16.3.2022
EN
Official Journal of the European Union
L 88/53
(250) Other export restrictions include licencing requirements and a qualified exporters list (in practice limited to the state trading enterprise Metal and Mineral Trading Corporation) for certain grades of the chromium ore, as well as a congestion surcharge levied on the Base Freight Rates of the Indian Railways in the rail transport of chromium ore to Bangladesh and Pakistan (being the only countries with rail connection with India).
(251) The most visible effect of the policy was the impressive reduction of the volume of export of chromium ore following the introduction of the targeted export restraints in 2008 and then again following their expansion in 2012.
The development of chromium ore export is illustrated by the below graph: IND, Chromiun exports (HS 261000)
(252) Hence, the targeted export restraints achieved the goal pursued by the GOI of discouraging exports and keeping chromium ore available for the domestic downstream industry.
(253) These export volumes have to be seen against the background of the domestic consumption of the chromium ore.
The GOI provided in its reply only limited data concerning export of the chromium ore (Financial Year (‘FY’) 18/19 (50) to FY20/21), while figures with regard to domestic production and consumption were provided for FY16/17 to FY19/20.
Both sets of those data are provided as confidential.
Nevertheless, it is possible to make on this basis a comparison of export volumes and domestic consumption for the FY19/20 (covering 9 months of the IP) and the preceding FY18/19.
In both financial years, export volumes did not exceed 1,5 % of domestic consumption.
It should be noted that share of imports in the domestic market was also insignificant.
(254) The Indian market also showed a constant and irrational overcapacity of production compared to the sum of domestic consumption and exports minus imports.
This overcapacity could not be explained by the GOI.
Such overcapacity can thus only be explained by the fact that the mining companies, including OMC in the chromium ore sector, exercised governmental functions (in particular, ensuring the adequate supply of chromium ore in line with the GOI’s policy objectives to support the downstream industry and add value to the supply chain).
(255) Second, the Commission found that according to the GOI Minerals Concession Rules of 2016, captive mines have a right of first refusal when their mining lease expires.
Article 8a of the Mines and Mineral Development Act of 1957 (as amended in 2015), also provides for extended periods of mining leases for captive users and reiterates the right of first refusal in auctions of mining leases for captive users.
This allows mining leases to remain predominantly in the hands of captive downstream ferrochrome producers, in line with the statements in recital (244) above.
De facto, the Commission also found, as mentioned in recital (236) above, that all the private chromium ore mining owners were (50) ‘FYx/x+1’ covers period from 1 April of the year x to 31 March of the year x+1.