Title: Stop UN Support for Assad Act of 2019
Policy area: International Affairs

Summary:
Stop UN Support for Assad Act of 2019
This bill prohibits U.S. funding for United Nations (U.N.) programs in Syria unless the Department of State certifies that certain conditions are met. Specifically, no such funding may be provided unless the State Department certifies that any U.N. program in Syria with U.S. funding (1) is delivered impartially to the areas of greatest need; (2) does not directly provide material support to Syria's government or related entities; (3) adheres to human-rights-related requirements for U.N. suppliers; and (4) is vetted by an independent review mechanism, if the program involves contracts in territory controlled by Syria's government.
Funding withheld from the U.N. under this bill shall be made available to the U.S. Agency for International Development's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance for assistance to populations in Syria in need.

[Congressional Bills 116th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 4868 Introduced in House (IH)]

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116th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 4868

  To certify that United States assistance to the United Nations for 
 humanitarian programs in the Syrian Arab Republic is not misdirected, 
                        and for other purposes.


_______________________________________________________________________


                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            October 28, 2019

Mr. Wilson of South Carolina (for himself, Mr. Kildee, Mr. Gonzalez of 
    Texas, and Mr. Chabot) introduced the following bill; which was 
              referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL


 
  To certify that United States assistance to the United Nations for 
 humanitarian programs in the Syrian Arab Republic is not misdirected, 
                        and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Stop UN Support for Assad Act of 
2019''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

    Congress finds the following:
            (1) The United States, which has been the biggest donor to 
        the United Nations (UN) Humanitarian Response in Syria, has 
        provided more than $6,000,000,000 for UN Syria programming 
        since 2011, including over $435,000,000 in fiscal year 2018 
        alone.
            (2) During the past eight years of conflict, the Assad 
        regime has repeatedly weaponized access to United Nations aid 
        in prolonged and unlawful sieges of civilians as part of a 
        widespread ``starve or surrender'' campaign, with the United 
        Nations estimating 975,000 Syrians under siege at the peak of 
        this strategy.
            (3) The United Nations Office for the Coordination of 
        Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) has reported repeated failures to 
        deliver aid to the hardest-hit areas due to such obstructions 
        by the Assad regime.
            (4) On February 12, 2018, former U.S. Ambassador to Syria 
        Robert Ford wrote of UN aid in Syria that ``it is clear the aid 
        is not neutral and is being used as a weapon by the Syrian 
        government.''.
            (5) The United Nations continues to procure goods and 
        services from several entities that have close ties to the 
        Assad regime, despite their role in supporting the Assad 
        regime's gross human rights violations and international 
        crimes--including torture, sexual violence, the targeting of 
        medical facilities, weaponized mass starvation, enforced 
        disappearance, and forced displacement--for which the United 
        Nations itself has found the Assad regime culpable.
            (6) A 2016 study of the UN Report of Procurement showed 
        that UN operations in Syria delivered $4 million to Syria's 
        state-owned fuel industry, $5 million to blood banks operated 
        by the Syrian Arab Army for the benefit of its troops, and $8.5 
        million to charities co-opted by members of the Assad family.
            (7) International NGOs working with the United Nations are 
        forced to select local partners, many of which are controlled 
        by the Assad family and inner circle, from a government-
        approved list, therefore allowing these actors to profit from 
        humanitarian relief efforts and perpetuate the conflict, 
        international crimes, and human rights violations.
            (8) The Assad regime compels the United Nations to house 
        its 150 international staff in the Four Seasons Hotel Damascus 
        where, since 2016, the United Nations has spent more than 
        $26,000 a night, equalling nearly $10 million a year.
            (9) On June 11, 2019, the United States Treasury Department 
        sanctioned the Four Seasons Hotel in Damascus for its role in 
        fueling an illicit network benefitting the Assad regime, and 
        also sanctioned its owner Samer Foz a businessman who is 
        ``directly supporting the murderous Assad regime and building 
        luxury developments on land stolen from those fleeing his 
        brutality'', according to U.S. Treasury Undersecretary Sigal 
        Mandelker; the European Union likewise sanctioned Foz for 
        funding the Military Security Shield Forces, a pro-government 
        militia responsible for severe human rights abuses.
            (10) United Nation agencies and international NGOs are 
        required to purchase mobile phones from Syriatel, a company 
        owned by Rami Makhlouf, a cousin of Bashar al-Assad who is 
        sanctioned for corruption and whose involvement in human rights 
        abuses in Syria is well documented.
            (11) The Assad regime has regularly siphoned humanitarian 
        funds for the war effort and bypassed international sanctions 
        through exploiting humanitarian exemptions.
            (12) On July 15, 2019, United Nations High Commissioner for 
        Refugees (UNHCR) Middle East Director Amin Awad recognized in 
        an interview with The National that the United Nations has no 
        procedure for assessing ownership and partnerships of suppliers 
        it uses for procurement in Syria: ``I do not have a mechanism 
        where we comb every single contract to see do you have one, 10 
        or 90 percent connection with the regime or not.''.
            (13) On June 28, 2019, Human Rights Watch published a 
        comprehensive report with the following conclusion: ``While 
        seemingly benign, the Syrian government's aid and 
        reconstruction policies are being used to punish perceived 
        opponents and reward its supporters. . . . The Syrian 
        government's aid framework undermines human rights, and donors 
        need to ensure they are not complicit . . . .''.

SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY.

    It is the policy of the United States that--
            (1) the delivery of assistance funded by the United States 
        through the United Nations must meet reasonable expectations 
        that aid reaches its intended recipients;
            (2) programming provided through the United Nations based 
        on United States funding should be determined according to 
        greatest need, not only greatest access;
            (3) United States assistance to Syria should not be 
        manipulated for political or financial gain of any party to the 
        conflict, especially those most responsible for compounding the 
        suffering of Syrian civilians, including the Assad regime, the 
        Russian Federation, the Islamic Republic of Iran, any entities 
        owned or controlled thereof, or non-state actors involved in 
        international crimes and human rights abuses;
            (4) no United States assistance should be given directly or 
        indirectly to the Assad regime in Syria, including through 
        organs or subsidiaries of the United Nations;
            (5) the United States should support all efforts by the 
        United Nations to establish an independent mechanism to vet 
        procurement contracts in Syrian government-held areas, and such 
        a mechanism must--
                    (A) ensure no contracts are entered into with the 
                Assad regime or its affiliates;
                    (B) develop and implement enhanced human rights due 
                diligence practices, including conducting quarterly 
                human rights impact assessments that review how United 
                Nations aid is disbursed and how such aid flows through 
                its suppliers and local partners in Syria; and
                    (C) make certain that the findings of the human 
                rights impact assessments are integrated into all 
                levels of United Nations operations, monitor the 
                effectiveness of such assessments on such operations, 
                and report how human rights impacts are being addressed 
                and mitigated;
            (6) the United Nations procurement operations throughout 
        Syria should abide by its own United Nations Supplier Code of 
        Conduct, which states that suppliers to the United Nations must 
        ``ensure that they are not complicit in human rights abuses''; 
        and
            (7) the United States will continue providing humanitarian 
        assistance to Syria while also continuing its efforts to 
        facilitate a negotiated political transition from the Assad 
        regime, in accordance with its commitment in United Nations 
        Security Council Resolution 2254.

SEC. 4. CERTIFICATION.

    (a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall certify to the 
appropriate congressional committees whether United Nations agency 
programming, including any program or project, in Syria funded in whole 
or in part by the United States--
            (1) is delivered impartially, without hindrance, to the 
        areas of greatest need;
            (2) does not directly materially support the Syrian 
        government or entities owned or controlled by the Syrian 
        government, Syrian government officials, their immediate 
        families, or entities under their direction;
            (3) does not directly materially support associated forces 
        of the Syrian government or entities under their direction;
            (4) adheres to the United Nations Supplier Code of Conduct, 
        which states that the United Nations must not support, directly 
        or indirectly, other entities and individuals involved in human 
        rights abuses, and which requires United Nations agencies to 
        secure guarantees from suppliers that ``they are not complicit 
        in human rights abuses''; and
            (5) is vetted by an independent mechanism that reviews 
        contract procurement in Syrian government-held areas, as 
        described in section 3(5).
    (b) Funding Limitation and Redirection.--If the Secretary of State 
makes a certification described in subsection (a) in the negative--
            (1) no Federal department or agency may provide any 
        funding, directly or indirectly, to any United Nations agency 
        programming, including any program or project, in Syria that 
        fails to meet the criteria of the certification specified in 
        subsection (a); and
            (2) amounts made available to the Secretary of State that 
        are withheld from United Nations agency programming, including 
        any program or project, in Syria in accordance with paragraph 
        (1) shall be made available to the Administrator of the United 
        States Agency for International Development's Office of Foreign 
        Disaster Assistance for providing assistance to populations in 
        Syria in need.
    (c) Definitions.--In this section:
            (1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
        ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
                    (A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the 
                Committee on Appropriations of the House of 
                Representatives; and
                    (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the 
                Committee on Appropriations of the Senate.
            (2) Associated forces.--The term ``associated forces'' 
        includes forces of the Russian government, the Iranian 
        government, Iranian-backed proxy militias, and Hezbollah.
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