26.4.2023
EN
Official Journal of the European Union
C 143/17
On the contrary, the Court held that this concept could not be interpreted differently according to the law of Member States but had an autonomous meaning specific to European Union law.
It considered that the concept of worker could not be interpreted narrowly (35) and concluded that it ‘must be defined in accordance with objective criteria which distinguish the employment relationship by reference to the rights and duties of the persons concerned.
The essential feature of an employment relationship, however, is that for a certain period of time a person performs services for and under the direction of another person in return for which he receives remuneration’ (36).
The Court thereby linked the interpretation of ‘worker’ for the purposes of the Working Time Directive to that established by case-law in the context of the free movement of workers as laid down in Article 45 of the Treaty.
The Court holds that ‘[i]t is for the national court to apply that concept of a “worker” in any classification, and the national court must base that classification on objective criteria and make an overall assessment of all the circumstances of the case brought before it, having regard both to the nature of the activities concerned and the relationship of the parties involved’ (37).
However, it has issued guidance on the application of these criteria and established that the category ‘worker’ under EU law is independent from the national one (38).
It has for example held that employees in a body governed by public law qualify as ‘workers’ irrespective of their civil servant status (39).
It also reasoned that casual and seasonal staff employed under fixed-term contracts who are not subject to certain provisions of the national labour code fall within the scope of the concept of ‘workers’ (40).
The Court has also ruled that the concept of worker could cover a person admitted to a work rehabilitation centre, regardless of the person’s productivity level, the origin of the funds linked to remuneration or the limited amount of remuneration (41).
It is not the status of the person under national law that is decisive for the applicability of the Working Time Directive.
For example, in Matzak, the Court qualified a volunteer firefighter under Belgian law as ‘worker’ in the meaning of the Directive (42).
Instead, the applicability of the Directive will depend on whether the person concerned qualifies as a ‘worker’ according to the EU jurisprudential definition of worker.
This is based on aspects of his or her concrete working arrangements, in particular on whether the person performs effective and genuine activities under the direction and supervision of another person and for remuneration.
This in turn means that certain persons qualified as ‘self-employed’ under national law could nonetheless be categorised as ‘workers’ by the Court for the purpose of the application of the Working Time Directive (43).
The Court indeed held that ‘the classification of a “self-employed person” under national law does not prevent that person being classified as an employee within the meaning of EU law if his independence is merely notional, thereby disguising an employment relationship’ (44).
The Court pointed to the following elements as possible indicators of the ‘worker’ qualification: if the person acts under the direction of an employer as regards, in particular, the freedom to choose the time, place and content of his or her work (45), if the person does not share the employer’s commercial risks (46) and if he or she forms an integral part of the employer’s undertaking for the duration of that relationship (47).
On the other (35) Order of 7 April 2011, Dieter May v AOK Rheinland/Hamburg – Die Gesundheitskasse, C-519/09, ECLI:EU:C:2011:221, para.
21. (36) Judgment in case C-428/09, Union syndicale Solidaires Isère, para.
28; Judgment of 20 November 2018, Sindicatul Familia Constanţa and Others v Direcţia Generală de Asistenţă Socială şi Protecţia Copilului Constanţa, C-147/17, ECLI:EU:C:2018:926, para.
41; Judgment of 16 July 2020, UX v Governo della Repubblica italiana, C-658/18, ECLI:EU:C:2020:572, paras.
90 and 94; Judgment in case C-742/19, Ministrstvo za obrambo, para. 49.
(37) Judgment in case C-428/09, Union syndicale Solidaires Isère, para.
29; Judgment in case C-658/18, Governo della Repubblica italiana, para. 91.
(38) Judgment in case C-428/09, Union syndicale Solidaires Isère, para.
30. (39) Order in case C-519/09, May, paras. 25-26.
(40) Judgment in case C-428/09, Union syndicale Solidaires Isère, paras. 30-32.
(41) Judgment of 26 March 2015, Gérard Fenoll v Centre d’aide par le travail ‘La Jouvene’ and Association de parents et d’amis de personnes handicapées mentales (APEI) d’Avignon, C-316/13, ECLI:EU:C:2015:200, paras. 29-41.
(42) Judgment in case C-518/15, Matzak, para. 45.
(43) See by analogy, Judgment of 4 December 2014, FNV Kunsten Informatie en Media v Staat der Nederlanden, C-413/13, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2411, paras. 35-37.
(44) Judgment in case C-413/13, FNV Kunsten Informatie en Media, para.
35. (45) Judgment of 13 January 2004, Debra Allonby v Accrington & Rossendale College, Education Lecturing Services, trading as Protocol Professional and Secretary of State for Education and Employment, C-256/01, ECLI:EU:C:2004:18, para. 72.
(46) Judgment of 14 December 1989, The Queen v Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex parte Agegate Ltd, C-3/87, ECLI:EU:C:1989:650, para.
36. (47) Judgment of 16 September 1999, Criminal proceedings against Jean Claude Becu, Annie Verweire, Smeg NV and Adia Interim NV, C-22/98, ECLI:EU:C:1999:419, para.
26.