Title: Declaring a state of emergency due to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, in order to establish a waiver of the minimum tonnage requirements of section 55305 of title 46, United States Code.
Policy area: Transportation and Public Works

Summary:
This concurrent resolution declares that a state of emergency exists due to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. It also states that such emergency justifies a waiver of the minimum tonnage requirements for the transport of equipment, materials, or commodities related to humanitarian operations resulting from the invasion. Such requirements apply to cargoes that are transported on ocean vessels and that are procured, furnished, or financed by the United States.

[Congressional Bills 117th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Con. Res. 92 Introduced in House (IH)]

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117th CONGRESS
  2d Session
H. CON. RES. 92

Declaring a state of emergency due to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, 
 in order to establish a waiver of the minimum tonnage requirements of 
             section 55305 of title 46, United States Code.


_______________________________________________________________________


                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                              May 20, 2022

Mrs. Walorski (for herself, Mr. Costa, Mrs. Fischbach, and Mr. Danny K. 
Davis of Illinois) submitted the following concurrent resolution; which 
            was referred to the Committee on Armed Services

_______________________________________________________________________

                         CONCURRENT RESOLUTION


 
Declaring a state of emergency due to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, 
 in order to establish a waiver of the minimum tonnage requirements of 
             section 55305 of title 46, United States Code.

Whereas, in March and April 2014, the Russian military invaded and annexed the 
        Ukrainian peninsula of Crimea, and the Russian Federation took action to 
        establish pro-Russian separatist states in the Donbas region of Ukraine;
Whereas the Russian Federation has failed to follow the cease-fire agreements 
        established by the Minsk 1 and Minsk 2 accords, and conflict has been 
        present in Ukraine since such invasion and annexation;
Whereas, throughout 2021, Russia amassed troops, weapon systems, and hardware on 
        the border of Russia and Ukraine;
Whereas, on December 17, 2021, the Russian Federation presented the North 
        Atlantic Treaty Organization (referred to in this preamble as ``NATO'') 
        with a list of security demands, including that NATO would never allow 
        Ukraine, or other former Soviet states, into the alliance;
Whereas such demands are non-starters for NATO and its ``open door policy'', 
        which dates to the alliance's founding and gives no third party a say in 
        such deliberations, and such demands were only offered as a 
        justification for a Russian invasion;
Whereas, on February 21, 2022, President Vladimir Putin officially recognized 
        the regions of Donetsk and Luhansk as independent states despite 
        international consensus that those regions remain part of the sovereign 
        territory of Ukraine;
Whereas, on February 22, 2022, President Putin ordered Russian troops to enter 
        Donetsk and Luhansk on a ``peacekeeping mission'' while setting the 
        stage for a larger invasion;
Whereas, on February 24, 2022, President Putin ordered Russian forces to conduct 
        a full-scale invasion, moving beyond the regions of Donetsk and Luhansk, 
        and initiating attacks throughout broader Ukrainian territory;
Whereas Russian forces continue to devastate Ukraine's hospitals, schools, 
        homes, and other civilian infrastructure, and threaten nuclear power 
        plants with heavy artillery, multi-launch rocket systems, and munitions 
        systems, with no regard for civilian casualties;
Whereas an October 19, 2017, Government Accountability Office Report stated that 
        a ``2015 analysis of agency data found that the application of [cargo 
        preference for food aid] requirements increased United States Agency for 
        International Development's and United States Department of 
        Agriculture's costs for shipping food aid by about 23 percent, or $107 
        million, compared with the estimated shipping costs without application 
        of CPFA requirements, from April 2011 through fiscal year 2014.'';
Whereas in a United States Agency for International Development fact sheet 
        titled: ``Food Aid Reform: Behind the Numbers'', the United States 
        Agency for International Development stated that eliminating the 
        mandatory cargo preference reimbursements will reduce the deficit by an 
        estimated $50,000,000 per year;
Whereas, in March 2020, the American Enterprise Institute published a report 
        titled ``The Cost of Cargo Preferences for International Food Aid 
        Programs'', which--

    (1) found ``that removing cargo preference requirements would allow for 
between $36 and $64 million of already appropriated funds to go to feeding 
the hungry and would benefit U.S. soft power globally''; and

    (2) concluded that ``cargo preference for food aid imposes substantial 
costs of USAID's Title II program budget . . . The impacts are substantial, 
reducing the funds available for additional food aid programs by $52.83 
million a year.'';

Whereas in a March 25, 2022, information note titled ``The importance of Ukraine 
        and the Russian Federation for global agricultural markets and the risks 
        associated with the current conflict'', the Food and Agriculture 
        Organization (referred to in this preamble as the ``FAO'') of the United 
        Nations stated that--

    (1) the invasion of Ukraine could raise food prices ``by 8 to 22 
percent above their already elevated baseline levels'';

    (2) ``current indications are that, as a result of the conflict, 
between 20 and 30 percent of areas sown to winter crops in Ukraine will 
remain unharvested during the 2022/23 season, with the yields of these 
crops also likely to be adversely affected''; and

    (3) ``FAO's simulations suggest that under such a scenario, the global 
number of undernourished people could increase by 8 to 13 million people in 
2022/23, with the most pronounced increases taking place in Asia-Pacific, 
followed by sub-Saharan Africa, and the Near East and North Africa.'';

Whereas, on April 8, 2022, the Associated Press published that ``The U.N. Food 
        and Agriculture Organization said its Food Price Index, which tracks 
        monthly changes in international prices for a basket of commodities, 
        averaged 159.3 points last month, up 12.6% from February'', and that 
        ``As it is, the February index was the highest level since its inception 
        in 1990.'';
Whereas, on April 27, 2022, the United States Agency for International 
        Development said in a press release that ``The world is suffering from 
        historic levels of global food insecurity, which is being exacerbated by 
        the impact Russia's war on Ukraine is having on global food supplies. 
        Available estimates suggest that an additional 40 million people could 
        be pushed into poverty and food insecurity as a result of Russia's 
        aggression.'';
Whereas, on April 27, 2022, the Administrator of the United States Agency for 
        International Development, Samantha Power, said that ``In Ukraine, which 
        provides 10 percent of the world's wheat, farmers are struggling to 
        plant and harvest their crops for fear of shelling and Russian 
        landmines, and their path to exporting these vital commodities is 
        severely restricted by Russia's invasion, which caused the closure of 
        Ukraine's ports.''; and
Whereas, on April 27, 2022, Secretary of Agriculture Tom Vilsack, said that 
        ``Russia's unprovoked war on Ukraine, a fellow major agricultural export 
        country, is driving food and energy costs higher for people around the 
        world.'': Now, therefore, be it
    Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), 
That--
            (1) a state of emergency exists due to the Russian invasion 
        of Ukraine;
            (2) such state of emergency--
                    (A) for the purposes of subparagraph (B), shall be 
                in effect beginning on May 1, 2022, and ending on 
                February 1, 2025; and
                    (B) justifies a waiver during such period of time 
                of the minimum tonnage requirements, in accordance with 
                section 55305(c) of title 46, United States Code, for 
                the transport of equipment, materials, or commodities 
                related to humanitarian operations resulting from the 
                2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine; and
            (3) the heads of the appropriate agencies shall be notified 
        of such waiver.
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