CVE-2018-18397 (C, published 2018-12-12T10:29Z)
Description: value: The userfaultfd implementation in the Linux kernel before 4.19.7 mishandles access control for certain UFFDIO_ ioctl calls, as demonstrated by allowing local users to write data into holes in a tmpfs file (if the user has read-only access to that file, and that file contains holes), related to fs/userfaultfd.c and mm/userfaultfd.c.
Severity: LOW (CVSS v3 base score: 5.5)
Weakness: CWE-863 \u2014 Incorrect Authorization
The product performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action, but it does not correctly perform the check. This allows attackers to bypass intended access restrictions.
Repository: https://github.com/torvalds/linux
Files changed:
fs/userfaultfd.c
mm/userfaultfd.c
Commit message: userfaultfd: shmem/hugetlbfs: only allow to register VM_MAYWRITE vmas

After the VMA to register the uffd onto is found, check that it has
VM_MAYWRITE set before allowing registration.  This way we inherit all
common code checks before allowing to fill file holes in shmem and
hugetlbfs with UFFDIO_COPY.

The userfaultfd memory model is not applicable for readonly files unless
it's a MAP_PRIVATE.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181126173452.26955-4-aarcange@redhat.com
Fixes: ff62a3421044 ("hugetlb: implement memfd sealing")
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Fixes: 4c27fe4c4c84 ("userfaultfd: shmem: add shmem_mcopy_atomic_pte for userfaultfd support")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Cc: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Cc: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>


Vulnerable code:
		 * Only allow __mcopy_atomic_hugetlb on userfaultfd
		 * registered ranges.
	 * Be strict and only allow __mcopy_atomic on userfaultfd
	 * registered ranges to prevent userland errors going
	 * unnoticed. As far as the VM consistency is concerned, it
	 * would be perfectly safe to remove this check, but there's
	 * no useful usage for __mcopy_atomic ouside of userfaultfd
	 * registered ranges. This is after all why these are ioctls
	 * belonging to the userfaultfd and not syscalls.

Fixed code:

		/*
		 * UFFDIO_COPY will fill file holes even without
		 * PROT_WRITE. This check enforces that if this is a
		 * MAP_SHARED, the process has write permission to the backing
		 * file. If VM_MAYWRITE is set it also enforces that on a
		 * MAP_SHARED vma: there is no F_WRITE_SEAL and no further
		 * F_WRITE_SEAL can be taken until the vma is destroyed.
		 */
		ret = -EPERM;
		if (unlikely(!(cur->vm_flags & VM_MAYWRITE)))
			goto out_unlock;

		WARN_ON(!(vma->vm_flags & VM_MAYWRITE));
		WARN_ON(!(vma->vm_flags & VM_MAYWRITE));
		 * Check the vma is registered in uffd, this is
		 * required to enforce the VM_MAYWRITE check done at
		 * uffd registration time.
	 * Check the vma is registered in uffd, this is required to
	 * enforce the VM_MAYWRITE check done at uffd registration
	 * time.