Title: SAUDI WMD Act
Policy area: International Affairs

Summary:
Stopping Activities Underpinning Development In Weapons of Mass Destruction Act or the SAUDI WMD Act
This bill establishes measures, including restrictions on U.S. arms sales to Saudi Arabia, to inhibit the development of nuclear weapons by Saudi Arabia.

[Congressional Bills 116th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 4946 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

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116th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                S. 4946

     To counter Saudi Arabia's possible pursuit of weapons of mass 
                  destruction, and for other purposes.


_______________________________________________________________________


                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                            December 2, 2020

Mr. Markey (for himself and Mr. Merkley) introduced the following bill; 
which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL


 
     To counter Saudi Arabia's possible pursuit of weapons of mass 
                  destruction, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Stopping Activities Underpinning 
Development In Weapons of Mass Destruction Act'' or the ``SAUDI WMD 
Act''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

    Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) The People's Republic of China (in this Act referred to 
        as ``China''), became a full-participant of the Nuclear 
        Suppliers Group in 2004, committing it to apply a strong 
        presumption of denial in exporting nuclear-related items that a 
        foreign country could divert to a nuclear weapons program.
            (2) China also committed to the United States, in November 
        2000, to abide by the foundational principles of the 1987 
        Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) to not ``assist, in 
        any way, any country in the development of ballistic missiles 
        that can be used to deliver nuclear weapons (i.e., missiles 
        capable of delivering a payload of at least 500 kilograms to a 
        distance of at least 300 kilometers)''.
            (3) In the 1980s, China secretly sold the Kingdom of Saudi 
        Arabia (in this Act referred to as ``Saudi Arabia'') 
        conventionally armed DF-3A ballistic missiles, and in 2007, 
        reportedly sold Saudi Arabia dual-use capable DF-21 medium-
        range ballistic missiles of a 300 kilometer, 500-kilogram range 
        and payload threshold which should have triggered a denial of 
        sale under the MTCR.
            (4) The 2020 Department of State Report on the Adherence to 
        and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and 
        Disarmament Agreements and Commitments found that China 
        ``continued to supply MTCR-controlled goods to missile programs 
        of proliferation concern in 2019'' and that the United States 
        imposed sanctions on nine Chinese entities for covered missile 
        transfers to Iran.
            (5) A June 5, 2019, press report indicated that China 
        allegedly provided assistance to Saudi Arabia in the 
        development of a ballistic missile facility, which if 
        confirmed, would violate the purpose of the MTCR and run 
        contrary to the longstanding United States policy priority to 
        prevent weapons of mass destruction proliferation in the Middle 
        East.
            (6) The Arms Export and Control Act of 1976 (Public Law 93-
        329) requires the President to sanction any foreign person or 
        government who knowingly ``exports, transfers, or otherwise 
        engages in the trade of any MTCR equipment or technology'' to a 
        country that does not adhere to the MTCR.
            (7) China concluded two nuclear cooperation agreements with 
        Saudi Arabia in 2012 and 2017, respectively, which may 
        facilitate China's bid to build two reactors in Saudi Arabia to 
        generate 2.9 Gigawatt-electric (GWe) of electricity.
            (8) On August 4, 2020, a press report revealed the alleged 
        existence of a previously undisclosed uranium yellowcake 
        extraction facility in Saudi Arabia allegedly constructed with 
        the assistance of China, which if confirmed, would indicate 
        significant progress by Saudi Arabia in developing the early 
        stages of the nuclear fuel cycle that precede uranium 
        enrichment.
            (9) Saudi Arabia's outdated Small Quantities Protocol and 
        its lack of an in force Additional Protocol to its 
        International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Comprehensive 
        Safeguards Agreement severely curtails IAEA inspections, which 
        has led the Agency to call upon Saudi Arabia to either rescind 
        or update its Small Quantities Protocol.
            (10) In May 24, 2018, testimony before the Committee on 
        Foreign Relations of the Senate, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo 
        said that the United States would insist upon the ``gold 
        standard'' in any bilateral civilian nuclear cooperation 
        ``123'' agreement with Saudi Arabia--no in-country enrichment 
        of uranium or reprocessing of plutonium--a standard the United 
        States achieved with the United Arab Emirates in their own May 
        2009 bilateral 123 agreement.
            (11) On March 15, 2018, the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia, 
        Mohammad bin-Salman, stated that ``if Iran developed a nuclear 
        bomb, we would follow suit as soon as possible,'' raising 
        questions about whether a Saudi Arabian nuclear program would 
        remain exclusively peaceful, particularly in the absence of 
        robust international IAEA safeguards.
            (12) An August 9, 2019, study by the United Nations High 
        Commissioner for Human Rights found that the Saudi Arabia-led 
        military coalition airstrikes in Yemen and its restrictions on 
        the flow of humanitarian assistance to the country, both of 
        which have disproportionately impacted civilians, may be 
        violations of international humanitarian law.

SEC. 3. DETERMINATION OF POSSIBLE MTCR TRANSFERS TO SAUDI ARABIA.

    (a) MTCR Transfers.--Not later than 30 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the appropriate 
committees of Congress a written determination, and any documentation 
to support that determination detailing--
            (1) whether any foreign person knowingly exported, 
        transferred, or engaged in trade of any item designated under 
        Category I of the MTCR Annex item with Saudi Arabia in the 
        previous three fiscal years; and
            (2) the sanctions the President has imposed or intends to 
        impose pursuant to section 11B(b) of the Export Administration 
        Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. 4612(b)) against any foreign person who 
        knowingly engaged in the export, transfer, or trade of that 
        item or items.
    (b) Waiver.--Notwithstanding any provision of paragraphs (3) 
through (7) of section 11(B)(b) of the Export Administration Act of 
1979 (50 U.S.C. 4612(b)), the President may only waive the application 
of sanctions under such section with respect to Saudi Arabia if that 
country is verifiably determined to no longer possess an item 
designated under Category I of the MTCR Annex received in the previous 
three fiscal years.
    (c) Form of Report.--The determination required under subsection 
(a) shall be unclassified with a classified annex.

SEC. 4. PROHIBITION ON UNITED STATES ARMS SALES TO SAUDI ARABIA IF IT 
              IMPORTS NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY WITHOUT SAFEGUARDS.

    (a) In General.--The United States shall not sell, transfer, or 
authorize licenses for export of any item designated under Category 
III, IV, VII, or VIII on the United States Munitions List pursuant to 
section 38(a)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2778(a)(1)) 
to Saudi Arabia, other than ground-based missile defense systems, if 
Saudi Arabia has, in the previous 3 fiscal years--
            (1) knowingly imported any item classified as ``plants for 
        the separation of isotopes of uranium'' or ``plants for the 
        reprocessing of irradiated nuclear reactor fuel elements'' 
        under Part 110 of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission export 
        licensing authority; or
            (2) engaged in nuclear cooperation related to the 
        construction of any nuclear-related fuel cycle facility or 
        activity that has not been notified to the IAEA and would be 
        subject to complementary access if an Additional Protocol was 
        in force.
    (b) Waiver.--The Secretary of State may waive the prohibition under 
subsection (a) with respect to a foreign country if the Secretary 
submits to the appropriate committees of Congress a written 
certification that contains a determination, and any relevant 
documentation on which the determination is based, that Saudi Arabia--
            (1) has brought into force an Additional Protocol to the 
        IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement based on the model 
        described in IAEA INFCIRC/540;
            (2) has concluded a civilian nuclear cooperation agreement 
        with the United States under section 123 of the Atomic Energy 
        Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153) or another supplier that prohibits 
        the enrichment of uranium or separation of plutonium on its own 
        territory; and
            (3) has rescinded its Small Quantities Protocol and is not 
        found by the IAEA Board of Governors to be in noncompliance 
        with its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement.
    (c) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this Act shall be construed 
as superseding the obligation of the President under section 502B(a)(2) 
or section 620I(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 
2304(a)(2), 22 U.S.C. 2378-1(a)), respectively, to not furnish security 
assistance to Saudi Arabia or any country if it--
            (1) engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of 
        internationally recognized human rights; or
            (2) prohibits or otherwise restricts, directly or 
        indirectly, the transport or delivery of United States 
        humanitarian assistance.

SEC. 5. MIDDLE EAST NONPROLIFERATION STRATEGY.

    (a) In General.--Not later than 60 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the Secretary of State 
and the Secretary of Energy, in consultation with the Director of 
National Intelligence, shall provide the appropriate committees of 
Congress, as an appendix to the Report on the Adherence to and 
Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament 
Agreements and Commitments, a report on MTCR compliance and the United 
States Middle East nonproliferation strategy.
    (b) Elements.--The report required under subsection (a) shall 
include the following elements:
            (1) An assessment of China's compliance, in the previous 
        fiscal year, with its November 2000 commitment to abide by the 
        MTCR and United States diplomatic efforts to address non-
        compliance.
            (2) A description of every foreign person that, in the 
        previous fiscal year, engaged in the export, transfer, or trade 
        of MTCR items to a country that is a non-MTCR adherent, and a 
        description of the sanctions the President imposed pursuant to 
        section 11B(b) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 
        U.S.C. 4612(b)).
            (3) A detailed strategy to prevent the proliferation of 
        ballistic missile and sensitive nuclear technology in the 
        Middle East and North Africa from China and other foreign 
        countries, including the following elements:
                    (A) An assessment of the proliferation risks 
                associated with concluding or renewing a civilian 
                nuclear cooperation ``123'' agreement with any country 
                in the Middle-East and North Africa and the risks of 
                such if that same equipment and technology is sourced 
                from a foreign state.
                    (B) An update on United States bilateral and 
                multilateral diplomatic actions to commence 
                negotiations on a Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone 
                (WMDFZ) since the 2015 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty 
                Review Conference.
                    (C) A description of United States Government 
                efforts to achieve global adherence and compliance with 
                the Nuclear Suppliers Group, MTCR, and the 2002 
                International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile 
                Proliferation guidelines.
            (4) An account of the briefings to the appropriate 
        committees of Congress in the reporting period detailing 
        negotiations on any new or renewed civilian nuclear cooperation 
        ``123'' agreement with any country consistent with the intent 
        of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.).
    (c) Form of Report.--The report required under subsection (a) shall 
be unclassified with a classified annex.

SEC. 6. DEFINITIONS.

    In this Act:
            (1) Appropriate committees of congress.--The term 
        ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
                    (A) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
                Senate;
                    (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
                Senate;
                    (C) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
                House of Representative; and
                    (D) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House 
                of Representatives.
            (2) Foreign person; person.--The terms ``foreign person'' 
        and ``person'' mean--
                    (A) a natural person that is an alien;
                    (B) a corporation, business association, 
                partnership, society, trust, or any other 
                nongovernmental entity, organization, or group, that is 
                organized under the laws of a foreign country or has 
                its principal place of business in a foreign country;
                    (C) any foreign governmental entity operating as a 
                business enterprise; and
                    (D) any successor, subunit, or subsidiary of any 
                entity described in subparagraph (B) or (C).
            (3) Middle east and north africa.--The term ``Middle East 
        and North Africa'' means those countries that are included in 
        the Area of Responsibility of the Assistant Secretary of State 
        for Near Eastern Affairs.
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