CVE-2020-15233 (Go, published 2020-10-02T21:15Z)
Description: value: ORY Fosite is a security first OAuth2 & OpenID Connect framework for Go. In Fosite from version 0.30.2 and before version 0.34.1, there is an issue in which an an attacker can override the registered redirect URL by performing an OAuth flow and requesting a redirect URL that is to the loopback adapter. Attackers can provide both custom URL query parameters to their loopback redirect URL, as well as actually overriding the host of the registered redirect URL. These attacks are only applicable in scenarios where the attacker has access over the loopback interface. This vulnerability has been patched in ORY Fosite v0.34.1.
Severity: MEDIUM (CVSS v3 base score: 4.8)
Weakness: CWE-601 \u2014 URL Redirection to Untrusted Site ('Open Redirect')
A web application accepts a user-controlled input that specifies a link to an external site, and uses that link in a Redirect. This simplifies phishing attacks.
Repository: https://github.com/ory/fosite
Files changed:
authorize_helper.go
authorize_helper_test.go
helper_test.go
Commit message: fix: make redirect URL checking more strict

The OAuth 2.0 Client's Redirect URL and the Redirect URL used in the OAuth 2.0 flow do not check if the query string is equal:

1. Registering a client with allowed redirect URL `https://example.com/callback`
2. Performing OAuth2 flow and requesting redirect URL `https://example.com/callback?bar=foo`
3. Instead of an error, the browser is redirected to `https://example.com/callback?bar=foo` with a potentially successful OAuth2 response.

Additionally, matching Redirect URLs used `strings.ToLower` normalization:

1. Registering a client with allowed redirect URL `https://example.com/callback`
2. Performing OAuth2 flow and requesting redirect URL `https://example.com/CALLBACK`
3. Instead of an error, the browser is redirected to `https://example.com/CALLBACK ` with a potentially successful OAuth2 response.

This patch addresses all of these issues and adds regression tests to keep the implementation secure in future releases.


Vulnerable code:
		if strings.ToLower(b) == strings.ToLower(uri) || isLoopbackURI(requested, b) {
func isLoopbackURI(requested *url.URL, registeredURI string) bool {
	if registered.Scheme != "http" || !isLoopbackAddress(registered.Host) {
		return false
	}

	if requested.Scheme == "http" && isLoopbackAddress(requested.Host) && registered.Path == requested.Path {
		{
			client:   &DefaultClient{RedirectURIs: []string{"https://bar.Com/cb"}},
			url:      "https://bar.com/cb",
			isError:  false,
			expected: "https://bar.com/cb",
		},
		{
			client:   &DefaultClient{RedirectURIs: []string{"https://bar.com/cb"}},
			url:      "https://bar.Com/cb",
			isError:  false,
			expected: "https://bar.Com/cb",
		},
			isError:  false,
			isError:  false,
			isError:  false,
			isError:  false,
			isError:  false,
			isError:  false,
		assert.Equal(t, c.isError, err != nil, "%d: %s", k, err)
		err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(`"` + escaped + `"`), &unmarshaled)

Fixed code:
		if b == uri || isMatchingAsLoopback(requested, b) {
func isMatchingAsLoopback(requested *url.URL, registeredURI string) bool {
	// Native apps that are able to open a port on the loopback network
	// interface without needing special permissions (typically, those on
	// desktop operating systems) can use the loopback interface to receive
	// the OAuth redirect.
	//
	// Loopback redirect URIs use the "http" scheme and are constructed with
	// the loopback IP literal and whatever port the client is listening on.
	//
	// Source: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8252#section-7.3
	if requested.Scheme == "http" &&
		isLoopbackAddress(requested.Host) &&
		registered.Hostname() == requested.Hostname() &&
		// The port is skipped here - see codedoc above!
		registered.Path == requested.Path &&
		registered.RawQuery == requested.RawQuery {
			isError:  false,
			isError:  false,
			isError:  false,
			isError:  false,
			isError:  false,
			isError:  false,
		{
			client:  &DefaultClient{RedirectURIs: []string{"http://127.0.0.1:8080/cb"}},
			url:     "http://127.0.0.1:8080/Cb",
			isError: true,
		},
		{
			client:  &DefaultClient{RedirectURIs: []string{"http://127.0.0.1:8080/cb"}},
			url:     "http://127.0.0.1:8080/cb?foo=bar",
			isError: true,
		},
		{
			client:   &DefaultClient{RedirectURIs: []string{"http://127.0.0.1:8080/cb?foo=bar"}},
			url:      "http://127.0.0.1:8080/cb?foo=bar",
			expected: "http://127.0.0.1:8080/cb?foo=bar",
			isError:  false,
		},
		{
			client:  &DefaultClient{RedirectURIs: []string{"http://127.0.0.1:8080/cb?foo=bar"}},
			url:     "http://127.0.0.1:8080/cb?baz=bar&foo=bar",
			isError: true,
		},
		{
			client:  &DefaultClient{RedirectURIs: []string{"http://127.0.0.1:8080/cb?foo=bar&baz=bar"}},
			url:     "http://127.0.0.1:8080/cb?baz=bar&foo=bar",
			isError: true,
		},
		{
			client:  &DefaultClient{RedirectURIs: []string{"https://www.ory.sh/cb"}},
			url:     "http://127.0.0.1:8080/cb",
			isError: true,
		},
		{
			client:  &DefaultClient{RedirectURIs: []string{"http://127.0.0.1:8080/cb"}},
			url:     "https://www.ory.sh/cb",
			isError: true,
		},
		assert.Equal(t, c.isError, err != nil, "%d: %+v", k, c)
		err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(`"`+escaped+`"`), &unmarshaled)