Title: Richard Lugar Nonproliferation and Arms Control Legacy Resolution
Policy area: International Affairs

Summary:
Richard Lugar Nonproliferation and Arms Control Legacy Resolution
This concurrent resolution (1) specifies that the United States should encourage all parties to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to comply with it fully, (2) encourages the United States to engage with Russia on strategic stability issues and other arms control and nonproliferation issues, and (3) condemns Russia's nonadherence to its treaty obligations regarding intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles.

[Congressional Bills 116th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Con. Res. 39 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>






116th CONGRESS
  1st Session
H. CON. RES. 39

      Expressing the sense of Congress that the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) continues to make an invaluable 
 contribution to United States and international security, and noting 
   former Senator Richard G. Lugar's indispensable contributions to 
   international security and reducing nuclear weapons-related risks.


_______________________________________________________________________


                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                              May 15, 2019

 Mr. Sherman (for himself, Mr. Banks, Mr. Foster, Mr. Fortenberry, Mr. 
    Lujan, and Mr. Fleischmann) submitted the following concurrent 
   resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs

_______________________________________________________________________

                         CONCURRENT RESOLUTION


 
      Expressing the sense of Congress that the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) continues to make an invaluable 
 contribution to United States and international security, and noting 
   former Senator Richard G. Lugar's indispensable contributions to 
   international security and reducing nuclear weapons-related risks.

Whereas the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) opened for 
        signature 50 years ago on July 1, 1968;
Whereas the United States and the former Soviet Union averted a catastrophic 
        nuclear exchange during the October 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, which led 
        to a series of bilateral and multilateral agreements to lessen the 
        chance of nuclear war, including the NPT;
Whereas President John F. Kennedy predicted in 1963 that as many as 25 countries 
        would acquire nuclear weapons by 1970 absent a treaty to control nuclear 
        weapons;
Whereas the United States Senate provided its advice and consent to the NPT on 
        March 13, 1969, with a vote on ratification of 83 to 15;
Whereas the NPT has grown to include 191 State Parties, making an irreplaceable 
        contribution to international security by preventing the spread of 
        nuclear weapons;
Whereas former Senator Richard G. Lugar made indispensable contributions to 
        reducing nuclear weapon risks, most notably through his leadership in 
        standing up the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (commonly referred 
        to as the ``Nunn-Lugar Program''), which eliminated 7,600 nuclear 
        weapons in the former Soviet Union;
Whereas Senator Lugar successfully secured the advice and consent of the Senate 
        to the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian 
        Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of 
        Strategic Offensive Arms, signed at Prague April 8, 2010, and entered 
        into force February 5, 2011 (commonly known as the ``New START 
        Treaty'');
Whereas Article III of the NPT obligates each nonnuclear weapon state to the NPT 
        to conclude a Safeguards Agreement with the International Atomic Energy 
        Agency (IAEA) to verify treaty compliance, 174 of which are 
        Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements crafted to detect the diversion of 
        nuclear materials from peaceful to non-peaceful uses;
Whereas the 2018 Department of Defense Nuclear Posture Review affirms, ``The 
        Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is a cornerstone of the nuclear 
        nonproliferation regime. It plays a positive role in building consensus 
        for non-proliferation and enhances international efforts to impose costs 
        on those that would pursue nuclear weapons outside the Treaty.'';
Whereas the success of the NPT has and will continue to depend upon the full 
        implementation by all State Parties of the Treaty's three mutually 
        reinforcing pillars: nonproliferation, access to peaceful uses of 
        nuclear energy, and disarmament;
Whereas, over the past half century, the United States has exhibited leadership 
        in strengthening each of the NPT's three pillars for the global good, 
        including--

    (1) reducing its nuclear weapons stockpile by more than 85 percent from 
its Cold War heights of 31,225 in parallel with equally massive reductions 
of the Russian Federation's stockpile through bilateral coordination;

    (2) cooperating with Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Belarus to facilitate the 
surrender of nuclear weapons on their soil after the fall of the Soviet 
Union--leading to each country's accession to the NPT as nonnuclear weapons 
states;

    (3) providing voluntary contributions to the IAEA to promote peaceful 
nuclear activities exceeding $378,000,000 since 2010, including activities 
that help in the treatment of cancer and other life-saving applications; 
and

    (4) extending deterrence to United States allies in the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO), Japan, and the Republic of Korea--which is an 
unmistakable demonstration of the United States commitment to collective 
security;

Whereas heightened geopolitical tensions in recent years have made cooperation 
        on nonproliferation and arms control issues with the Russian Federation 
        more challenging;
Whereas a range of actions by the Government of the Russian Federation has led 
        to a deterioration in bilateral relations with the United States, 
        including Russia's brazen interference in the 2016 United States 
        presidential elections, its violation of the Treaty between the United 
        States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the 
        Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles 
        (commonly known as the ``INF Treaty''), signed at Washington, DC, 
        December 8, 1987, and entered into force June 1, 1988, its use of a 
        chemical nerve agent in an assassination attempt against Sergei Skripal 
        and his daughter Yulia in the United Kingdom in March 2018, its illegal 
        annexation of Crimea, its invasion of Eastern Ukraine, and its 
        destabilizing actions in Syria;
Whereas, within a difficult environment, preserving agreements that continue to 
        contribute to United States and global security, particularly the New 
        START Treaty, is important, and that to that end, the Department of 
        State confirmed in February 2018 that Russia had met New START's Central 
        Treaty Limits and stated that ``implementation of the New START Treaty 
        enhances the safety and security of the United States'';
Whereas United States efforts to reduce dangers associated with nuclear arsenals 
        through ambitious arms control agreements with both the Russian 
        Federation and the People's Republic of China would advance United 
        States and global security, adding to the benefits of stability and 
        transparency provided by existing agreements;
Whereas, in a March 2018 speech, President Vladimir Putin of the Russian 
        Federation unveiled details of new kinds of strategic nuclear weapons 
        under development, including hypersonic nuclear weapons, nuclear-powered 
        ballistic missiles, and multi-megaton nuclear torpedoes shot from drone 
        submarines that may be accountable under the New START Treaty;
Whereas the Russian Federation erroneously claimed that the United States may 
        have not reached New START Treaty central limits by February 5, 2018, as 
        is mandated by the Treaty;
Whereas the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC) is the appropriate forum for 
        the Parties to engage constructively on any New START Treaty 
        implementation issues that arise; and
Whereas the collapse of the INF Treaty and expiration of the New START Treaty 
        would lead to the absence of any binding, bilateral treaty or agreement 
        governing United States and Russian nuclear forces, which account for 90 
        percent of those currently in existence globally, for the first time 
        since 1972: Now, therefore be it
    Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring),

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This concurrent resolution may be cited as the ``Richard Lugar 
Nonproliferation and Arms Control Legacy Resolution''.

SEC. 2. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

    That it is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the United States should continue to encourage all 
        States Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
        Weapons (NPT) to comply fully with the Treaty;
            (2) the United States should maintain support for the IAEA 
        through its assessed and voluntary contributions and promote 
        the universal adoption of the IAEA Additional Protocol;
            (3) the United States should--
                    (A) consider extending the New START Treaty, within 
                the context of wider enhancement of strategic stability 
                between the United States and the Russian Federation 
                and provided the Treaty continues to advance United 
                States national security;
                    (B) assess whether Russia's recently announced 
                nuclear capabilities should be accountable under the 
                New START Treaty, and raise the issue directly with the 
                Russian Federation;
                    (C) conclude an interagency process to consider an 
                extension of the New START Treaty and to engage with 
                the Russian Federation on the full range of strategic 
                stability issues and other arms control and 
                nonproliferation issues;
                    (D) begin negotiations with the Russian Federation 
                on an agreement to address the massive disparity 
                between the nonstrategic nuclear weapons stockpiles of 
                the Russian Federation and of the United States and to 
                secure and reduce nonstrategic nuclear weapons in a 
                verifiable manner; and
                    (E) consider the consequences of the New START 
                Treaty's expiration in 2021 in relation to the insights 
                it provides into the location, movement, and 
                disposition of current and future Russian strategic 
                systems;
            (4) the United States strongly condemns the Russian 
        Federation's violations of the INF Treaty and its noncompliance 
        with its other arms control commitments and treaty obligations, 
        and urges the Russian Federation to come back into full 
        compliance;
            (5) in responding to the Russian Federation's deployment of 
        INF-range systems, advocate for those defense and deterrence 
        steps which preserve NATO alliance cohesion and are aimed at 
        averting an arms race on the European continent;
            (6) pursuit of a verifiable and comprehensive arms control 
        agreement with the Russian Federation and the People's Republic 
        of China, which may capture strategic and nonstrategic nuclear 
        weapons capabilities, would enhance United States and global 
        security by building upon other treaties, agreements, and 
        transparency measures that reduce nuclear risk; and
            (7) the United States should continue to encourage 
        opportunities for cooperation with other nuclear possessing 
        states to reduce the salience, number, and role of nuclear 
        weapons in their national military strategies.
                                 <all>