Title: Iran Diplomacy Act of 2020
Policy area: International Affairs

Summary:
Iran Diplomacy Act of 2020
This bill states that it is U.S. policy to (1) seek negotiations with Iran toward establishing a new agreement that closes off Iran's paths to a nuclear weapon; (2) address Iran's regionally destabilizing actions and bring Iran back to compliance with its human rights obligations, and (3) create an environment that fosters humanitarian trade with Iran.

[Congressional Bills 116th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 3314 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

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116th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                S. 3314

  To seek a diplomatic resolution to Iran's nuclear program, and for 
                            other purposes.


_______________________________________________________________________


                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                           February 13, 2020

Mr. Markey (for himself, Mrs. Feinstein, Mr. Van Hollen, Ms. Duckworth, 
 and Mr. Sanders) introduced the following bill; which was read twice 
           and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL


 
  To seek a diplomatic resolution to Iran's nuclear program, and for 
                            other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Iran Diplomacy Act of 2020''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

    Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was 
        agreed to on July 14, 2015, by China, France, Germany, Russia, 
        the United Kingdom, the United States, the European Union, and 
        Iran.
            (2) When it was fully implemented by all parties, the JCPOA 
        had increased the amount of time it would take Iran to acquire 
        enough fissile material for one nuclear weapon, provided a 
        political decision to do so, from approximately two to three 
        months to at least one year.
            (3) The JCPOA blocked Iran's uranium, plutonium, and covert 
        pathways to a nuclear weapon, in the period when all sides had 
        fully implemented their commitments, in part by--
                    (A) imposing verifiable limits on Iran's uranium 
                enrichment and plutonium production capabilities;
                    (B) reducing the number of Iran's installed 
                centrifuges by two-thirds; and
                    (C) permitting the International Atomic Energy 
                Agency (IAEA) to monitor and verify of all stages of 
                Iran's nuclear fuel cycle to include requesting short-
                notice access to ``verify the non-diversion of declared 
                material'' and ``absence of undeclared nuclear material 
                and activities'' in Iran, consistent with its 
                provisional implementation of the Additional Protocol 
                to its IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement.
            (4) The 2018 Department of State Compliance Report 
        concluded, ``Tehran's adherence to these commitments will 
        hinder its ability to produce a nuclear weapon even after the 
        time-bound provisions of the deal expire, helping to ensure 
        that its nuclear program remains exclusively peaceful in 
        nature''.
            (5) On January 29, 2019, Director of the Central 
        Intelligence Agency (CIA) Gina Haspel, testified before the 
        Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate that ``at the 
        moment, technically they [Iran] are in compliance,'' with the 
        JCPOA.
            (6) On January 29, 2019, a worldwide threat assessment 
        issued by Director of National Intelligence Dan Coats, observed 
        that the United States ``[does] not believe that Iran is 
        currently undertaking the key activities we judge necessary to 
        produce a nuclear device'' and ``Iran's continued 
        implementation of the JCPOA has extended the amount of time 
        Iran would need to produce enough fissile material for a 
        nuclear weapon from a few months to about one year''.
            (7) On May 8, 2018, President Donald J. Trump announced the 
        unilateral abrogation of the United States from the JCPOA, and 
        announced that the United States would re-impose all United 
        States sanctions that had been lifted after Iran verifiably met 
        its nuclear-related commitments under the agreement on the 
        agreement's implementation day of January 16, 2016.
            (8) Whereas the United States move to abrogate the JCPOA is 
        a violation of its commitments under the agreement and is 
        inconsistent with the United States reputation of honoring 
        agreements to which it is a party, making the future conclusion 
        of such agreements more difficult.
            (9) Prior to Iran's first breach of the JCPOA on May 8, 
        2019, quarterly reports from the IAEA Board of Governors 
        Reports found that since ``implementation day,'' on January 16, 
        2016, Iran's nuclear program was consistent with the 
        restrictions under the JCPOA.
            (10) Following the removal of nearly all remaining waivers 
        to United States nuclear-related sanctions on May 2, 2019, the 
        Government of Iran has committed a series of reversible but 
        concerning breaches of the JCPOA, including by exceeding: the 
        allowable stock of low-enriched uranium and heavy water; the 
        number of installed centrifuges at its pilot enrichment 
        facility; and the permitted Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) 
        enrichment level of 3.67 percent of the Uranium U-235 isotope.
            (11) Since the full re-imposition of United States nuclear-
        related sanctions, the Government of Iran has also engaged in a 
        series of escalatory actions outside its nuclear program that 
        have put the United States Armed Forces, diplomats, and 
        strategic partners at risk and have heightened the threat of an 
        armed conflict with Iran, including the following events:
                    (A) May 12-13, 2019, the Department of Defense 
                faulted Iran for an attack on four oil tankers 
                belonging to Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, 
                and Norway.
                    (B) On June 13, 2019, Secretary Mike Pompeo stated 
                that it was the United States assessment that Iran was 
                responsible for the attack on two Saudi oil tankers.
                    (C) On June 20, 2019, the Government of Iran shot 
                down a United States Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV). 
                Reportedly, President Trump authorized retaliatory 
                strikes against targets in Iran before rescinding the 
                order for fear that the Iranian loss of life in such a 
                strike would be ``disproportionate''.
                    (D) On July 24, 2019, the Government of Iran 
                announced the seizure of a British-flagged tanker in 
                the Strait of Hormuz.
                    (E) On September 14, 2019, the United States 
                Government concluded that the Government of Iran was 
                responsible for UAV and cruise missile strikes at Saudi 
                Arabia's energy infrastructure at Khurais and Abqaiq, 
                which caused significant damage to Saudi Arabia's oil 
                energy production.
                    (F) On November 19, 2019, the Government of Israel 
                concluded that Iranian forces in Syria fired four 
                rockets intended for the Golan Heights.
            (12) Following the unauthorized United States strike 
        resulting in the death of General Qassem Soleimani on January 
        3, 2020, Iran announced as was anticipated that it would no 
        longer be bound by the limits of the JCPOA, while also noting 
        that it would remain as a party to the Treaty on the Non-
        Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Washington, London, 
        and Moscow July 1, 1968 (NPT), and would fully cooperate with 
        IAEA monitoring and verification activities.
            (13) Iran has made no meaningful progress on the 12 
        conditions Secretary of State Pompeo outlined as preconditions 
        for the United States to enter into an agreement with Iran, 
        clearly demonstrating that the administration's policy of 
        ``maximum pressure'' has not favorably changed Iran's behavior. 
        Further, Department of Defense officials have been warning for 
        more than a year that the Trump Administration's ``maximum 
        pressure'' campaign raised the risk of retaliation against 
        United States troops and diplomatic personnel.
            (14) On January 14, 2020, the foreign ministers of France, 
        Germany, and the United Kingdom issued a joint statement that 
        refers the issue of Iran's non-compliance to the Dispute 
        Resolution Mechanism of the Joint Commission, while noting both 
        their ``determination to work with all participants to preserve 
        (the agreement)'' and ``and that they remain convinced that 
        this landmark multilateral international agreement and its 
        nonproliferation benefits enhance our shared security interests 
        and strengthen the rules-based international order''.
            (15) On February 13, 2020, a bipartisan majority in the 
        United States Senate directed the President to remove United 
        States Armed Forces from hostilities against Iran or any part 
        of its government or military, unless otherwise explicitly 
        authorized by Congress. This direction, which followed passage 
        of a similar measure in the House of Representatives on January 
        9, 2020, provides an opportunity for de-escalation of tensions 
        and renewed diplomatic engagement between the United States and 
        Iran.

SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY.

    It is the policy of the United States as follows:
            (1) Achieving a diplomatic resolution to Iran's nuclear 
        program, one that the United States had in place prior to 
        President Trump's unilateral abrogation from the JCPOA, would 
        represent a meaningful step to preventing a future armed 
        conflict between the United States and Iran, one which would 
        result in the untold loss of life and treasure.
            (2) While the United States no longer has standing in the 
        Joint Commission or the Dispute Resolution mechanism triggered 
        by France, Germany, and the United Kingdom on January 14, 2020, 
        it should support good-faith efforts to achieve one or both of 
        the following:
                    (A) Returning all sides to not less than full 
                compliance with its commitments under the JCPOA and 
                refraining from imposing or threatening to impose 
                economic penalties on France, Germany, or the United 
                Kingdom.
                    (B) Negotiating an interim agreement that provides 
                Iran with tailored, temporary economic relief in 
                exchange for verifiable measures by Iran that reverses 
                steps taken since May 2019 with respect to its nuclear 
                program.
            (3) Provided that all sides verifiably return to compliance 
        with no less than its commitments under the JCPOA, or to build 
        upon the progress of an interim agreement described in 
        paragraph (2)(B), the United States and the other P5+1 parties 
        should seek out negotiations with Iran, prior to 2023, towards 
        a new comprehensive agreement that closes off all Iranian paths 
        to a nuclear weapon by--
                    (A) addressing the sunset of certain provisions of 
                the JCPOA in 2026; and
                    (B) advancing any other measures that advance 
                United States and international security.
            (4) Parallel to one or more of the actions described in 
        paragraph (2), the United States and its international partners 
        should seek to address other aspects of Iran's destabilizing 
        actions in the region and work to bring Iran back to compliance 
        with its human rights obligations.
            (5) No JCPOA Participating State should issue a claim of 
        ``significant nonperformance'' by Iran to the United Nations 
        Security Council outside of the Dispute Resolution mechanism 
        detailed in paragraphs 36 and 37 of the JCPOA.
            (6) The United States should, consistent with its JCPOA 
        commitments, issue waivers for cooperative projects specified 
        in the JCPOA, all of which make it more difficult for Iran to 
        reconstitute activities that pose a proliferation risk, thereby 
        advancing United States and international security.
            (7) The United States should create an environment in which 
        financial institutions and entities can make practical use of 
        existing exemptions and mechanisms ``allowing for the sale of 
        agricultural commodities, food, medicine, and medical devices 
        to Iran,'' as well as other humanitarian trade.
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