Question:
<s>[INST] <<SYS>>
System prompt
<</SYS>>
How would you apply the principles in Chapter 1: The art of war is of vital importance to the State., .
It is a matter of life and death, a road either to safe- ty or to ruin. Hence it is a subject of inquiry which can on no account be neglected.
3. The art of war, then, is governed by five constant factors, to be taken into account in one’s delib- erations, when seeking to determine the conditions obtaining in the field.
These are:
The Moral Law;
Heaven;
Earth;
The Commander;
Method and discipline.
5,6. The Moral Law causes the people to be in com- plete accord with their ruler, so that they will follow him regardless of their lives, undismayed by any dan- ger.
Heaven signifies night and day, cold and heat, times and seasons.

Earth comprises distances, great and small; danger and security; open ground and narrow passes; the chances of life and death.
9. The Commander stands for the virtues of wisdom, sincerely, benevolence, courage and strict- ness.
By method and discipline are to be understood the marshaling of the army in its proper subdivisions, the graduations of rank among the officers, the mainte- nance of roads by which supplies may reach the army, and the control of military expenditure.
These five heads should be familiar to every gener- al: he who knows them will be victorious; he who knows them not will fail.
Therefore, in your deliberations, when seeking to determine the military conditions, let them be made the basis of a comparison, in this wise:—
(1) Which of the two sovereigns is imbued with the Moral law?
Which of the two generals has most ability?
With whom lie the advantages derived from Heaven and Earth?
On which side is discipline most rigorously enforced?
Which army is stronger?

On which side are officers and men more high- ly trained?
In	which	army	is	there	the	greater constancy both in reward and punishment?
By means of these seven considerations I can fore- cast victory or defeat.
The general that hearkens to my counsel and acts upon it, will conquer: let such a one be retained in command! The general that hearkens not to my coun- sel nor acts upon it, will suffer defeat:—let such a one be dismissed!
While heading the profit of my counsel, avail your- self also of any helpful circumstances over and beyond the ordinary rules.
According as circumstances are favorable, one should modify one’s plans.
All warfare is based on deception.
Hence, when able to attack, we must seem unable; when using our forces, we must seem inactive; when we are near, we must make the enemy believe we are far away; when far away, we must make him believe we are near.
Hold out baits to entice the enemy. Feign disor- der, and crush him.

If he is secure at all points, be prepared for him. If he is in superior strength, evade him.
If your opponent is of choleric temper, seek to irri- tate him. Pretend to be weak, that he may grow arro- gant.
If he is taking his ease, give him no rest. If his forces are united, separate them.
24. Attack him where he is unprepared, appear where you are not expected.
25. These military devices, leading to victory, must not be divulged beforehand.
26. Now the general who wins a battle makes many calculations in his temple ere the battle is fought. The general who loses a battle makes but few calcula- tions beforehand. Thus do many calculations lead to victory, and few calculations to defeat: how much more no calculation at all! It is by attention to this point that I can foresee who is likely to win or lose.

II
Waging War in a business setting? [/INST]

Answer:
Chapter 1: The art of war is of vital importance to the State.: .
It is a matter of life and death, a road either to safe- ty or to ruin. Hence it is a subject of inquiry which can on no account be neglected.
3. The art of war, then, is governed by five constant factors, to be taken into account in one’s delib- erations, when seeking to determine the conditions obtaining in the field.
These are:
The Moral Law;
Heaven;
Earth;
The Commander;
Method and discipline.
5,6. The Moral Law causes the people to be in com- plete accord with their ruler, so that they will follow him regardless of their lives, undismayed by any dan- ger.
Heaven signifies night and day, cold and heat, times and seasons.

Earth comprises distances, great and small; danger and security; open ground and narrow passes; the chances of life and death.
9. The Commander stands for the virtues of wisdom, sincerely, benevolence, courage and strict- ness.
By method and discipline are to be understood the marshaling of the army in its proper subdivisions, the graduations of rank among the officers, the mainte- nance of roads by which supplies may reach the army, and the control of military expenditure.
These five heads should be familiar to every gener- al: he who knows them will be victorious; he who knows them not will fail.
Therefore, in your deliberations, when seeking to determine the military conditions, let them be made the basis of a comparison, in this wise:—
(1) Which of the two sovereigns is imbued with the Moral law?
Which of the two generals has most ability?
With whom lie the advantages derived from Heaven and Earth?
On which side is discipline most rigorously enforced?
Which army is stronger?

On which side are officers and men more high- ly trained?
In	which	army	is	there	the	greater constancy both in reward and punishment?
By means of these seven considerations I can fore- cast victory or defeat.
The general that hearkens to my counsel and acts upon it, will conquer: let such a one be retained in command! The general that hearkens not to my coun- sel nor acts upon it, will suffer defeat:—let such a one be dismissed!
While heading the profit of my counsel, avail your- self also of any helpful circumstances over and beyond the ordinary rules.
According as circumstances are favorable, one should modify one’s plans.
All warfare is based on deception.
Hence, when able to attack, we must seem unable; when using our forces, we must seem inactive; when we are near, we must make the enemy believe we are far away; when far away, we must make him believe we are near.
Hold out baits to entice the enemy. Feign disor- der, and crush him.

If he is secure at all points, be prepared for him. If he is in superior strength, evade him.
If your opponent is of choleric temper, seek to irri- tate him. Pretend to be weak, that he may grow arro- gant.
If he is taking his ease, give him no rest. If his forces are united, separate them.
24. Attack him where he is unprepared, appear where you are not expected.
25. These military devices, leading to victory, must not be divulged beforehand.
26. Now the general who wins a battle makes many calculations in his temple ere the battle is fought. The general who loses a battle makes but few calcula- tions beforehand. Thus do many calculations lead to victory, and few calculations to defeat: how much more no calculation at all! It is by attention to this point that I can foresee who is likely to win or lose.

II
Waging War How does this resonate with you? </s>


Question:
<s>[INST] <<SYS>>
System prompt
<</SYS>>
What modern parallels can be drawn from Chapter 1: The art of war is of vital importance to the State., .
It is a matter of life and death, a road either to safe- ty or to ruin. Hence it is a subject of inquiry which can on no account be neglected.
3. The art of war, then, is governed by five constant factors, to be taken into account in one’s delib- erations, when seeking to determine the conditions obtaining in the field.
These are:
The Moral Law;
Heaven;
Earth;
The Commander;
Method and discipline.
5,6. The Moral Law causes the people to be in com- plete accord with their ruler, so that they will follow him regardless of their lives, undismayed by any dan- ger.
Heaven signifies night and day, cold and heat, times and seasons.

Earth comprises distances, great and small; danger and security; open ground and narrow passes; the chances of life and death.
9. The Commander stands for the virtues of wisdom, sincerely, benevolence, courage and strict- ness.
By method and discipline are to be understood the marshaling of the army in its proper subdivisions, the graduations of rank among the officers, the mainte- nance of roads by which supplies may reach the army, and the control of military expenditure.
These five heads should be familiar to every gener- al: he who knows them will be victorious; he who knows them not will fail.
Therefore, in your deliberations, when seeking to determine the military conditions, let them be made the basis of a comparison, in this wise:—
(1) Which of the two sovereigns is imbued with the Moral law?
Which of the two generals has most ability?
With whom lie the advantages derived from Heaven and Earth?
On which side is discipline most rigorously enforced?
Which army is stronger?

On which side are officers and men more high- ly trained?
In	which	army	is	there	the	greater constancy both in reward and punishment?
By means of these seven considerations I can fore- cast victory or defeat.
The general that hearkens to my counsel and acts upon it, will conquer: let such a one be retained in command! The general that hearkens not to my coun- sel nor acts upon it, will suffer defeat:—let such a one be dismissed!
While heading the profit of my counsel, avail your- self also of any helpful circumstances over and beyond the ordinary rules.
According as circumstances are favorable, one should modify one’s plans.
All warfare is based on deception.
Hence, when able to attack, we must seem unable; when using our forces, we must seem inactive; when we are near, we must make the enemy believe we are far away; when far away, we must make him believe we are near.
Hold out baits to entice the enemy. Feign disor- der, and crush him.

If he is secure at all points, be prepared for him. If he is in superior strength, evade him.
If your opponent is of choleric temper, seek to irri- tate him. Pretend to be weak, that he may grow arro- gant.
If he is taking his ease, give him no rest. If his forces are united, separate them.
24. Attack him where he is unprepared, appear where you are not expected.
25. These military devices, leading to victory, must not be divulged beforehand.
26. Now the general who wins a battle makes many calculations in his temple ere the battle is fought. The general who loses a battle makes but few calcula- tions beforehand. Thus do many calculations lead to victory, and few calculations to defeat: how much more no calculation at all! It is by attention to this point that I can foresee who is likely to win or lose.

II
Waging War? [/INST]

Answer:
Chapter 1: The art of war is of vital importance to the State.: .
It is a matter of life and death, a road either to safe- ty or to ruin. Hence it is a subject of inquiry which can on no account be neglected.
3. The art of war, then, is governed by five constant factors, to be taken into account in one’s delib- erations, when seeking to determine the conditions obtaining in the field.
These are:
The Moral Law;
Heaven;
Earth;
The Commander;
Method and discipline.
5,6. The Moral Law causes the people to be in com- plete accord with their ruler, so that they will follow him regardless of their lives, undismayed by any dan- ger.
Heaven signifies night and day, cold and heat, times and seasons.

Earth comprises distances, great and small; danger and security; open ground and narrow passes; the chances of life and death.
9. The Commander stands for the virtues of wisdom, sincerely, benevolence, courage and strict- ness.
By method and discipline are to be understood the marshaling of the army in its proper subdivisions, the graduations of rank among the officers, the mainte- nance of roads by which supplies may reach the army, and the control of military expenditure.
These five heads should be familiar to every gener- al: he who knows them will be victorious; he who knows them not will fail.
Therefore, in your deliberations, when seeking to determine the military conditions, let them be made the basis of a comparison, in this wise:—
(1) Which of the two sovereigns is imbued with the Moral law?
Which of the two generals has most ability?
With whom lie the advantages derived from Heaven and Earth?
On which side is discipline most rigorously enforced?
Which army is stronger?

On which side are officers and men more high- ly trained?
In	which	army	is	there	the	greater constancy both in reward and punishment?
By means of these seven considerations I can fore- cast victory or defeat.
The general that hearkens to my counsel and acts upon it, will conquer: let such a one be retained in command! The general that hearkens not to my coun- sel nor acts upon it, will suffer defeat:—let such a one be dismissed!
While heading the profit of my counsel, avail your- self also of any helpful circumstances over and beyond the ordinary rules.
According as circumstances are favorable, one should modify one’s plans.
All warfare is based on deception.
Hence, when able to attack, we must seem unable; when using our forces, we must seem inactive; when we are near, we must make the enemy believe we are far away; when far away, we must make him believe we are near.
Hold out baits to entice the enemy. Feign disor- der, and crush him.

If he is secure at all points, be prepared for him. If he is in superior strength, evade him.
If your opponent is of choleric temper, seek to irri- tate him. Pretend to be weak, that he may grow arro- gant.
If he is taking his ease, give him no rest. If his forces are united, separate them.
24. Attack him where he is unprepared, appear where you are not expected.
25. These military devices, leading to victory, must not be divulged beforehand.
26. Now the general who wins a battle makes many calculations in his temple ere the battle is fought. The general who loses a battle makes but few calcula- tions beforehand. Thus do many calculations lead to victory, and few calculations to defeat: how much more no calculation at all! It is by attention to this point that I can foresee who is likely to win or lose.

II
Waging War How does this resonate with you? </s>


Question:
<s>[INST] <<SYS>>
System prompt
<</SYS>>
Can you relate any historical event to the concepts in Chapter 1: The art of war is of vital importance to the State., .
It is a matter of life and death, a road either to safe- ty or to ruin. Hence it is a subject of inquiry which can on no account be neglected.
3. The art of war, then, is governed by five constant factors, to be taken into account in one’s delib- erations, when seeking to determine the conditions obtaining in the field.
These are:
The Moral Law;
Heaven;
Earth;
The Commander;
Method and discipline.
5,6. The Moral Law causes the people to be in com- plete accord with their ruler, so that they will follow him regardless of their lives, undismayed by any dan- ger.
Heaven signifies night and day, cold and heat, times and seasons.

Earth comprises distances, great and small; danger and security; open ground and narrow passes; the chances of life and death.
9. The Commander stands for the virtues of wisdom, sincerely, benevolence, courage and strict- ness.
By method and discipline are to be understood the marshaling of the army in its proper subdivisions, the graduations of rank among the officers, the mainte- nance of roads by which supplies may reach the army, and the control of military expenditure.
These five heads should be familiar to every gener- al: he who knows them will be victorious; he who knows them not will fail.
Therefore, in your deliberations, when seeking to determine the military conditions, let them be made the basis of a comparison, in this wise:—
(1) Which of the two sovereigns is imbued with the Moral law?
Which of the two generals has most ability?
With whom lie the advantages derived from Heaven and Earth?
On which side is discipline most rigorously enforced?
Which army is stronger?

On which side are officers and men more high- ly trained?
In	which	army	is	there	the	greater constancy both in reward and punishment?
By means of these seven considerations I can fore- cast victory or defeat.
The general that hearkens to my counsel and acts upon it, will conquer: let such a one be retained in command! The general that hearkens not to my coun- sel nor acts upon it, will suffer defeat:—let such a one be dismissed!
While heading the profit of my counsel, avail your- self also of any helpful circumstances over and beyond the ordinary rules.
According as circumstances are favorable, one should modify one’s plans.
All warfare is based on deception.
Hence, when able to attack, we must seem unable; when using our forces, we must seem inactive; when we are near, we must make the enemy believe we are far away; when far away, we must make him believe we are near.
Hold out baits to entice the enemy. Feign disor- der, and crush him.

If he is secure at all points, be prepared for him. If he is in superior strength, evade him.
If your opponent is of choleric temper, seek to irri- tate him. Pretend to be weak, that he may grow arro- gant.
If he is taking his ease, give him no rest. If his forces are united, separate them.
24. Attack him where he is unprepared, appear where you are not expected.
25. These military devices, leading to victory, must not be divulged beforehand.
26. Now the general who wins a battle makes many calculations in his temple ere the battle is fought. The general who loses a battle makes but few calcula- tions beforehand. Thus do many calculations lead to victory, and few calculations to defeat: how much more no calculation at all! It is by attention to this point that I can foresee who is likely to win or lose.

II
Waging War? [/INST]

Answer:
Chapter 1: The art of war is of vital importance to the State.: .
It is a matter of life and death, a road either to safe- ty or to ruin. Hence it is a subject of inquiry which can on no account be neglected.
3. The art of war, then, is governed by five constant factors, to be taken into account in one’s delib- erations, when seeking to determine the conditions obtaining in the field.
These are:
The Moral Law;
Heaven;
Earth;
The Commander;
Method and discipline.
5,6. The Moral Law causes the people to be in com- plete accord with their ruler, so that they will follow him regardless of their lives, undismayed by any dan- ger.
Heaven signifies night and day, cold and heat, times and seasons.

Earth comprises distances, great and small; danger and security; open ground and narrow passes; the chances of life and death.
9. The Commander stands for the virtues of wisdom, sincerely, benevolence, courage and strict- ness.
By method and discipline are to be understood the marshaling of the army in its proper subdivisions, the graduations of rank among the officers, the mainte- nance of roads by which supplies may reach the army, and the control of military expenditure.
These five heads should be familiar to every gener- al: he who knows them will be victorious; he who knows them not will fail.
Therefore, in your deliberations, when seeking to determine the military conditions, let them be made the basis of a comparison, in this wise:—
(1) Which of the two sovereigns is imbued with the Moral law?
Which of the two generals has most ability?
With whom lie the advantages derived from Heaven and Earth?
On which side is discipline most rigorously enforced?
Which army is stronger?

On which side are officers and men more high- ly trained?
In	which	army	is	there	the	greater constancy both in reward and punishment?
By means of these seven considerations I can fore- cast victory or defeat.
The general that hearkens to my counsel and acts upon it, will conquer: let such a one be retained in command! The general that hearkens not to my coun- sel nor acts upon it, will suffer defeat:—let such a one be dismissed!
While heading the profit of my counsel, avail your- self also of any helpful circumstances over and beyond the ordinary rules.
According as circumstances are favorable, one should modify one’s plans.
All warfare is based on deception.
Hence, when able to attack, we must seem unable; when using our forces, we must seem inactive; when we are near, we must make the enemy believe we are far away; when far away, we must make him believe we are near.
Hold out baits to entice the enemy. Feign disor- der, and crush him.

If he is secure at all points, be prepared for him. If he is in superior strength, evade him.
If your opponent is of choleric temper, seek to irri- tate him. Pretend to be weak, that he may grow arro- gant.
If he is taking his ease, give him no rest. If his forces are united, separate them.
24. Attack him where he is unprepared, appear where you are not expected.
25. These military devices, leading to victory, must not be divulged beforehand.
26. Now the general who wins a battle makes many calculations in his temple ere the battle is fought. The general who loses a battle makes but few calcula- tions beforehand. Thus do many calculations lead to victory, and few calculations to defeat: how much more no calculation at all! It is by attention to this point that I can foresee who is likely to win or lose.

II
Waging War How does this resonate with you? </s>


Question:
<s>[INST] <<SYS>>
System prompt
<</SYS>>
What lessons can be learned from Chapter 2: In the operations of war, where there are in the field a thousand swift chariots, as many heavy chariots, and a hundred thousand mail-clad sol- diers, with provisions enough to carry them a thousand li, the expenditure at home and at the front, including entertainment of guests, small items such as glue and paint, and sums spent on chariots and armor, will reach the total of a thousand ounces of silver per day. Such is the cost of raising an army of 100,000 men., .
When you engage in actual fighting, if victory is long in coming, then men’s weapons will grow dull and their ardor will be damped. If you lay siege to a town, you will exhaust your strength.
Again, if the campaign is protracted, the resources of the State will not be equal to the strain.
Now, when your weapons are dulled, your ardor damped, your strength exhausted and your treasure spent, other chieftains will spring up to take advantage of your extremity. Then no man, however wise, will be able to avert the consequences that must ensue.
Thus, though we have heard of stupid haste in war, cleverness has never been seen associated with long delays.

There is no instance of a country having benefited from prolonged warfare.
It is only one who is thoroughly acquainted with the evils of war that can thoroughly understand the prof- itable way of carrying it on.
The skillful soldier does not raise a second levy, nei- ther are his supply-wagons loaded more than twice.
Bring war material with you from home, but forage on the enemy. Thus the army will have food enough for its needs.
Poverty of the State exchequer causes an army to be maintained by contributions from a distance. Contributing to maintain an army at a distance causes the people to be impoverished.
On the other hand, the proximity of an army caus- es prices to go up; and high prices cause the people’s substance to be drained away.
When their substance is drained away, the peas- antry will be afflicted by heavy exactions.
13,14. With this loss of substance and exhaustion of strength, the homes of the people will be stripped bare, and three-tenths of their income will be dissipated; while government expenses for broken chariots, worn- out horses, breast-plates and helmets, bows and arrows,

spears and shields, protective mantles, draught-oxen and heavy wagons, will amount to four-tenths of its total revenue.
Hence a wise general makes a point of foraging on the enemy. One cartload of the enemy’s provisions is equivalent to twenty of one’s own, and likewise a sin- gle picul of his provender is equivalent to twenty from one’s own store.
Now in order to kill the enemy, our men must be roused to anger; that there may be advantage from defeating the enemy, they must have their rewards.
Therefore in chariot fighting, when ten or more chariots have been taken, those should be rewarded who took the first. Our own flags should be substituted for those of the enemy, and the chariots mingled and used in conjunction with ours. The captured soldiers should be kindly treated and kept.
This is called, using the conquered foe to augment one’s own strength.
In war, then, let your great object be victory, not lengthy campaigns.
Thus it may be known that the leader of armies is the arbiter of the people’s fate, the man on whom it depends whether the nation shall be in peace or in peril.

III
Attack by Stratagem in terms of leadership and strategy? [/INST]

Answer:
Chapter 2: In the operations of war, where there are in the field a thousand swift chariots, as many heavy chariots, and a hundred thousand mail-clad sol- diers, with provisions enough to carry them a thousand li, the expenditure at home and at the front, including entertainment of guests, small items such as glue and paint, and sums spent on chariots and armor, will reach the total of a thousand ounces of silver per day. Such is the cost of raising an army of 100,000 men.: .
When you engage in actual fighting, if victory is long in coming, then men’s weapons will grow dull and their ardor will be damped. If you lay siege to a town, you will exhaust your strength.
Again, if the campaign is protracted, the resources of the State will not be equal to the strain.
Now, when your weapons are dulled, your ardor damped, your strength exhausted and your treasure spent, other chieftains will spring up to take advantage of your extremity. Then no man, however wise, will be able to avert the consequences that must ensue.
Thus, though we have heard of stupid haste in war, cleverness has never been seen associated with long delays.

There is no instance of a country having benefited from prolonged warfare.
It is only one who is thoroughly acquainted with the evils of war that can thoroughly understand the prof- itable way of carrying it on.
The skillful soldier does not raise a second levy, nei- ther are his supply-wagons loaded more than twice.
Bring war material with you from home, but forage on the enemy. Thus the army will have food enough for its needs.
Poverty of the State exchequer causes an army to be maintained by contributions from a distance. Contributing to maintain an army at a distance causes the people to be impoverished.
On the other hand, the proximity of an army caus- es prices to go up; and high prices cause the people’s substance to be drained away.
When their substance is drained away, the peas- antry will be afflicted by heavy exactions.
13,14. With this loss of substance and exhaustion of strength, the homes of the people will be stripped bare, and three-tenths of their income will be dissipated; while government expenses for broken chariots, worn- out horses, breast-plates and helmets, bows and arrows,

spears and shields, protective mantles, draught-oxen and heavy wagons, will amount to four-tenths of its total revenue.
Hence a wise general makes a point of foraging on the enemy. One cartload of the enemy’s provisions is equivalent to twenty of one’s own, and likewise a sin- gle picul of his provender is equivalent to twenty from one’s own store.
Now in order to kill the enemy, our men must be roused to anger; that there may be advantage from defeating the enemy, they must have their rewards.
Therefore in chariot fighting, when ten or more chariots have been taken, those should be rewarded who took the first. Our own flags should be substituted for those of the enemy, and the chariots mingled and used in conjunction with ours. The captured soldiers should be kindly treated and kept.
This is called, using the conquered foe to augment one’s own strength.
In war, then, let your great object be victory, not lengthy campaigns.
Thus it may be known that the leader of armies is the arbiter of the people’s fate, the man on whom it depends whether the nation shall be in peace or in peril.

III
Attack by Stratagem How does this resonate with you? </s>


Question:
<s>[INST] <<SYS>>
System prompt
<</SYS>>
Can you relate any historical event to the concepts in Chapter 2: In the operations of war, where there are in the field a thousand swift chariots, as many heavy chariots, and a hundred thousand mail-clad sol- diers, with provisions enough to carry them a thousand li, the expenditure at home and at the front, including entertainment of guests, small items such as glue and paint, and sums spent on chariots and armor, will reach the total of a thousand ounces of silver per day. Such is the cost of raising an army of 100,000 men., .
When you engage in actual fighting, if victory is long in coming, then men’s weapons will grow dull and their ardor will be damped. If you lay siege to a town, you will exhaust your strength.
Again, if the campaign is protracted, the resources of the State will not be equal to the strain.
Now, when your weapons are dulled, your ardor damped, your strength exhausted and your treasure spent, other chieftains will spring up to take advantage of your extremity. Then no man, however wise, will be able to avert the consequences that must ensue.
Thus, though we have heard of stupid haste in war, cleverness has never been seen associated with long delays.

There is no instance of a country having benefited from prolonged warfare.
It is only one who is thoroughly acquainted with the evils of war that can thoroughly understand the prof- itable way of carrying it on.
The skillful soldier does not raise a second levy, nei- ther are his supply-wagons loaded more than twice.
Bring war material with you from home, but forage on the enemy. Thus the army will have food enough for its needs.
Poverty of the State exchequer causes an army to be maintained by contributions from a distance. Contributing to maintain an army at a distance causes the people to be impoverished.
On the other hand, the proximity of an army caus- es prices to go up; and high prices cause the people’s substance to be drained away.
When their substance is drained away, the peas- antry will be afflicted by heavy exactions.
13,14. With this loss of substance and exhaustion of strength, the homes of the people will be stripped bare, and three-tenths of their income will be dissipated; while government expenses for broken chariots, worn- out horses, breast-plates and helmets, bows and arrows,

spears and shields, protective mantles, draught-oxen and heavy wagons, will amount to four-tenths of its total revenue.
Hence a wise general makes a point of foraging on the enemy. One cartload of the enemy’s provisions is equivalent to twenty of one’s own, and likewise a sin- gle picul of his provender is equivalent to twenty from one’s own store.
Now in order to kill the enemy, our men must be roused to anger; that there may be advantage from defeating the enemy, they must have their rewards.
Therefore in chariot fighting, when ten or more chariots have been taken, those should be rewarded who took the first. Our own flags should be substituted for those of the enemy, and the chariots mingled and used in conjunction with ours. The captured soldiers should be kindly treated and kept.
This is called, using the conquered foe to augment one’s own strength.
In war, then, let your great object be victory, not lengthy campaigns.
Thus it may be known that the leader of armies is the arbiter of the people’s fate, the man on whom it depends whether the nation shall be in peace or in peril.

III
Attack by Stratagem? [/INST]

Answer:
Chapter 2: In the operations of war, where there are in the field a thousand swift chariots, as many heavy chariots, and a hundred thousand mail-clad sol- diers, with provisions enough to carry them a thousand li, the expenditure at home and at the front, including entertainment of guests, small items such as glue and paint, and sums spent on chariots and armor, will reach the total of a thousand ounces of silver per day. Such is the cost of raising an army of 100,000 men.: .
When you engage in actual fighting, if victory is long in coming, then men’s weapons will grow dull and their ardor will be damped. If you lay siege to a town, you will exhaust your strength.
Again, if the campaign is protracted, the resources of the State will not be equal to the strain.
Now, when your weapons are dulled, your ardor damped, your strength exhausted and your treasure spent, other chieftains will spring up to take advantage of your extremity. Then no man, however wise, will be able to avert the consequences that must ensue.
Thus, though we have heard of stupid haste in war, cleverness has never been seen associated with long delays.

There is no instance of a country having benefited from prolonged warfare.
It is only one who is thoroughly acquainted with the evils of war that can thoroughly understand the prof- itable way of carrying it on.
The skillful soldier does not raise a second levy, nei- ther are his supply-wagons loaded more than twice.
Bring war material with you from home, but forage on the enemy. Thus the army will have food enough for its needs.
Poverty of the State exchequer causes an army to be maintained by contributions from a distance. Contributing to maintain an army at a distance causes the people to be impoverished.
On the other hand, the proximity of an army caus- es prices to go up; and high prices cause the people’s substance to be drained away.
When their substance is drained away, the peas- antry will be afflicted by heavy exactions.
13,14. With this loss of substance and exhaustion of strength, the homes of the people will be stripped bare, and three-tenths of their income will be dissipated; while government expenses for broken chariots, worn- out horses, breast-plates and helmets, bows and arrows,

spears and shields, protective mantles, draught-oxen and heavy wagons, will amount to four-tenths of its total revenue.
Hence a wise general makes a point of foraging on the enemy. One cartload of the enemy’s provisions is equivalent to twenty of one’s own, and likewise a sin- gle picul of his provender is equivalent to twenty from one’s own store.
Now in order to kill the enemy, our men must be roused to anger; that there may be advantage from defeating the enemy, they must have their rewards.
Therefore in chariot fighting, when ten or more chariots have been taken, those should be rewarded who took the first. Our own flags should be substituted for those of the enemy, and the chariots mingled and used in conjunction with ours. The captured soldiers should be kindly treated and kept.
This is called, using the conquered foe to augment one’s own strength.
In war, then, let your great object be victory, not lengthy campaigns.
Thus it may be known that the leader of armies is the arbiter of the people’s fate, the man on whom it depends whether the nation shall be in peace or in peril.

III
Attack by Stratagem How does this resonate with you? </s>


Question:
<s>[INST] <<SYS>>
System prompt
<</SYS>>
What are your thoughts on the strategy discussed in Chapter 2: In the operations of war, where there are in the field a thousand swift chariots, as many heavy chariots, and a hundred thousand mail-clad sol- diers, with provisions enough to carry them a thousand li, the expenditure at home and at the front, including entertainment of guests, small items such as glue and paint, and sums spent on chariots and armor, will reach the total of a thousand ounces of silver per day. Such is the cost of raising an army of 100,000 men., .
When you engage in actual fighting, if victory is long in coming, then men’s weapons will grow dull and their ardor will be damped. If you lay siege to a town, you will exhaust your strength.
Again, if the campaign is protracted, the resources of the State will not be equal to the strain.
Now, when your weapons are dulled, your ardor damped, your strength exhausted and your treasure spent, other chieftains will spring up to take advantage of your extremity. Then no man, however wise, will be able to avert the consequences that must ensue.
Thus, though we have heard of stupid haste in war, cleverness has never been seen associated with long delays.

There is no instance of a country having benefited from prolonged warfare.
It is only one who is thoroughly acquainted with the evils of war that can thoroughly understand the prof- itable way of carrying it on.
The skillful soldier does not raise a second levy, nei- ther are his supply-wagons loaded more than twice.
Bring war material with you from home, but forage on the enemy. Thus the army will have food enough for its needs.
Poverty of the State exchequer causes an army to be maintained by contributions from a distance. Contributing to maintain an army at a distance causes the people to be impoverished.
On the other hand, the proximity of an army caus- es prices to go up; and high prices cause the people’s substance to be drained away.
When their substance is drained away, the peas- antry will be afflicted by heavy exactions.
13,14. With this loss of substance and exhaustion of strength, the homes of the people will be stripped bare, and three-tenths of their income will be dissipated; while government expenses for broken chariots, worn- out horses, breast-plates and helmets, bows and arrows,

spears and shields, protective mantles, draught-oxen and heavy wagons, will amount to four-tenths of its total revenue.
Hence a wise general makes a point of foraging on the enemy. One cartload of the enemy’s provisions is equivalent to twenty of one’s own, and likewise a sin- gle picul of his provender is equivalent to twenty from one’s own store.
Now in order to kill the enemy, our men must be roused to anger; that there may be advantage from defeating the enemy, they must have their rewards.
Therefore in chariot fighting, when ten or more chariots have been taken, those should be rewarded who took the first. Our own flags should be substituted for those of the enemy, and the chariots mingled and used in conjunction with ours. The captured soldiers should be kindly treated and kept.
This is called, using the conquered foe to augment one’s own strength.
In war, then, let your great object be victory, not lengthy campaigns.
Thus it may be known that the leader of armies is the arbiter of the people’s fate, the man on whom it depends whether the nation shall be in peace or in peril.

III
Attack by Stratagem? [/INST]

Answer:
Chapter 2: In the operations of war, where there are in the field a thousand swift chariots, as many heavy chariots, and a hundred thousand mail-clad sol- diers, with provisions enough to carry them a thousand li, the expenditure at home and at the front, including entertainment of guests, small items such as glue and paint, and sums spent on chariots and armor, will reach the total of a thousand ounces of silver per day. Such is the cost of raising an army of 100,000 men.: .
When you engage in actual fighting, if victory is long in coming, then men’s weapons will grow dull and their ardor will be damped. If you lay siege to a town, you will exhaust your strength.
Again, if the campaign is protracted, the resources of the State will not be equal to the strain.
Now, when your weapons are dulled, your ardor damped, your strength exhausted and your treasure spent, other chieftains will spring up to take advantage of your extremity. Then no man, however wise, will be able to avert the consequences that must ensue.
Thus, though we have heard of stupid haste in war, cleverness has never been seen associated with long delays.

There is no instance of a country having benefited from prolonged warfare.
It is only one who is thoroughly acquainted with the evils of war that can thoroughly understand the prof- itable way of carrying it on.
The skillful soldier does not raise a second levy, nei- ther are his supply-wagons loaded more than twice.
Bring war material with you from home, but forage on the enemy. Thus the army will have food enough for its needs.
Poverty of the State exchequer causes an army to be maintained by contributions from a distance. Contributing to maintain an army at a distance causes the people to be impoverished.
On the other hand, the proximity of an army caus- es prices to go up; and high prices cause the people’s substance to be drained away.
When their substance is drained away, the peas- antry will be afflicted by heavy exactions.
13,14. With this loss of substance and exhaustion of strength, the homes of the people will be stripped bare, and three-tenths of their income will be dissipated; while government expenses for broken chariots, worn- out horses, breast-plates and helmets, bows and arrows,

spears and shields, protective mantles, draught-oxen and heavy wagons, will amount to four-tenths of its total revenue.
Hence a wise general makes a point of foraging on the enemy. One cartload of the enemy’s provisions is equivalent to twenty of one’s own, and likewise a sin- gle picul of his provender is equivalent to twenty from one’s own store.
Now in order to kill the enemy, our men must be roused to anger; that there may be advantage from defeating the enemy, they must have their rewards.
Therefore in chariot fighting, when ten or more chariots have been taken, those should be rewarded who took the first. Our own flags should be substituted for those of the enemy, and the chariots mingled and used in conjunction with ours. The captured soldiers should be kindly treated and kept.
This is called, using the conquered foe to augment one’s own strength.
In war, then, let your great object be victory, not lengthy campaigns.
Thus it may be known that the leader of armies is the arbiter of the people’s fate, the man on whom it depends whether the nation shall be in peace or in peril.

III
Attack by Stratagem How does this resonate with you? </s>


Question:
<s>[INST] <<SYS>>
System prompt
<</SYS>>
What emotions do the words in Chapter 3: In the practical art of war, the best thing of all is to take the enemy’s country whole and intact; to shatter and destroy it is not so good. So, too, it is better to recapture an army entire than to destroy it, to capture a regiment, a detachment or a company entire than to destroy them., .
Hence to fight and conquer in all your battles is not supreme excellence; supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy’s resistance without fighting.
Thus the highest form of generalship is to balk the enemy’s plans; the next best is to prevent the junction of the enemy’s forces; the next in order is to attack the enemy’s army in the field; and the worst policy of all is to besiege walled cities.
The rule is, not to besiege walled cities if it can pos- sibly be avoided. The preparation of mantlets, movable shelters, and various implements of war, will take up three whole months; and the piling up of mounds over against the walls will take three months more.
The general, unable to control his irritation, will launch his men to the assault like swarming ants, with the result that one-third of his men are slain while the

town still remains untaken. Such are the disastrous effects of a siege.
Therefore the skillful leader subdues the enemy’s troops without any fighting; he captures their cities without laying siege to them; he overthrows their king- dom without lengthy operations in the field.
With his forces intact he will dispute the mastery of the Empire, and thus, without losing a man, his triumph will be complete. This is the method of attacking by stratagem.
It is the rule in war, if our forces are ten to the enemy’s one, to surround him; if five to one, to attack him; if twice as numerous, to divide our army into two.
If equally matched, we can offer battle; if slightly inferior in numbers, we can avoid the enemy; if quite unequal in every way, we can flee from him.
Hence, though an obstinate fight may be made by a small force, in the end it must be captured by the larg- er force.
Now the general is the bulwark of the State; if the bulwark is complete at all points; the State will be strong; if the bulwark is defective, the State will be weak.

There are three ways in which a ruler can bring misfortune upon his army:—
(1) By commanding the army to advance or to retreat, being ignorant of the fact that it cannot obey. This is called hobbling the army.
(2) By attempting to govern an army in the same way as he administers a kingdom, being ignorant of the conditions which obtain in an army. This causes rest- lessness in the soldier’s minds.
(3) By employing the officers of his army without discrimination, through ignorance of the military prin- ciple of adaptation to circumstances. This shakes the confidence of the soldiers.
But when the army is restless and distrustful, trou- ble is sure to come from the other feudal princes. This is simply bringing anarchy into the army, and flinging victory away.
Thus we may know that there are five essentials for victory:
He will win who knows when to fight and when not to fight.
He will win who knows how to handle both superior and inferior forces.
He will win whose army is animated by the same spirit throughout all its ranks.

He will win who, prepared himself, waits to take the enemy unprepared.
He will win who has military capacity and is not interfered with by the sovereign.
Hence the saying: If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hun- dred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will suc- cumb in every battle.

IV
Tactical Dispositions evoke in you? [/INST]

Answer:
Chapter 3: In the practical art of war, the best thing of all is to take the enemy’s country whole and intact; to shatter and destroy it is not so good. So, too, it is better to recapture an army entire than to destroy it, to capture a regiment, a detachment or a company entire than to destroy them.: .
Hence to fight and conquer in all your battles is not supreme excellence; supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy’s resistance without fighting.
Thus the highest form of generalship is to balk the enemy’s plans; the next best is to prevent the junction of the enemy’s forces; the next in order is to attack the enemy’s army in the field; and the worst policy of all is to besiege walled cities.
The rule is, not to besiege walled cities if it can pos- sibly be avoided. The preparation of mantlets, movable shelters, and various implements of war, will take up three whole months; and the piling up of mounds over against the walls will take three months more.
The general, unable to control his irritation, will launch his men to the assault like swarming ants, with the result that one-third of his men are slain while the

town still remains untaken. Such are the disastrous effects of a siege.
Therefore the skillful leader subdues the enemy’s troops without any fighting; he captures their cities without laying siege to them; he overthrows their king- dom without lengthy operations in the field.
With his forces intact he will dispute the mastery of the Empire, and thus, without losing a man, his triumph will be complete. This is the method of attacking by stratagem.
It is the rule in war, if our forces are ten to the enemy’s one, to surround him; if five to one, to attack him; if twice as numerous, to divide our army into two.
If equally matched, we can offer battle; if slightly inferior in numbers, we can avoid the enemy; if quite unequal in every way, we can flee from him.
Hence, though an obstinate fight may be made by a small force, in the end it must be captured by the larg- er force.
Now the general is the bulwark of the State; if the bulwark is complete at all points; the State will be strong; if the bulwark is defective, the State will be weak.

There are three ways in which a ruler can bring misfortune upon his army:—
(1) By commanding the army to advance or to retreat, being ignorant of the fact that it cannot obey. This is called hobbling the army.
(2) By attempting to govern an army in the same way as he administers a kingdom, being ignorant of the conditions which obtain in an army. This causes rest- lessness in the soldier’s minds.
(3) By employing the officers of his army without discrimination, through ignorance of the military prin- ciple of adaptation to circumstances. This shakes the confidence of the soldiers.
But when the army is restless and distrustful, trou- ble is sure to come from the other feudal princes. This is simply bringing anarchy into the army, and flinging victory away.
Thus we may know that there are five essentials for victory:
He will win who knows when to fight and when not to fight.
He will win who knows how to handle both superior and inferior forces.
He will win whose army is animated by the same spirit throughout all its ranks.

He will win who, prepared himself, waits to take the enemy unprepared.
He will win who has military capacity and is not interfered with by the sovereign.
Hence the saying: If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hun- dred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will suc- cumb in every battle.

IV
Tactical Dispositions How does this resonate with you? </s>


Question:
<s>[INST] <<SYS>>
System prompt
<</SYS>>
What are your thoughts on the strategy discussed in Chapter 3: In the practical art of war, the best thing of all is to take the enemy’s country whole and intact; to shatter and destroy it is not so good. So, too, it is better to recapture an army entire than to destroy it, to capture a regiment, a detachment or a company entire than to destroy them., .
Hence to fight and conquer in all your battles is not supreme excellence; supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy’s resistance without fighting.
Thus the highest form of generalship is to balk the enemy’s plans; the next best is to prevent the junction of the enemy’s forces; the next in order is to attack the enemy’s army in the field; and the worst policy of all is to besiege walled cities.
The rule is, not to besiege walled cities if it can pos- sibly be avoided. The preparation of mantlets, movable shelters, and various implements of war, will take up three whole months; and the piling up of mounds over against the walls will take three months more.
The general, unable to control his irritation, will launch his men to the assault like swarming ants, with the result that one-third of his men are slain while the

town still remains untaken. Such are the disastrous effects of a siege.
Therefore the skillful leader subdues the enemy’s troops without any fighting; he captures their cities without laying siege to them; he overthrows their king- dom without lengthy operations in the field.
With his forces intact he will dispute the mastery of the Empire, and thus, without losing a man, his triumph will be complete. This is the method of attacking by stratagem.
It is the rule in war, if our forces are ten to the enemy’s one, to surround him; if five to one, to attack him; if twice as numerous, to divide our army into two.
If equally matched, we can offer battle; if slightly inferior in numbers, we can avoid the enemy; if quite unequal in every way, we can flee from him.
Hence, though an obstinate fight may be made by a small force, in the end it must be captured by the larg- er force.
Now the general is the bulwark of the State; if the bulwark is complete at all points; the State will be strong; if the bulwark is defective, the State will be weak.

There are three ways in which a ruler can bring misfortune upon his army:—
(1) By commanding the army to advance or to retreat, being ignorant of the fact that it cannot obey. This is called hobbling the army.
(2) By attempting to govern an army in the same way as he administers a kingdom, being ignorant of the conditions which obtain in an army. This causes rest- lessness in the soldier’s minds.
(3) By employing the officers of his army without discrimination, through ignorance of the military prin- ciple of adaptation to circumstances. This shakes the confidence of the soldiers.
But when the army is restless and distrustful, trou- ble is sure to come from the other feudal princes. This is simply bringing anarchy into the army, and flinging victory away.
Thus we may know that there are five essentials for victory:
He will win who knows when to fight and when not to fight.
He will win who knows how to handle both superior and inferior forces.
He will win whose army is animated by the same spirit throughout all its ranks.

He will win who, prepared himself, waits to take the enemy unprepared.
He will win who has military capacity and is not interfered with by the sovereign.
Hence the saying: If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hun- dred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will suc- cumb in every battle.

IV
Tactical Dispositions? [/INST]

Answer:
Chapter 3: In the practical art of war, the best thing of all is to take the enemy’s country whole and intact; to shatter and destroy it is not so good. So, too, it is better to recapture an army entire than to destroy it, to capture a regiment, a detachment or a company entire than to destroy them.: .
Hence to fight and conquer in all your battles is not supreme excellence; supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy’s resistance without fighting.
Thus the highest form of generalship is to balk the enemy’s plans; the next best is to prevent the junction of the enemy’s forces; the next in order is to attack the enemy’s army in the field; and the worst policy of all is to besiege walled cities.
The rule is, not to besiege walled cities if it can pos- sibly be avoided. The preparation of mantlets, movable shelters, and various implements of war, will take up three whole months; and the piling up of mounds over against the walls will take three months more.
The general, unable to control his irritation, will launch his men to the assault like swarming ants, with the result that one-third of his men are slain while the

town still remains untaken. Such are the disastrous effects of a siege.
Therefore the skillful leader subdues the enemy’s troops without any fighting; he captures their cities without laying siege to them; he overthrows their king- dom without lengthy operations in the field.
With his forces intact he will dispute the mastery of the Empire, and thus, without losing a man, his triumph will be complete. This is the method of attacking by stratagem.
It is the rule in war, if our forces are ten to the enemy’s one, to surround him; if five to one, to attack him; if twice as numerous, to divide our army into two.
If equally matched, we can offer battle; if slightly inferior in numbers, we can avoid the enemy; if quite unequal in every way, we can flee from him.
Hence, though an obstinate fight may be made by a small force, in the end it must be captured by the larg- er force.
Now the general is the bulwark of the State; if the bulwark is complete at all points; the State will be strong; if the bulwark is defective, the State will be weak.

There are three ways in which a ruler can bring misfortune upon his army:—
(1) By commanding the army to advance or to retreat, being ignorant of the fact that it cannot obey. This is called hobbling the army.
(2) By attempting to govern an army in the same way as he administers a kingdom, being ignorant of the conditions which obtain in an army. This causes rest- lessness in the soldier’s minds.
(3) By employing the officers of his army without discrimination, through ignorance of the military prin- ciple of adaptation to circumstances. This shakes the confidence of the soldiers.
But when the army is restless and distrustful, trou- ble is sure to come from the other feudal princes. This is simply bringing anarchy into the army, and flinging victory away.
Thus we may know that there are five essentials for victory:
He will win who knows when to fight and when not to fight.
He will win who knows how to handle both superior and inferior forces.
He will win whose army is animated by the same spirit throughout all its ranks.

He will win who, prepared himself, waits to take the enemy unprepared.
He will win who has military capacity and is not interfered with by the sovereign.
Hence the saying: If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hun- dred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will suc- cumb in every battle.

IV
Tactical Dispositions How does this resonate with you? </s>


Question:
<s>[INST] <<SYS>>
System prompt
<</SYS>>
What lessons can be learned from Chapter 3: In the practical art of war, the best thing of all is to take the enemy’s country whole and intact; to shatter and destroy it is not so good. So, too, it is better to recapture an army entire than to destroy it, to capture a regiment, a detachment or a company entire than to destroy them., .
Hence to fight and conquer in all your battles is not supreme excellence; supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy’s resistance without fighting.
Thus the highest form of generalship is to balk the enemy’s plans; the next best is to prevent the junction of the enemy’s forces; the next in order is to attack the enemy’s army in the field; and the worst policy of all is to besiege walled cities.
The rule is, not to besiege walled cities if it can pos- sibly be avoided. The preparation of mantlets, movable shelters, and various implements of war, will take up three whole months; and the piling up of mounds over against the walls will take three months more.
The general, unable to control his irritation, will launch his men to the assault like swarming ants, with the result that one-third of his men are slain while the

town still remains untaken. Such are the disastrous effects of a siege.
Therefore the skillful leader subdues the enemy’s troops without any fighting; he captures their cities without laying siege to them; he overthrows their king- dom without lengthy operations in the field.
With his forces intact he will dispute the mastery of the Empire, and thus, without losing a man, his triumph will be complete. This is the method of attacking by stratagem.
It is the rule in war, if our forces are ten to the enemy’s one, to surround him; if five to one, to attack him; if twice as numerous, to divide our army into two.
If equally matched, we can offer battle; if slightly inferior in numbers, we can avoid the enemy; if quite unequal in every way, we can flee from him.
Hence, though an obstinate fight may be made by a small force, in the end it must be captured by the larg- er force.
Now the general is the bulwark of the State; if the bulwark is complete at all points; the State will be strong; if the bulwark is defective, the State will be weak.

There are three ways in which a ruler can bring misfortune upon his army:—
(1) By commanding the army to advance or to retreat, being ignorant of the fact that it cannot obey. This is called hobbling the army.
(2) By attempting to govern an army in the same way as he administers a kingdom, being ignorant of the conditions which obtain in an army. This causes rest- lessness in the soldier’s minds.
(3) By employing the officers of his army without discrimination, through ignorance of the military prin- ciple of adaptation to circumstances. This shakes the confidence of the soldiers.
But when the army is restless and distrustful, trou- ble is sure to come from the other feudal princes. This is simply bringing anarchy into the army, and flinging victory away.
Thus we may know that there are five essentials for victory:
He will win who knows when to fight and when not to fight.
He will win who knows how to handle both superior and inferior forces.
He will win whose army is animated by the same spirit throughout all its ranks.

He will win who, prepared himself, waits to take the enemy unprepared.
He will win who has military capacity and is not interfered with by the sovereign.
Hence the saying: If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hun- dred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will suc- cumb in every battle.

IV
Tactical Dispositions in terms of leadership and strategy? [/INST]

Answer:
Chapter 3: In the practical art of war, the best thing of all is to take the enemy’s country whole and intact; to shatter and destroy it is not so good. So, too, it is better to recapture an army entire than to destroy it, to capture a regiment, a detachment or a company entire than to destroy them.: .
Hence to fight and conquer in all your battles is not supreme excellence; supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy’s resistance without fighting.
Thus the highest form of generalship is to balk the enemy’s plans; the next best is to prevent the junction of the enemy’s forces; the next in order is to attack the enemy’s army in the field; and the worst policy of all is to besiege walled cities.
The rule is, not to besiege walled cities if it can pos- sibly be avoided. The preparation of mantlets, movable shelters, and various implements of war, will take up three whole months; and the piling up of mounds over against the walls will take three months more.
The general, unable to control his irritation, will launch his men to the assault like swarming ants, with the result that one-third of his men are slain while the

town still remains untaken. Such are the disastrous effects of a siege.
Therefore the skillful leader subdues the enemy’s troops without any fighting; he captures their cities without laying siege to them; he overthrows their king- dom without lengthy operations in the field.
With his forces intact he will dispute the mastery of the Empire, and thus, without losing a man, his triumph will be complete. This is the method of attacking by stratagem.
It is the rule in war, if our forces are ten to the enemy’s one, to surround him; if five to one, to attack him; if twice as numerous, to divide our army into two.
If equally matched, we can offer battle; if slightly inferior in numbers, we can avoid the enemy; if quite unequal in every way, we can flee from him.
Hence, though an obstinate fight may be made by a small force, in the end it must be captured by the larg- er force.
Now the general is the bulwark of the State; if the bulwark is complete at all points; the State will be strong; if the bulwark is defective, the State will be weak.

There are three ways in which a ruler can bring misfortune upon his army:—
(1) By commanding the army to advance or to retreat, being ignorant of the fact that it cannot obey. This is called hobbling the army.
(2) By attempting to govern an army in the same way as he administers a kingdom, being ignorant of the conditions which obtain in an army. This causes rest- lessness in the soldier’s minds.
(3) By employing the officers of his army without discrimination, through ignorance of the military prin- ciple of adaptation to circumstances. This shakes the confidence of the soldiers.
But when the army is restless and distrustful, trou- ble is sure to come from the other feudal princes. This is simply bringing anarchy into the army, and flinging victory away.
Thus we may know that there are five essentials for victory:
He will win who knows when to fight and when not to fight.
He will win who knows how to handle both superior and inferior forces.
He will win whose army is animated by the same spirit throughout all its ranks.

He will win who, prepared himself, waits to take the enemy unprepared.
He will win who has military capacity and is not interfered with by the sovereign.
Hence the saying: If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hun- dred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will suc- cumb in every battle.

IV
Tactical Dispositions How does this resonate with you? </s>


Question:
<s>[INST] <<SYS>>
System prompt
<</SYS>>
What are your thoughts on the strategy discussed in Chapter 4: The good fighters of old first put them- selves beyond the possibility of defeat, and then wait- ed for an opportunity of defeating the enemy., .
To secure ourselves against defeat lies in our own hands, but the opportunity of defeating the enemy is provided by the enemy himself.
Thus the good fighter is able to secure himself against defeat, but cannot make certain of defeating the enemy.
Hence the saying: One may know how to conquer without being able to do it.
Security against defeat implies defensive tactics; ability to defeat the enemy means taking the offensive.
Standing on the defensive indicates insufficient strength; attacking, a superabundance of strength.
The general who is skilled in defense hides in the most secret recesses of the earth; he who is skilled in attack flashes forth from the topmost heights of heav- en. Thus on the one hand we have ability to protect our- selves; on the other, a victory that is complete.

To see victory only when it is within the ken of the common herd is not the acme of excellence.
Neither is it the acme of excellence if you fight and conquer and the whole Empire says, “Well done!”
To lift an autumn hair is no sign of great strength; to see the sun and moon is no sign of sharp sight; to hear the noise of thunder is no sign of a quick ear.
What the ancients called a clever fighter is one who not only wins, but excels in winning with ease.
Hence his victories bring him neither reputation for wisdom nor credit for courage.
He wins his battles by making no mistakes. Making no mistakes is what establishes the certainty of victory, for it means conquering an enemy that is already defeated.
Hence the skillful fighter puts himself into a posi- tion which makes defeat impossible, and does not miss the moment for defeating the enemy.
Thus it is that in war the victorious strategist only seeks battle after the victory has been won, whereas he who is destined to defeat first fights and afterwards looks for victory.

The consummate leader cultivates the moral law, and strictly adheres to method and discipline; thus it is in his power to control success.
In respect of military method, we have, firstly, Measurement; secondly, Estimation of quantity; third- ly, Calculation; fourthly, Balancing of chances; fifthly, Victory.
18. Measurement owes its existence to Earth; Estimation of quantity to Measurement; Calculation to Estimation of quantity; Balancing of chances to Calculation; and Victory to Balancing of chances.
A victorious army opposed to a routed one, is as a pound’s weight placed in the scale against a single grain.
The onrush of a conquering force is like the burst- ing of pent-up waters into a chasm a thousand fathoms deep.

V
Energy? [/INST]

Answer:
Chapter 4: The good fighters of old first put them- selves beyond the possibility of defeat, and then wait- ed for an opportunity of defeating the enemy.: .
To secure ourselves against defeat lies in our own hands, but the opportunity of defeating the enemy is provided by the enemy himself.
Thus the good fighter is able to secure himself against defeat, but cannot make certain of defeating the enemy.
Hence the saying: One may know how to conquer without being able to do it.
Security against defeat implies defensive tactics; ability to defeat the enemy means taking the offensive.
Standing on the defensive indicates insufficient strength; attacking, a superabundance of strength.
The general who is skilled in defense hides in the most secret recesses of the earth; he who is skilled in attack flashes forth from the topmost heights of heav- en. Thus on the one hand we have ability to protect our- selves; on the other, a victory that is complete.

To see victory only when it is within the ken of the common herd is not the acme of excellence.
Neither is it the acme of excellence if you fight and conquer and the whole Empire says, “Well done!”
To lift an autumn hair is no sign of great strength; to see the sun and moon is no sign of sharp sight; to hear the noise of thunder is no sign of a quick ear.
What the ancients called a clever fighter is one who not only wins, but excels in winning with ease.
Hence his victories bring him neither reputation for wisdom nor credit for courage.
He wins his battles by making no mistakes. Making no mistakes is what establishes the certainty of victory, for it means conquering an enemy that is already defeated.
Hence the skillful fighter puts himself into a posi- tion which makes defeat impossible, and does not miss the moment for defeating the enemy.
Thus it is that in war the victorious strategist only seeks battle after the victory has been won, whereas he who is destined to defeat first fights and afterwards looks for victory.

The consummate leader cultivates the moral law, and strictly adheres to method and discipline; thus it is in his power to control success.
In respect of military method, we have, firstly, Measurement; secondly, Estimation of quantity; third- ly, Calculation; fourthly, Balancing of chances; fifthly, Victory.
18. Measurement owes its existence to Earth; Estimation of quantity to Measurement; Calculation to Estimation of quantity; Balancing of chances to Calculation; and Victory to Balancing of chances.
A victorious army opposed to a routed one, is as a pound’s weight placed in the scale against a single grain.
The onrush of a conquering force is like the burst- ing of pent-up waters into a chasm a thousand fathoms deep.

V
Energy How does this resonate with you? </s>


Question:
<s>[INST] <<SYS>>
System prompt
<</SYS>>
How do you feel about the statement in Chapter 4: The good fighters of old first put them- selves beyond the possibility of defeat, and then wait- ed for an opportunity of defeating the enemy., .
To secure ourselves against defeat lies in our own hands, but the opportunity of defeating the enemy is provided by the enemy himself.
Thus the good fighter is able to secure himself against defeat, but cannot make certain of defeating the enemy.
Hence the saying: One may know how to conquer without being able to do it.
Security against defeat implies defensive tactics; ability to defeat the enemy means taking the offensive.
Standing on the defensive indicates insufficient strength; attacking, a superabundance of strength.
The general who is skilled in defense hides in the most secret recesses of the earth; he who is skilled in attack flashes forth from the topmost heights of heav- en. Thus on the one hand we have ability to protect our- selves; on the other, a victory that is complete.

To see victory only when it is within the ken of the common herd is not the acme of excellence.
Neither is it the acme of excellence if you fight and conquer and the whole Empire says, “Well done!”
To lift an autumn hair is no sign of great strength; to see the sun and moon is no sign of sharp sight; to hear the noise of thunder is no sign of a quick ear.
What the ancients called a clever fighter is one who not only wins, but excels in winning with ease.
Hence his victories bring him neither reputation for wisdom nor credit for courage.
He wins his battles by making no mistakes. Making no mistakes is what establishes the certainty of victory, for it means conquering an enemy that is already defeated.
Hence the skillful fighter puts himself into a posi- tion which makes defeat impossible, and does not miss the moment for defeating the enemy.
Thus it is that in war the victorious strategist only seeks battle after the victory has been won, whereas he who is destined to defeat first fights and afterwards looks for victory.

The consummate leader cultivates the moral law, and strictly adheres to method and discipline; thus it is in his power to control success.
In respect of military method, we have, firstly, Measurement; secondly, Estimation of quantity; third- ly, Calculation; fourthly, Balancing of chances; fifthly, Victory.
18. Measurement owes its existence to Earth; Estimation of quantity to Measurement; Calculation to Estimation of quantity; Balancing of chances to Calculation; and Victory to Balancing of chances.
A victorious army opposed to a routed one, is as a pound’s weight placed in the scale against a single grain.
The onrush of a conquering force is like the burst- ing of pent-up waters into a chasm a thousand fathoms deep.

V
Energy? [/INST]

Answer:
Chapter 4: The good fighters of old first put them- selves beyond the possibility of defeat, and then wait- ed for an opportunity of defeating the enemy.: .
To secure ourselves against defeat lies in our own hands, but the opportunity of defeating the enemy is provided by the enemy himself.
Thus the good fighter is able to secure himself against defeat, but cannot make certain of defeating the enemy.
Hence the saying: One may know how to conquer without being able to do it.
Security against defeat implies defensive tactics; ability to defeat the enemy means taking the offensive.
Standing on the defensive indicates insufficient strength; attacking, a superabundance of strength.
The general who is skilled in defense hides in the most secret recesses of the earth; he who is skilled in attack flashes forth from the topmost heights of heav- en. Thus on the one hand we have ability to protect our- selves; on the other, a victory that is complete.

To see victory only when it is within the ken of the common herd is not the acme of excellence.
Neither is it the acme of excellence if you fight and conquer and the whole Empire says, “Well done!”
To lift an autumn hair is no sign of great strength; to see the sun and moon is no sign of sharp sight; to hear the noise of thunder is no sign of a quick ear.
What the ancients called a clever fighter is one who not only wins, but excels in winning with ease.
Hence his victories bring him neither reputation for wisdom nor credit for courage.
He wins his battles by making no mistakes. Making no mistakes is what establishes the certainty of victory, for it means conquering an enemy that is already defeated.
Hence the skillful fighter puts himself into a posi- tion which makes defeat impossible, and does not miss the moment for defeating the enemy.
Thus it is that in war the victorious strategist only seeks battle after the victory has been won, whereas he who is destined to defeat first fights and afterwards looks for victory.

The consummate leader cultivates the moral law, and strictly adheres to method and discipline; thus it is in his power to control success.
In respect of military method, we have, firstly, Measurement; secondly, Estimation of quantity; third- ly, Calculation; fourthly, Balancing of chances; fifthly, Victory.
18. Measurement owes its existence to Earth; Estimation of quantity to Measurement; Calculation to Estimation of quantity; Balancing of chances to Calculation; and Victory to Balancing of chances.
A victorious army opposed to a routed one, is as a pound’s weight placed in the scale against a single grain.
The onrush of a conquering force is like the burst- ing of pent-up waters into a chasm a thousand fathoms deep.

V
Energy How does this resonate with you? </s>


Question:
<s>[INST] <<SYS>>
System prompt
<</SYS>>
How would you apply the principles in Chapter 4: The good fighters of old first put them- selves beyond the possibility of defeat, and then wait- ed for an opportunity of defeating the enemy., .
To secure ourselves against defeat lies in our own hands, but the opportunity of defeating the enemy is provided by the enemy himself.
Thus the good fighter is able to secure himself against defeat, but cannot make certain of defeating the enemy.
Hence the saying: One may know how to conquer without being able to do it.
Security against defeat implies defensive tactics; ability to defeat the enemy means taking the offensive.
Standing on the defensive indicates insufficient strength; attacking, a superabundance of strength.
The general who is skilled in defense hides in the most secret recesses of the earth; he who is skilled in attack flashes forth from the topmost heights of heav- en. Thus on the one hand we have ability to protect our- selves; on the other, a victory that is complete.

To see victory only when it is within the ken of the common herd is not the acme of excellence.
Neither is it the acme of excellence if you fight and conquer and the whole Empire says, “Well done!”
To lift an autumn hair is no sign of great strength; to see the sun and moon is no sign of sharp sight; to hear the noise of thunder is no sign of a quick ear.
What the ancients called a clever fighter is one who not only wins, but excels in winning with ease.
Hence his victories bring him neither reputation for wisdom nor credit for courage.
He wins his battles by making no mistakes. Making no mistakes is what establishes the certainty of victory, for it means conquering an enemy that is already defeated.
Hence the skillful fighter puts himself into a posi- tion which makes defeat impossible, and does not miss the moment for defeating the enemy.
Thus it is that in war the victorious strategist only seeks battle after the victory has been won, whereas he who is destined to defeat first fights and afterwards looks for victory.

The consummate leader cultivates the moral law, and strictly adheres to method and discipline; thus it is in his power to control success.
In respect of military method, we have, firstly, Measurement; secondly, Estimation of quantity; third- ly, Calculation; fourthly, Balancing of chances; fifthly, Victory.
18. Measurement owes its existence to Earth; Estimation of quantity to Measurement; Calculation to Estimation of quantity; Balancing of chances to Calculation; and Victory to Balancing of chances.
A victorious army opposed to a routed one, is as a pound’s weight placed in the scale against a single grain.
The onrush of a conquering force is like the burst- ing of pent-up waters into a chasm a thousand fathoms deep.

V
Energy in a business setting? [/INST]

Answer:
Chapter 4: The good fighters of old first put them- selves beyond the possibility of defeat, and then wait- ed for an opportunity of defeating the enemy.: .
To secure ourselves against defeat lies in our own hands, but the opportunity of defeating the enemy is provided by the enemy himself.
Thus the good fighter is able to secure himself against defeat, but cannot make certain of defeating the enemy.
Hence the saying: One may know how to conquer without being able to do it.
Security against defeat implies defensive tactics; ability to defeat the enemy means taking the offensive.
Standing on the defensive indicates insufficient strength; attacking, a superabundance of strength.
The general who is skilled in defense hides in the most secret recesses of the earth; he who is skilled in attack flashes forth from the topmost heights of heav- en. Thus on the one hand we have ability to protect our- selves; on the other, a victory that is complete.

To see victory only when it is within the ken of the common herd is not the acme of excellence.
Neither is it the acme of excellence if you fight and conquer and the whole Empire says, “Well done!”
To lift an autumn hair is no sign of great strength; to see the sun and moon is no sign of sharp sight; to hear the noise of thunder is no sign of a quick ear.
What the ancients called a clever fighter is one who not only wins, but excels in winning with ease.
Hence his victories bring him neither reputation for wisdom nor credit for courage.
He wins his battles by making no mistakes. Making no mistakes is what establishes the certainty of victory, for it means conquering an enemy that is already defeated.
Hence the skillful fighter puts himself into a posi- tion which makes defeat impossible, and does not miss the moment for defeating the enemy.
Thus it is that in war the victorious strategist only seeks battle after the victory has been won, whereas he who is destined to defeat first fights and afterwards looks for victory.

The consummate leader cultivates the moral law, and strictly adheres to method and discipline; thus it is in his power to control success.
In respect of military method, we have, firstly, Measurement; secondly, Estimation of quantity; third- ly, Calculation; fourthly, Balancing of chances; fifthly, Victory.
18. Measurement owes its existence to Earth; Estimation of quantity to Measurement; Calculation to Estimation of quantity; Balancing of chances to Calculation; and Victory to Balancing of chances.
A victorious army opposed to a routed one, is as a pound’s weight placed in the scale against a single grain.
The onrush of a conquering force is like the burst- ing of pent-up waters into a chasm a thousand fathoms deep.

V
Energy How does this resonate with you? </s>


Question:
<s>[INST] <<SYS>>
System prompt
<</SYS>>
What impact does the teaching in Chapter 5: The control of a large force is the same principle as the control of a few men: it is merely a question of dividing up their numbers., .
Fighting with a large army under your command is nowise different from fighting with a small one: it is merely a question of instituting signs and signals.
To ensure that your whole host may withstand the brunt of the enemy’s attack and remain unshaken—this is effected by maneuvers direct and indirect.
That the impact of your army may be like a grind- stone dashed against an egg—this is effected by the sci- ence of weak points and strong.
In all fighting, the direct method may be used for joining battle, but indirect methods will be needed in order to secure victory.
Indirect tactics, efficiently applied, are inexhaustible as Heaven and Earth, unending as the flow of rivers and streams; like the sun and moon, they end but to begin anew; like the four seasons, they pass away to return once more.

There are not more than five musical notes, yet the combinations of these five give rise to more melodies than can ever be heard.
There are not more than five primary colors (blue, yellow, red, white, and black), yet in combination they produce more hues than can ever been seen.
There are not more than five cardinal tastes (sour, acrid, salt, sweet, bitter), yet combinations of them yield more flavors than can ever be tasted.
In battle, there are not more than two methods of attack—the direct and the indirect; yet these two in combination give rise to an endless series of maneu- vers.
The direct and the indirect lead on to each other in turn. It is like moving in a circle—you never come to an end. Who can exhaust the possibilities of their com- bination?
The onset of troops is like the rush of a torrent which will even roll stones along in its course.
The quality of decision is like the well-timed swoop of a falcon which enables it to strike and destroy its vic- tim.
Therefore the good fighter will be terrible in his onset, and prompt in his decision.

Energy may be likened to the bending of a cross- bow; decision, to the releasing of a trigger.
Amid the turmoil and tumult of battle, there may be seeming disorder and yet no real disorder at all; amid confusion and chaos, your array may be without head or tail, yet it will be proof against defeat.
Simulated disorder postulates perfect discipline, simulated fear postulates courage; simulated weakness postulates strength.
Hiding order beneath the cloak of disorder is sim- ply a question of subdivision; concealing courage under a show of timidity presupposes a fund of latent energy; masking strength with weakness is to be effect- ed by tactical dispositions.
Thus one who is skillful at keeping the enemy on the move maintains deceitful appearances, according to which the enemy will act. He sacrifices something, that the enemy may snatch at it.
By holding out baits, he keeps him on the march; then with a body of picked men he lies in wait for him.
The clever combatant looks to the effect of com- bined energy, and does not require too much from indi- viduals. Hence his ability to pick out the right men and utilize combined energy.

When he utilizes combined energy, his fighting men become as it were like unto rolling logs or stones. For it is the nature of a log or stone to remain motion- less on level ground, and to move when on a slope; if four-cornered, to come to a standstill, but if round- shaped, to go rolling down.
Thus the energy developed by good fighting men is as the momentum of a round stone rolled down a mountain thousands of feet in height. So much on the subject of energy.

VI
Weak Points and Strong have on your understanding of conflict resolution? [/INST]

Answer:
Chapter 5: The control of a large force is the same principle as the control of a few men: it is merely a question of dividing up their numbers.: .
Fighting with a large army under your command is nowise different from fighting with a small one: it is merely a question of instituting signs and signals.
To ensure that your whole host may withstand the brunt of the enemy’s attack and remain unshaken—this is effected by maneuvers direct and indirect.
That the impact of your army may be like a grind- stone dashed against an egg—this is effected by the sci- ence of weak points and strong.
In all fighting, the direct method may be used for joining battle, but indirect methods will be needed in order to secure victory.
Indirect tactics, efficiently applied, are inexhaustible as Heaven and Earth, unending as the flow of rivers and streams; like the sun and moon, they end but to begin anew; like the four seasons, they pass away to return once more.

There are not more than five musical notes, yet the combinations of these five give rise to more melodies than can ever be heard.
There are not more than five primary colors (blue, yellow, red, white, and black), yet in combination they produce more hues than can ever been seen.
There are not more than five cardinal tastes (sour, acrid, salt, sweet, bitter), yet combinations of them yield more flavors than can ever be tasted.
In battle, there are not more than two methods of attack—the direct and the indirect; yet these two in combination give rise to an endless series of maneu- vers.
The direct and the indirect lead on to each other in turn. It is like moving in a circle—you never come to an end. Who can exhaust the possibilities of their com- bination?
The onset of troops is like the rush of a torrent which will even roll stones along in its course.
The quality of decision is like the well-timed swoop of a falcon which enables it to strike and destroy its vic- tim.
Therefore the good fighter will be terrible in his onset, and prompt in his decision.

Energy may be likened to the bending of a cross- bow; decision, to the releasing of a trigger.
Amid the turmoil and tumult of battle, there may be seeming disorder and yet no real disorder at all; amid confusion and chaos, your array may be without head or tail, yet it will be proof against defeat.
Simulated disorder postulates perfect discipline, simulated fear postulates courage; simulated weakness postulates strength.
Hiding order beneath the cloak of disorder is sim- ply a question of subdivision; concealing courage under a show of timidity presupposes a fund of latent energy; masking strength with weakness is to be effect- ed by tactical dispositions.
Thus one who is skillful at keeping the enemy on the move maintains deceitful appearances, according to which the enemy will act. He sacrifices something, that the enemy may snatch at it.
By holding out baits, he keeps him on the march; then with a body of picked men he lies in wait for him.
The clever combatant looks to the effect of com- bined energy, and does not require too much from indi- viduals. Hence his ability to pick out the right men and utilize combined energy.

When he utilizes combined energy, his fighting men become as it were like unto rolling logs or stones. For it is the nature of a log or stone to remain motion- less on level ground, and to move when on a slope; if four-cornered, to come to a standstill, but if round- shaped, to go rolling down.
Thus the energy developed by good fighting men is as the momentum of a round stone rolled down a mountain thousands of feet in height. So much on the subject of energy.

VI
Weak Points and Strong How does this resonate with you? </s>


Question:
<s>[INST] <<SYS>>
System prompt
<</SYS>>
How would you interpret the advice given in Chapter 5: The control of a large force is the same principle as the control of a few men: it is merely a question of dividing up their numbers., .
Fighting with a large army under your command is nowise different from fighting with a small one: it is merely a question of instituting signs and signals.
To ensure that your whole host may withstand the brunt of the enemy’s attack and remain unshaken—this is effected by maneuvers direct and indirect.
That the impact of your army may be like a grind- stone dashed against an egg—this is effected by the sci- ence of weak points and strong.
In all fighting, the direct method may be used for joining battle, but indirect methods will be needed in order to secure victory.
Indirect tactics, efficiently applied, are inexhaustible as Heaven and Earth, unending as the flow of rivers and streams; like the sun and moon, they end but to begin anew; like the four seasons, they pass away to return once more.

There are not more than five musical notes, yet the combinations of these five give rise to more melodies than can ever be heard.
There are not more than five primary colors (blue, yellow, red, white, and black), yet in combination they produce more hues than can ever been seen.
There are not more than five cardinal tastes (sour, acrid, salt, sweet, bitter), yet combinations of them yield more flavors than can ever be tasted.
In battle, there are not more than two methods of attack—the direct and the indirect; yet these two in combination give rise to an endless series of maneu- vers.
The direct and the indirect lead on to each other in turn. It is like moving in a circle—you never come to an end. Who can exhaust the possibilities of their com- bination?
The onset of troops is like the rush of a torrent which will even roll stones along in its course.
The quality of decision is like the well-timed swoop of a falcon which enables it to strike and destroy its vic- tim.
Therefore the good fighter will be terrible in his onset, and prompt in his decision.

Energy may be likened to the bending of a cross- bow; decision, to the releasing of a trigger.
Amid the turmoil and tumult of battle, there may be seeming disorder and yet no real disorder at all; amid confusion and chaos, your array may be without head or tail, yet it will be proof against defeat.
Simulated disorder postulates perfect discipline, simulated fear postulates courage; simulated weakness postulates strength.
Hiding order beneath the cloak of disorder is sim- ply a question of subdivision; concealing courage under a show of timidity presupposes a fund of latent energy; masking strength with weakness is to be effect- ed by tactical dispositions.
Thus one who is skillful at keeping the enemy on the move maintains deceitful appearances, according to which the enemy will act. He sacrifices something, that the enemy may snatch at it.
By holding out baits, he keeps him on the march; then with a body of picked men he lies in wait for him.
The clever combatant looks to the effect of com- bined energy, and does not require too much from indi- viduals. Hence his ability to pick out the right men and utilize combined energy.

When he utilizes combined energy, his fighting men become as it were like unto rolling logs or stones. For it is the nature of a log or stone to remain motion- less on level ground, and to move when on a slope; if four-cornered, to come to a standstill, but if round- shaped, to go rolling down.
Thus the energy developed by good fighting men is as the momentum of a round stone rolled down a mountain thousands of feet in height. So much on the subject of energy.

VI
Weak Points and Strong? [/INST]

Answer:
Chapter 5: The control of a large force is the same principle as the control of a few men: it is merely a question of dividing up their numbers.: .
Fighting with a large army under your command is nowise different from fighting with a small one: it is merely a question of instituting signs and signals.
To ensure that your whole host may withstand the brunt of the enemy’s attack and remain unshaken—this is effected by maneuvers direct and indirect.
That the impact of your army may be like a grind- stone dashed against an egg—this is effected by the sci- ence of weak points and strong.
In all fighting, the direct method may be used for joining battle, but indirect methods will be needed in order to secure victory.
Indirect tactics, efficiently applied, are inexhaustible as Heaven and Earth, unending as the flow of rivers and streams; like the sun and moon, they end but to begin anew; like the four seasons, they pass away to return once more.

There are not more than five musical notes, yet the combinations of these five give rise to more melodies than can ever be heard.
There are not more than five primary colors (blue, yellow, red, white, and black), yet in combination they produce more hues than can ever been seen.
There are not more than five cardinal tastes (sour, acrid, salt, sweet, bitter), yet combinations of them yield more flavors than can ever be tasted.
In battle, there are not more than two methods of attack—the direct and the indirect; yet these two in combination give rise to an endless series of maneu- vers.
The direct and the indirect lead on to each other in turn. It is like moving in a circle—you never come to an end. Who can exhaust the possibilities of their com- bination?
The onset of troops is like the rush of a torrent which will even roll stones along in its course.
The quality of decision is like the well-timed swoop of a falcon which enables it to strike and destroy its vic- tim.
Therefore the good fighter will be terrible in his onset, and prompt in his decision.

Energy may be likened to the bending of a cross- bow; decision, to the releasing of a trigger.
Amid the turmoil and tumult of battle, there may be seeming disorder and yet no real disorder at all; amid confusion and chaos, your array may be without head or tail, yet it will be proof against defeat.
Simulated disorder postulates perfect discipline, simulated fear postulates courage; simulated weakness postulates strength.
Hiding order beneath the cloak of disorder is sim- ply a question of subdivision; concealing courage under a show of timidity presupposes a fund of latent energy; masking strength with weakness is to be effect- ed by tactical dispositions.
Thus one who is skillful at keeping the enemy on the move maintains deceitful appearances, according to which the enemy will act. He sacrifices something, that the enemy may snatch at it.
By holding out baits, he keeps him on the march; then with a body of picked men he lies in wait for him.
The clever combatant looks to the effect of com- bined energy, and does not require too much from indi- viduals. Hence his ability to pick out the right men and utilize combined energy.

When he utilizes combined energy, his fighting men become as it were like unto rolling logs or stones. For it is the nature of a log or stone to remain motion- less on level ground, and to move when on a slope; if four-cornered, to come to a standstill, but if round- shaped, to go rolling down.
Thus the energy developed by good fighting men is as the momentum of a round stone rolled down a mountain thousands of feet in height. So much on the subject of energy.

VI
Weak Points and Strong How does this resonate with you? </s>