Title: Iran Diplomacy Act of 2021
Policy area: International Affairs

Summary:
Iran Diplomacy Act of 2021
This bill outlines U.S. policy with respect to Iran and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), commonly known as the Iran nuclear deal.
Specifically, the bill states that the United States and Iran should promptly return to full compliance with their commitments under the JCPOA. Further, the bill encourages the United States to lead international efforts to advance diplomatic measures that promote U.S., regional, and international security.

[Congressional Bills 117th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 434 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

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117th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                 S. 434

  To seek a diplomatic resolution to Iran's nuclear program, and for 
                            other purposes.


_______________________________________________________________________


                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                           February 24, 2021

 Mr. Markey (for himself, Ms. Warren, Mr. Sanders, Ms. Duckworth, Mr. 
 Leahy, Mrs. Feinstein, Mr. Murphy, Ms. Baldwin, Mrs. Murray, Mr. Van 
Hollen, and Mr. Merkley) introduced the following bill; which was read 
        twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL


 
  To seek a diplomatic resolution to Iran's nuclear program, and for 
                            other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Iran Diplomacy Act of 2021''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

    Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) On July 14, 2015, the People's Republic of China, 
        France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States, 
        the European Union, and Iran agreed to the Joint Comprehensive 
        Plan of Action (JCPOA).
            (2) When all parties fully implemented the JCPOA, it had 
        increased the amount of time it would take Iran to acquire 
        enough fissile material for one nuclear weapon, from 
        approximately two to three months to at least one year, if Iran 
        made the political decision to take such an action.
            (3) The JCPOA blocked Iran's uranium, plutonium, and covert 
        pathways to a nuclear weapon, in the period when all sides had 
        fully implemented their commitments, in part by--
                    (A) imposing verifiable limits on Iran's uranium 
                enrichment and plutonium production capabilities;
                    (B) reducing the number of Iran's installed 
                centrifuges by two-thirds; and
                    (C) permitting the International Atomic Energy 
                Agency (IAEA) to monitor and verify all stages of 
                Iran's nuclear fuel cycle to include requesting short-
                notice access to ``verify the non-diversion of declared 
                material'' and ``absence of undeclared nuclear material 
                and activities'' in Iran, consistent with its 
                provisional implementation of the Additional Protocol 
                to its IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement.
            (4) The 2018 Department of State Compliance Report 
        concluded, ``Tehran's adherence to these commitments will 
        hinder its ability to produce a nuclear weapon even after the 
        time-bound provisions of the deal expire, helping to ensure 
        that its nuclear program remains exclusively peaceful in 
        nature''.
            (5) On January 29, 2019, Director of the Central 
        Intelligence Agency (CIA) Gina Haspel, testified before the 
        Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate that ``at the 
        moment, technically they [Iran] are in compliance,'' with the 
        JCPOA.
            (6) On January 29, 2019, Director of National Intelligence 
        Dan Coats issued a worldwide threat assessment, which observed 
        that the United States ``[does] not believe that Iran is 
        currently undertaking the key activities we judge necessary to 
        produce a nuclear device'' and ``Iran's continued 
        implementation of the JCPOA has extended the amount of time 
        Iran would need to produce enough fissile material for a 
        nuclear weapon from a few months to about one year''.
            (7) On May 8, 2018, President Donald J. Trump announced the 
        United States unilateral abrogation of the JCPOA, and announced 
        that the United States would re-impose all of its sanctions 
        that it had lifted after Iran verifiably met its nuclear-
        related commitments under the agreement on its implementation 
        day of January 16, 2016.
            (8) The United States abrogation of the JCPOA is a 
        violation of its commitments under the agreement and threatened 
        United States relations with European allies, whose cooperation 
        is necessary to counter Iran's malign influence in the Middle 
        East.
            (9) Prior to Iran's first breach of the JCPOA on May 8, 
        2019, quarterly reports from the IAEA Board of Governors 
        Reports found that since ``implementation day,'' on January 16, 
        2016, Iran's nuclear program was consistent with the JCPOA's 
        restrictions.
            (10) Following the removal of nearly all remaining waivers 
        to United States nuclear-related sanctions on May 2, 2019, the 
        Government of Iran committed a series of concerning, but 
        reversible, breaches of its commitments under the JCPOA, 
        including by--
                    (A) exceeding the allowable stock of low-enriched 
                uranium and heavy water;
                    (B) exceeding the allowable number of installed 
                centrifuges at its Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant;
                    (C) enriching uranium at the Fordow Fuel Enrichment 
                Plant;
                    (D) exceeding the permitted Low Enriched Uranium 
                (LEU) enrichment level of 3.67 percent of the Uranium 
                U-235 isotope and by enriching up to 20 percent; and
                    (E) beginning production of uranium metal;
            (11) Since the full re-imposition of United States nuclear-
        related sanctions in 2019, the Government of Iran has also 
        engaged in a series of escalatory actions outside its nuclear 
        program that have put the United States Armed Forces, 
        diplomats, and strategic partners at risk and have heightened 
        the threat of an armed conflict with Iran.
            (12) Tensions with Iran reached a high-point following the 
        unauthorized United States strike against Iranian General 
        Qassem Soleimani on January 3, 2020, and an Iranian ballistic 
        missile strike on January 7, 2020, on two United States bases 
        in Iraq, which left 110 United States service members with 
        traumatic brain injuries.
            (13) On January 5, 2020, Iran announced that it would no 
        longer comply with the limits of the JCPOA, while also noting 
        that it would not take the escalatory step of withdrawing from 
        the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at 
        Washington, London, and Moscow, July 1, 1968 (NPT), which 
        commits Iran to IAEA safeguards and obligates it to not obtain 
        a nuclear weapon.
            (14) On December 21, 2020, the foreign ministers of each of 
        the remaining parties to the JCPOA affirmed their continued 
        ``commitment to preserve the agreement,'' and called for the 
        ``full and effective implementation of the JCPOA'' by all 
        parties, heralding it as ``significant achievement of 
        multilateral diplomacy that contributes to regional and 
        international security''.
            (15) Congressional review of the JCPOA under the Iran 
        Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015 (Public Law 114-17; 129 
        Stat. 201) is already complete, and that Act still provides a 
        meaningful role for congressional oversight of the JCPOA 
        through its reporting requirements that assess Iran's ongoing 
        compliance with the agreement.
            (16) During Secretary of State Antony Blinken's January 19, 
        2021, nomination hearing before the Committee on Foreign 
        Relations of the Senate, he testified that President Joseph R. 
        Biden's position is that ``if Iran returns to compliance with 
        the JCPOA, we would do the same thing and then use that as a 
        platform, working with our allies and partners to build a 
        longer and stronger agreement to also capture some of the other 
        issues that need to be dealt with regard to missiles, with 
        regard to Iran's activities and destabilizing activities in the 
        region''.

SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY.

    It is the policy of the United States as follows:
            (1) Full implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of 
        Action (JCPOA) would represent a meaningful step to both 
        preventing an Iranian nuclear weapon and a costly future armed 
        conflict.
            (2) The United States and Iran should promptly return to 
        full compliance with all of their commitments under the JCPOA.
            (3) After such time that all sides return to their 
        commitments under the JCPOA, the United States should lead 
        international efforts to--
                    (A) strengthen the restrictions Iran's on ballistic 
                missile program and counter the proliferation of such 
                technology to other countries and actors;
                    (B) address the sunset of select provisions of the 
                JCPOA and other elements of the agreement that merit 
                strengthening; and
                    (C) advance any other diplomatic measures that 
                promote United States, regional, and international 
                security.
            (4) The United States should reaffirm its commitment to 
        United Nations Security Resolution 2231 (2015).
            (5) Through implementation of the President's January 21, 
        2021, National Security Memorandum -1, and other steps, the 
        United States will better foster an environment in which 
        financial institutions and entities can make practical use of 
        existing exemptions and mechanisms ``allowing for the sale of 
        agricultural commodities, food, medicine, and medical devices 
        to Iran,'' and help Iran battle the COVID-19 pandemic.
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