24.3.2022
EN
Official Journal of the European Union
L 97/81
invested capital reported by CdI and later SNS (see footnote 135), and that the rate is higher than the 6,5 % risk capital premium laid down by the CIPE directive, but lower than the rate resulting from the full application of the CIPE methodology (i.e. 8,87 %, see recital (218)).
If the 6,5 % rate had been applied, there would have been a ROIC of just EUR 5 million.
The Commission thus notes that Siremar was over­ compensated by approximately EUR 0,9 million for 2010; — Fourthly, after Siremar went into Extraordinary Administration in September 2010 (in this case, a liquidation procedure), the 2010, 2011 and 2012 financial statements were not prepared.
The same applies to the lineby-line accounts for 2011 and 2012.
On the contrary, and as per applicable law, the Extraordinary Adminis­ tration prepared and submitted quarterly reports to the supervising national authorities, i.e. the Ministry for Economic Development.
These reports show that the total operating results between September 2010 and June 2012 were negative, with a loss of EUR 0,7 million.
By September 2012, i.e. after the transfer of the business branch to CdI, those operational losses had increased to EUR 4,8 million.
Therefore, Siremar was incurring losses as it kept operating the public service obligations while the sale procedure of the Siremar business branch was ongoing.
While the Commission regrets that no line by line accounts were prepared for 2011 and the first half of 2012, Italy has confirmed that Siremar was not operating any services outside their public service obligations during the prolongation.
As the overall financial results for the period between September 2010 and September 2012 were negative, those documents strongly suggest that Siremar was not overcompensated in the period after it entered into Extraordinary Administration, and that the limited over­ compensation it received in 2010 was lost in the following years.
(477) Against this background, taking into account the very specific circumstances of the privatisation of the Siremar
business branch, and based on the information submitted by the Italian authorities, the Commission notes that the limited overcompensation it identified for 2010 was consumed by the losses of the subsequent period.
Therefore, the Commission concludes that Siremar was not overcompensated in the period between 1 January 2010 and 30 July 2012 taken as a whole.
As the Commission had expressed doubts in its 2011 Decision on potential overcompensation to Siremar only for that period, the Commission considers that its doubts on this issue have been dispelled.
(478) Paragraph 49 of the 2011 SGEI Framework requires Member States to ensure that the compensation granted for
operating the SGEI does not result in undertakings receiving overcompensation (as defined in paragraph 47 of that Framework).
Indeed, Member States must provide evidence upon request from the Commission.
Furthermore, they must carry out regular checks, or ensure that such checks are carried out, at the end of the period of entrustment and, in any event, at intervals no longer than 3 years.
In this regard, the Commission notes that the Italian authorities have provided the necessary evidence as described above (see recitals (469) and (470)).
Indeed, in 2009 and 2010, Siremar submitted its route-by-route accounts to the supervisory ministry allowing the latter to review the compensation amount.
From 17 September 2010 onwards, the presence of the Extraordinary Commissioner, appointed by the Italian State, subject to detailed rules under national law and with civil and criminal liability, provided another safeguard against overcompensation.
In addition, the Commission recalls that the compensation is paid out in instalments; that the final pay-out is made on the basis of the actual costs and revenues of the year; and that, after 25 November 2010, by decision of the Interdepartmental Conference, any amount of overcompensation is deducted from future advance subsidy payments (see recital (43)).
Against this background, while Siremar was overcompensated in 2010, the Commission notes that that overcompensation was nonetheless consumed in the following years, as Siremar in EA was incurring losses (see recital (476)).
Therefore, no overcompensation was granted for the period between 1 January 2010 and 30 July 2012 taken as a whole.
Against this background, the Commission concludes that, taking into account the very specific circum­ stances of the privatisation, which was carried out by the Extraordinary Administration while ensuring continuity of public services, the measures described above could be considered sufficient to avoid and detect overcom­ pensation.
(479) Based on the elements described above (see recitals (472) to (478)), the Commission concludes that the applicable
requirements of Section 2.8 of the 2011 SGEI Framework (Amount of compensation) are complied with.
8.3.1.7.
T h e b e r t h i n g p r i o r i t y
(480) Article 19-ter paragraph 21 of Decree Law 135/2009 clearly specifies that the berthing priority is necessary to
guarantee the territorial continuity with the islands and in light of the public service obligations of the companies of the former Tirrenia Group, including Siremar.
Indeed, if there were no priority berthing for companies entrusted with public service obligations, these may (sometimes) have to wait their turn before docking and thereby incur delays, which would defeat the purpose of ensuring reliable and convenient connectivity to the citizens.
In the case of Siremar, a regular timetable is indeed necessary to satisfy the mobility needs of the