Title: Modernizing America’s Missile Defense Act of 2019
Policy area: Armed Forces and National Security

Summary:
Modernizing America's Missile Defense Act of 2019
This bill directs the Department of Defense to generally incorporate non-ballistic systems (e.g., hypersonic and cruise missiles) into its missile defense strategies and to test and report on specified space-based and ground-based missile defense technology.

[Congressional Bills 116th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 1690 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

<DOC>






116th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                S. 1690

   To improve United States missile defense, and for other purposes.


_______________________________________________________________________


                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                 May 23 (legislative day, May 22), 2019

  Mr. Sullivan (for himself and Mr. Manchin) introduced the following 
   bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Armed 
                                Services

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL


 
   To improve United States missile defense, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Modernizing America's Missile 
Defense Act of 2019''.

SEC. 2. EXPANSION OF NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE POLICY AND PROGRAM 
              REDESIGNATION.

    (a) Findings.--Congress finds that the 2019 Missile Defense 
Review--
            (1) is fully aligned with the 2017 National Security 
        Strategy (NSS), the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS), and 
        the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR);
            (2) establishes a policy framework for United States 
        missile defense that is responsive to new threats and exploits 
        new approaches to the defensive mission;
            (3) adopts a balanced and integrated approach to countering 
        missile threats through a combination of deterrence, active and 
        passive missile defenses, and attack operations;
            (4) is entitled the ``Missile Defense Review'' (MDR) 
        because of the expanding offensive missile threat includes 
        nonballistic systems, such as advanced cruise missiles and 
        hypersonic weapons;
            (5) states that the United States, allies, and partners 
        will pursue a comprehensive missile defense strategy that will 
        deliver integrated and effective capabilities to counter 
        ballistic, cruise, and hypersonic missile threats; and
            (6) hedges against future unanticipated offensive missile 
        threats and pledges to develop and field innovative and 
        advanced missile defense capabilities to counter future 
        threats.
    (b) Sense of the Senate.--It is the Sense of the Senate that--
            (1) the United States must continue to pursue a 
        comprehensive missile defense strategy that will deliver 
        integrated and effective capabilities to counter ballistic, 
        cruise, and hypersonic missile threats;
            (2) adversaries are quickly expanding the capabilities of 
        their existing missile systems, adding new and unprecedented 
        types of missile capabilities to their arsenals, and further 
        integrating offensive missiles into their coercive threats, 
        military exercises, and war planning;
            (3) both Russia and China are rapidly enhancing their 
        existing offensive missile systems and developing advanced sea-
        , ground-, and air-launched cruise missiles as well as 
        hypersonic capabilities;
            (4) due to the proliferation of offensive ballistic and 
        cruise missiles and the emergence of game-changing hypersonic 
        weapons technologies, all of which threaten regional balances, 
        our allies and partners, United States deployed armed forces, 
        and the United States homeland, missile defenses become an even 
        more critical element of United States strategy; and
            (5) the United States must outpace adversary offensive 
        missile capabilities.
    (c) Expansion of Policy.--Section 1681(a) of the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (Public Law 114-328; 10 U.S.C. 
2431 note) is amended by striking ``ballistic missile threat'' and 
inserting ``ballistic, cruise, and hypersonic missile threats''.
    (d) Redesignation Requirement.--Not later than the date on which 
the President submits to Congress pursuant to section 1105 of title 31, 
United States Code, the annual budget request of the President for 
fiscal year 2021, the Secretary of Defense shall, as the Secretary 
considers appropriate, redesignate all strategies, policies, programs, 
and systems under the jurisdiction of the Secretary to reflect that 
missile defense programs of the United States defend against ballistic, 
cruise, and hypersonic missiles in all phases of flight.

SEC. 3. ACCELERATION OF THE DEPLOYMENT OF PERSISTENT SPACE-BASED SENSOR 
              ARCHITECTURE.

    (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) The Missile Defense Agency currently operates the Space 
        Tracking and Surveillance System-Demonstration (STSS-D), a two-
        satellite constellation for testing purposes, which uses 
        sensors capable of detecting visible and infrared light and 
        serves as an experimental space tracker for the ballistic 
        missile defense system.
            (2) Conceptually developed in 2009, the Precision Tracking 
        Space System (PTSS) would have provided the persistent space-
        based tracking of ballistic missiles, including object 
        characterization and discrimination, and would have also 
        supported homeland, regional, and theater missile defense.
            (3) Projected to enter orbit in 2018, the Missile Defense 
        Agency and the Applied Physics Laboratory of Johns Hopkins 
        University is currently conducting a Space-Based Kill 
        Assessment (SKA) experiment, a network of small sensors hosted 
        on commercial satellites, used to collect the energy signature 
        of the impact between a ballistic missile threat and an 
        interceptor from the ballistic missile defense system.
            (4) Section 236 of the National Defense Authorization Act 
        for Fiscal Year 2014 (127 Stat. 715; Public Law 113-66) 
        required the Secretary of Defense to conduct an evaluation of 
        options and alternatives for future sensor architectures for 
        ballistic missile defense in order to enhance the ballistic 
        missile defense capabilities of the United States.
            (5) General John Hyten, Commander of the United States 
        Strategic Command, has argued for the ``deployment of a global 
        space-based sensor system with discrimination capability'' as a 
        ``critical component to improving the effectiveness of our 
        deployed interceptors'' to ``conduct both the characterization 
        of these new threats . . . as well as discriminate better and 
        earlier the mid-course element of the threat that exists 
        today'', and finally to ``target against . . . hypersonic 
        capabilities [and] other capabilities in the boost phase.''.
            (6) General O'Shaughnessy, Commander of the United States 
        Northern Command, stated that--
                    (A) ``A space-based sensor network will provide far 
                greater coverage, survivability, and persistence--all 
                of which are necessary to maintaining confidence in our 
                ability to deter, detect, and defeat missile threats to 
                the homeland.'';
                    (B) ``We must take prudent steps now to ensure our 
                next generation defensive capabilities to include a 
                space-based sensing layer [are] not late to need.''; 
                and
                    (C) ``The space-based sensing layer . . . is of the 
                highest urgency [and] that we gain that capability as 
                soon as possible because our adversaries are actively 
                developing these weapons as we speak.''.
            (7) General Samuel Greaves, a former Director of the 
        Missile Defense Agency, has stated that--
                    (A) space provides the critical vantage point 
                necessary to address rapidly advancing threats across 
                multiple regions of interest and the only vantage point 
                for global persistence to address warfighter 
                requirements;
                    (B) a space-based sensor layer consisting of two 
                separate constellations, one for tracking and 
                discriminating ballistic missiles and one for tracking 
                dim ballistic targets and hypersonic missiles, would 
                enable the United States to use interceptor inventory 
                more efficiently and effectively to counter a broad 
                array of threats; and
                    (C) space-based sensors are ``absolutely critical 
                for the real threat that we see in front of us, the 
                hypersonic threat''.
            (8) Admiral James Syring, a former Director of the Missile 
        Defense Agency, has stated, ``From a missile defense 
        perspective, we have to develop a future operational space 
        layer. Given where the threat is going with hypersonics and 
        more ICBMs and so forth this persistent tracking and 
        discrimination capability from space is a must.''.
            (9) The Department of Defense's 2019 Missile Defense Review 
        states that--
                    (A) the exploitation of space provides a missile 
                defense posture that is more effective, resilient, and 
                adaptable to known and unanticipated threats;
                    (B) space-based sensors, for example, can monitor, 
                detect, and track missile launches from locations 
                almost anywhere on the globe--they enjoy a measure of 
                flexibility of movement that is unimpeded by the 
                constraints that geographic limitations impose on 
                terrestrial sensors; and
                    (C) unlike land-based sensors, space sensors do not 
                require basing rights or agreements with foreign states 
                enabling them to be placed where necessary to achieve 
                the ideal viewing geometry for launch detection, 
                missile tracking, threat discrimination, and intercept 
                detection/kill assessment of missile threats to the 
                United States homeland, our forces abroad, and to our 
                allies and partners.
    (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the two most recently enacted National Defense 
        Authorization Acts have expressed support for a space-based 
        missile defense sensor program;
            (2) the Secretary of Defense should rapidly develop and 
        deploy a persistent, space-based sensor architecture to ensure 
        missile defenses of the United States are more effective 
        against ballistic missile threats and more responsive to 
        emergent threats from hypersonic and cruise missiles;
            (3) the responsibility for developing and deploying a 
        hypersonic and ballistic tracking space sensor should remain 
        within the Director of the Missile Defense Agency; and
            (4) the Director of the Missile Defense Agency should 
        deploy a hypersonic and ballistic tracking space sensor 
        constellation as soon as technically feasible.
    (c) Assignment of Primary Responsibility for Development and 
Deployment of the Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor.--Not 
later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the 
Secretary shall--
            (1) assign the Director of the Missile Defense Agency with 
        the principal responsibility for the development and deployment 
        of a hypersonic and ballistic tracking space sensor; and
            (2) submit to the congressional defense committees 
        certification of such assignment.
    (d) Certification Regarding Funding of Hypersonic and Ballistic 
Tracking Space Sensor Program.--At the same time that the President 
submits to Congress pursuant to section 1105 of title 31, United States 
Code, the annual budget request of the President for fiscal year 2021, 
the Under Secretary of Defense Comptroller and the Director for Cost 
Assessment and Program Evaluation shall jointly certify to the 
congressional defense committees whether the hypersonic and ballistic 
tracking space sensor program is sufficiently funded in the Future-
Years Defense Program for the Missile Defense Agency.
    (e) Deployment Deadline.--Section 1683(a) of the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 (Public Law 115-91; 10 U.S.C. 
2431 note) is amended--
            (1) by striking ``(a) In General.--'' and inserting the 
        following:
    ``(a) Development, Testing, and Deployment.--
            ``(1) Development.--''; and
            (2) by adding at the end the following new paragraphs:
            ``(2) Testing and deployment.--The Director shall begin on-
        orbit testing of a hypersonic and ballistic tracking space 
        sensor no later than December 31, 2021, with full operational 
        deployment as soon as technically feasible thereafter.
            ``(3) Waiver.--The Secretary of Defense may waive the 
        deadline for testing specified in paragraph (2) if the 
        Secretary submits to the congressional defense committees a 
        report containing--
                    ``(A) the explanation why the Secretary cannot meet 
                such deadline;
                    ``(B) the technical risks and estimated cost of 
                accelerating the program to attempt to meet such 
                deadline;
                    ``(C) an assessment of threat systems that could 
                not be detected or tracked persistently due to waiving 
                such deadline; and
                    ``(D) a plan, including a timeline, for beginning 
                the required testing.''.
    (f) Report on Progress.--
            (1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall 
        submit to the congressional defense committees a report on the 
        progress of all efforts being made by the Missile Defense 
        Agency, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, the Air 
        Force, and the Space Development Agency relating to space-based 
        sensing and tracking capabilities for missile defense and how 
        each of such organizations will work together to avoid 
        duplication of efforts.
            (2) Form.--The report required by paragraph (1) shall be 
        submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified 
        annex.

SEC. 4. NONSTANDARD ACQUISITION PROCESSES OF MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY.

    (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) In 2002, four years prior to North Korea's Taepodong-2 
        ICBM/SLV test in 2006, the Department of Defense directed the 
        Missile Defense Agency to utilize flexible acquisition 
        approaches to quickly develop missile defense capabilities, 
        which led to the fielding of an initial operational homeland 
        missile defense system by the fall of 2004.
            (2) The Department of Defense's 2018 National Defense 
        Strategy states that the Department of Defense must ``[d]eliver 
        performance at the speed of relevance [and to] prioritize speed 
        of delivery, continuous adaptation, and frequent modular 
        upgrades.''.
            (3) The Department of Defense's 2019 Missile Defense Review 
        states that--
                    (A) the Department must adopt processes and 
                cultures that enable the Missile Defense Agency and the 
                military departments to deliver missile defense 
                capabilities faster, learn from failure and rapidly 
                adjust, and swiftly adapt systems once fielded;
                    (B) the Department cannot meet this goal by 
                returning the Missile Defense Agency to the standard 
                acquisition and requirements generation processes; and
                    (C) the Department must instead continue to 
                streamline and refine acquisition processes and ensure 
                flexibility in the development, testing, and fielding 
                of missile defenses.
            (4) General Greaves, the former Director of the Missile 
        Defense Agency, stated that--
                    (A) the Missile Defense Agency understands the 
                importance of innovating, developing, and delivering 
                new missile defense capabilities quickly, accelerating 
                where possible missile defense acquisition timelines 
                while adhering to sound acquisition principles; and
                    (B) United States missile defenses must be 
                responsive to existing and new threats and leverage new 
                approaches to the homeland and regional defensive 
                missions by delivering capabilities faster, learning 
                from failures to make rapid adjustments, and swiftly 
                adapting our systems once they are fielded.
    (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense Congress that--
            (1) in order for the Department of Defense to provide more 
        lethal capabilities at the speed of relevance, the Department 
        needs to ensure its acquisition processes continue to fulfill 
        the needs of members of the Armed Forces now and in the future;
            (2) significant defense acquisition reforms enacted over 
        the past three National Defense Authorization Acts have 
        improved access to nontraditional and commercial innovation and 
        to expanded flexible acquisition authorities in the development 
        of alternative acquisition pathways to acquire critical 
        national security capabilities;
            (3) the Department appropriately recognized the Missile 
        Defense Agency for its acquisition success by presenting it 
        with the 2018 David Packard Excellence in Acquisition Award for 
        the development of the Space-Based Kill Assessment (SKA) 
        program and the Missile Defense Agency should be commended for 
        its numerous and rapid acquisition successes;
            (4) the recently completed Missile Defense Review 
        explicitly highlights, in stark terms, the threat posed to the 
        United States by ballistic and hypersonic missile threats; and
            (5) the Missile Defense Agency should maintain its 
        nonstandard acquisition authorities in order to continue to 
        rapidly design, test, and deliver critically needed defensive 
        capabilities to the warfighter.
    (c) Changes to Nonstandard Acquisition Processes and 
Responsibilities.--
            (1) Limitation.--None of the funds authorized to be 
        appropriated by this Act may be obligated or expended to change 
        the nonstandard acquisition processes and responsibilities 
        described in paragraph (2) until the Secretary--
                    (A) has consulted with the Under Secretary of 
                Defense for Engineering and Policy, the secretaries of 
                the military departments, the Chairman of the Joint 
                Chiefs of Staff, the Commander of United States 
                Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), the Commander of United 
                States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), and the Director 
                of the Missile Defense Agency;
                    (B) certifies to the congressional defense 
                committees that the Secretary has coordinated the 
                changes with and received the views of the individuals 
                referred to in subparagraph (A);
                    (C) submits to the congressional defense committees 
                a report describing the changes, the rationale for the 
                changes, and the views of the individuals referred to 
                in subparagraph (A) with respect to such changes; and
                    (D) a period of 270 days has elapsed since 
                submittal of the report under subparagraph (C).
            (2) Nonstandard acquisition processes and responsibilities 
        described.--The nonstandard acquisition processes and 
        responsibilities described in this paragraph are such processes 
        and responsibilities described in--
                    (A) the memorandum of the Secretary of Defense 
                titled ``Missile Defense Program Direction'' signed on 
                January 2, 2002; and
                    (B) Department of Defense Directive 5134.09, as in 
                effect on the date of the enactment of this Act.

SEC. 5. PLAN FOR THE REDESIGNED KILL VEHICLE.

    (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the ground-based midcourse defense system is the only 
        system capable of defending the United States from long-range 
        ballistic missile threats and is critical to our national 
        security;
            (2) the redesigned kill vehicle for the ground-based 
        interceptor is a top priority for the Missile Defense Agency 
        and a critical element to increasing system reliability to 
        build warfighter confidence;
            (3) the Missile Defense Agency must continue to leverage 
        mature technologies from proven fielded components in a modular 
        design to reduce the number of production processes and improve 
        reliability, producibility, and maintainability of the 
        redesigned kill vehicle;
            (4) the consensus among senior Department of Defense 
        experts on missile defense, including General Terrance 
        O'Shaughnessy, Commander of the United States Northern Command, 
        and Lieutenant General Greaves, the Director the Missile 
        Defense Agency, is that the redesigned kill vehicle will make 
        homeland defenses much more robust and will improve our ability 
        to defend the homeland of the United States;
            (5) the Redesigned Kill Vehicle Program is vital to 
        providing the warfighter with a more reliable and effective 
        capability to defend the homeland from long-rage ballistic 
        missile threats; and
            (6) the Missile Defense Agency should be commended for its 
        rigorous and disciplined acquisition and engineering processes 
        it has applied to the Redesigned Kill Vehicle Program.
    (b) Report Required.--The Director of the Missile Defense Agency 
shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report on the 
delay in the Redesigned Kill Vehicle Program.
    (c) Elements.--The report required by subsection (b) shall include 
the following:
            (1) A description of the reason for the delay.
            (2) An overview of the revised program schedule including a 
        revised test plan and revised acquisition strategy.
            (3) A detailed description of any recommendations that 
        could be utilized to accelerate the scheduled fielding 
        including modifications to the acquisition strategy or the 
        procurement and assembly of long-lead materials unaffected by 
        the reason for the delay.
            (4) A timeline associated with such recommendations.
            (5) Additional funding required to carry out such 
        recommendations.
            (6) An assessment of risk associated with such 
        recommendations.
            (7) A description of any recommendations that were 
        submitted to the Director by contractors that the Director 
        considers reasonable but were not adopted.
            (8) An explanation as to why the recommendations described 
        in paragraph (7) were not adopted.
    (d) Form of Report.--The report required under subsection (b) shall 
be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex.

SEC. 6. REPORT ON IMPROVING GROUND-BASED MIDCOURSE DEFENSE ELEMENT OF 
              BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM.

    (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) A report from Johns Hopkins University, published in 
        2015, and entitled ``North Korea's Nuclear Futures: Technology 
        and Strategy'', concluded that, by 2020, North Korea could have 
        as many as 100 nuclear weapons.
            (2) Currently, the United States will have 44 operational 
        ground-based interceptors distributed between Fort Greely, 
        Alaska, and Vandenberg Air Force Base, California.
            (3) Section 1686 of the National Defense Authorization Act 
        for Fiscal Year 2018 (Public Law 115-91; 10 U.S.C. 2431 note) 
        authorizes up 28 additional ground-based interceptors (GBIs) 
        and begins the deployment of 20 additional ground-based 
        interceptors to Fort Greely.
            (4) In September 2017, Congress approved a Department of 
        Defense reprogramming of fiscal year 2017 funding of more than 
        $400,000,000 to counter the North Korean missile threat.
            (5) In November 2017, the President submitted an amendment 
        to his fiscal year 2018 budget request, which Congress 
        subsequently approved, for $4,000,000,000 for missile defeat 
        and defense, including funding to begin the construction of a 
        new missile field at Fort Greely, Alaska, and additional 
        procurement funding necessary for 20 new ground-based 
        interceptors.
            (6) The 2000 Final Environmental Impact Statement for Fort 
        Greely included the authorization for up to 100 ground-based 
        interceptors to ensure that growth would not incur any 
        unexpected environmental delays.
            (7) The current maximum potential capacity for ground-based 
        interceptors is 104, with up to 100 at Fort Greely, and 4 at 
        Vandenberg Air Force Base.
    (b) Report Required.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Director of the Missile Defense Agency shall 
submit to the congressional defense committees a report on--
            (1) the options to increase the capability, capacity, and 
        reliability of the ground-based midcourse defense element of 
        the United States ballistic missile defense system; and
            (2) the infrastructure requirements for increasing the 
        number of ground-based interceptors as part of such element.
    (c) Contents.--The report required by subsection (b) shall include 
the following:
            (1) An assessment of the requirements of the ground-based 
        midcourse defense element of the United States ballistic 
        missile defense system to meet threats outlined in the 2018 
        National Defense Strategy and the 2019 Missile Defense Review.
            (2) An assessment of the feasibility of fielding up to 104 
        ground-based interceptors as part of such element, including a 
        description of the additional infrastructure and components 
        needed to further outfit missile fields at Fort Greely, Alaska.
            (3) A cost estimate of such infrastructure and components.
            (4) An estimated schedule for completing such construction 
        as may be required for such infrastructure and components.
            (5) An identification of any environmental assessments or 
        impact studies that would need to be conducted to expand 
        missile fields at Fort Greely beyond current capacity.
            (6) A determination of the appropriate fleet mix of ground-
        based interceptor kill vehicles and boosters to maximize 
        overall system effectiveness and increase its capacity and 
        capability, including the costs and benefits of continued 
        inclusion of capability enhancement II block 1 interceptors 
        after the fielding of the redesigned kill vehicle.
            (7) The modernization requirements for the ground-based 
        midcourse system, including all command and control, ground 
        systems, sensors and sensor interfaces, boosters and kill 
        vehicles, and integration of known future systems and 
        components.
            (8) A discussion of the obsolescence of such systems and 
        components.
            (9) The industrial base requirements relating to the 
        ground-based midcourse system, as determined by the Director of 
        the Missile Defense Agency.
            (10) Such other matters as the Director considers 
        appropriate.
    (d) Form.--The report submitted under subsection (b) shall be 
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

SEC. 7. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON RECENT MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY TESTS.

    It is the sense of Congress that the Office of the Under Secretary 
of Defense for Research and Engineering, the Missile Defense Agency, 
the Office of the Director for Operational Test and Evaluation, the 
operational test agencies, the military departments, and warfighters 
should--
            (1) be strongly commended for a highly successful 2018 
        flight test campaign, which consisted of 13 total flight test 
        events including--
                    (A) FTX-35, which successfully proved 
                interoperability between Terminal High Altitude Area 
                Defense (THAAD) and the Phased Array Tracking Radar to 
                Intercept on Target (PATRIOT) to detect and track a 
                simulated engagement with a short-range ballistic 
                missile;
                    (B) Pacific Dragon 2018, which successfully 
                demonstrated joint ballistic missile defense 
                interoperability with Japan and Korea to engage a 
                short-range ballistic missile with a Standard Missile 3 
                (SM-3) Block IB by a Japanese ship and an Aegis Ashore 
                site;
                    (C) JFTM-5, which successfully demonstrated the 
                intercept of a short-range ballistic missile with a 
                Standard Missile 3 Block IB threat upgrade from a 
                Japanese ship;
                    (D) FTM-45, which successfully demonstrated the 
                intercept of a medium-range ballistic missile with a 
                Standard Missile 3 Block IIA from a United States ship; 
                and
                    (E) FTI-03, which as a part of the operational test 
                of the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) Phase 3 
                architecture, successfully demonstrated the intercept 
                of an intermediate-range ballistic missile using the 
                Aegis Weapon System's Engage-on-Remote capability;
            (2) be especially recognized for the success of FTG-11, the 
        first salvo test of the United States Ground-based Midcourse 
        Defense system, during which two ground-based interceptors were 
        launched nearly simultaneously from the same location and 
        successfully intercepted a threat-representative 
        intercontinental ballistic missile target, and then the next 
        most lethal object;
            (3) continue to pursue an increasingly rigorous testing 
        regime for all elements of the Ballistic Missile Defense 
        System, in coordination with the Office of the Director, 
        Operational Test and Evaluation, to more rapidly deliver 
        capabilities to the warfighter as the threat evolves;
            (4) not consider tests which do not achieve an intercept or 
        the main objective as failures; and
            (5) recognize, in an effort to deliver capabilities at the 
        speed of relevance, the learning value of individual 
        advancements made by all test events, rather than viewing any 
        total outcome as an indication of the reliability of entire 
        missile defense systems.

SEC. 8. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON MISSILE DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT 
              PRIORITIES.

    It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the 2019 Missile Defense Review articulates a 
        comprehensive approach to preventing and defeating the rapidly 
        expanding offensive missile threat through a combination of 
        deterrence, active and passive missile defense, and attack 
        operations;
            (2) to counter the expanding offense missile capabilities 
        of potential adversaries and hedge against unanticipated 
        missile threats, the Secretary of Defense should aggressively 
        pursue new missile defense capabilities and examine concepts 
        and technologies for advanced missile defense systems;
            (3) the Secretary should fully implement the 2019 Missile 
        Defense Review's focus on increasing investments in and 
        deploying new technologies and concepts, including--
                    (A) the redesigned kill vehicle;
                    (B) a hypersonic and ballistic tracking space 
                sensor;
                    (C) hypersonic glide vehicle defense;
                    (D) directed energy for missile defense to include 
                laser scaling;
                    (E) the multi-object kill vehicle;
                    (F) a space-based missile intercept layer;
                    (G) improved Standard Missile 3 (SM-3) ballistic 
                missile interceptors;
                    (H) F-35 sensor suite missile defense integration;
                    (I) neutral particle beam; and
                    (J) missile defense capabilities from Missile 
                Defense Agency-configured airborne platforms, including 
                the discrimination sensor demonstrator; and
            (4) the Secretary should work to ensure that all missile 
        defense systems are more survivable, including through--
                    (A) more distributed air and missile defense 
                operations; and
                    (B) improved camouflage, concealment, and 
                deception, including emission control.
                                 <all>