President of the California Institute of Technology
Harold Brown (Secretary of Defense) took which position between Apr 1972 and Oct 1975?
Harold Brown ( Secretary of Defense ) Harold Brown ( September 19 , 1927 – January 4 , 2019 ) was an American nuclear physicist who served as United States Secretary of Defense from 1977 to 1981 , under President Jimmy Carter . Previously , in the John F . Kennedy and Lyndon B . Johnson administrations , he held the posts of Director of Defense Research and Engineering ( 1961–1965 ) and United States Secretary of the Air Force ( 1965–1969 ) . A child prodigy , Brown graduated from the Bronx High School of Science at age 15 , and earned a Ph.D . in physics from Columbia University at age 21 . As Secretary of Defense , he set the groundwork for the Camp David Accords , took part in strategic arms negotiations with the Soviet Union and supported , unsuccessfully , ratification of the SALT II treaty . Early life and career . Brown was born in Brooklyn , New York , the son of Abraham , a lawyer who had fought in World War I , and Gertrude ( Cohen ) Brown , a diamond merchants bookkeeper . His parents were secular Jews and strong supporters of President Franklin D . Roosevelt . From a very young age Brown was drawn to mathematics and physics ; he enrolled as a student at the Bronx High School of Science , from which he graduated at age 15 with a grade average of 99.5 . He then immediately entered Columbia University , earning an A.B . summa cum laude at 17 years of age , as well as the Green Memorial Prize for the best academic record . He continued as a graduate student at Columbia , and was awarded a Ph.D . in physics in 1949 , when he was 21 . After a short period of teaching and postdoctoral research , Brown became a research scientist at the Radiation Laboratory at the University of California , Berkeley . At Berkeley , he played a role in the construction of the Polaris missile and the development of plutonium . In 1952 , he joined the staff of the University of California Radiation Laboratory at Livermore and became its director in 1960 , succeeding Edward Teller , of whom he was a protégé . At Livermore , Brown led a team of six other physicists , all older than he was , who used some of the first computers , along with mathematics and engineering , to reduce the size of thermonuclear warheads for strategic military use . Brown and his team helped make Livermores reputation by designing nuclear warheads small and light enough to be placed on the Navys nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines ( SSBNs ) . During the 1950s he served as a member of , or consultant to , several federal scientific bodies and as senior science adviser at the 1958-1959 Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Tests . Brown worked under United States Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara as Director of Defense Research and Engineering from 1961 to 1965 , and then as United States Secretary of the Air Force from October 1965 to February 1969 , first under McNamara and then under Clark Clifford . From 1969 to 1977 , he was President of the California Institute of Technology ( Caltech ) . U.S . Secretary of Defense . Appointment and initial agenda . Although Brown had accumulated almost eight years of prior service in the Pentagon , he was the first natural scientist to become secretary of defense . He involved himself in practically all areas of departmental activity . Consistent with the Carter administrations objective to reorganize the federal government , Brown launched a comprehensive review of defense organization that eventually brought significant change . But he understood the limits to effective reform . In one of his first speeches after leaving office , Managing the Defense Department-Why It Cant Be Done , at the University of Michigan in March 1981 , he observed:With regard to strategic planning , Brown shared much the same concerns as his Republican predecessors—the need to upgrade U.S . military forces and improve collective security arrangements—but with a stronger commitment to arms control . Brown adhered to the principle of essential equivalence in the nuclear competition with the Soviet Union . This meant that Soviet strategic nuclear forces do not become usable instruments of political leverage , diplomatic coercion , or military advantage ; nuclear stability , especially in a crisis , is maintained ; any advantages in force characteristics enjoyed by the Soviets are offset by U.S . advantages in other characteristics ; and the U.S . posture is not in fact , and is not seen as , inferior in performance to the strategic nuclear forces of the Soviet Union . His later writings in his 2012 memoir , Star-Spangled Security , reinforced this agenda:When I became secretary of defense in 1977 , the military services , most of all the army , were disrupted badly by the Vietnam War . There was general agreement that the Soviet Union outclassed the West in conventional military capability , especially in ground forces in Europe.According to The New York Times , experts say in retrospect that contrary to a popular narrative which asserts that President Ronald Reagan increased defense spending to ramp up competition with ( and ultimately bankrupting ) the Soviet Union , it was Carter and Brown who began maintaining the strategic balance , countering Soviet aircraft and ballistic innovations by improving land-based ICBMs , by upgrading B-52 strategic bombers with low-flying cruise missiles and by deploying far more submarine-launched missiles tipped with MIRVs , or multiple warheads that split into independent trajectories to hit many targets . Nuclear missiles . Brown considered it essential to maintain the triad of ICBMs , SLBMs , and strategic bombers ; some of the administrations most important decisions on weapon systems reflected this commitment . Although he decided not to produce the B-1 bomber , he did recommend upgrading existing B-52s and equipping them with air-launched cruise missiles , and gave the go-ahead for development of a stealth technology , fostered by William J . Perry , under-secretary of defense for research and engineering , that would make it possible to produce planes ( bombers as well as other aircraft ) with very low radar profiles , presumably able to elude enemy defenses and deliver weapons on targets . The administration backed development of the MX missile , intended to replace in the 1980s the increasingly vulnerable Minuteman and Titan intercontinental missiles . To insure MX survivability , Brown recommended deploying the missiles in multiple protective shelters ; 200 MX missiles would be placed in Utah and Nevada , with each missile to be shuttled among 23 different shelters of its own located along roadways-meaning a total of 4,600 such shelters . Although this plan was expensive and environmentally controversial , Brown argued that it was the most viable scheme to protect the missiles from enemy attack . For the sea leg of the triad , Brown accelerated development of the larger Trident nuclear submarine and carried forward the conversion of Poseidon submarines to a fully MIRVed missile capability . By early 1979 , Brown and his staff had developed a countervailing strategy , an approach to nuclear targeting that past secretaries of defense Robert McNamara and James R . Schlesinger had both earlier found attractive ; but , never formally codified . As Brown put it , we must have forces and plans for the use of our strategic nuclear forces such that in considering aggression against our interests , our adversary would recognize that no plausible outcome would represent a success-on any rational definition of success . The prospect of such a failure would then deter an adversarys attack on the United States or our vital interests . Although Brown did not rule out the assured destruction approach , which stressed attacks on urban and industrial targets , he believed that such destruction must not be automatic , our only choice , or independent of any enemys attack . Indeed , it is at least conceivable that the mission of assured destruction would not have to be executed at all in the event that deterrence failed . Official adoption of the countervailing strategy came with President Carters approval of Presidential Directive 59 ( PD 59 ) on July 25 , 1980 . In explaining PD 59 Brown argued that it was not a new strategic doctrine , but rather a refinement , a codification of previous explanations of our strategic policy . The heart of PD 59 , as Brown described it , was as follows : Because the almost simultaneous disclosures of PD 59 and the stealth technology came in the midst of the 1980 United States presidential election campaign ; some critics asserted that the Carter administration leaked them to counter charges of weakness and boost its re-election chances . Others charged that PD 59 made it more likely that the United States would initiate a nuclear conflict , based on the assumption that a nuclear war could somehow be limited . Brown insisted that the countervailing strategy was not a first strike strategy . As he put it , Nothing in the policy contemplates that nuclear war can be a deliberate instrument of achieving our national security goals . .. . But we cannot afford the risk that the Soviet leadership might entertain the illusion that nuclear war could be an option – or its threat a means of coercion – for them . NATO . Brown regarded the strengthening of NATO as a key national security objective and worked hard to invigorate the alliance . With the assistance of Robert W . Komer , at first his special adviser on NATO affairs and subsequently under-secretary of defense for policy , Brown launched a series of NATO initiatives shortly after taking office . In May 1978 the NATO heads of government endorsed a long term defense program which included 10 priority categories : enhanced readiness ; rapid reinforcement ; stronger European reserve forces ; improvements in maritime capabilities ; integrated air defenses ; effective command , control , and communications ; electronic warfare ; rationalized procedures for armaments collaboration ; logistics co-ordination and increased war reserves ; and theater nuclear modernization . To implement the last item , NATO defense and foreign ministers decided in December 1979 , to respond to the Soviet deployment of new theater nuclear weapons—the SS-20 missile and the Backfire bomber—by placing 108 Pershing II missiles and 464 ground-launched cruise missiles ( GLCMs ) in several Western European countries beginning in December 1983 . The NATO leaders indicated that the new missile deployment would be scaled down if satisfactory progress occurred in arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union . At Browns urging , NATO members pledged in 1977 to increase their individual defense spending three percent per year in real terms for the 1979-86 period . The objective , Brown explained , was to ensure that alliance resources and capabilities-both conventional and nuclear-would balance those of the Soviet bloc . Although some NATO members hesitated to confirm the agreement to accept new missiles and did not always attain the three percent target , Brown was pleased with NATOs progress . Midway in his term he told an interviewer that he thought his most important achievement thus far had been the revitalization of NATO . Brown also tried to strengthen the defense contributions of U.S . allies outside of NATO , particularly Japan and South Korea . He repeatedly urged the Japanese government to increase its defense budget so that it could shoulder a larger share of the Western allies Pacific security burden . Although the Carter administration decided in 1977 on a phased withdrawal of United States ground forces from South Korea , it pledged to continue military and other assistance to that country . Later , because of a substantial buildup of North Korean military forces and opposition to the troop withdrawal in the United States , the president shelved the plan , leaving approximately 40,000 U.S . troops in Korea . In establishing diplomatic relations with the Peoples Republic of China ( PRC ) on January 1 , 1979 , the United States formally recognized the PRC almost 30 years after its establishment . A year later Brown visited the PRC , talked with its political and military leaders , and helped lay the groundwork for limited collaboration on security issues . Arms control . Arms control formed an integral part of Browns national security policy . He staunchly supported the June 1979 SALT II treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union and was the administrations leading spokesman in urging the Senate to approve it . SALT II limited both sides to 2,250 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles ( bombers , ICBMs , SLBMs , and air-to-surface ballistic missiles ) , including a sublimit of 1,200 launchers of MIRVed ballistic missiles , of which only 820 could be launchers of MIRVed ICBMs . It also placed restrictions on the number of warheads on each missile and on deployment of new land-based ballistic missile systems , except for one new type of light ICBM for each side . There was also a provision for verification by each side using its own national technical means . Brown explained that SALT II would reduce the Soviet Unions strategic forces , bring enhanced predictability and stability to Soviet-U.S . nuclear relationships , reduce the cost of maintaining a strategic balance , help the United States to monitor Soviet forces , and reduce the risk of nuclear war . He rebutted charges by SALT II critics that the United States had underestimated the Soviet military buildup , that the treaty would weaken the Western alliance , that the Soviet Union could not be trusted to obey the treaty , and that its terms could not really be verified . Partly to placate Senate opponents of the treaty , the Carter administration agreed in the fall of 1979 to support higher increases in the defense budget . However , the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 ensured that the Senate would not accept the treaty at that time , forcing the president to withdraw it from consideration . When his term ended in 1981 , Brown said that failure to secure ratification of SALT II was his greatest regret . The U.S . and the Soviet Union still followed the terms of the pact , even though it was non-binding , until 1986 , when President Ronald Reagan accused the Soviet Union of violating the terms and withdrew from the pact . Regional matters . Panama Canal . Besides broad national security policy matters , Brown had to deal with several more immediate questions , among them the Panama Canal issue . Control of the Panama canal zone had been a source of contention ever since Panama achieved its independence from Colombia in 1903 and granted the United States a concession in perpetuity . In the mid-1960s , after serious disturbances in the zone , the United States and Panama began negotiations that went on intermittently until September 7 , 1977 , when the countries signed two treaties , one providing for full Panamanian control of the canal by the year 2000 and the other guaranteeing the canals neutrality . The Defense Department played a major role in the Panama negotiations . Brown championed the treaties through a difficult fight to gain Senate approval ( secured in March and April 1978 ) , insisting that they were both advantageous to the United States and essential to the canals future operation and security . Middle East . In Middle East affairs , Brown supported President Carters efforts as an intermediary in the Egyptian-Israeli negotiations leading to the Camp David Accords of September 1978 and the signing by the two nations of a peace treaty in March 1979 . Elsewhere , the fall of the Shah from power in Iran in January 1979 eliminated a major U.S . ally and triggered a chain of events that played havoc with American policy in the region . In November 1979 , Iranian revolutionaries occupied the U.S . embassy in Tehran and took more than 50 hostages . Brown participated closely in planning for a rescue operation that ended in failure and the loss of eight U.S . servicemen on April 24–25 , 1980 . Not until the last day of his administration , on January 20 , 1981 , could President Carter make final arrangements for the release of the hostages . Soviet invasion of Afghanistan . The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 to bolster a pro-Soviet Communist government further complicated the role of the United States in the Middle East and Southwest Asia . In response to the events in Iran and Afghanistan and in anticipation of others , Brown activated the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force ( RDJTF ) at MacDill Air Force Base , Florida , on March 1 , 1980 . Although normally a planning headquarters without operational units , the RDJTF could obtain such forces from the several services and command them in crisis situations . Brown explained that the RDJTF was responsible for developing plans for contingency operations , particularly in Southwest Asia , and maintaining adequate capabilities and readiness for such missions . Budget . As with all of his predecessors , budget matters occupied a major portion of Browns time . During the 1976 campaign , President Carter criticized the defense spending levels of the Ford administration and promised cuts in the range of $5 billion to $7 billion . Shortly after he became secretary , Brown suggested a series of amendments to Fords proposed fiscal year 1978 budget , having the effect of cutting it by almost $3 billion , but still allowing a Total Obligational Authority ( TOA ) increase of more than $8 billion over the fiscal year 1977 budget . Subsequent budgets under Brown moved generally upward , reflecting high prevailing rates of inflation , the need to strengthen and modernize conventional forces neglected somewhat since the end of the Vietnam War , and serious challenges in the Middle East , Iran , Afghanistan , and elsewhere . The Brown Defense budgets by fiscal year , in TOA , were as follows : 1978 , $116.1 billion ; 1979 , $124.7 billion ; 1980 , $141.9 billion ; and 1981 , $175.5 billion . In terms of real growth , there were slight negative percentages in 1978 and 1979 , and increases in 1980 and 1981 . Part of the increase for fiscal year 1981 resulted from supplemental appropriations obtained by the Reagan administration ; but the Carter administration by this time had departed substantially from its early emphasis on curtailing the department of defense budget . Its proposals for fiscal year 1982 , submitted in January 1981 , called for significant real growth over the TOA for fiscal year 1981 . In his 2012 memoir , Star-Spangled Security , Brown boasted that the Defense Department budget in real terms was 10 to 12 percent more when we left than when we came in , which he opined was not an easy accomplishment , especially considering Carters campaign promise to cut defense spending , and pressure to that effect from congressional Democrats . With the increased budget , Brown oversaw the development of stealth aircraft , and the acceleration of the Trident submarine program and the conversion of older Poseidon submarines to carry MIRVs . Departure . Brown left office on January 20 , 1981 , following President Carters unsuccessful bid for re-election . During the 1980 campaign , Brown actively defended the Carter administrations policies , speaking frequently on national issues in public . Brown received the Presidential Medal of Freedom from President Carter in 1981 and the Enrico Fermi Award from President Bill Clinton in 1993 . Later life . After leaving the Pentagon , Brown remained in Washington , D.C. , joining the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies as a visiting professor and later the universitys Foreign Policy Institute as chairman . He continued to speak and write widely on national security issues , and in 1983 published Thinking About National Security : Defense and Foreign Policy in a Dangerous World/ In later years , Brown was affiliated with research organizations and served on the boards of a number of corporations , like Altria ( previously Philip Morris ) . On January 5 , 2006 , he participated in a meeting at the White House of former Secretaries of Defense and State to discuss United States foreign policy with Bush administration officials . In July 2011 , Brown became a member of the United States Energy Security Council , which seeks to diminish oils monopoly over the U.S . transportation sector and is sponsored by the Institute for the Analysis of Global Security ( IAGS ) . Brown died of pancreatic cancer on January 4 , 2019 , at the age of 91 .