Title: Strategic Arctic Naval Focus Act of 2019
Policy area: Armed Forces and National Security

Summary:
Strategic Arctic Naval Focus Act of 2019
This bill articulates the policy of the United States with respect to the Arctic. Specifically, it shall be the policy of the United States to prioritize Navy and Coast Guard missions, infrastructure and capability development, training, and stationing of assets in the Arctic.
The Department of Defense, in consultation with the Coast Guard, shall submit a report on the development and execution of a strategic plan that focuses on addressing U.S. Arctic policy.

[Congressional Bills 116th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 3080 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

<DOC>






116th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                S. 3080

    To state the policy of the United States regarding the need for 
  strategic placement of military assets in the Arctic, and for other 
                               purposes.


_______________________________________________________________________


                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                           December 18, 2019

Mr. Sullivan (for himself, Mr. King, and Ms. Murkowski) introduced the 
 following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on 
                             Armed Services

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL


 
    To state the policy of the United States regarding the need for 
  strategic placement of military assets in the Arctic, and for other 
                               purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Strategic Arctic Naval Focus Act of 
2019''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

    Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) The strategic importance of the Arctic continues to 
        increase as the United States and other countries recognize the 
        military significance of the sea lanes and choke points within 
        the region and understand the potential for power projection 
        from the Arctic into multiple regions.
            (2) On January 19, 2018, Secretary of Defense James Mattis 
        released the ``2018 National Defense Strategy of the United 
        States of America'' in which the Secretary outlined the 
        reemergence of long-term, strategic competition by countries 
        classified by the National Security Strategy as revisionist 
        powers such as China and Russia.
            (3) Russia and China have conducted military exercises 
        together in the Arctic, have agreed to connect the Northern Sea 
        Route, claimed by Russia, with China's Maritime Silk Road, and 
        are working together in developing natural gas resources in the 
        Arctic.
            (4) The Government of the Russian Federation--
                    (A) has prioritized the development of Arctic 
                capabilities and has made significant investments in 
                military infrastructure in the Arctic, including the 
                creation of a new Arctic Command and the construction 
                or refurbishment of 16 deepwater ports and 14 airfields 
                in the region;
                    (B) has approximately 40 icebreakers as of May 
                2019, including several nuclear-powered icebreakers, is 
                currently constructing four icebreakers, and is 
                planning to build an additional eight icebreakers; and
                    (C) conducted the largest military exercise since 
                the 1980s, Vostok 2018, which included--
                            (i) 300,000 troops;
                            (ii) 1,000 aircraft;
                            (iii) 80 ships;
                            (iv) 36,000 vehicles; and
                            (v) notably, 3,200 Chinese troops, 30 
                        Chinese rotary and fixed-wing aircraft, and 900 
                        Chinese tanks.
            (5) The Government of the People's Republic of China--
                    (A) released, in January 2018, its new Arctic 
                Strategy, the Polar Silk Road, in which it declares 
                itself as a ``near-Arctic state'', even though its 
                nearest territory to the Arctic is 900 miles away;
                    (B) has publicly stated that it seeks to expand its 
                ``Belt and Road Initiative'' to the Arctic region, 
                including current investment in the natural gas fields 
                in the Yamal Peninsula in Russia, rare-earth element 
                mines in Greenland, and the real estate, alternative 
                energy, and fisheries in Iceland; and
                    (C) has shown great interest in expanding its 
                Arctic presence, including through--
                            (i) the operation of research vessels in 
                        the region;
                            (ii) the recent construction of the Xuelong 
                        2, or Snow Dragon II, the only polar research 
                        boat vessel in the world that can break ice 
                        while going forward or backward;
                            (iii) a freedom of navigation operation in 
                        the Aleutian Islands in 2015; and
                            (iv) its recent plans to develop a 33,000 
                        ton nuclear-powered icebreaker.
            (6) The economic significance of the Arctic continues to 
        grow as countries around the globe begin to understand the 
        magnitude of the natural resources in the Arctic, the potential 
        for maritime transportation through, and economic and trade 
        development in, the region.
            (7) The Arctic is home to 13 percent of the world's 
        undiscovered oil, 30 percent of its undiscovered gas, an 
        abundance of uranium, rare earth minerals, gold, diamonds, and 
        millions of square miles of untapped resources, including 
        abundant fisheries.
            (8) The Bering Strait is experiencing significant increases 
        in international traffic from vessels transiting the Northern 
        Sea Route, increases which are projected to continue if 
        decreases in sea ice coverage continue.
            (9) Along a future ice-free Arctic shipping route, a ship 
        sailing from South Korea to Germany would have an average 
        travel time of just 23 days, compared to 34 days via the Suez 
        Canal and 46 days via the Cape of Good Hope.
            (10) In a speech at the Arctic Forum in September 2011, 
        Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin highlighted the 
        Northern Sea Route as a potential alternative to the Suez Canal 
        and has publicly stated plans to invest $11,400,000,000 along 
        the Northern Sea Route by 2024.
            (11) Increases in human, maritime, and resource development 
        activity in the Arctic region create additional mission 
        requirements for the Department of Defense and the Department 
        of Homeland Security, given--
                    (A) the strategic focus of the Government of the 
                Russian Federation and the Government of the People's 
                Republic of China on the Arctic;
                    (B) overlapping territorial claims; and
                    (C) the potential for maritime accidents, oil 
                spills, and illegal fishing near the exclusive economic 
                zone of the United States.
            (12) The increasing role of the United States in the Arctic 
        has been highlighted in each of the last four National Defense 
        Authorization Acts.
            (13) Section 1068 of the National Defense Authorization Act 
        for Fiscal Year 2016 (Public Law 114-92; 129 Stat. 992) 
        required a new Department of Defense strategy to protect United 
        States national security interests in the Arctic region.
            (14) Section 1095 of the National Defense Authorization Act 
        for Fiscal Year 2017 (Public Law 114-328; 130 Stat. 2438) 
        required the Department of Defense to create criteria to 
        designate a Department of Defense Strategic Arctic Port.
            (15) Section 122 of the National Defense Authorization Act 
        for Fiscal Year 2018 (Public Law 115-91; 131 Stat. 1310) 
        authorized the procurement of one polar-class heavy icebreaker 
        vessel.
            (16) Section 151 of the John S. McCain National Defense 
        Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (Public Law 115-232; 132 
        Stat. 1671) authorized the procurement of five additional 
        polar-class icebreaker vessels and expressed that the Coast 
        Guard should--
                    (A) maintain an inventory of not fewer than six 
                polar-class icebreaker vessels;
                    (B) award a contract for the first new polar-class 
                icebreaker not later than fiscal year 2019 and deliver 
                the icebreaker not later than fiscal year 2023; and
                    (C) deliver the second through sixth polar-class 
                icebreakers at a rate of one vessel per year in fiscal 
                years 2025 through 2029.
            (17) In January 2017, the Department of Defense released a 
        report entitled ``Report to Congress on Strategy to Protect 
        United States National Security Interests in the Arctic 
        Region'' to update ``the ways and means'' the Department of 
        Defense intends to use to achieve its objectives as it 
        implements the 2013 National Strategy for the Arctic Region, 
        including--
                    (A) enhancing the capability of United States 
                forces to defend the homeland and exercise sovereignty;
                    (B) strengthening deterrence at home and abroad;
                    (C) preserving freedom of the seas in the Arctic; 
                and
                    (D) evolving the infrastructure and capabilities of 
                the Department in the Arctic consistent with changing 
                conditions and needs.
            (18) The United States Coast Guard Arctic Strategic Outlook 
        released in April 2019 states that ``[d]emonstrating commitment 
        to operational presence, Canada, Denmark, and Norway have made 
        strategic investments in ice-capable patrol ships charged with 
        national or homeland security missions. [The United States] is 
        the only Arctic State that has not made similar investments in 
        ice-capable surface maritime security assets. This limits the 
        ability of the Coast Guard, and the Nation, to credibly uphold 
        sovereignty or respond to contingencies in the Arctic''.
            (19) On July 16, 2019, Secretary of Defense Mark Esper 
        stated that ``[t]he Arctic is strategic terrain for the United 
        States. The region has significant economic opportunity, and 
        must remain free and open. It is also growing more complicated 
        as strategic competitors--Russia and, increasingly, China--seek 
        to enhance their position in the region. It is critical that 
        the Arctic remain a secure and stable region where U.S. 
        national interests are safeguarded, the U.S. homeland is 
        defended, and nations work together to address challenges''.
            (20) On January 9, 2019, Secretary of the Air Force Heather 
        Wilson and Chief of Staff of the Air Force General David 
        Goldfein wrote that ``. . . the Arctic has become even more 
        important to the nation. Both a northern approach to the United 
        States, as well as a critical location for projecting American 
        power, its geo-strategic significance is difficult to 
        overstate''.
            (21) On February 26, 2019, General John Hyten, Commander of 
        the United States Strategic Command, stated that ``[i]n 
        particular, the Arctic is an area that we really need to focus 
        on and really look at investing. That is no longer a buffer 
        zone. We need to be able to operate there. We need to be able 
        to communicate there. We need to have a presence there that we 
        have not invested in in the same way that our adversaries have. 
        And they see that as a vulnerability from us, whereas it is 
        becoming a strength for them and it is a weakness for us, we 
        need to flip that equation''.
            (22) On February 26, 2019, General Terrence O'Shaughnessy, 
        Commander of the United States Northern Command stated that 
        ``[i]t has become clear that defense of the homeland depends on 
        our ability to detect and defeat threats operating both in the 
        Arctic and passing through the Arctic. Russia's fielding of 
        advanced, long-range cruise missiles capable of flying through 
        the northern approaches and striking targets in the United 
        States and Canada has emerged as the dominant military threat 
        in the Arctic. . . . Meanwhile, China has declared that it is 
        not content to remain a mere observer in the Arctic and has 
        taken action to normalize its naval and commercial presence in 
        the region in order to increase its access to lucrative 
        resources and shipping routes. I view the Arctic as the front 
        line in the defense of the United States and Canada . . .''.
            (23) On May 6, 2019, Admiral Karl Schultz, Commandant of 
        the Coast Guard stated that ``[w]e talk about the Arctic as a 
        competitive space. We've seen China, we see Russia investing 
        extensively. China built icebreakers in the time since we 
        updated our strategy. China's been operating off the Alaskan 
        Arctic for a good part of the last six years on an annual 
        basis. [The Coast Guard is] championing increased capabilities 
        in the Arctic . . . better communications, better domain 
        awareness . . . I want to see the Arctic remain a peaceful 
        domain. China's a self-declared Arctic state. They're not one 
        of the eight Arctic nations, so for me, for the service, its 
        presence equals influence''.
            (24) On May 6, 2019, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo stated 
        that--
                    (A) the Arctic ``has become an arena for power and 
                for competition'', and the United States is ``entering 
                a new age of strategic engagement in the Arctic, 
                complete with new threats to the Arctic and its real 
                estate, and to all of our interests in that region'';
                    (B) ``Arctic sea lanes could become the 21st 
                century Suez and Panama Canals'';
                    (C) ``[w]e're concerned about Russia's claim over 
                the international waters of the Northern Sea Route, 
                including its newly announced plans to connect it with 
                China's Maritime Silk Road'';
                    (D) ``[i]n the Northern Sea Route, Moscow already 
                illegally demands other nations request permission to 
                pass, requires Russian maritime pilots to be aboard 
                foreign ships, and threatens to use military force to 
                sink any that fail to comply with their demands'';
                    (E) there is a ``pattern of aggressive Russian 
                behavior here in the Arctic'' and ``we know Russian 
                territorial ambitions can turn violent''; and
                    (F) we do not want ``the Arctic Ocean to transform 
                into a new South China Sea, fraught with militarization 
                and competing territorial claims'', nor do we want 
                ``the fragile Arctic environment exposed to the same 
                ecological devastation caused by China's fishing fleet 
                in the seas off its coast, or unregulated industrial 
                activity in its own country''.
            (25) On December 6, 2018, Secretary of the Navy Richard 
        Spencer stated that ``[w]e need to have a strategic Arctic port 
        up in Alaska. We need to be doing FONOPs in the northwest--in 
        the northern passage . . . peace through presence with a 
        submarine is a little tough''.
            (26) Meanwhile, the two closest strategic seaports, as 
        designated by the Department of Defense, to the Arctic Circle 
        are the Port of Anchorage and the Port of Tacoma, located 
        approximately 1,500 nautical miles and 2,400 nautical miles 
        away, respectively, and approximately 1,900 nautical miles and 
        2,800 nautical miles respectively from Barrow, Alaska.
            (27) The distance from Bangor, Maine, to Key West, Florida, 
        is approximately 1,450 nautical miles.

SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY.

    It is the policy of the United States--
            (1) to prioritize Navy and Coast Guard missions, 
        infrastructure and capability development, training, and 
        stationing of assets to meet the growing array of challenges in 
        the Arctic due to the region's strategic importance to the 
        national security interests of the United States;
            (2) that the increasing freedom of navigation and expansion 
        of activity in the Arctic must be met with increasing 
        deployment of Navy and Coast Guard surface vessels capable of 
        exerting influence through persistent presence in the Arctic;
            (3) that, while the recapitalization of the Coast Guard's 
        fleet of cutters and aircraft is needed and important, the 
        Coast Guard must avoid overextending operational assets for 
        remote international missions at the cost of dedicated focus on 
        this domestic area of responsibility with significant 
        international interest and activity; and
            (4) that, although some progress has been made to increase 
        awareness of Arctic issues and to promote increased military 
        presence in the region, additional measures shall be taken to 
        protect vital economic, environmental, and national security 
        interests of the United States, and to show the commitment of 
        the United States to this emerging strategic choke point of 
        increasing great power competition, including the formation of 
        an Arctic Security Initiative with the funding and authority to 
        drive--
                    (A) the creation of a network of strategically 
                advantageous ports in the Arctic;
                    (B) the long-term homeporting of significant Coast 
                Guard assets in the Arctic;
                    (C) the development of Navy and Coast Guard ship 
                maintenance and repair relationships with facilities 
                located within Alaska in or near the Arctic;
                    (D) increased military training for operating in 
                the Arctic environment; and
                    (E) the creation of a Department of Defense Center 
                for Security Studies for the Arctic.

SEC. 4. REPORT ON THE STRATEGIC NAVAL FOCUS IN THE ARCTIC.

    (a) In General.--Not later than one year after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense in consultation with 
the Secretary of the department in which the Coast Guard is operating 
shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on the 
development and execution of a strategic plan that focuses on 
addressing the findings in section 2 and the policy stated in section 
3.
    (b) Elements.--The report required by subsection (a) shall include 
a detailed plan to achieve the following:
            (1) The creation of a Department of Defense Strategic 
        Arctic Port by 2035.
            (2) The establishment of the position of Deputy Assistant 
        Secretary of Defense for the Arctic tasked with optimizing the 
        Unified Command Plan for the Arctic and other overarching 
        strategies for the Arctic region.
            (3) The procurement of not fewer than four ice-hardened 
        Navy vessels by 2030.
            (4) Not fewer than one ice-hardened Navy vessel on patrol 
        in the Arctic and able to maintain maritime domain awareness, 
        conduct training exercises, and perform national defense 
        operations not fewer than six months of every year.
            (5) Not fewer than one major Coast Guard cutter on patrol 
        in the Arctic and able to execute search and rescue operations, 
        fisheries enforcement, pollution response, and support for 
        national defense operations at all times.
            (6) Not fewer than two icebreaking vessels permanently 
        stationed within the Arctic by 2035.
            (7) Sufficient icebreaking activity to keep the Northwest 
        Passage sea lanes open for commerce, national defense, rescue 
        and recovery operations, and scientific exploration by 2030.
    (c) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this section, 
the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
            (1) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on 
        Commerce, Science, and Transportation, the Committee on Foreign 
        Relations, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; 
        and
            (2) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on 
        Transportation and Infrastructure, the Committee on Foreign 
        Affairs, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of 
        Representatives.

SEC. 5. ARCTIC DEFINED.

    In this Act, the term ``Arctic'' has the meaning given that term in 
section 112 of the Arctic Research and Policy Act of 1984 (15 U.S.C. 
4111).
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