EN
23.5.2022
Official Journal of the European Union
C 207/17
5.
If Question IV is answered in the affirmative: Is the Independent Arbitration Committee established under Paragraph 8 of the 2021 ADBG an official authority within the meaning of Article 10 of the General Data Protection Regulation?
(1)
Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) (OJ 2016 L 119, p. 1).
Appeal brought on 18 February 2022 by Dyson Ltd, Dyson Technology Ltd, Dyson Operations Pte Ltd, Dyson Manufacturing Sdn Bhd, Dyson Spain, SL, Dyson Austria GmbH, Dyson sp. z o.o., Dyson Ireland Ltd, Dyson GmbH, Dyson, Dyson Srl, Dyson Sweden AB, Dyson Denmark ApS, Dyson Finland Oy, Dyson BV against the judgment of the General Court (Seventh Chamber) delivered on 8 December 2021 in Case T-127/19, Dyson and Others v Commission (Case C-122/22 P) (2022/C 207/24) Language of the case: English Parties Appellants: Dyson Ltd, Dyson Technology Ltd, Dyson Operations Pte Ltd, Dyson Manufacturing Sdn Bhd, Dyson Spain, SL, Dyson Austria GmbH, Dyson sp. z o.o., Dyson Ireland Ltd, Dyson GmbH, Dyson, Dyson Srl, Dyson Sweden AB, Dyson Denmark ApS, Dyson Finland Oy, Dyson BV (represented by: E. Batchelor, T. Selwyn Sharpe and M. Healy, solicitors and avocats) Other party to the proceedings: European Commission
Form of order sought The appellants claim that the Court should: — Annul the Contested Judgment in its entirety; — Rule that the Commission committed a sufficiently serious breach of EU law and remit the damages application back to the General Court; and — Order the Commission to pay its own costs and Dyson’s costs in connection with these proceedings and the proceedings before the General Court.
Pleas in law and main arguments First, the General Court mischaracterised Dyson’s pleas and failed to state its reasoning.
Dyson’s plea was solely directed to the Commission’s grave and manifest error in choosing the one test method that was clearly outside its discretion, namely of testing with no dust at all.
The General Court did not address this plea; Second, the General Court erred in applying the case law on sufficiently serious breach, in not according determinative weight to its conclusion that the Commission breached a non-discretionary requirement under Art.
10 Parent Directive; Third, the General Court misapplied the law on sufficiently serious breach and legally mischaracterized the evidence in concluding that the ‘during use’ specification in the Parent Directive gave rise to interpretational difficulties; Fourth, the General Court misapplied the law on sufficiently serious breach in concluding that the ‘during use’ specification in the Parent Directive gave rise to regulatory complexity; Fifth, the General Court misapplied the law on sufficiently serious breach in concluding there was no grave and manifest error in connection with the Commission’s breach of the fundamental principle of equal treatment;