Title: Fostering Unity Against Russian Aggression Act of 2017
Policy area: International Affairs

Summary:
Fostering Unity Against Russian Aggression Act of 2017
This bill expresses the sense of Congress that: (1) the Russian Federation should return to verifiable compliance with the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF) Treaty, (2) concerns persist over the growing sophistication of unconventional and hybrid state-sponsored Russian threats, and (3) maritime capabilities should be enhanced.
The Department of Defense (DOD) shall: (1) develop a strategy to counter Russian threats; (2) develop a strategy to increase conventional precision strike weapon stockpiles in the U.S. European Command's areas of responsibility, including increases to enhance deterrence and fighting capability of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; (3) develop a plan to counter Russian military capabilities; (4) develop a plan to train the national security forces of U.S. allies and partners to counter Russian cyberspace and information operations; (5) report to Congress regarding DOD's strategy to expand the forward presence of U.S. military forces in Europe; (6) submit a plan to Congress that includes options to reduce the risk of miscalculation and unintended consequences that could precipitate a nuclear war; and (7) report to Congress regarding the location and capacities of training areas in the European Command's areas of responsibility.
The President shall submit a plan to Congress to impose sanctions against Russia for non-compliance with the INF Treaty. Such sanctions should include expanding asset freezes and travel bans and prohibiting financial transactions and government-to-government contracts.

[Congressional Bills 115th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 3025 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>






115th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 3025

To strengthen security and deterrence in Europe and to hold the Russian 
Federation accountable for violations of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear 
                 Forces Treaty, and for other purposes.


_______________________________________________________________________


                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             June 22, 2017

 Mr. Smith of Washington (for himself, Ms. Speier, Mr. Garamendi, Ms. 
 Bordallo, Mr. Courtney, Mr. Langevin, Mr. Brady of Pennsylvania, Mrs. 
Murphy of Florida, Mr. Gallego, Mrs. Davis of California, Mr. Moulton, 
 Mr. Brown of Maryland, Mr. Cooper, Ms. Shea-Porter, Mr. Norcross, Mr. 
    Veasey, Ms. Tsongas, Mr. McEachin, Ms. Rosen, Ms. Hanabusa, Mr. 
 O'Halleran, and Mr. Suozzi) introduced the following bill; which was 
 referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the 
Committee on Armed Services, for a period to be subsequently determined 
 by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as 
        fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL


 
To strengthen security and deterrence in Europe and to hold the Russian 
Federation accountable for violations of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear 
                 Forces Treaty, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Fostering Unity Against Russian 
Aggression Act of 2017''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS AND SENSE OF CONGRESS.

    (a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
            (1) General Curtis M. Scaparrotti, Commander of the United 
        States European Command, testified before the House Armed 
        Services Committee on March 27, 2017, that ``Today we face the 
        most dynamic European security environment in history.'' and 
        that ``Russia's malign actions are supported by its diplomatic, 
        information, economic, and military initiatives.''.
            (2) The Russian Federation continues to be in violation of 
        INF Treaty as a result of testing and deploying a new nuclear-
        capable cruise missile.
            (3) The Russian Federation has shifted to a military 
        doctrine that envisions using nuclear weapons in an attempt to 
        end a failing regional conventional conflict. On June 25, 2015, 
        Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Work and then-Vice-Chairman 
        of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral James Winnefeld testified 
        before the House Armed Services Committee that ``Russian 
        military doctrine includes what some have called an `escalate 
        to de-escalate' strategy--a strategy that purportedly seeks to 
        deescalate a conventional conflict through coercive threats, 
        including limited nuclear use. We think that this label is 
        dangerously misleading. Anyone who thinks they can control 
        escalation through the use of nuclear weapons is literally 
        playing with fire. Escalation is escalation, and nuclear use 
        would be the ultimate escalation.''.
            (4) General Scaparrotti noted in his March 27, 2017, 
        testimony before the House Armed Services Committee that 
        ``Moscow's provocative rhetoric and nuclear threats increase 
        the likelihood of misunderstanding and miscalculation.''.
            (5) The Russian Federation continues to conduct ongoing 
        influence campaigns aimed at undermining democracies around the 
        world. According to an assessment by the intelligence 
        community, ``Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered an 
        influence campaign in 2016 aimed at the U.S. presidential 
        election'', which included the use of the Russian military 
        intelligence organization. The intelligence community also 
        assessed that Russia would apply lessons learned to future 
        influence efforts worldwide, including against United States 
        allies and their election systems.
            (6) The Russian Federation continues its aggression on its 
        periphery. In 2008, the Russian Federation fomented conflict in 
        Georgia. The Russian Federation has also illegally occupied and 
        attempted to annex Crimea. Further, the Russian Federation is 
        directing combined Russian-Separatist units in eastern Ukraine, 
        actively inciting violence and prolonging the most significant 
        conflict in Europe.
            (7) The investment of over $5 billion in the European 
        Reassurance Initiative (ERI), now the European Deterrence 
        Initiative (EDI), has proven successful in significantly 
        enhancing the ability of United States forces, NATO allies, and 
        regional partners to deter Russian aggression. EDI has not only 
        assured our European allies and partners but supported 
        essential investments in NATO's military capacity, 
        interoperability, and agility.
    (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the Russian Federation should return to compliance with 
        the INF Treaty in a verifiable manner as soon as possible;
            (2) the risks of miscalculation in a crisis are exacerbated 
        by the Russian Federation's shift to a military doctrine of 
        ``escalate to de-escalate'', lowering the threshold for Russian 
        use of nuclear weapons and thereby increasing the risk of using 
        nuclear weapons, potentially escalating in to a massive nuclear 
        exchange;
            (3) strengthening effective and credible conventional 
        deterrence, particularly on the northeastern flank of NATO, is 
        a political and military priority;
            (4) NATO's formal adoption at the 2014 Wales Summit of the 
        goal for each member state to allocate at least two percent of 
        its gross domestic product to its national defense budget 
        within a decade should be commended, as increased defense 
        spending by NATO member states is strongly encouraged to 
        maintain the alliance's strategic vitality through the 
        enhancement of its collective capacity;
            (5) reaffirming support for the principle of collective 
        defense in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty for NATO 
        allies is vital to a strong and meaningful alliance and is not 
        conditional;
            (6) subversive and destabilizing activities by the Russian 
        Federation targeting NATO allies and partners causes concern 
        and should be condemned;
            (7) strengthened deterrence efforts by NATO allies, 
        including NATO's Enhanced Forward Presence, should be commended 
        and enhancing defense cooperation efforts with NATO allies and 
        partners should be encouraged;
            (8) European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) investments are 
        long-term and, as such, Congress expects future budgets to 
        reflect United States commitment by planning for funding in the 
        base budget, and further EDI should build on United States 
        presence by increasing the United States permanent force 
        posture; and
            (9) credible deterrence requires steadfast cooperation and 
        joint action with NATO allies and partners and other United 
        States allies and partners in Europe.

SEC. 3. STRATEGY TO COUNTER THREATS BY THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.

    (a) Strategy Required.--The Secretary of Defense, in consultation 
with each of the Secretaries of the military departments, the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, and the commanders of each of the regional and 
functional combatant commands, shall develop and implement a 
comprehensive strategy to counter threats by the Russian Federation.
    (b) Report Required.--
            (1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall 
        submit to the congressional defense committees a report on the 
        strategy required by subsection (a).
            (2) Elements.--The report required by this subsection shall 
        include the following elements:
                    (A) An evaluation of strategic objectives and 
                motivations of the Russian Federation.
                    (B) A detailed description of Russian threats to 
                the national security of the United States, including 
                threats that may pose challenges below the threshold of 
                armed conflict.
                    (C) A discussion of how the strategy complements 
                the National Defense Strategy and the National Military 
                Strategy.
                    (D) A discussion of the ends, ways, and means 
                inherent to the strategy.
                    (E) A discussion of the strategy's objectives with 
                respect to deterrence, escalation control, and conflict 
                resolution.
                    (F) A description of the military activities across 
                geographic regions and military functions and domains 
                that are inherent to the strategy.
                    (G) A description of the posture, forward presence, 
                and readiness requirements inherent to the strategy.
                    (H) A description of the roles of the United States 
                Armed Forces in implementing the strategy, including--
                            (i) the role of United States nuclear 
                        capabilities;
                            (ii) the role of United States space 
                        capabilities;
                            (iii) the role of United States cyber 
                        capabilities;
                            (iv) the role of United States conventional 
                        ground forces;
                            (v) the role of United States naval forces;
                            (vi) the role of United States air forces; 
                        and
                            (vii) the role of United States special 
                        operations forces.
                    (I) An assessment of contributions of United States 
                allies and partners in countering Russian threats and a 
                description of the roles of allies and partners in 
                implementing and sustaining the strategy.
                    (J) An assessment of the force requirements needed 
                to implement and sustain the strategy.
                    (K) A description of the logistical requirements 
                needed to implement and sustain the strategy.
                    (L) An assessment of the technological research and 
                development requirements needed to implement and 
                sustain the strategy.
                    (M) An assessment of the training and exercise 
                requirements needed to implement and sustain the 
                strategy.
                    (N) An assessment of the budgetary resource 
                requirements needed to implement and sustain the 
                strategy through December 31, 2030.
                    (O) A discussion of how the strategy provides a 
                framework for future planning and investments in 
                regional defense initiatives, including the European 
                Deterrence Initiative.
            (3) Form.--The report required by this subsection shall be 
        submitted in unclassified form but may contain a classified 
        annex.

SEC. 4. STRATEGY TO INCREASE CONVENTIONAL PRECISION STRIKE WEAPON 
              STOCKPILES IN THE UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND'S AREAS 
              OF RESPONSIBILITY.

    (a) Strategy Required.--
            (1) In general.--The Secretary of Defense shall develop and 
        implement a strategy to increase conventional precision strike 
        weapon stockpiles in the United States European Command's areas 
        of responsibility.
            (2) Elements.--The strategy required by this subsection 
        shall include necessary increases in the quantities of such 
        stockpiles that the Secretary determines will enhance 
        deterrence and warfighting capability of the North Atlantic 
        Treaty Organization forces.
    (b) Report Required.--
            (1) In general.--Not later than April 1, 2018, the 
        Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense 
        committees a report on the strategy required by subsection (a).
            (2) Form.--The report required by this subsection shall be 
        submitted in unclassified form but may contain a classified 
        annex.

SEC. 5. PLAN TO COUNTER THE MILITARY CAPABILITIES OF THE RUSSIAN 
              FEDERATION.

    (a) Plan Required.--
            (1) In general.--The Secretary of Defense shall develop and 
        implement a plan to counter the military capabilities of the 
        Russian Federation.
            (2) Elements.--The plan required by this subsection shall 
        include the following:
                    (A) Accelerating programs to improve the capability 
                of United States military forces to operate in a Global 
                Positioning System (GPS)-denied or GPS-degraded 
                environment.
                    (B) Accelerating programs of the Department of the 
                Army to counter Russian unmanned aircraft systems, 
                electronic warfare, and long-range precision strike 
                capabilities.
                    (C) Countering unconventional capabilities and 
                hybrid threats from the Russian Federation.
                    (D) Any other elements that the Secretary 
                determines to be appropriate.
    (b) Report Required.--
            (1) In general.--Not later than April 1, 2018, the 
        Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense 
        committees a report on the plan required by subsection (a).
            (2) Form.--The report required by this subsection shall be 
        submitted in unclassified form but may contain a classified 
        annex.
    (c) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the strategy for the Department of Defense to counter 
        unconventional warfare threats posed by adversarial state and 
        non-state actors required by section 1097 of the National 
        Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 (Public Law 114-
        92) has not yet been submitted to the congressional defense 
        committees and should be submitted without further delay; and
            (2) concerns persist over the growing sophistication of 
        unconventional and hybrid state-sponsored threats by the 
        Russian Federation as demonstrated through its advancement and 
        integration of conventional warfare, economic warfare, cyber 
        and information operations, intelligence operations, and other 
        activities to undermine United States national security 
        objectives as well as the objectives of United States allies 
        and partners in Europe.

SEC. 6. PLAN TO PROVIDE TRAINING TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES OF 
              UNITED STATES ALLIES AND PARTNERS TO COUNTER CYBERSPACE 
              OPERATIONS AND INFORMATION OPERATIONS OF THE RUSSIAN 
              FEDERATION.

    (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the establishment by the Commander of the United States 
        European Command of the interagency Russian Information Group 
        to counter Russian information operations against the United 
        States and United States allies and partners should be 
        supported and cooperation and synchronization of efforts and 
        activities with the Department of State's Global Engagement 
        Center and with the NATO Strategic Communications Center of 
        Excellence should be encouraged;
            (2) the Secretary of Defense should, to the extent 
        appropriate, prioritize the transfer of funds as authorized 
        under section 1287(e) of the National Defense Authorization Act 
        for Fiscal Year 2017 (Public Law 114-328; 130 Stat. 2546) to 
        the Department of State's Global Engagement Center specifically 
        for the purpose of countering Russia state-sponsored propaganda 
        aimed at undermining the national security interests of the 
        United States and United States allies and partners; and
            (3) the Secretary of Defense should prioritize providing 
        funding to the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of 
        Excellence and the NATO Strategic Communication Center of 
        Excellence or purposes of enhancing cooperation with NATO 
        allies to counter cyberspace operations of the Russian 
        Federation against the national security interests of the 
        Untied States and United States and allies and partners.
    (b) Plan Required.--The Secretary of Defense shall develop and 
implement a plan to provide training to the national security forces of 
United States allies and partners for the purpose of building the 
capacity of such forces to counter cyberspace operations and 
information operations of the Russian Federation.
    (c) Report Required.--
            (1) In general.--Not later than April 1, 2018, the 
        Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense 
        committees a report on the plan required by subsection (b).
            (2) Form.--The report required by this subsection shall be 
        submitted in unclassified form but may contain a classified 
        annex.

SEC. 7. REPORT ON MAINTAINING AND EXPANDING FORWARD PRESENCE OF UNITED 
              STATES MILITARY FORCES AND PERSONNEL IN EUROPE.

    (a) Report Required.--Not later than April 1, 2018, the Secretary 
of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees a 
report on the strategy of the Department of Defense maintaining and 
expanding forward presence of United States military forces and 
personnel in Europe.
    (b) Elements.--The report required by subsection (a) shall include 
the following with respect to United States European Command areas of 
responsibility:
            (1) An assessment of the additional permanently stationed 
        forces in Europe required to meet United States strategic 
        requirements and the operational requirements of the geographic 
        combatant commander.
            (2) An assessment of the infrastructure capacity of 
        existing European locations and their ability to accommodate 
        additional forces.
            (3) An overview of new locations in Europe that might be 
        considered for permanently stationed forces and the estimated 
        cost and scope of infrastructure investments, to include 
        improvements to training areas, which would be required at 
        those locations to support permanently stationed forces, 
        including an assessment of what infrastructure investments 
        might be provided by the host-nation as well as new 
        construction or modernization of existing facilities that would 
        be funded by the United States.
            (4) A detailed list of investments in equipment, supplies, 
        logistics, storage, and maintenance, at current and new 
        locations in Europe, required to support additional permanently 
        stationed forces.
            (5) An assessment of the readiness advantages and 
        disadvantages associated with stationing additional permanent 
        forces at European locations.
            (6) A discussion of potential challenges with stationing 
        additional permanent forces or developing new locations for 
        permanently stationed forces as a result of treaty obligations, 
        international agreements, or other legally binding instruments.
    (c) Form.--The report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted 
in unclassified form but may include a classified annex.

SEC. 8. REPORT ON IMPROVING TRAINING AREAS IN THE UNITED STATES 
              EUROPEAN COMMAND'S AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY.

    (a) Report Required.--Not later than April 1, 2018, the Secretary 
of Defense, in coordination with the Secretaries of the military 
departments, the Commander of the United States European Command, and 
the Commander of the United States Special Operations Command, shall 
submit to the congressional defense committees a report on the 
location, capabilities, and capacities of training areas in the United 
States European Command's areas of responsibility, including air and 
ground ranges, range complexes, military training routes, and special-
use areas.
    (b) Elements.--The report required by subsection (a) shall include 
the following:
            (1) An inventory of such training areas that are utilized 
        by United States Armed Forces or with respect to which United 
        States Armed Forces have access.
            (2) An overview of the capabilities and capacity of such 
        training areas to support permanent and rotational forward 
        presence of United States Armed Forces.
            (3) An assessment of any capability gaps of such training 
        areas that limit the ability to meet training standards of 
        United States Armed Forces.
            (4) Details of current and planned investments in training 
        infrastructure to mitigate identified capability gaps, help 
        meet United States training standards, and support additional 
        permanent or rotational forces in Europe, to be funded by the 
        NATO, the United States, or United States allies or partners.

SEC. 9. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON ENHANCING MARITIME CAPABILITIES.

    Congress notes the 2016 Force Structure Assessment (FSA) that 
increased the requirement for fast attack submarine (SSN) from 48 to 66 
and supports an acquisition plan that enhances maritime capabilities 
that address this requirement.

SEC. 10. PLAN TO REDUCE THE RISKS OF MISCALCULATION AND UNINTENDED 
              CONSEQUENCES THAT COULD PRECIPITATE A NUCLEAR WAR.

    (a) Findings.--Congress finds that--
            (1) the Russian Federation has adopted a dangerous nuclear 
        doctrine that includes a strategy of ``escalate to de-
        escalate'', which could lower the threshold for Russian use of 
        nuclear weapons in a regional conflict; and
            (2) such nuclear doctrine exacerbates the risks of 
        miscalculation and unintended consequences that could 
        precipitate a nuclear war.
    (b) Plan Required.--
            (1) In general.--Not later than March 1, 2018, the 
        Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Chairman of the 
        Joint Chief of Staff, the Commander of the United States 
        Strategic Command, and the Commander of the United States 
        European Command, shall submit to the congressional defense 
        committees a plan that includes options to reduce the risk of 
        miscalculation and unintended consequences that could 
        precipitate a nuclear war.
            (2) Elements.--The plan required under this subsection 
        shall include--
                    (A) an assessment of the value of military-to-
                military dialog to reduce such risk; and
                    (B) any other recommendations the Secretary 
                determines to be appropriate.

SEC. 11. PLAN TO IMPOSE SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE RUSSIAN 
              FEDERATION BY REASON OF NON-COMPLIANCE BY THE RUSSIAN 
              FEDERATION WITH THE INF TREATY.

    (a) In General.--Not later than April 1, 2018, the President shall 
submit to the congressional defense committees a plan to impose 
sanctions with respect to the Russia Federation by reason of non-
compliance by the Russian Federation with the INF Treaty.
    (b) Elements.--The plan required under subsection (a) should 
include expanding asset freezes and travel bans, prohibiting financial 
transactions, prohibiting government-to-government contracts, and any 
other sanctions that the President determines to be appropriate.
    (c) Termination.--The plan required under subsection (a) shall 
provide for termination of sanctions described in the plan beginning on 
the date on which the President submits to the appropriate 
congressional committees a certification that the Russian Federation 
has verifiably returned to compliance with the INF Treaty.
    (d) Cooperation.--The Secretary of State shall seek to cooperate 
with United States allies and partners to maximize the effect of 
sanctions described in the plan required under subsection (a).

SEC. 12. DEFINITIONS.

    In this Act:
            (1) Congressional defense committees.--The term 
        ``congressional defense committees'' has the meaning given such 
        term in section 101 of title 10, United States Code.
            (2) INF treaty.--The term ``INF Treaty'' means the Treaty 
        Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet 
        Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-
        Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, commonly referred to as the 
        Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, signed at 
        Washington, December 8, 1987, and entered into force June 1, 
        1988.
            (3) NATO.--The term ``NATO'' means the North Atlantic 
        Treaty Organization.
                                 <all>