আফগানিস্তানে ইসলাম
আফগানিস্তানে ইসলাম চর্চা শুরু হয় সপ্তম শতাব্দী থেকে দশম শতাব্দী পর্যন্ত আরব ইসলামী বিজয় লাভের পর এবং উনবিংশ শতাব্দীর শেষ দিকে এর রূপান্তর ঘটে।
ইসলাম আফগানিস্তানের সরকারি রাষ্ট্রীয় ধর্ম, দেশটির জনসংখ্যার প্রায় ৯৯.৭% মুসলিম। এর মধ্যে ৯০ শতাংশ মুসলিম সুন্নী, যারা হানাফি মাযহাব অনুসরণ করে। বাকি ১০ শতাংশ মুসলমান শিয়া মতাদর্শী। বেশির ভাগ শিয়া টুইলভার শাখার অনুসারী এবং গুটিকয়েক শিয়া ইসমাইলিজম অনুসরণ করে।
সপ্তম শতাব্দীতে রাশিদুন খিলাফতের আরবগণ নাহাওয়ান্দের যুদ্ধে সাসানীয় পারস্যদের পরাজিত করার পর আধুনিক আফগানিস্তানে প্রবেশ করেছিলেন। এই বিশাল পরাজয়ের পর, শেষ সাসানীয় সম্রাট তৃতীয় ইয়াজদিগার্দ মধ্য এশিয়ার পূর্বদিকের গভীরে পালিয়ে যান। ইয়াজদিগার্দকে অনুসরণ করে এই অঞ্চলটিতে প্রবেশ করতে নির্বাচিত আরবরা উত্তর-পূর্ব ইরানে ছিলেন এবং পরবর্তীতে তাঁরা হেরাতের মধ্যে ছিলেন, যেখানে তাঁরা উত্তর আফগানিস্তানের দিকে অগ্রসর হওয়ার আগে তাঁদের সেনাবাহিনীর একটি বড় অংশ স্থাপন করেছিলেন।
উত্তর আফগানিস্তানের অধিবাসীরা বিপুল সংখ্যক উমাইয়া ধর্মপ্রচারক প্রচেষ্টার মাধ্যমে ইসলাম গ্রহণ করে, বিশেষ করে হিশাম ইবনে আবদুল মালিক এবং উমর ইবনে আবদুল আজিজ এর অধীনে। দক্ষিণে আবদুর রহমান বিন সামারা জাবুলিস্তানের অধিবাসীদের কাছে ইসলাম চালু করেছিলেন, যা জুনবিলের শাসনে ছিল। 
আল-মুতাসিম শাসনের সময় এই অঞ্চলের অধিকাংশ বাসিন্দাদের মধ্যে ইসলাম চর্চা শুরু হয় এবং সাধারণত অবশেষে ইয়াকুব-ই লিত সাফারীর অধীনে অনুশীলন করা হয়, আফগানিস্তানের অন্যান্য প্রধান শহরগুলির পাশাপাশি কাবুলের প্রধান ধর্ম ছিল ইসলাম। ইমাম আবু হানিফার পিতা সাবিত ইবনে যুতা আধুনিক আফগানিস্তানের অধিবাসী ছিলেন। তিনি ইরাকের কুফায় অভিবাসিত হন, যেখানে আবু হানিফা জন্মগ্রহণ করেন। পরবর্তীতে সামানিগণ সুন্নি ইসলামকে মধ্য এশিয়ার হৃদয়ে গভীরভাবে প্রচার করেছিলেন এবং নবম শতাব্দীতে ফার্সি ভাষায় কুরআনের সম্পূর্ণ অনুবাদ করা হয়েছিল। তখন থেকে দেশটিতে ইসলাম ধর্মের আধিপত্য বিস্তার হয়েছে। ইসলামী নেতাগণ সংকটের বিভিন্ন সময়ে রাজনৈতিক গোলযোগে প্রবেশ করেছেন, কিন্তু খুব কমই দীর্ঘ সময়ের জন্য ধর্মনিরপেক্ষ কর্তৃপক্ষ ব্যবহার করা হয়।
পেশাওয়ারে শাহীর অবশিষ্টাংশ ৯৯৮ এবং ১০৩০ খ্রিস্টাব্দে মাহমুদ গজনভি দ্বারা বহিষ্কৃত হয়। গজনভি রাজবংশ ঘুরি রাজবংশ দ্বারা প্রতিস্থাপিত হয়, যাদের ইতোমধ্যে শক্তিশালী ইসলামী সাম্রাজ্য প্রসারিত। দ্বাদশ শতাব্দীতে ঘুরি শাসনামলে নির্মিত প্রথম স্থাপনা হেরাত জামে মসজিদ দেশটির পুরনো মসজিদগুলোর মধ্যে অন্যতম। ইসলামি স্বর্ণযুগ হিসাবে পরিচিত এই সময়ে বাগদাদের পর আফগানিস্তান মুসলিম বিশ্বের দ্বিতীয় প্রধান শিক্ষা কেন্দ্র হয়ে ওঠে।
মঙ্গোল আক্রমণ এবং ধ্বংসের পরে, তৈমুরগণ এলাকাটি পুনর্গঠন করে আবারো এটি ইসলামী শিক্ষা কেন্দ্র গড়ে তোলে। ষোড়শ শতাব্দীতে সাফাভিদের শাসনকালে দক্ষিণ আফগানিস্তানে শিয়া ইসলাম তার পথ তৈরি করে। ১৭০৯ সালে মীরওয়াইস হুতাক কর্তৃক আফগানদের মুক্তি দেয়া পর্যন্ত আফগানিস্তানের কান্দাহার অঞ্চল প্রায়শই শিয়া সাফাভিদের এবং সুন্নী মুঘলদের মধ্যে একটি যুদ্ধক্ষেত্র ছিল।
কেন্দ্রীয়করণের দিকে চালনার সময় রাজা আবদুর রহমান খান (১৮৮০-১৯০১) রাষ্ট্রীয় বিল্ডিংয়ের জন্য একটি যন্ত্র হিসাবে ইসলামের প্রথম পদ্ধতিগত কর্মসংস্থান চালু করেছিলেন। তিনি সব আইন ইসলামী আইন মেনে চলতে হবে এবং এইভাবে পশতুনওয়ালিতে আবদ্ধ প্রথামত আইন উপর শরিয়াকে উত্থাপন করার আদেশ দেন। আলেমগণকে তাঁর রাষ্ট্রীয় প্রচেষ্টার পাশাপাশি কেন্দ্রীয় কর্তৃপক্ষকে বৈধতা ও অনুমোদন করার জন্য তালিকাভুক্ত করা হয়েছিল। এটি একদিকে ধর্মীয় সম্প্রদায় উন্নত করলেও যখন তারা ক্রমবর্ধমানভাবে আমলাতন্ত্রে রাষ্ট্রের দাস হিসাবে যোগদান করছিল তখন ধর্মীয় নেতৃত্ব অবশেষে দুর্বল হয়ে পড়েছিল। ধর্মীয় ব্যক্তিত্ব ও প্রতিষ্ঠানগুলোর দ্বারা উপভোগ করা অনেক অর্থনৈতিক সুযোগ রাজ্যের কাঠামোর মধ্যে পুনর্গঠন করা হয়েছিল, একবার শিক্ষার প্রচার, একবার আলেমগণের বিশেষাধিকার ঘনিষ্ঠভাবে তত্ত্বাবধান করা হয়েছিল এবং আমির ন্যায়বিচারের সর্বোচ্চ রক্ষাকর্তা হয়ে উঠেছিলেন।
তাঁর উত্তরাধিকারীরা সম্রাট আবদুর রহমান খানের নীতিগুলি অব্যাহত ও প্রসারিত করেছিল কারণ তারা ধর্মনিরপেক্ষতার গতি বাড়িয়েছিল। ইসলাম মিথস্ক্রিয়া কেন্দ্রীয় ছিল, কিন্তু ধর্মীয় প্রতিষ্ঠা মূলত অরাজনৈতিক ছিল, রাজনৈতিক প্রভাবের পরিবর্তে নৈতিক হিসাবে কাজ করে। তবুও জাতীয় সংকটের সময় ইসলাম নিজেই জোর দিয়েছিল এবং যখন ধর্মীয় নেতৃত্ব নিজেকে গুরুতরভাবে হুমকির মুখে ফেলেছিল, তখন সহজাত দক্ষতা সম্পন্ন ধর্মীয় ব্যক্তিত্বরা নিয়মিতভাবে ইসলাম বিরোধী দলকে রাষ্ট্রের বিরোধিতায় বিভক্ত করার জন্য নিযুক্ত করেছিল। They rose up on several occasions against King Amanullah Shah (1919–1929), for example, in protest against reforms they believed to be western intrusions inimical to Islam.
Subsequent rulers, mindful of traditional attitudes antithetical to secularization were careful to underline the compatibility of Islam with modernization. Even so, and despite its pivotal position within the society which continued to draw no distinction between religion and state, the role of religion in state affairs continued to decline.
The 1931 Constitution made the Hanafi Shariah the state religion, while the 1964 Constitution simply prescribed that the state should conduct its religious ritual according to the Hanafi School. The 1977 Constitution, declared Islam the religion of Afghanistan, but made no mention that the state ritual should be Hanafi. The Penal Code (1976) and civil law (1977), covering the entire field of social justice, represent major attempts to cope with elements of secular law, based on, but superseded by other systems. Courts, for instance, were enjoined to consider cases first according to secular law, resorting to the BCShariah in areas where secular law did not exist. By 1978, the government of the Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) openly expressed its aversion to the religious establishment. This precipitated the fledgling Islamist Movement into a national revolt; Islam moved from its passive stance on the periphery to play an active role.
Politicized Islam in Afghanistan represents a break from Afghan traditions. The Islamist Movement originated in 1958 among faculties of Kabul University, particularly within the Faculty of Islamic Law which had been formed in 1952 with the announced purpose of raising the quality of religious teaching to accommodate modern science and technology. The founders were largely professors influenced by the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, a party formed in the 1930s that was dedicated to Islamic revivalism and social, economic, and political equity. Their objective is to come to terms with the modern world through the development of a political ideology based on Islam. The Afghan leaders, while indebted to many of these concepts, did not forge strong ties to similar movements in other countries.
The liberalization of government attitudes following the passage of the 1964 Constitution ushered in a period of intense activism among students at Kabul University. Professors and their students set up the Muslim Youth Organization (Sazmani Jawanani Musulman) in the mid-1960s at the same time that the leftists were also forming many parties. Initially communist students outnumbered the Muslim students, but by 1970 the Muslim Youth had gained a majority in student elections. Their membership was recruited from university faculties and from secondary schools in several cities such as Mazari Sharif and Herat. Some of these professors and students became the leaders of the Mujahideen rebels in the 1980s.
The 1979 Soviet invasion in support of a communist government triggered a major intervention of religion into Afghan political conflict, and Islam united the multiethnic political opposition. With the takeover of government by the PDPA in April 1978, Islam had already become central to uniting the opposition against the communist ideology of the new rulers. As a politico-religious system, Islam is well-suited to the needs of a diverse, unorganized, often mutually antagonistic citizenry wishing to forge a united front against a common enemy; and war permitted various groups within the mujahideen to put into effect competing concepts of organization.
The Soviet invasion and the Iranian Revolution not only led national uprisings but also the importation of foreign radical Muslims to Afghanistan. The mujahideen leaders were charismatic figures with dyadic ties to followers. In many cases military and political leaders replaced the tribal leadership; at times the religious leadership was strengthened; often the religious combined with the political leadership. Followers selected their local leaders on the basis of personal choice and precedence among regions, sects, ethnic groups or tribes, but the major leaders rose to prominence through their ties to outsiders who controlled the resources of money and arms.
With the support of foreign aid, the mujahideen were ultimately successful in their jihad to drive out the Soviet forces, but not in their attempts to construct a political alternative to govern Afghanistan after their victory. Throughout the war, the mujahideen were never fully able to replace traditional structures with a modern political system based on Islam. Most mujahideen commanders either used traditional patterns of power, becoming the new khans, or sought to adapt modern political structures to the traditional society. In time the prominent leaders accumulated wealth and power and, in contrast to the past, wealth became a determining factor in the delineation of power at all levels.
With the departure of foreign troops and the long sought demise of Kabul's leftist government, The Islamic State of Afghanistan finally came into being in April 1992. This represented a distinct break with Afghan history, for religious specialists had never before exercised state power. But the new government failed to establish its legitimacy and, as much of its financial support dissipated, local and middle range commanders and their militia not only fought among themselves but resorted to a host of unacceptable practices in their protracted scrambles for power and profit. Throughout the nation the populous suffered from harassment, extortion, kidnapping, burglary, hijacking and acts dishonoring women. Drug trafficking increased alarmingly; nowhere were the highways safe. The mujahideen had forfeited the trust they once enjoyed.
In the fall of 1994 a group called the Taliban came forth vowing to cleanse the nation of warlords and criminals. Their intention was to create a "pure" Islamic government subject to their own strict interpretations of the Shariah. Many Pakistani politicians supported the Taliban, including Sami ul Haq who is regarded as the Father of the Taliban. A number of its leaders were one-time mujahideen members, but the bulk of their forces were young Afghan refugees trained in Pakistani madrassas (religious schools), especially those run by the Jamiat-e Ulema-e Islam Pakistan, the aggressively conservative Pakistani political religious party headed by Maulana Fazlur Rahman, arch rival of Qazi Hussain Ahmad, leader of the equally conservative Jamaat-e-Islami and longtime supporter of the mujahideen.
Headquartered in Kandahar, mostly Pashtuns from the rural areas, and from the top leadership down to the fighting militia characteristically in their thirties or forties and even younger, the Taliban swept the country. In September 1996 they captured Kabul and ruled over most of Afghanistan by 2001. The meteoric take over went almost unchallenged. Arms were collected and security was established. At the same time, acts committed for the purpose of enforcing the Shariah included public executions of murderers, stoning for adultery, amputation for theft, a ban on all forms of gambling such as kite flying, chess and cockfights, prohibition of music and videos, proscriptions against pictures of humans and animals, and an embargo on women's voices over the radio. Women were to remain as invisible as possible, behind the veil, in purdah in their homes, and dismissed from work or study outside their homes. They were toppled by a combined Afghan-NATO military force in late 2001. Majority of them escaped to neighboring Pakistan from where they launched insurgency against the current NATO-backed Afghan government. Peace negotiations between the Taliban and the Afghan government is ongoing as of 2013.
For Afghans, Islam represents a potentially unifying symbolic system which offsets the divisiveness that frequently rises from the existence of a deep pride in tribal loyalties and an abounding sense of personal and family honor found in multitribal and multiethnic societies such as Afghanistan.
Islam is a central, pervasive influence throughout Afghan society; religious observances punctuate the rhythm of each day and season. In addition to a central congregational masjid for weekly communal prayers which are obligatory for men in Islam (but not for woman) and are generally well attended, smaller community-maintained mosques stand at the center of villages, as well as town and city neighborhoods. Masjids serve not only as places of worship, but for a multitude of functions, including shelter for guests, places to meet, the focus of social religious festivities and schools. Almost every Afghan has at one time during his youth studied at a mosque school; for many this is the only formal education they receive.
Because Islam is a total way of life and functions as a comprehensive code of social behavior regulating all human relationships, individual and family status depends on the proper observance of the society's value system based on concepts defined in Islam. These are characterized by honesty, frugality, generosity, virtuousness, piousness, fairness, truthfulness, tolerance and respect for others. To uphold family honor, elders also control the behavior of their children according to these same Islamic prescriptions. At times, even competitive relations between tribal or ethnic groups are expressed in terms claiming religious superiority. In short, Islam structures day-to-day interactions of all members of the community.
The religious establishment consists of several levels. Any Muslim can lead informal groups in prayer. Mullahs who officiate at mosques are normally appointed by the government after consultation with their communities and, although partially financed by the government, mullahs are largely dependent for their livelihood on community contributions including shelter and a portion of the harvest. Supposedly versed in the Qur'an, Sunnah, Hadith and Shariah, they must ensure that their communities are knowledgeable in the fundamentals of Islamic ritual and behavior. This qualifies them to arbitrate disputes over religious interpretation. Often they function as paid teachers responsible for religious education classes held in mosques where children learn basic moral values and correct ritual practices. Their role has additional social aspects for they officiate on the occasion of life crisis rituals associated with births, marriages and deaths.
But rural mullahs are not part of an institutionalized hierarchy of clergy. Most are part-time mullahs working also as farmers or craftsmen. Some are barely literate, or only slightly more educated than the people they serve. Often, but by no means always, they are men of minimal wealth and, because they depend for their livelihood on the community that appoints them, they have little authority even within their own social boundaries. They are often treated with scant respect and are the butt of a vast body of jokes making fun of their arrogance and ignorance. Yet their role as religious arbiters forces them to take positions on issues that have political ramifications and since mullahs often disagree with one another, pitting one community against the other, they are frequently perceived as disruptive elements within their communities.
Veneration of saints and shrines is opposed by some Islamic groups, particularly those ascribing to the Salafi or Ahle Hadith. Nevertheless, Afghanistan's landscape is liberally strewn with shrines honoring saints of all descriptions. Many of Afghanistan's oldest villages and towns grew up around shrines of considerable antiquity. Some are used as sanctuaries by fugitives.
Shrines vary in form from simple mounds of earth or stones marked by pennants to lavishly ornamented complexes surrounding a central domed tomb. These large establishments are controlled by prominent religious and secular leaders. Shrines may mark the final resting place of a fallen hero (shahid), a venerated religious teacher, a renowned Sufi poet, or relics, such as a hair of Muhammad or a piece of his cloak (khirqah). A great many commemorate legends about the miraculous exploits of Ali ibn Abi Talib, the fourth caliph and the first Imam of Shi'a Islam believed to be buried at the nation's most elaborate shrine located in the heart of Mazari Sharif, the Exalted Shrine. Ali is revered throughout Afghanistan for his role as an intermediary in the face of tyranny.
Festive annual fairs celebrated at shrines attract thousands of pilgrims and bring together all sections of communities. Pilgrims also visit shrines to seek the intercession of the saint for special favors, be it a cure for illness or the birth of a son. Women are particularly devoted to activities associated with shrines. These visits may be short or last several days and many pilgrims carry away specially blessed curative and protective amulets (usually a tawiz) to ward off the evil eye, assure loving relationships between husbands and wives and many other forms of solace. It should be noted however, that like saint veneration, such practices are generally not encouraged in Islam according to classical understanding of the Holy Qu'ran and Hadiths (prophetic sayings of the Rabi)
Roughly 10% (7-15%) of the Afghan population practice Shia Islam. Most Shias in Afghanistan belong to the Twelver branch. This includes the Hazara ethnic group and the smaller urbanized Qizilbash group, who are originally from eastern Iran.
Politically aware Shia students formed the hardcore of the Afghan Maoist movement in the 1960s and early 1970s. After the Saur Revolution (April Revolution) of 1978 and the Iranian Revolution of 1979, Shia rebel groups in the Hazarajat region, although frequently at odds with one another, became active in mujahideen activities. They were aided by Shi'a Iran and fought against the Soviet-backed Afghan government as well as other mujahideen groups.
During the political maneuvering leading up to the establishment of the Islamic State of Afghanistan in 1992, the Shi'a groups unsuccessfully negotiated for more equitable, consequential political and social roles.
The Ismaili Shiites accepted Ismail ibn Jafar instead of Musa al-Kadhim as the successor to Imam Jafar as-Sadiq. Ismaili communities in Afghanistan are less populous than the Twelver who consider the Ismaili heretical. They are found primarily in and near the eastern Hazarajat, in the Baghlan area north of the Hindu Kush, among the mountain Tajik of Badakhshan, and amongst the Wakhi in the Wakhan Corridor.
Ismaili are seen to follow their leaders uncritically. The pir or leader of Afghan Ismaili comes from the Sayyid family of Kayan, located near Doshi, a small town at the northern foot of the Salang Pass, in western Baghlan Province. During the 1980s Soviet war in Afghanistan this family acquired considerable political power. The Serena Hotel in Kabul is owned and operated by Ismailis.
The Ahmadiyya is considered a movement that began in the late 19th century by Mirza Ghulam Ahmad in Qadian, India. It was seen as apostasy by most other Muslim groups, and accordingly only 12 years after Mirza Ghulam's claim of mahdi-hood, a couple of Ahmadiyya members were stoned to death in Kabul during 1901 to 1903. Later in the 1920s, King Amanullah Khan had several Ahmadiyya members forcibly reverted, and in 1924 affiliation with Ahmadiyya became a capital offense.
Three Sufi orders are prominent: the Naqshbandiya founded in Bukhara, the Qadiriya founded in Baghdad, and the Cheshtiya located at Chesht-i-Sharif east of Herat. Among the Naqshbandi, Ahmad al Faruqi Kabuli, born north of Kabul, acquired renown for his teachings in India during the reign of the Moghul Emperor Akbar in the sixteenth century. 
Another famous Qadiriya pir named Mawlana Faizani came to prominence in the 1960s and 1970s, and was a leading critic against the creeping influence of communist philosophy. Jailed in the mid-70s, Mawlana Faizani disappeared when the khalqis came to power and remains missing to this day.
The Cheshtiya order was founded by Mawdid al-Cheshti who was born in the twelfth century and later taught in India. The Cheshtiya brotherhood, concentrated in the Hari River valley around Obe, Karukh and Chehst-i-Sharif, is very strong locally and maintains madrasas with fine libraries. Traditionally the Cheshtiya have kept aloof from politics, although they were effectively active during the resistance within their own organizations and in their own areas.
Herat and its environs has the largest number and greatest diversity of Sufi branches, many of which are connected with local tombs of pir (ziarat). Other Sufi groups are found all across the north, with important centers in Maimana, Faryab Province, and in Kunduz. The brotherhoods in Kabul and around Mazari Sharif are mostly associated with the Naqshbandiya. The Qadiriya are found mainly among the eastern Pushtun of Wardak, Paktia and Nangarhar, including many Ghilzai nomadic groups. Other smaller groups are settled in Kandahar and in Shindand, Farah Province. The Cheshtiya are centered in the Hari River valley. There are no formal Sufi orders among the Shi'a in the central Hazarajat, although some of the concepts are associated with Sayyids, descendants of Mohammad, who are especially venerated among the Shi'a.
Afghanistan is unique in that there is little hostility between the ulama (religion scholars) and the Sufi orders. A number of Sufi leaders are considered as ulama, and many ulama closely associate with Sufi brotherhoods. The general populace accords Sufis respect for their learning and for possessing karamat, the psychic spiritual power conferred upon them by God that enables pirs to perform acts of generosity and bestow blessings (barakat). Sufism therefore is an effective popular force. In addition, since Sufi leaders distance themselves from the mundane, they are at times turned to as more disinterested mediators in tribal disputes in preference to mullahs who are reputed to escalate minor secular issues into volatile confrontations couched in Islamic rhetoric.
Despite the Afghan Sufis' stable position in Afghan society, Sufi leaders were among those executed following the Saur Revolution, among them Baha'uddin Jan, the "pir naqshbandi" of the Aimaq of Purchaman District, Farah.