CVE-2015-3290 (Other, published 2015-08-31T10:59Z)
Description: value: arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S in the Linux kernel before 4.1.6 on the x86_64 platform improperly relies on espfix64 during nested NMI processing, which allows local users to gain privileges by triggering an NMI within a certain instruction window.
Severity: HIGH (CVSS v3 base score: )
Weakness: CWE-264 \u2014 Permissions, Privileges, and Access Controls
Weaknesses in this category are related to the management of permissions, privileges, and other security features that are used to perform access control.
Repository: https://github.com/torvalds/linux
Files changed:
arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
Commit message: x86/nmi/64: Switch stacks on userspace NMI entry

Returning to userspace is tricky: IRET can fail, and ESPFIX can
rearrange the stack prior to IRET.

The NMI nesting fixup relies on a precise stack layout and
atomic IRET.  Rather than trying to teach the NMI nesting fixup
to handle ESPFIX and failed IRET, punt: run NMIs that came from
user mode on the normal kernel stack.

This will make some nested NMIs visible to C code, but the C
code is okay with that.

As a side effect, this should speed up perf: it eliminates an
RDMSR when NMIs come from user mode.

Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>


Vulnerable code:
	 * If %cs was not the kernel segment, then the NMI triggered in user
	 * space, which means it is definitely not nested.
	cmpl	$__KERNEL_CS, 16(%rsp)
	jne	first_nmi

Fixed code:
	 *
	 * However, espfix prevents us from directly returning to userspace
	 * with a single IRET instruction.  Similarly, IRET to user mode
	 * can fault.  We therefore handle NMIs from user space like
	 * other IST entries.
	testb	$3, CS-RIP+8(%rsp)
	jz	.Lnmi_from_kernel

	/*
	 * NMI from user mode.  We need to run on the thread stack, but we
	 * can't go through the normal entry paths: NMIs are masked, and
	 * we don't want to enable interrupts, because then we'll end
	 * up in an awkward situation in which IRQs are on but NMIs
	 * are off.
	 */

	SWAPGS
	cld
	movq	%rsp, %rdx
	movq	PER_CPU_VAR(cpu_current_top_of_stack), %rsp
	pushq	5*8(%rdx)	/* pt_regs->ss */
	pushq	4*8(%rdx)	/* pt_regs->rsp */
	pushq	3*8(%rdx)	/* pt_regs->flags */
	pushq	2*8(%rdx)	/* pt_regs->cs */
	pushq	1*8(%rdx)	/* pt_regs->rip */
	pushq   $-1		/* pt_regs->orig_ax */
	pushq   %rdi		/* pt_regs->di */
	pushq   %rsi		/* pt_regs->si */
	pushq   (%rdx)		/* pt_regs->dx */
	pushq   %rcx		/* pt_regs->cx */
	pushq   %rax		/* pt_regs->ax */
	pushq   %r8		/* pt_regs->r8 */
	pushq   %r9		/* pt_regs->r9 */
	pushq   %r10		/* pt_regs->r10 */
	pushq   %r11		/* pt_regs->r11 */
	pushq	%rbx		/* pt_regs->rbx */
	pushq	%rbp		/* pt_regs->rbp */
	pushq	%r12		/* pt_regs->r12 */
	pushq	%r13		/* pt_regs->r13 */
	pushq	%r14		/* pt_regs->r14 */
	pushq	%r15		/* pt_regs->r15 */

	 * At this point we no longer need to worry about stack damage
	 * due to nesting -- we're on the normal thread stack and we're
	 * done with the NMI stack.
	movq	%rsp, %rdi
	movq	$-1, %rsi
	call	do_nmi

	/*
	 * Return back to user mode.  We must *not* do the normal exit
	 * work, because we don't want to enable interrupts.  Fortunately,
	 * do_nmi doesn't modify pt_regs.
	 */
	SWAPGS
	jmp	restore_c_regs_and_iret

.Lnmi_from_kernel: