CVE-2017-6001 (C, published 2017-02-18T21:59Z)
Description: value: Race condition in kernel/events/core.c in the Linux kernel before 4.9.7 allows local users to gain privileges via a crafted application that makes concurrent perf_event_open system calls for moving a software group into a hardware context.  NOTE: this vulnerability exists because of an incomplete fix for CVE-2016-6786.
Severity: HIGH (CVSS v3 base score: 7)
Weakness: CWE-362 \u2014 Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition')
The product contains a code sequence that can run concurrently with other code, and the code sequence requires temporary, exclusive access to a shared resource, but a timing window exists in which the shared resource can be modified by another code sequence that is operating concurrently.
Repository: https://github.com/torvalds/linux
Files changed:
kernel/events/core.c
Commit message: perf/core: Fix concurrent sys_perf_event_open() vs. 'move_group' race

Di Shen reported a race between two concurrent sys_perf_event_open()
calls where both try and move the same pre-existing software group
into a hardware context.

The problem is exactly that described in commit:

  f63a8daa5812 ("perf: Fix event->ctx locking")

... where, while we wait for a ctx->mutex acquisition, the event->ctx
relation can have changed under us.

That very same commit failed to recognise sys_perf_event_context() as an
external access vector to the events and thereby didn't apply the
established locking rules correctly.

So while one sys_perf_event_open() call is stuck waiting on
mutex_lock_double(), the other (which owns said locks) moves the group
about. So by the time the former sys_perf_event_open() acquires the
locks, the context we've acquired is stale (and possibly dead).

Apply the established locking rules as per perf_event_ctx_lock_nested()
to the mutex_lock_double() for the 'move_group' case. This obviously means
we need to validate state after we acquire the locks.

Reported-by: Di Shen (Keen Lab)
Tested-by: John Dias <joaodias@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Min Chong <mchong@google.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Fixes: f63a8daa5812 ("perf: Fix event->ctx locking")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170106131444.GZ3174@twins.programming.kicks-ass.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>


Vulnerable code:
		gctx = group_leader->ctx;
		mutex_lock_double(&gctx->mutex, &ctx->mutex);
		mutex_unlock(&gctx->mutex);
		mutex_unlock(&gctx->mutex);

Fixed code:
/*
 * Variation on perf_event_ctx_lock_nested(), except we take two context
 * mutexes.
 */
static struct perf_event_context *
__perf_event_ctx_lock_double(struct perf_event *group_leader,
			     struct perf_event_context *ctx)
{
	struct perf_event_context *gctx;

again:
	rcu_read_lock();
	gctx = READ_ONCE(group_leader->ctx);
	if (!atomic_inc_not_zero(&gctx->refcount)) {
		rcu_read_unlock();
		goto again;
	}
	rcu_read_unlock();

	mutex_lock_double(&gctx->mutex, &ctx->mutex);

	if (group_leader->ctx != gctx) {
		mutex_unlock(&ctx->mutex);
		mutex_unlock(&gctx->mutex);
		put_ctx(gctx);
		goto again;
	}

	return gctx;
}

		gctx = __perf_event_ctx_lock_double(group_leader, ctx);


		/*
		 * Check if we raced against another sys_perf_event_open() call
		 * moving the software group underneath us.
		 */
		if (!(group_leader->group_caps & PERF_EV_CAP_SOFTWARE)) {
			/*
			 * If someone moved the group out from under us, check
			 * if this new event wound up on the same ctx, if so
			 * its the regular !move_group case, otherwise fail.
			 */
			if (gctx != ctx) {
				err = -EINVAL;
				goto err_locked;
			} else {
				perf_event_ctx_unlock(group_leader, gctx);
				move_group = 0;
			}
		}
		perf_event_ctx_unlock(group_leader, gctx);
		perf_event_ctx_unlock(group_leader, gctx);