21.2.2022
EN
Official Journal of the European Union
L 39/7
(11)
In June 2021, the Philippines made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG) to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime.
Since then, the Philippines has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, by developing and implementing guidance on delistings and the unfreezing of assets for targeted financial sanctions related to PF.
The Philippines should work to implement its action plan, including by: (1) demonstrating that effective risk-based supervision of DNFBPs is occurring; (2) demonstrating that supervisors are using AML/CFT controls to mitigate risks associated with casino junkets; (3) implementing the new registration requirements for MVTS and applying sanctions to unregistered and illegal remittance operators; (4) enhancing and streamlining LEA access to BO information and taking steps to ensure that BO information is accurate and up-to-date; (5) demonstrating an increase in the use of financial intelligence and an increase in ML investigations and prosecutions in line with risk; (6) demonstrating an increase in the identification, investigation and prosecution of TF cases; (7) demonstrating that appropriate measures are taken with respect to the NPO sector (including unregistered NPOs) without disrupting legitimate NPO activity; and (8) enhancing the effectiveness of the targeted financial sanctions framework for both TF and PF.
On this basis, the Philippines should be considered as a country having strategic deficiencies in its AML/CFT regime under Article 9 of Directive (EU) 2015/849.
(12)
In February 2021, Senegal made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and GIABA to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime.
Senegal should continue to work on implementing its action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by: (1) ensuring consistent understanding of ML/TF risks (in particular related to the DNFBP sector) across relevant authorities through training and outreach; (2) seeking MLA and other forms of international cooperation in line with its risk profile; (3) ensuring that Financial Institutions and DNFBPs are subject to adequate and effective supervision; (4) updating and maintaining comprehensive beneficial ownership information on legal persons and arrangements and strengthening the system of sanctions for violations of transparency obligations; (5) continuing to enhance the FIU’s human resources to ensure that it maintains effective operational analysis capacities; (6) demonstrating that efforts aimed at strengthening detection mechanisms and reinforcing the capability to conduct ML/predicate offences investigations and prosecutions activities are sustained consistently in line with the Senegal’s risk profile; (7) establishing comprehensive and standardised policies and procedures for identifying, tracing, seizing and confiscating proceeds and instrumentalities of crime in line with its risk profile; (8) strengthening the authorities understanding of TF risks and enhancing capacity and support for LEAs and prosecutorial authorities involved in TF in line with the 2019 TF National Strategy; and (9) implementing an effective targeted financial sanctions regime related to terrorist financing and proliferation financing as well as risk-based monitoring and supervision of NPOs.
On this basis, Senegal should be considered as a country having strategic deficiencies in its AML/CFT regime under Article 9 of Directive (EU) 2015/849.
(13)
In June 2021, South Sudan made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime.
South Sudan will work to implement its action plan, including by: (1) applying and engaging with the Eastern & Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG) for membership and committing to undergo a mutual evaluation by ESAAMLG or other assessment body; (2) conducting a comprehensive review of the AML/CFT Act (2012), with the support of international partners, including technical assistance, to comply with the FATF Standards; (3) designating an authority/authorities in charge of coordinating the national ML/TF risks assessments; (4) becoming a party to and implementing the 1988 Vienna Convention, the 2000 Palermo Convention, and the 1999 Terrorist Financing Convention; (5) competent authorities should be suitably structured and capacitated to implement a risk-based approach to AML/CFT supervision for financial institutions; (6) developing a comprehensive legal framework to collect and verify the accuracy of beneficial ownership information for legal persons; (7) operationalising a fully functioning and independent FIU; (8) establishing and implementing the legal and institutional framework to implement targeted financial sanctions in compliance with United Nations Security Council Resolutions on terrorism and proliferation financing; and (9) commencing implementation of targeted risk-based supervision/monitoring of NPOs at risk of TF abuse.
On this basis, South Sudan should be considered as a country having strategic deficiencies in its AML/CFT regime under Article 9 of Directive (EU) 2015/849.