C 214/148
EN
Official Journal of the European Union
16.6.2023
Thursday 19 January 2023
105.
Welcomes the adoption of the Conditionality Regulation; reiterates that it entered into force on 1 January 2021; welcomes the judgments of the CJEU of 16 February 2022 concerning the actions brought by two Member States against the conditionality mechanism and its conclusions confirming that the EU does indeed have competences regarding the rule of law in the Member States and that the rule-of-law conditionality mechanism is in line with EU law;
106.
Recalls that Member States’ ineffective or untimely cooperation or non-cooperation with the EPPO and OLAF constitutes grounds for action under the Conditionality Regulation; calls on the EPPO and OLAF to therefore report each case where Member States have failed to comply with their obligations to inform, to assist, to take appropriate action and precautionary measures and to ensure an appropriate and timely follow-up of reports and recommendations;
107.
Points out that the Conditionality Regulation is a permanent instrument applying beyond the limits of a given MFF and applicable across the board as a prerequisite for accessing all EU funds;
108.
Recalls that compliance with the rule of law and with Article 2 TEU are prerequisites for gaining access to funds, that the rule-of-law conditionality mechanism is fully applicable to the resources of the RRF as explicitly stipulated by Article 8 of the RRF Regulation, and that no measures may be financed under the RRF that are contrary to the EU values enshrined in Article 2 TEU;
109.
Considers that the Conditionality Regulation is sufficient and able to prevent or remedy democratic backsliding, but only if it is used in a timely manner, with strict and clear conditions and followed up by close monitoring of the implementation of the national remedial measures;
110.
Deeply regrets the fact that under the rule-of-law conditionality mechanism, the Commission presented Hungary, as remedial measures, with a set of 17 conditions that are not sufficient to rectify the serious breaches of the rule of law; regrets that the Commission did not request more substantial changes and safeguards to restore the independence of the judiciary, reduce the level of corruption and guarantee the adequate protection of the EU’s financial interests;
111.
Maintains that compliance by the Member States with the principles of the rule of law is a prerequisite for sound financial management, in general, and for the efficient and effective management of EU resources, in particular; believes that violations of such principles therefore pose a serious danger to the Union’s financial interests; welcomes the judgments of the CJEU (25) that have recently highlighted the clear relationship between respect for the principles of the rule of law and the efficient implementation of the Union budget; reiterates that only by strengthening the EU anti-fraud architecture can the protection of the EU’s financial interests be effectively and efficiently pursued and enhanced by overcoming the national systems’ inherent limits, which are an obstacle when dealing with financial crime, which has become an increasingly transnational form of misconduct; takes the view that only effective judicial review can ensure compliance with EU law as noted by the CJEU, namely that expenditure ‘cannot be fully guaranteed in the absence of effective judicial review designed to ensure compliance with EU law; the existence of such review, both in the Member States and at EU level, by independent courts and tribunals, is of the essence of the rule of law’ (26);
112.
Highlights the detrimental effects of corruption on the rights of citizens; reiterates once again its recommendation that the EU should become a member of the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO), since there are no legal obstacles to its full membership; invites the Commission, therefore, to recommend that the Council conclude an international agreement with GRECO to set down its membership; requests the Council to take a clear position on the EU joining GRECO, clarifying whether there is any specific opposition and, if so, from which Member State or States;
(25) (26)
Judgment of 16 February 2022, Hungary v European Parliament and Council of the European Union, C-156/21, ECLI: EU:C:2022:97 and the judgment of 16 February 2022, Republic of Poland v European Parliament and Council of the European Union, C-157/21, ECLI: EU:C:2022:98.
Judgment of 16 February 2022, Hungary v European Parliament and Council of the European Union, C-156/21, ECLI: EU:C:2022:97, paragraph 132.