CVE-2013-7026 (C, published 2013-12-09T18:55Z)
Description: value: Multiple race conditions in ipc/shm.c in the Linux kernel before 3.12.2 allow local users to cause a denial of service (use-after-free and system crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted application that uses shmctl IPC_RMID operations in conjunction with other shm system calls.
Severity: MEDIUM (CVSS v3 base score: )
Weakness: CWE-362 \u2014 Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition')
The product contains a code sequence that can run concurrently with other code, and the code sequence requires temporary, exclusive access to a shared resource, but a timing window exists in which the shared resource can be modified by another code sequence that is operating concurrently.
Repository: https://github.com/torvalds/linux
Files changed:
ipc/shm.c
Commit message: ipc,shm: fix shm_file deletion races

When IPC_RMID races with other shm operations there's potential for
use-after-free of the shm object's associated file (shm_file).

Here's the race before this patch:

  TASK 1                     TASK 2
  ------                     ------
  shm_rmid()
    ipc_lock_object()
                             shmctl()
                             shp = shm_obtain_object_check()

    shm_destroy()
      shum_unlock()
      fput(shp->shm_file)
                             ipc_lock_object()
                             shmem_lock(shp->shm_file)
                             <OOPS>

The oops is caused because shm_destroy() calls fput() after dropping the
ipc_lock.  fput() clears the file's f_inode, f_path.dentry, and
f_path.mnt, which causes various NULL pointer references in task 2.  I
reliably see the oops in task 2 if with shmlock, shmu

This patch fixes the races by:
1) set shm_file=NULL in shm_destroy() while holding ipc_object_lock().
2) modify at risk operations to check shm_file while holding
   ipc_object_lock().

Example workloads, which each trigger oops...

Workload 1:
  while true; do
    id=$(shmget 1 4096)
    shm_rmid $id &
    shmlock $id &
    wait
  done

  The oops stack shows accessing NULL f_inode due to racing fput:
    _raw_spin_lock
    shmem_lock
    SyS_shmctl

Workload 2:
  while true; do
    id=$(shmget 1 4096)
    shmat $id 4096 &
    shm_rmid $id &
    wait
  done

  The oops stack is similar to workload 1 due to NULL f_inode:
    touch_atime
    shmem_mmap
    shm_mmap
    mmap_region
    do_mmap_pgoff
    do_shmat
    SyS_shmat

Workload 3:
  while true; do
    id=$(shmget 1 4096)
    shmlock $id
    shm_rmid $id &
    shmunlock $id &
    wait
  done

  The oops stack shows second fput tripping on an NULL f_inode.  The
  first fput() completed via from shm_destroy(), but a racing thread did
  a get_file() and queued this fput():
    locks_remove_flock
    __fput
    ____fput
    task_work_run
    do_notify_resume
    int_signal

Fixes: c2c737a0461e ("ipc,shm: shorten critical region for shmat")
Fixes: 2caacaa82a51 ("ipc,shm: shorten critical region for shmctl")
Signed-off-by: Greg Thelen <gthelen@google.com>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <davidlohr@hp.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>  # 3.10.17+ 3.11.6+
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>


Vulnerable code:
	if (!is_file_hugepages(shp->shm_file))
		shmem_lock(shp->shm_file, 0, shp->mlock_user);
		user_shm_unlock(file_inode(shp->shm_file)->i_size,
						shp->mlock_user);
	fput (shp->shm_file);

Fixed code:
	struct file *shm_file;

	shm_file = shp->shm_file;
	shp->shm_file = NULL;
	if (!is_file_hugepages(shm_file))
		shmem_lock(shm_file, 0, shp->mlock_user);
		user_shm_unlock(file_inode(shm_file)->i_size, shp->mlock_user);
	fput(shm_file);

		/* check if shm_destroy() is tearing down shp */
		if (shm_file == NULL) {
			err = -EIDRM;
			goto out_unlock0;
		}


	/* check if shm_destroy() is tearing down shp */
	if (shp->shm_file == NULL) {
		ipc_unlock_object(&shp->shm_perm);
		err = -EIDRM;
		goto out_unlock;
	}