Title: Taiwan Defense Act
Policy area: Armed Forces and National Security

Summary:
Taiwan Defense Act
This bill requires, no later than April 30 every year, beginning in 2021 and ending in 2026, the Department of Defense (DOD) to submit to Congress a report on the progress of DOD with respect to improving the ability of the U.S. Armed Forces to conduct combined joint operations to deny the ability of China to execute a fait accompli against Taiwan.
The bill defines fait accompli as the strategy of China designed to allow it to use military force to seize control of Taiwan before the U.S. Armed Forces are able to respond effectively, while simultaneously deterring an effective combined joint response by the Armed Forces by convincing the United States that mounting such a response would be prohibitively difficult or costly.

[Congressional Bills 116th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 7423 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>






116th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 7423

  To maintain the ability of the United States Armed Forces to deny a 
fait accompli by the People's Republic of China against Taiwan, and for 
                            other purposes.


_______________________________________________________________________


                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             June 30, 2020

Mr. Gallagher introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committee on Armed 
Services, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in 
   each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the 
                jurisdiction of the committee concerned

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL


 
  To maintain the ability of the United States Armed Forces to deny a 
fait accompli by the People's Republic of China against Taiwan, and for 
                            other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Taiwan Defense Act''.

SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.

    In this Act:
            (1) Deny.--The term ``deny'' means to use combined joint 
        operations to delay, degrade, and ultimately defeat an attempt 
        by the People's Republic of China to execute a fait accompli 
        against Taiwan, resulting in--
                    (A) the termination of hostilities or, at a 
                minimum, the termination of the attempted fait 
                accompli; or
                    (B) the neutralization of the ability of the 
                People's Republic of China to execute a fait accompli 
                against Taiwan.
            (2) Fait accompli.--The term ``fait accompli'' means the 
        strategy of the People's Republic of China designed to allow 
        the People's Republic of China to use military force to seize 
        control of Taiwan before the United States Armed Forces are 
        able to respond effectively, while simultaneously deterring an 
        effective combined joint response by the United States Armed 
        Forces by convincing the United States that mounting such a 
        response would be prohibitively difficult or costly.

SEC. 3. FINDINGS.

    Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) Taiwan is--
                    (A) a beacon of democracy in Asia; and
                    (B) a steadfast partner of the United States in the 
                common pursuit of a free and open Indo-Pacific region 
                in which--
                            (i) all societies enjoy sovereign autonomy;
                            (ii) people live securely, prosperously, 
                        and with dignity; and
                            (iii) the societies of the region rise and 
                        fall not by coercion but on the basis of 
                        peaceful competition.
            (2) If the Government of the People's Republic of China 
        were to use military force to compel the unification of Taiwan 
        with the People's Republic of China--
                    (A) the world would lose one of the great champions 
                of freedom and democracy;
                    (B) the United States and allies and partners of 
                the United States would face severe difficulty in 
                maintaining favorable balances of power relative to the 
                People's Republic of China in Northeast and Southeast 
                Asia; and
                    (C) as the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific 
                region shifted in favor of the People's Republic of 
                China, the Government of the People's Republic of China 
                would possess an increasing ability--
                            (i) to impose its will throughout the Indo-
                        Pacific region; and
                            (ii) to prevent United States access to key 
                        trade routes and markets in the Indo-Pacific 
                        region, thereby imposing severe economic 
                        hardship on middle-class and working-class 
                        people of the United States and undermining the 
                        American way of life.
            (3) In January 2019, the Defense Intelligence Agency 
        assessed that the ``longstanding'' intent of the Government of 
        the People's Republic of China to compel the unification of 
        Taiwan with the People's Republic of China, and deter any 
        attempt by Taiwan to declare independence, was the ``primary 
        driver for China's military modernization''.
            (4) The Department of Defense Indo-Pacific Strategy Report 
        released in June 2019, states that the Government of the 
        People's Republic of China is ``preparing for a contingency to 
        unify Taiwan with the mainland by force, while simultaneously 
        deterring, delaying, or denying any third-party intervention on 
        Taiwan's behalf''.
            (5) Department of Defense statements and publications 
        indicate that the Government of the People's Republic of China 
        is developing the plans and capabilities required to employ the 
        fait accompli strategy to compel the unification of Taiwan with 
        the People's Republic of China, including--
                    (A) the assessment by the Defense Science Board in 
                2017 that the Government of the People's Republic of 
                China had adopted a theory of victory whereby once 
                conflict with the United States appeared inevitable, as 
                might be the case if the Government of the People's 
                Republic of China attempted to use military force to 
                compel the unification of Taiwan with the People's 
                Republic of China, then the Government of the People's 
                Republic of China ``will attempt to achieve a decisive 
                outcome very quickly, presenting the United States and 
                its allies with a fait accompli'' and ``then seek to 
                demonstrate that the United States and its allies will 
                incur significant costs in seeking to reverse that 
                outcome'';
                    (B) the assessment in the Indo-Pacific Strategy 
                Report that, if the Government of the People's Republic 
                of China or another competitor in the Indo-Pacific 
                region decides ``to advance their interests through 
                force, they are likely to enjoy a local military 
                advantage at the onset of conflict. In a fait accompli 
                scenario, competitors would seek to employ their 
                capabilities quickly to achieve limited objectives and 
                forestall a response from the United States and its 
                allies and partners'';
                    (C) testimony by then Acting Secretary of Defense 
                Patrick Shanahan in March 2019 that--
                            (i) the Government of the People's Republic 
                        of China ``has made investments specifically 
                        intended to offset U.S. advantages''; and
                            (ii) if deployed in the initial stages of a 
                        conflict, ``these capabilities could seek to 
                        achieve a `fait accompli' that would make 
                        reversing Chinese gains more difficult, 
                        militarily and politically''; and
                    (D) testimony by then Commanding General of Marine 
                Corps Combat Development Command Lieutenant General 
                David Berger in April 2019 that peer adversaries of the 
                United States seek ``to create strategic dilemmas 
                through fait accompli scenarios''.
            (6) In March 2019, then Acting Secretary of Defense Patrick 
        Shanahan testified that the implementation of the 2018 National 
        Defense Strategy would ensure the United States has ``the 
        capabilities, posture, and employment of forces'' required to 
        prevent a fait accompli by the People's Republic of China.
            (7) According to the Indo-Pacific Strategy Report, ``[t]he 
        National Defense Strategy implicitly acknowledges the most 
        stressing potential scenarios will occur along our competitors' 
        peripheries''. An attempted fait accompli by the People's 
        Republic of China against Taiwan should therefore be expected 
        to constitute a ``most stressing'' potential scenario for the 
        United States Armed Forces.
            (8) The National Defense Strategy Commission found that the 
        United States Armed Forces must be postured ``to deter and 
        prevent a fait accompli by an agile opportunistic adversary'' 
        in order to compete effectively in the Indo-Pacific region and 
        stated that ``the United States must develop new operational 
        concepts to achieve strategic advantage, including by 
        addressing the ability of aggressive regimes to achieve a fait 
        accompli against states on their periphery,'' in recognition 
        of--
                    (A) the unique challenges to the United States 
                Armed Forces posed by the employment of the fait 
                accompli strategy by the Government of the People's 
                Republic of China or another strategic competitor; and
                    (B) the consequent urgent need for new thinking and 
                steady focus by the Department of Defense on ensuring 
                the ability of the United States Armed Forces to 
                prevent an adversary from using the fait accompli 
                strategy to advance its interests at the expense of 
                those of the United States.
            (9) Department of Defense strategic guidance and official 
        statements underscore the essential role that denial operations 
        will play in preventing a fait accompli by the People's 
        Republic of China against Taiwan, including--
                    (A) the incorporation in the National Defense 
                Strategy of the Global Operating Model that includes a 
                ``blunt layer'' of combat-credible forward forces 
                postured and employed to ``delay, degrade, or deny 
                adversary aggression'';
                    (B) the conclusion by the National Defense Strategy 
                Commission that the Department of Defense must position 
                ``substantial capability forward'' in the form of the 
                ``blunt layer'' included in the Global Operating Model 
                to ``deter and prevent a fait accompli'';
                    (C) the statement for the record by the Commander 
                of the United States Indo-Pacific Command, Admiral Phil 
                Davidson, in April 2018 in which he concludes, ``[d]ue 
                to the distances involved in the Indo-Pacific, we 
                cannot rely solely on surge forces from the continental 
                United States to deter Chinese aggression or prevent a 
                fait accompli. PACOM must maintain a robust blunt layer 
                that effectively deters Chinese aggression in the Indo-
                Pacific'';
                    (D) the Joint Operating Concept for Deterrence 
                Operations, which states that forward-deployed forces, 
                such as those included in the blunt layer of the Global 
                Operating Model and referenced by the National Defense 
                Strategy Commission and the Commander of the United 
                States Indo-Pacific Command, contribute to ``denying 
                benefits'' and thereby reduce ``the likelihood of an 
                adversary achieving strategic or tactical surprise, 
                thus helping to prevent adversary decisionmakers from 
                concluding they might achieve a military fait accompli 
                that could be extremely costly for the [United States] 
                to reverse by force'';
                    (E) the United States Army Multi-Domain Operations 
                concept document, which states that the Armed Forces 
                must demonstrate the capability ``to immediately deny a 
                fait accompli attack'' in order to deter a near-peer 
                adversary; and
                    (F) the Marine Corps Force Design 2030 report, 
                which states that forward-deployed forces ``that can 
                continue to operate inside an adversary's long-range 
                precision-fire weapons engagement zone (WEZ) are more 
                operationally relevant than forces which must rapidly 
                maneuver to positions outside the WEZ in order to 
                remain survivable,'' and that such ``stand-in'' forces 
                possess the capability to ``attrite adversary forces, 
                enable joint force access requirements, complicate 
                targeting and consume adversary [intelligence, 
                surveillance, and reconnaissance] resources, and 
                prevent fait accompli scenarios''.

SEC. 4. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

    It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the ability of the United States to uphold a free and 
        open Indo-Pacific region would be severely compromised if the 
        Government of the People's Republic of China were able to 
        compel the unification of Taiwan with the People's Republic of 
        China, particularly if the People's Republic of China were able 
        to do so by military force;
            (2) the loss by the United States of the ability to 
        maintain a free and open Indo-Pacific region would result in 
        the significantly increased vulnerability of the middle-class 
        and working-class people of the United States and the allies 
        and partners of the United States to economic coercion by the 
        Government of the People's Republic of China;
            (3) the fate of Taiwan is therefore crucially linked to the 
        fates of all countries in the Indo-Pacific region, including to 
        the fate of the United States;
            (4) under the Taiwan Relations Act (22 U.S.C. 3301 et 
        seq.), it is the policy of the United States to consider any 
        effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful 
        means to be of grave concern to the United States;
            (5) since 1979, the United States Government has 
        consistently upheld the commitments of the United States under 
        the Taiwan Relations Act (22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.);
            (6) the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
        2020 (Public Law 116-92) reaffirms that the Taiwan Relations 
        Act (22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.) and the ``Six Assurances'' are the 
        cornerstones of United States relations with Taiwan;
            (7) the Taiwan Relations Act (22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.) 
        further establishes the policy of the United States ``to 
        maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort 
        to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the 
        security, or the social or economic system, of the people on 
        Taiwan'';
            (8) the Government of the People's Republic of China 
        appears to be developing the plans and capabilities required to 
        use the fait accompli strategy to compel the unification of 
        Taiwan with the People's Republic of China, thereby 
        jeopardizing the security and the social and economic system of 
        the people of Taiwan;
            (9) denial operations will have an essential role in any 
        strategy to prevent a fait accompli by the People's Republic of 
        China against Taiwan; and
            (10) implementation of the Taiwan Relations Act (22 U.S.C. 
        3301 et seq.) therefore requires the United States to maintain 
        the ability to defeat a fait accompli by the People's Republic 
        of China against Taiwan, especially by denial operations.

SEC. 5. STATEMENT OF POLICY.

    It shall be the policy of the United States to maintain the ability 
of the United States Armed Forces to deny a fait accompli by the 
People's Republic of China against Taiwan.

SEC. 6. REPORT ON PROGRESS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE WITH RESPECT TO 
              DENYING A FAIT ACCOMPLI BY THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 
              AGAINST TAIWAN.

    (a) In General.--Not later than April 30 each year, beginning in 
2021 and ending in 2026, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the 
congressional defense committees a report on the progress of the 
Department of Defense with respect to improving the ability of the 
United States Armed Forces to conduct combined joint operations to deny 
the ability of the People's Republic of China to execute a fait 
accompli against Taiwan.
    (b) Matters To Be Included.--Each report under subsection (a) shall 
include the following:
            (1) An explanation of the objectives for the United States 
        Armed Forces that would be necessary to deny the fait accompli 
        by the People's Republic of China against Taiwan.
            (2) An identification of joint warfighting capabilities and 
        current efforts to organize, train, and equip the United States 
        Armed Forces in support of the objectives referred to in 
        paragraph (1), including--
                    (A) an assessment of whether the programs included 
                in the most recent future-years defense program 
                submitted to Congress under section 221 of title 10, 
                United States Code, are sufficient to enable the United 
                States Armed Forces to conduct joint combined 
                operations to achieve such objectives;
                    (B) a description of additional investments or 
                force posture adjustments required to maintain or 
                improve the ability of the United States Armed Forces 
                to conduct joint combined operations to achieve such 
                objectives;
                    (C) a description of the manner in which the 
                Secretary of Defense intends to develop and integrate 
                Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Space Force 
                operational concepts to maintain or improve the ability 
                of the United States Armed Forces to conduct joint 
                combined operations to achieve such objectives; and
                    (D) an assessment of the manner in which different 
                options for pre-delegating authorities, including 
                authorities relating to kinetic strikes against targets 
                on the mainland of the People's Republic of China, may 
                improve the ability of the United States Armed Forces 
                to conduct joint combined operations to achieve such 
                objectives.
            (3) An assessment of the role of the nuclear forces of the 
        United States in deterring or defeating a fait accompli by the 
        People's Republic of China against Taiwan, including concepts 
        for--
                    (A) deterring limited use of nuclear weapons by the 
                People's Republic of China in the Indo-Pacific region 
                without undermining the ability of the United States 
                Armed Forces to maintain nuclear deterrence at the 
                strategic and theater levels against the Russian 
                Federation and the Democratic People's Republic of 
                Korea; and
                    (B) ensuring the United States Armed Forces are 
                able to continue combined joint operations to defend 
                Taiwan in a nuclear environment following nuclear 
                weapons use by the People's Republic of China or the 
                United States.
    (c) Form.--Each report required by subsection (a) shall be 
submitted in classified form but may include an unclassified executive 
summary.
    (d) Congressional Defense Committees Defined.--In this section, the 
term ``congressional defense committees'' has the meaning given the 
term in section 101(a)(16) of title 10, United States Code.
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