Title: Prevention of Arms Race Act of 2019
Policy area: International Affairs

Summary:
Prevention of Arms Race Act of 2019
This bill restricts the appropriation of funds for the procurement, flight testing, or deployment of missiles banned by the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF Treaty). Before such funds may be appropriated, the Department of Defense shall submit a report to Congress that includes (1) a memorandum of understanding from a North Atlantic Treaty Organization or Indo-Pacific ally committing to hosting the deployment of such a missile, (2) confirmation that the United States has not rejected any diplomatic offer to resolve Russia's violation of the INF Treaty, (3) discussion of the ramifications of a collapse of the treaty and of a U.S. withdrawal from the agreement, (4) discussion of the mission requirements with respect to Russia and China that would be met by weapons systems covered by the INF, and (5) discussion of the degree to which INF-compliant weapons can meet such mission requirements.

[Congressional Bills 116th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 1231 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>






116th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 1231

 To prevent a nuclear arms race resulting from weakened international 
  restrictions on the proliferation of intermediate- and short-range 
                   missiles, and for other purposes.


_______________________________________________________________________


                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           February 14, 2019

 Ms. Frankel (for herself, Mr. Ted Lieu of California, Mr. Khanna, and 
  Mr. Pocan) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
   Committee on Armed Services, and in addition to the Committee on 
  Foreign Affairs, for a period to be subsequently determined by the 
  Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall 
           within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL


 
 To prevent a nuclear arms race resulting from weakened international 
  restrictions on the proliferation of intermediate- and short-range 
                   missiles, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Prevention of Arms Race Act of 
2019''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

    Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) On February 1, 2019, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo 
        announced the United States would immediately suspend its 
        obligations and would withdraw, in six months, from the Treaty 
        between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet 
        Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-
        Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, together with the Memorandum 
        of Understanding and Two Protocols (commonly known as the ``INF 
        Treaty''), signed at Washington, December 8, 1987, and entered 
        into force June 1, 1988.
            (2) The United States Senate provided its advice and 
        consent to ratification of the INF Treaty on May 27, 1988, by a 
        vote of 93 to 5.
            (3) The INF Treaty permanently bans the United States and 
        twelve former Soviet republics, including Russia, Belarus, 
        Ukraine, and Kazakhstan, from testing or possessing ground-
        launched cruise or ballistic missiles of intermediate range 
        (500 to 5,500 kilometers, or roughly 300 to 3,400 miles).
            (4) The INF Treaty, signed by President Ronald Reagan and 
        Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, led to the 
        elimination of entire classes of United States and Russian 
        nuclear and conventional ground-launched ballistic and cruise 
        missiles--2,692 in total--supported by on-site inspections that 
        allowed both sides to ``trust but verify'' compliance with the 
        Treaty.
            (5) The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies 
        were deeply involved in the pursuit of negotiation on the INF 
        Treaty and have significant national security interests in the 
        Treaty's preservation. The communique from the July 11, 2018, 
        NATO Summit in Brussels stated that the INF Treaty ``has been 
        crucial to Euro-Atlantic security''.
            (6) Less than one month prior to the announcement of the 
        United States intent to withdraw from the INF Treaty, then-
        Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis met with his NATO counterparts 
        to discuss the full-range of diplomatic, economic, and INF-
        compliant military options to pressure the Russian Federation 
        to return to compliance with the Treaty as outlined in the 
        ``Trump Administration INF Treaty Integrated Strategy'' 
        published December 8, 2017.
            (7) Since the United States publicly declared in July 2014 
        that the Russian Federation was in violation of the INF 
        Treaty's prohibition on possessing, producing, or flight-
        testing a ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM), which is the 
        equivalent of the Russian SSC-8 missile system, the United 
        States has worked with its NATO allies to identify a unified 
        approach on the best way forward.
            (8) The United States did not exhaust diplomatic, economic, 
        and military means to bring the Russian Federation back into 
        compliance with the Treaty, and in 2018 alone, the United 
        States cancelled at least two strategic stability dialogues 
        planned to be conducted with the Russian Federation.
            (9) On January 16, 2019, Under Secretary of State for Arms 
        Control and International Security Andrea Thompson confirmed 
        that the Russian Federation offered to exhibit the SSC-8 
        missile system for the United States, which, while insufficient 
        in itself to resolve its Treaty violation, represented the 
        first such offer since the first United States finding of non-
        compliance in 2014.
            (10) The United States withdrawal from the INF Treaty will 
        allow the Russian Federation to escape international criticism 
        for its violation of the Treaty and sow division among NATO 
        allies at a time when Alliance unity is critical to respond to 
        a range of destabilizing actions by the Russian Federation.
            (11) The United States withdrawal from the INF Treaty will 
        free the Russian Federation to expand deployment of the SSC-8 
        missile system in ways that threaten NATO and Indo-Pacific 
        allies without bearing any international legal cost in doing 
        so.
            (12) The Department of Defense has also not yet identified 
        the full estimated research, development, testing, and 
        evaluation, procurement, or personnel costs of producing, 
        testing, and deploying a new short- or intermediate-range 
        ground-launched cruise or ballistic missile currently 
        prohibited by the INF Treaty.
            (13) No European or Asian ally has publicly declared its 
        willingness or readiness to host a future United States short- 
        or intermediate-range ground-launched cruise or ballistic 
        missile currently prohibited by the INF Treaty should the 
        United States seek to deploy that capability.
            (14) The Secretary General of NATO, Jens Stoltenberg, 
        stated on October 24, 2018, that ``we don't want a new Cold 
        War, we don't want a new arms race and therefore I don't 
        foresee that Allies will deploy more nuclear weapons in Europe 
        as a response to the new Russian missile,'' which precedes 
        United States National Security Advisor John Bolton's statement 
        of November 9, 2018, that ``there are no American plans to seek 
        to deploy INF non-compliant missiles in Europe for the 
        foreseeable future''.
            (15) Any effort by the United States Government to proceed 
        beyond research and development of an intermediate-range cruise 
        or ballistic missile that is nuclear armed will be portrayed in 
        as deeply inconsistent with the United States obligation under 
        Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
        Weapons, signed at Washington, July 1, 1968 (commonly known as 
        the ``NPT''), to ``pursue negotiations in good faith on 
        effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear 
        arms race''.
            (16) Achieving the objective of expanding the INF Treaty's 
        membership to the People's Republic of China, which has 
        deployed intermediate-range missile systems in great number, is 
        greatly diminished if parties to the existing Treaty cease 
        implementation.
            (17) The Congressional Budget Office in October 2017 
        estimated that the costs of United States nuclear weapons 
        spending over the next three decades will amount to 
        $1,200,000,000,000, or $1,700,000,000,000 when adjusted for 
        inflation, which does not include new systems proposed in the 
        2018 United States Nuclear Posture Review such as a low-yield 
        submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), a sea-launched 
        cruise missile (SLCM), and a ground-launched cruise missile 
        (GLCM).

SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

    It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) Secretary of State Pompeo's announcement of the 
        decision of the United States to withdraw from the INF Treaty, 
        without proper consultation with Congress, is a serious breach 
        of Congress's proper constitutional role as a co-equal branch 
        of government;
            (2) United States withdrawal from the INF Treaty will free 
        the Russian Federation to deploy greater quantities of the SSC-
        8 missile to the detriment of United States national security 
        and that of our allies in Europe and the Indo-Pacific;
            (3) withdrawal from the INF Treaty will fail to limit or 
        eliminate China's short- and intermediate-range missiles;
            (4) the NATO alliance makes critical contributions to 
        United States national security, and the failure to weigh the 
        concerns of NATO allies risks weakening the joint resolve 
        necessary to counter Russia's aggressive behavior; and
            (5) as opposed to withdrawing from the INF Treaty, the 
        United States should continue to advance other diplomatic, 
        economic, and military measures outlined in the ``Trump 
        Administration INF Treaty Integrated Strategy'' to resolve the 
        concerns related to the Russian Federation's violation of the 
        Treaty and to reach agreement on measures to ensure the 
        Treaty's future viability.

SEC. 4. PROHIBITION ON USE OF FUNDS FOR PROCUREMENT, FLIGHT TESTING, OR 
              DEPLOYMENT OF SHORT- OR INTERMEDIATE-RANGE GROUND-
              LAUNCHED BALLISTIC OR CRUISE MISSILE SYSTEM.

    (a) In General.--No funds may be appropriated or otherwise made 
available for the procurement, flight testing, or deployment of a 
United States short- or intermediate-range ground-launched ballistic or 
cruise missile system with a range between 500 and 5,500 kilometers 
until the Secretary of Defense, in concurrence with the Secretary of 
State and the Director of National Intelligence, submits a report and 
offers a briefing to the appropriate committees of Congress that--
            (1) includes a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) from a 
        NATO or Indo-Pacific ally that commits such ally to host 
        deployment of any such missile on its own territory, and in the 
        case of deployment on the European continent, has the 
        concurrence of the North Atlantic Council;
            (2) confirms that the United States has not rejected any 
        diplomatic offer to exhibit the SSC-8 missile system, 
        negotiations on a verifiable mutual agreement prohibiting the 
        placement of INF-range missiles on NATO territory or within 
        range of a NATO Member State, or any other transparency measure 
        which may successfully move Russia closer to returning to 
        compliance with the Treaty or prevent a proliferation of INF-
        range systems on the continent;
            (3) assesses the implications, in terms of the military 
        threat to the United States and its allies in Europe and the 
        Indo-Pacific, of a Russian Federation deployment of 
        intermediate-range cruise and ballistic missiles without 
        restriction;
            (4) identifies what types of technologies and programs the 
        United States would need to pursue to offset the additional 
        Russian capabilities, and at what cost;
            (5) identifies what mission requirements with respect to 
        the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China will 
        be met by INF-type systems;
            (6) identifies the degree to which INF-compliant 
        capabilities, such as sea and air-launched cruise missiles, can 
        meet those same mission requirements; and
            (7) identifies the ramifications of a collapse of the INF 
        Treaty on the ability to generate consensus among States 
        Parties to the NPT Treaty ahead of the 2020 NPT Review 
        Conference, and assesses the degree to which the Russian 
        Federation will use the United States unilateral withdrawal to 
        sow discord within the NATO alliance.
    (b) Form of Report.--The report required under subsection (a) shall 
be unclassified with a classified annex.
    (c) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this section, 
the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
            (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on 
        Armed Services of the Senate; and
            (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on 
        Armed Services of the House of Representatives.
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