University of Bonn
Which employer did Georg Nöldeke work for from 1999 to 2006?
Georg Nöldeke Georg Nöldeke ( born November 19 , 1964 ) is an economist and currently serves as Professor of Economics at the University of Basel . His research interests focuses on microeconomic theory , game theory , and social evolution . In 2007 , Georg Nöldekes contributions to economics of information - in particular on the communication within financial markets - as well as to game theory and contract theory were awarded the Gossen Prize by the German Economic Association . Biography . After having spent his undergraduate studies at the University of Bonn and at the University of California , Berkeley , Georg Nöldeke earned a diploma in economics from the University of Bonn in 1988 . In 1992 , after graduate studies at the University of Bonn and at the London School of Economics , he further earned a Ph.D . from the former while simultaneously working there as a teaching and research assistant ( 1989–92 ) . Following his studies , he became an assistant professor of economics at Princeton University ( 1992–94 ) before returning to Bonn in 1994 , where he took up the position of an associate professor . Three years later , Nöldeke moved to the University of Basel , where he was made professor of economics ( 1997–99 ) and directed the universitys graduate studies in economics , before taking up the same position at the University of Bonn two years later ( 1999-2006 ) . During his tenure at Bonn , he also served as co-director of graduate studies , chairman of the Department of Economics , and Dean of the Faculty of Law and Economics . Finally , having returned to Switzerland , he has been a Professor of Economics at the University of Basel since 2006 . However , Nöldeke has also held in parallel many visiting appointments , e.g . at Yale University , Yale-NUS College , University of Toulouse , University of Zurich , University of Munich , and Tel Aviv University . At the University of Basel , Georg Nöldeke is the founder of the Bernoulli Network for the Behavioral Sciences . He also is affiliated with the German Economic Association , wherein he currently serves as member of the Executive Council and chairs the Standing Field Committee in Economic Theory ( 2015–18 ) . Moreover , he is a research fellow at CESifo and has been a research fellow at the Centre for Economic Policy Research ( CEPR ) . Furthermore , since 2015 , he has also been serving on the Council of the Game Theory Society ( 2015–21 ) . Finally , Nöldeke currently performs editorial duties for the Journal of the European Economic Association , Games and Theoretical Economics , and has worked in the past in editorial positions for academic journals such as Econometrica , European Economic Review , Review of Economic Studies , and International Economic Review . Georg Nöldeke is married and has two children . Research . Georg Nöldekes research focuses on microeconomic theory in general and game and contract theory in particular . Key contributions of his research include : - In Harts and Moores model of the hold-up problem simple option contracts giving the seller the right to make the delivery decision and specify payments depending on whether the delivery taking place is sufficient to make renegotiation superfluous ( with Klaus M . Schmidt ) . - Contingent ownership ( as found in e.g . joint ventures ) wherein one party owns the firm initially but the other party has the option to buy the firm at a set price at a later date yields first-best investments in a hold-up problem model with sequential investments and a joint surplus ( with Klaus M . Schmidt ) . - The limiting distribution of a dynamic evolutionary process driven by stochastic learning and rate mutations in a class of extensive-form games with perfect information always includes the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome but also includes other outcomes unless stringent conditions are met ( with Larry Samuelson ) . - As the frequency of firms wage offers in a dynamic labour market increases , any equilibrium that satisfies the Kohlberg-Mertens criterion of an independent never weak best response results ( in expectation ) in the unique stable outcome of the static Spence model of labour market signalling , wherein workers completely reveal their productivity ( with Eric van Damme ) . External links . - Website of Georg Nöldeke