CVE-2015-1344 (C, published 2015-12-07T20:59Z)
Description: value: The do_write_pids function in lxcfs.c in LXCFS before 0.12 does not properly check permissions, which allows local users to gain privileges by writing a pid to the tasks file.
Severity: HIGH (CVSS v3 base score: )
Weakness: CWE-264 \u2014 Permissions, Privileges, and Access Controls
Weaknesses in this category are related to the management of permissions, privileges, and other security features that are used to perform access control.
Repository: https://github.com/lxc/lxcfs
Files changed:
lxcfs.c
Commit message: Implement privilege check when moving tasks

When writing pids to a tasks file in lxcfs, lxcfs was checking
for privilege over the tasks file but not over the pid being
moved.  Since the cgm_movepid request is done as root on the host,
not with the requestor's credentials, we must copy the check which
cgmanager was doing to ensure that the requesting task is allowed
to change the victim task's cgroup membership.

This is CVE-2015-1344
https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/lxcfs/+bug/1512854

Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>


Vulnerable code:
static bool do_write_pids(pid_t tpid, const char *contrl, const char *cg, const char *file, const char *buf)
		r = do_write_pids(fc->pid, f->controller, f->cgroup, f->file, localbuf);

Fixed code:
/*
 * Given host @uid, return the uid to which it maps in
 * @pid's user namespace, or -1 if none.
 */
bool hostuid_to_ns(uid_t uid, pid_t pid, uid_t *answer)
{
	FILE *f;
	char line[400];

	sprintf(line, "/proc/%d/uid_map", pid);
	if ((f = fopen(line, "r")) == NULL) {
		return false;
	}

	*answer = convert_id_to_ns(f, uid);
	fclose(f);

	if (*answer == -1)
		return false;
	return true;
}

/*
 * get_pid_creds: get the real uid and gid of @pid from
 * /proc/$$/status
 * (XXX should we use euid here?)
 */
void get_pid_creds(pid_t pid, uid_t *uid, gid_t *gid)
{
	char line[400];
	uid_t u;
	gid_t g;
	FILE *f;

	*uid = -1;
	*gid = -1;
	sprintf(line, "/proc/%d/status", pid);
	if ((f = fopen(line, "r")) == NULL) {
		fprintf(stderr, "Error opening %s: %s\n", line, strerror(errno));
		return;
	}
	while (fgets(line, 400, f)) {
		if (strncmp(line, "Uid:", 4) == 0) {
			if (sscanf(line+4, "%u", &u) != 1) {
				fprintf(stderr, "bad uid line for pid %u\n", pid);
				fclose(f);
				return;
			}
			*uid = u;
		} else if (strncmp(line, "Gid:", 4) == 0) {
			if (sscanf(line+4, "%u", &g) != 1) {
				fprintf(stderr, "bad gid line for pid %u\n", pid);
				fclose(f);
				return;
			}
			*gid = g;
		}
	}
	fclose(f);
}

/*
 * May the requestor @r move victim @v to a new cgroup?
 * This is allowed if
 *   . they are the same task
 *   . they are ownedy by the same uid
 *   . @r is root on the host, or
 *   . @v's uid is mapped into @r's where @r is root.
 */
bool may_move_pid(pid_t r, uid_t r_uid, pid_t v)
{
	uid_t v_uid, tmpuid;
	gid_t v_gid;

	if (r == v)
		return true;
	if (r_uid == 0)
		return true;
	get_pid_creds(v, &v_uid, &v_gid);
	if (r_uid == v_uid)
		return true;
	if (hostuid_to_ns(r_uid, r, &tmpuid) && tmpuid == 0
			&& hostuid_to_ns(v_uid, r, &tmpuid))
		return true;
	return false;
}

static bool do_write_pids(pid_t tpid, uid_t tuid, const char *contrl, const char *cg,
		const char *file, const char *buf)
				if (!may_move_pid(tpid, tuid, cred.pid)) {
					fail = true;
					break;
				}
		r = do_write_pids(fc->pid, fc->uid, f->controller, f->cgroup, f->file, localbuf);