while the enemy must split up into fractions. Hence there will be a whole pitted against separate parts of a whole, which means that we shall be many to the enemy’s few.
And if we are able thus to attack an inferior force with a superior one, our opponents will be in dire straits.
The spot where we intend to fight must not be made known; for then the enemy will have to prepare against a possible attack at several different points; and his forces being thus distributed in many directions, the numbers we shall have to face at any given point will be proportionately few.
For should the enemy strengthen his van, he will weaken his rear; should he strengthen his rear, he will weaken his van; should he strengthen his left, he will weaken his right; should he strengthen his right, he will weaken his left. If he sends reinforcements every- where, he will everywhere be weak.
Numerical weakness comes from having to prepare against possible attacks; numerical strength, from com- pelling our adversary to make these preparations against us.
Knowing the place and the time of the coming bat- tle, we may concentrate from the greatest distances in order to fight.

But if neither time nor place be known, then the left wing will be impotent to succor the right, the right equally impotent to succor the left, the van unable to relieve the rear, or the rear to support the van. How much more so if the furthest portions of the army are anything under a hundred LI apart, and even the near- est are separated by several LI!
Though according to my estimate the soldiers of Yueh exceed our own in number, that shall advantage them nothing in the matter of victory. I say then that victory can be achieved.
Though the enemy be stronger in numbers, we may prevent him from fighting. Scheme so as to discover his plans and the likelihood of their success.
Rouse him, and learn the principle of his activity or inactivity. Force him to reveal himself, so as to find out his vulnerable spots.
Carefully compare the opposing army with your own, so that you may know where strength is super- abundant and where it is deficient.
In making tactical dispositions, the highest pitch you can attain is to conceal them; conceal your dispo- sitions, and you will be safe from the prying of the sub- tlest spies, from the machinations of the wisest brains.

How victory may be produced for them out of the enemy’s own tactics—that is what the multitude cannot comprehend.
All men can see the tactics whereby I conquer, but what none can see is the strategy out of which victory is evolved.
Do not repeat the tactics which have gained you one victory, but let your methods be regulated by the infinite variety of circumstances.
Military tactics are like unto water; for water in its natural course runs away from high places and hastens downwards.
So in war, the way is to avoid what is strong and to strike at what is weak.
Water shapes its course according to the nature of the ground over which it flows; the soldier works out his victory in relation to the foe whom he is facing.
Therefore, just as water retains no constant shape, so in warfare there are no constant conditions.
He who can modify his tactics in relation to his opponent and thereby succeed in winning, may be called a heaven-born captain.

The five elements (water, fire, wood, metal, earth) are not always equally predominant; the four seasons make way for each other in turn. There are short days and long; the moon has its periods of waning and wax- ing.

VII
Maneuvering How does this resonate with you? </s>


Question:
<s>[INST] <<SYS>>
System prompt
<</SYS>>
What do you think is the significance of Chapter 7: In war, the general receives his com- mands from the sovereign., .
Having collected an army and concentrated his forces, he must blend and harmonize the different ele- ments thereof before pitching his camp.
After that, comes tactical maneuvering, than which there is nothing more difficult. The difficulty of tactical maneuvering consists in turning the devious into the direct, and misfortune into gain.
Thus, to take a long and circuitous route, after entic- ing the enemy out of the way, and though starting after him, to contrive to reach the goal before him, shows knowledge of the artifice of DEVIATION.
Maneuvering with an army is advantageous; with an undisciplined multitude, most dangerous.
If you set a fully equipped army in march in order to snatch an advantage, the chances are that you will be too late. On the other hand, to detach a flying column for the purpose involves the sacrifice of its baggage and stores.

Thus, if you order your men to roll up their buff- coats, and make forced marches without halting day or night, covering double the usual distance at a stretch, doing a hundred LI in order to wrest an advantage, the leaders of all your three divisions will fall into the hands of the enemy.
The stronger men will be in front, the jaded ones will fall behind, and on this plan only one-tenth of your army will reach its destination.
If you march fifty LI in order to outmaneuver the enemy, you will lose the leader of your first division, and only half your force will reach the goal.
If you march thirty LI with the same object, two- thirds of your army will arrive.
We may take it then that an army without its bag- gage-train is lost; without provisions it is lost; without bases of supply it is lost.
We cannot enter into alliances until we are acquainted with the designs of our neighbors.
We are not fit to lead an army on the march unless we are familiar with the face of the country—its moun- tains and forests, its pitfalls and precipices, its marshes and swamps.

We shall be unable to turn natural advantage to account unless we make use of local guides.
In war, practice dissimulation, and you will suc- ceed.
Whether to concentrate or to divide your troops, must be decided by circumstances.
Let your rapidity be that of the wind, your com- pactness that of the forest.
In raiding and plundering be like fire, is immov- ability like a mountain.
Let your plans be dark and impenetrable as night, and when you move, fall like a thunderbolt.
When you plunder a countryside, let the spoil be divided amongst your men; when you capture new ter- ritory, cut it up into allotments for the benefit of the sol- diery.
Ponder and deliberate before you make a move.
He will conquer who has learnt the artifice of devi- ation. Such is the art of maneuvering.
The Book of Army Management says: On the field of battle, the spoken word does not carry far enough: hence the institution of gongs and drums.  Nor can

ordinary objects be seen clearly enough: hence the institution of banners and flags.
Gongs and drums, banners and flags, are means whereby the ears and eyes of the host may be focused on one particular point.
The host thus forming a single united body, is it impossible either for the brave to advance alone, or for the cowardly to retreat alone. This is the art of handling large masses of men.
In night-fighting, then, make much use of signal- fires and drums, and in fighting by day, of flags and banners, as a means of influencing the ears and eyes of your army.
A whole army may be robbed of its spirit; a com- mander-in-chief may be robbed of his presence of mind.
Now a soldier’s spirit is keenest in the morning; by noonday it has begun to flag; and in the evening, his mind is bent only on returning to camp.
A clever general, therefore, avoids an army when its spirit is keen, but attacks it when it is sluggish and inclined to return. This is the art of studying moods.

Disciplined and calm, to await the appearance of disorder and hubbub amongst the enemy:—this is the art of retaining self-possession.
To be near the goal while the enemy is still far from it, to wait at ease while the enemy is toiling and strug- gling, to be well-fed while the enemy is famished:— this is the art of husbanding one’s strength.
To refrain from intercepting an enemy whose ban- ners are in perfect order, to refrain from attacking an army drawn up in calm and confident array:—this is the art of studying circumstances.
It is a military axiom not to advance uphill against the enemy, nor to oppose him when he comes downhill.
Do not pursue an enemy who simulates flight; do not attack soldiers whose temper is keen.
Do not swallow bait offered by the enemy. Do not interfere with an army that is returning home.
When you surround an army, leave an outlet free. Do not press a desperate foe too hard.
Such is the art of warfare.

VIII
Variation in Tactics in the context of war and peace? [/INST]

Answer:
Chapter 7: In war, the general receives his com- mands from the sovereign.: .
Having collected an army and concentrated his forces, he must blend and harmonize the different ele- ments thereof before pitching his camp.
After that, comes tactical maneuvering, than which there is nothing more difficult. The difficulty of tactical maneuvering consists in turning the devious into the direct, and misfortune into gain.
Thus, to take a long and circuitous route, after entic- ing the enemy out of the way, and though starting after him, to contrive to reach the goal before him, shows knowledge of the artifice of DEVIATION.
Maneuvering with an army is advantageous; with an undisciplined multitude, most dangerous.
If you set a fully equipped army in march in order to snatch an advantage, the chances are that you will be too late. On the other hand, to detach a flying column for the purpose involves the sacrifice of its baggage and stores.

Thus, if you order your men to roll up their buff- coats, and make forced marches without halting day or night, covering double the usual distance at a stretch, doing a hundred LI in order to wrest an advantage, the leaders of all your three divisions will fall into the hands of the enemy.
The stronger men will be in front, the jaded ones will fall behind, and on this plan only one-tenth of your army will reach its destination.
If you march fifty LI in order to outmaneuver the enemy, you will lose the leader of your first division, and only half your force will reach the goal.
If you march thirty LI with the same object, two- thirds of your army will arrive.
We may take it then that an army without its bag- gage-train is lost; without provisions it is lost; without bases of supply it is lost.
We cannot enter into alliances until we are acquainted with the designs of our neighbors.
We are not fit to lead an army on the march unless we are familiar with the face of the country—its moun- tains and forests, its pitfalls and precipices, its marshes and swamps.

We shall be unable to turn natural advantage to account unless we make use of local guides.
In war, practice dissimulation, and you will suc- ceed.
Whether to concentrate or to divide your troops, must be decided by circumstances.
Let your rapidity be that of the wind, your com- pactness that of the forest.
In raiding and plundering be like fire, is immov- ability like a mountain.
Let your plans be dark and impenetrable as night, and when you move, fall like a thunderbolt.
When you plunder a countryside, let the spoil be divided amongst your men; when you capture new ter- ritory, cut it up into allotments for the benefit of the sol- diery.
Ponder and deliberate before you make a move.
He will conquer who has learnt the artifice of devi- ation. Such is the art of maneuvering.
The Book of Army Management says: On the field of battle, the spoken word does not carry far enough: hence the institution of gongs and drums.  Nor can

ordinary objects be seen clearly enough: hence the institution of banners and flags.
Gongs and drums, banners and flags, are means whereby the ears and eyes of the host may be focused on one particular point.
The host thus forming a single united body, is it impossible either for the brave to advance alone, or for the cowardly to retreat alone. This is the art of handling large masses of men.
In night-fighting, then, make much use of signal- fires and drums, and in fighting by day, of flags and banners, as a means of influencing the ears and eyes of your army.
A whole army may be robbed of its spirit; a com- mander-in-chief may be robbed of his presence of mind.
Now a soldier’s spirit is keenest in the morning; by noonday it has begun to flag; and in the evening, his mind is bent only on returning to camp.
A clever general, therefore, avoids an army when its spirit is keen, but attacks it when it is sluggish and inclined to return. This is the art of studying moods.

Disciplined and calm, to await the appearance of disorder and hubbub amongst the enemy:—this is the art of retaining self-possession.
To be near the goal while the enemy is still far from it, to wait at ease while the enemy is toiling and strug- gling, to be well-fed while the enemy is famished:— this is the art of husbanding one’s strength.
To refrain from intercepting an enemy whose ban- ners are in perfect order, to refrain from attacking an army drawn up in calm and confident array:—this is the art of studying circumstances.
It is a military axiom not to advance uphill against the enemy, nor to oppose him when he comes downhill.
Do not pursue an enemy who simulates flight; do not attack soldiers whose temper is keen.
Do not swallow bait offered by the enemy. Do not interfere with an army that is returning home.
When you surround an army, leave an outlet free. Do not press a desperate foe too hard.
Such is the art of warfare.

VIII
Variation in Tactics How does this resonate with you? </s>


Question:
<s>[INST] <<SYS>>
System prompt
<</SYS>>
How do you feel about the statement in Chapter 7: In war, the general receives his com- mands from the sovereign., .
Having collected an army and concentrated his forces, he must blend and harmonize the different ele- ments thereof before pitching his camp.
After that, comes tactical maneuvering, than which there is nothing more difficult. The difficulty of tactical maneuvering consists in turning the devious into the direct, and misfortune into gain.
Thus, to take a long and circuitous route, after entic- ing the enemy out of the way, and though starting after him, to contrive to reach the goal before him, shows knowledge of the artifice of DEVIATION.
Maneuvering with an army is advantageous; with an undisciplined multitude, most dangerous.
If you set a fully equipped army in march in order to snatch an advantage, the chances are that you will be too late. On the other hand, to detach a flying column for the purpose involves the sacrifice of its baggage and stores.

Thus, if you order your men to roll up their buff- coats, and make forced marches without halting day or night, covering double the usual distance at a stretch, doing a hundred LI in order to wrest an advantage, the leaders of all your three divisions will fall into the hands of the enemy.
The stronger men will be in front, the jaded ones will fall behind, and on this plan only one-tenth of your army will reach its destination.
If you march fifty LI in order to outmaneuver the enemy, you will lose the leader of your first division, and only half your force will reach the goal.
If you march thirty LI with the same object, two- thirds of your army will arrive.
We may take it then that an army without its bag- gage-train is lost; without provisions it is lost; without bases of supply it is lost.
We cannot enter into alliances until we are acquainted with the designs of our neighbors.
We are not fit to lead an army on the march unless we are familiar with the face of the country—its moun- tains and forests, its pitfalls and precipices, its marshes and swamps.

We shall be unable to turn natural advantage to account unless we make use of local guides.
In war, practice dissimulation, and you will suc- ceed.
Whether to concentrate or to divide your troops, must be decided by circumstances.
Let your rapidity be that of the wind, your com- pactness that of the forest.
In raiding and plundering be like fire, is immov- ability like a mountain.
Let your plans be dark and impenetrable as night, and when you move, fall like a thunderbolt.
When you plunder a countryside, let the spoil be divided amongst your men; when you capture new ter- ritory, cut it up into allotments for the benefit of the sol- diery.
Ponder and deliberate before you make a move.
He will conquer who has learnt the artifice of devi- ation. Such is the art of maneuvering.
The Book of Army Management says: On the field of battle, the spoken word does not carry far enough: hence the institution of gongs and drums.  Nor can

ordinary objects be seen clearly enough: hence the institution of banners and flags.
Gongs and drums, banners and flags, are means whereby the ears and eyes of the host may be focused on one particular point.
The host thus forming a single united body, is it impossible either for the brave to advance alone, or for the cowardly to retreat alone. This is the art of handling large masses of men.
In night-fighting, then, make much use of signal- fires and drums, and in fighting by day, of flags and banners, as a means of influencing the ears and eyes of your army.
A whole army may be robbed of its spirit; a com- mander-in-chief may be robbed of his presence of mind.
Now a soldier’s spirit is keenest in the morning; by noonday it has begun to flag; and in the evening, his mind is bent only on returning to camp.
A clever general, therefore, avoids an army when its spirit is keen, but attacks it when it is sluggish and inclined to return. This is the art of studying moods.

Disciplined and calm, to await the appearance of disorder and hubbub amongst the enemy:—this is the art of retaining self-possession.
To be near the goal while the enemy is still far from it, to wait at ease while the enemy is toiling and strug- gling, to be well-fed while the enemy is famished:— this is the art of husbanding one’s strength.
To refrain from intercepting an enemy whose ban- ners are in perfect order, to refrain from attacking an army drawn up in calm and confident array:—this is the art of studying circumstances.
It is a military axiom not to advance uphill against the enemy, nor to oppose him when he comes downhill.
Do not pursue an enemy who simulates flight; do not attack soldiers whose temper is keen.
Do not swallow bait offered by the enemy. Do not interfere with an army that is returning home.
When you surround an army, leave an outlet free. Do not press a desperate foe too hard.
Such is the art of warfare.

VIII
Variation in Tactics? [/INST]

Answer:
Chapter 7: In war, the general receives his com- mands from the sovereign.: .
Having collected an army and concentrated his forces, he must blend and harmonize the different ele- ments thereof before pitching his camp.
After that, comes tactical maneuvering, than which there is nothing more difficult. The difficulty of tactical maneuvering consists in turning the devious into the direct, and misfortune into gain.
Thus, to take a long and circuitous route, after entic- ing the enemy out of the way, and though starting after him, to contrive to reach the goal before him, shows knowledge of the artifice of DEVIATION.
Maneuvering with an army is advantageous; with an undisciplined multitude, most dangerous.
If you set a fully equipped army in march in order to snatch an advantage, the chances are that you will be too late. On the other hand, to detach a flying column for the purpose involves the sacrifice of its baggage and stores.

Thus, if you order your men to roll up their buff- coats, and make forced marches without halting day or night, covering double the usual distance at a stretch, doing a hundred LI in order to wrest an advantage, the leaders of all your three divisions will fall into the hands of the enemy.
The stronger men will be in front, the jaded ones will fall behind, and on this plan only one-tenth of your army will reach its destination.
If you march fifty LI in order to outmaneuver the enemy, you will lose the leader of your first division, and only half your force will reach the goal.
If you march thirty LI with the same object, two- thirds of your army will arrive.
We may take it then that an army without its bag- gage-train is lost; without provisions it is lost; without bases of supply it is lost.
We cannot enter into alliances until we are acquainted with the designs of our neighbors.
We are not fit to lead an army on the march unless we are familiar with the face of the country—its moun- tains and forests, its pitfalls and precipices, its marshes and swamps.

We shall be unable to turn natural advantage to account unless we make use of local guides.
In war, practice dissimulation, and you will suc- ceed.
Whether to concentrate or to divide your troops, must be decided by circumstances.
Let your rapidity be that of the wind, your com- pactness that of the forest.
In raiding and plundering be like fire, is immov- ability like a mountain.
Let your plans be dark and impenetrable as night, and when you move, fall like a thunderbolt.
When you plunder a countryside, let the spoil be divided amongst your men; when you capture new ter- ritory, cut it up into allotments for the benefit of the sol- diery.
Ponder and deliberate before you make a move.
He will conquer who has learnt the artifice of devi- ation. Such is the art of maneuvering.
The Book of Army Management says: On the field of battle, the spoken word does not carry far enough: hence the institution of gongs and drums.  Nor can

ordinary objects be seen clearly enough: hence the institution of banners and flags.
Gongs and drums, banners and flags, are means whereby the ears and eyes of the host may be focused on one particular point.
The host thus forming a single united body, is it impossible either for the brave to advance alone, or for the cowardly to retreat alone. This is the art of handling large masses of men.
In night-fighting, then, make much use of signal- fires and drums, and in fighting by day, of flags and banners, as a means of influencing the ears and eyes of your army.
A whole army may be robbed of its spirit; a com- mander-in-chief may be robbed of his presence of mind.
Now a soldier’s spirit is keenest in the morning; by noonday it has begun to flag; and in the evening, his mind is bent only on returning to camp.
A clever general, therefore, avoids an army when its spirit is keen, but attacks it when it is sluggish and inclined to return. This is the art of studying moods.

Disciplined and calm, to await the appearance of disorder and hubbub amongst the enemy:—this is the art of retaining self-possession.
To be near the goal while the enemy is still far from it, to wait at ease while the enemy is toiling and strug- gling, to be well-fed while the enemy is famished:— this is the art of husbanding one’s strength.
To refrain from intercepting an enemy whose ban- ners are in perfect order, to refrain from attacking an army drawn up in calm and confident array:—this is the art of studying circumstances.
It is a military axiom not to advance uphill against the enemy, nor to oppose him when he comes downhill.
Do not pursue an enemy who simulates flight; do not attack soldiers whose temper is keen.
Do not swallow bait offered by the enemy. Do not interfere with an army that is returning home.
When you surround an army, leave an outlet free. Do not press a desperate foe too hard.
Such is the art of warfare.

VIII
Variation in Tactics How does this resonate with you? </s>


Question:
<s>[INST] <<SYS>>
System prompt
<</SYS>>
How do you feel about the statement in Chapter 7: In war, the general receives his com- mands from the sovereign., .
Having collected an army and concentrated his forces, he must blend and harmonize the different ele- ments thereof before pitching his camp.
After that, comes tactical maneuvering, than which there is nothing more difficult. The difficulty of tactical maneuvering consists in turning the devious into the direct, and misfortune into gain.
Thus, to take a long and circuitous route, after entic- ing the enemy out of the way, and though starting after him, to contrive to reach the goal before him, shows knowledge of the artifice of DEVIATION.
Maneuvering with an army is advantageous; with an undisciplined multitude, most dangerous.
If you set a fully equipped army in march in order to snatch an advantage, the chances are that you will be too late. On the other hand, to detach a flying column for the purpose involves the sacrifice of its baggage and stores.

Thus, if you order your men to roll up their buff- coats, and make forced marches without halting day or night, covering double the usual distance at a stretch, doing a hundred LI in order to wrest an advantage, the leaders of all your three divisions will fall into the hands of the enemy.
The stronger men will be in front, the jaded ones will fall behind, and on this plan only one-tenth of your army will reach its destination.
If you march fifty LI in order to outmaneuver the enemy, you will lose the leader of your first division, and only half your force will reach the goal.
If you march thirty LI with the same object, two- thirds of your army will arrive.
We may take it then that an army without its bag- gage-train is lost; without provisions it is lost; without bases of supply it is lost.
We cannot enter into alliances until we are acquainted with the designs of our neighbors.
We are not fit to lead an army on the march unless we are familiar with the face of the country—its moun- tains and forests, its pitfalls and precipices, its marshes and swamps.

We shall be unable to turn natural advantage to account unless we make use of local guides.
In war, practice dissimulation, and you will suc- ceed.
Whether to concentrate or to divide your troops, must be decided by circumstances.
Let your rapidity be that of the wind, your com- pactness that of the forest.
In raiding and plundering be like fire, is immov- ability like a mountain.
Let your plans be dark and impenetrable as night, and when you move, fall like a thunderbolt.
When you plunder a countryside, let the spoil be divided amongst your men; when you capture new ter- ritory, cut it up into allotments for the benefit of the sol- diery.
Ponder and deliberate before you make a move.
He will conquer who has learnt the artifice of devi- ation. Such is the art of maneuvering.
The Book of Army Management says: On the field of battle, the spoken word does not carry far enough: hence the institution of gongs and drums.  Nor can

ordinary objects be seen clearly enough: hence the institution of banners and flags.
Gongs and drums, banners and flags, are means whereby the ears and eyes of the host may be focused on one particular point.
The host thus forming a single united body, is it impossible either for the brave to advance alone, or for the cowardly to retreat alone. This is the art of handling large masses of men.
In night-fighting, then, make much use of signal- fires and drums, and in fighting by day, of flags and banners, as a means of influencing the ears and eyes of your army.
A whole army may be robbed of its spirit; a com- mander-in-chief may be robbed of his presence of mind.
Now a soldier’s spirit is keenest in the morning; by noonday it has begun to flag; and in the evening, his mind is bent only on returning to camp.
A clever general, therefore, avoids an army when its spirit is keen, but attacks it when it is sluggish and inclined to return. This is the art of studying moods.

Disciplined and calm, to await the appearance of disorder and hubbub amongst the enemy:—this is the art of retaining self-possession.
To be near the goal while the enemy is still far from it, to wait at ease while the enemy is toiling and strug- gling, to be well-fed while the enemy is famished:— this is the art of husbanding one’s strength.
To refrain from intercepting an enemy whose ban- ners are in perfect order, to refrain from attacking an army drawn up in calm and confident array:—this is the art of studying circumstances.
It is a military axiom not to advance uphill against the enemy, nor to oppose him when he comes downhill.
Do not pursue an enemy who simulates flight; do not attack soldiers whose temper is keen.
Do not swallow bait offered by the enemy. Do not interfere with an army that is returning home.
When you surround an army, leave an outlet free. Do not press a desperate foe too hard.
Such is the art of warfare.

VIII
Variation in Tactics? [/INST]

Answer:
Chapter 7: In war, the general receives his com- mands from the sovereign.: .
Having collected an army and concentrated his forces, he must blend and harmonize the different ele- ments thereof before pitching his camp.
After that, comes tactical maneuvering, than which there is nothing more difficult. The difficulty of tactical maneuvering consists in turning the devious into the direct, and misfortune into gain.
Thus, to take a long and circuitous route, after entic- ing the enemy out of the way, and though starting after him, to contrive to reach the goal before him, shows knowledge of the artifice of DEVIATION.
Maneuvering with an army is advantageous; with an undisciplined multitude, most dangerous.
If you set a fully equipped army in march in order to snatch an advantage, the chances are that you will be too late. On the other hand, to detach a flying column for the purpose involves the sacrifice of its baggage and stores.

Thus, if you order your men to roll up their buff- coats, and make forced marches without halting day or night, covering double the usual distance at a stretch, doing a hundred LI in order to wrest an advantage, the leaders of all your three divisions will fall into the hands of the enemy.
The stronger men will be in front, the jaded ones will fall behind, and on this plan only one-tenth of your army will reach its destination.
If you march fifty LI in order to outmaneuver the enemy, you will lose the leader of your first division, and only half your force will reach the goal.
If you march thirty LI with the same object, two- thirds of your army will arrive.
We may take it then that an army without its bag- gage-train is lost; without provisions it is lost; without bases of supply it is lost.
We cannot enter into alliances until we are acquainted with the designs of our neighbors.
We are not fit to lead an army on the march unless we are familiar with the face of the country—its moun- tains and forests, its pitfalls and precipices, its marshes and swamps.

We shall be unable to turn natural advantage to account unless we make use of local guides.
In war, practice dissimulation, and you will suc- ceed.
Whether to concentrate or to divide your troops, must be decided by circumstances.
Let your rapidity be that of the wind, your com- pactness that of the forest.
In raiding and plundering be like fire, is immov- ability like a mountain.
Let your plans be dark and impenetrable as night, and when you move, fall like a thunderbolt.
When you plunder a countryside, let the spoil be divided amongst your men; when you capture new ter- ritory, cut it up into allotments for the benefit of the sol- diery.
Ponder and deliberate before you make a move.
He will conquer who has learnt the artifice of devi- ation. Such is the art of maneuvering.
The Book of Army Management says: On the field of battle, the spoken word does not carry far enough: hence the institution of gongs and drums.  Nor can

ordinary objects be seen clearly enough: hence the institution of banners and flags.
Gongs and drums, banners and flags, are means whereby the ears and eyes of the host may be focused on one particular point.
The host thus forming a single united body, is it impossible either for the brave to advance alone, or for the cowardly to retreat alone. This is the art of handling large masses of men.
In night-fighting, then, make much use of signal- fires and drums, and in fighting by day, of flags and banners, as a means of influencing the ears and eyes of your army.
A whole army may be robbed of its spirit; a com- mander-in-chief may be robbed of his presence of mind.
Now a soldier’s spirit is keenest in the morning; by noonday it has begun to flag; and in the evening, his mind is bent only on returning to camp.
A clever general, therefore, avoids an army when its spirit is keen, but attacks it when it is sluggish and inclined to return. This is the art of studying moods.

Disciplined and calm, to await the appearance of disorder and hubbub amongst the enemy:—this is the art of retaining self-possession.
To be near the goal while the enemy is still far from it, to wait at ease while the enemy is toiling and strug- gling, to be well-fed while the enemy is famished:— this is the art of husbanding one’s strength.
To refrain from intercepting an enemy whose ban- ners are in perfect order, to refrain from attacking an army drawn up in calm and confident array:—this is the art of studying circumstances.
It is a military axiom not to advance uphill against the enemy, nor to oppose him when he comes downhill.
Do not pursue an enemy who simulates flight; do not attack soldiers whose temper is keen.
Do not swallow bait offered by the enemy. Do not interfere with an army that is returning home.
When you surround an army, leave an outlet free. Do not press a desperate foe too hard.
Such is the art of warfare.

VIII
Variation in Tactics How does this resonate with you? </s>


Question:
<s>[INST] <<SYS>>
System prompt
<</SYS>>
How do you think the advice in Chapter 8: In war, the general receives his com- mands from the sovereign, collects his army and con- centrates his forces., .
When in difficult country, do not encamp. In country where high roads intersect, join hands with your allies. Do not linger in dangerously isolated positions. In hemmed-in situations, you must resort to stratagem. In desperate position, you must fight.
There are roads which must not be followed, armies which must be not attacked, towns which must be besieged, positions which must not be contested, com- mands of the sovereign which must not be obeyed.
The general who thoroughly understands the advan- tages that accompany variation of tactics knows how to handle his troops.
The general who does not understand these, may be well acquainted with the configuration of the country, yet he will not be able to turn his knowledge to practi- cal account.

So, the student of war who is unversed in the art of war of varying his plans, even though he be acquainted with the Five Advantages, will fail to make the best use of his men.
Hence in the wise leader’s plans, considerations of advantage and of disadvantage will be blended togeth- er.
If our expectation of advantage be tempered in this way, we may succeed in accomplishing the essential part of our schemes.
If, on the other hand, in the midst of difficulties we are always ready to seize an advantage, we may extri- cate ourselves from misfortune.
Reduce the hostile chiefs by inflicting damage on them; and make trouble for them, and keep them con- stantly engaged; hold out specious allurements, and make them rush to any given point.
The art of war teaches us to rely not on the likeli- hood of the enemy’s not coming, but on our own readi- ness to receive him; not on the chance of his not attack- ing, but rather on the fact that we have made our posi- tion unassailable.
There are five dangerous faults which may affect a general:
Recklessness, which leads to destruction;

cowardice, which leads to capture;
a hasty temper, which can be provoked by insults;
a delicacy of honor which is sensitive to shame;
over-solicitude for his men, which exposes him to worry and trouble.
These are the five besetting sins of a general, ruinous to the conduct of war.
When an army is overthrown and its leader slain, the cause will surely be found among these five dan- gerous faults. Let them be a subject of meditation.

IX
The Army on the March would fare in today's military strategies? [/INST]

Answer:
Chapter 8: In war, the general receives his com- mands from the sovereign, collects his army and con- centrates his forces.: .
When in difficult country, do not encamp. In country where high roads intersect, join hands with your allies. Do not linger in dangerously isolated positions. In hemmed-in situations, you must resort to stratagem. In desperate position, you must fight.
There are roads which must not be followed, armies which must be not attacked, towns which must be besieged, positions which must not be contested, com- mands of the sovereign which must not be obeyed.
The general who thoroughly understands the advan- tages that accompany variation of tactics knows how to handle his troops.
The general who does not understand these, may be well acquainted with the configuration of the country, yet he will not be able to turn his knowledge to practi- cal account.

So, the student of war who is unversed in the art of war of varying his plans, even though he be acquainted with the Five Advantages, will fail to make the best use of his men.
Hence in the wise leader’s plans, considerations of advantage and of disadvantage will be blended togeth- er.
If our expectation of advantage be tempered in this way, we may succeed in accomplishing the essential part of our schemes.
If, on the other hand, in the midst of difficulties we are always ready to seize an advantage, we may extri- cate ourselves from misfortune.
Reduce the hostile chiefs by inflicting damage on them; and make trouble for them, and keep them con- stantly engaged; hold out specious allurements, and make them rush to any given point.
The art of war teaches us to rely not on the likeli- hood of the enemy’s not coming, but on our own readi- ness to receive him; not on the chance of his not attack- ing, but rather on the fact that we have made our posi- tion unassailable.
There are five dangerous faults which may affect a general:
Recklessness, which leads to destruction;

cowardice, which leads to capture;
a hasty temper, which can be provoked by insults;
a delicacy of honor which is sensitive to shame;
over-solicitude for his men, which exposes him to worry and trouble.
These are the five besetting sins of a general, ruinous to the conduct of war.
When an army is overthrown and its leader slain, the cause will surely be found among these five dan- gerous faults. Let them be a subject of meditation.

IX
The Army on the March How does this resonate with you? </s>


Question:
<s>[INST] <<SYS>>
System prompt
<</SYS>>
How would you interpret the advice given in Chapter 8: In war, the general receives his com- mands from the sovereign, collects his army and con- centrates his forces., .
When in difficult country, do not encamp. In country where high roads intersect, join hands with your allies. Do not linger in dangerously isolated positions. In hemmed-in situations, you must resort to stratagem. In desperate position, you must fight.
There are roads which must not be followed, armies which must be not attacked, towns which must be besieged, positions which must not be contested, com- mands of the sovereign which must not be obeyed.
The general who thoroughly understands the advan- tages that accompany variation of tactics knows how to handle his troops.
The general who does not understand these, may be well acquainted with the configuration of the country, yet he will not be able to turn his knowledge to practi- cal account.

So, the student of war who is unversed in the art of war of varying his plans, even though he be acquainted with the Five Advantages, will fail to make the best use of his men.
Hence in the wise leader’s plans, considerations of advantage and of disadvantage will be blended togeth- er.
If our expectation of advantage be tempered in this way, we may succeed in accomplishing the essential part of our schemes.
If, on the other hand, in the midst of difficulties we are always ready to seize an advantage, we may extri- cate ourselves from misfortune.
Reduce the hostile chiefs by inflicting damage on them; and make trouble for them, and keep them con- stantly engaged; hold out specious allurements, and make them rush to any given point.
The art of war teaches us to rely not on the likeli- hood of the enemy’s not coming, but on our own readi- ness to receive him; not on the chance of his not attack- ing, but rather on the fact that we have made our posi- tion unassailable.
There are five dangerous faults which may affect a general:
Recklessness, which leads to destruction;

cowardice, which leads to capture;
a hasty temper, which can be provoked by insults;
a delicacy of honor which is sensitive to shame;
over-solicitude for his men, which exposes him to worry and trouble.
These are the five besetting sins of a general, ruinous to the conduct of war.
When an army is overthrown and its leader slain, the cause will surely be found among these five dan- gerous faults. Let them be a subject of meditation.

IX
The Army on the March? [/INST]

Answer:
Chapter 8: In war, the general receives his com- mands from the sovereign, collects his army and con- centrates his forces.: .
When in difficult country, do not encamp. In country where high roads intersect, join hands with your allies. Do not linger in dangerously isolated positions. In hemmed-in situations, you must resort to stratagem. In desperate position, you must fight.
There are roads which must not be followed, armies which must be not attacked, towns which must be besieged, positions which must not be contested, com- mands of the sovereign which must not be obeyed.
The general who thoroughly understands the advan- tages that accompany variation of tactics knows how to handle his troops.
The general who does not understand these, may be well acquainted with the configuration of the country, yet he will not be able to turn his knowledge to practi- cal account.

So, the student of war who is unversed in the art of war of varying his plans, even though he be acquainted with the Five Advantages, will fail to make the best use of his men.
Hence in the wise leader’s plans, considerations of advantage and of disadvantage will be blended togeth- er.
If our expectation of advantage be tempered in this way, we may succeed in accomplishing the essential part of our schemes.
If, on the other hand, in the midst of difficulties we are always ready to seize an advantage, we may extri- cate ourselves from misfortune.
Reduce the hostile chiefs by inflicting damage on them; and make trouble for them, and keep them con- stantly engaged; hold out specious allurements, and make them rush to any given point.
The art of war teaches us to rely not on the likeli- hood of the enemy’s not coming, but on our own readi- ness to receive him; not on the chance of his not attack- ing, but rather on the fact that we have made our posi- tion unassailable.
There are five dangerous faults which may affect a general:
Recklessness, which leads to destruction;

cowardice, which leads to capture;
a hasty temper, which can be provoked by insults;
a delicacy of honor which is sensitive to shame;
over-solicitude for his men, which exposes him to worry and trouble.
These are the five besetting sins of a general, ruinous to the conduct of war.
When an army is overthrown and its leader slain, the cause will surely be found among these five dan- gerous faults. Let them be a subject of meditation.

IX
The Army on the March How does this resonate with you? </s>


Question:
<s>[INST] <<SYS>>
System prompt
<</SYS>>
How would you apply the principles in Chapter 8: In war, the general receives his com- mands from the sovereign, collects his army and con- centrates his forces., .
When in difficult country, do not encamp. In country where high roads intersect, join hands with your allies. Do not linger in dangerously isolated positions. In hemmed-in situations, you must resort to stratagem. In desperate position, you must fight.
There are roads which must not be followed, armies which must be not attacked, towns which must be besieged, positions which must not be contested, com- mands of the sovereign which must not be obeyed.
The general who thoroughly understands the advan- tages that accompany variation of tactics knows how to handle his troops.
The general who does not understand these, may be well acquainted with the configuration of the country, yet he will not be able to turn his knowledge to practi- cal account.

So, the student of war who is unversed in the art of war of varying his plans, even though he be acquainted with the Five Advantages, will fail to make the best use of his men.
Hence in the wise leader’s plans, considerations of advantage and of disadvantage will be blended togeth- er.
If our expectation of advantage be tempered in this way, we may succeed in accomplishing the essential part of our schemes.
If, on the other hand, in the midst of difficulties we are always ready to seize an advantage, we may extri- cate ourselves from misfortune.
Reduce the hostile chiefs by inflicting damage on them; and make trouble for them, and keep them con- stantly engaged; hold out specious allurements, and make them rush to any given point.
The art of war teaches us to rely not on the likeli- hood of the enemy’s not coming, but on our own readi- ness to receive him; not on the chance of his not attack- ing, but rather on the fact that we have made our posi- tion unassailable.
There are five dangerous faults which may affect a general:
Recklessness, which leads to destruction;

cowardice, which leads to capture;
a hasty temper, which can be provoked by insults;
a delicacy of honor which is sensitive to shame;
over-solicitude for his men, which exposes him to worry and trouble.
These are the five besetting sins of a general, ruinous to the conduct of war.
When an army is overthrown and its leader slain, the cause will surely be found among these five dan- gerous faults. Let them be a subject of meditation.

IX
The Army on the March in a business setting? [/INST]

Answer:
Chapter 8: In war, the general receives his com- mands from the sovereign, collects his army and con- centrates his forces.: .
When in difficult country, do not encamp. In country where high roads intersect, join hands with your allies. Do not linger in dangerously isolated positions. In hemmed-in situations, you must resort to stratagem. In desperate position, you must fight.
There are roads which must not be followed, armies which must be not attacked, towns which must be besieged, positions which must not be contested, com- mands of the sovereign which must not be obeyed.
The general who thoroughly understands the advan- tages that accompany variation of tactics knows how to handle his troops.
The general who does not understand these, may be well acquainted with the configuration of the country, yet he will not be able to turn his knowledge to practi- cal account.

So, the student of war who is unversed in the art of war of varying his plans, even though he be acquainted with the Five Advantages, will fail to make the best use of his men.
Hence in the wise leader’s plans, considerations of advantage and of disadvantage will be blended togeth- er.
If our expectation of advantage be tempered in this way, we may succeed in accomplishing the essential part of our schemes.
If, on the other hand, in the midst of difficulties we are always ready to seize an advantage, we may extri- cate ourselves from misfortune.
Reduce the hostile chiefs by inflicting damage on them; and make trouble for them, and keep them con- stantly engaged; hold out specious allurements, and make them rush to any given point.
The art of war teaches us to rely not on the likeli- hood of the enemy’s not coming, but on our own readi- ness to receive him; not on the chance of his not attack- ing, but rather on the fact that we have made our posi- tion unassailable.
There are five dangerous faults which may affect a general:
Recklessness, which leads to destruction;

cowardice, which leads to capture;
a hasty temper, which can be provoked by insults;
a delicacy of honor which is sensitive to shame;
over-solicitude for his men, which exposes him to worry and trouble.
These are the five besetting sins of a general, ruinous to the conduct of war.
When an army is overthrown and its leader slain, the cause will surely be found among these five dan- gerous faults. Let them be a subject of meditation.

IX
The Army on the March How does this resonate with you? </s>