CVE-2018-3740 (Ruby, published 2018-03-30T19:29Z)
Description: value: A specially crafted HTML fragment can cause Sanitize gem for Ruby to allow non-whitelisted attributes to be used on a whitelisted HTML element.
Severity: MEDIUM (CVSS v3 base score: 7.5)
Weakness: CWE-20 \u2014 Improper Input Validation
The product receives input or data, but it does
        not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the
        properties that are required to process the data safely and
        correctly.
Repository: https://github.com/rgrove/sanitize
Files changed:
lib/sanitize/transformers/clean_element.rb
test/test_clean_element.rb
test/test_malicious_html.rb
Commit message: fix: Prevent code injection due to improper escaping in libxml2 >= 2.9.2

When Sanitize <= 4.6.2 is used in combination with libxml2 >= 2.9.2, a
specially crafted HTML fragment can cause libxml2 to generate improperly
escaped output, allowing non-whitelisted attributes to be used on
whitelisted elements.

Sanitize now performs additional escaping on affected attributes to
prevent this.

Many thanks to the Shopify Application Security Team for responsibly
reporting this issue.

Fixes #176


Vulnerable code:
        if attr_whitelist.include?(attr_name)
          # The attribute is whitelisted.
          # Remove any attributes that use unacceptable protocols.
          if @protocols.include?(name) && @protocols[name].include?(attr_name)
            attr_protocols = @protocols[name][attr_name]
            if attr.value =~ REGEX_PROTOCOL
              attr.unlink unless attr_protocols.include?($1.downcase)
            else
              attr.unlink unless attr_protocols.include?(:relative)
          end
        else
          # The attribute isn't whitelisted.
          if allow_data_attributes && attr_name.start_with?('data-')
            # Arbitrary data attributes are allowed. Verify that the attribute
            # is a valid data attribute.
            attr.unlink unless attr_name =~ REGEX_DATA_ATTR
            # Either the attribute isn't a data attribute, or arbitrary data
            # attributes aren't allowed. Remove the attribute.
            attr.unlink
        .must_equal 'foo <a href="" rel="nofollow">foo</a> bar'

Fixed code:
  # Attributes that need additional escaping on `<a>` elements due to unsafe
  # libxml2 behavior.
  UNSAFE_LIBXML_ATTRS_A = Set.new(%w[
    name
  ])

  # Attributes that need additional escaping on all elements due to unsafe
  # libxml2 behavior.
  UNSAFE_LIBXML_ATTRS_GLOBAL = Set.new(%w[
    action
    href
    src
  ])

  # Mapping of original characters to escape sequences for characters that
  # should be escaped in attributes affected by unsafe libxml2 behavior.
  UNSAFE_LIBXML_ESCAPE_CHARS = {
    ' ' => '%20',
    '"' => '%22'
  }

  # Regex that matches any single character that needs to be escaped in
  # attributes affected by unsafe libxml2 behavior.
  UNSAFE_LIBXML_ESCAPE_REGEX = /[ "]/

        unless attr_whitelist.include?(attr_name)
          # The attribute isn't whitelisted.

          if allow_data_attributes && attr_name.start_with?('data-')
            # Arbitrary data attributes are allowed. If this is a data
            # attribute, continue.
            next if attr_name =~ REGEX_DATA_ATTR
          end

          # Either the attribute isn't a data attribute or arbitrary data
          # attributes aren't allowed. Remove the attribute.
          attr.unlink
          next
        end

        # The attribute is whitelisted.
        # Remove any attributes that use unacceptable protocols.
        if @protocols.include?(name) && @protocols[name].include?(attr_name)
          attr_protocols = @protocols[name][attr_name]
          if attr.value =~ REGEX_PROTOCOL
            unless attr_protocols.include?($1.downcase)
              attr.unlink
              next
            unless attr_protocols.include?(:relative)
              attr.unlink
              next
            end

          # Leading and trailing whitespace around URLs is ignored at parse
          # time. Stripping it here prevents it from being escaped by the
          # libxml2 workaround below.
          attr.value = attr.value.strip
        end

        # libxml2 >= 2.9.2 doesn't escape comments within some attributes, in an
        # attempt to preserve server-side includes. This can result in XSS since
        # an unescaped double quote can allow an attacker to inject a
        # non-whitelisted attribute.
        #
        # Sanitize works around this by implementing its own escaping for
        # affected attributes, some of which can exist on any element and some
        # of which can only exist on `<a>` elements.
        #
        # The relevant libxml2 code is here:
        # <https://github.com/GNOME/libxml2/commit/960f0e275616cadc29671a218d7fb9b69eb35588>
        if UNSAFE_LIBXML_ATTRS_GLOBAL.include?(attr_name) ||
            (name == 'a' && UNSAFE_LIBXML_ATTRS_A.include?(attr_name))

          attr.value = attr.value.gsub(UNSAFE_LIBXML_ESCAPE_REGEX, UNSAFE_LIBXML_ESCAPE_CHARS)
        .must_equal 'foo <a href rel="nofollow">foo</a> bar'
    it "should not allow relative URLs when relative URLs aren't whitelisted" do
      input = '<a href="/foo/bar">Link</a>'

      Sanitize.fragment(input,
        :elements   => ['a'],
        :attributes => {'a' => ['href']},
        :protocols  => {'a' => {'href' => ['http']}}
      ).must_equal '<a>Link</a>'
    end


  # libxml2 >= 2.9.2 doesn't escape comments within some attributes, in an
  # attempt to preserve server-side includes. This can result in XSS since an
  # unescaped double quote can allow an attacker to inject a non-whitelisted
  # attribute. Sanitize works around this by implementing its own escaping for
  # affected attributes.
  #
  # The relevant libxml2 code is here:
  # <https://github.com/GNOME/libxml2/commit/960f0e275616cadc29671a218d7fb9b69eb35588>
  describe 'unsafe libxml2 server-side includes in attributes' do
    tag_configs = [
      {
        tag_name: 'a',
        escaped_attrs: %w[ action href src name ],
        unescaped_attrs: []
      },

      {
        tag_name: 'div',
        escaped_attrs: %w[ action href src ],
        unescaped_attrs: %w[ name ]
      }
    ]

    before do
      @s = Sanitize.new({
        elements: %w[ a div ],

        attributes: {
          all: %w[ action href src name ]
        }
      })
    end

    tag_configs.each do |tag_config|
      tag_name = tag_config[:tag_name]

      tag_config[:escaped_attrs].each do |attr_name|
        input = %[<#{tag_name} #{attr_name}='examp<!--" onmouseover=alert(1)>-->le.com'>foo</#{tag_name}>]

        it 'should escape unsafe characters in attributes' do
          @s.fragment(input).must_equal(%[<#{tag_name} #{attr_name}="examp<!--%22%20onmouseover=alert(1)>-->le.com">foo</#{tag_name}>])
        end

        it 'should round-trip to the same output' do
          output = @s.fragment(input)
          @s.fragment(output).must_equal(output)
        end
      end

      tag_config[:unescaped_attrs].each do |attr_name|
        input = %[<#{tag_name} #{attr_name}='examp<!--" onmouseover=alert(1)>-->le.com'>foo</#{tag_name}>]

        it 'should not escape characters unnecessarily' do
          @s.fragment(input).must_equal(input)
        end

        it 'should round-trip to the same output' do
          output = @s.fragment(input)
          @s.fragment(output).must_equal(output)
        end
      end
    end
  end