C 152/76
EN
Official Journal of the European Union
6.4.2022
4.10.
The European Union must acquire more capabilities to be able to fight effectively against disinformation, which is systematically spread by hostile powers, often driven by governments of certain third countries, among which, most notably Russia, as well as China.
To respond to this threat, it will not be enough to work on codes of conduct.
National authorities need more support from intelligence services and it would make sense for governments to share their knowledge, while taking into account the problems in some Member States mentioned above. 4.11.
These actions should also ensure accessibility for and understanding of people with disabilities, especially sensory, psychosocial and intellectual disabilities, who are particularly vulnerable to false information. 4.12.
Civil society appears to be insufficiently involved.
The main partners in dialogue cited by the Commission as being able to act are the platforms, the media, researchers and fact-checkers.
Businesses in particular must be given a major role in the fight against disinformation, because they can lose a lot of money or their reputation as a result of disinformation practices, but also trade unions and associations.
Civil society organisations have considerable legitimacy that can be harnessed to combat disinformation. 4.13.
The EESC notes that the fight against disinformation mainly tackles English-language content.
This is not least due to the fact that most platforms are of English-speaking origin.
While some States appear to be heavily concerned (such as the Czech Republic, Poland and the Baltic States), it would like to see more action on content in languages other than English. 4.14.
Overall, the EESC recommends more preventive and proactive action.
Because new networks are emerging all the time (including Clubhouse), because disinformation uses increasingly sophisticated means (such as ‘deep fake’), and because some applications straddle the line between a platform and a private messaging service (such as Telegram), action must be taken as soon as a new type of risk is detected. 4.15.
As the European Court of Auditors noted with some disappointment in its report of 3 June 2021, the EU still lacks a media literacy strategy enabling civil society to better decipher information, whether disseminated by traditional media or online.
This plan, which falls under Member State competence, must be implemented from an early age, so that younger people are quickly able to distinguish the true information from the fake information that they receive. 4.16.
The EESC notes that, too often, many media outlets, in particular audiovisual media outlets, accept personalities on their platforms who claim to have scientific expertise in order to increase their credibility.
In particular, it recommends more thorough verification of the academic credentials of those invited to speak as experts in the media.
Brussels, 9 December 2021.
The President of the European Economic and Social Committee Christa SCHWENG