6.4.2022
EN
Official Journal of the European Union
C 152/75
3.5.
The guidance recognises that fact-checking is not sufficiently shared between EU States.
This means that information known to be false in one country can circulate in another. 3.6.
The guidance notes that the fight against disinformation must be stepped up with regard to the monetisation of disinformation through the choice of advertising placements on the digital sphere, notably Google Ads. 3.7.
The Code reiterates the issue of political advertising.
The identity of the issuer of political advertising is too often opaque and the transparency of the advertisements broadcast needs to be improved.
This is in line with the proposals in the Digital Services legislation (9) (Article 30).
New legislation for more transparency in political advertising will be proposed by the Commission. 4.
Specific comments 4.1.
The EESC welcomes the quality of the European Commission’s work in the fight against disinformation, and in particular the gradual strengthening of its action. 4.2.
The EESC notes that the fight against disinformation must always take into account the need to protect freedom of expression. 4.3.
Discussions between all stakeholders are now being structured, in particular through a broad appeal to academics.
The EESC recognises that the focus on the online advertising sector was a necessity that has now been taken into consideration. 4.4.
The EESC’s main criticism of the guidance on strengthening the code on disinformation practices is that it focuses too much on content and its moderation and not enough on those who propagate it.
The content is constantly changing and the platforms that are used evolve, but the main actors remain basically the same and the motives do not change.
The approach must be one of prevention rather than cure, and the Commission’s work must focus on the causes rather than the consequences. 4.5.
Behind the image of a few ideologues, sects or fanatics, there is a real and extremely profitable business of disinformation.
Unwittingly, European companies spend more than EUR 400 million on disinformation sites (10).
As it is recognised that the major sources of disinformation have financial objectives, notably through a referrals system that enables them to obtain large sums of money from online advertising, but also through specific statutes allowing them to claim public subsidies, the Commission should encourage an arsenal of economic and financial tools to fight disinformation at its source. 4.6.
The EESC notes that many platforms do not publish enough about their methodology for dealing with disinformation and that this penalises all European players in their fight against disinformation practices.
At the same time, the EESC is pleased to see that some platforms (YouTube) seem to have taken the problem seriously. 4.7.
The power of the main platforms (Facebook and Twitter) should not hide the fact that the most effective disinformation is concentrated on tools that are less well known to the general public, such as VKontakte, Rumble, Odysee, Gab and Parler.
These smaller platforms have smaller audiences but can more easily target specific groups by region, age or any other parameter.
These platforms also lack the financial means to fight against the disinformation they propagate or do not consider important, hiding behind the banner of freedom of speech.
Disinformation often originates on more confidential platforms before quickly reaching a wider audience (11). 4.8.
The EESC considers that European action is too compartmentalised and lacks coordination.
The structures appear to be too separate, particularly where the two main bodies, the EDMO and European StratCom, are concerned.
The creation of a permanent working group involving the European Regulators Group for Audiovisual Media Services (ERGA) should facilitate information-sharing.
The EESC fears, however, that its resources for action are too limited, given the scale of the phenomena. 4.9.
Better cooperation between the Member States is needed urgently.
At the same time, the EU must take into account that media freedom, which is inseparable from freedom of expression, is currently at risk in several Member States.
The same applies with regard to their legal systems.
This will inevitably have a negative impact on the ability of these countries to cooperate successfully, for example in the field of fact-checking and in accordance with the values of the EU and more precisely the principles of the rule of law.
Any effort to tackle disinformation can have very significant consequences for fundamental rights, which must be guaranteed and defended in all Member States.
(9) (10) (11)
COM(2020) 825 final.
European Commission Proposal for a Regulation on a Single Market for Digital Services, 15 December 2020.
Claudia Cohen, Des marques financent, malgré elles, la désinformation, [Brands that unwittingly finance disinformation] Le Figaro, 5 August 2021.
Institute for public relations, Combating foreign disinformation on social media, Rand corporation, 28 July 2021.