Title: Bunker Buster Act
Policy area: International Affairs

Summary:
Bunker Buster Act
This bill authorizes the President take certain actions to help Israel prepare for all contingencies if Iran seeks to develop a nuclear weapon, if certain conditions are met.
The President may take such actions, including storing in Israel large ordnance systems designed to destroy underground nuclear infrastructure or supporting infrastructure construction in Israel to accommodate such ordnance systems only if, among other requirements, the President certifies to Congress that the action is vital to U.S. national security interests.
The President may transfer such ordnance systems to Israel upon making additional certifications, including a certification that Israel has no other means of destroying Iran's underground nuclear infrastructure.

[Congressional Bills 117th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 7148 Introduced in House (IH)]

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117th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 7148

To authorize the President to take actions to ensure Israel is prepared 
 for all contingencies if Iran seeks to develop a nuclear weapon, and 
                          for other purposes.


_______________________________________________________________________


                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             March 18, 2022

  Mr. Gottheimer (for himself and Mr. Mast) introduced the following 
      bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL


 
To authorize the President to take actions to ensure Israel is prepared 
 for all contingencies if Iran seeks to develop a nuclear weapon, and 
                          for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Bunker Buster Act''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

    Congress finds the following:
            (1) The United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission defines 
        ``high-enriched uranium'' as uranium enriched to at least 20 
        percent uranium-235.
            (2) Under the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, Iran 
        agreed to refrain from producing enriched uranium containing 
        more than 3.67 percent uranium-235 for 15 years.
            (3) On January 13, 2019, the head of the Atomic Energy 
        Organization of Iran, Dr. Ali Akbar Salehi, told the Fars News 
        Agency, ``If we want to come out of the nuclear deal and 
        produce, within four days we could start our 20 percent.''.
            (4) On June 17, 2019, the spokesman for Iran's Atomic 
        Energy Organization, Behrouz Kamalvandi, suggested that Iran's 
        enrichment could reach up to 20 percent.
            (5) On April 16, 2021, the head of the Atomic Energy 
        Organization of Iran, Dr. Ali Akbar Salehi, told the state 
        television that Iran had begun enriching uranium to 60 percent.
            (6) On July 14, 2021, the former President of Iran, 
        President Hassan Rouhani, says during a press conference that 
        Iran has the knowledge and ability to enrich weapons-grade 
        uranium at 90 percent.
            (7) On September 7, 2021, the International Atomic Energy 
        Agency warned in their quarterly report of the knowledge gained 
        by Iran about advanced centrifuge performance and higher-level 
        enrichment that cannot be fully reversed. The report showed 
        that the stockpile of 60 percent enriched uranium grew from 2.4 
        kilograms in May to 10 kilograms. It also indicated Iran 
        reconfigured its 60 percent production lines at Natanz and 
        appears to be enriching to that level more efficiently and 
        consistently.

SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

    It is the sense of Congress that the United States should--
            (1) seek to extend the limitations on Iran's enriched 
        uranium, including through engagement in multilateral 
        diplomatic initiatives;
            (2) ensure that Israel and other allies are prepared for 
        all contingencies if Iran pursues development of a nuclear 
        weapon;
            (3) send a clear signal to Iran that development of a 
        nuclear weapon will never be tolerated; and
            (4) reaffirm the United States commitment to deter Iranian 
        nuclear development with a credible military threat.

SEC. 4. STUDY AND REPORT.

    (a) Study.--The President, acting through the Secretary of Defense, 
shall seek to conduct a study with the Government of Israel on Israeli 
military requirements to defend itself against a wide range of threats 
to Israel's qualitative military edge (as such term is defined in 
section 36(h)(3) of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2776(h)(3))) 
and national security, including an Iranian nuclear weapon. Such study 
shall include an analysis of gaps in Israel's security requirements, 
including infrastructure, munitions, intelligence sharing, satellites, 
and the extent to which the transfer of United States ordnance to 
Israel would advance the national interests of both countries.
    (b) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the President shall transmit to Congress a 
report that contains the results of the study described in subsection 
(a).
    (c) Form.--The report referred to in subsection (b) shall be 
submitted in unclassified form but may include a classified annex.

SEC. 5. ACTIONS TO ENSURE ISRAEL IS PREPARED FOR ALL CONTINGENCIES IF 
              IRAN SEEKS TO DEVELOP A NUCLEAR WEAPON.

    (a) In General.--Subject to the preliminary conditions described in 
subsection (b), the President is authorized to take the actions 
described in subsection (c), upon the request of the Government of 
Israel, to ensure Israel is prepared for all contingencies if Iran 
seeks to develop a nuclear weapon.
    (b) Preliminary Conditions.--The President may exercise the 
authority of subsection (a) only if the President first determines and 
certifies to Congress that--
            (1) it is consistent with the results of the study and 
        report required under section 4 to do so; and
            (2) it is vital to the national security interests of the 
        United States to do so.
    (c) Actions Described.--The actions described in this subsection 
are the following:
            (1) To provide for the construction of infrastructure in 
        Israel to accommodate large ordnance systems that are designed 
        to destroy underground nuclear infrastructure, including--
                    (A) construction of extended runways for aircraft 
                that carry the Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP);
                    (B) basing options for such aircraft; and
                    (C) munition storage facilities.
            (2)(A) To store in the territory of Israel the MOP or 
        related munitions described in paragraph (1), to be used by the 
        United States except as provided in subparagraph (B).
            (B) To transfer the MOP or related munitions described in 
        paragraph (1) to Israeli custody if the President determines 
        and certifies to Congress that--
                    (i) Iran--
                            (I) is in noncompliance with the NPT 
                        Safeguards Agreement;
                            (II) has modified its implementation of the 
                        NPT Safeguards Agreement (including modified 
                        Code 3.1); or
                            (III) as determined by the President, has 
                        reduced access of inspectors of the Agency in 
                        such a manner so as to be prejudicial to the 
                        Agency's ability to provide confidence as to 
                        the non-diversion of declared nuclear material 
                        and absence of undeclared nuclear activities;
                    (ii) it is vital to the national security of the 
                United States to do so;
                    (iii) Israel has no other means to achieve a mutual 
                national security objective of destroying Iran's 
                underground nuclear infrastructure or facilities; and
                    (iv) a dual key control system is in place 
                requiring approval by the President, acting through the 
                Secretary of Defense (which may not be further 
                delegated) for deployment of the MOP or related 
                munitions described in paragraph (1) prior to Israeli 
                deployment of such munitions.
            (3) To provide for training of Israeli personnel with 
        respect to the MOP or related munitions described in paragraph 
        (1).
            (4) To conduct joint research and development with Israel 
        to--
                    (A) enhance United States ordnance; and
                    (B) develop Israeli capability for ordnance to 
                destroy underground infrastructure, including Hezbollah 
                rocket storage and manufacturing facilities and 
                underground Iranian nuclear facilities.
    (d) NPT Safeguards Agreement Defined.--In this section, the term 
``NPT Safeguards Agreement'' means the Agreement between Iran and the 
International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in 
Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 
which entered into force on May 15, 1974.

SEC. 6. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.

    Nothing in this Act may be construed to serve as an authorization 
for the use of military force against Iran.
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