EN
31.1.2022
Official Journal of the European Union
C 51/23
2.
Does the principle of the independence of the judiciary, enshrined in the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, read in conjunction with Article 2 TEU and Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, preclude a provision of national law, such as that contained in Article 99(ș) of Legea nr.
303/2004 privind statutul judecătorilor și procurorilor (Law No 303/2004 on the rules governing judges and prosecutors), which provides for the initiation of disciplinary proceedings and the application of disciplinary penalties in respect of a judge for failure to comply with a decision of the Constitutional Court, where that judge is called upon to acknowledge the primacy of EU law over the grounds of a decision of the Constitutional Court, that provision of national law depriving him or her of the possibility of applying a judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union which he or she regards as taking precedence? 3.
Does the principle of the independence of the judiciary, enshrined in the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, read in conjunction with Article 2 TEU and Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, preclude a national judicial practice which precludes a judge, on pain of incurring disciplinary liability, from applying the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union in criminal proceedings in relation to a complaint regarding the reasonable duration of criminal proceedings, governed by Article 4881 of the Romanian Code of Criminal Procedure?
Appeal brought on 9 December 2021 by Ryanair DAC, Airport Marketing Services Ltd, FR Financing (Malta) Ltd against the judgment of the General Court (Fifth Chamber) delivered on 29 September 2021 in Case T-448/18, Ryanair and Others v Commission (Case C-758/21 P) (2022/C 51/32) Language of the case: English Parties Appellants: Ryanair DAC, Airport Marketing Services Ltd, FR Financing (Malta) Ltd (represented by: E. Vahida, avocat, B. Byrne, advocaat, and S. Rating, abogado) Other party to the proceedings: European Commission
Form of order sought The appellants claim that the Court should: — set aside the judgment under appeal; — annul Articles 5 and 6 and Articles 9, 10 and 11, insofar as they concern the appellants, of Commission Decision (EU) 2018/628 (the contested decision) (1), or in the alternative, refer the case back to the General Court for reconsideration; and in any event — order the Commission to pay the appellants’ costs of this appeal and of the procedure in case T-448/18 before the General Court.
Pleas in law and main arguments The appellants advance four grounds of appeal.
First, the General Court erred in law by rejecting as inadmissible, and therefore refusing to take into account for its judicial review, key pieces of evidence that were submitted by the appellants prior to the closure of the oral part of the procedure before the General Court.
The General Court: erred in disregarding, or failing to duly consider, the legal principles underpinning the rules in Articles 85, (1) to (3), of the General Court’s Rules of Procedure; and erred in disregarding the case law applying those provisions.
Second, the General Court misinterpreted Article 17 of Council Regulation (EU) 2015/1589 (2) and misapplied Article 296 TFEU by finding respectively that: (i) the Commission had not violated the applicable limitation period for aid recovery; and (ii) the Contested Decision contained sufficient reasoning in that regard.