Title: Reaffirming the sense of the House of Representatives that the United States must lead the world in preventing further nuclear proliferation, while also reducing and eventually eliminating all nuclear weapons.
Policy area: International Affairs

Summary:
This resolution expresses support for sustained dialogue between the United States, Russia, and China to reduce the threats posed by nuclear weapons. The resolution calls on the President to extend the New START Treaty for five years and urges the current administration to consider continued participation in the Treaty on Open Skies.

[Congressional Bills 117th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Res. 54 Introduced in House (IH)]

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117th CONGRESS
  1st Session
H. RES. 54

 Reaffirming the sense of the House of Representatives that the United 
States must lead the world in preventing further nuclear proliferation, 
  while also reducing and eventually eliminating all nuclear weapons.


_______________________________________________________________________


                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            January 21, 2021

Mr. Beyer (for himself, Mr. Johnson of Georgia, Mr. Foster, Mr. Cohen, 
Mr. Case, Ms. Lee of California, Mr. Langevin, Mrs. Carolyn B. Maloney 
  of New York, Mr. Vargas, Mr. Cicilline, Mr. Huffman, Mr. Costa, Mr. 
McGovern, Ms. Pingree, Mr. Carson, and Mr. Levin of Michigan) submitted 
   the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on 
                            Foreign Affairs

_______________________________________________________________________

                               RESOLUTION


 
 Reaffirming the sense of the House of Representatives that the United 
States must lead the world in preventing further nuclear proliferation, 
  while also reducing and eventually eliminating all nuclear weapons.

Whereas, in the 1984 State of the Union Address, President Reagan said, ``A 
        nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought'';
Whereas the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons has been a bedrock principle of 
        United States foreign policy since 1945;
Whereas the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was ratified by 
        the United States in 1968, and extended indefinitely in 1995, and 
        depends upon the full implementation by all States Parties of three 
        mutually reinforcing pillars: nonproliferation, access to peaceful uses 
        of nuclear energy under safeguards, and disarmament;
Whereas the United States maintains a safe, secure, and effective nuclear 
        deterrent to provide for the national defense of the United States and 
        to bolster the security of the allies of the United States, while also 
        pursuing a number of arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation 
        agreements designed to end dangerous nuclear competition and the spread 
        of nuclear weapons-related technologies and to ensure strategic 
        stability, reduce nuclear risks, and protect the United States homeland 
        and allies of the United States;
Whereas the United States is now at risk of losing all the agreements that have 
        underpinned strategic stability and nuclear risk reduction;
Whereas the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet 
        Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and 
        Shorter-Range Missiles (in this resolution referred to as the ``INF 
        Treaty'') successfully led to the total ban on the possession, 
        production, and flight-testing of land-based nuclear and conventional 
        ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and missile launchers with ranges 
        of 500 kilometers to 5,500 kilometers;
Whereas, as a result of the INF Treaty, the United States and the Soviet Union 
        destroyed a total of 2,692 short-, medium-, and intermediate-range 
        missiles by the treaty's implementation deadline of June 1, 1991;
Whereas the United States formally withdrew from the INF Treaty on August 2, 
        2019, with no plan to avert a new and destabilizing intermediate-range 
        missile arms race;
Whereas the Treaty on Open Skies, signed in 1992 and in effect since 2002, is a 
        vital instrument of confidence-building and verification for the United 
        States and the allies of the United States;
Whereas the Treaty on Open Skies has permitted unarmed surveillance flights over 
        the territories of 34 countries, including Russia, with the purpose of 
        enhancing mutual understanding of the military forces and activities of 
        concern to them;
Whereas, on May 22, 2020, the President announced his intent to withdraw from 
        the Treaty on Open Skies in six months due to continued concerns over 
        compliance with the Treaty's provisions by Russia;
Whereas this announcement, and the subsequent November 22 withdrawal from the 
        Treaty on Open Skies, did not comply with section 1234 of the National 
        Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 (Public Law 116-92; 133 
        Stat. 1648; 22 U.S.C. 2593a note) that requires the Secretary of Defense 
        and the Secretary of State to notify Congress at least 120 days before a 
        formal notice is sent to treaty depositories about an intent to leave 
        the Treaty on Open Skies, and was made despite objections expressed by 
        United States allies;
Whereas the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian 
        Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of 
        Strategic Offensive Arms (in this resolution referred to as the ``New 
        START Treaty'') entered into force on February 5, 2011, and is scheduled 
        to expire on February 5, 2021, unless the United States and Russia agree 
        to extend the Treaty by a period of up to five years;
Whereas the New START Treaty has strengthened the nuclear security and strategic 
        stability of the United States by reducing the number of strategic 
        systems in Russia's nuclear arsenal and providing the United States with 
        the inspection and monitoring tools necessary to confidently verify 
        Russian compliance with the Treaty;
Whereas maintaining legally binding, verifiable limits on Russian strategic 
        nuclear forces is in the national security interest of the United 
        States;
Whereas the Department of State has repeatedly verified that Russia is in full 
        compliance with the New START Treaty, including most recently in the 
        June 2020 report to Congress on ``Adherence to and Compliance with Arms 
        Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments'';
Whereas the New START Treaty has not and does not restrict the nuclear 
        modernization programs of the United States nor limit the missile 
        defense efforts of the United States, and the United States continues to 
        assure allies of guarantees by the United States to their security;
Whereas if the New START Treaty is allowed to expire, the United States will be 
        faced with an unconstrained Russian nuclear arsenal for the first time 
        since 1972, and the United States will be discarding decades of progress 
        to maintain nuclear deterrence at a much lower level of strategic 
        nuclear arsenals, from which the United States, NATO, and other allies 
        have all benefitted;
Whereas a perceived retreat by the United States from arms control and 
        international affairs more broadly has caused allies and partners across 
        the globe to doubt the United States commitment to meet its own nuclear 
        disarmament obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
        Nuclear Weapons, which could compromise United States efforts to 
        strengthen the nuclear nonproliferation system;
Whereas Congress has historically taken a bipartisan approach to arms control 
        initiatives, including the bipartisan vote of 71-26 in the Senate to 
        provide its advice and consent to the ratification of the New START 
        Treaty on December 22, 2010, demonstrating that Congress can be a close 
        partner with the executive branch in the shaping of the arms control 
        policies of the United States; and
Whereas there are bipartisan bills in Congress to urge an extension of the New 
        START Treaty, the last remaining treaty constraining the world's two 
        largest nuclear arsenals, and former officials who served under 
        Republican and Democratic administrations, military leaders, and nuclear 
        policy experts agree that the Treaty should be extended: Now, therefore, 
        be it
    Resolved, That the House of Representatives--
            (1) reaffirms that effective arms control treaties, and 
        other confidence-building and verification agreements, that 
        successfully limit and reduce nuclear weapons and curb nuclear 
        competition are important tools that strengthen the security of 
        the United States and international security;
            (2) strongly supports a sustained and intensive dialogue 
        with Russia and China to reduce the threats posed by nuclear 
        weapons, and underscores that effective arms control has always 
        been an area of crucial and necessary dialogue, even during the 
        lowest points in bilateral and multilateral relations;
            (3) recognizes that the United States and Russia, which 
        possess more than 90 percent of the world's 13,000 nuclear 
        weapons, have a special responsibility to reduce the nuclear 
        danger, and are committed to do so under the Treaty on the Non-
        Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;
            (4) calls on the President to extend the New START Treaty 
        for five years without further delay to give the United States, 
        in consultation with allies, the time and space needed to 
        pursue a broader, more comprehensive arms control agenda with 
        Russia and China that addresses all types of nuclear weapons 
        and emerging technologies that can affect strategic stability; 
        and
            (5) calls on the administration to consider continued 
        participation in the Treaty on Open Skies, which allies, 
        partners, and arms control experts all agree is a vital 
        instrument of confidence-building and verification for the 
        United States and its objectives for promoting international 
        security and strategic stability.
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