Title: Future of Arms Control Act
Policy area: International Affairs

Summary:
Future of Arms Control Act
This bill restricts the United States from taking certain actions in the event that the President does not extend the Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START Treaty) by November 3, 2020. (The New START Treaty, a nuclear nonproliferation agreement between the United States and Russia, is set to expire in February 2021 but may be extended to February 2026.)
If the treaty is not extended, the United States may not take any action that would violate the treaty until March 1, 2021, unless (1) the President certifies to Congress the intention to waive this restriction, and (2) Congress does not enact a joint resolution of disapproval within 15 days of the certification.
The President's certification shall contain (1) a determination that Russia has materially violated the treaty and that this violation gravely threatens U.S. security, and (2) the reasoning behind this determination.

[Congressional Bills 116th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 3843 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

<DOC>






116th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                S. 3843

  To establish a positive agenda and framework for the future of arms 
control with the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China.


_______________________________________________________________________


                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                              May 21, 2020

 Mr. Menendez introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
             referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL


 
  To establish a positive agenda and framework for the future of arms 
control with the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Future of Arms Control Act''.

SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.

    In this Act:
            (1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
        ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
                    (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the 
                Committee on Armed Services, and the Select Committee 
                on Intelligence of the Senate; and
                    (B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee 
                on Armed Services, and the Permanent Select Committee 
                on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.
            (2) New start.--The term ``New START'' means the Treaty 
        between the United States and the Russian Federation on 
        Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic 
        Offensive Arms, signed April 8, 2010, and entered into force 
        February 5, 2011 (commonly known as the ``New START Treaty'').

SEC. 3. FINDINGS.

    Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) Since the end of World War II, the United States has 
        relied on a robust and effective nuclear deterrent as part of 
        its national defense, particularly against the Soviet Union and 
        its successor state, the Russian Federation.
            (2) In tandem with its nuclear deterrent, the United States 
        pursued a number of arms control, disarmament, and 
        nonproliferation agreements with the Soviet Union as a means of 
        ensuring strategic stability, providing transparency into the 
        Soviet Union's nuclear forces, reducing United States nuclear 
        expenditures, and defending the United States, including the 
        Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty and the Strategic Arms 
        Reduction Treaty.
            (3) After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the United 
        States continued to pursue arms control with the Russian 
        Federation along with a credible nuclear deterrent as a means 
        of ensuring United States security from nuclear attack.
            (4) The New START Treaty, ratified with bipartisan support 
        on December 22, 2010, remains an important tool for limiting 
        and verifying the Russian Federation's strategic nuclear 
        arsenal.
            (5) The New START Treaty, which expires in February 2021, 
        can be extended until February 2026 if both parties agree to 
        such an extension.
            (6) The United States engages in robust, verifiable arms 
        control because it fundamentally protects United States and 
        allied security interests.
            (7) On April 17, 2020, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo met 
        with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, and in those talks 
        asserted that any future arms control talks must include the 
        People's Republic of China.
            (8) The Government of the People's Republic of China has 
        signaled that it has no intention of engaging in trilateral 
        arms control talks with the United States and the Russian 
        Federation.
            (9) Since 1964, the People's Republic of China has been a 
        nuclear weapons state and has developed strategic and tactical 
        systems capable of threatening the United States, United States 
        allies and partners, and United States and alliance assets in 
        the Indo-Pacific region.
            (10) Today, the People's Republic of China retains a 
        limited but survivable nuclear deterrent with an extensive 
        modernization program which, according to the Defense 
        Intelligence Agency's 2019 China Military Power Report, will 
        make its arsenal ``more mobile, responsive, and accurate''.
            (11) It is in the security interests of the United States 
        to engage with the People's Republic of China on relevant arms 
        control issues, whether in a bilateral or multilateral format, 
        through a coherent, coordinated strategy.

SEC. 4. STATEMENT OF POLICY.

    It is the policy of the United States that--
            (1) unless the President determines and so informs Congress 
        that the Russian Federation is not in material compliance with 
        New START such that the object and purpose of the Treaty is 
        significantly undermined, and that efforts to resolve any such 
        material noncompliance have been undertaken and not resolved 
        such noncompliance, the United States shall extend New START 
        from its initial termination date in February 2021 to February 
        2026, as permitted under Article XIV of the Treaty;
            (2) if the President has not extended New START by November 
        3, 2020, the United States Government should encourage the 
        Government of the Russian Federation not to exceed or prepare 
        to exceed the limitations of the New START Treaty prior to the 
        expiration of the Treaty on February 5, 2021, providing an 
        opportunity from January 20, 2021, until February 5, 2021, for 
        the United States and the Russian Federation to negotiate an 
        extension to and continued implementation of the treaty;
            (3) if the President does not extend the New START Treaty 
        by November 3, 2020, no action or activity should be taken by 
        any United States official, agency, or department that would 
        violate or lead to the violation of the treaty while the treaty 
        remains in force;
            (4) the United States must maintain a credible nuclear 
        deterrent capable of defending the homeland and United States 
        allies covered under extended deterrence;
            (5) the United States, in conjunction with New START's 
        extension, should pursue additional arms control frameworks 
        with the Russian Federation that limit the possibility of 
        purposeful or accidental nuclear war and advance United States 
        security, including--
                    (A) further reductions to the Russian Federation's 
                strategic nuclear arsenal, including the number of its 
                warheads and deployed delivery systems;
                    (B) limitations or elimination of the Russian 
                Federation's tactical and intermediate range systems 
                that directly threaten United States allies and 
                partners in Europe and the Indo-Pacific;
                    (C) control, limitation, or elimination of the 
                Russian Federation's novel nuclear weapons, such as 
                hypersonic weapons, undersea nuclear weapons, or other 
                delivery systems;
                    (D) transparency and confidence-building measures 
                to avoid, manage, or control nuclear, conventional, and 
                unconventional military escalation between the United 
                States and the Russian Federation;
                    (E) areas of potential dialogue between the 
                governments of the United States and the Russian 
                Federation on space, cyberspace, and conventional 
                forces, as well as other strategic domains, which could 
                reduce the likelihood of war, limit escalation if a 
                conflict were to occur, and constrain a destabilizing 
                arms race; and
                    (F) rigorous inspection and monitoring mechanisms 
                to verify compliance with any future arms control 
                framework; and
            (6) the United States Government should formulate a 
        coherent strategy to engage the Government of the People's 
        Republic of China on relevant bilateral issues that lays the 
        groundwork for bringing the People's Republic of China into an 
        arms control framework, including--
                    (A) fostering bilateral dialogue on arms control 
                leading to the convening of bilateral strategic 
                stability talks;
                    (B) negotiating norms for outer space;
                    (C) developing pre-launch notification regimes 
                aimed at reducing nuclear miscalculation; and
                    (D) expanding lines of communication between both 
                governments for the purposes of reducing the risks of 
                conventional war and increasing transparency.

SEC. 5. RESTRICTION ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS POLICY.

    (a) In General.--If the President does not extend the New START 
Treaty by November 3, 2020, no action or activity may be taken by any 
United States official, agency, or department that would violate or 
lead to the violation of the treaty until March 1, 2021.
    (b) Waiver.--
            (1) In general.--The President may waive the restriction in 
        subsection (a) 15 days after certifying to the appropriate 
        congressional committees that the Government of the Russian 
        Federation has materially violated the New START Treaty such 
        that the security of the United States has been gravely 
        threatened. The certification shall include the reasons for 
        making such determination. The certification shall be 
        unclassified to the maximum extent possible, but may include a 
        classified annex.
            (2) Effectiveness.--
                    (A) In general.--A waiver under subsection (a) 
                shall take effect if, at the end of 15 days after the 
                President makes the certification described under such 
                subsection, Congress has not enacted a joint resolution 
                of disapproval.
                    (B) Consideration of joint resolution of 
                disapproval.--A joint resolution introduced pursuant to 
                subparagraph (A) shall be considered in the Senate in 
                accordance with the provisions of section 601(b) of the 
                International Security Assistance and Arms Export 
                Control Act of 1976 (Public Law 94-329; 90 Stat. 765).

SEC. 6. REPORTS.

    (a) Implementation of United States Policy.--Not later than 90 days 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in 
coordination with the Secretary of Defense, shall submit to the 
appropriate congressional committees a report, and a separate 
classified annex, detailing the United States Government's plans for 
implementing the policy of the United States stated in section 4 with 
respect to the Russian Federation.
    (b) Arms Control Talks With the Russian Federation and the People's 
Republic of China.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the 
Secretary of Defense, shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
committees a report that describes--
            (1) a concrete plan for arms control talks that includes 
        both the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation;
            (2) if trilateral arms control dialogue does not arise, 
        what alternative plans the Department of State envisages for 
        ensuring United States security from Russian and Chinese 
        nuclear weapons;
            (3) efforts at engaging the People's Republic of China to 
        join arms control talks, whether on a bilateral or multilateral 
        basis; and
            (4) the interest level of the Government of the People's 
        Republic of China in joining arms control talks, whether on a 
        bilateral or multilateral basis.
    (c) Extension of New START.--Not later than 90 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination 
with the Secretary of Defense and the Director of National 
Intelligence, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees 
a report, and a separate classified annex, that includes the following 
elements:
            (1) The strategy behind the decision to extend or not 
        extend New START.
            (2) If New START is set to expire, an assessment whether 
        such an expiration is in the national security interests of the 
        United States, including the specific reasons for such 
        conclusion.
            (3) An examination of the effects of the expiration of New 
        START on--
                    (A) strategic stability with the Russian 
                Federation;
                    (B) the United States nuclear budget;
                    (C) spending on United States conventional forces 
                as a result of increased nuclear spending; and
                    (D) international nuclear nonproliferation efforts.
            (4) An assessment of how the Government of the Russian 
        Federation will modify its nuclear forces in an unconstrained 
        environment and how the United States Government will respond 
        if the Government of the Russian Federation expands its 
        arsenal.
            (5) An assessment of how the United States Government will 
        need to alter intelligence capabilities and spending to regain, 
        if possible, the knowledge of the Russian Federation's arsenal 
        that is currently provided by the inspection and verification 
        mechanisms inherent to New START.
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