CVE-2014-5207 (C, published 2014-08-18T11:15Z)
Description: value: fs/namespace.c in the Linux kernel through 3.16.1 does not properly restrict clearing MNT_NODEV, MNT_NOSUID, and MNT_NOEXEC and changing MNT_ATIME_MASK during a remount of a bind mount, which allows local users to gain privileges, interfere with backups and auditing on systems that had atime enabled, or cause a denial of service (excessive filesystem updating) on systems that had atime disabled via a "mount -o remount" command within a user namespace.
Severity: MEDIUM (CVSS v3 base score: )
Weakness: CWE-269 \u2014 Improper Privilege Management
The product does not properly assign, modify, track, or check privileges for an actor, creating an unintended sphere of control for that actor.
Repository: https://github.com/torvalds/linux
Files changed:
fs/namespace.c
include/linux/mount.h
Commit message: mnt: Correct permission checks in do_remount

While invesgiating the issue where in "mount --bind -oremount,ro ..."
would result in later "mount --bind -oremount,rw" succeeding even if
the mount started off locked I realized that there are several
additional mount flags that should be locked and are not.

In particular MNT_NOSUID, MNT_NODEV, MNT_NOEXEC, and the atime
flags in addition to MNT_READONLY should all be locked.  These
flags are all per superblock, can all be changed with MS_BIND,
and should not be changable if set by a more privileged user.

The following additions to the current logic are added in this patch.
- nosuid may not be clearable by a less privileged user.
- nodev  may not be clearable by a less privielged user.
- noexec may not be clearable by a less privileged user.
- atime flags may not be changeable by a less privileged user.

The logic with atime is that always setting atime on access is a
global policy and backup software and auditing software could break if
atime bits are not updated (when they are configured to be updated),
and serious performance degradation could result (DOS attack) if atime
updates happen when they have been explicitly disabled.  Therefore an
unprivileged user should not be able to mess with the atime bits set
by a more privileged user.

The additional restrictions are implemented with the addition of
MNT_LOCK_NOSUID, MNT_LOCK_NODEV, MNT_LOCK_NOEXEC, and MNT_LOCK_ATIME
mnt flags.

Taken together these changes and the fixes for MNT_LOCK_READONLY
should make it safe for an unprivileged user to create a user
namespace and to call "mount --bind -o remount,... ..." without
the danger of mount flags being changed maliciously.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>


Vulnerable code:
	if ((flag & CL_UNPRIVILEGED) && (mnt->mnt.mnt_flags & MNT_READONLY))
		mnt->mnt.mnt_flags |= MNT_LOCK_READONLY;
			mnt_flags |= MNT_NODEV;

Fixed code:
	if (flag & CL_UNPRIVILEGED) {
		mnt->mnt.mnt_flags |= MNT_LOCK_ATIME;

		if (mnt->mnt.mnt_flags & MNT_READONLY)
			mnt->mnt.mnt_flags |= MNT_LOCK_READONLY;

		if (mnt->mnt.mnt_flags & MNT_NODEV)
			mnt->mnt.mnt_flags |= MNT_LOCK_NODEV;

		if (mnt->mnt.mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)
			mnt->mnt.mnt_flags |= MNT_LOCK_NOSUID;

		if (mnt->mnt.mnt_flags & MNT_NOEXEC)
			mnt->mnt.mnt_flags |= MNT_LOCK_NOEXEC;
	}
	if ((mnt->mnt.mnt_flags & MNT_LOCK_NODEV) &&
	    !(mnt_flags & MNT_NODEV)) {
		return -EPERM;
	}
	if ((mnt->mnt.mnt_flags & MNT_LOCK_NOSUID) &&
	    !(mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)) {
		return -EPERM;
	}
	if ((mnt->mnt.mnt_flags & MNT_LOCK_NOEXEC) &&
	    !(mnt_flags & MNT_NOEXEC)) {
		return -EPERM;
	}
	if ((mnt->mnt.mnt_flags & MNT_LOCK_ATIME) &&
	    ((mnt->mnt.mnt_flags & MNT_ATIME_MASK) != (mnt_flags & MNT_ATIME_MASK))) {
		return -EPERM;
	}

			mnt_flags |= MNT_NODEV | MNT_LOCK_NODEV;
#define MNT_ATIME_MASK (MNT_NOATIME | MNT_NODIRATIME | MNT_RELATIME )
#define MNT_LOCK_ATIME		0x040000
#define MNT_LOCK_NOEXEC		0x080000
#define MNT_LOCK_NOSUID		0x100000
#define MNT_LOCK_NODEV		0x200000