Stanford University
Where was Alvin E. Roth educated in 1971?
Alvin E . Roth Alvin Elliot Roth ( born December 18 , 1951 ) is an American academic . He is the Craig and Susan McCaw professor of economics at Stanford University and the Gund professor of economics and business administration emeritus at Harvard University . He was President of the American Economics Association in 2017 . Roth has made significant contributions to the fields of game theory , market design and experimental economics , and is known for his emphasis on applying economic theory to solutions for real-world problems . In 2012 , he won the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences jointly with Lloyd Shapley for the theory of stable allocations and the practice of market design . Biography . Alvin Roth graduated from Columbia Universitys School of Engineering and Applied Science in 1971 with a bachelors degree in Operations Research . He then moved to Stanford University , receiving both his Masters and PhD also in Operations Research there in 1973 and 1974 respectively . After leaving Stanford , Roth went on to teach at the University of Illinois at Urbana–Champaign which he left in 1982 to become the Andrew W . Mellon professor of economics at the University of Pittsburgh . While at Pittsburgh , he also served as a fellow in the Universitys Center for Philosophy of Science and as a professor in the Katz Graduate School of Business . In 1998 , Roth left to join the faculty at Harvard where he remained until deciding to return to Stanford in 2012 . In 2013 he became a full member of the Stanford faculty and took emeritus status at Harvard . Roth is an Alfred P . Sloan fellow , a Guggenheim fellow , and a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences . He is also a member of the National Bureau of Economic Research ( NBER ) and the Econometric Society . In 2013 , Roth , Shapley , and David Gale won a Golden Goose Award for their work on market design . A collection of Roths papers is housed at the Rubenstein Library at Duke University . Work . Roth has worked in the fields of game theory , market design , and experimental economics . In particular , he helped redesign mechanisms for selecting medical residents , New York City high schools and Boston primary schools . Describing the dynamism of market design , Roth suggests that As the conditions of the market change , the behavior of people change and that causes old rules to be discarded and new rules to be created . Case study in game theory . Roths 1984 paper on the National Resident Matching Program ( NRMP ) highlighted the system designed by John Stalknaker and F . J . Mullen in 1952 . The system was built on theoretical foundations independently introduced by David Gale and Lloyd Shapley in 1962 . Roth proved that the NRMP was both stable and strategy-proof for unmarried residents but deferred to future study the question of how to match married couples efficiently . In 1999 Roth redesigned the matching program to ensure stable matches even with married couples . New York City public school system . Roth later helped design the market to match New York City public school students to high schools as incoming freshmen . Previously , the school district had students mail in a list of their five preferred schools in rank order , then mailed a photocopy of that list to each of the five schools . As a result , schools could tell whether or not students had listed them as their first choice . This meant that some students really had a choice of one school , rather than five . It also meant that students had an incentive to hide their true preferences . Roth and his colleagues Atila Abdulkadiroğlu and Parag Pathak proposed David Gale and Lloyd Shapleys incentive-compatible student-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm to the school board in 2003 . The school board accepted the measure as the method of selection for New York City public school students . Bostons public school system . Working with Atila Abdulkadiroğlu , Parag A . Pathak , and Tayfun Sonmez , Roth presented a similar measure to Bostons public school system in 2003 . Here the Boston system gave so much preference to an applicants first choice that were a student to not receive her first or second choice , it was likely that she would not be matched with any school on her list and be administratively assigned to schools which had vacancies . Some Boston parents had informally recognized this feature of the system and developed detailed lists in order to avoid having their children administratively assigned . Boston held public hearings on the school selection system and finally in 2005 settled on David Gale and Lloyd Shapleys incentive-compatible student-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm . New England Program for Kidney Exchange . Roth is a founder of the New England Program for Kidney Exchange along with Tayfun Sonmez and Utku Unver , a registry and matching program that pairs compatible kidney donors and recipients . The program was designed to operate primarily through the use of two pairs of incompatible donors . Each donor was incompatible with her partner but could be compatible with another donor who was likewise incompatible with his partner . Francis Delmonico , a transplant surgeon at Harvard Medical School , describes a typical situation , Because the National Organ Transplant Act forbids the creation of binding contracts for organ transplant , steps in the procedure had to be performed roughly simultaneously . Two pairs of patients means four operating rooms and four surgical teams acting in concert with each other . Hospitals and professionals in the transplant community felt that the practical burden of three pairwise exchanges would be too large . While the original theoretical work discovered that an efficient frontier would be reached with exchanges between three pairs of otherwise incompatible donors , it was determined that the goals of the program would not be sacrificed by limiting exchanges to pairs of incompatible donors . A 12-party ( six donors and six recipients ) kidney exchange was performed in April 2008 . Personal life . Roth is married and has two sons . His elder son , Aaron Roth , is a professor of computer science at the University of Pennsylvania . , his younger son , Ben Roth , is an Assistant Professor of Business Administration at Harvard Business School . Books . Roth is the author of numerous scholarly articles , books , and other publications . A selection : - 1979 . Axiomatic Models of Bargaining , Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems . Springer Verlag . - 1985 . Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining , ( editor ) Cambridge University Press , 1985 . - 1987 . Laboratory Experimentation in Economics : Six Points of View . ( editor ) Cambridge University Press . ( Chinese translation , 2008 ) - 1988 . The Shapley Value : Essays in Honor of Lloyd S . Shapley . ( editor ) Cambridge University Press . - 1990 . Two-Sided Matching : A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis . With Marilda Sotomayor . Cambridge University Press . - 1995 . Handbook of Experimental Economics . Edited with J.H . Kagel . Princeton University Press . - 2001 . Game Theory in the Tradition of Bob Wilson . Edited with Bengt Holmstrom and Paul Milgrom . - 2015 . Who Gets What and Why . Eamon Dolan/Houghton Mifflin Harcourt . Journal articles . Roth has published over 70 articles in peer reviewed journals . According to Scopus , the most widely cited have been :