C 347/92
EN
Official Journal of the European Union
9.9.2022
Wednesday 9 March 2022
vulnerability assessments before entering into new partnerships with foreign partners; stresses that academic staff should be trained to report covert funding or influence through a dedicated hotline and that those coming forward should always receive whistleblower protection; calls on the Commission and Member States to ensure that funding for research of geopolitical concern at European universities comes from European sources; calls on the Commission to propose legislation on increasing the transparency of the foreign financing of universities, as well as NGOs and think tanks, such as through mandatory donation declarations, due diligence for their funding streams and the disclosure of funding, in-kind contributions and subsidies from foreign parties; calls on Member State authorities to adopt effective rules on foreign funding for higher education institutions, including strict ceilings and reporting requirements;
129.
Underlines that similar risks to security and intellectual property theft exist in the private sector, where employees might have access to key technologies and trade secrets; calls on the Commission and Member States to encourage both academic institutions and the private sector to set up comprehensive security and compliance programmes, including specific security reviews for new contracts; notes that heightened limitations on systems and network access, as well as security clearance, may be warranted for some of the professors or employees working on critical research and products;
130.
Notes that the revised Blue Card Directive (25), which makes it easier for skilled non-EU migrants to come to the EU, enables Chinese and Russian companies established in Europe, for example, to bring over skilled migrants from their respective countries; points out that this could make it more difficult for Member States to exercise control over the influx of these citizens, which might lead to risks of foreign interference;
131.
Notes the increasing number of Confucius Institutes established around the world, and in particular in Europe; remarks that the Center for Language Education and Cooperation, formerly known as Confucius Institute Headquarters or Hanban (Office of Chinese Language Council International), which is responsible for the Confucius Institutes programme worldwide, is part of the Chinese party-state’s propaganda system; calls on Member States and the Commission to support independent Chinese language courses without the involvement of the Chinese state or affiliated organisations; believes that the recently established National China Centre in Sweden could serve as an important example of how to increase independent China competence in Europe;
132.
Considers, in addition, that Confucius Institutes serve as a lobbying platform for Chinese economic interests and for the Chinese intelligence service and the recruitment of agents and spies; recalls that many universities have decided to terminate their cooperation with Confucius Institutes because of the risks of Chinese espionage and interference, as did the universities of Dusseldorf in 2016, Brussels (VUB and ULB) in 2019, and Hamburg in 2020, and all universities in Sweden; calls for more universities to reflect on their current cooperation to ensure that it does not affect their academic freedom; calls on Member States to closely monitor teaching, research and other activities within the Confucius Institutes and, where alleged espionage or interference is substantiated by clear evidence, take enforcement action to safeguard European economic and political sovereignty, including through the denial of funding or the revocation of the licences of associated institutes;
133.
Observes that foreign interference can also be pursued through influence in and the instrumentalisation of religious institutes, such as Russian influence in Orthodox churches, in particular in Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, especially in its Republika Srpska entity, Georgia and to some extent in Ukraine, including by sowing division among local populations, developing a biased writing of history and promoting an anti-EU agenda, Turkish Government influence through mosques in France and Germany, and Saudi Arabian influence through Salafi mosques across Europe promoting radical Islam; calls on the Commission and Member States to ensure better coordination on protecting religious institutes from foreign interference and to cap and increase the transparency of funding; calls on Member States to closely monitor activities in religious institutes and, where appropriate and supported by evidence, take action, including through the denial of funding or the revocation of the licences of associated institutes;
134.
Calls on the EEAS to produce a study into the prevalence and influence of malicious state actors in European think tanks, universities, religious organisations and media institutions; calls on all EU institutions and Member States to collaborate with and engage in systematic dialogue with stakeholders and experts in order to accurately map and monitor
(25)
Directive (EU) 2021/1883 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 October 2021 on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purpose of highly qualified employment, and repealing Council Directive 2009/50/EC (OJ L 382, 28.10.2021, p. 1).