6.9.2022
EN
Official Journal of the European Union
C 342/83 Wednesday 16 February 2022
17.
Considers, in this regard, that the political and economic consequences of the decision to leave the Union are significant; believes that these were not genuinely and fully assessed by the UK prior to its decision to withdraw, which resulted in a lack of preparation for the procedure; believes that British citizens had scant knowledge about the European Union and were not adequately informed about the far-reaching consequences of the decision to leave the Union;
18.
Is of the view that the provisions of Article 50 TEU on the notification and extension of the period under Article 50 (3) TEU have been handled in a sufficiently flexible manner to respond to the political vacillations and inconsistencies of successive UK governments, while preserving the integrity of the withdrawal process and upholding the legal order of the Union;
19.
Recalls that the decision to withdraw is the sovereign right of a Member State and that the Union is obliged to acknowledge the intention of that state; highlights that Article 50 TEU does not specify and therefore places no constraints on the form of the notification of the intention to withdraw; believes in this context that when a Member State does not respect EU law and/or expresses its intention to refuse to apply the Treaties or recognise the jurisdiction of the CJEU and respect its judgments, this represents a clear rejection of the obligations linked to EU membership;
20.
Points out that withdrawal from the European Union is by nature a complex process and that the political choices of the withdrawing Member State regarding its future relations with the Union can add to such complexity;
The importance of an orderly withdrawal
21.
Believes that although the withdrawal is not conditional upon an agreement between the withdrawing Member State and the Union, the process of the withdrawal of the UK shows the importance of concluding an agreement on the withdrawal arrangements, particularly with a view to protecting the rights and legitimate expectations of the citizens affected;
22.
Considers that the EU institutions did their utmost and accomplished their obligation to ensure the conclusion of an agreement; commends the efforts made to avoid a no-deal scenario; notes, in this regard, that in accordance with Article 50 (3) TEU, if an agreement is not reached, the withdrawal becomes effective two years after the Council is notified; emphasises that there are no provisions in the TEU to tackle a no-deal scenario and a disorderly withdrawal;
23.
Underlines that given the high integrated nature of the EU single market, the withdrawal of a Member State affects all areas of economic activity and legal and administrative adjustments are necessary at all EU, Member State and local levels; reiterates the importance of the work undertaken by the Commission and the Member States at all levels of public administration and in raising awareness and preparing citizens and the private sector through the publication of many specific stakeholder preparedness notices and the timely adoption of unilateral and temporary contingency measures to tackle the possibility of a no-deal scenario and of a disorderly withdrawal;
24.
Notes that the TEU does not specify any substantive requirements regarding the framework for the future relationship between the withdrawing Member State and the Union and its link with the withdrawal arrangements; recalls however that, according to Article 50(2) TEU, the withdrawal agreement is to take account of the framework for the withdrawing state’s future relationship with the Union;
25.
Notes that in the case of the withdrawal of the UK, the two-year period laid down in Article 50(3) TEU for when the Treaties cease to apply to the withdrawing Member State from the moment of its notification of withdrawal has proved too short for an orderly withdrawal, as three extensions of this period as well as a subsequent transition period were deemed necessary; recalls that this time period can be increased via an extension in accordance with Article 50(3) TEU; considers that such an extension allows for the continuation of the negotiations in order to avoid a cliff edge; recalls, however, that throughout the two-year period and its further extensions, citizens, economic operators, Member States and third country trading partners faced an unprecedented and prolonged level of legal uncertainty;