Title: New START Policy Act of 2019
Policy area: International Affairs

Summary:
New START Policy Act of 2019
This bill requires reports related to Russia's nuclear arsenal and the effect that the Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START treaty) has had on that arsenal. (The treaty is set to expire in February 2021 but may be extended to February 2026.)
The Office of the Director of National Intelligence shall report to Congress on (1) Russia's current nuclear forces and predicted force levels in 2026, (2) the impact the New START treaty has had on Russia's nuclear forces and strategic delivery systems, (3) how the expiration of the treaty would affect strategic stability and security for the United States and its allies, and (4) how the expiration of the treaty would affect the ability of the U.S. intelligence community to accurately assess Russia's nuclear arsenal.
The Department of Defense (DOD) shall report to Congress on (1) the impact the expiration of the treaty will have on the U.S. nuclear arsenal and posture, (2) the options available to respond to changes to Russia's nuclear posture if the treaty's limitations are removed, (3) the changes to DOD's budget that will be necessary if the treaty is not extended, and (4) how the expiration of the treaty would affect strategic stability.

[Congressional Bills 116th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 845 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

<DOC>






116th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                 S. 845

To establish as United States policy that, pending confirmation of the 
 Russian Federation's continued compliance with the New START Treaty, 
        the United States should extend the Treaty through 2026.


_______________________________________________________________________


                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             March 14, 2019

  Mr. Menendez (for himself, Mr. Reed, and Mr. Warner) introduced the 
 following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on 
                           Foreign Relations

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL


 
To establish as United States policy that, pending confirmation of the 
 Russian Federation's continued compliance with the New START Treaty, 
        the United States should extend the Treaty through 2026.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``New START Policy Act of 2019''.

SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.

    In this Act:
            (1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
        ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
                    (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the 
                Committee on Armed Services, and the Select Committee 
                on Intelligence of the Senate; and
                    (B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee 
                on Armed Services, and the Permanent Select Committee 
                on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.
            (2) New start, treaty.--The terms ``New START'' and 
        ``Treaty'' mean the Treaty between the United States of America 
        and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further 
        Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, signed 
        April 8, 2010, and entered into force February 5, 2011 
        (commonly known as the ``New START Treaty'').

SEC. 3. FINDINGS.

    Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) Since the end of World War II, the United States has 
        relied on a robust and effective nuclear deterrent as part of 
        our national defense, particularly against the Soviet Union and 
        its successor state, the Russian Federation.
            (2) In tandem with our nuclear deterrent, the United States 
        pursued a number of arms control, disarmament, and 
        nonproliferation agreements with the Soviet Union as a means of 
        ensuring strategic stability and United States defense of the 
        homeland, such as the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty and the 
        Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty.
            (3) The Nuclear Posture Review issued in February 2018 
        states that arms control agreements during the Cold War 
        ``increased transparency, moderated competition, codified rough 
        parity in strategic nuclear areas, and closed off areas of 
        competition''.
            (4) In the aftermath of the fall of the Soviet Union, the 
        United States continues to rely on a combination of nuclear 
        deterrence and strategic arms control to protect the United 
        States from nuclear attack.
            (5) On April 8, 2010, the United States and the Russian 
        Federation signed the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New 
        START).
            (6) In an op-ed to the Washington Post dated December 2, 
        2010, former Secretaries of State Henry A. Kissinger, George P. 
        Shultz, James A. Baker III, Lawrence S. Eagleburger, and Colin 
        L. Powell all urged the Senate to ratify New START, stating 
        that it was in ``the national interest to ratify''.
            (7) During the ratification process, New START garnered 
        bipartisan support, and the United States Senate approved New 
        START on December 22, 2010, by a 71-26 vote.
            (8) New START entered into force on February 5, 2011, 
        placing limitations on United States and Russian strategic 
        systems, including intercontinental ballistic missiles, 
        submarine launched ballistic missiles, and heavy bombers, as 
        well as warheads that threatened the United States.
            (9) On February 5, 2018, the central limits on United 
        States and Russia strategic nuclear arsenals took effect.
            (10) In March 2018, the United States and the Russian 
        Federation exchanged data on their respective strategic nuclear 
        arsenals in accordance with the Treaty.
            (11) Through the Treaty's verification regime, which 
        includes short-notice, on-site inspections at military bases 
        and facilities, the United States is able to verify the data 
        provided by the Russian Federation regarding its strategic 
        nuclear arsenal. The verification regime provides both 
        countries insight into each other's strategic nuclear delivery 
        systems, warheads, and facilities, as well as data exchanges to 
        track the status and makeup of nuclear weapons systems.
            (12) During a February 26, 2019, hearing of the Committee 
        on Armed Services of the Senate on nuclear deterrence 
        requirements, Commander of the United States Strategic Command 
        (STRATCOM) and Air Force General John Hyten voiced his 
        enthusiastic support for the Treaty, saying he was ``a big 
        supporter of the New START agreement'' stating, ``The New START 
        treaty'' provides ``insights into the Russians capabilities. 
        Those are hugely beneficial to me.''.
            (13) During a March 2017 hearing of the Committee on Armed 
        Services of the House of Representatives on nuclear deterrence 
        requirements, Air Force General Paul Selva, the Vice Chairman 
        of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, also endorsed the treaty, saying 
        New START is ``a bilateral, verifiable agreement that gives us 
        some degree of predictability on what our potential adversaries 
        look like''.
            (14) Lieutenant General Jack Weinstein, the Air Force 
        Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear 
        Integration, asserted that New START was of ``huge value'' to 
        United States security.
            (15) The Nuclear Posture Review states that arms control 
        agreements can ``foster transparency, understanding, and 
        predictability in adversary relations, thereby reducing the 
        risk of misunderstanding and miscalculation''.
            (16) New START strengthens United States nuclear security 
        and strategic stability by reducing the number of strategic 
        systems in Russia's nuclear arsenal and provides the United 
        States with the inspection and monitoring tools necessary to 
        confidently verify Russian compliance with New START.
            (17) New START does not restrict United States nuclear 
        modernization programs or limit United States missile defense 
        efforts.
            (18) During a September 2018 hearing before the Committee 
        on Foreign Relations of the Senate, Deputy Secretary of Defense 
        for Policy David Trachtenberg stated that ``the transparency 
        and verification requirements of the New START Treaty are a 
        benefit'' to United States security and, in response to a 
        question regarding missile defense, asserted that New START had 
        ``no'' effect on limiting our missile defense capabilities.
            (19) In a March 2017 hearing of the Strategic Forces 
        Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services of the House of 
        Representatives, Retired Air Force General and former commander 
        of U.S. Strategic Command Robert Kehler stated ``I think that 
        we have gotten tremendous benefit out of those kinds of 
        agreements with the Russians over the years, provided that the 
        Russians comply'' regarding the importance of New START.

SEC. 4. STATEMENT OF POLICY.

    It is the policy of the United States to extend New START from its 
initial termination date in February 2021 to February 2026, as allowed 
in the Treaty, unless the President determines and so informs Congress 
that Russia is in material breach of New START.

SEC. 5. REPORTS TO CONGRESS.

    (a) Director of National Intelligence.--Not later than 180 days 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National 
Intelligence shall submit a report and provide a briefing to the 
appropriate congressional committees that includes the following 
elements:
            (1) A description of the Russian Federation's current 
        nuclear forces and predicted force levels in 2026.
            (2) An analysis of the impact New START has had on the size 
        and posture of the Russian Federation's nuclear forces and 
        strategic delivery systems.
            (3) An assessment of how the Russian Federation's nuclear 
        and missile arsenals would change if the New START is not 
        extended or if a follow-on agreement to New START is not 
        concluded.
            (4) An assessment of how strategic stability would be 
        impacted if New START is not extended or if a follow-on 
        agreement to New START is not concluded.
            (5) A description of the strategic security ramifications 
        for the United States and our allies if New START is not 
        extended or a follow-on agreement to New START is not 
        concluded.
            (6) An assessment of how our allies will respond if the 
        limitations on the Russian Federation's nuclear arsenal are 
        dissolved because of New START not being extended or a follow-
        on agreement to New START not being concluded.
            (7) An assessment of the impact on the United States 
        intelligence community's ability to accurately assess the 
        Russian Federation's strategic nuclear arsenal and future 
        nuclear force levels if New START is not extended or if a 
        follow-on agreement to New START is not concluded.
    (b) Secretary of Defense.--Not later than 180 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit a 
report and provide a briefing to appropriate congressional committees 
that includes the following elements:
            (1) An assessment by the Secretary of Defense on the impact 
        on the United States nuclear arsenal and posture if New START 
        is not extended or a follow-on agreement is not concluded.
            (2) A description of the options that the United States has 
        to respond to potential changes in the Russian Federation's 
        nuclear posture if the limitations contained in the New START 
        treaty are removed.
            (3) A description of the adjustments to the Department of 
        Defense budget that will be necessary if New START is not 
        extended or a follow-on agreement is not concluded.
            (4) A description of the impact on strategic stability if 
        New START is not extended or a follow-on agreement is not 
        concluded.
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