Title: Senate Select Committee on the Afghanistan Withdrawal Resolution
Policy area: Congress

Summary:
Senate Select Committee on the Afghanistan Withdrawal Resolution
This resolution establishes the Select Committee on the United States Withdrawal from Afghanistan to investigate and report on the United States' withdrawal from Afghanistan.

[Congressional Bills 117th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. Res. 763 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

<DOC>






117th CONGRESS
  2d Session
S. RES. 763

Establishing a Senate Select Committee on the United States withdrawal 
                           from Afghanistan.


_______________________________________________________________________


                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                           September 14, 2022

 Mr. Hawley submitted the following resolution; which was referred to 
               the Committee on Rules and Administration

_______________________________________________________________________

                               RESOLUTION


 
Establishing a Senate Select Committee on the United States withdrawal 
                           from Afghanistan.

    Resolved,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This resolution may be cited as the ``Senate Select Committee on 
the Afghanistan Withdrawal Resolution''.

SEC. 2. ESTABLISHMENT OF SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE.

    There is established a select committee of the Senate, to be known 
as the Select Committee on the United States Withdrawal from 
Afghanistan (referred to in this resolution as the ``Senate Select 
Committee''), to investigate and report on the United States withdrawal 
from Afghanistan.

SEC. 3. MEMBERSHIP.

    (a) In General.--The Senate Select Committee shall be composed of 
20 Members of the Senate appointed according to the following:
            (1) The majority leader of the Senate shall appoint 2 
        members.
            (2) The minority leader of the Senate shall appoint 2 
        members.
            (3) The chairman of the Committee on Armed Services shall 
        appoint 2 members.
            (4) The ranking member of the Committee on Armed Services 
        shall appoint 2 members.
            (5) The chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations 
        shall appoint 2 members.
            (6) The ranking member of the Committee on Foreign 
        Relations shall appoint 2 members.
            (7) The chairman of the Committee on Homeland Security and 
        Governmental Affairs shall appoint 2 members.
            (8) The ranking member of the Committee on Homeland 
        Security and Governmental Affairs shall appoint 2 members.
            (9) The chairman of the Select Committee on Intelligence 
        shall appoint 2 members.
            (10) The ranking member of the Select Committee on 
        Intelligence shall appoint 2 members.
    (b) Appointment of Co-Chairs.--The majority leader and the minority 
leader of the Senate shall each appoint 1 co-chair of the Senate Select 
Committee from the members appointed to the Senate Select Committee.
    (c) Date.--Members of the Senate Select Committee shall be 
appointed not later than 14 calendar days after the date on which the 
Senate agrees to this resolution.
    (d) Period of Appointment.--Members of the Senate Select Committee 
shall be appointed for the life of the Senate Select Committee.
    (e) Vacancies.--A vacancy in the Senate Select Committee--
            (1) shall not affect the powers of the Senate Select 
        Committee; and
            (2) shall be filled in the same manner as the original 
        appointment.

SEC. 4. INVESTIGATION AND REPORT.

    (a) In General.--The Senate Select Committee shall investigate and, 
not later than 1 year after the date of agreement to this resolution, 
shall submit a report to the Senate on the United States withdrawal 
from Afghanistan.
    (b) Elements.--The report required under subsection (a) shall 
address the following:
            (1) Intelligence products available to the United States 
        Government over the course of the withdrawal, including as 
        related to--
                    (A) anticipated timelines for a Taliban takeover of 
                Afghanistan, especially as the Taliban seized control 
                of Afghanistan districts and provinces, often without 
                fighting, in early to mid 2021;
                    (B) the ability of the Afghan National Defense and 
                Security Forces to prevent a Taliban takeover of 
                Afghanistan after the withdrawal of the United States 
                Armed Forces and associated combat, logistical, and 
                other support;
                    (C) the willingness of then-President of the 
                Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Ashraf Ghani and other 
                Afghan political leaders to remain in Afghanistan as 
                the military situation deteriorated, including any 
                plans such leaders may have made to escape Afghanistan 
                as the Taliban advanced;
                    (D) any other intelligence that may have informed 
                decisions by the United States Government regarding the 
                timeline for the withdrawal of its forces, moving of 
                its embassy in Kabul, initiation of a noncombatant 
                evacuation operation, force requirements for a 
                noncombatant evacuation operation, or related matters; 
                and
                    (E) any dissenting views shared in writing or other 
                formats, including verbally, by United States 
                diplomats, military commanders, or other government 
                officials regarding the topics described in 
                subparagraphs (A) through (D).
            (2) The failure to secure Hamid Karzai International 
        Airport, relocate the United States Embassy in Kabul, and 
        initiate a noncombatant evacuation operation prior to Kabul's 
        imminent collapse, despite warnings by military commanders on 
        the ground that such a collapse was increasingly likely and 
        could occur rapidly, including--
                    (A) the failure by the United States Government to 
                accelerate the fortification of the Hamid Karzai 
                International Airport, the relocation of the United 
                States Embassy in Kabul, or the initiation of the 
                noncombatant evacuation operation in response to 
                warnings that the Government of the Islamic Republic of 
                Afghanistan was increasingly likely to collapse and 
                could do so rapidly;
                    (B) the development of a ``trigger assessment 
                tool'' or other conditions-based planning aids to 
                support monitoring of and timely response to the 
                deteriorating security environment in Afghanistan, 
                including use of such aids by Department of Defense and 
                Department of State officials in Afghanistan;
                    (C) table-top exercises or other planning events 
                held at agency or interagency levels, with particular 
                focus on planning assumptions, associated timelines, 
                and participant reactions to the planning events;
                    (D) any decision by the Department of State or 
                other Federal agency to delay or deprioritize planning 
                for a noncombatant evacuation operation, including for 
                the purpose of demonstrating confidence in the 
                Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan;
                    (E) any suggestion by Department of State or other 
                United States Government officials that executing a 
                noncombatant evacuation operation would constitute 
                failure for the United States in Afghanistan, as 
                reported by the United States Central Command 
                investigation of the Abbey Gate bombing; and
                    (F) any orders, instructions, or other guidance 
                provided to Department of Defense officials to prevent 
                such officials from planning for a noncombatant 
                evacuation operation with multinational partners, as 
                reported by the United States Central Command 
                investigation of the Abbey Gate bombing.
            (3) The decision to prioritize evacuating as many 
        individuals as possible over protecting members of the United 
        States Armed Forces and thoroughly vetting all prospective 
        evacuees, as reported by the United States Central Command 
        investigation of the Abbey Gate bombing, including--
                    (A) force protection measures, including obstacles, 
                barriers, and other measures, implemented at the Hamid 
                Karzai International Airport prior to and during 
                execution of the noncombatant evacuation operation; and
                    (B) force protection measures not implemented at 
                the Hamid Karzai International Airport, with an 
                explanation for why such force protection measures were 
                not implemented and implications of the failure to 
                implement such measures for risk to force during 
                execution of the noncombatant evacuation operation.
            (4) Threat reporting prior to the suicide bombing at Abbey 
        Gate, additional force protection measures implemented in 
        response to such threat reporting, and additional force 
        protection measures not implemented in response to such threat 
        reporting, with an assessment of why certain additional force 
        protection measures were not taken.
            (5) The failure to thoroughly vet evacuees prior to their 
        transfer to United States territory, military installations, or 
        other locations outside of Afghanistan, including detailed 
        descriptions of--
                    (A) any delays by the Department of State to send 
                adequate numbers of consular officials to Hamid Karzai 
                International Airport to facilitate thorough vetting of 
                prospective evacuees;
                    (B) any changes to guidance issued by the 
                Department of State regarding the vetting of 
                prospective evacuees over the course of the 
                noncombatant evacuation operation;
                    (C) any guidance issued by the President or other 
                United States Government officials to reduce standards 
                for or expedite vetting of prospective evacuees prior 
                to their removal from Afghanistan;
                    (D) any failure by the United States Government to 
                utilize all existing biometric databases or proper 
                identification standards when processing individuals to 
                be removed from Afghanistan; and
                    (E) any criminal incidents involving evacuees 
                following their transfer to United States territory.
            (6) The total number of United States nationals left in 
        Afghanistan following the United States withdrawal from 
        Afghanistan, and the knowledge on the part of United States 
        Government officials of the total number of United States 
        nationals left in Afghanistan when such officials informed 
        Congress that the United States Government had not left 
        Americans behind in Afghanistan.
            (7) Equipment provided by the United States to the Afghan 
        National Defense and Security Forces and recovered by the 
        Taliban following the collapse of the Afghan National Defense 
        and Security Forces, including the type and amount of such 
        equipment recovered by the Taliban as well as the manner in 
        which the Taliban has been able to use such equipment.
            (8) Detailed descriptions of--
                    (A) orders issued by the President related to the 
                United States withdrawal from Afghanistan, including 
                with regard to the relocation of the United States 
                Embassy in Kabul and the initiation and execution of 
                the noncombatant evacuation operation;
                    (B) analysis or recommendations provided by the 
                Assistant to the President for National Security 
                Affairs, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of 
                Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the 
                Commander of United States Central Command, and other 
                national security leaders related to the United States 
                withdrawal from Afghanistan, including as related to--
                            (i) the deteriorating military situation in 
                        Afghanistan; and
                            (ii) the consequent need to accelerate the 
                        relocation of the United States Embassy in 
                        Kabul and the initiation of the noncombatant 
                        evacuation operation; and
                    (C) requests for forces or other requests for 
                additional authorities or resources made to the 
                President by the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of 
                State, or other national security leaders during the 
                United States withdrawal from Afghanistan, and the 
                President's responses to any such requests.
            (9) Any other matters identified by members of the Senate 
        Select Committee.
    (c) Form.--The report required under subsection (a) shall be 
submitted in unclassified form but may contain a classified annex.

SEC. 5. MEETINGS, HEARINGS, AND ACCESS TO INFORMATION.

    (a) Meetings.--
            (1) In general.--The Senate Select Committee shall meet at 
        the call of the co-chairs or at the request of at least 3 
        members.
            (2) Quorum.--Half of the members of the Senate Select 
        Committee shall constitute a quorum.
            (3) Voting.--Proxy voting shall be allowed on behalf of the 
        members of the Senate Select Committee.
    (b) Hearings.--
            (1) In general.--The Senate Select Committee shall, for the 
        purposes described in section 4, hold such hearings, compel 
        attendance of such witnesses, take or compel such testimony, 
        receive or compel such evidence, and administer such oaths as 
        the Senate Select Committee considers advisable.
            (2) Frequency.--The Senate Select Committee shall hold an 
        open hearing no less frequently than once per month until it 
        has received open testimony from all of the witnesses listed in 
        paragraph (3).
            (3) Witnesses.--The co-chairs shall hear testimony from the 
        following before the Senate Select Committee in open session, 
        even if the person holds a different public office or no longer 
        holds public office at the time of the hearing:
                    (A) Assistant to the President for National 
                Security Affairs Jake Sullivan.
                    (B) Secretary of State Antony Blinken.
                    (C) Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin.
                    (D) Secretary of Homeland Security Alejandro 
                Mayorkas.
                    (E) Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines.
                    (F) Director of the Central Intelligence Agency 
                William Burns.
                    (G) Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General 
                Mark Milley.
                    (H) Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Colin 
                Kahl.
                    (I) Former United States Ambassador to Afghanistan 
                Ambassador John Bass.
                    (J) Former United States Ambassador to Afghanistan 
                Ambassador Ross Wilson.
                    (K) Former Commander of United States Forces 
                Afghanistan--Forward Rear Admiral Peter Vasely.
                    (L) Former Commanding General of Joint Task Force--
                Crisis Response Brigadier General Farrell J. Sullivan.
                    (M) Former Commanding General of 82nd Airborne 
                Division Lieutenant General Christopher T. Donahue.
                    (N) Any other individuals, including former United 
                States Government officials, identified by the co-
                chairs or a group of 3 members of the Senate Select 
                Committee.
            (4) Transparency.--The Senate Select Committee may receive 
        classified testimony in a closed session, but any witnesses 
        questioned in a closed session shall also testify in an open 
        session, in the interest of public transparency.
            (5) Questioning.--Co-chairs shall permit members of the 
        Senate Select Committee to question witnesses at a hearing for 
        periods longer than 5 minutes or multiple periods of 5 minutes, 
        at the request of a member.
            (6) Procedures.--
                    (A) Announcement.--The co-chairs of the Senate 
                Select Committee shall make a public announcement of 
                the date, time, place, and subject matter of any 
                hearing to be conducted, not less than 7 days in 
                advance of such hearing, unless the co-chairs determine 
                that there is good cause to begin such hearing at any 
                earlier date.
                    (B) Written statement.--A witness appearing before 
                the Senate Select Committee shall file a written 
                statement of proposed testimony and respond in writing 
                to any advance questions from the Senate Select 
                Committee at least 2 calendar days before the 
                appearance of the witness unless the requirement is 
                waived by the co-chairs.
    (c) Cooperation From Federal Agencies.--
            (1) Technical assistance.--Upon written request of the co-
        chairs, a Federal agency shall provide technical assistance to 
        the Senate Select Committee in order for the Senate Select 
        Committee to carry out its duties.
            (2) Provision of information.--The National Security 
        Council, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, the 
        Secretary of Homeland Security, the Director of National 
        Intelligence, the heads of the elements of the intelligence 
        community, and the heads of other relevant Federal agencies 
        shall expeditiously provide information requested by the Senate 
        Select Committee related to the investigation and report under 
        required under section 4, and in no case later than 3 weeks 
        after a request by a member of the Senate Select Committee.
            (3) Limitation on exclusions.--Federal agencies shall not 
        withhold information from the Senate Select Committee, 
        including for reasons of classification, executive privilege, 
        or attorney-client privilege.
    (d) Subpoena Authority.--Members of the Senate Select Committee are 
authorized to--
            (1) compel by subpoena the furnishing of information by 
        United States Government officials and other individuals, 
        including former United States Government officials; and
            (2) take or order the taking of depositions, including 
        pursuant to subpoena, in the same manner as a standing 
        committee of the Senate.

SEC. 6. ADMINISTRATION.

    (a) Funding.--There shall be paid, out of the contingent fund of 
the Senate from the appropriations account ``Miscellaneous Items,'' 
such sums as may be necessary for the expenses of the Senate Select 
Committee, subject to the rules and regulations of the Senate.
    (b) Expenses.--In carrying out its functions, the Senate Select 
Committee is authorized to incur expenses in the same manner and under 
the same conditions as the Joint Economic Committee is authorized under 
section 11 of the Employment Act of 1946 (15 U.S.C. 1024).
    (c) Staffing.--
            (1) Staff director.--The co-chairs, acting jointly, shall 
        hire the staff director of the Senate Select Committee.
            (2) Other staff.--The co-chairs, acting jointly, may employ 
        such additional staff as they determine necessary for the 
        Senate Select Committee to carry out its duties.
            (3) Compensation.--The co-chairs, acting jointly, may 
        appoint and fix the compensation of the staff director and 
        additional staff as they determine necessary, within the 
        guidelines for employees of the Senate and following all 
        applicable rules and employment requirements of the Senate.
            (4) Ethical standards.--Members and staff of the Senate 
        Select Committee shall comply with the ethics rules of the 
        Senate.
    (d) Facilities.--The Senate Select Committee shall have priority 
access to--
            (1) rooms of the Senate for purposes of meetings, hearings, 
        and other Senate Select Committee functions; and
            (2) secure facilities for purpose of receiving classified 
        testimony and handling other classified materials.
    (e) Termination.--The Senate Select Committee shall terminate on 
the later of the following:
            (1) 30 days after the submission of the report required 
        under section 4(a).
            (2) 30 days after the Senate Select Committee has held open 
        hearings with all of the witnesses listed under section 
        5(b)(3).
            (3) The expiration of the Congressional session during 
        which the Senate agrees to this resolution.
    (f) Disposition of Records.--Upon the termination of the Senate 
Select Committee, the records of the Senate Select Committee shall 
become the records of the Committee on Armed Services.
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