Title: Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018
Policy area: International Affairs

Summary:
Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018
This bill provides for the promotion of U.S. values and diplomatic, security, and economic interests in the Indo-Pacific region. It includes statements of policy and measures concerning

[Congressional Bills 115th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 2736 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

<DOC>






115th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                S. 2736

     To develop a long-term strategic vision and a comprehensive, 
multifaceted, and principled United States policy for the Indo-Pacific 
                    region, and for other purposes.


_______________________________________________________________________


                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             April 24, 2018

 Mr. Gardner (for himself, Mr. Markey, Mr. Rubio, Mr. Cardin, and Mr. 
Young) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred 
                 to the Committee on Foreign Relations

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL


 
     To develop a long-term strategic vision and a comprehensive, 
multifaceted, and principled United States policy for the Indo-Pacific 
                    region, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

    (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Asia Reassurance 
Initiative Act of 2018''.
    (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as 
follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Findings.
Sec. 3. Statement of policy on United States engagement in the Indo-
                            Pacific region.
TITLE I--PROMOTING UNITED STATES SECURITY INTERESTS IN THE INDO-PACIFIC 
                                 REGION

Sec. 101. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 102. Treaty alliances in the Indo-Pacific region.
Sec. 103. United States-China relationship.
Sec. 104. United States-India strategic partnership.
Sec. 105. United States-ASEAN strategic partnership.
Sec. 106. United States-Republic of Korea-Japan trilateral security 
                            partnership.
Sec. 107. Quadrilateral security dialogue.
Sec. 108. Enhanced security partnerships in Southeast Asia.
Sec. 109. Commitment to Taiwan.
Sec. 110. North Korea strategy.
Sec. 111. New Zealand and the Pacific islands.
Sec. 112. Freedom of navigation and overflight; promotion of 
                            international law.
Sec. 113. Combating terrorism in Southeast Asia.
Sec. 114. Cybersecurity cooperation.
Sec. 115. Nuclear nonproliferation and arms control in the Indo-Pacific 
                            region.
   TITLE II--PROMOTING UNITED STATES ECONOMIC INTERESTS IN THE INDO-
                             PACIFIC REGION

Sec. 201. Findings; sense of Congress.
Sec. 202. Trade negotiations, multilateral agreements, and regional 
                            economic summits.
Sec. 203. United States-ASEAN Economic Partnership.
Sec. 204. Trade capacity building and trade facilitation.
Sec. 205. Intellectual property protection.
Sec. 206. Energy programs and initiatives.
Sec. 207. Lower Mekong Initiative.
  TITLE III--PROMOTING UNITED STATES VALUES IN THE INDO-PACIFIC REGION

Sec. 301. Findings.
Sec. 302. Trafficking-in-persons.
Sec. 303. Bilateral and regional dialogues; people-to-people 
                            engagement.
Sec. 304. Imposition of sanctions and suspension of United States 
                            assistance.
Sec. 305. Authorization of appropriations.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

    Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) The Indo-Pacific region--
                    (A) represents nearly \1/2\ of the global 
                population;
                    (B) is home to some of the most dynamic economies 
                in the world; and
                    (C) poses security challenges that threaten to 
                undermine United States national security interests, 
                regional peace, and global stability.
            (2) The core tenants of the United States-backed 
        international system are being challenged with increasingly 
        coercive behavior, including--
                    (A) China's illegal construction and militarization 
                of artificial features in the South China Sea;
                    (B) North Korea's acceleration of its nuclear and 
                ballistic missile capabilities; and
                    (C) the increased presence throughout Southeast 
                Asia of the Islamic State (referred to in this Act as 
                ``ISIS'') and other international terrorist 
                organizations that threaten the United States.
            (3) The economic order in the Indo-Pacific region continues 
        to transform, presenting both opportunities and challenges to 
        United States economic interests.
            (4) The United States has a fundamental interest in 
        defending human rights and promoting the rule of law in the 
        Indo-Pacific region. Although many countries in that region 
        have improved the treatment of their citizens, several Indo-
        Pacific countries continue to be human rights abusers and there 
        are serious concerns with political rights and civil liberties 
        throughout the Indo-Pacific region.
            (5) Without strong leadership from the United States, the 
        international system, fundamentally rooted in the rule of law, 
        may wither, to the detriment of United States, regional, and 
        global interests. It is imperative that the United States 
        continue to play a leading role in the Indo-Pacific region by--
                    (A) defending peace and security;
                    (B) advancing economic prosperity; and
                    (C) promoting respect for fundamental human rights.
            (6) In 2017, the Subcommittee on East Asia, the Pacific, 
        and International Cybersecurity Policy of the Committee on 
        Foreign Relations of the Senate held a series of hearings on 
        United States leadership in the Indo-Pacific region, in which--
                    (A) experts, including Representative Randy Forbes, 
                Ambassador Robert Gallucci, Ms. Tami Overby, Dr. Robert 
                Orr, Ambassador Derek Mitchell, Ambassador Robert King, 
                Mr. Murray Hiebert, and others detailed the security 
                challenges, economic opportunities, and imperatives of 
                promoting rule of law, human rights, and democracy, in 
                the Indo-Pacific region; and
                    (B) Dr. Graham Allison, the Douglas Dillon 
                Professor of Government at the John F. Kennedy School 
                of Government at Harvard University, testified, ``As 
                realistic students of history, Chinese leaders 
                recognize that the role the U.S. has played since World 
                War II as the architect and underwriter of regional 
                stability and security has been essential to the rise 
                of Asia, including China itself. But they believe that 
                as the tide that brought the U.S. to Asia recedes, 
                America must leave with it. Much as Britain's role in 
                the Western Hemisphere faded at the beginning of the 
                twentieth century, so must America's role in Asia as 
                the region's historic superpower resumes its place.''.
            (7) The United States National Security Strategy (referred 
        to in this Act as the ``National Security Strategy''), which 
        was released in December 2017, states--
                    (A) ``A geopolitical competition between free and 
                repressive visions of world order is taking place in 
                the Indo-Pacific region. The region, which stretches 
                from the west coast of India to the western shores of 
                the United States, represents the most populous and 
                economically dynamic part of the world. The U.S. 
                interest in a free and open Indo-Pacific extends back 
                to the earliest days of our republic.''; and
                    (B) ``Our vision for the Indo-Pacific excludes no 
                nation. We will redouble our commitment to established 
                alliances and partnerships, while expanding and 
                deepening relationships with new partners that share 
                respect for sovereignty, fair and reciprocal trade, and 
                the rule of law. We will reinforce our commitment to 
                freedom of the seas and the peaceful resolution of 
                territorial and maritime disputes in accordance with 
                international law. We will work with allies and 
                partners to achieve complete, verifiable, and 
                irreversible denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula 
                and preserve the non-proliferation regime in Northeast 
                Asia.''.

SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON UNITED STATES ENGAGEMENT IN THE INDO-
              PACIFIC REGION.

    It is the policy of the United States to develop, and to commit to, 
a long-term strategic vision and a comprehensive, multifaceted, and 
principled United States policy for the Indo-Pacific region that--
            (1) preserves peace through strength by securing the vital 
        national security interests of the United States;
            (2) promotes American prosperity by advancing the economic 
        interests of the United States;
            (3) advances American influence by reflecting the values of 
        the American people and universal human rights; and
            (4) accords with and supports the rule of law and 
        international norms.

TITLE I--PROMOTING UNITED STATES SECURITY INTERESTS IN THE INDO-PACIFIC 
                                 REGION

SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

    (a) In General.--There are authorized to be appropriated for the 
Department of State, the United States Agency for International 
Development, and, as appropriate, the Department of Defense 
$1,500,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 2019 through 2023, which 
shall be used--
            (1) to advance United States foreign policy interests and 
        objectives in the Indo-Pacific region in recognition of the 
        value of diplomatic initiatives and programs in the furtherance 
        of United States strategy;
            (2) to bolster the United States military presence and 
        readiness in the Indo-Pacific region for the purpose of 
        deterring and defending against provocative actions, including 
        by improving the defense infrastructure and critical munitions 
        stockpiles of the United States Armed Forces;
            (3) to improve the defense capacity of partner nations to 
        resist coercion and to deter and defend against security 
        threats, including through foreign military financing and 
        international military education and training programs;
            (4) to conduct regular bilateral and multilateral 
        exercises, particularly with our most highly-capable allies and 
        partners, to meet strategic challenges, including--
                    (A) certain destabilizing activities of the 
                People's Republic of China; and
                    (B) emerging threats, such as the nuclear and 
                ballistic missile programs of the Democratic People's 
                Republic of Korea;
            (5) to build new counterterrorism partnership programs in 
        Southeast Asia to combat the growing presence of ISIS and other 
        terrorist organizations that pose a significant threat to the 
        United States, our allies, and our citizens' interests abroad; 
        and
            (6) to increase maritime domain awareness programs in 
        Southeast Asia--
                    (A) by expanding the scope of naval and coast guard 
                training efforts with Southeast Asian countries;
                    (B) through intelligence sharing and other 
                information-sharing efforts; and
                    (C) through multilateral exercises, including by 
                involving Japan, Australia, and India in such efforts 
                and exercises.
    (b) Countering China's Influence To Undermine the International 
System.--Amounts appropriated pursuant to subsection (a) shall be made 
available for United States Government efforts to counter the strategic 
influence of the People's Republic of China, in accordance with the 
strategy required under section 7043(e)(3) of the Department of State, 
Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2014 
(division K of Public Law 113-76; 128 Stat. 536) and in consultation 
with the appropriate committees of Congress.
    (c) Burma.--None of the amounts appropriated pursuant to subsection 
(a) may be made available for the programs, initiatives, or 
interactions that may benefit the defense sector of the Republic of the 
Union of Myanmar (historically known as ``Burma'').
    (d) Philippines.--Amounts appropriated pursuant to subsection (a) 
may not be made available for counternarcotics assistance (other than 
maritime programs) for the Philippine National Police unless the 
Secretary of State certifies and reports to the appropriate committees 
of Congress that the Government of the Philippines has adopted and is 
implementing a counternarcotics strategy that complies with 
international norms of due process.
    (e) Cambodia.--Amounts appropriated pursuant to subsection (a) may 
not be made available for certain United States assistance programs 
that benefit the Government of Cambodia.
    (f) Defined Term.--In this section, the term ``appropriate 
committees of Congress'' means--
            (1) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;
            (2) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;
            (3) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of 
        Representatives; and
            (4) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
        Representatives.

SEC. 102. TREATY ALLIANCES IN THE INDO-PACIFIC REGION.

    (a) United States-Japan Alliance.--The United States Government--
            (1) is committed to the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and 
        Security between the United States and Japan, done at 
        Washington, January 19, 1960, and subsequent security 
        agreements;
            (2) recognizes the vital role of the alliance between the 
        United States and Japan in promoting peace and security in the 
        Indo-Pacific region; and
            (3) calls for the strengthening and broadening of 
        diplomatic, economic, and security ties between the United 
        States and Japan.
    (b) United States-Republic of Korea Alliance.--The United States 
Government--
            (1) is committed to the Mutual Defense Treaty Between the 
        United States and the Republic of Korea, done at Washington 
        October 1, 1953, and subsequent security agreements;
            (2) recognizes the vital role of the alliance between the 
        United States and South Korea in promoting peace and security 
        in the Indo-Pacific region; and
            (3) calls for the strengthening and broadening of 
        diplomatic, economic, and security ties between the United 
        States and the Republic of Korea.
    (c) United States-Australia Alliance.--The United States 
Government--
            (1) is committed to the Security Treaty Between Australia 
        and the United States of America, done at San Francisco 
        September 1, 1951, and subsequent security agreements between 
        these 2 nations;
            (2) recognizes the vital role of the alliance between the 
        United States and Australia in promoting peace and security in 
        the Indo-Pacific region; and
            (3) calls for the strengthening and broadening of 
        diplomatic, economic, and security ties between the United 
        States and Australia.
    (d) United States-Philippines Alliance.--The United States 
Government is committed to the Mutual Defense Treaty between the 
Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America, done at 
Washington August 30, 1951, and subsequent bilateral security 
agreements, including the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, done 
at Manila April 28, 2014.
    (e) Thailand.--The United States Government is committed to--
            (1) the Agreement Respecting Military Assistance Between 
        the Government of the United States of America and the 
        Government of Thailand, done at Bangkok October 17, 1950;
            (2) the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, done at 
        Manila September 8, 1954; and
            (3) all subsequent bilateral security agreements, including 
        the Joint Vision Statement for the Thai-U.S. Defense Alliance, 
        issued in Bangkok November 15, 2012.

SEC. 103. UNITED STATES-CHINA RELATIONSHIP.

    (a) In General.--The United States Government--
            (1) expresses grave concerns with Chinese actions that 
        seek--
                    (A) to further constrain space for civil society 
                within China; and
                    (B) to undermine a rules-based order in the Indo-
                Pacific region;
            (2) encourages China to play a constructive role in world 
        affairs by demonstrating consistent respect for the rule of law 
        and international norms;
            (3) seeks to build a positive, cooperative, and 
        comprehensive relationship with China--
                    (A) by expanding areas of cooperation; and
                    (B) by addressing areas of disagreement, including 
                over human rights, economic policies, and maritime 
                security; and
            (4) is committed to working with China on shared regional 
        and global challenges, especially--
                    (A) upholding and strengthening the rules-based 
                international system; and
                    (B) the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.
    (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the United 
States should--
            (1) welcome China's decision to change course and pursue 
        responsible engagement on global issues;
            (2) encourage China to play a constructive role in the 
        Indo-Pacific region and globally; and
            (3) continue to call out Chinese actions that undermine the 
        rules-based international system.

SEC. 104. UNITED STATES-INDIA STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP.

    (a) In General.--The United States Government--
            (1) recognizes the vital role of the strategic partnership 
        between the United States and India in promoting peace and 
        security in the Indo-Pacific region;
            (2) calls for the strengthening and broadening of 
        diplomatic, economic, and security ties between the United 
        States and India; and
            (3) is committed to--
                    (A) the New Framework for the United States-India 
                Defense Relationship, done at Arlington, Virginia June 
                28, 2005;
                    (B) the United States-India Defense Technology and 
                Trade Initiative, launched in 2012;
                    (C) the Joint Strategic Vision for the Indo-Pacific 
                and Indian Ocean Region, announced on January 25, 2015; 
                and
                    (D) all related and subsequent bilateral and 
                security agreements.
    (b) India as Major Defense Partner.--Congress makes the following 
findings:
            (1) Section 1292(a)(1)(A) of the National Defense 
        Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (Public Law 114-328; 130 
        Stat. 2559; 22 U.S.C. 2751 note) requires the recognition of 
        India as a major defense partner.
            (2) The designation of India as a major defense partner, 
        which is unique to India--
                    (A) institutionalizes the progress made to 
                facilitate defense trade and technology sharing between 
                the United States and India;
                    (B) elevates defense trade and technology 
                cooperation between the United States and India to a 
                level commensurate with the closest allies and partners 
                of the United States;
                    (C) facilitates technology sharing between the 
                United States and India, including license-free access 
                to a wide range of dual-use technologies, after taking 
                into account national security concerns; and
                    (D) facilitates joint exercises, coordination on 
                defense strategy and policy, military exchanges, and 
                port calls in support of defense cooperation between 
                the United States and India.

SEC. 105. UNITED STATES-ASEAN STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP.

    It is the sense of the Senate that the United States should--
            (1) support and affirm the elevation of the United States-
        Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) relationship to 
        a strategic partnership;
            (2) recommit to ASEAN centrality by helping build a strong, 
        stable, politically cohesive, economically integrated, and 
        socially responsible community of nations that has common 
        rules, norms, procedures, and standards which are consistent 
        with international law and the principles of a rules-based 
        Indo-Pacific community;
            (3) urge ASEAN to continue its efforts to foster greater 
        integration among its members;
            (4) recognize the value of--
                    (A) ASEAN engagement with economic, political, and 
                security partners within Asia and elsewhere, including 
                Australia, Canada, the European Union, India, Japan, 
                New Zealand, Norway, the Republic of Korea, and Taiwan; 
                and
                    (B) strategic economic initiatives, such as the 
                U.S.-ASEAN Connect, which demonstrate a commitment to 
                ASEAN and the ASEAN Economic Community and build upon 
                economic relationships in the Indo-Pacific region;
            (5) support efforts by the nations comprising ASEAN--
                    (A) to address maritime and territorial disputes in 
                a constructive manner; and
                    (B) to pursue claims through peaceful, diplomatic, 
                and legitimate regional and international arbitration 
                mechanisms, consistent with international law, 
                including through the adoption of a code of conduct in 
                the South China Sea to further promote peace and 
                stability in the Indo-Pacific region;
            (6) support efforts by United States partners and allies in 
        ASEAN--
                    (A) to enhance maritime capability and maritime 
                domain awareness;
                    (B) to protect unhindered access to, and use of, 
                international waterways in the Asia-Pacific region that 
                are critical to ensuring the security and free flow of 
                commerce;
                    (C) to counter piracy;
                    (D) to disrupt illicit maritime trafficking 
                activities such as the trafficking of persons, goods, 
                and drugs; and
                    (E) to enhance the maritime capabilities of 
                countries or regional organizations to respond to 
                emerging threats to maritime security in the Asia-
                Pacific region; and
            (7) urge ASEAN member states to develop a common approach 
        to reaffirm the decision of the Permanent Court of 
        Arbitration's ruling with respect to the case between the 
        Republic of the Philippines and the People's Republic of China.

SEC. 106. UNITED STATES-REPUBLIC OF KOREA-JAPAN TRILATERAL SECURITY 
              PARTNERSHIP.

    It is the sense of Congress that the President should develop a 
strategy to deepen the trilateral security cooperation between the 
United States, South Korea, and Japan, including missile defense, 
intelligence-sharing, and other defense-related initiatives.

SEC. 107. QUADRILATERAL SECURITY DIALOGUE.

    It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the security dialogue between the United States, 
        Australia, India, and Japan is vital to addressing pressing 
        security challenges in the Indo-Pacific region in order to 
        promote--
                    (A) a rules-based order;
                    (B) respect for international law; and
                    (C) a free and open Indo-Pacific; and
            (2) such a dialogue is intended to augment, rather than to 
        replace, current mechanisms.

SEC. 108. ENHANCED SECURITY PARTNERSHIPS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA.

    (a) Indonesia.--The United States Government is committed to--
            (1) the U.S.-Indonesia Comprehensive Partnership, done in 
        Washington November 9, 2010;
            (2) the Joint Statement on Comprehensive Defense 
        Cooperation, done in Washington October 26, 2015; and
            (3) all related and subsequent bilateral and security 
        agreements between the United States and Indonesia.
    (b) Malaysia.--The United States Government is committed to--
            (1) the U.S.-Malaysia Comprehensive Partnership, done at 
        Putrajaya April 27, 2014;
            (2) the Joint Statement for Enhancing the Comprehensive 
        Partnership between the United States of America and Malaysia, 
        done in Washington September 13, 2017; and
            (3) all related and subsequent bilateral and security 
        agreements between the United States and Malaysia.
    (c) Singapore.--The United States Government is committed to--
            (1) the Strategic Framework Agreement Between the United 
        States of America and the Republic of Singapore for a Closer 
        Cooperation Partnership in Defense and Security, done at 
        Washington July 12, 2005;
            (2) the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, done at 
        Arlington, Virginia December 7, 2015; and
            (3) all related and subsequent bilateral and security 
        agreements between the United States and Singapore.
    (d) Vietnam.--The United States Government is committed to--
            (1) the U.S.-Vietnam Comprehensive Partnership, done at 
        Washington December 16, 2013;
            (2) the U.S.-Vietnam Joint Vision Statement on Defense 
        Relations, done at Hanoi on June 1, 2015;
            (3) the U.S.-Vietnam Joint Vision Statement, done at 
        Washington May 31, 2017; and
            (4) all related and subsequent bilateral and security 
        agreements between the United States and Vietnam.
    (e) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the United 
States should deepen the diplomatic, economic, and security 
cooperation, especially in the areas of maritime security and 
counterterrorism, with Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Vietnam.

SEC. 109. COMMITMENT TO TAIWAN.

    (a) United States Commitment to Taiwan.--It is the policy of the 
United States to faithfully enforce all existing United States 
Government commitments to Taiwan, as enshrined in the Taiwan Relations 
Act of 1979 (Public Law 96-8) and the Six Assurances agreed to by 
President Ronald Reagan in July 1982.
    (b) Arms Sales to Taiwan.--The President shall conduct regular 
transfers of defense articles to Taiwan that are tailored to meet the 
existing and likely future threats from the People's Republic of China, 
including supporting the efforts of Taiwan to develop and integrate 
asymmetric capabilities, including undersea warfare and air defense 
capabilities, into its military forces.
    (c) Travel.--The President shall authorize the travel of high-level 
United States officials to Taiwan, in accordance with the Taiwan Travel 
Act (Public Law 115-135).

SEC. 110. NORTH KOREA STRATEGY.

    (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) The Government of the Democratic People's Republic of 
        Korea has flagrantly defied the international community by 
        illicitly developing its nuclear and ballistic missile 
        programs, in violation of United Nations Security Council 
        Resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 
        2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017), and 2397 
        (2017).
            (2) The Government of the Democratic People's Republic of 
        Korea engages in gross human rights abuses against its own 
        people and citizens of other countries, including the United 
        States, the Republic of Korea, and Japan.
            (3) The United States is committed to pursuing a peaceful 
        denuclearization of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea 
        through a policy of maximum pressure and engagement, in close 
        concert with its partners.
    (b) Policy of the United States With Respect to Sanctions Against 
the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.--
            (1) Statement of policy.--It is the policy of the United 
        States to continue to impose sanctions with respect to 
        activities of the Government of the Democratic People's 
        Republic of Korea, persons acting for or on behalf of such 
        government, or other persons in accordance with Executive Order 
        13687 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to imposing additional 
        sanctions with respect to North Korea), Executive Order 13694 
        (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to blocking the property of 
        certain persons engaging in significant malicious cyber-enabled 
        activities), Executive Order 13722 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; 
        relating to blocking the property of the Government of North 
        Korea and the Workers' Party of Korea, and prohibiting certain 
        transactions with respect to North Korea), and Executive Order 
        13810 (82 Fed. Reg. 44705; relating to imposing additional 
        sanctions with respect to North Korea), as such Executive 
        orders are in effect on the day before the date of the 
        enactment of this Act, until the Democratic People's Republic 
        of Korea is no longer engaged in the illicit activities 
        described in such Executive orders, including actions in 
        violation of United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1718 
        (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 
        2321 (2016), 2371 (2017), and 2375 (2017).
            (2) Report.--Not later than 30 days after terminating any 
        sanction with respect to the activities of the Government of 
        the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, a person acting for 
        or on behalf of such government, or any other person provided 
        for in an Executive order listed in subsection (a), the 
        Secretary of State shall submit a report to the appropriate 
        congressional committees regarding the cessation of any illicit 
        activity that violates United Nations Security Council 
        Resolution 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 
        2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2371 (2017), or 2375 (2017) by such 
        Government or person.
            (3) Rule of construction.--Nothing in this subsection shall 
        be construed to limit the authority of the President pursuant 
        to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 
        1701 et seq.).
    (c) Policy of the United States With Respect to Negotiation on the 
Democratic People's Republic of Korea's Nuclear and Ballistic Missile 
Programs.--It is the policy of the United States that the objective of 
negotiations with respect to the nuclear and ballistic missile programs 
of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea be the complete, 
verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement of such programs.
    (d) Report on a Strategy To Address the Threats Posed by, and the 
Capabilities of, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.--
            (1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter, the 
        Secretary of State, or a designee of the Secretary, shall 
        submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees 
        that describes actions taken by the United States to address 
        the threats posed by, and the capabilities of, the Democratic 
        People's Republic of Korea.
            (2) Elements.--Each report required under paragraph (1) 
        shall include--
                    (A) a summary of ongoing efforts by the United 
                States to identify strategies and policies, including 
                an assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of such 
                strategies and policies--
                            (i) to achieve peaceful denuclearization of 
                        the Korean Peninsula; and
                            (ii) to eliminate the threat posed by the 
                        ballistic missile program of the Democratic 
                        People's Republic of Korea;
                    (B) an assessment of--
                            (i) potential road maps toward peaceful 
                        denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and 
                        the elimination of the nuclear and ballistic 
                        missile threats posed by the Democratic 
                        People's Republic of Korea; and
                            (ii) specific actions that the Democratic 
                        People's Republic of Korea would need to take 
                        for each such roadmap to become viable;
                    (C) a summary of the United States strategy to 
                increase international coordination and cooperation, 
                whether unilaterally, bilaterally, or multilaterally, 
                including sanctions enforcement and interdiction, to 
                address the threat posed by the nuclear and ballistic 
                missile programs of the Democratic People's Republic of 
                Korea, which shall include--
                            (i) a description of the actions taken by 
                        the Secretary of State, or designees of the 
                        Secretary, to consult with governments around 
                        the world, with the purpose of inducing such 
                        governments to diplomatically and economically 
                        isolate the Democratic People's Republic of 
                        Korea;
                            (ii) a description of the actions taken by 
                        such governments to implement measures to 
                        diplomatically and economically isolate the 
                        Democratic People's Republic of Korea;
                            (iii) a list of countries with governments 
                        that the Secretary has determined are 
                        noncooperative with respect to implementing 
                        measures to diplomatically and economically 
                        isolate the Democratic People's Republic of 
                        Korea; and
                            (iv) a plan of action to engage, and 
                        increase cooperation with respect to the 
                        Democratic People's Republic of Korea, with the 
                        governments of the countries on the list 
                        described in clause (iii); and
                    (D) an assessment of the adequacy of the national 
                export control regimes of countries that are members of 
                the United Nations, and multilateral export control 
                regimes, that are necessary to enforce sanctions 
                imposed with respect to the Democratic People's 
                Republic of Korea pursuant to United Nations Security 
                Council resolutions; and
                    (E) an action plan to encourage and assist 
                countries in adopting and using authorities necessary 
                to enforce export controls required by United Nations 
                Security Council resolutions.
            (3) Form of report.--Each report required under this 
        subsection shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may 
        include a classified annex.
    (e) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) representatives of the United States shall use the 
        voice and vote of the United States in all international 
        organizations, as appropriate, to advocate for the expulsion of 
        the Democratic People's Republic of Korea from such 
        organizations, until such time as the Democratic People's 
        Republic of Korea meets its commitments under United Nations 
        Security Council Resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 
        (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2371 (2017), 
        2375 (2017), and 2397 (2017);
            (2) the Secretary of State may take such actions as are 
        necessary to induce countries to take measures to 
        diplomatically and economically isolate the Democratic People's 
        Republic of Korea, including--
                    (A) reducing the diplomatic presence in the United 
                States of countries with governments that the Secretary 
                has determined are noncooperative with respect to 
                implementing measures to diplomatically and 
                economically isolate the Democratic People's Republic 
                of Korea; and
                    (B) reducing the diplomatic presence of the United 
                States in such countries; and
            (3) the Secretary of State may terminate or reduce United 
        States foreign assistance to countries enabling the Democratic 
        People's Republic of Korea.

SEC. 111. NEW ZEALAND AND THE PACIFIC ISLANDS.

    It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the United States supports strengthening diplomatic, 
        economic, and the security relationship with New Zealand;
            (2) the United States supports strong United States 
        engagement with the nations of the South Pacific, including 
        Fiji, Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of 
        Micronesia, Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, the Solomon 
        Islands Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu;
            (3) the United States recognizes the strong historical, 
        strategic and cultural ties to these countries;
            (4) the United States should deepen its cooperation with 
        New Zealand and the nations of the South Pacific in areas of 
        mutual interest, including--
                    (A) fisheries and marine resource conservation;
                    (B) environmental challenges and resilience;
                    (C) global health;
                    (D) development and trade; and
                    (E) people-to-people ties; and
            (5) the United States should provide robust foreign 
        assistance to the Pacific islands.

SEC. 112. FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION AND OVERFLIGHT; PROMOTION OF 
              INTERNATIONAL LAW.

    (a) Freedom of Navigation.--It is the policy of the United States--
            (1) to conduct, as part of its global Freedom of Navigation 
        Program, regular freedom of navigation and overflight 
        operations in the Indo-Pacific region, in accordance with 
        applicable international law; and
            (2) to promote genuine multilateral negotiations to 
        peacefully resolve maritime disputes in the South China Sea, in 
        accordance with applicable international law.
    (b) Joint Indo-Pacific Diplomatic Strategy.--It is the sense of 
Congress that the President should develop a diplomatic strategy that 
includes working with United States allies and partners to conduct 
joint maritime training and freedom of navigation operations in the 
Indo-Pacific region, including the East China Sea and the South China 
Sea, in support of a rules-based international system benefitting all 
countries.

SEC. 113. COMBATING TERRORISM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA.

    (a) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in 
consultation with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and 
other appropriate officials, shall submit a report to the appropriate 
committees of Congress that contains an assessment of the current and 
future capabilities and activities of ISIS-linked, al-Qaeda-linked, and 
other violent extremist groups in Southeast Asia that pose a 
significant threat to the United States, its allies, and its citizens 
interests abroad.
    (b) Elements.--The report required under subsection (a) shall 
include--
            (1) the current number of ISIS-linked, al-Qaeda-linked, and 
        other violent extremist group-affiliated fighters in Southeast 
        Asia;
            (2) the estimated number of ISIS-linked, al-Qaeda-linked, 
        and other violent extremist group-affiliated fighters expected 
        to return to Southeast Asia from fighting in the Middle East;
            (3) the current resources available to combat the threat of 
        ISIS-linked, al-Qaeda-linked, and other violent extremist 
        group-affiliated fighters in Southeast Asia, and the additional 
        resources required to combat such threat;
            (4) a detailed assessment of the capabilities of ISIS-
        linked, al-Qaeda-linked, and other violent extremist group-
        affiliated fighters to operate effectively in countries such as 
        the Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia;
            (5) a description of the capabilities and resources of 
        governments in Southeast Asia to counter violent extremist 
        groups; and
            (6) a list of additional United States resources and 
        capabilities that the Department of Defense recommends 
        providing to governments in Southeast Asia to combat violent 
        extremist groups.
    (c) Definitions.--In this section--
            (1) the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
                    (A) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate;
                    (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
                Senate;
                    (C) the Committee on Armed Services of the House of 
                Representatives; and
                    (D) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House 
                of Representatives; and
            (2) the term ``ISIS'' means the Islamic State of Iraq and 
        Syria.

SEC. 114. CYBERSECURITY COOPERATION.

    (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that there 
should be robust cybersecurity cooperation between the United States 
and nations in the Indo-Pacific region--
            (1) to effectively respond to cybersecurity threats, 
        including state-sponsored threats;
            (2) to share best practices to combat such threats; and
            (3) to strengthen resilience against misinformation and 
        propaganda.
    (b) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized to be 
appropriated such sums as may be necessary--
            (1) to build capacity for responding to cybersecurity 
        threats originating in the Indo-Pacific region; and
            (2) to enhance cooperation between the United States and 
        nations in such region for combating such threats.

SEC. 115. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION AND ARMS CONTROL IN THE INDO-PACIFIC 
              REGION.

    (a) In General.--The United States Government--
            (1) recognizes that the spread of nuclear weapons, and 
        their means of delivery, constitutes a threat to international 
        peace and security;
            (2) seeks to peacefully address the unique challenge posed 
        to regional and global stability by the illicit use, and the 
        proliferation to and from North Korea, of sensitive nuclear and 
        missile technologies;
            (3) notes efforts by China and Russia--
                    (A) to expand and modernize their respective 
                nuclear arsenals; and
                    (B) to pursue sales of commercial nuclear 
                technologies; and
            (4) recognizes the legitimate pursuit by many countries in 
        the Indo-Pacific region of nuclear energy for a variety of 
        peaceful applications.
    (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the United 
States Government should undertake all reasonable and appropriate 
efforts to pursue effective arms control and nuclear nonproliferation 
policies in the Indo-Pacific region to limit the further spread of 
potentially dangerous and destabilizing conventional and nuclear 
weapons.

   TITLE II--PROMOTING UNITED STATES ECONOMIC INTERESTS IN THE INDO-
                             PACIFIC REGION

SEC. 201. FINDINGS; SENSE OF CONGRESS.

    (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) According to the United States Chamber of Commerce, by 
        2030--
                    (A) 66 percent of the global middle class 
                population will be in Asia; and
                    (B) 59 percent of middle class consumption will be 
                in Asia.
            (2) According to the Asian Development Bank--
                    (A) Asian countries have signed 140 bilateral or 
                regional trade agreements; and
                    (B) 75 more trade agreements with Asian countries 
                are under negotiation or concluded and awaiting entry 
                into force.
            (3) The United States has signed free trade agreements with 
        3 nations in the Indo-Pacific region, namely Australia, 
        Singapore, and the Republic of Korea.
            (4) The member states of the Association of Southeast Asian 
        Nations (referred to in this section as ``ASEAN''), as a 
        group--
                    (A) represent the fifth largest economy in the 
                world; and
                    (B) have a combined gross domestic product of 
                $2,400,000,000,000.
            (5) The economy comprised of ASEAN member states grew by 66 
        percent between 2006 and 2015, and the total value of bilateral 
        trade between the United States and ASEAN member states has 
        increased by 78 percent since 2004.
            (6) In 2015, the trade surplus of goods sold by companies 
        in ASEAN member states to consumers in the United States was 
        $77,000,000,000, while the United States 2015 trade surplus of 
        services provided to consumers in ASEAN member states was 
        $8,000,000,000.
            (7) According to U.S.-ASEAN Business Council, Inc., goods 
        and services exported from the United States to ASEAN member 
        states support 550,000 jobs in the United States.
            (8) According to the Business Roundtable--
                    (A) the United States, Australia, Brunei, Canada, 
                Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, 
                Singapore and Vietnam were responsible for a combined 
                40 percent of global gross domestic product in 2017; 
                and
                    (B) United States bilateral trade with the other 
                nations referred to in subparagraph (A) supports 
                15,600,000 jobs in the United States.
            (9) According to the United States National Security 
        Strategy--
                    (A) ASEAN and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
                (APEC) ``remain centerpieces of the Indo-Pacific's 
                regional architecture and platforms for promoting an 
                order based on freedom''; and
                    (B) the United States will ``work with partners to 
                build a network of states dedicated to free markets and 
                protected from forces that would subvert their 
                sovereignty.''.
    (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that trade 
between the United States and the nations in the Indo-Pacific region is 
vitally important to the United States economy, United States exports, 
and jobs in the United States.

SEC. 202. TRADE NEGOTIATIONS, MULTILATERAL AGREEMENTS, AND REGIONAL 
              ECONOMIC SUMMITS.

    Congress supports--
            (1) multilateral, bilateral, or regional trade agreements 
        that increase United States employment and expand the economy;
            (2) formal economic dialogues that include concrete 
        outcomes;
            (3) high-standard bilateral investment treaties between the 
        United States and nations in the Indo-Pacific region;
            (4) negotiations of the Trade in Services Agreement and the 
        Environmental Goods Agreement that include several major Asian 
        economies; and
            (5) the proactive, strategic, and continuing high-level use 
        of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, the East Asia 
        Summit, and the Group of 20 to pursue United States economic 
        objectives in the Indo-Pacific region.

SEC. 203. UNITED STATES-ASEAN ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP.

    The President, acting through the United States Trade 
Representative, is authorized to negotiate a comprehensive economic 
engagement framework with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.

SEC. 204. TRADE CAPACITY BUILDING AND TRADE FACILITATION.

    (a) In General.--The President is encouraged to produce a robust 
and comprehensive trade capacity building and trade facilitation 
strategy for the Indo-Pacific region.
    (b) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized to be 
appropriated such amounts as may be necessary to carry out subsection 
(a).

SEC. 205. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION.

    (a) In General.--The President is encouraged to impose penalties on 
all entities found to be complicit in the theft of United States 
intellectual property, in accordance with applicable law, including 
commercial cyber-enabled theft.
    (b) Annual Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the President shall 
submit a report to Congress that--
            (1) describes the efforts of the United States Government 
        to combat intellectual property and commercial cyber-enabled 
        theft in the Indo-Pacific region, particularly the People's 
        Republic of China; and
            (2) includes a country-by-country assessment of priority 
        areas for United States engagement and capacity building 
        assistance.
    (c) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized to be 
appropriated such amounts as may be necessary to sponsor bilateral and 
multilateral activities designed to build capacity in the identified 
priority areas described in the annual report required under subsection 
(b).

SEC. 206. ENERGY PROGRAMS AND INITIATIVES.

    (a) Indo-Pacific Energy Strategy.--
            (1) Strategy.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the 
        Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of 
        Energy, shall create a United States Government strategy to 
        increase United States exports of energy to the nations in the 
        Indo-Pacific region.
            (2) Authorization of appropriations.--There are authorized 
        to be appropriated such amounts as may be necessary to carry 
        out paragraph (1).
    (b) Reliable Energy Partnerships.--It is the sense of Congress 
that--
            (1) the President should establish bilateral and regional 
        initiatives to increase energy security in the Indo-Pacific 
        region;
            (2) the United States should authorize the supply of 
        liquefied natural gas to the nations in the Indo-Pacific 
        region; and
            (3) the United States should create a dedicated program, in 
        partnership with the private sector and multilateral 
        institutions, such as the World Bank and the Asian Development 
        Bank, to promote universal access to reliable electricity in 
        Myanmar (historically known as ``Burma'').

SEC. 207. LOWER MEKONG INITIATIVE.

    The Secretary of State, in cooperation with the Administrator of 
the United States Agency for International Development, should increase 
regional engagement in the areas of environment, health, education, and 
infrastructure development with the Lower Mekong countries, including--
            (1) assisting to develop programs that focus on forecasting 
        environmental challenges and resilience;
            (2) assisting with transnational cooperation on sustainable 
        uses of forest and water resources with the goal of preserving 
        the biodiversity of the Mekong Basin and access to safe 
        drinking water;
            (3) assisting with education enrollment and broadband 
        internet connectivity, particularly English training and 
        connectivity in rural communities; and
            (4) improving global health in the Lower Mekong countries, 
        including--
                    (A) reducing the HIV/AIDS infection rate; and
                    (B) helping regional partners to track and treat 
                malaria and tuberculosis.

  TITLE III--PROMOTING UNITED STATES VALUES IN THE INDO-PACIFIC REGION

SEC. 301. FINDINGS.

    Congress finds that--
            (1) the promotion of human rights and respect for 
        democratic values in the Indo-Pacific region is in the United 
        States national security interests;
            (2) there are serious concerns with the rule of law and 
        civil liberties in Cambodia, China, North Korea, Laos, 
        Thailand, and Vietnam, which have all been identified by 
        Freedom House as ``Not Free'';
            (3) there have been recent disturbing human rights 
        developments in--
                    (A) Burma (Myanmar), which has been identified by 
                Freedom House as ``Not Free''; and
                    (B) the Philippines, which has been identified by 
                Freedom House as ``Partly Free''; and
            (4) according to the National Security Strategy, the United 
        States--
                    (A) will ``support, with our words and actions, 
                those who live under oppressive regimes and who seek 
                freedom, individual dignity, and the rule of law'';
                    (B) ``may use diplomacy, sanctions, and other tools 
                to isolate states and leaders who threaten our 
                interests and whose actions run contrary to our 
                values''; and
                    (C) ``will support efforts to advance women's 
                equality, protect the rights of women and girls, and 
                promote women and youth empowerment programs.''.

SEC. 302. TRAFFICKING-IN-PERSONS.

    The President is encouraged to pursue additional efforts to combat 
trafficking in persons and human slavery in the Indo-Pacific region.

SEC. 303. BILATERAL AND REGIONAL DIALOGUES; PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE 
              ENGAGEMENT.

    The Secretary of State should--
            (1) establish high-level bilateral and regional dialogues 
        with nations in the Indo-Pacific region regarding human rights 
        and religious freedom violations;
            (2) establish or support robust, people-to-people exchange 
        programs in the Indo-Pacific region, particularly programs 
        engaging young leaders; and
            (3) establish educational exchanges and capacity-building 
        programs emphasizing civil society development.

SEC. 304. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS AND SUSPENSION OF UNITED STATES 
              ASSISTANCE.

    (a) Sanctions.--The President is authorized to impose sanctions, in 
accordance with applicable law, including financial penalties and visa 
bans, on any individual or entity that--
            (1) violates human rights or religious freedoms; or
            (2) engages in censorship activities.
    (b) Suspension of Foreign Assistance.--The President is authorized, 
in accordance with applicable law, to terminate, suspend, or otherwise 
alter United States economic assistance to any country that has engaged 
in serious violations of human rights or religious freedoms.

SEC. 305. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

    (a) Promotion of Democracy in the Indo-Pacific Region.--
            (1) In general.--There is authorized to be appropriated 
        $150,000,000, for each of the fiscal years 2019 through 2023, 
        to promote democracy, strengthen civil society, human rights, 
        rule of law, transparency, and accountability in the Indo-
        Pacific region.
            (2) Democracy in china.--Amounts appropriated pursuant to 
        paragraph (1) shall be made available for United States 
        Government efforts, led by the Assistant Secretary of State for 
        Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, to promote democracy, the 
        rule of law, and human rights in the People's Republic of 
        China.
            (3) Tibet.--Amounts appropriated pursuant to paragraph (1) 
        shall be made available for nongovernmental organizations to 
        support activities preserving cultural traditions and promoting 
        sustainable development, education, and environmental 
        conservation in Tibetan communities in the Tibet Autonomous 
        Region and in other Tibetan communities in China, India, and 
        Nepal.
    (b) Freedom of Information to North Korea.--
            (1) In general.--There is authorized to be appropriated 
        $10,000,000, for each of the fiscal years 2019 through 2023, to 
        implement programs to enhance freedom of information efforts 
        with regard to North Korea.
            (2) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
        enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter through 
        September 30, 2023, the Broadcasting Board of Governors shall 
        submit a report to Congress that describes the implementation 
        of the programs described in paragraph (1).
                                 <all>