CVE-2020-35517 (C, published 2021-01-28T20:15Z)
Description: value: A flaw was found in qemu. A host privilege escalation issue was found in the virtio-fs shared file system daemon where a privileged guest user is able to create a device special file in the shared directory and use it to r/w access host devices.
Severity: MEDIUM (CVSS v3 base score: 8.2)
Weakness: CWE-269 \u2014 Improper Privilege Management
The product does not properly assign, modify, track, or check privileges for an actor, creating an unintended sphere of control for that actor.
Repository: https://github.com/qemu/qemu
Files changed:
tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c
Commit message: virtiofsd: avoid /proc/self/fd tempdir

In order to prevent /proc/self/fd escapes a temporary directory is
created where /proc/self/fd is bind-mounted. This doesn't work on
read-only file systems.

Avoid the temporary directory by bind-mounting /proc/self/fd over /proc.
This does not affect other processes since we remounted / with MS_REC |
MS_SLAVE. /proc must exist and virtiofsd does not use it so it's safe to
do this.

Path traversal can be tested with the following function:

  static void test_proc_fd_escape(struct lo_data *lo)
  {
      int fd;
      int level = 0;
      ino_t last_ino = 0;

      fd = lo->proc_self_fd;
      for (;;) {
          struct stat st;

          if (fstat(fd, &st) != 0) {
              perror("fstat");
              return;
          }
          if (last_ino && st.st_ino == last_ino) {
              fprintf(stderr, "inode number unchanged, stopping\n");
              return;
          }
          last_ino = st.st_ino;

          fprintf(stderr, "Level %d dev %lu ino %lu\n", level,
                  (unsigned long)st.st_dev,
                  (unsigned long)last_ino);
          fd = openat(fd, "..", O_PATH | O_DIRECTORY | O_NOFOLLOW);
          level++;
      }
  }

Before and after this patch only Level 0 is displayed. Without
/proc/self/fd bind-mount protection it is possible to traverse parent
directories.

Fixes: 397ae982f4df4 ("virtiofsd: jail lo->proc_self_fd")
Cc: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Cc: Jens Freimann <jfreimann@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20201006095826.59813-1-stefanha@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Jens Freimann <jfreimann@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jens Freimann <jfreimann@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>


Vulnerable code:
    char template[] = "virtiofsd-XXXXXX";
    char *tmpdir;
    tmpdir = mkdtemp(template);
    if (!tmpdir) {
        fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_ERR, "tmpdir(%s): %m\n", template);
        exit(1);
    }

    if (mount("/proc/self/fd", tmpdir, NULL, MS_BIND, NULL) < 0) {
        fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_ERR, "mount(/proc/self/fd, %s, MS_BIND): %m\n",
                 tmpdir);
    /* Now we can get our /proc/self/fd directory file descriptor */
    lo->proc_self_fd = open(tmpdir, O_PATH);
        fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_ERR, "open(%s, O_PATH): %m\n", tmpdir);

    if (umount2(tmpdir, MNT_DETACH) < 0) {
        fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_ERR, "umount2(%s, MNT_DETACH): %m\n", tmpdir);
        exit(1);
    }

    if (rmdir(tmpdir) < 0) {
        fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_ERR, "rmdir(%s): %m\n", tmpdir);
    }

Fixed code:
    /*
     * We only need /proc/self/fd. Prevent ".." from accessing parent
     * directories of /proc/self/fd by bind-mounting it over /proc. Since / was
     * previously remounted with MS_REC | MS_SLAVE this mount change only
     * affects our process.
     */
    if (mount("/proc/self/fd", "/proc", NULL, MS_BIND, NULL) < 0) {
        fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_ERR, "mount(/proc/self/fd, MS_BIND): %m\n");
    /* Get the /proc (actually /proc/self/fd, see above) file descriptor */
    lo->proc_self_fd = open("/proc", O_PATH);
        fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_ERR, "open(/proc, O_PATH): %m\n");