Title: STRATEGIC Act
Policy area: International Affairs

Summary:
Strengthening Trade, Regional Alliances, Technology, and Economic and Geopolitical Initiatives concerning China Act or the STRATEGIC Act
This bill contains provisions addressing China and foreign relations generally.
The provisions include

[Congressional Bills 117th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 687 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

<DOC>






117th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                 S. 687

To advance a policy for managed strategic competition with the People's 
                           Republic of China.


_______________________________________________________________________


                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             March 10, 2021

   Mr. Risch (for himself, Mr. Romney, Mr. Young, Mr. Sullivan, Mr. 
Rounds, Mr. Wicker, Mr. Rubio, Mr. Hagerty, and Mr. Portman) introduced 
the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee 
                          on Foreign Relations

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL


 
To advance a policy for managed strategic competition with the People's 
                           Republic of China.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLES.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Strengthening Trade, Regional 
Alliances, Technology, and Economic and Geopolitical Initiatives 
concerning China Act'' or the ``STRATEGIC Act''.

SEC. 2. TABLE OF CONTENTS.

    The table of contents for this Act is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short titles.
Sec. 2. Table of contents.
Sec. 3. Definitions.
                 TITLE I--A COMPREHENSIVE CHINA POLICY

Sec. 101. Findings.
Sec. 102. Statement of policy.
Sec. 103. Sense of Congress.
  TITLE II--PROTECTING THE UNITED STATES FROM CHINA'S DISCRIMINATORY 
                           ECONOMIC PRACTICES

Sec. 201. Findings and sense of Congress regarding the PRC's industrial 
                            policy.
Sec. 202. Intellectual property violators list.
Sec. 203. Government of the People's Republic of China subsidies list.
Sec. 204. Review of petitions related to intellectual property theft 
                            and forced technology transfer.
Sec. 205. Predatory pricing by entities owned, controlled, or directed 
                            by a foreign state.
Sec. 206. Reporting on requests to comply with the corporate social 
                            credit system in the People's Republic of 
                            China.
Sec. 207. Annual review on the presence of Chinese companies in United 
                            States capital markets.
      TITLE III--REINVESTING IN AMERICAN AND ALLIED TECHNOLOGICAL 
                            COMPETITIVENESS

Sec. 301. Regulatory exchanges with allies and partners.
Sec. 302. Authorization to assist United States companies with supply 
                            chain diversification and management.
Sec. 303. Scientific and private sector advisory panel on protection of 
                            critical technologies.
Sec. 304. Establishment of a tech coalition.
Sec. 305. United States representation in standards-setting bodies.
              TITLE IV--SAFEGUARDING AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS

Sec. 401. Amendment to Foreign Agent Registration Act regarding gifts 
                            made to universities.
Sec. 402. Designation of a country of national security concern in the 
                            Foreign Agent Registration Act.
Sec. 403. Ban on Senate-confirmed Department of State officials 
                            representing countries of national security 
                            concern.
Sec. 404. Amendment to the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange 
                            Act.
   TITLE V--MAINTAINING THE INTEGRITY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

Sec. 501. Office of Integrity in the United Nations system.
   TITLE VI--BOLSTERING UNITED STATES AND ALLIED DEFENSE AND SECURITY

Sec. 601. Findings.
Sec. 602. Statement of policy expressing the political will of the 
                            United States to defend its interests in 
                            the Indo-Pacific and pursue expanded 
                            political-military cooperation with allies 
                            and partners.
Sec. 603. Sense of Congress regarding bolstering security partnerships 
                            in the Indo-Pacific.
Sec. 604. Report on capability development of Indo-Pacific allies and 
                            partners.
Sec. 605. Statement of policy on unmanned aerial systems and the 
                            missile technology control regime.
Sec. 606. Report on national technology and industrial base.
Sec. 607. Authorization of appropriations for Southeast Asia maritime 
                            security programs and diplomatic outreach 
                            activities.
Sec. 608. Report on China Coast Guard.
Sec. 609. Report on Chinese military activity in Djibouti.
Sec. 610. Statement of policy regarding universal implementation of 
                            United Nations sanctions on North Korea.
                 TITLE VII--ENSURING STRATEGIC SECURITY

Sec. 701. Findings on strategic security and arms control.
Sec. 702. Cooperation on a strategic nuclear dialogue.
Sec. 703. Agreements.

SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.

    In this Act:
            (1) CCP.--The term ``CCP'' means the Chinese Communist 
        Party.
            (2) Centrally administered, state-owned enterprise.--The 
        term ``centrally administered, state-owned enterprise'' means 
        any company that previously was or currently is--
                    (A)(i) incorporated in the PRC; and
                    (ii) supervised and managed by the State-owned 
                Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the 
                State Council of the PRC; or
                    (B) an owned or controlled subsidiary of an 
                enterprise meeting the requirements under subparagraph 
                (A).
            (3) People's liberation army; pla.--The terms ``People's 
        Liberation Army'' and ``PLA'' mean the armed forces of the 
        People's Republic of China.
            (4) PRC; china.--The terms ``PRC'' and ``China'' mean the 
        People's Republic of China.

                 TITLE I--A COMPREHENSIVE CHINA POLICY

SEC. 101. FINDINGS.

    Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) The People's Republic of China has increased its 
        political, diplomatic, economic, military, technological, and 
        ideological power to become a strategic, near-peer, global 
        competitor of the United States. The policies increasingly 
        pursued by the PRC in each of these domains are contrary to the 
        interests and values of the United States, its partners, and 
        much of the rest of the world.
            (2) The current competition between the United States and 
        the PRC--
                    (A) is taking place over the future character of 
                the international order;
                    (B) will shape the rules, norms, and institutions 
                that govern relations among states in the coming 
                decades;
                    (C) will determine the ability of the United States 
                to secure its national interests; and
                    (D) will determine future levels of peace, 
                prosperity, and freedom for the United States and the 
                international community in the coming decades.
            (3) After normalizing diplomatic relations with the PRC in 
        1979, the United States actively worked to advance the PRC's 
        economic and social development to ensure that it participated 
        in, and benefitted from, the free and open international order. 
        The United States pursued these goals and contributed to the 
        welfare of the Chinese people by--
                    (A) increasing the PRC's trade relations and access 
                to global capital markets;
                    (B) promoting the PRC's accession to the World 
                Trade Organization;
                    (C) providing development finance and technical 
                assistance;
                    (D) promoting research collaboration;
                    (E) educating the PRC's top students;
                    (F) permitting transfers of cutting-edge 
                technologies and scientific knowledge; and
                    (G) providing intelligence and military assistance.
            (4) It is now clear that the PRC has no intention of 
        reforming politically or economically. Instead, it is pursuing 
        state-led, mercantilist economic policies, increasing 
        restrictions on personal freedoms, and implementing an 
        aggressive and assertive foreign policy. These policies 
        frequently and deliberately undermine United States interests 
        and are contrary to core United States values and the values of 
        other nations, both in the Indo-Pacific and beyond. In response 
        to this strategic decision of the PRC, the United States was 
        compelled to reexamine and revise its strategy towards the PRC.
            (5) The General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party 
        and the President of the People's Republic of China, Xi 
        Jinping, has elevated the ``Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese 
        Nation'' as central to the domestic and foreign policy of the 
        PRC. His program demands--
                    (A) strong, centralized CCP leadership;
                    (B) concentration of military power;
                    (C) a strong role for the CCP in the state and the 
                economy;
                    (D) an aggressive foreign policy seeking control 
                over broadly asserted territorial claims; and
                    (E) the denial of any universal values and 
                individual rights that are deemed to threaten the CCP.
            (6) The PRC views its Leninist model of governance, 
        ``socialism with Chinese characteristics'', as superior to, and 
        at odds with, the constitutional models of the United States 
        and other democracies. This approach to governance is lauded by 
        the CCP as essential to securing the PRC's status as a global 
        leader, and to shaping the future of the world. In a 2013 
        speech, President Xi said, ``We firmly believe that as 
        socialism with Chinese characteristics develops further . . . 
        it is . . . inevitable that the superiority of our socialist 
        system will be increasingly apparent . . . [and] our country's 
        road of development will have increasingly greater influence on 
        the world.''.
            (7) The PRC's objectives are to first establish regional 
        hegemony over the Indo-Pacific and then to use that dominant 
        position to propel the PRC to become the ``leading world 
        power''. The PRC seeks to shape an international order that is 
        conducive to the interests of authoritarian and autocratic 
        regimes. Achieving these objectives requires turning the PRC 
        into a wealthy nation under strict CCP rule by using a strong 
        military and advanced technological capability to pursue the 
        PRC's objectives, regardless of other countries' interests.
            (8) The PRC is reshaping the current international order, 
        which was built upon free and open ideals and principles, by 
        conducting global information and influence operations, 
        redefining international laws and norms to align with the 
        objectives of the CCP, rejecting the legitimacy of 
        internationally recognized human rights, and securing 
        leadership positions in multinational organizations to alter 
        their agendas. In December 2018, President Xi suggested that 
        the CCP views its ``historic mission'' as not only to govern 
        China, but also to profoundly influence global governance to 
        benefit the CCP.
            (9) The PRC is encouraging other countries to follow its 
        model of ``socialism with Chinese characteristics''. During the 
        19th Party Congress in 2017, President Xi said that the PRC 
        could serve as a model of development for other countries by 
        utilizing ``Chinese wisdom'' and a ``Chinese approach to 
        solving problems''.
            (10) The PRC is promoting its governance model and 
        attempting to weaken other models of governance by--
                    (A) undermining democratic institutions;
                    (B) subverting financial institutions;
                    (C) coercing businesses to accommodate the policies 
                of the CCP; and
                    (D) using disinformation to disguise the nature of 
                the actions described in subparagraphs (A) through (C).
            (11) The PRC is getting close to its goal of becoming the 
        global leader in science and technology. In May 2018, President 
        Xi said that for the PRC to reach ``prosperity and 
        rejuvenation'', it needs to ``endeavor to be a major world 
        center for science and innovation''. The PRC has invested the 
        equivalent of billions of dollars into education and research 
        and development and established joint scientific research 
        centers and science universities. Scientists and scholars from 
        the PRC have made numerous contributions to a wide array of 
        fields, including through international partnerships.
            (12) The PRC's drive, however, to become a ``manufacturing 
        and technological superpower'' and to promote ``innovation with 
        Chinese characteristics'' is coming at the expense of human 
        rights, national security, and longstanding international rules 
        and norms about economic competition. In particular, the PRC 
        advances its illiberal political and social policies through 
        mass surveillance, social credit systems, and a significant 
        role of the state in internet governance. Through these means, 
        the PRC increases direct and indirect government control over 
        its citizens' everyday lives. Its national strategy of ``civil-
        military fusion'' mandates that civil and commercial research, 
        which increasingly drives global innovation, is leveraged to 
        develop new military capabilities.
            (13) The PRC is using legal and illegal means to achieve 
        its objective of becoming a manufacturing and technological 
        superpower. The PRC uses state-directed industrial policies in 
        anticompetitive ways to ensure the dominance of PRC companies. 
        The CCP engages in and encourages actions that actively 
        undermine a free and open international market, such as 
        intellectual property theft, forced technology transfers, 
        regulatory and financial subsidies, and mandatory CCP access to 
        proprietary data as part of business and commercial agreements 
        between Chinese and foreign companies.
            (14) The policies referred to in paragraph (13) freeze 
        United States and other foreign firms out of the PRC market, 
        while eroding competition in other important markets. The heavy 
        subsidization of Chinese companies includes potential violation 
        of its World Trade Organization commitments. In May 2018, 
        President Xi said that the PRC aims to keep the ``initiatives 
        of innovation and development security . . . in [China's] own 
        hands''.
            (15) The PRC advances its global objectives through a 
        variety of avenues, including its signature initiative, the 
        Belt and Road Initiative (referred to in this section as 
        ``BRI''), which is enshrined in the Chinese Constitution and 
        includes the Digital Silk Road and Health Silk Road. The PRC 
        describes BRI as a straightforward and wholly beneficial plan 
        for all countries. In practice, it seeks to advance an economic 
        system with the PRC at its center, making it the most concrete 
        geographical representation of the PRC's global ambitions. BRI 
        increases the economic influence of state-owned Chinese firms 
        in global markets, enhances the PRC's political leverage with 
        government leaders around the world, and provides greater 
        access to strategic nodes such as ports and railways. Through 
        BRI, the PRC seeks political deference through economic 
        dependence.
            (16) The PRC is executing a plan to establish regional 
        hegemony over the Indo-Pacific and displace the United States 
        from the region. As a Pacific power, the United States has 
        built and supported enduring alliances and economic 
        partnerships that secure peace and prosperity and promote the 
        rule of law and political pluralism in the Pacific. In 
        contrast, the PRC uses economic and military coercion in the 
        region to secure the interests of the CCP.
            (17) The PRC's military strategy seeks to keep the United 
        States military from operating in the Western Pacific and 
        erodes United States security guarantees.
            (18) The PRC is aggressively pursuing exclusive control of 
        critical land routes, sea lanes, and air space in the Indo-
        Pacific in the hopes of eventually exercising greater influence 
        beyond the region. This includes lanes crucial to commercial 
        activity, energy exploration, transport, and the exercise of 
        security operations in areas permitted under international law.
            (19) The PRC seeks unification with Taiwan through whatever 
        means may ultimately be required. The CCP's insistence that 
        ``reunification'' is Taiwan's only option makes this goal 
        inherently coercive. In January 2019, President Xi stated that 
        the PRC ``make[s] no promise to renounce the use of force and 
        reserve[s] the option of taking all necessary means''. Taiwan's 
        embodiment of democratic values and economic liberalism 
        challenges President Xi's goal of achieving national 
        rejuvenation. The PRC plans to exploit Taiwan's dominant 
        strategic position in the First Island Chain and to project 
        power into the Second Island Chain and beyond.
            (20) In the South China Sea, the PRC has executed an 
        illegal island-building campaign that interferes with freedom 
        of navigation, damages the environment, bolsters the PLA power 
        projection capabilities, and coerces and intimidates other 
        regional claimants in an effort to advance its unlawful claims 
        and control the waters around neighboring countries. Despite 
        President Xi's September 2015 speech, in which he said the PRC 
        was not militarizing the South China Sea, during the 2017 19th 
        Party Congress, President Xi announced that ``construction on 
        islands and reefs in the South China Sea have seen steady 
        progress''.
            (21) The PRC is rapidly modernizing the PLA to attain a 
        level of capacity and capability superior to the United States 
        in terms of equipment and conduct of modern military operations 
        by shifting its military doctrine from having a force 
        ``adequate [for] China's defensive needs'' to having a force 
        ``commensurate with China's international status''. Ultimately, 
        this transformation will enable China to impose its will in the 
        Indo-Pacific region through the threat of military force. In 
        2017, President Xi established the following developmental 
        benchmarks for the advancement of the PLA:
                    (A) A mechanized force with increased informatized 
                and strategic capabilities by 2020.
                    (B) The complete modernization of China's national 
                defense by 2035.
                    (C) The full transformation of the PLA into a 
                world-class force by 2050.
            (22) The PRC's strategy and supporting policies described 
        in this section undermine United States interests, such as--
                    (A) upholding a free and open international order;
                    (B) maintaining the integrity of international 
                institutions with liberal norms and values;
                    (C) preserving a favorable balance of power in the 
                Indo-Pacific;
                    (D) ensuring the defense of its allies;
                    (E) preserving open sea and air lanes;
                    (F) fostering the free flow of commerce through 
                open and transparent markets; and
                    (G) promoting individual freedom and human rights.
            (23) The global COVID-19 pandemic has intensified and 
        accelerated these trends in the PRC's behavior and therefore 
        increased the need for United States global leadership and a 
        competitive posture. The PRC has capitalized on the world's 
        focus on the COVID-19 pandemic by--
                    (A) moving rapidly to undermine Hong Kong's 
                autonomy, including imposing a so-called ``national 
                security law'' on Hong Kong;
                    (B) aggressively imposing its will in the East and 
                South China Seas;
                    (C) contributing to increased tensions with India; 
                and
                    (D) engaging in a widespread and government-
                directed disinformation campaign to obscure the PRC 
                Government's efforts to cover up the seriousness of 
                COVID-19, sow confusion about the origination of the 
                outbreak, and discredit the United States, its allies, 
                and global health efforts.
            (24) In response to the PRC's strategy and policies, the 
        United States must--
                    (A) adopt a strategy of managed strategic 
                competition with the PRC to protect our vital 
                interests; and
                    (B) seek opportunities to cooperate with the PRC 
                when such cooperation is in the United States' national 
                interests.

SEC. 102. STATEMENT OF POLICY.

    (a) Objectives.--It is the policy of the United States, in pursuing 
managed strategic competition with the PRC, to pursue the following 
objectives:
            (1) The United States' global leadership role is sustained 
        and its political system and major foundations of national 
        power are postured for long-term political, economic, 
        technological, and military competition with the PRC.
            (2) The balance of power in the Indo-Pacific remains 
        favorable to the United States and its allies. The United 
        States and its allies maintain unfettered access to the region 
        and the PRC neither dominates the region nor coerces its 
        neighbors.
            (3) The allies and partners of the United States--
                    (A) maintain confidence in United States leadership 
                and its commitment to the Indo-Pacific region;
                    (B) can withstand and combat subversion and undue 
                influence by the PRC; and
                    (C) align themselves with the United States in 
                setting global rules, norms, and standards.
            (4) The combined weight of the United States and its allies 
        and partners is strong enough to demonstrate to the PRC that 
        the risks of attempts to dominate other states outweigh the 
        potential benefits.
            (5) The United States leads the free and open international 
        order, which is comprised of resilient states and institutions 
        that uphold and defend principles, including sovereignty, rule 
        of law, individual freedom, and human rights. The international 
        order is strengthened to defeat attempts at destabilization by 
        illiberal and authoritarian actors.
            (6) The key rules, norms, and standards of international 
        engagement in the 21st century--
                    (A) protect human rights, commercial engagement and 
                investment, and technology; and
                    (B) are in alignment with the values and interests 
                of the United States, its allies and partners, and the 
                free world.
            (7) The CCP cannot and does not--
                    (A) subvert open and democratic societies;
                    (B) distort global markets;
                    (C) manipulate the international trade system;
                    (D) coerce other nations via economic and military 
                means; or
                    (E) use its technological advantages to undermine 
                individual freedoms or other states' national security 
                interests.
            (8) The United States deters military confrontation with 
        the PRC and both nations establish structured dialogue and 
        negotiation mechanisms to reduce the risk of conflict. The 
        United States has a mutually respectful relationship with the 
        PRC, and the American people maintain friendly relations with 
        the Chinese people.
    (b) Policy.--It is the policy of the United States, in pursuit of 
the objectives set forth in subsection (a)--
            (1) to strengthen the United States' domestic foundation by 
        reinvesting in market-based economic growth, education, 
        scientific and technological innovation, democratic 
        institutions, and other areas that improve the United States' 
        ability to pursue its vital economic, foreign policy, and 
        national security interests;
            (2) to pursue a strategy of managed strategic competition 
        with the PRC in the political, diplomatic, economic, 
        development, military, informational, and technological realms 
        that maximizes United States strengths and increases the costs 
        for the PRC of harming United States interests;
            (3) to lead a free, open, and secure international system 
        characterized by respect for sovereignty, rule of law, open 
        markets and the free flow of commerce, and a shared commitment 
        to security and peaceful resolution of disputes, human rights, 
        and transparent and citizen-centric governance;
            (4) to strengthen and deepen United States alliances and 
        partnerships, prioritizing the Indo-Pacific and Europe, by 
        pursuing greater bilateral and multilateral cooperative 
        initiatives that advance shared interests and bolster partner 
        countries' confidence that the United States is and will remain 
        a strong, committed, and constant partner;
            (5) to encourage and aid United States allies and partners 
        in boosting their own capabilities and resiliency to pursue, 
        defend, and protect shared interests and values, free from 
        coercion and external pressure;
            (6) to pursue fair, reciprocal treatment and healthy 
        competition in United States-China economic relations by--
                    (A) advancing policies that harden the United 
                States economy against unfair and illegal commercial or 
                trading practices and the coercion of United States 
                businesses; and
                    (B) tightening United States laws and regulations 
                as necessary to prevent the PRC's attempts to harm 
                United States economic competitiveness;
            (7) to demonstrate the value of private sector-led growth 
        in emerging markets around the world, including through the use 
        of United States Government tools that--
                    (A) support greater private sector investment and 
                advance capacity-building initiatives that are grounded 
                in the rule of law;
                    (B) promote open markets;
                    (C) establish clear policy and regulatory 
                frameworks;
                    (D) improve the management of key economic sectors;
                    (E) reduce corruption; and
                    (F) foster collaboration with partner countries and 
                the United States private sector to develop secure and 
                sustainable infrastructure;
            (8) to lead in the advancement of international rules and 
        norms that foster free and reciprocal trade and open and 
        integrated markets;
            (9) to conduct vigorous commercial diplomacy in support of 
        United States companies and businesses in partner countries 
        that seek fair competition;
            (10) to support greater private sector cooperation between 
        the United States and its partners;
            (11) to ensure that the United States leads in the 
        innovation of critical and emerging technologies, such as next-
        generation telecommunications, artificial intelligence, quantum 
        computing, semiconductors, and biotechnology, by--
                    (A) providing concrete incentives for the private 
                sector to accelerate development of such technologies;
                    (B) improving contracting processes to enable the 
                United States Government--
                            (i) to allocate capital and work with 
                        start-up companies more efficiently; and
                            (ii) to increase investment in experimental 
                        technologies;
                    (C) modernizing export controls and investment 
                restrictions to place a ``high fence around a small 
                yard'' of critical technologies;
                    (D) enhancing United States leadership in technical 
                standards-setting bodies and avenues for developing 
                norms regarding the use of emerging critical 
                technologies;
                    (E) reducing United States barriers and increasing 
                incentives for collaboration with allies and partners 
                on the research and codevelopment of critical 
                technologies;
                    (F) collaborating with allies and partners to 
                protect critical technologies by--
                            (i) crafting multilateral export control 
                        measures;
                            (ii) building capacity for defense 
                        technology security;
                            (iii) safeguarding chokepoints in the 
                        supply chains; and
                            (iv) ensuring diversification; and
                    (G) designing major defense capabilities for export 
                to allies and partners;
            (12) to enable the people of the United States, including 
        the private sector, civil society, universities and other 
        academic institutions, State and local legislators, and other 
        relevant actors to identify and remain vigilant to the risks 
        posed by undue influence of the CCP in the United States;
            (13) to enact legislation, regulations, and other measures 
        to mitigate the risks referred to in paragraph (12), while 
        still preserving opportunities for economic engagement, 
        academic research, and cooperation in other areas where the 
        United States and the PRC share interests;
            (14) to collaborate with advanced democracies and other 
        willing partners to promote ideals and principles that--
                    (A) advance a free and open order;
                    (B) strengthen democratic institutions;
                    (C) protect and promote human rights; and
                    (D) uphold a free press and fact-based reporting;
            (15) to demonstrate effective leadership at the United 
        Nations, its associated agencies, and other multilateral 
        organizations and defend the integrity of these organizations 
        against co-optation by illiberal and authoritarian nations;
            (16) to prioritize the defense of fundamental freedoms and 
        human rights in the United States' relationship with the PRC;
            (17) to cooperate with allies, partners, and multilateral 
        organizations to hold the Government of the PRC accountable 
        for--
                    (A) violations and abuses of human rights;
                    (B) restrictions on religious practices;
                    (C) abrogation of treaties and other international 
                agreements related to human rights; and
                    (D) other affronts to the freedom and individual 
                liberty of the citizens of the PRC;
            (18) to expose the PRC's use of corruption, repression, 
        coercion, and other malign behavior to attain unfair economic 
        advantage and deference of other nations to its political and 
        strategic objectives;
            (19) to maintain United States access to the Western 
        Pacific, including by--
                    (A) increasing or regaining the qualitative 
                advantage of United States forward-deployed forces in 
                the Indo-Pacific region;
                    (B) modernizing the United States military through 
                investments in existing and new major platforms, 
                emerging technologies, critical in-theater force 
                structure and enabling capabilities, joint operational 
                concepts, and access agreements; and
                    (C) operating and conducting exercises with allies 
                and partners--
                            (i) to mitigate the PLA's ability to 
                        project power and establish contested zones 
                        within the First and Second Island Chains;
                            (ii) to diminish the ability of the PLA to 
                        coerce its neighbors;
                            (iii) to maintain open sea and air lanes, 
                        particularly in the Taiwan Strait, the East 
                        China Sea, and the South China Sea; and
                            (iv) to project power from the United 
                        States and its allies and partners to 
                        demonstrate the ability to conduct contested 
                        logistics;
            (20) to deter the PRC from--
                    (A) coercing Indo-Pacific nations, including by 
                developing more combat-credible forces that are 
                integrated with allies and partners in contact, blunt, 
                and surge layers and able to defeat any PRC theory of 
                victory in the First or Second Island Chains of the 
                Western Pacific and beyond, as called for in the 2018 
                National Defense Strategy;
                    (B) using gray-zone tactics below the level of 
                armed conflict; or
                    (C) initiating armed conflict;
            (21) to strengthen United States-PRC military-to-military 
        communication and improve de-escalation procedures to 
        deconflict operations and reduce the risk of unwanted conflict; 
        and
            (22) to cooperate with the PRC if interests align, conduct 
        persistent and determined diplomacy that clarifies United 
        States interests and values to Chinese officials, and pursue 
        confidence-building measures in areas particularly susceptible 
        to escalation.

SEC. 103. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

    It is the sense of Congress that the execution of the policy 
described in section 102(b) requires the following actions:
            (1) Managed strategic competition with the PRC will require 
        the United States--
                    (A) to marshal sustained political will to protect 
                its vital interests and advance its economic and 
                national security objectives for decades to come; and
                    (B) to achieve this sustained political will, 
                persuade the American people and United States allies 
                and partners of--
                            (i) the challenges posed by the PRC; and
                            (ii) the need for long-term competition to 
                        defend shared interests and values.
            (2) The United States must--
                    (A) coordinate closely with allies and partners to 
                compete effectively with the PRC;
                    (B) cooperate with the PRC where our interests 
                align; and
                    (C) pursue its interests, while still accounting 
                for partner country viewpoints on how to best approach 
                the challenges posed by the PRC.
            (3) At the same time, other countries must step up to 
        assume greater roles in balancing and checking the aggressive 
        and assertive behavior of the PRC than the roles they have 
        assumed in the past.
            (4) The President of the United States must lead and direct 
        the entire executive branch to make the People's Republic of 
        China the top priority in United States foreign policy. At 
        present, the United States identifies it as such in the 2017 
        National Security Strategy and the 2018 National Defense 
        Strategy, but must further increase the prioritization of 
        managed strategic competition with the PRC and broader United 
        States interests in the Indo-Pacific region in the conduct of 
        foreign policy to implement the strategic imperatives outlined 
        in those documents.
            (5) The President should ensure that any senior official in 
        the Executive Office of the President appointed to coordinate 
        the United States' strategy of managed strategic competition 
        with the PRC across the entire United States Government has the 
        authority and resources to do so.
            (6) The head of every Federal department and agency should 
        designate a senior official at the level of Under Secretary or 
        above to coordinate the department's or agency's policies with 
        respect to managed strategic competition with the PRC.
            (7) The ability of the United States to execute a strategy 
        of managed strategic competition with the PRC will be 
        undermined if our attention is repeatedly diverted to 
        challenges that are not vital to United States economic and 
        national security interests.
            (8) In the coming decades, the United States must prevent 
        the PRC from--
                    (A) establishing regional hegemony in the Indo-
                Pacific; and
                    (B) using that position to advance its assertive 
                political, economic, and foreign policy goals around 
                the world.
            (9) The United States must ensure that the Federal budget 
        is properly aligned with the strategic imperative to compete 
        with the PRC by--
                    (A) authorizing sufficient levels of funding to 
                resource all instruments of United States national 
                power; and
                    (B) coherently prioritizing how such funds are 
                used.
            (10) Sustained prioritization of the challenge posed by the 
        PRC requires--
                    (A) bipartisan cooperation within Congress; and
                    (B) frequent, sustained, and meaningful 
                collaboration and consultation between the executive 
                and legislative branches.
            (11) The United States must ensure close integration among 
        economic and foreign policymakers, the private sector, civil 
        society, universities and academic institutions, and other 
        relevant actors in free and open societies affected by the 
        challenges posed by the PRC to enable such actors--
                    (A) to collaborate to advance common interests; and
                    (B) to identify appropriate policies--
                            (i) to strengthen the United States and its 
                        allies;
                            (ii) to promote a compelling vision of a 
                        free and open order; and
                            (iii) to push back against detrimental 
                        policies pursued by the CCP.
            (12) The United States must ensure that all Federal 
        departments and agencies are organized to reflect the fact that 
        competing with the PRC is the United States' top foreign policy 
        priority, including through the assigned missions and location 
        of United States Government personnel, by--
                    (A) dedicating more personnel in the Indo-Pacific 
                region, at posts around the world, and in Washington 
                D.C., with priorities directly relevant to advancing 
                competition with the People's Republic of China;
                    (B) placing greater numbers of foreign service 
                officers, international development professionals, 
                members of the foreign commercial service, intelligence 
                professionals, and other United States Government 
                personnel in the Indo-Pacific region; and
                    (C) ensuring that this workforce, both civilian and 
                military, has the training in language, technical 
                skills, and other competencies required to advance a 
                successful competitive strategy with the PRC.
            (13) The United States must place renewed emphasis on 
        strengthening the nonmilitary instruments of national power, 
        including diplomacy, information, technology, economics, 
        foreign assistance and development finance, commerce, 
        intelligence, and law enforcement, which are crucial for 
        addressing the unique economic, political, and ideological 
        challenges posed by the PRC.
            (14) The United States should--
                    (A) sustain resourcing for the Pacific Deterrence 
                Initiative, as aligned with the overarching political 
                and diplomatic objectives articulated in the Asia 
                Reassurance Initiative Act (Public Law 115-409); and
                    (B) ensure prioritization of the military 
                investments necessary to achieve United States 
                political objectives in the Indo-Pacific, including--
                            (i) promoting regional security in the 
                        Indo-Pacific;
                            (ii) reassuring allies and partners while 
                        protecting them from coercion; and
                            (iii) deterring conflict with the PRC.
            (15) Competition with the PRC requires the United States' 
        skillful adaptation to the information environment of the 21st 
        century. United States public diplomacy and messaging efforts 
        must effectively--
                    (A) promote the value of partnership with the 
                United States;
                    (B) highlight the risks and costs of enmeshment 
                with the PRC; and
                    (C) counter CCP propaganda and disinformation.

  TITLE II--PROTECTING THE UNITED STATES FROM CHINA'S DISCRIMINATORY 
                           ECONOMIC PRACTICES

SEC. 201. FINDINGS AND SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING THE PRC'S INDUSTRIAL 
              POLICY.

    (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) The People's Republic of China, at the direction of the 
        Chinese Communist Party, is advancing an ecosystem of 
        anticompetitive economic and industrial policies that--
                    (A) distort global markets;
                    (B) limit innovation;
                    (C) unfairly advantage PRC firms at the expense of 
                the United States and other foreign firms;
                    (D) unfairly and harmfully prejudice consumer 
                choice; and
                    (E) do not align with the ethical uses and 
                development of technologies embraced by democratic 
                nations.
            (2) Of the extensive and systemic economic and industrial 
        policies pursued by the PRC, the mass subsidization of Chinese 
        firms, intellectual property theft, and forced technology 
        transfer are among the most damaging to the global economy.
            (3) Through regulatory interventions and direct financial 
        subsidies, the CCP, for the purposes of advancing national 
        political and economic objectives, directs, coerces, and 
        influences in anti-competitive ways the commercial activities 
        of firms that are directed, financed, influenced, or otherwise 
        controlled by the state, including state-owned enterprises, and 
        ostensibly independent and private Chinese companies, such as 
        technology firms in strategic sectors.
            (4) The PRC Government, at the national and subnational 
        levels, grants special privileges or status to certain PRC 
        firms in key sectors designated as strategic, such as 
        telecommunications, oil, power, aviation, banking, and 
        semiconductors. Enterprises receive special state preferences 
        in the form of favorable loans, tax exemptions, and 
        preferential land access from the CCP.
            (5) The subsidization of PRC companies, as described in 
        paragraphs (3) and (4)--
                    (A) enables these companies to sell goods below 
                market prices, allowing them to outbid and crowd out 
                market-based competitors and thereby pursue global 
                dominance of key sectors;
                    (B) distorts the global market economy by 
                undermining longstanding and generally accepted market-
                based principles of fair competition, leading to 
                barriers to entry and forced exit from the market for 
                foreign or private firms, not only in the PRC, but in 
                markets around the world;
                    (C) creates government-sponsored or supported de 
                facto monopolies, cartels, and other anti-market 
                arrangements in key sectors, limiting or removing 
                opportunities for other firms; and
                    (D) leads to, as a result of the issues described 
                in paragraphs (A) through (C), declines in profits and 
                revenue needed by foreign and private firms for 
                research and development.
            (6) The CCP incentivizes and empowers Chinese actors to 
        steal critical technologies and trade secrets from private and 
        foreign competitors operating in the PRC and around the world, 
        particularly in areas that the CCP has identified as critical 
        to advancing PRC objectives. The PRC, as directed by the CCP, 
        also continues to implement anti-competitive regulations, 
        policies, and practices that coerce the handover of technology 
        and other propriety or sensitive data from foreign enterprises 
        to domestic firms in exchange for access to the PRC market.
            (7) Companies in the United States and in foreign countries 
        compete with state-subsidized PRC companies that enjoy the 
        protection and power of the state in third country markets 
        around the world. The advantages granted to PRC firms, combined 
        with significant restrictions to accessing the PRC market 
        itself, severely hamper the ability of United States and 
        foreign firms to compete, innovate, and pursue the provision of 
        best value to customers. The result is an unbalanced playing 
        field. Such an unsustainable course, if not checked, will over 
        time lead to depressed competition around the world, reduced 
        opportunity, and harm to both producers and consumers.
            (8) As stated in the United States Trade Representative's 
        investigation of the PRC's trade practices under section 301 of 
        the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2411), conducted in March 
        2018, ``When U.S. companies are deprived of fair returns on 
        their investment in IP, they are unable to achieve the growth 
        necessary to reinvest in innovation. In this sense, China's 
        technology transfer regime directly burdens the innovation 
        ecosystem that is an engine of economic growth in the United 
        States and similarly-situated economies.''.
            (9) In addition to forced technology described in this 
        subsection, the United States Trade Representative's 
        investigation of the PRC under section 301 of the Trade Act of 
        1974 (19 U.S.C. 2411) also identified requirements that foreign 
        firms license products at less than market value, government-
        directed and government-subsidized acquisition of sensitive 
        technology for strategic purposes, and cyber theft as other key 
        PRC technology and industrial policies that are unreasonable 
        and discriminatory. These policies place at risk United States 
        intellectual property rights, innovation and technological 
        development, and jobs in dozens of industries.
            (10) Other elements of the PRC's ecosystem of industrial 
        policies that harm innovation and distort global markets 
        include--
                    (A) advancement of policies that encourage local 
                production over imports;
                    (B) continuation of policies that favor unique 
                technical standards in use by Chinese firms rather than 
                globally accepted standards, which often force foreign 
                firms to alter their products and manufacturing chains 
                to compete;
                    (C) requirements that foreign companies disclose 
                proprietary information to qualify for the adoption of 
                their standards for use in the PRC domestic market; and
                    (D) maintenance of closed procurement processes, 
                which limit participation by foreign firms, including 
                by setting terms that require such firms to use 
                domestic suppliers, transfer know-how to firms in the 
                PRC, and disclose proprietary information.
            (11) The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and associated 
        industry-specific efforts under this initiative, such as the 
        Digital Silk Road, are key vectors to advance the PRC's 
        mercantilist policies and practices globally. The resulting 
        challenges do not only affect United States firms. As the 
        European Chamber of Commerce reported in a January 2020 report, 
        the combination of concessional lending to Chinese state-owned 
        enterprises, nontransparent procurement and bidding processes, 
        closed digital standards, and other factors severely limit 
        European and other participation in BRI and make ``competition 
        [with Chinese companies] in third-country markets extremely 
        challenging''. This underscores a key objective of BRI, which 
        is to ensure the reliance of infrastructure, digital 
        technologies, and other important goods on PRC supply chains 
        and technical standards.
    (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the challenges presented by a nonmarket economy like 
        the PRC's economy, which has captured such a large share of 
        global economic exchange, are in many ways unprecedented and 
        require sufficiently elevated and sustained long-term focus and 
        engagement;
            (2) while the Economic and Trade Agreement Between the 
        Government of the United States and the Government of the 
        People's Republic of China, done at Washington January 15, 
        2020, makes initial progress in several areas, including 
        intellectual property and trade secret protection, significant 
        further steps are still required to address some of the more 
        difficult economic and industrial policies issues in the PRC, 
        which affect the United States and other nations;
            (3) in order to truly address the most detrimental aspects 
        of CCP-directed mercantilist economic strategy, the United 
        States must adopt policies that--
                    (A) expose the full scope and scale of intellectual 
                property theft and mass subsidization of Chinese firms, 
                and the resulting harm to the United States, foreign 
                markets, and the global economy;
                    (B) ensure that PRC companies face costs and 
                consequences for anticompetitive behavior;
                    (C) provide options for affected United States 
                persons to address and respond to unreasonable and 
                discriminatory CCP-directed industrial policies; and
                    (D) strengthen the protection of critical 
                technology and sensitive data, while still fostering an 
                environment that provides incentives for innovation and 
                competition;
            (4) the United States must work with its allies and 
        partners through the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
        Development (OECD), the World Trade Organization, and other 
        venues and fora--
                    (A) to reinforce long-standing generally accepted 
                principles of fair competition and market behavior and 
                address the PRC's anticompetitive economic and 
                industrial polices that undermine decades of global 
                growth and innovation;
                    (B) to ensure that the PRC is not granted the same 
                treatment as that of a free-market economy until it 
                ceases the implementation of laws, regulations, 
                policies, and practices that provide unfair advantage 
                to PRC firms in furtherance of national objectives and 
                impose unreasonable, discriminatory, and illegal 
                burdens on market-based international commerce; and
                    (C) to align policies with respect to curbing 
                state-directed subsidization of the private sector, 
                such as advocating for global rules related to 
                transparency and adherence to notification 
                requirements, including through the efforts currently 
                being advanced by the United States, Japan, and the 
                European Union; and
            (5) the United States and its allies and partners must 
        collaborate to provide incentives to their respective companies 
        to cooperate in areas such as--
                    (A) advocating for protection of intellectual 
                property rights in markets around the world;
                    (B) fostering open technical standards; and
                    (C) increasing joint investments in overseas 
                markets.

SEC. 202. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY VIOLATORS LIST.

    (a) In General.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, and not less frequently than annually 
thereafter, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary 
of Commerce, the United States Trade Representative, and the Director 
of National Intelligence, shall create a list (referred to in this 
section as the ``intellectual property violators list''), which 
identifies all centrally administered, state-owned enterprises that 
have benefitted from--
            (1) a significant act or series of acts of intellectual 
        property theft that subjected a United States economic sector 
        or particular company incorporated in the United States to 
        harm; or
            (2) an act or government policy of involuntary or coerced 
        technology transfer of intellectual property ultimately owned 
        by a company incorporated in the United States.
    (b) Rules for Identification.--To determine whether there is a 
credible basis for determining that a company should be included on the 
intellectual property violators list, the Secretary of State, in 
coordination with the Secretary of Commerce, the United States Trade 
Representative, and the Director of National Intelligence, shall 
consider--
            (1) any finding by a United States court that the company 
        has violated relevant United States laws intended to protect 
        intellectual property rights;
            (2) a decision by the President to impose sanctions 
        authorized under section 204(e); or
            (3) substantial and credible information received from any 
        entity described in subsection (c) or other interested persons.
    (c) Consultation.--In carrying out this section, the Secretary of 
State, in coordination with the Secretary of Commerce, the United 
States Trade Representative, and the Director of National Intelligence, 
may consult, as necessary and appropriate, with--
            (1) other Federal agencies, including independent agencies;
            (2) the private sector; and
            (3) civil society organizations with relevant expertise.
    (d) Report.--
            (1) In general.--The Secretary of State shall publish, in 
        the Federal Register, an annual report that--
                    (A) lists the companies engaged in the activities 
                described in subsection (a)(1); and
                    (B) describes the circumstances surrounding actions 
                described in subsection (a)(2), including any role of 
                the Government of the PRC; and
                    (C) assesses, to the extent practicable, the 
                economic advantage derived by the companies engaged in 
                the activities described in subsection (a)(1).
            (2) Form.--The report published under paragraph (1) shall 
        be unclassified, but may include a classified annex.
    (e) Declassification and Release.--The Director of National 
Intelligence may authorize the declassification of information, as 
appropriate, to inform the contents of the report published pursuant to 
subsection (d).
    (f) Requirement To Protect Business-Confidential Information.--
            (1) In general.--The Secretary of State and the heads of 
        all other Federal agencies involved in the production of the 
        intellectual property violators list shall protect from 
        disclosure any proprietary information submitted by a private 
        sector participant and marked as business-confidential 
        information, unless the party submitting the confidential 
        business information--
                    (A) had notice, at the time of submission, that 
                such information would be released by the Secretary; or
                    (B) subsequently consents to the release of such 
                information.
            (2) Nonconfidential version of report.--If confidential 
        business information is provided by a private sector 
        participant, a nonconfidential version of the report under 
        subsection (d) shall be published in the Federal Register that 
        summarizes or deletes, if necessary, the confidential business 
        information.
            (3) Treatment as trade secrets.--Proprietary information 
        submitted by a private party under this section--
                    (A) shall be considered to be trade secrets and 
                commercial or financial information (as defined under 
                section 552(b)(4) of title 5, United States Code); and
                    (B) shall be exempt from disclosure without the 
                express approval of the private party.

SEC. 203. GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA SUBSIDIES LIST.

    (a) Report.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment 
of this Act, and annually thereafter, the Secretary of State, in 
coordination with the United States Trade Representative and the 
Secretary of Commerce, shall publish an unclassified report in the 
Federal Register that comprehensively identifies and measures--
            (1) subsidies provided by the Government of the PRC to 
        enterprises in the PRC in contravention of agreed trade and 
        other rules; and
            (2) discriminatory treatment favoring enterprises in the 
        PRC over foreign market participants.
    (b) Subsidies Described.--In compiling the report under subsection 
(a), the Secretary of State shall consider--
            (1) regulatory and other policies enacted or promoted by 
        the Government of the PRC that--
                    (A) discriminate in favor of enterprises in the PRC 
                at the expense of foreign market participants;
                    (B) shield centrally administered, state-owned 
                enterprises from competition; or
                    (C) otherwise suppress market-based competition;
            (2) financial subsidies, including favorable lending terms, 
        from or promoted by the Government of the PRC or centrally 
        administered, state-owned enterprises that materially benefit 
        PRC enterprises over foreign market participants in 
        contravention of generally accepted market principles; and
            (3) any subsidy that violates the agreement referred to in 
        section 101(d)(12) of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (19 
        U.S.C. 3511(d)(12)) (commonly known as the World Trade 
        Organization's Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
        Measures).
    (c) Consultation.--The Secretary of State, in coordination with the 
Secretary of Commerce and the United States Trade Representative, may, 
as necessary and appropriate, consult with--
            (1) other Federal agencies, including independent agencies;
            (2) the private sector; and
            (3) civil society organizations with relevant expertise.

SEC. 204. REVIEW OF PETITIONS RELATED TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY THEFT 
              AND FORCED TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER.

    (a) Definitions.--In this section:
            (1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
        ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
                    (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
                Senate;
                    (B) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban 
                Affairs of the Senate;
                    (C) the Committee on Commerce, Science, and 
                Transportation of the Senate;
                    (D) the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate;
                    (E) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House 
                of Representatives;
                    (F) the Committee on Financial Services of the 
                House of Representatives;
                    (G) the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the 
                House of Representatives; and
                    (H) the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of 
                Representatives.
            (2) Committee.--The term ``Committee'' means the committee 
        established or designated under subsection (b).
            (3) Foreign person.--The term ``foreign person'' means a 
        person that is not a United States person.
            (4) Intellectual property.--The term ``intellectual 
        property'' means--
                    (A) any work protected by a copyright under title 
                17, United States Code;
                    (B) any property protected by a patent granted by 
                the United States Patent and Trademark Office under 
                title 35, United States Code;
                    (C) any word, name, symbol, or device, or any 
                combination thereof, that is registered as a trademark 
                with the United States Patent and Trademark Office 
                under the Act entitled ``An Act to provide for the 
                registration and protection of trademarks used in 
                commerce, to carry out the provisions of certain 
                international conventions, and for other purposes'', 
                approved July 5, 1946 (commonly known as the ``Lanham 
                Act'' or the ``Trademark Act of 1946'') (15 U.S.C. 1051 
                et seq.);
                    (D) a trade secret (as defined in section 1839 of 
                title 18, United States Code); or
                    (E) any other form of intellectual property.
            (5) United states person.--The term ``United States 
        person'' means--
                    (A) a United States citizen or an alien lawfully 
                admitted for permanent residence to the United States; 
                or
                    (B) an entity organized under the laws of the 
                United States or any jurisdiction within the United 
                States, including a foreign branch of such an entity.
    (b) Establishment of a Committee.--
            (1) In general.--The President shall--
                    (A) establish a multi-agency committee to carry out 
                this section; or
                    (B) designate an existing multi-agency committee 
                within the executive branch to carry out this section 
                if the President determines that the existing committee 
                has the relevant expertise and personnel to carry out 
                this section.
            (2) Membership.--The Committee shall be comprised of the 
        following officials (or, subject to paragraph (3), a designee 
        of any such official):
                    (A) The Secretary of the Treasury.
                    (B) The Secretary of Commerce.
                    (C) The Secretary of State.
                    (D) The Attorney General.
                    (E) The Director of National Intelligence.
                    (F) The heads of such other agencies as the 
                President determines appropriate, generally or on a 
                case-by-case basis.
            (3) Designee.--An official specified in paragraph (2) may 
        select a designee to serve on the Committee from among 
        individuals serving in positions appointed by the President by 
        and with the advice and consent of the Senate.
            (4) Chair and vice chair.--The President shall appoint a 
        chairperson and a vice chairperson of the Committee from among 
        the members of the Committee.
    (c) Submission of Petitions.--
            (1) In general.--A United States person described in 
        paragraph (3) may submit a petition to the Committee requesting 
        that the Committee--
                    (A) review, under subsection (d), a significant act 
                or series of acts described in paragraph (2) committed 
                by a foreign person; and
                    (B) refer the matter to the President with a 
                recommendation to impose sanctions under subsection (e) 
                to address any threat to the national security of the 
                United States posed by the significant act or series of 
                acts.
            (2) Significant act or series of acts described.--A 
        significant act or series of acts described in this paragraph 
        is a significant act or series of acts of--
                    (A) theft of intellectual property of a United 
                States person; or
                    (B) forced transfer of technology that is the 
                intellectual property of a United States person.
            (3) United states person described.--A United States person 
        is described in this paragraph if--
                    (A) a court of competent jurisdiction in the United 
                States has rendered a final judgment in favor of the 
                United States person that--
                            (i) the foreign person identified in the 
                        petition submitted under paragraph (1) 
                        committed the significant act or series of acts 
                        identified in the petition;
                            (ii) the United States person is the owner 
                        of the intellectual property identified in the 
                        petition; and
                            (iii) the foreign person is using that 
                        intellectual property without the permission of 
                        the United States person; and
                    (B) the United States person can provide clear and 
                convincing evidence to the Committee that the value of 
                the economic loss to the United States person resulting 
                from the significant act or series of acts exceeds 
                $10,000,000.
    (d) Review and Action by the Committee.--
            (1) Review.--Upon receiving a petition under subsection 
        (c), the Committee shall conduct a review of the petition in 
        order to determine whether the imposition of sanctions under 
        subsection (e) is necessary and appropriate to address any 
        threat to the national security of the United States posed by 
        the significant act or series of acts identified in the 
        petition.
            (2) Action.--After conducting a review under paragraph (1) 
        of a petition submitted under subsection (c), the Committee may 
        take no action, dismiss the petition, or refer the petition to 
        the President with a recommendation with respect to whether to 
        impose sanctions under subsection (e).
    (e) Imposition of Sanctions.--
            (1) In general.--The President may impose the sanctions 
        described in paragraph (3) with respect to a foreign person 
        identified in a petition submitted under subsection (c) if the 
        President determines that imposing such sanctions is necessary 
        and appropriate to address any threat to the national security 
        of the United States posed by the significant act or series of 
        acts identified in the petition.
            (2) Notice to congress.--Not later than 30 days after the 
        Committee refers a petition to the President with a 
        recommendation under subsection (d)(2), the President shall 
        submit to the appropriate congressional committees a notice of 
        the determination of the President under paragraph (1) with 
        respect to whether or not to impose sanctions described in 
        paragraph (3) with respect to each foreign person identified in 
        the petition. Each notice required under this paragraph shall 
        be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified 
        annex.
            (3) Sanctions described.--The sanctions that may be imposed 
        under paragraph (1) with respect to a foreign person identified 
        in a petition submitted under subsection (c) are the following:
                    (A) Export sanction.--The President may order the 
                United States Government not to issue any specific 
                license and not to grant any other specific permission 
                or authority to export any goods or technology to the 
                person under--
                            (i) the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 
                        (50 U.S.C. 4801 et seq.);
                            (ii) the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 
                        2751 et seq.);
                            (iii) the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 
                        U.S.C. 2011 et seq.); or
                            (iv) any other statute that requires the 
                        prior review and approval of the United States 
                        Government as a condition for the export or 
                        reexport of goods or services.
                    (B) Loans from united states financial 
                institutions.--The President may prohibit any United 
                States financial institution from making loans or 
                providing credits to the person totaling more than 
                $10,000,000 in any 12-month period unless the person is 
                engaged in activities to relieve human suffering and 
                the loans or credits are provided for such activities.
                    (C) Loans from international financial 
                institutions.--The President may direct the United 
                States executive director to each international 
                financial institution to use the voice and vote of the 
                United States to oppose any loan from the international 
                financial institution that would benefit the person.
                    (D) Prohibitions on financial institutions.--The 
                following prohibitions may be imposed against the 
                person if the person is a financial institution:
                            (i) Prohibition on designation as primary 
                        dealer.--Neither the Board of Governors of the 
                        Federal Reserve System nor the Federal Reserve 
                        Bank of New York may designate, or permit the 
                        continuation of any prior designation of, the 
                        financial institution as a primary dealer in 
                        United States Government debt instruments.
                            (ii) Prohibition on service as a repository 
                        of government funds.--The financial institution 
                        may not serve as agent of the United States 
                        Government or serve as repository for United 
                        States Government funds.
                    (E) Procurement sanction.--The President may 
                prohibit the United States Government from procuring, 
                or entering into any contract for the procurement of, 
                any goods or services from the person.
                    (F) Foreign exchange.--The President may, pursuant 
                to such regulations as the President may prescribe, 
                prohibit any transactions in foreign exchange that are 
                subject to the jurisdiction of the United States and in 
                which the person has any interest.
                    (G) Banking transactions.--The President may, 
                pursuant to such regulations as the President may 
                prescribe, prohibit any transfers of credit or payments 
                between financial institutions or by, through, or to 
                any financial institution, to the extent that such 
                transfers or payments are subject to the jurisdiction 
                of the United States and involve any interest of the 
                person.
                    (H) Property transactions.--The President may, 
                pursuant to such regulations as the President may 
                prescribe, prohibit any person from--
                            (i) acquiring, holding, withholding, using, 
                        transferring, withdrawing, transporting, 
                        importing, or exporting any property that is 
                        subject to the jurisdiction of the United 
                        States and with respect to which the person 
                        identified in the petition has any interest;
                            (ii) dealing in or exercising any right, 
                        power, or privilege with respect to such 
                        property; or
                            (iii) conducting any transaction involving 
                        such property.
                    (I) Ban on investment in equity or debt of 
                sanctioned person.--The President may, pursuant to such 
                regulations or guidelines as the President may 
                prescribe, prohibit any United States person from 
                investing in or purchasing significant amounts of 
                equity or debt instruments of the person.
                    (J) Exclusion of corporate officers.--The President 
                may direct the Secretary of State to deny a visa to, 
                and the Secretary of Homeland Security to exclude from 
                the United States, any alien that the President 
                determines is a corporate officer or principal of, or a 
                shareholder with a controlling interest in, the person.
                    (K) Sanctions on principal executive officers.--The 
                President may impose on the principal executive officer 
                or officers of the person, or on individuals performing 
                similar functions and with similar authorities as such 
                officer or officers, any of the sanctions described in 
                this paragraph.
    (f) Implementation; Penalties.--
            (1) Implementation.--The President may exercise all 
        authorities provided to the President under sections 203 and 
        205 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 
        U.S.C. 1702 and 1704) to carry out this section.
            (2) Penalties.--A person that violates, attempts to 
        violate, conspires to violate, or causes a violation of this 
        section or any regulation, license, or order issued to carry 
        out this section shall be subject to the penalties set forth in 
        subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 of the International 
        Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) to the same 
        extent as a person that commits an unlawful act described in 
        subsection (a) of that section.
    (g) Confidentiality of Information.--
            (1) In general.--The Committee shall protect from 
        disclosure any proprietary information submitted by a United 
        States person and marked as business confidential information, 
        unless the person submitting the information--
                    (A) had notice, at the time of submission, that the 
                information would be released by the Committee; or
                    (B) subsequently consents to the release of the 
                information.
            (2) Treatment as trade secrets.--Proprietary information 
        submitted by a United States person under this section shall 
        be--
                    (A) considered to be trade secrets and commercial 
                or financial information (as defined under section 
                552(b)(4) of title 5, United States Code);
                    (B) exempt from disclosure without the express 
                approval of the person.
    (h) Rulemaking.--The President may prescribe such licenses, orders, 
and regulations as are necessary to carry out this section, including 
with respect to the process by which United States persons may submit 
petitions under subsection (c).

SEC. 205. PREDATORY PRICING BY ENTITIES OWNED, CONTROLLED, OR DIRECTED 
              BY A FOREIGN STATE.

    (a) Prohibited Acts.--
            (1) In general.--It is contrary to public policy, illegal, 
        and void for a combination, conspiracy, trust, agreement, or 
        contract executed by an entity owned, controlled, or directed 
        by a foreign state or an agent or instrumentality of a foreign 
        state (as defined in section 1603 of title 28, United States 
        Code) and participating in international commerce to engage in 
        acts to establish or set prices below the average variable cost 
        in a manner that may foreseeably eliminate market competitors.
            (2) Economic support.--In determining the average variable 
        cost under paragraph (1), the court may take into account the 
        effects of economic support provided by the owning or 
        controlling foreign state to the entity on a discriminatory 
        basis that may allow the entity to unfairly price at or below 
        marginal cost.
            (3) Government subsidies.--In determining the 
        foreseeability of the elimination of market competitors under 
        paragraph (1), the court may take into account the aggravating 
        factor of the actions of the foreign state owning or 
        controlling the entity referred to in such paragraph to use 
        government resources to subsidize or underwrite the losses of 
        the entity in a manner that allows the entity to sustain the 
        predatory period and recoup its losses.
    (b) Recovery of Damages by Claimant for Violations of This 
Section.--Any person (as defined in section 1(a) of the Clayton Act (15 
U.S.C. 12(a))) whose business or property is injured as a result of the 
actions of an entity described in subsection (a) shall be entitled to 
recovery from the defendant for damages and other related costs under 
section 4 of such Act (15 U.S.C. 15).
    (c) Elements of Prima Facie Case.--A plaintiff may initiate a claim 
against a defendant in an appropriate Federal court for a violation of 
subsection (a) in order to recover damages under subsection (b) by--
            (1) establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that 
        the defendant--
                    (A) is a foreign state or an agency or 
                instrumentality of a foreign state (as defined in 
                section 1603 of title 28, United States Code); and
                    (B) is not immune from the jurisdiction of the 
                Federal court pursuant to section 1605(a)(2) of title 
                28, United States Code; and
            (2) setting forth sufficient evidence to establish a 
        reasonable inference that the defendant has violated subsection 
        (a).
    (d) Court Determination Leading to Evidentiary Burden Shifting to 
Defendant.--If a Federal court finds that a plaintiff has met its 
burden of proof under subsection (c), the court may determine that--
            (1) the plaintiff has established a prima facie case that 
        the conduct of the defendant is in violation of subsection (a); 
        and
            (2) the defendant has the burden of rebutting such case by 
        establishing that the defendant is not in violation of 
        subsection (a).
    (e) Filing of Amicus Briefs by the Department of State Regarding 
International Comity.--
            (1) In general.--For the purposes of considering questions 
        of international comity with respect to making decisions 
        regarding commercial activity and the scope of applicable 
        sovereign immunity, the Federal court may receive and consider 
        relevant amicus briefs filed by the Secretary of State.
            (2) Savings provision.--Nothing in paragraph (1) may be 
        construed to limit the ability of the Federal court to receive 
        and consider any other amicus briefs.

SEC. 206. REPORTING ON REQUESTS TO COMPLY WITH THE CORPORATE SOCIAL 
              CREDIT SYSTEM IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

    (a) Defined Term.--In this section, the term ``corporate social 
credit system,'' as established by the ``Planning Outline for the 
Construction of a Social Credit System'' released by the State Council 
of the Government of the People's Republic of China in 2014, means a 
nationwide network of systems operated by private and state actors, 
that--
            (1) use existing financial credit systems, public records, 
        online activity, government licenses and registrations, and 
        other information to collect, aggregate, and integrate data 
        regarding corporate entities that come within the jurisdiction 
        of the PRC, including United States companies operating in the 
        PRC;
            (2) use the data referred to in paragraph (1)--
                    (A) to monitor a corporate entity's activities; and
                    (B) to evaluate and rate certain financial, social, 
                religious, or political behaviors of the entity and its 
                key personnel;
            (3) rates such corporate entities according to their 
        trustworthiness (as defined by the CCP and the Government of 
        the PRC); and
            (4) implements punishments and rewards based on such 
        ratings that have a direct bearing on a corporate entity's 
        activities within the PRC.
    (b) Reporting Requirement.--The President, acting through the 
Secretary of Commerce, and in consultation with the Secretary of State 
and any other individuals the President determines should be consulted, 
shall issue regulations requiring United States entities with at least 
$100,000,000 of assets or other investment in the PRC to submit a 
semiannual report regarding the impact of the corporate social credit 
system on the ability of such United States companies to conduct 
business or otherwise operate in the PRC.
    (c) Matters To Be Included.--The regulations issued pursuant to 
subsection (b) shall require each entity described in such subsection 
to report information regarding--
            (1) the positive and negative impacts of the corporate 
        social credit system on the ability of the entity to conduct 
        business in the PRC;
            (2) major disruptions to the business operations of the 
        entity that are directly linked to the corporate social credit 
        system, including in hiring, making contracts, implementing 
        partnerships with other entities, and other appropriate 
        matters;
            (3) whether the entity has been placed on or removed from a 
        blacklist, untrustworthy entities list, priority key watchlist, 
        or a redlist within the corporate social credit system;
            (4) whether the Government of the PRC took any actions 
        directed at the entity as a result of a list described in 
        paragraph (3), including any specific punishments or rewards;
            (5) any instances in which an agent of the Government of 
        the PRC has asked for the resignation of key leadership within 
        the company due to their individual social credit scores;
            (6) any instances in which an entity within the Government 
        of PRC at the national, local, or municipal level informed the 
        entity that it will face a negative impact on its rating within 
        the corporate social credit system unless the entity takes a 
        certain course of action or refrains from taking a certain 
        course of action;
            (7) any instances in which the entity was asked by an agent 
        of the Government of the PRC to take an action to accommodate a 
        political position of the CCP or the Government of the PRC for 
        the purposes of complying with the corporate social credit 
        system; and
            (8) any instances in which the entity was required to 
        provide sensitive proprietary business information to comply 
        with the corporate social credit system.
    (d) Consultation With the Private Sector.--In developing the 
regulations required under subsection (b), the Secretary of Commerce, 
in consultation with the Secretary of State, shall consult with United 
States entities with significant business operations in the PRC.
    (e) Willful Failure To Report.--Not later than 180 days after the 
issuance of regulations pursuant to subsection (b), any United States 
entity required to report under such subsection who knowingly and 
willfully fails to make such report may, in addition to other penalties 
provided by law, be fined not more than $25,000.

SEC. 207. ANNUAL REVIEW ON THE PRESENCE OF CHINESE COMPANIES IN UNITED 
              STATES CAPITAL MARKETS.

    (a) Appropriate Congressional Committees.--In this section, the 
term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
            (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;
            (2) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate;
            (3) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of 
        the Senate;
            (4) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
        Representatives;
            (5) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
        House of Representatives; and
            (6) the Committee on Financial Services of the House of 
        Representatives.
    (b) Report.--
            (1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for the 
        following 5 years, the Secretary of State, in consultation with 
        the Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of the 
        Treasury, shall submit an unclassified report to the 
        appropriate congressional committees that describes the risks 
        posed to the United States by the presence in United States 
        capital markets of companies incorporated in the PRC.
            (2) Matters to be included.--The report required under 
        paragraph (1) shall--
                    (A) identify companies incorporated in the PRC 
                that--
                            (i) are listed or traded on 1 or several 
                        stock exchanges within the United States, 
                        including over-the-counter market and ``A 
                        Shares'' added to indexes and exchange-traded 
                        funds out of mainland exchanges in the PRC; and
                            (ii) based on the factors for consideration 
                        described in paragraph (3), have knowingly and 
                        materially contributed to--
                                    (I) activities that undermine 
                                United States national security;
                                    (II) serious abuses of 
                                internationally recognized human 
                                rights; or
                                    (III) a substantially increased 
                                financial risk exposure for United 
                                States-based investors;
                    (B) describe the activities of the companies 
                identified pursuant to subparagraph (A), and their 
                implications for the United States; and
                    (C) develop policy recommendations for the United 
                States Government, State governments, United States 
                financial institutions, United States equity and debt 
                exchanges, and other relevant stakeholders to address 
                the risks posed by the presence in United States 
                capital markets of the companies identified pursuant to 
                subparagraph (A).
            (3) Factors for consideration.--In completing the report 
        under paragraph (1), the President shall consider whether a 
        company identified pursuant to paragraph (2)(A)--
                    (A) has materially contributed to the development 
                or manufacture, or sold or facilitated procurement by 
                the PLA, of lethal military equipment or component 
                parts of such equipment;
                    (B) has contributed to the construction and 
                militarization of features in the South China Sea;
                    (C) has been sanctioned by the United States or has 
                been determined to have conducted business with 
                sanctioned entities;
                    (D) has engaged in an act or a series of acts of 
                intellectual property theft;
                    (E) has engaged in corporate or economic espionage;
                    (F) has contributed to the proliferation of nuclear 
                or missile technology in violation of United Nations 
                Security Council resolutions or United States 
                sanctions;
                    (G) has contributed to the repression of religious 
                and ethnic minorities within the PRC, including in 
                Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region or Tibet Autonomous 
                Region;
                    (H) has contributed to the development of 
                technologies that enable censorship directed or 
                directly supported by the Government of the PRC;
                    (I) has failed to comply fully with Federal 
                securities laws (including required audits by the 
                Public Company Accounting Oversight Board) and 
                ``material risk'' disclosure requirements of the 
                Securities and Exchange Commission; or
                    (J) has contributed to other activities or behavior 
                determined to be relevant by the President.
    (c) Report Form.--The report required under subsection (b)(1) shall 
be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
    (d) Publication.--The unclassified portion of the report under 
subsection (b)(1) shall be made accessible to the public online through 
relevant United States Government websites.

      TITLE III--REINVESTING IN AMERICAN AND ALLIED TECHNOLOGICAL 
                            COMPETITIVENESS

SEC. 301. REGULATORY EXCHANGES WITH ALLIES AND PARTNERS.

    (a) In General.--The Secretary of State, in coordination with the 
heads of other participating executive branch agencies, shall establish 
and develop a program to facilitate and encourage regular dialogues 
between United States Government regulatory and technical agencies and 
their counterpart organizations in allied and partner countries, both 
bilaterally and in relevant multilateral institutions and 
organizations--
            (1) to promote best practices in regulatory formation and 
        implementation;
            (2) to collaborate to achieve optimal regulatory outcomes 
        based on scientific, technical, and other relevant principles;
            (3) to seek better harmonization and alignment of 
        regulations and regulatory practices;
            (4) to build consensus around industry and technical 
        standards in emerging sectors that will drive future global 
        economic growth and commerce; and
            (5) to promote United States standards regarding 
        environmental, labor, and other relevant protections in 
        regulatory formation and implementation, in keeping with the 
        values of free and open societies, including the rule of law.
    (b) Prioritization of Activities.--In facilitating expert exchanges 
under subsection (a), the Secretary shall prioritize--
            (1) bilateral coordination and collaboration with countries 
        where greater regulatory coherence, harmonization of standards, 
        or communication and dialogue between technical agencies is 
        achievable and best advances the economic and national security 
        interests of the United States;
            (2) multilateral coordination and coordination where 
        greater regulatory coherence, harmonization of standards, or 
        dialogue on other relevant regulatory matters is achievable and 
        best advances the economic and national security interests of 
        the United States, including with--
                    (A) the European Union;
                    (B) the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation;
                    (C) the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
                (ASEAN);
                    (D) the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
                Development (OECD); and
                    (E) multilateral development banks; and
            (3) regulatory practices and standards setting bodies 
        focused on key economic sectors and emerging technologies.
    (c) Participation by Nongovernmental Entities.--With regard to the 
program described in subsection (a), the Secretary may facilitate, 
including through the use of amounts appropriated pursuant to 
subsection (e), the participation of private sector representatives and 
other relevant organizations and individuals with relevant expertise, 
as appropriate and to the extent that such participation advances the 
goals of such program.
    (d) Delegation of Authority by the Secretary.--The Secretary of 
State is authorized to delegate the responsibilities described in this 
section to the Under Secretary of State for Economic Growth, Energy, 
and the Environment.
    (e) Authorization of Appropriations.--
            (1) In general.--There is authorized to be appropriated 
        $2,500,000 for each of the fiscal years 2022 through 2026 to 
        carry out this section.
            (2) Use of funds.--The Secretary may obligate amounts 
        appropriated pursuant to paragraph (1) in a manner that--
                    (A) facilities participation by representatives 
                from technical agencies within the United States 
                Government and their counterparts; and
                    (B) complies with applicable procedural 
                requirements under the State Department Basic 
                Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 2651a et seq.) and 
                the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et 
                seq.).
    (f) Agreements.--
            (1) Submission.--The text of any agreement concluded under 
        the authorities provided under this section shall be submitted 
        to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the 
        Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives 
        not later than 60 days after any notice of intent to be 
        formally bound by the terms of such agreement.
            (2) Effective date.--Each agreement described in paragraph 
        (1) shall be legally effective and binding upon the United 
        States, in accordance with the terms provided in the agreement, 
        beginning on--
                    (A) the date on which appropriate implementing 
                legislation is enacted into law, which shall provide 
                for the approval of the specific agreement or 
                agreements, including attachments, annexes, and 
                supporting documentation; or
                    (B) if the agreement is concluded and submitted as 
                a treaty, the date on which such treaty is ratified by 
                the Senate.

SEC. 302. AUTHORIZATION TO ASSIST UNITED STATES COMPANIES WITH SUPPLY 
              CHAIN DIVERSIFICATION AND MANAGEMENT.

    (a) Authorization To Contract Services.--The Secretary of State, in 
coordination with the Secretary of Commerce, is authorized to establish 
a program to facilitate the contracting by United States embassies for 
the professional services of qualified experts, on a reimbursable fee 
for service basis, to assist interested United States persons and 
business entities with supply chain management issues related to the 
PRC, including--
            (1) exiting from the PRC market or relocating certain 
        production facilities to locations outside the PRC;
            (2) diversifying sources of inputs, and other efforts to 
        diversify supply chains to locations outside of the PRC;
            (3) navigating legal, regulatory, or other challenges in 
        the course of the activities described in paragraphs (1) and 
        (2); and
            (4) identifying alternative markets for production or 
        sourcing outside of the PRC, including through providing market 
        intelligence, facilitating contact with reliable local partners 
        as appropriate, and other services.
    (b) Chief of Mission Oversight.--The persons hired to perform the 
services described in subsection (a) shall--
            (1) be under the authority of the United States Chief of 
        Mission in the country in which they are hired, in accordance 
        with existing United States laws;
            (2) coordinate with Department of State and Department of 
        Commerce officers; and
            (3) coordinate with United States missions and relevant 
        local partners in other countries as needed to carry out the 
        services described in subsection (a).
    (c) Prioritization of Micro-, Small-, and Medium-Sized 
Enterprises.--The services described in subsection (a) shall be 
prioritized to assisting micro-, small-, and medium-sized enterprises.
    (d) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be 
appropriated $15,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 2022 through 2026 
for the purposes of carrying out this section.

SEC. 303. SCIENTIFIC AND PRIVATE SECTOR ADVISORY PANEL ON PROTECTION OF 
              CRITICAL TECHNOLOGIES.

    (a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the President shall establish an advisory panel 
comprised of representatives of the United States private sector, and 
other members of the scientific and technology community--
            (1) to advise the President on regulatory and policy 
        matters related to critical infrastructure and critical 
        technologies (as such terms are defined in paragraphs (5) and 
        (6) of section 721(a) of the Defense Production Act of 1950 (50 
        U.S.C. 4565(a)); and
            (2) to ensure regular consultation and engagement by the 
        Federal Government with the United States private sector and 
        scientific and technology community with respect to the matters 
        described in paragraph (1).
    (b) Duties.--In addition to other topics considered relevant by the 
President, the National Security Advisor, the Director of the National 
Economic Council, or the advisory panel established pursuant to 
subsection (a), the advisory panel shall provide information, analysis, 
and recommendations to the President, including--
            (1) assessing key developments in the economic and 
        industrial sectors relevant to critical technologies and 
        critical infrastructure;
            (2) safeguarding critical technologies and critical 
        infrastructure, including the Federal Government's role and the 
        role of the United States private sector;
            (3) developing regulations and policies to contribute to 
        and sustain the United States technology base;
            (4) developing partnerships with United States allies and 
        partners in scientific and technological development, including 
        changes to existing regulations and policies to better 
        facilitate the development of such partnerships;
            (5) providing assessments of the impact on the United 
        States private sector and United States economic 
        competitiveness of current and planned regulations and policies 
        related critical technologies and critical infrastructure;
            (6) engaging in consistent consultations with the United 
        States private sector during regulatory and policy formation; 
        and
            (7) making available to the United States private sector an 
        accurate understanding of new regulations and policies.
    (c) Membership.--Members of the advisory panel--
            (1) shall be appointed by the President, based on 
        recommendations of the National Security Advisor, the Director 
        of the National Economic Council, and the heads of executive 
        agencies designated by the President;
            (2) shall be broadly representative of the key industries 
        and sectors relevant to the duties and functions of the panel;
            (3) shall consist of not more than 10 private sector 
        corporate members or executives of industry and trade 
        associations representing critical technology sectors; and
            (4) shall consist of not more than 10 members with 
        distinguished backgrounds in relevant scientific and 
        technological fields or with substantial expertise in the 
        direct management and oversight of United States critical 
        infrastructure, including at least 2 members from the National 
        Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine.
    (d) Participation by Executive Agencies.--The President shall 
direct--
            (1) the Council of Economic Advisors and the Office of 
        Science and Technology Policy to appoint personnel to 
        participate in the activities of advisory panel; and
            (2) the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Commerce, the 
        Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Homeland Security, 
        the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Energy, and the head 
        of any other relevant Federal agency to provide personnel to 
        participate in the task force.
    (e) Designated Federal Officer.--The President shall appoint a 
full-time or permanent part-time Federal officer or employee to manage 
the activities of the advisory panel.
    (f) Authorities.--The advisory panel shall be governed by the 
Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.).

SEC. 304. ESTABLISHMENT OF A TECH COALITION.

    (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the United States and its allies and partners should 
        collaborate to advance and encourage the use of international 
        technical standards for new and emerging technologies;
            (2) widespread acceptance of international standards--
                    (A) improves the quality of technologies;
                    (B) reduces barriers to market access for 
                technology companies; and
                    (C) ensures the global interoperability of products 
                and services;
            (3) the United States and its allies and partners should 
        lead in defining and upholding norms for the responsible and 
        ethical development and use of new and emerging technologies, 
        including--
                    (A) cybersecurity technologies;
                    (B) artificial intelligence;
                    (C) next-generation telecommunications;
                    (D) semiconductors;
                    (E) quantum computing;
                    (F) biotechnology;
                    (G) the internet; and
                    (H) the Internet of Things;
            (4) the United States should collaborate with allies and 
        partners to ``work internationally to promote an open, 
        interoperable, secure, and reliable information and 
        communications infrastructure that supports international trade 
        and commerce, strengthens international security, and fosters 
        free expression and innovation in which norms of responsible 
        behavior guide states' actions, sustain partnerships, and 
        support the rule of law in cyberspace,'' as stated in the 
        United States International Strategy for Cyberspace, which was 
        issued in May 2011;
            (5) as stated in the National Cyber Strategy of the United 
        States of America, issued in September 2018, ``[i]nternational 
        law and voluntary non-binding norms of responsible state 
        behavior in cyberspace provide stabilizing, security-enhancing 
        standards that define acceptable behavior to all states and 
        promote greater predictability and stability in cyberspace. . . 
        . Increased public affirmation by the United States and other 
        governments will lead to accepted expectations of state 
        behavior and thus contribute to greater predictability and 
        stability in cyberspace.'';
            (6) the United States and its allies and partners--
                    (A) should be at the forefront of--
                            (i) promoting and sustaining a multi-
                        stakeholder model for internet governance; and
                            (ii) defining standards and norms in the 
                        use of emerging technologies;
                    (B) should develop norms for the responsible and 
                ethical development and use of technology, in 
                consultation with the private sectors, academic 
                institutions, international organizations, and other 
                relevant experts; and
                    (C) must collaborate to advance appropriate 
                confidence-building measures between states regarding 
                the development of new and emerging technologies, which 
                will create a framework for cooperation and promote 
                greater stability in cyberspace;
            (7) the private sector must continue to play the leading 
        role in--
                    (A) developing and deploying new and emerging 
                technologies;
                    (B) advancing international technical standards in 
                appropriate standards-setting institutions; and
                    (C) sharing responsibility for implementing norms 
                and standards;
            (8) the United States should ensure a coordinated approach 
        across the entire Federal Government for advocating for 
        international standards and norms relevant to new and emerging 
        technologies;
            (9) the United States Government should review how it can 
        best support private sector-led initiatives to set new 
        international standards and norms; and
            (10) the establishment of a technology coalition between 
        the United States and interested, like-minded partners is 
        necessary to uphold existing, and to establish new, standards 
        and norms that will sustain an open internet, safeguard free 
        and open societies, and set the standards for new and emerging 
        technologies.
    (b) Appropriate Congressional Committees.--In this section, the 
term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
            (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; and
            (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
        Representatives.
    (c) Tech Coalition.--The President should seek to establish a 
coalition of countries that are committed to--
            (1) the safe and responsible development and use of new and 
        emerging technologies and the establishment of related norms 
        and standards;
            (2) a secure internet architecture governed by a multi-
        stakeholder model instead of centralized government control;
            (3) robust international cooperation to promote an open 
        internet and interoperable technological products and services 
        that are necessary to freedom, innovation, transparency, and 
        privacy; and
            (4) multilateral coordination, including through diplomatic 
        initiatives, information sharing, and other activities, to 
        defend the principles described in paragraphs (1) through (3) 
        against efforts by state and non-state actors to undermine 
        them.
    (d) Functions.--The President, acting through the Secretary of 
State, should undertake regular efforts to coordinate with other 
members of the coalition established pursuant to subsection (c)--
            (1) to establish and advocate for norms, standards, and 
        regulations to ensure that the development and application of 
        new and emerging technologies uphold the goals of shared 
        prosperity, security, and commitment to human rights, including 
        through engagement in international organizations and 
        standards-setting bodies, such as--
                    (A) the International Organization for 
                Standardization;
                    (B) the Internet Engineering Task Force;
                    (C) the Internet Electrotechnical Commission;
                    (D) the United Nations International 
                Telecommunication Union;
                    (E) the United Nations Internet Governance Forum;
                    (F) the United Nations Group of Governmental 
                Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and 
                Telecommunications in the Context of International 
                Security (UN CGE);
                    (G) the United Nations Open-Ended Working Group on 
                Developments in the Field of Information and 
                Telecommunications in the Context of International 
                Security;
                    (H) the United Nations Commission on Science and 
                Technology for Development (CSTD);
                    (I) the Directorate for Science, Technology and 
                Innovation of the Organisation for Economic Co-
                operation and Development; and
                    (J) other international standards organizations and 
                multilateral norm-setting bodies, as appropriate;
            (2) to support and expand adherence to international 
        treaties and frameworks governing responsible behavior in 
        cyberspace and the use of new and emerging technologies, 
        including--
                    (A) the Council of Europe's Convention on 
                Cybercrime, done at Budapest November 23, 2001;
                    (B) the Organization for Security and Co-operation 
                in Europe Decision 1202 on Confidence-Building Measures 
                to Reduce the Risks of Conflict Stemming from the Use 
                of Information and Communication Technologies, decided 
                in Vienna March 10, 2016;
                    (C) the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Cyber 
                Defense Pledge, done in Warsaw July 8, 2016;
                    (D) the G7 Declaration of Responsible States 
                Behavior in Cyberspace, done in Lucca, Italy April 11, 
                2017;
                    (E) the Prague Proposals, done in Prague May 3, 
                2019; and
                    (F) other relevant international frameworks, as 
                appropriate;
            (3) to support and expand adherence to international 
        frameworks governing responsible regulation of new and emerging 
        technologies to support international trade and economic 
        development, including through World Trade Organization 
        agreements, such as--
                    (A) the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, 
                done at Geneva April 12, 1979;
                    (B) the General Agreement on Trade in Services 
                (entered in force January 1, 1995); and
                    (C) agreements by the United Nations Working Group 
                on Electronic Commerce;
            (4) to coordinate export control policies, including 
        through the Wassenaar Arrangement On Export Controls for 
        Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies, done at 
        The Hague December 1995, supply chain security, and investment 
        in or licensing of critical infrastructure and dual-use 
        technologies;
            (5) to coordinate basic and pre-competitive research and 
        development initiatives and to pool resources and talent to 
        pursue opportunities in artificial intelligence, 
        semiconductors, quantum computing, and other industries;
            (6) to coordinate, as appropriate, dialogues and other 
        initiatives between United States domestic regulatory agencies, 
        States, local governments, private sector entities, and 
        nongovernmental organizations, with their counterpart 
        organizations in other countries that are members of the 
        coalition established pursuant to subsection (c), on best 
        practices in developing and upholding standards and norms for 
        emerging technologies, including through the program 
        established under section 301; and
            (7) to deter state and non-state actors from engaging in 
        malicious and illegal activities in cyberspace and from using 
        new and emerging technologies in violation of the norms and 
        standards described in this subsection.
    (e) Briefing.--The Secretary of State, or the Secretary's designee, 
shall semiannually brief the appropriate congressional committees 
regarding the activities described in subsection (d). Such briefings 
shall include representatives from other Federal agencies who 
participate in such activities, as appropriate.
    (f) Agreements.--
            (1) Submission.--The text of any agreement concluded under 
        the authorities provided under this section shall be submitted 
        to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the 
        Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives 
        not later than 60 days after any notice of intent to be 
        formally bound by the terms of such agreement.
            (2) Effective date.--Each agreement described in paragraph 
        (1) shall be legally effective and binding upon the United 
        States, in accordance with the terms provided in the agreement, 
        beginning on--
                    (A) the date on which appropriate implementing 
                legislation is enacted into law, which shall provide 
                for the approval of the specific agreement or 
                agreements, including attachments, annexes, and 
                supporting documentation; or
                    (B) if the agreement is concluded and submitted as 
                a treaty, the date on which such treaty is ratified by 
                the Senate.

SEC. 305. UNITED STATES REPRESENTATION IN STANDARDS-SETTING BODIES.

    (a) Short Title.--This section may be cited as the ``Promoting 
United States International Leadership in 5G Act of 2020''.
    (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the United States and its allies and partners should 
        maintain participation and leadership at international 
        standards-setting bodies for 5th and future generations mobile 
        telecommunications systems and infrastructure;
            (2) the United States should work with its allies and 
        partners to encourage and facilitate the development of secure 
        supply chains and networks for 5th and future generations 
        mobile telecommunications systems and infrastructure; and
            (3) the maintenance of a high standard of security in 
        telecommunications and cyberspace between the United States and 
        its allies and partners is a national security interest of the 
        United States.
    (c) Enhancing Representation and Leadership of United States at 
International Standards-Setting Bodies.--
            (1) In general.--The President shall--
                    (A) establish an interagency working group to 
                provide assistance and technical expertise to enhance 
                the representation and leadership of the United States 
                at international bodies that set standards for 
                equipment, systems, software, and virtually-defined 
                networks that support 5th and future generations mobile 
                telecommunications systems and infrastructure, such as 
                the International Telecommunication Union and the 3rd 
                Generation Partnership Project; and
                    (B) work with allies, partners, and the private 
                sector to increase productive engagement.
            (2) Interagency working group.--The interagency working 
        group described in paragraph (1)--
                    (A) shall be chaired by the Secretary of State or a 
                designee of the Secretary of State; and
                    (B) shall consist of the head (or designee) of each 
                Federal department or agency the President determines 
                appropriate.
            (3) Briefing.--
                    (A) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the 
                date of the enactment of this Act, and subsequently 
                thereafter as provided in subparagraph (A), the 
                interagency working group described in paragraph (1) 
                shall provide a briefing to the Committee on Foreign 
                Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign 
                Affairs of the House of Representatives that includes--
                            (i) a strategy to promote United States 
                        leadership at international standards-setting 
                        bodies for equipment, systems, software, and 
                        virtually-defined networks relevant to 5th and 
                        future generation mobile telecommunications 
                        systems and infrastructure, taking into account 
                        the different processes followed by the various 
                        international standard-setting bodies;
                            (ii) a strategy for diplomatic engagement 
                        with allies and partners to share security risk 
                        information and findings pertaining to 
                        equipment that supports or is used in 5th and 
                        future generations mobile telecommunications 
                        systems and infrastructure and cooperation on 
                        mitigating such risks;
                            (iii) a discussion of China's presence and 
                        activities at international standards-setting 
                        bodies relevant to 5th and future generation 
                        mobile telecommunications systems and 
                        infrastructure, including information on the 
                        differences in the scope and scale of China's 
                        engagement at such bodies compared to 
                        engagement by the United States or its allies 
                        and partners and the security risks raised by 
                        Chinese proposals in such standards-setting 
                        bodies; and
                            (iv) a strategy for engagement with private 
                        sector communications and information service 
                        providers, equipment developers, academia, 
                        federally funded research and development 
                        centers, and other private-sector stakeholders 
                        to propose and develop secure standards for 
                        equipment, systems, software, and virtually-
                        defined networks that support 5th and future 
                        generation mobile telecommunications systems 
                        and infrastructure.
                    (B) Subsequent briefings.--Upon receiving a request 
                from the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate 
                and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
                Representatives, or as determined appropriate by the 
                chair of the interagency working group established 
                pursuant to paragraph (1), the interagency working 
                group shall provide the requesting committee an updated 
                briefing that covers the matters described in clauses 
                (i) through (iv) of subparagraph (A).

              TITLE IV--SAFEGUARDING AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS

SEC. 401. AMENDMENT TO FOREIGN AGENT REGISTRATION ACT REGARDING GIFTS 
              MADE TO UNIVERSITIES.

    Section 3(e) of the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938 (22 
U.S.C. 613(e)) is amended--
            (1) by striking ``Any person'' and inserting the following:
            ``(1) In general.--Any person''; and
            (2) by adding at the end the following:
            ``(2) Waiver of exemption recommendation.--The Secretary of 
        Education, the Secretary of State, and the Attorney General may 
        jointly submit a recommendation to the President to waive the 
        exception under this subsection for an institution of higher 
        education (as defined in section 101 of the Higher Education 
        Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1001) that has accepted a gift from, or 
        has entered into a contract, agreement, affiliation, or similar 
        transaction (not including tuition payments) with, a foreign 
        government that requires a disclosure under section 117 of such 
        Act (20 U.S.C. 1011f).
            ``(3) Presidential determination.--The President, after 
        consideration of a joint recommendation submitted pursuant to 
        paragraph (2), may determine that a foreign source gift, 
        contract, agreement or similar transaction required to be 
        disclosed under section 117 of the Higher Education Act of 1965 
        (20 U.S.C. 1011f) that has been accepted by an institution of 
        higher education has created a relationship of foreign agency 
        with a foreign source that requires registration of the 
        appropriate representatives of the institution as a foreign 
        agent or agents under section 2(a).''.

SEC. 402. DESIGNATION OF A COUNTRY OF NATIONAL SECURITY CONCERN IN THE 
              FOREIGN AGENT REGISTRATION ACT.

    (a) In General.--Section 3 of the Foreign Agents Registration Act 
of 1938 (22 U.S.C. 613) is amended by adding at the end the following:
    ``(i) Countries of National Security Concern.--The President may 
issue a finding that a country constitutes a significant threat to the 
national security of the United States and should be designated a 
`country of national security concern' after--
            ``(1) considering a joint recommendation submitted pursuant 
        to section 402(c) of the Strengthening Trade, Regional 
        Alliances, Technology, and Economic and Geopolitical 
        Initiatives concerning China Act;
            ``(2) consulting with the Committee on Foreign Relations of 
        the Senate, the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate, the 
        Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, 
        and the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of 
        Representatives; and
            ``(3) providing a written detailed justification for such 
        designation to the appropriate congressional committees.''.
    (b) Waiver of Exemptions.--
            (1) In general.--Upon designating a country as a ``country 
        of national security concern'' under section 3(i) of the 
        Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, as added by subsection 
        (a), the President may waive any of the exemptions for agents 
        of foreign principals set forth in subsections (d), (e), and 
        (h) of section 3 of such Act (22 U.S.C. 613) for up to 1 year.
            (2) Renewals.--The President may renew waivers under this 
        subsection for additional 1-year periods, in accordance with 
        paragraph (1), while the country in question continues to 
        present a threat to the national security of the United States.
            (3) Rule of construction.--For purposes of this section, a 
        waiver under paragraph (1) shall not apply to bona fide 
        religious pursuits referred to in section 3(e) of the Foreign 
        Agents Registration Act of 1938 (22 U.S.C. 613(e)).
    (c) Recommendation.--The Secretary of State, in coordination with 
the Attorney General, may jointly submit a recommendation to the 
President that a country constitutes a significant national security 
threat to the United States of such nature that 1 or more of the 
exemptions set forth in subsections (d), (e), and (h), of section 3 of 
the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938 (22 U.S.C. 613) should be 
waived for up to 1 year.
    (d) Termination by the President.--The President may suspend or 
terminate the designation of a country as a country of national 
security concern under section 3(i) of such Act, as added by subsection 
(a), and any associated reporting requirements, if the President 
determines such country no longer presents a threat to the national 
security of the United States.
    (e) Additional Disclosure Measures.--The Attorney General, in 
coordination with the Secretary of State, may establish enhanced 
reporting requirements under the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 
1938 (22 U.S.C. 611 et seq.) for agents representing foreign principals 
of a designated ``country of national security concern'' under section 
613(i) of such Act, as added by subsection (a), including enhanced 
transparency and reporting requirements, as appropriate.

SEC. 403. BAN ON SENATE-CONFIRMED DEPARTMENT OF STATE OFFICIALS 
              REPRESENTING COUNTRIES OF NATIONAL SECURITY CONCERN.

    (a) Defined Term.--Section 1 of the Foreign Agents Registration Act 
of 1938 (22 U.S.C. 611) is amended by inserting after subsection (i) 
the following:
    ``(j) The term `country of national security concern' means a 
country designated under section 3(i).''.
    (b) Representation After Service.--Section 207(f) of title 18, 
United States Code, is amended--
            (1) by redesignating paragraph (3) as paragraph (4); and
            (2) by inserting after paragraph (2) the following:
            ``(3) Special rule for senior officials of the department 
        of state.--With respect to a person serving as a senior 
        official at the Department of State who was appointed by the 
        President and confirmed by the Senate, the restrictions 
        described in paragraph (1) shall apply to representing the 
        government of a country of national security concern (as 
        defined in section 1(j) of the Foreign Agents Registration Act 
        of 1938 (22 U.S.C. 611(j))) at any time--
                    ``(A) after the termination of such service; and
                    ``(B) during the period that such country is 
                designated a country of national security concern.''.
    (c) Limitation on Appointment as a Senate-Confirmed Department of 
State Official.--Section 841 of the State Department Basic Authorities 
Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 2651a) is amended by adding at the end the 
following:
    ``(h) Limitation on Appointments.--A person who has directly 
represented the government of a country of national security concern 
(as defined in section 1(j) of the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 
1938 (22 U.S.C. 611(j))) may not be appointed by the President to serve 
in a position within the Department of State that requires Senate 
confirmation.''.

SEC. 404. AMENDMENT TO THE MUTUAL EDUCATIONAL AND CULTURAL EXCHANGE 
              ACT.

    The Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 
2451 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 108A the following:

``SEC. 108B. REPORTING REQUIREMENTS WITH RESPECT TO PARTICIPATION BY 
              FEDERAL EMPLOYEES IN CULTURAL EXCHANGE PROGRAMS INVOLVING 
              THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

    ``(a) In General.--In applying section 108A of the Mutual 
Educational and Cultural Exchange Act (22 U.S.C. 2458a) with respect to 
any cultural exchange program that involves the Government of the 
People's Republic of China, the Secretary of State shall require a 
report to be submitted to the Department of State, not later than 
January 31, 2022, and annually thereafter through 2027, by--
            ``(1) any element within the Government of the People's 
        Republic of China that has an agreement currently in force with 
        the Department of State pursuant to section 108A; and
            ``(2) any United States entity that carries out a program 
        pursuant to an agreement described in paragraph (1).
    ``(b) Matters To Be Included.--Each report submitted under 
subsection (a) shall include, for the relevant reporting period--
            ``(1) the total number of cultural exchange programs 
        conducted by the reporting entity;
            ``(2) a description of each program referred to in 
        paragraph (1), including--
                    ``(A) the purpose of each such program; and
                    ``(B) an agenda or itinerary that describes the 
                activities engaged in by program participants; and
            ``(3) a list of participants in each such program, 
        including the names and professional affiliation of the 
        participants during such program.
    ``(c) Failure To Report by the Government of the People's Republic 
of China.--If any entity described in subsection (a)(1) fails to submit 
the report required under subsection (a), the Secretary of State shall 
suspend the agreement between the entity and the Department of State 
until the entity within the Government of the People's Republic of 
China has submitted such report.
    ``(d) Failure To Report by a United States Entity.--Any United 
States entity described in subsection (a)(2) that fails to submit the 
report required under subsection (a) shall be ineligible to receive any 
funds, in the form of grants or otherwise, from the Department of State 
until such entity has submitted such report.
    ``(e) Rulemaking.--The Secretary of State shall promulgate 
regulations to carry out this section.
    ``(f) Summary Report.--
            ``(1) Submission to congress.--Not later than July 30, 
        2022, and annually thereafter through 2027, the Secretary of 
        State shall submit a summary of the reports received from the 
        entities described in subsection (a) to the appropriate 
        congressional committees.
            ``(2) Matters to be included.--The summary required under 
        paragraph (1) shall include, for the reporting period--
                    ``(A) the total number of cultural exchange 
                programs conducted;
                    ``(B) the total number of participants in such 
                cultural exchange programs;
                    ``(C) a list of the professional affiliations of 
                such participants;
                    ``(D) an overview of the cultural exchange 
                programs, including illustrative examples of activities 
                in which participants engaged;
                    ``(E) an assessment of whether the cultural 
                programs conducted during the reporting period adhere 
                to purposes set forth in section 101, including a 
                description of any noticeable deviations from such 
                purposes; and
                    ``(F) a description of all actions by the 
                Department of State to remediate deviations from such 
                purposes.
            ``(3) Form of report.--The summary required under paragraph 
        (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form.''.

   TITLE V--MAINTAINING THE INTEGRITY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

SEC. 501. OFFICE OF INTEGRITY IN THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM.

    (a) Establishment.--
            (1) In general.--The Secretary of State shall establish, 
        within the Bureau of International Organization Affairs of the 
        Department of State, the Office of Integrity in the United 
        Nations System (referred to in this section as the ``UN 
        Integrity Office'').
            (2) Office leadership.--
                    (A) Head of office.--The Secretary of State shall 
                appoint a career member of the Senior Foreign Service 
                to head the UN Integrity Office.
                    (B) Special envoy.--The Secretary of State may 
                appoint a Special Envoy for Integrity in the United 
                Nations System.
    (b) Purpose of Office.--The UN Integrity Office shall assume the 
primary responsibility for--
            (1) promoting United States participation in the United 
        Nations System;
            (2) ensuring that United Nations employees uphold the 
        principals of impartiality enshrined in the United Nations 
        charter, rules, and regulations;
            (3) monitoring and countering undue influence, especially 
        by authoritarian nations, within the United Nations System;
            (4) promoting participation and inclusion of Taiwan in the 
        United Nations System; and
            (5) advancing other priorities deemed relevant by the 
        Secretary of State to ensuring the integrity of the United 
        Nations System.
    (c) Authorization of Appropriations.--Of the amounts authorized to 
be appropriated to the Department of State for administration of 
foreign affairs, not less than $1,000,000 is authorized to be 
appropriated for fiscal year 2022 and for each subsequent fiscal year 
for the UN Integrity Office.

   TITLE VI--BOLSTERING UNITED STATES AND ALLIED DEFENSE AND SECURITY

SEC. 601. FINDINGS.

    Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) The People's Republic of China aims to use its growing 
        military might in concert with other instruments of its 
        national power to displace the United States in the Indo-
        Pacific and establish hegemony over the region.
            (2) The military balance in the Indo-Pacific region is 
        increasingly unfavorable to the United States because--
                    (A) the PRC is rapidly modernizing and expanding 
                the capabilities of the PLA to project power and create 
                contested areas across the entire Indo-Pacific region;
                    (B) PLA modernization has largely focused on areas 
                where it possesses operational advantages and can 
                exploit weaknesses in the United States' suite of 
                capabilities; and
                    (C) current United States force structure and 
                presence do not sufficiently counter threats in the 
                Indo-Pacific, as United States allies, bases, and 
                forces at sea in the Indo-Pacific region are 
                concentrated in large bases that are highly vulnerable 
                to the PRC's strike capabilities.
            (3) This shift in the regional military balance and erosion 
        of conventional deterrence in the Indo-Pacific region--
                    (A) presents a substantial and imminent risk to the 
                security of the United States; and
                    (B) left unchecked, could embolden the PRC to take 
                actions, including the use of military force, to change 
                the status quo before the United States can mount an 
                effective response.
            (4) The PRC believes the political bonds between the United 
        States and its Indo-Pacific allies are weakening. The PRC sees 
        an opportunity to diminish confidence among United States 
        allies and partners in the strength of United States 
        commitments, even to the extent that these nations feel 
        compelled to bandwagon with the PRC to protect their interests. 
        The PRC is closely monitoring the United States' reaction to 
        PRC pressure and coercion of United States allies, searching 
        for indicators of United States resolve.
            (5) Achieving so-called ``reunification'' of Taiwan to 
        mainland China is a key step for the PRC to achieve its 
        regional hegemonic ambitions. The PRC has increased the 
        frequency and scope of its exercises and operations targeting 
        Taiwan, such as amphibious assault and live-fire exercises in 
        the Taiwan Strait, PLA Air Force flights that encircle Taiwan, 
        and flights across the unofficial median line in the Taiwan 
        Strait. The Government of the PRC's full submission of Hong 
        Kong potentially accelerates the timeline of a Taiwan scenario, 
        and makes the defense of Taiwan an even more urgent priority.
            (6) The defense of Taiwan is critical to--
                    (A) retaining the United States' credibility as a 
                defender of the democratic values and free-market 
                principles embodied by Taiwan's people and government;
                    (B) limiting the PLA's ability to project power 
                beyond the First Island Chain, including to United 
                States territory, such as Guam and Hawaii;
                    (C) defending the territorial integrity of Japan; 
                and
                    (D) preventing the PLA from diverting military 
                planning, resources, and personnel to broader military 
                ambitions.
            (7) The PRC has capitalized on the world's attention to 
        COVID-19 to advance its military objectives in the South China 
        Sea, intensifying and accelerating trends already underway. The 
        PRC has sent militarized survey vessels into the Malaysian 
        Exclusive Economic Zone, announced the establishment of an 
        administrative district in the Spratly and Paracel Islands 
        under the Chinese local government of Sansha, aimed a fire 
        control radar at a Philippine navy ship, encroached on 
        Indonesia's fishing grounds, sunk a Vietnamese fishing boat, 
        announced new ``research stations'' on Fiery Cross Reef and 
        Subi Reef, and landed special military aircraft on Fiery Cross 
        Reef to routinize such deployments.
            (8) On July 13, 2020, Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo 
        clarified United States policy on the South China Sea and 
        stated, ``Beijing's claims to offshore resources across most of 
        the South China Sea are completely unlawful, as is its campaign 
        of bullying to control them.''.
            (9) These actions enable the PLA to exert influence and 
        project power deeper into Oceania and the Indian Ocean. As 
        Admiral Phil Davidson, Commander of Indo-Pacific Command, 
        testified in 2019, ``In short, China is now capable of 
        controlling the South China Sea in all scenarios short of war 
        with the United States.''.
            (10) The PLA also continues to advance its claims in the 
        East China Sea, including through a high number of surface 
        combatant patrols and frequent entry into the territorial 
        waters of the Senkaku Islands, over which the United States 
        recognizes Japan's administrative control. In April 2014, 
        President Barack Obama stated, ``Our commitment to Japan's 
        security is absolute and article five [of the U.S.-Japan 
        security treaty] covers all territory under Japan's 
        administration, including the Senkaku islands.''.
            (11) On March 1, 2019, Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo 
        stated, ``As the South China Sea is part of the Pacific, any 
        armed attack on Philippine forces, aircraft, or public vessels 
        in the South China Sea will trigger mutual defense obligations 
        under Article 4 of our Mutual Defense Treaty.''.
            (12) The PLA is modernizing and gaining critical capability 
        in every branch and every domain, including--
                    (A) positioning the PLA Navy to become a great 
                maritime power or ``blue-water'' navy that can 
                completely control all activity within the First Island 
                Chain and project power beyond it with a massive fleet 
                of 425 battle force ships by 2030;
                    (B) increasing the size and range of its strike 
                capabilities, including approximately 1,900 ground-
                launched short- and intermediate-range missiles capable 
                of targeting United States allies and partners in the 
                First and Second Island chains, United States bases in 
                the Indo-Pacific, and United States forces at sea;
                    (C) boosting capabilities for air warfare, 
                including with Russian-origin Su-35 fighters and S-400 
                air defense systems, new J-20 5th generation stealth 
                fighters, and Y-20 heavy lift aircraft; and
                    (D) making critical investments in new domains of 
                warfare, such as cyber warfare, electronic warfare, and 
                space warfare.
            (13) The PRC is pursuing this modernization through all 
        means at its disposal, including its Military-Civil Fusion 
        initiative, which, as United States Assistant Secretary of 
        State Christopher Ford said in March 2020, ``aims to make any 
        technology accessible to anyone under the PRC's jurisdiction 
        available to support the Chinese Communist Party's ambitions.'' 
        It enlists the whole of PRC society in developing and acquiring 
        technology with military applications to pursue technological 
        advantage over the United States in artificial intelligence, 
        hypersonic glide vehicles, directed energy weapons, 
        electromagnetic railguns, counter-space weapons, and other 
        emerging capabilities.
            (14) The United States' lead in the development of science 
        and technology relevant to defense is eroding in the face of 
        competition from the PRC. United States research and 
        development spending on defense capabilities has declined 
        sharply as a share of global research and development. The 
        commercial sector's leading role in innovation presents certain 
        unique challenges to the Department of Defense's reliance on 
        technology for battlefield advantage.
            (15) The PRC has vastly increased domestic research and 
        development expenditures, supported the growth of new cutting-
        edge industries and tapped into a large workforce to invest in 
        fostering science and engineering talent.
            (16) The PRC is increasing exports of defense and security 
        capabilities to build its defense technology and industrial 
        base and improve its own military capabilities. For example, 
        the PRC has enjoyed particular success in exporting numerous 
        unmanned aerial systems (UAS). Such exports have helped it 
        establish new defense relationships, test its systems under 
        operational conditions, and refine its designs for its own 
        forces. The PRC has exploited an available gap in the global 
        market, as the PRC does not subject itself to the limitations 
        of the Missile Technology Control Regime, which is a voluntary 
        protocol under which the United States and other members 
        restrict their own UAS exports. PLA military analyst Song 
        Zhongping has noted that ``the Chinese [defense] product now 
        doesn't lack technology, it only lacks market share, and the 
        United States restricting its arms exports is precisely what 
        gives China a great opportunity.''.

SEC. 602. STATEMENT OF POLICY EXPRESSING THE POLITICAL WILL OF THE 
              UNITED STATES TO DEFEND ITS INTERESTS IN THE INDO-PACIFIC 
              AND PURSUE EXPANDED POLITICAL-MILITARY COOPERATION WITH 
              ALLIES AND PARTNERS.

    It is the policy of the United States--
            (1) to prioritize the Indo-Pacific region as the most 
        important political-military theater for United States foreign 
        policy;
            (2) to prioritize resources for achieving United States 
        political and military objectives in this most critical region, 
        while still balancing resources for other lower-priority 
        security challenges across the globe;
            (3) to reaffirm and strengthen United States commitments to 
        treaty allies in the Indo-Pacific region, as articulated by 
        successive United States administrations and in the Asia 
        Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018 (Public Law 115-409; 132 
        Stat. 5387), including--
                    (A) with respect to Japan--
                            (i) upholding the Treaty of Mutual 
                        Cooperation and Security Between Japan and the 
                        United States of America, done at Washington 
                        January 19, 1960, and all related and 
                        subsequent security agreements;
                            (ii) recognizing Japan's administrative 
                        control over the Senkaku Islands and maritime 
                        exclusive economic zones in the East China Sea; 
                        and
                            (iii) further advancing defense cooperation 
                        in priority areas, such as long-range precision 
                        fires, missile defense, maritime security, 
                        space, cyberspace, and the electromagnetic 
                        spectrum;
                    (B) with respect to the Republic of Korea--
                            (i) upholding the Mutual Defense Treaty 
                        Between the United States and the Republic of 
                        Korea, done at Washington October 1, 1953, and 
                        all related and subsequent security agreements; 
                        and
                            (ii) strengthening alliance defense and 
                        deterrence capabilities;
                    (C) with respect to Australia and New Zealand--
                            (i) upholding the Security Treaty Between 
                        the United States, Australia, and New Zealand, 
                        done at San Francisco September 1, 1951, and 
                        all related and subsequent security agreements;
                            (ii) increasing collaboration to address 
                        shared security challenges; and
                            (iii) providing mutual support in the face 
                        of coercion;
                    (D) with respect to the Philippines--
                            (i) upholding the Mutual Defense Treaty 
                        Between the United States and the Republic of 
                        the Philippines, done at Washington August 30, 
                        1951, including commitments relevant to the 
                        South China Sea, and all related and subsequent 
                        security arrangements; and
                            (ii) cooperating with the Philippines to 
                        build and maintain defense capabilities, 
                        particularly in the maritime domain, that 
                        enable the Philippines to protect its 
                        sovereignty and resist external coercion; and
                    (E) with respect to Thailand--
                            (i) upholding the security treaties and all 
                        related and subsequent security arrangements 
                        that underpin the United States-Thailand 
                        alliance; and
                            (ii) reinvigorating defense cooperation and 
                        partnership through exercises, training, and 
                        interoperability that enable it to protect its 
                        sovereignty and resist external coercion;
            (4) to collaborate with United States treaty allies in the 
        Indo-Pacific to foster greater multilateral security and 
        defense cooperation with other regional partners;
            (5) to sustain the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96-8; 
        22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.) and the ``Six Assurances'' provided by 
        the United States to Taiwan in July 1982 as the foundations for 
        United States-Taiwan relations, and to deepen, to the fullest 
        extent possible, the extensive, close, and friendly relations 
        of the United States and Taiwan, including cooperation to 
        support the development of a capable, ready, and modern forces 
        necessary for the defense of Taiwan;
            (6) to enhance security partnerships with India, across 
        Southeast Asia, and with other nations of the Indo-Pacific, 
        including as described in sections 204, 205, and 208 of the 
        Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018 (Public Law 115-409);
            (7) to deter, in the shorter term, the PRC from 
        capitalizing on the world's focus on the COVID-19 pandemic to 
        advance its military objectives in the Western Pacific, 
        including deterring more aggressive behavior towards Taiwan and 
        in the South China Sea;
            (8) to deter, over the longer term, acts of aggression or 
        coercion by the PRC against United States and allies' interests 
        along the First Island Chain and in the Western Pacific by 
        showing PRC leaders that the United States can and is willing 
        to deny them the ability to achieve their objectives, including 
        by--
                    (A) consistently demonstrating the political will 
                of the United States to deepening existing treaty 
                alliances and growing new partnerships as a durable, 
                asymmetric, and unmatched strategic advantage to the 
                PRC's growing military capabilities and reach;
                    (B) maintaining a system of forward-deployed bases 
                in the Indo-Pacific region as the most visible sign of 
                United States resolve and commitment to the region, and 
                as platforms to ensure United States operational 
                readiness and advance interoperability with allies and 
                partners;
                    (C) adopting a more dispersed force posture 
                throughout the region, particularly the Western 
                Pacific, and pursuing maximum access for United States 
                mobile and relocatable launchers for long-range cruise, 
                ballistic, and hypersonic weapons throughout the Indo-
                Pacific region;
                    (D) fielding long-range, precision-strike networks 
                to United States and allied forces, including ground-
                launched cruise missiles, undersea and naval 
                capabilities, and integrated air and missile defense in 
                the First Island Chain and the Second Island Chain, in 
                order to impose high risks on the PRC for operating in 
                these zones, and maximize the United States' ability to 
                operate;
                    (E) strengthening extended deterrence to 
                demonstrate that escalation against key United States 
                interests would be costly, risky, and self-defeating; 
                and
                    (F) collaborating with allies and partners to 
                accelerate their roles in more equitably sharing the 
                burdens of mutual defense, including through the 
                acquisition and fielding of advanced capabilities and 
                training that will better enable them to repel PRC 
                aggression or coercion; and
            (9) to convey to the PRC that, in the event that deterrence 
        by denial fails, the United States, if necessary--
                    (A) will impose prohibitive diplomatic, economic, 
                financial, reputational, and military costs on the PRC 
                for its aggression; and
                    (B) will defend itself and its allies regardless of 
                the point of origin of attacks against them.

SEC. 603. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING BOLSTERING SECURITY PARTNERSHIPS 
              IN THE INDO-PACIFIC.

    It is the Sense of Congress that steps to bolster United States 
security partnership in the Indo-Pacific must include--
            (1) supporting Japan in its development of long-range 
        precision fires, air and missile defense capacity, 
        interoperability across all domains, maritime security, and 
        intelligence, and surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities;
            (2) launching a United States-Japan national security 
        innovation fund to solicit and support private sector 
        cooperation for new technologies that could benefit the United 
        States' and Japan's mutual security objectives;
            (3) promoting a deeper defense relationship between Japan 
        and Australia, including supporting reciprocal access 
        agreements and trilateral United States-Japan-Australia 
        intelligence sharing;
            (4) encouraging and facilitating Taiwan's accelerated 
        acquisition of asymmetric defense capabilities, which are 
        crucial to defending the islands of Taiwan from invasion, 
        including long-range precision fires, anti-ship missiles, 
        coastal defense, anti-armor, air defense, undersea warfare, 
        advanced command, control, communications, computers, 
        intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR), and 
        resilient command and control capabilities, and increasing the 
        conduct of relevant and practical training and exercises with 
        Taiwan's defense forces; and
            (5) prioritizing building the capacity of United States 
        allies and partners to protect defense technology.

SEC. 604. REPORT ON CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT OF INDO-PACIFIC ALLIES AND 
              PARTNERS.

    (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the Secretary of State should expand and strengthen 
        existing measures under the United States Conventional Arms 
        Transfer Policy to provide capabilities to allies and partners, 
        prioritizing allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific region in 
        accordance with United States strategic imperatives;
            (2) the United States should design for export to Indo-
        Pacific allies and partners capabilities critical to 
        maintaining a favorable military balance in the region, 
        including long-range precision fires, air and missile defense 
        systems, anti-ship cruise missiles, land attack cruise 
        missiles, conventional hypersonic systems, intelligence, 
        surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities, and command and 
        control systems;
            (3) the United States should pursue, to the maximum extent 
        possible, anticipatory technology security and foreign 
        disclosure policy on the systems described in paragraph (2); 
        and
            (4) the Secretary of State, in coordination with the 
        Secretary of Defense, should--
                    (A) urge allies and partners to invest in 
                sufficient quantities of munitions to meet contingency 
                requirements and avoid the need for accessing United 
                States stocks in wartime; and
                    (B) cooperate with allies to deliver such 
                munitions, or when necessary, to increase allies' 
                capacity to produce such munitions.
    (b) Defined Term.--In this section, the term ``appropriate 
congressional committees'' means--
            (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;
            (2) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate;
            (3) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
        Representatives; and
            (4) the Committee on Armed Services of the House of 
        Representatives.
    (c) Report.--
            (1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in 
        coordination with the Secretary of Defense, shall submit a 
        report to the appropriate congressional committees that--
                    (A) describes United States priorities for building 
                more capable security partners in the Indo-Pacific 
                region; and
                    (B) identifies legal, regulatory, or other 
                obstacles to advancing such priorities.
            (2) Matters to be included.--The report required under 
        paragraph (1) shall--
                    (A) provide a priority list of defense and military 
                capabilities that Indo-Pacific allies and partners must 
                possess for the United States to be able to achieve its 
                military objectives in the Indo-Pacific region;
                    (B) identify, from the list referred to in 
                subparagraph (A), the capabilities that are best 
                provided, or can only be provided, by the United 
                States;
                    (C) identify--
                            (i) actions required to prioritize United 
                        States Government resources and personnel to 
                        expedite fielding the capabilities identified 
                        in subparagraph (B); and
                            (ii) steps needed to fully account for and 
                        a plan to integrate all means of United States 
                        foreign military sales, direct commercial 
                        sales, security assistance, and all applicable 
                        authorities of the Department of State and the 
                        Department of Defense;
                    (D) assess the requirements for United States 
                security assistance, including International Military 
                Education and Training, in the Indo-Pacific region, as 
                a part of the means to deliver critical partner 
                capability requirements identified in subparagraph (B);
                    (E) assess the resources necessary to meet the 
                requirements for United States security assistance, and 
                identify resource gaps;
                    (F) assess the major obstacles to fulfilling 
                requirements for United States security assistance in 
                the Indo-Pacific region, including resources and 
                personnel limits, legislative and policy barriers, and 
                factors related to specific partner countries;
                    (G) identify limitations on the United States 
                ability to provide such capabilities, including those 
                identified under subparagraph (B), because of existing 
                United States treaty obligations, or United States law, 
                policies, or other regulations;
                    (H) recommend changes to existing laws, 
                regulations, or other policies that would reduce or 
                eliminate limitations on providing critical 
                capabilities to allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific 
                region;
                    (I) identify requirements to streamline the 
                International Trafficking in Arms Regulations (22 
                C.F.R. 120 et seq.) that would enable more effective 
                delivery of capabilities to allies and partners in the 
                Indo-Pacific region;
                    (J) recommend improvements to the process for 
                developing requirements for partners capabilities; and
                    (K) recommend other legal, regulatory, or policy 
                changes that would improve delivery timelines.
            (3) Form.--The report required under this subsection shall 
        be unclassified, but may include a classified annex.

SEC. 605. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEMS AND THE 
              MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME.

    It is the policy of the United States--
            (1) to maintain its commitment to nonproliferation through 
        voluntary adherence to the 1987 Missile Technology Control 
        Regime (referred to in this section as ``MTCR'');
            (2) to exercise its sovereign right within that regime to 
        define unmanned aerial systems (referred to in this section as 
        ``UAS'') as aircraft rather than as cruise missiles;
            (3) to consider UAS as not subject to MTCR guidelines, 
        annexes, or any other United States policy subject to the MTCR;
            (4) to ensure that exports of military UAS remain subject 
        to the same export considerations as military aircraft; and
            (5) to ensure that military UAS share the same co-
        development, co-production, and any other privilege or 
        consideration afforded to military aircraft for the purposes of 
        direct commercial sale or foreign military sale.

SEC. 606. REPORT ON NATIONAL TECHNOLOGY AND INDUSTRIAL BASE.

    (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the Sense of Congress that--
            (1) a more streamlined, shared, and coordinated approach, 
        which leverages economies of scale with major allies, is 
        necessary for the United States to retain its lead in defense 
        technology;
            (2) allowing for the export, re-export, or transfer of 
        defense-related technologies and services to members of the 
        national technology and industrial base (as defined in section 
        2500 of title 10, United States Code) would advance United 
        States security interests by helping to leverage the defense-
        related technologies and skilled workforces of trusted allies 
        to reduce the dependence on other countries, including 
        countries that pose challenges to United States interests 
        around the world, for defense-related innovation and 
        investment; and
            (3) it is in the interest of the United States to continue 
        to increase cooperation with close allies to protect critical 
        defense-related technology and services and leverage the 
        investments of like-minded, major ally nations in order to 
        maximize the strategic edge afforded by defense technology 
        innovation.
    (b) Defined Term.--In this section, the term ``appropriate 
congressional committees'' means--
            (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;
            (2) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate;
            (3) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
        Representatives; and
            (4) the Committee on Armed Services of the House of 
        Representatives.
    (c) Report.--
            (1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit 
        a report to the appropriate congressional committees that--
                    (A) describes the Department of State's efforts to 
                facilitate access among the national technology and 
                industrial base to defense articles and services 
                subject to the United States Munitions List under 
                section 38(a)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act (22 
                U.S.C. 2778(a)(1)); and
                    (B) identifies legal, regulatory, foreign policy, 
                or other challenges or considerations that prevent or 
                frustrate these efforts, to include any gaps in the 
                respective export control regimes implemented by United 
                Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 
                Australia, or Canada.
            (2) Form.--This report required under paragraph (1) shall 
        be unclassified, but may include a classified annex.

SEC. 607. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR SOUTHEAST ASIA MARITIME 
              SECURITY PROGRAMS AND DIPLOMATIC OUTREACH ACTIVITIES.

    (a) Southeast Asia Maritime Security Programs.--There are 
authorized to be appropriated to the Department of State for the 
Southeast Asia Maritime Security Initiative, the Southeast Asia 
Maritime Law Enforcement Initiative, and other related regional 
programs--
            (1) $50,000,000 for fiscal year 2022;
            (2) $60,000,000 for fiscal year 2023;
            (3) $75,000,000 for fiscal year 2024;
            (4) $90,000,000 for fiscal year 2025; and
            (5) $100,000,000 for fiscal year 2026.
    (b) Diplomatic Outreach Activities.--There is authorized to be 
appropriated to the Department of State, $1,000,000 for each of the 
fiscal years 2022 through 2026, which shall be used--
            (1) to conduct, in coordination with the Department of 
        Defense, outreach activities, including conferences and 
        symposia, to familiarize partner countries, particularly in the 
        Indo-Pacific region, with the United States' interpretation of 
        international law relating to freedom of the seas; and
            (2) to work with allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific 
        region to better align respective interpretations of 
        international law relating to freedom of the seas, including on 
        the matters of operations by military ships in exclusive 
        economic zones, innocent passage through territorial seas, and 
        transits through international straits.

SEC. 608. REPORT ON CHINA COAST GUARD.

    (a) Defined Term.--In this section, the term ``appropriate 
congressional committees'' means--
            (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;
            (2) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate;
            (3) the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 
        Affairs of the Senate;
            (4) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
        Representatives;
            (5) the Committee on Armed Services of the House of 
        Representatives; and
            (6) the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of 
        Representatives.
    (b) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the 
Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall 
submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the 
China Coast Guard (referred to in this section as the ``CCG'').
    (c) Matters To Be Included.--The report required under subsection 
(b) shall--
            (1) describe recent changes in the CCG's command structure, 
        including--
                    (A) its control under the Central Military 
                Commission's chain of command; and
                    (B) whether such changes undermine the CCG's claim 
                that it should be treated as a law enforcement entity;
            (2) assess the implications of the new command structure of 
        the CCG with respect to its role as a coercive tool in ``gray 
        zone'' activity in the East China Sea and in the South China 
        Sea;
            (3) assess how changes in the command structure of the CCG 
        may affect interactions between the United States Navy and the 
        United States Coast Guard with the CCG;
            (4) assess the implications for the United States and 
        regional allies of the Coast Guard Law of the People's Republic 
        of China, which went into effect on February 1, 2021; and
            (5) assess whether the CCG should be considered a military 
        force rather than a civilian law enforcement entity, and the 
        implications of such an assessment on United States policy.
    (d) Form of Report.--The report required under subsection (b) shall 
be unclassified, but may include a classified annex.

SEC. 609. REPORT ON CHINESE MILITARY ACTIVITY IN DJIBOUTI.

    (a) Defined Term.--In this section, the term ``appropriate 
congressional committees'' means--
            (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;
            (2) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate;
            (3) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
        Representatives; and
            (4) the Committee on Armed Services of the House of 
        Representatives.
    (b) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with 
the Secretary of State, shall submit a report to Congress regarding 
Chinese military activity in Djibouti.
    (c) Matters To Be Included.--The report required under subsection 
(b) shall include--
            (1) a summary of any incidents of harassment of United 
        States military and embassy personnel by any element within the 
        Government of the PRC; and
            (2) an evaluation of the extent to which the presence of 
        the PLA in Djibouti affects the United States military's 
        ability to operate in the region.
    (d) Form of Report.--The report required under subsection (b) shall 
be unclassified, but may include a classified annex.

SEC. 610. STATEMENT OF POLICY REGARDING UNIVERSAL IMPLEMENTATION OF 
              UNITED NATIONS SANCTIONS ON NORTH KOREA.

    It is the policy of the United States to sustain maximum economic 
pressure on the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea 
(referred to in this section as the ``DPRK'') until the regime 
undertakes complete, verifiable, and irreversible actions toward 
denuclearization, including by--
            (1) encouraging pressing all nations, including the PRC, to 
        implement and enforce existing United Nations sanctions with 
        regard to the DPRK;
            (2) pressing all nations, including the PRC, and in 
        accordance with United Nations Security Council resolutions, to 
        end the practice of hosting DPRK citizens as guest workers, 
        recognizing that such workers are demonstrated to constitute an 
        illicit source of revenue for the DPRK regime and its nuclear 
        ambitions;
            (3) pressing all nations, including the PRC, to pursue 
        rigorous interdiction of shipments to and from the DPRK, 
        including ship-to-ship transfers, consistent with United 
        Nations Security Council resolutions;
            (4) pressing the PRC and PRC entities--
                    (A) to cease business activities with United 
                Nations-designated entities and their affiliates in the 
                DPRK; and
                    (B) to expel from the PRC individuals who enable 
                the DPRK to acquire materials for its nuclear and 
                ballistic missile programs; and
            (5) enforcing United Nations Security Council resolutions 
        with respect to the DPRK and United States sanctions, including 
        those pursuant to the North Korea Sanctions and Policy 
        Enhancement Act of 2016 (Public Law 114-122), the Countering 
        America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (Public Law 115-
        44), the Otto Warmbier North Korea Nuclear Sanctions and 
        Enforcement Act of 2019 (title LXXI of division F of Public Law 
        116-92), and relevant United States executive orders.

                 TITLE VII--ENSURING STRATEGIC SECURITY

SEC. 701. FINDINGS ON STRATEGIC SECURITY AND ARMS CONTROL.

    Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) The United States and the PRC have a shared interest in 
        strategic security through enforceable arms control and non-
        proliferation agreements.
            (2) The United States has long pursued and continues to 
        seek effective, verifiable, and enforceable arms control and 
        nonproliferation agreements that support United States and 
        allied security by--
                    (A) controlling the spread of nuclear materials and 
                technology;
                    (B) placing limits on the production, stockpiling 
                and deployment of nuclear weapons;
                    (C) decreasing misperception and miscalculation; 
                and
                    (D) avoiding destabilizing nuclear arms 
                competition.
            (3) The PRC has long alleged that it does not seek to 
        compete in an arms race with nuclear superpowers. Its 2019 
        Defense White Paper states, ``China does not engage in any 
        nuclear arms race with any other country and keeps its nuclear 
        capabilities at the minimum level required for national 
        security.'' Yet, the behavior of the PRC suggests otherwise.
            (4) The PRC is pushing the boundaries of its traditional 
        posture of minimum deterrence as it expands and improves its 
        nuclear forces. The PRC's ``No First Use'' policy--which has 
        always been highly contingent and ambiguous--is increasingly in 
        doubt. The PRC's traditional goal of maintaining only a ``lean 
        and effective'' deterrent is called into question by the rapid 
        expansion of its forces.
            (5) In May 2019, Director of the Defense Intelligence 
        Agency Lieutenant General Robert Ashley stated, ``China is 
        likely to at least double the size of its nuclear stockpile in 
        the course of implementing the most rapid expansion and 
        diversification of its nuclear arsenal in China's history.''. 
        The PLA is building a full triad of modernized fixed and mobile 
        ground-based launchers, and new capabilities for nuclear-armed 
        bombers and submarine-launched ballistic missiles.
            (6) In June 2020, the Department of State raised concerns 
        in its annual ``Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, 
        Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments'' 
        report to Congress that the PRC is not complying with the 
        ``zero-yield'' nuclear testing ban and accused the PRC of 
        ``blocking the flow of data from the monitoring stations'' in 
        China.
            (7) The PRC is conducting research on its first potential 
        early warning radar, with technical cooperation from Russia. 
        This radar could indicate that the PRC is moving to a launch-on 
        warning posture.
            (8) The PRC plans to use its increasingly capable space, 
        cyber, and electronic warfare capabilities against United 
        States early warning systems and critical infrastructure in a 
        crisis scenario. This poses great risk to strategic security, 
        as it could lead to inadvertent escalation.
            (9) The PRC's nuclear expansion comes as a part of a 
        massive modernization of the PLA which, combined with the PLA's 
        aggressive actions, has increasingly destabilized the Indo-
        Pacific region.
            (10) The PLA Rocket Force (PLARF), which was elevated in 
        2015 to become a separate branch within the PLA, has formed 11 
        new missile brigades since May 2017, some of which are capable 
        of both conventional and nuclear strikes. Unlike the United 
        States, which separates its conventional strike and nuclear 
        capabilities, the PLARF appears to not only co-locate 
        conventional and nuclear forces, including dual-use missiles 
        like the DF-26, but to task the same unit with both nuclear and 
        conventional missions. Such intermingling could lead to 
        inadvertent escalation in a crisis. The United States Defense 
        Intelligence Agency determined in March 2020 that the PLA 
        tested more ballistic missiles than the rest of the world 
        combined in 2019.
            (11) Planned United States nuclear modernization efforts 
        will not increase the size of the United States nuclear 
        deterrent and the United States Program of Record remains 
        within the limits set by the Treaty between the United States 
        of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the 
        Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, 
        done at Prague April 8, 2010 (commonly known as the ``New START 
        Treaty'').
            (12) The United States' extended nuclear deterrence--
                    (A) provides critical strategic security around the 
                world;
                    (B) is an essential element of United States 
                military alliances; and
                    (C) serves a vital nonproliferation function.
            (13) United States declaratory policy has profound 
        implications for extended deterrence and alliance management. 
        Since the PRC has no formal treaty allies, the PLA has no 
        similar requirement for extended deterrence.
            (14) While the United States has concluded numerous arms 
        control agreements with Russia and has reduced its nuclear 
        stockpile by 85 percent, the PRC has repeatedly refused to 
        conduct arms control negotiations.
            (15) As a signatory to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation 
        of Nuclear Weapons, done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 
        1, 1968, the PRC is obligated under Article Six of the treaty 
        to pursue arms control negotiations in good faith.
            (16) In May and July 2019, President Trump called on the 
        PRC to participate in arms control negotiations, but the PRC 
        Foreign Ministry indicated that China would not participate in 
        such talks without further reductions by the United States and 
        Russia. In December 2019, the United States formally invited 
        the PRC to begin arms control negotiations, but the PRC also 
        rejected this invitation. In June 2020, the United States once 
        again invited the PRC to join talks with the Russian Federation 
        in Vienna, but the PRC declined.
            (17) The governments of Poland, Slovenia, Denmark, Norway, 
        Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, the Netherlands, Romania, Austria, 
        Albania, and the Deputy Secretary General of the North Atlantic 
        Treaty Organization have all encouraged the PRC to join arms 
        control discussions.

SEC. 702. COOPERATION ON A STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DIALOGUE.

    (a) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United States--
            (1) to pursue, in coordination with United States allies, 
        arms control negotiations and sustained and regular engagement 
        with the PRC--
                    (A) to enhance understanding of each other's 
                respective nuclear policies, doctrine, and 
                capabilities;
                    (B) to improve transparency; and
                    (C) to help manage the risks of miscalculation and 
                misperception;
            (2) to pursue relevant capabilities in coordination with 
        our allies and partners to ensure the security of United States 
        and allied interests in the face of the PRC's military 
        modernization and expansion, including--
                    (A) ground-launched cruise and ballistic missiles;
                    (B) integrated air and missile defense;
                    (C) hypersonic missiles;
                    (D) intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance;
                    (E) space-based capabilities;
                    (F) cyber capabilities; and
                    (G) command, control, and communications;
            (3) to maintain sufficient force structure, posture, and 
        capabilities to provide extended nuclear deterrence assurances 
        to United States allies and partners;
            (4) to maintain appropriate missile defense capabilities to 
        protect threats to the United States homeland and our forces 
        across the theater from rogue intercontinental ballistic 
        missiles from the Indo-Pacific region; and
            (5) to ensure that the United States declaratory policy 
        reflects the requirements of extended deterrence, to both 
        assure allies and to preserve its nonproliferation benefits.
    (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) in the midst of growing competition between the United 
        States and the PRC, it is in the interest of both nations to 
        cooperate in insulating their nuclear forces from such 
        dynamics, and thereby reduce risks of escalation;
            (2) a physical, cyber, electronic, or any other PLA attack 
        on United States early warning satellites, other portions of 
        the nuclear command and control enterprise, or critical 
        infrastructure poses a high risk to inadvertent but rapid 
        escalation;
            (3) no PRC territory used to stage attacks on the United 
        States or its allies should be considered safe from potential 
        retaliation;
            (4) PRC leaders are unlikely to view any United States 
        adoption of a ``no first use'' or ``sole purpose'' declaratory 
        policy as credible, and are thus unlikely to change their 
        behavior in a crisis if the United States adopted such a 
        policy;
            (5) United States allies and partners are likely to view 
        any United States adoption of a ``no first use'' or ``sole 
        purpose'' declaratory policy as a weakening of United States 
        security commitments, undermining our long-term alliances 
        across the region;
            (6) the United States and its allies should promote 
        international norms on military operations in space, the 
        employment of cyber capabilities, and the military use of 
        artificial intelligence, as an element of risk reduction 
        regarding nuclear command and control; and
            (7) United States allies and partners should share the 
        burden of promoting and protecting such norms by voting against 
        the PRC's proposals regarding the weaponization of space, 
        highlighting unsafe behavior by the PRC that violates 
        international norms, such as in rendezvous and proximity 
        operations, and promoting responsible behavior in space and all 
        other domains.

SEC. 703. AGREEMENTS.

    (a) Submission.--The text of any agreement concluded under the 
authorities provided under this title shall be submitted to the 
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on 
Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives not later than 60 days 
after any notice of intent to be formally bound by the terms of such 
agreement.
    (b) Effective Date.--Each agreement described in subsection (a) 
shall be legally effective and binding upon the United States, in 
accordance with the terms provided in the agreement, beginning on--
            (1) the date on which appropriate implementing legislation 
        is enacted into law, which shall provide for the approval of 
        the specific agreement or agreements, including attachments, 
        annexes, and supporting documentation; or
            (2) if the agreement is concluded and submitted as a 
        treaty, the date on which such treaty is ratified by the 
        Senate.
                                 <all>