2024 Russian offensive: For this reason we have many articles to integrate anything that could be possibly included here such as Battle of Avdiivka (2022–2024) , Battle of Marinka (2022–2023) , Eastern Ukraine campaign , Luhansk Oblast campaign .  We don't need this article.  Super Ψ Dro 22:27, 24 February 2024 (UTC) [ reply ] Note:  This discussion has been included in the deletion sorting lists for the following topics: Military , Russia ,  and Ukraine .  Super Ψ Dro 22:27, 24 February 2024 (UTC) [ reply ] Redirect to Russian invasion of Ukraine#2023–2024 winter attrition (1 December 2023 – present) ;  if this turns out to be significant enough to warrant its own page (as did the 2023 Ukrainian counteroffensive ) we can can change that then, but so far the only event of any importance has been the capture of Avdiivka.  Occidental𓍝Phantasmagoria [ T / C ] 22:37, 24 February 2024 (UTC) [ reply ] Keep Yes it is true most fighting is of Russian initiative but many sources are noticing that Russia is conducting larger scale offensives than usual.  Even after Avdiivka was captured Russia is still pushing and reports are they captured Lastochkyne and half of Sjeverne west of the city.  They have also attacked in the south approaching Robotyne and in the Bakhmut sector they've entered Ivanivkse.  The ISW reports that Russia is also going to conduct a large scale operation in Luhansk.  The Kremlin also claimed they took back Krynky which while denied by the Ukrainians does show Russia is doing attacks there as well.  Overall, it appears Russia is attacking across the front in an offensive larger than we've seen since 2022.  I think its important for it to be recorded in a separate article just like many offensives in other wars.  Timetorockknowlege ( talk ) 23:18, 24 February 2024 (UTC) [ reply ] Redirect My main problem with the article is the scope of locations it has.  It specifically says the offensive is occuring in all of Donetsk, Kherson, Zaporizhia, and Luhansk Oblasts.  None of the four listed sources specifically say that it is occuring in all four Oblasts.  Rather, some just say a new offensive is occuring, while the ISW source says a "multi-axis offensive operation" is occuring.  Until we find sources that make clear the connection of the offensives in all four Oblasts, I think that the offensive efforts in each individual Oblast can be handled in the various articles already created for them (such as Eastern Ukraine campaign ; Luhansk Oblast campaign ; or Dnieper campaign (2022–present) ), specifically because it is debatable whether or not operationally significant gains have been made yet.   I think it would make sense to, for now, redirect to Russian invasion of Ukraine#2023–2024 winter attrition (1 December 2023 – present) , which would talk about the offensive efforts in each Oblast, without necessarily making a connection between them and a coordinated offensive across all the four Oblasts.  Gödel2200 ( talk ) 13:11, 25 February 2024 (UTC) [ reply ] I will note that the two new sources added still don't make the connection that the offensives in each individual Oblast correspond to a wider coordinated campaign in all four Oblasts.  The NY Times sources doesn't even talk about offensives outside of Robytne, while the Yahoo source, which cites an ISW source , does not say that all the three separate offensive efforts listed correspond to a coordinated offensive campaign.  Gödel2200 ( talk ) 23:25, 25 February 2024 (UTC) [ reply ] Redirect .  Offensives usually do something in wars, like capture territory, political gain, etc.  So far, this supposed offensive has done none of that.  If there is an offensive that is notable, then it will get it's own article in due time, but for now WP:TOOSOON to have this page.  Not to mention, this seems like a mishmash of sources saying "yep, there's an offensive" instead of detailed locations, timeframes, goals, etc.  For now, news of an offensive can easily fit in their respective campaign articles.  Jebiguess ( talk ) 22:36, 25 February 2024 (UTC) [ reply ] Redirect per Gödel2200.  The article portrays events in Donetsk and Kharkiv Oblasts collectively, as if they were a single offensive.  In the absence of this framing in reliable sources, this looks like synthesis to me.  SaintPaulOfTarsus ( talk ) 20:54, 27 February 2024 (UTC) [ reply ] "A Russian military analyst close to the defense industry, Ruslan Pukhov, wrote last week that the assault on Avdiivka was part of a wider Russian strategy of pressuring Ukrainian forces along the entire 600-mile front line with thrusts and probes to exhaust the enemy “by a thousand cuts.” https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/27/world/europe/russia-deaths-avdiivka-strategy.html Timetorockknowlege ( talk ) 00:14, 28 February 2024 (UTC) [ reply ] The source specifically says that Russia is using "thrusts and probes" along the entire frontline. It does not say that Russia is engaging in offensive actions along the entire frontline (non-offensive thrusts and probes can occur), but rather efforts in "pressuring" Ukrainian forces. More importantly, even if the source said Russia is engaging in offensives along the entire frontline, this still doesn't mean there is a singular coordinated 2024 Russian offensive across all axes, as the title of the article implies. Also, I'm not sure we should even be using information from Russia In Global Affairs in the first place. It says its editorial board is headed by Sergei Karaganov , a well known pro war advocate, who has called for the use of nuclear weapons against European NATO states. Gödel2200 ( talk ) 02:24, 28 February 2024 (UTC) [ reply ] I don't mind changing the title of the article to reflect an offensive that is not fully coordinated across the entire front. But it is still clear that Russian forces are attacking across the front in an effort to take advantage of delays in US aid as well as exhaustion and morale loss on the Ukrainian side. It definitely shouldn't be kept as it is right now called a stalemate as Russia in the past 2 months or so likely captured more Russian territory than during the Ukrainian counteroffensive. Also, just because Karaganov is pro-war does not mean we shouldn't cite him, for example the Russian MoD is cited in the main Russian invasion of Ukraine article. He clearly has links to the Russian military and his claims of offensive actions across the front are supported  by the advances Russia is making across the front. Robotyne in the south, Marinka, Avdiivka, Ivanivske and Novomikhailovka in the east, and Krokhmalne and Kupiansk in the northeast. Even in Kherson the Russians are pushing as reports https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-18-2024 say. The Ukrainians were attacking in a similar way with thrusts and probes to test defenses and making less progress than this current offensive during the initial parts of the 2023 Ukrainian counteroffensive and it still deserved an article which I agree with. And offensives don't have to capture massive amounts of territory to be considered an offensive. Some may think its too soon to call this an offensive but I think it is clear from what's going on that an offensive attempt is going on at the very least on eastern and southern Ukraine. There will likely be more sources on this as time goes on. Timetorockknowlege ( talk ) 03:07, 28 February 2024 (UTC) [ reply ] You're right that just because Karaganov is pro-war doesn't mean we can't cite him. I just think we should be a bit more skeptical of analyses for which he is the head of the editorial board. The problem with the article isn't whether we think this is "similar" to the 2023 Ukrainian counteroffensive, or whether we think the actions by the Russians constitute an offensive; it's what the RS's say.  And so far, the RS's state things differently than they did during the 2023 Ukrainian counteroffensive.  The RS's in the Ukrainain counteroffensive article consistently refer to the counteroffensive as a singular counteroffensive, not multiple counteroffensives.  In contrast, the sources here do not say there is an offensive, but multiple offensive efforts, and do not state they are part of a larger coordinated one that is occuring throughout all the four Oblasts (as the article says).  The sources we use here certainly do make it clear there are offensive efforts throughout Ukraine.  But my argument is that we don't need to make separate articles for each offensive effort, as they can be sufficiently handled in the various articles we already have (such as Eastern Ukraine campaign , Luhansk Oblast campaign , etc.,).  Gödel2200 ( talk ) 12:58, 28 February 2024 (UTC) [ reply ] The above discussion is preserved as an archive of the debate.  Please do not modify it.  Subsequent comments should be made on the appropriate discussion page (such as the article's talk page or in a deletion review ).  No further edits should be made to this page.

Discussion outcome: redirect