Title: Protect Our Universities Act of 2021
Policy area: Education

Summary:
Protect Our Universities Act of 2021
This bill restricts student participation in sensitive research projects and prohibits the use of certain technologies for these projects.
The bill requires each student, prior to participating in a sensitive research project, to provide proof of citizenship to the institution of higher education (IHE) where the project is being carried out. Specifically, it prohibits students who are citizens of certain countries, including China and Russia, from participating in a project unless the student applies for and receives approval from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
It prohibits certain technologies developed by listed entities, including Huawei Technologies Company and ZTE Corporation, from being used to carry out sensitive research projects.
It also requires the Department of Education to establish a national security technology task force, which must maintain a list of sensitive research projects and provide guidance to the IHEs where these projects are being carried out.

[Congressional Bills 117th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 1091 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>






117th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 1091

 To create a task force within the Department of Education to address 
  the threat of foreign government influence and threats to academic 
    research integrity on college campuses, and for other purposes.


_______________________________________________________________________


                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           February 18, 2021

  Mr. Banks introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
Committee on Education and Labor, and in addition to the Committees on 
 Intelligence (Permanent Select), Armed Services, and Science, Space, 
   and Technology, for a period to be subsequently determined by the 
  Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall 
           within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL


 
 To create a task force within the Department of Education to address 
  the threat of foreign government influence and threats to academic 
    research integrity on college campuses, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Protect Our Universities Act of 
2021''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

    Congress finds the following:
            (1) Adversaries of the United States take advantage of a 
        largely vulnerable academic system. Academia is a place of 
        uniquely free thought; however, adversaries take advantage of 
        access to federally funded sensitive research that takes place 
        on the campuses of institutions of higher education.
            (2) As stated in a 2018 report by the White House Office of 
        Trade and Manufacturing Policy, ``More than 300,000 Chinese 
        nationals annually attend U.S. universities or find employment 
        at U.S. national laboratories, innovation centers, incubators, 
        and think tanks. Chinese nationals now account for 
        approximately one third of foreign university and college 
        students in the United States and about 25 percent of graduate 
        students specializing in science, technology, engineering, or 
        math (STEM).''.
            (3) International students from nations that are 
        adversarial to the United States could face undue pressure or 
        incentives to divulge technology to their home nation or to use 
        sensitive information to negatively impact the United States. 
        According to the same 2018 White House Report, ``The national 
        and economic security risks are that the Chinese State may seek 
        to manipulate or pressure even unwitting or unwilling Chinese 
        nationals into becoming non-traditional information collectors 
        that serve Beijing's military and strategic ambitions.''.
            (4) Technology and information that could be deemed 
        sensitive to the national security interests of the United 
        States should be given increased scrutiny to determine if 
        access should be restricted in a research environment.
            (5) An open federally funded research environment exposes 
        the United States to the possibility of exchanging research 
        affiliated with current or future critical military 
        technological systems.
            (6) In Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Director 
        Wray's view, Chinese non-traditional intelligence collectors 
        ``are exploiting the very open research and development 
        environment that we have, which we all revere. But they're 
        taking advantage of it, so one of the things we're trying to do 
        is view the China threat as not just the whole-of-government 
        threat, but a whole-of-society threat on their end, and I think 
        it's going to take a whole-of-society response by us.''.
            (7) As stated in the January 2018 China's Technology 
        Transfer Strategy report by the Defense Innovation Unit, 
        ``Academia is an opportune environment for learning about 
        science and technology since the cultural values of U.S. 
        educational institutions reflect an open and free exchange of 
        ideas. As a result, Chinese science and engineering students 
        frequently master technologies that later become critical to 
        key military systems, amounting over time to unintentional 
        violations of U.S. export control laws.''.
            (8) In 2020, Bill Evanina, the senior counterintelligence 
        official in the Office of the Director of National 
        Intelligence, stated ``. . . our ideas, technology, research, 
        innovation is incubated on those university campuses. That's 
        where the science and technology originates--and that's why 
        it's the most prime place to steal.''.
            (9) David Bowdich, Deputy Director of the Federal Bureau of 
        Investigation, stated at the March 2020 Academic Security and 
        Counter Exploitation Annual Seminar that [China] is ``taking 
        advantage of non-traditional collectors to work on their 
        behalf, like ostensibly private companies or some graduate 
        students and researchers. . . . And they are targeting cutting-
        edge research at our universities.''.
            (10) The 2020 House of Representatives China Task Force 
        Report states, ``Research programs at U.S. colleges and 
        universities are increasingly targeted by students and 
        researchers acting as `non-traditional collectors'. These 
        students, ranging from undergraduates to postdoctoral 
        researchers, are generally untrained in espionage techniques 
        but are asked to actively target sensitive dual-use 
        technologies and other emerging research during their time in 
        the U.S. The stated goal for these operations is to exfiltrate 
        research data from the U.S. to the PRC.''.

SEC. 3. TASK FORCE.

    (a) Task Force Established.--Not later than one year after the date 
of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Education, in consultation 
with the Secretary of Defense and the Director of National 
Intelligence, shall establish the National Security Technology Task 
Force (hereinafter referred to as the ``Task Force'') within the 
Department of Education to address the threat of espionage at 
institutions of higher education.
    (b) Membership.--
            (1) Designation.--The Task Force shall include not more 
        than 30 members, of which--
                    (A) at least 1 representative shall be from the 
                Department of Defense, designated by the Secretary of 
                Defense;
                    (B) at least 1 representative shall be from the 
                intelligence community, designated by the Director of 
                National Intelligence;
                    (C) at least 1 representative shall be from the 
                Department of Justice, designated by the United States 
                Attorney General;
                    (D) at least 1 representative shall be from the 
                Department of Energy, designated by the Secretary of 
                Energy; and
                    (E) at least 1 representative shall be from each of 
                the following offices of the Department of Education, 
                as appointed and named by the Secretary of Education:
                            (i) Office of Postsecondary Education.
                            (ii) Office of Planning, Evaluation, and 
                        Policy Development.
                            (iii) Office of the General Counsel.
                            (iv) Any other office the Secretary of 
                        Education determines to be appropriate.
            (2) Membership list.--Not later than 10 days after the 
        first meeting of the Task Force, the Task Force shall submit to 
        Congress a list identifying each member of the Task Force.
    (c) Sensitive Research Project List.--The Task Force shall, in 
consultation with the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 
actively maintain a list of sensitive research projects. Such list 
shall--
            (1) be referred to as the Sensitive Research Projects List; 
        and
            (2) for each project included on the list, indicate--
                    (A) the qualified funding agency that is funding 
                the project;
                    (B) whether the project is open to student 
                participation; and
                    (C) whether the project is related to--
                            (i) an item listed on the Commerce Control 
                        List (CCL) maintained by the Department of 
                        Commerce;
                            (ii) an item listed on the United States 
                        Munitions List maintained by the Department of 
                        State; or
                            (iii) technology designated by the 
                        Secretary of Defense as having a technology 
                        readiness level of 1, 2, or 3.
    (d) Consultation With OIG.--The Task Force shall periodically, but 
no less than annually, consult with the Office of the Inspector General 
of the Department of Education, which shall include annual reports to 
the Office of the Inspector General on the activities of the Task 
Force, with an opportunity for the Office of the Inspector General to 
provide active feedback related to such activities.
    (e) Instruction to Institutions of Higher Education.--Not less than 
once every six months, the Task Force shall provide relevant 
instruction to institutions of higher education at which research 
projects on the Sensitive Research Project List are being carried out. 
Such instruction shall provide the institutions of higher education 
with information related to the threat posed by espionage, best 
practices identified by the Task Force, and, to the extent possible, 
any specific risks that the intelligence community, the qualified 
funding agency, or law enforcement entities determine appropriate to 
share with the institutions.
    (f) Report to Congress.--Not later than one year after the date of 
enactment of this Act, and every six months thereafter, the Task Force 
shall provide a report to the Committee on Education and Labor, the 
Committee on Armed Services, and the Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence of the House of Representatives, and to the Committee on 
Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, the Committee on Armed 
Services, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, 
regarding the threat of espionage at institutions of higher education. 
In each such briefing, the Task Force shall identify actions that may 
be taken to reduce espionage carried out through student participation 
in sensitive research projects. The Task Force shall also include in 
this report an assessment of whether the current licensing regulations 
relating to the International Traffic in Arms Regulations and the 
Export Administration Regulations are sufficient to protect the 
security of the projects listed on the Sensitive Research Project List.

SEC. 4. FOREIGN STUDENT PARTICIPATION IN SENSITIVE RESEARCH PROJECTS.

    (a) Approval of Foreign Student Participation Required.--Beginning 
on the date that is one year after the date of enactment of this Act, 
for each project on the Sensitive Research Project List that is open to 
student participation, the head of such project at the institution of 
higher education at which the project is being carried out shall ensure 
that each student participating in such project shall be required to 
provide proof of citizenship before the student is permitted to 
participate in such project. A student who is a citizen of a country 
identified in subsection (b) shall be permitted to participate in such 
a project only if--
            (1) the student applies for, and receives approval from, 
        the Director of National Intelligence to participate in such 
        project, based on a background check and any other information 
        the Director determines to be appropriate; and
            (2) in the case of such a project that is related to an 
        item or technology described in subparagraph (C) of section 
        3(c)(2), the student applies for, and receives approval from, 
        the head of the qualified funding agency, to participate in 
        such project.
    (b) List of Citizenship Requiring Approval.--Approval under 
subsection (a) shall be required for any student who is a citizen of a 
country that is one of the following:
            (1) The People's Republic of China.
            (2) The Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
            (3) The Russian Federation.
            (4) The Islamic Republic of Iran.
            (5) Any country identified by the head of the qualified 
        funding agency as requiring approval for the purposes of this 
        section.

SEC. 5. FOREIGN ENTITIES.

    (a) List of Foreign Entities That Pose an Intelligence Threat.--Not 
later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the 
Director of National Intelligence shall identify foreign entities, 
including governments, corporations, non-profit and for-profit 
organizations, and any subsidiary or affiliate of such an entity, that 
the Director determines pose a threat of espionage with respect to 
sensitive research projects, and shall develop and maintain a list of 
such entities. The Director may add or remove entities from such list 
at any time. The initial list developed by the Director shall include 
the following entities (including any subsidiary or affiliate):
            (1) Huawei Technologies Company.
            (2) ZTE Corporation.
            (3) Hytera Communications Corporation.
            (4) Hangzhou Hikvision Digital Technology Company.
            (5) Dahua Technology Company.
            (6) Kaspersky Lab.
            (7) Any entity that is owned or controlled by, or otherwise 
        has demonstrated financial ties to, the government of a country 
        identified under section 4(b).
    (b) Notice to Institutions of Higher Education.--The Director of 
National Intelligence shall make the initial list required under 
subsection (a), and any changes to such list, available to the 
Secretary of Education, the Task Force, and the head of each qualified 
funding agency as soon as practicable. The Secretary of Education shall 
provide such initial list and subsequent amendments to each institution 
of higher education at which a project on the Sensitive Research 
Project List is being carried out.
    (c) Prohibition on Use of Certain Technologies.--Beginning on the 
date that is one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the 
head of each sensitive research project shall, as a condition of 
receipt of funds from a qualified funding agency, provide an assurance 
to such qualified funding agency that, beginning on the date that is 
two years after the date of the enactment of this Act, any technology 
developed by an entity included on the list maintained under subsection 
(a) shall not be utilized in carrying out the sensitive research 
project.

SEC. 6. ENFORCEMENT.

    The head of each qualified funding agency shall take such steps as 
may be necessary to enforce the provisions of sections 4 and 5 of this 
Act. Upon determination that the head of a sensitive research project 
has failed to meet the requirements of either section 4 or section 5, 
the head of a qualified funding agency may determine the appropriate 
enforcement action, including--
            (1) imposing a probationary period, not to exceed 6 months, 
        on the head of such project, or on the project;
            (2) reducing or otherwise limiting the funding for such 
        project until the violation has been remedied;
            (3) permanently cancelling the funding for such project; or
            (4) any other action the head of the qualified funding 
        agency determines to be appropriate.

SEC. 7. DEFINITIONS.

    In this Act:
            (1) Citizen of a country.--The term ``citizen of a 
        country'', with respect to a student, includes all countries in 
        which the student has held or holds citizenship or holds 
        permanent residency.
            (2) Institution of higher education.--The term 
        ``institution of higher education'' means an institution 
        described in section 102 of the Higher Education Act of 1965 
        (20 U.S.C. 1002) that receives Federal funds in any amount and 
        for any purpose.
            (3) Intelligence community.--The term ``intelligence 
        community'' has the meaning given that term in section 3 of the 
        National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003).
            (4) Qualified funding agency.--The term ``qualified funding 
        agency'', with respect to a sensitive research project, means--
                    (A) the Department of Defense, if the sensitive 
                research project is funded in whole or in part by the 
                Department of Defense;
                    (B) the Department of Energy, if the sensitive 
                research project is funded in whole or in part by the 
                Department of Energy; or
                    (C) an element of the intelligence community, if 
                the sensitive research project is funded in whole or in 
                part by the element of the intelligence community.
            (5) Sensitive research project.--The term ``sensitive 
        research project'' means a research project at an institution 
        of higher education that is funded by a qualified funding 
        agency, except that such term shall not include any research 
        project that is classified or that requires the participants in 
        such project to obtain a security clearance.
            (6) Student participation.--The term ``student 
        participation'' shall not include student activity in--
                    (A) a research project that is required for 
                completion of a course in which the student is enrolled 
                at an institution of higher education; or
                    (B) a research project for which the student is 
                conducting unpaid research.
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