Title: Iran Nuclear Weapons Capability Monitoring Act of 2022
Policy area: International Affairs

Summary:
Iran Nuclear Weapons Capability Monitoring Act of 2022
This bill requires the Department of State to establish a task force to consolidate and synthesize efforts to monitor and assess Iran's nuclear weapons activity. The State Department must also report on Iran's nuclear activity and submit a diplomatic strategy for engaging U.S. allies regarding Iran's nuclear weapons and missile activities.

[Congressional Bills 117th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 4554 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

<DOC>






117th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                S. 4554

 To establish a task force to monitor the nuclear weapons and missile 
             capabilities of the Islamic Republic of Iran.


_______________________________________________________________________


                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             July 19, 2022

  Mr. Graham (for himself and Mr. Menendez) introduced the following 
  bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign 
                               Relations

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL


 
 To establish a task force to monitor the nuclear weapons and missile 
             capabilities of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Iran Nuclear Weapons Capability 
Monitoring Act of 2022''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

    Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) In the late 1980s, the Islamic Republic of Iran 
        established the AMAD Project with the intent to manufacture 5 
        nuclear weapons and prepare an underground nuclear test site.
            (2) Since at least 2002, the Islamic Republic of Iran has 
        advanced its nuclear and ballistic missile programs, posing 
        serious threats to the security interests of the United States, 
        Israel, and other allies and partners.
            (3) In 2002, nuclear facilities in Natanz and Arak, Iran, 
        were revealed to the public by the National Council of 
        Resistance of Iran.
            (4) On April 11, 2006, the Islamic Republic of Iran 
        announced that it had enriched uranium for the first time to a 
        level close to 3.5 percent at the Natanz Pilot Fuel Enrichment 
        Plant, Natanz, Iran.
            (5) On December 23, 2006, the United Nations Security 
        Council adopted Resolution 1737 (2006), which imposed sanctions 
        with respect to the Islamic Republic of Iran for its failure to 
        suspend enrichment activities.
            (6) The United Nations Security Council subsequently 
        adopted Resolutions 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), and 1929 (2010), 
        all of which targeted the nuclear program of and imposed 
        additional sanctions with respect to the Islamic Republic of 
        Iran.
            (7) On February 3, 2009, the Islamic Republic of Iran 
        announced that it had launched its first satellite, which 
        raised concern over the applicability of the satellite to the 
        ballistic missile program.
            (8) In September 2009, the United States, the United 
        Kingdom, and France revealed the existence of the clandestine 
        Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant in Iran, years after construction 
        started on the plant.
            (9) In 2010, the Islamic Republic of Iran reportedly had 
        enriched uranium to a level of 20 percent.
            (10) On March 9, 2016, the Islamic Republic of Iran 
        launched 2 variations of the Qadr medium-range ballistic 
        missile.
            (11) On January 28, 2017, the Islamic Republic of Iran 
        conducted a test of a medium-range ballistic missile, which 
        traveled an estimated 600 miles and provides the Islamic 
        Republic of Iran the capability to threaten military 
        installations of the United States in the Middle East.
            (12) In 2018, Israel seized a significant portion of the 
        nuclear archive of the Islamic Republic of Iran, which 
        contained tens of thousands of files and compact discs relating 
        to past efforts at nuclear weapon design, development, and 
        manufacturing by the Islamic Republic of Iran, including such 
        efforts occurring after 2003.
            (13) On September 27, 2018, Israel revealed the existence 
        of a secret warehouse housing radioactive material in the 
        Turquz Abad district in Tehran, and an inspection of the 
        warehouse by the International Atomic Energy Agency detected 
        radioactive particles, which the Government of the Islamic 
        Republic of Iran failed to adequately explain.
            (14) On June 19, 2020, the International Atomic Energy 
        Agency adopted Resolution GOV/2020/34 expressing ``serious 
        concern . . . that Iran has not provided access to the Agency 
        under the Additional Protocol to two locations''.
            (15) On January 8, 2020, an Iranian missile struck an Iraqi 
        military base where members of the United States Armed Forces 
        were stationed, resulting in 11 of such members being treated 
        for injuries.
            (16) On April 17, 2021, the International Atomic Energy 
        Agency verified that the Islamic Republic of Iran had begun to 
        enrich uranium to 60 percent purity.
            (17) On August 14, 2021, President of Iran Hassan Rouhani 
        stated that ``Iran's Atomic Energy Organization can enrich 
        uranium by 20 percent and 60 percent and if one day our 
        reactors need it, it can enrich uranium to 90 percent purity''.
            (18) According to the International Institute for Strategic 
        Studies, the Islamic Republic of Iran has ``between six and 
        eight liquid-fuel ballistic missiles and up to 12 solid-fuel 
        systems'' as of 2021.
            (19) On November 9, 2021, the Islamic Republic of Iran 
        completed Zolfaghar-1400, a 3-day war game that included 
        conventional navy, army, air force, and air defense forces 
        testing cruise missiles, torpedoes, and suicide drones in the 
        Strait of Hormuz, the Gulf of Oman, the Red Sea, and the Indian 
        Ocean.
            (20) On December 20, 2021, the Islamic Republic of Iran 
        commenced a 5-day drill in which it launched a number of short- 
        and long-range ballistic missiles that it claimed could destroy 
        Israel, constituting an escalation in the already genocidal 
        rhetoric of the Islamic Republic of Iran toward Israel.
            (21) On January 24, 2022, Houthi rebels, backed by the 
        Islamic Republic of Iran, fired 2 missiles at Al Dhafra Air 
        Base in the United Arab Emirates, which hosts around 2,000 
        members of the Armed Forces of the United States.
            (22) On January 31, 2022, surface-to-air interceptors of 
        the United Arab Emirates shot down a Houthi missile fired at 
        the United Arab Emirates during a visit by President of Israel 
        Isaac Herzog, the first-ever visit of an Israeli President to 
        the United Arab Emirates.
            (23) On February 9, 2022, the Islamic Republic of Iran 
        unveiled a new surface-to-surface missile, named ``Kheibar 
        Shekan'', which has a reported range of 900 miles (1450 
        kilometers) and is capable of penetrating missile shields.
            (24) On March 13, 2022, the Islamic Republic of Iran 
        launched 12 missiles into Erbil, Iraq, which struck near a 
        consulate building of the United States.
            (25) On April 17, 2022, the Islamic Republic of Iran 
        confirmed the relocation of a production facility for advanced 
        centrifuges from an aboveground facility at Karaj, Iran, to the 
        fortified underground Natanz Enrichment Complex.
            (26) On April 19, 2022, the Department of State released a 
        report stating that there are ``serious concerns'' about 
        ``possible undeclared nuclear material and activities in 
        Iran''.
            (27) On May 30, 2022, the International Atomic Energy 
        Agency reported that the Islamic Republic of Iran had achieved 
        a stockpile of 43.3 kilograms, equivalent to 95.5 pounds, of 60 
        percent highly enriched uranium, roughly enough material for a 
        nuclear weapon.
            (28) On June 8, 2022, the Islamic Republic of Iran turned 
        off surveillance cameras installed by the International Atomic 
        Energy Agency to monitor uranium enrichment activities at 
        nuclear sites in the country.

SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

    It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the Department of State has used evidence of the intent 
        of the Islamic Republic of Iran to advance a nuclear program to 
        secure the support of the international community in passing 
        and implementing United Nations Security Council Resolutions on 
        the Islamic Republic of Iran;
            (2) intelligence agencies have compiled evidence of the 
        intent of the Islamic Republic of Iran to advance a nuclear 
        program, with direct evidence of an active nuclear weapons 
        program prior to 2003;
            (3) an Islamic Republic of Iran that possesses a nuclear 
        weapons capability would be a serious threat to the national 
        security of the United States, Israel, and other allies and 
        partners;
            (4) the Islamic Republic of Iran has been less than 
        cooperative with international inspectors from the 
        International Atomic Energy Agency and has obstructed their 
        ability to inspect numerous nuclear facilities across Iran;
            (5) the Islamic Republic of Iran continues to advance its 
        nuclear weapons and missile programs, which are a threat to the 
        national security of the United States, Israel, and other 
        allies and partners; and
            (6) all possible action should be taken by the United 
        States--
                    (A) to ensure that the Islamic Republic of Iran 
                does not develop a nuclear weapons capability; and
                    (B) to protect against aggression from the Islamic 
                Republic of Iran manifested in its missiles program.

SEC. 4. DEFINITIONS.

    In this Act:
            (1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
        ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
                    (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the 
                Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Armed 
                Services, the Committee on Energy and Natural 
                Resources, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of 
                the Senate; and
                    (B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee 
                on Appropriations, the Committee on Armed Services, the 
                Committee on Energy and Commerce, and the Permanent 
                Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of 
                Representatives.
            (2) Comprehensive safeguards agreement.--The term 
        ``Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement'' means the Agreement 
        between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the International 
        Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in 
        Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
        Weapons, done at Vienna June 19, 1973.
            (3) Task force.--The term ``task force'' means the task 
        force established under section 5.
            (4) Unmanned aircraft system.--The term ``unmanned aircraft 
        system'' has the meaning given the term in section 44801 of 
        title 49, United States Code.

SEC. 5. ESTABLISHMENT OF INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON NUCLEAR ACTIVITY IN 
              THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN.

    (a) Establishment.--The Secretary of State shall establish a task 
force to consolidate and synthesize efforts by the United States 
Government to monitor and assess nuclear weapons activity being carried 
out by the Islamic Republic of Iran or its proxies.
    (b) Composition.--
            (1) Chairperson.--The Secretary of State shall be the 
        Chairperson of the task force.
            (2) Membership.--
                    (A) In general.--The task force shall be composed 
                of individuals, each of whom shall be an employee of 
                and appointed to the task force by the head of one of 
                the following agencies:
                            (i) The Department of State.
                            (ii) The Office of the Director of National 
                        Intelligence.
                            (iii) The Department of Defense.
                            (iv) The Department of Energy.
                            (v) The Central Intelligence Agency.
                    (B) Additional members.--The Chairperson may 
                appoint to the task force additional individuals from 
                other Federal agencies, as the Chairperson considers 
                necessary.

SEC. 6. REPORTS TO CONGRESS.

    (a) Report on Nuclear Activity.--
            (1) In general.--Not later than 120 days after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act, and every 120 days thereafter until 
        December 31, 2028, the Secretary of State, in consultation with 
        the task force, shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
        committees a report on nuclear activity in the Islamic Republic 
        of Iran.
            (2) Contents.--The report required by paragraph (1) shall 
        include--
                    (A) a description and location of current fuel 
                cycle activities for the production of fissile material 
                being undertaken by the Islamic Republic of Iran, 
                including--
                            (i) research and development activities to 
                        procure or construct additional advanced IR-2, 
                        IR-6, and other model centrifuges and 
                        enrichment cascades, including for stable 
                        isotopes;
                            (ii) research and development of 
                        reprocessing capabilities, including--
                                    (I) reprocessing of spent fuel; and
                                    (II) extraction of medical isotopes 
                                from irradiated uranium targets;
                            (iii) activities with respect to designing 
                        or constructing reactors, including--
                                    (I) the construction of heavy water 
                                reactors;
                                    (II) the manufacture or procurement 
                                of reactor components, including the 
                                intended application of such 
                                components; and
                                    (III) efforts to rebuild the 
                                original reactor at Arak;
                            (iv) uranium mining, concentration, 
                        conversion, and fuel fabrication, including--
                                    (I) estimated uranium ore 
                                production capacity and annual 
                                recovery;
                                    (II) recovery processes and ore 
                                concentrate production capacity and 
                                annual recovery;
                                    (III) research and development with 
                                respect to, and the annual rate of, 
                                conversion of uranium; and
                                    (IV) research and development with 
                                respect to the fabrication of reactor 
                                fuels, including the use of depleted, 
                                natural, and enriched uranium; and
                            (v) activities with respect to--
                                    (I) producing or acquiring 
                                plutonium or uranium (or their alloys);
                                    (II) conducting research and 
                                development on plutonium or uranium (or 
                                their alloys);
                                    (III) uranium metal; or
                                    (IV) casting, forming, or machining 
                                plutonium or uranium;
                    (B) with respect to any activity described in 
                subparagraph (A), a description, as applicable, of--
                            (i) the number and type of centrifuges used 
                        to enrich uranium and the operating status of 
                        such centrifuges;
                            (ii) the number and location of any 
                        enrichment or associated research and 
                        development facility used to engage in such 
                        activity;
                            (iii) the amount of heavy water, in metric 
                        tons, produced by such activity and the 
                        acquisition or manufacture of major reactor 
                        components, including, for the second and 
                        subsequent reports, the amount produced since 
                        the last report;
                            (iv) the number and type of fuel assemblies 
                        produced by the Islamic Republic of Iran, 
                        including failed or rejected assemblies; and
                            (v) the total amount of--
                                    (I) uranium-235 enriched to not 
                                greater than 5 percent purity;
                                    (II) uranium-235 enriched to 
                                greater than 5 percent purity and not 
                                greater than 20 percent purity;
                                    (III) uranium-235 enriched to 
                                greater than 20 percent purity and not 
                                greater than 60 percent purity;
                                    (IV) uranium-235 enriched to 
                                greater than 60 percent purity and not 
                                greater than 90 percent purity; and
                                    (V) uranium-235 enriched greater 
                                than 90 percent purity;
                    (C) a description of weaponization plans and 
                capabilities of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 
                including--
                            (i) plans and capabilities with respect 
                        to--
                                    (I) weapon design, including 
                                fission, warhead miniaturization, and 
                                boosted and early thermonuclear weapon 
                                design;
                                    (II) high-yield fission 
                                development;
                                    (III) design, development, 
                                acquisition, or use of computer models 
                                to simulate nuclear explosive devices; 
                                and
                                    (IV) design, development, 
                                fabricating, acquisition, or use of 
                                explosively driven neutron sources or 
                                specialized materials for explosively 
                                driven neutron sources;
                            (ii) the ability of the Islamic Republic of 
                        Iran to deploy a working or reliable delivery 
                        vehicle capable of carrying a nuclear warhead;
                            (iii) the estimated breakout time for the 
                        Islamic Republic of Iran to develop and deploy 
                        a nuclear weapon, including a crude nuclear 
                        weapon;
                            (iv) the status and location of any 
                        research and development work site related to 
                        the preparation of an underground nuclear test; 
                        and
                            (v) any dual-use item (as defined under 
                        section 730.3 of title 15, Code of Federal 
                        Regulations or listed on the List of Nuclear-
                        Related Dual-Use Equipment, Materials, 
                        Software, and Related Technology issued by the 
                        Nuclear Suppliers Group or any successor list) 
                        the Islamic Republic of Iran is using to 
                        further the nuclear weapon or missile program;
                    (D) an identification of clandestine nuclear 
                facilities, including nuclear facilities and activities 
                discovered or reported by Israel or other allies or 
                partners of the United States;
                    (E) an assessment of whether the Islamic Republic 
                of Iran--
                            (i) is in compliance with the Comprehensive 
                        Safeguards Agreement and modified Code 3.1 of 
                        the Subsidiary Arrangements to the 
                        Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement; and
                            (ii) has denied access to sites that the 
                        International Atomic Energy Agency has sought 
                        to inspect during the period covered by the 
                        report;
                    (F) any diversion by the Islamic Republic of Iran 
                of uranium, carbon-fiber, or other materials for use in 
                an undeclared or clandestine facility;
                    (G) an assessment of activities related to nuclear 
                weapons conducted at facilities controlled by the 
                Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics of Iran, 
                the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, and the 
                Organization of Defensive Innovation and Research, 
                including an analysis of gaps in knowledge due to the 
                lack of inspections and nontransparency of such 
                facilities;
                    (H) a description of activities between the Islamic 
                Republic of Iran and other countries, including the 
                Democratic People's Republic of Korea, or persons with 
                respect to sharing information on nuclear weapons or 
                activities related to weaponization;
                    (I) with respect to any new ballistic, cruise, or 
                hypersonic missiles being designed and tested by the 
                Islamic Republic of Iran or any of its proxies, a 
                description of--
                            (i) the type of missile;
                            (ii) the range of such missiles;
                            (iii) the capability of such missiles to 
                        deliver a nuclear warhead;
                            (iv) the number of such missiles; and
                            (v) any testing of such missiles;
                    (J) an assessment of whether the Islamic Republic 
                of Iran or any of its proxies possesses an unmanned 
                aircraft system or other military equipment capable of 
                delivering a nuclear weapon;
                    (K) an assessment of whether the Islamic Republic 
                of Iran or any of its proxies has engaged in new or 
                evolving nuclear weapons development activities that 
                would pose a threat to the national security of the 
                United States, Israel, or other partners or allies; and
                    (L) any other information that the task force 
                determines is necessary to ensure a complete 
                understanding of the nuclear or other weapons 
                activities of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
            (3) Form; public availability.--
                    (A) Form.--Each report required by paragraph (1) 
                shall be submitted in unclassified form but may include 
                a classified annex for information that, if released, 
                would be detrimental to the national security of the 
                United States.
                    (B) Public availability.--The unclassified portion 
                of a report required by paragraph (1) shall be made 
                available to the public on an internet website of the 
                Department of State.
    (b) Immediate Report Required.--If the task force receives credible 
intelligence of a significant development in the nuclear weapons 
capabilities or delivery systems capabilities of the Islamic Republic 
of Iran, which if not reported before the delivery of the next report 
under subsection (a)(1) would be detrimental to the national security 
of the United States, Israel, or other allies or partners, the task 
force shall, within 72 hours of the receipt of such intelligence, 
submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on such 
development.

SEC. 7. DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY TO ADDRESS IDENTIFIED NUCLEAR AND BALLISTIC 
              MISSILE THREATS TO THE UNITED STATES.

    (a) In General.--Not later than 30 days after the submission of the 
initial report under section 6(a), and annually thereafter, the 
Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
committees a diplomatic strategy that outlines a comprehensive plan for 
engaging with partners and allies of the United States regarding the 
nuclear weapons and missile activities of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
    (b) Contents.--The diplomatic strategy required by subsection (a) 
shall include--
            (1) a description of efforts of the United States to 
        counter efforts of the Islamic Republic of Iran to project 
        political and military influence into the Middle East;
            (2) a response by the Secretary of State to the increased 
        threat that new or evolving nuclear weapons or missile 
        development activities by the Islamic Republic of Iran pose to 
        United States citizens and the diplomatic presence of the 
        United States in the Middle East;
            (3) a description of a coordinated whole-of-government 
        approach to use political, economic, and security related tools 
        to address such activities; and
            (4) a comprehensive plan for engaging with allies and 
        regional partners in all relevant multilateral fora to address 
        such activities.
    (c) Updated Strategy Related to Immediate Reports.--Not later than 
15 days after the submission of report under section 6(b), the 
Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
committees an update to the most recent diplomatic strategy submitted 
under subsection (a).
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