Title: HALT Act of 2021
Policy area: International Affairs

Summary:
Hastening Arms Limitations Talks Act of 2021 or the HALT Act of 2021
This bill prohibits the obligation or expenditure of funds to conduct an explosive nuclear weapons test that produces yield unless (1) the President details any change to the condition of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile from the previous year, and (2) Congress enacts a joint resolution approving the test.
Further, the bill declares it to be U.S. policy to lead international negotiations on specific arms-reduction measures.

[Congressional Bills 117th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 3837 Introduced in House (IH)]

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117th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 3837

To reduce and eliminate threats posed by nuclear weapons to the United 
                    States, and for other purposes.


_______________________________________________________________________


                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             June 11, 2021

     Mr. McGovern (for himself, Mr. Beyer, Mr. Blumenauer, and Mr. 
  Garamendi) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
   Committee on Armed Services, and in addition to the Committee on 
  Foreign Affairs, for a period to be subsequently determined by the 
  Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall 
           within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL


 
To reduce and eliminate threats posed by nuclear weapons to the United 
                    States, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Hastening Arms Limitations Talks Act 
of 2021'' or the ``HALT Act of 2021''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

    Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) The use of nuclear weapons poses an existential threat 
        to humanity, a fact that led President Ronald Reagan and Soviet 
        Premier Mikhail Gorbachev to declare in a joint statement in 
        1987 that a ``nuclear war cannot be won and must never be 
        fought''.
            (2) On June 12, 1982, an estimated 1,000,000 people 
        attended the largest peace rally in United States history, in 
        support of a movement to freeze and reverse the nuclear arms 
        race, a movement that helped to create the political will 
        necessary for the negotiation of several bilateral arms control 
        treaties between the United States and former Soviet Union, and 
        then the Russian Federation. Those treaties contributed to 
        strategic stability through mutual and verifiable reciprocal 
        nuclear weapons reductions.
            (3) Since the advent of nuclear weapons in 1945, millions 
        of people around the world have stood up to demand meaningful, 
        immediate international action to halt, reduce, and eliminate 
        the threats posed by nuclear weapons, nuclear weapons testing, 
        and nuclear war, to humankind and the planet.
            (4) In 1970, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
        Weapons done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968 (21 
        UST 483) (commonly referred to as the ``Nuclear Non-
        Proliferation Treaty'' or the ``NPT'') entered into force, 
        which includes a binding obligation on the 5 nuclear-weapon 
        states (commonly referred to as the ``P5''), among other 
        things, ``to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective 
        measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race . . 
        . and to nuclear disarmament''.
            (5) Bipartisan United States global leadership has curbed 
        the growth in the number of countries possessing nuclear 
        weapons and has slowed overall vertical proliferation among 
        countries already possessing nuclear weapons, as is highlighted 
        by a more than 85-percent reduction in the United States 
        nuclear weapons stockpile from its Cold War height of 31,255 in 
        1967.
            (6) The United States testing of nuclear weapons is no 
        longer necessary as a result of the following major technical 
        developments since the Senate's consideration of the 
        Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (commonly referred to as 
        the ``CTBT'') in 1999:
                    (A) The verification architecture of the 
                Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban-Treaty Organization 
                (commonly referred to as the ``CTBTO'')--
                            (i) has made significant advancements, as 
                        seen through its network of 300 International 
                        Monitoring Stations and its International Data 
                        Centre, which together provide for the near 
                        instantaneous detection of nuclear explosives 
                        tests, including all 6 such tests conducted by 
                        North Korea between 2006 and 2017; and
                            (ii) is operational 24 hours a day, 7 days 
                        a week.
                    (B) Since the United States signed the CTBT, 
                confidence has grown in the science-based Stockpile 
                Stewardship and Management Plan of the Department of 
                Energy, which forms the basis of annual certifications 
                to the President regarding the continual safety, 
                security, and effectiveness of the United States 
                nuclear deterrent in the absence of nuclear testing, 
                leading former Secretary of Energy Ernest Moniz to 
                remark in 2015 that ``lab directors today now state 
                that they certainly understand much more about how 
                nuclear weapons work than during the period of nuclear 
                testing''.
            (7) Despite the progress made to reduce the number and role 
        of, and risks posed by, nuclear weapons, and to halt the Cold 
        War-era nuclear arms race, tensions between countries that 
        possess nuclear weapons are on the rise, key nuclear risk 
        reduction treaties are under threat, significant stockpiles of 
        weapons-usable fissile material remain, and a qualitative 
        global nuclear arms race is now underway with each of the 
        countries that possess nuclear weapons spending tens of 
        billions of dollars each year to maintain and improve their 
        arsenals.
            (8) The Russian Federation is pursuing the development of 
        destabilizing types of nuclear weapons that are not presently 
        covered under any existing arms control treaty or agreement and 
        the People's Republic of China, India, Pakistan, and North 
        Korea have each taken concerning steps to diversify their more 
        modest sized, but nonetheless very deadly, nuclear arsenals.
            (9) Former President Donald J. Trump's 2018 Nuclear Posture 
        Review called for the development two new nuclear weapons 
        capabilities, which have the effect of lowering the threshold 
        for nuclear weapons use:
                    (A) A low-yield warhead on a submarine-launched 
                ballistic missile, which was deployed before the date 
                of the enactment of this Act.
                    (B) A sea-launched cruise missile, still under 
                development on the date of the enactment of this Act.
            (10) On February 3, 2021, President Joseph R. Biden 
        preserved binding and verifiable limits on the deployed and 
        non-deployed strategic forces of the largest two nuclear 
        weapons powers through the five-year extension of the Treaty 
        between the United States of America and the Russian Federation 
        on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of 
        Strategic Offensive Arms, signed April 8, 2010, and entered 
        into force February 5, 2011 (commonly referred to as the ``New 
        START Treaty'').
            (11) In 2013, the report on a nuclear weapons employment 
        strategy of the United States submitted under section 492 of 
        title 10, United States Code, determined that it is possible to 
        ensure the security of the United States and allies and 
        partners of the United States and maintain a strong and 
        credible strategic deterrent while safely pursuing up to a \1/
        3\ reduction in deployed nuclear weapons from the level 
        established in the New START Treaty.
            (12) On January 12, 2017, then-Vice President Biden stated, 
        ``[G]iven our non-nuclear capabilities and the nature of 
        today's threats--it's hard to envision a plausible scenario in 
        which the first use of nuclear weapons by the United States 
        would be necessary. Or make sense.''.
            (13) In light of moves by the United States and other 
        countries to increase their reliance on nuclear weapons, a 
        global nuclear freeze would seek to halt the new nuclear arms 
        race by seeking conclusion of a comprehensive and verifiable 
        freeze on the testing, deployment, and production of nuclear 
        weapons and delivery vehicles for such weapons.

SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY.

    The following is the policy of the United States:
            (1) The United States should build upon its decades long, 
        bipartisan efforts to reduce the number and salience of nuclear 
        weapons by leading international negotiations on specific arms-
        reduction measures as part of a 21st century global nuclear 
        freeze movement.
            (2) Building on the successful extension of the New START 
        Treaty, the United States should engage with all other 
        countries that possess nuclear weapons to seek to negotiate and 
        conclude future multilateral arms control, disarmament, and 
        risk reduction agreements, which should contain some or all of 
        the following provisions:
                    (A) An agreement by the United States and the 
                Russian Federation on a follow-on treaty or agreement 
                to the New START Treaty that may lower the central 
                limits of the Treaty and cover new kinds of strategic 
                delivery vehicles or non-strategic nuclear weapons.
                    (B) An agreement on a verifiable freeze on the 
                testing, production, and further deployment of all 
                nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles for such weapons.
                    (C) An agreement that establishes a verifiable 
                numerical ceiling on the deployed shorter-range and 
                intermediate-range and strategic delivery systems (as 
                defined by the INF Treaty and the New START Treaty, 
                respectively) and the nuclear warheads associated with 
                such systems belonging to the P5, and to the extent 
                possible, all countries that possess nuclear weapons, 
                at August 2, 2019, levels.
                    (D) An agreement by each country to adopt a policy 
                of no first use of nuclear weapons or provide 
                transparency into its nuclear declaratory policy.
                    (E) An agreement on a proactive United Nations 
                Security Council resolution that expands access by the 
                International Atomic Energy Agency to any country found 
                by the Board of Governors of that Agency to be 
                noncompliant with its obligations under the NPT.
                    (F) An agreement to refrain from configuring 
                nuclear forces in a ``launch on warning'' or ``launch 
                under warning'' nuclear posture, which may prompt a 
                nuclear armed country to launch a ballistic missile 
                attack in response to detection by an early-warning 
                satellite or sensor of a suspected incoming ballistic 
                missile.
                    (G) An agreement not to target or interfere in the 
                nuclear command, control, and communications (commonly 
                referred to as ``NC3'') infrastructure of another 
                country through a kinetic attack or a cyberattack.
                    (H) An agreement on transparency measures or 
                verifiable limits, or both, on hypersonic cruise 
                missiles and glide vehicles that are fired from sea-
                based, ground, and air platforms.
                    (I) An agreement to provide a baseline and 
                continuous exchanges detailing the aggregate number of 
                active nuclear weapons and associated systems possessed 
                by each country.
            (3) The United States should rejuvenate efforts in the 
        United Nations Conference on Disarmament toward the negotiation 
        of a verifiable Fissile Material Treaty or Fissile Material 
        Cutoff Treaty, or move negotiations to another international 
        body or fora, such as a meeting of the P5. Successful 
        conclusion of such a treaty would verifiably prevent any 
        country's production of highly enriched uranium and plutonium 
        for use in nuclear weapons.
            (4) The United States should convene a series of head-of-
        state level summits on nuclear disarmament modeled on the 
        Nuclear Security Summits process, which saw the elimination of 
        the equivalent of 3,000 nuclear weapons.
            (5) The President should seek ratification by the Senate of 
        the CTBT and mobilize all countries covered by Annex 2 of the 
        CTBT to pursue similar action to hasten entry into force of the 
        CTBT. The entry into force of the CTBT, for which ratification 
        by the United States will provide critical momentum, will 
        activate the CTBT's onsite inspection provision to investigate 
        allegations that any country that is a party to the CTBT has 
        conducted a nuclear test of any yield.
            (6) The President should make the accession of North Korea 
        to the CTBT a component of any final agreement in fulfilling 
        the pledges the Government of North Korea made in Singapore, as 
        North Korea is reportedly the only country to have conducted a 
        nuclear explosive test since 1998.
            (7) The United States should--
                    (A) refrain from developing any new designs for 
                nuclear warheads or bombs, but especially designs that 
                could add a level of technical uncertainty into the 
                United States stockpile and thus renew calls to resume 
                nuclear explosive testing in order to test that new 
                design; and
                    (B) seek reciprocal commitments from other 
                countries that possess nuclear weapons.

SEC. 4. PROHIBITION ON USE OF FUNDS FOR NUCLEAR TEST EXPLOSIONS.

    (a) In General.--None of the funds authorized to be appropriated or 
otherwise made available for fiscal year 2022 or any fiscal year 
thereafter, or authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made 
available for any fiscal year before fiscal year 2022 and available for 
obligation as of the date of the enactment of this Act, may be 
obligated or expended to conduct or make preparations for any explosive 
nuclear weapons test that produces any yield until such time as--
            (1) the President submits to Congress an addendum to the 
        report required by section 4205 of the Atomic Energy Defense 
        Act (50 U.S.C. 2525) that details any change to the condition 
        of the United States nuclear weapons stockpile from the report 
        submitted under that section in the preceding year; and
            (2) there is enacted into law a joint resolution of 
        Congress that approves the test.
    (b) Rule of Construction.--Subsection (a) does not limit nuclear 
stockpile stewardship activities that are consistent with the zero-
yield standard and other requirements under law.
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