Title: Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty Preservation Act of 2017
Policy area: International Affairs

Summary:
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty Preservation Act of 2017
This bill states that it is the policy of the United States that: (1) Russian actions undertaken in violation of the the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF treaty) constitute a material breach of the treaty, (2) the United States is legally entitled to suspend the INF treaty in whole or in part for so long as Russia continues to be in material breach, and (3) the United States should take certain actions to bring the Russian Federation back into compliance.
The bill authorizes additional appropriations for: (1) development of active defenses to counter ground launched missile systems; (2) counterforce and countervailing capabilities; (3) missile system transfers to allied countries; and (4) research, development, and evaluation activities for a dual-capable road-mobile ground-launched cruise missile system.
The Department of Defense (DOD) shall: (1) develop such a system with a range of between 500 to 5,500 kilometers; (2) report on the cost, schedule, and feasibility to modify the Tomahawk, Standard Missile-3, Standard Missile-6, Long-Range Stand Off Cruise Missile, and Army Tactical Missile System missiles for ground-launch with such range; and (3) report on the number and location of AEGIS Ashore sites with anti-air warfare capability necessary in Asia and Europe to defend U.S. forces and allies from Russian ground launched missile systems.
The Director of National Intelligence, every 90 days for five years, shall determine whether Russia has flight tested, produced, or possesses a system that is inconsistent with the INF treaty and that has reached initial operational capability, is deployed, or is about to be deployed.
No funds may be obligated or expended to extend the New START Treaty, permit Russian flights over the United States or U.S. allies pursuant to the Open Skies Treaty, or permit the approval of new or updated implementation decisions through the Open Skies Consultative Commission unless the President certifies that Russia has eliminated all missiles that are in violation of, or that may be inconsistent with, the INF treaty.
The Department of State shall conduct a review of the RS-26 Ballistic Missile system.
Upon a determination that Russia has flight-tested, produced, or is in possession of certain missiles, the President shall: (1) suspend the application of the INF treaty with respect to the United States, and (2) notify the other state parties to the INF treaty that Russia is in material breach of the INF treaty and of the U.S. decision to suspend the INF treaty.

[Congressional Bills 115th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 430 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

<DOC>






115th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                 S. 430

 To provide for compliance enforcement regarding Russian violations of 
   the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, and for other 
                               purposes.


_______________________________________________________________________


                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                           February 16, 2017

  Mr. Cotton (for himself, Mr. Johnson, and Mr. Rubio) introduced the 
 following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on 
                           Foreign Relations

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL


 
 To provide for compliance enforcement regarding Russian violations of 
   the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, and for other 
                               purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces 
(INF) Treaty Preservation Act of 2017''.

SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.

    In this Act:
            (1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
        ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
                    (A) the Select Committee on Intelligence, the 
                Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Armed 
                Services, and the Committee on Appropriations of the 
                Senate; and
                    (B) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, 
                the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on 
                Armed Services, and the Committee on Appropriations of 
                the House of Representatives.
            (2) INF treaty.--The term ``INF Treaty'' means the Treaty 
        between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet 
        Socialist Republics on the Elimination of their Intermediate-
        Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, signed at Washington, DC, on 
        December 8, 1987, and entered into force June 1, 1988.
            (3) Intelligence community.--The term ``intelligence 
        community'' has the meaning given the term in section 3(4) of 
        the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003(4)).
            (4) New start treaty.--The term ``New START Treaty'' means 
        the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian 
        Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation 
        of Strategic Offensive Arms, signed at Prague April 8, 2010, 
        and entered into force February 5, 2011.
            (5) Open skies treaty.--The term ``Open Skies Treaty'' 
        means the Treaty on Open Skies, done at Helsinki March 24, 
        1992, and entered into force January 1, 2002.

SEC. 3. FINDINGS.

    Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) The 2014, 2015, and 2016 Department of State reports 
        entitled, ``Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, 
        Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments'', 
        all stated that the United States has determined that ``the 
        Russian Federation is in violation of its obligations under the 
        INF Treaty not to possess, produce, or flight-test a ground-
        launched cruise missile (GLCM) with a range capability of 500 
        km to 5,500 km, or to possess or produce launchers of such 
        missiles''.
            (2) The 2016 report also noted that ``the cruise missile 
        developed by Russia meets the INF Treaty definition of a 
        ground-launched cruise missile with a range capability of 500 
        km to 5,500 km, and as such, all missiles of that type, and all 
        launchers of the type used or tested to launch such a missile, 
        are prohibited under the provisions of the INF Treaty''.
            (3) Potential consistency and compliance concerns regarding 
        the INF Treaty noncompliant GLCM have existed since 2008, were 
        not officially raised with the Russian Federation until 2013, 
        and were not briefed to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
        (NATO) until January 2014.
            (4) The United States Government is aware of other 
        consistency and compliance concerns regarding Russia actions 
        vis-a-vis its INF Treaty obligations.
            (5) Since 2013, senior United States officials, including 
        the President, the Secretary of State, and the Chairman of the 
        Joint Chiefs of Staff have raised Russian noncompliance with 
        the INF Treaty to their counterparts, but no progress has been 
        made in bringing the Russian Federation back into compliance 
        with the INF Treaty.
            (6) In April 2014, General Breedlove, the Supreme Allied 
        Commander Europe, correctly stated, ``A weapon capability that 
        violates the INF, that is introduced into the greater European 
        land mass, is absolutely a tool that will have to be dealt with 
        . . . It can't go unanswered.''.
            (7) The Department of Defense, in its September 2013 
        report, Report on Conventional Prompt Global Strike Options if 
        Exempt from the Restrictions of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear 
        Forces Treaty Between the United States of America and the 
        Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, stated that it has 
        multiple validated military requirement gaps due to the 
        prohibitions imposed on the United States as a result of its 
        compliance with the INF Treaty.
            (8) It is not in the national security interests of the 
        United States to be legally prohibited from developing dual-
        capable ground-launched cruise missiles with ranges between 500 
        and 5,500 kilometers, while Russia makes advances in developing 
        and fielding this class of weapon systems.
            (9) A material breach of the INF Treaty by the Russian 
        Federation affords the United States the right to invoke such 
        breach as grounds for suspending the operation of the treaty in 
        whole or in part.

SEC. 4. COMPLIANCE ENFORCEMENT REGARDING RUSSIAN VIOLATIONS OF THE INF 
              TREATY.

    (a) Statement of United States Policy.--It is the policy of the 
United States as follows:
            (1) The actions undertaken by the Russian Federation in 
        violation of the INF Treaty constitute a material breach of the 
        treaty.
            (2) In light of the Russian Federation's material breach of 
        the INF Treaty, the United States is legally entitled to 
        suspend the operation of the INF Treaty in whole or in part for 
        so long as the Russian Federation continues to be in material 
        breach.
            (3) For so long as the Russian Federation remains in 
        noncompliance with the INF Treaty, the United States should 
        take actions to bring the Russian Federation back into 
        compliance, including--
                    (A) providing additional funds to the activities 
                and systems identified in section 1243(d) of the 
                National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 
                (Public Law 114-92; 129 Stat. 1062);
                    (B) the establishment of a program of record for a 
                dual-capable road-mobile ground-launched cruise missile 
                system with a maximum range of 5,500 kilometers; and
                    (C) aggressively seeking additional missile defense 
                assets in the European theater to protect United States 
                and NATO forces from the Russian INF Treaty 
                noncompliant Ground Launch Cruise Missile.
    (b) Authorization of Additional Appropriations.--In addition to any 
other amounts authorized to be appropriated for such purposes, there 
are authorized to be appropriated--
            (1) $500,000,000 for fiscal year 2017 for--
                    (A) the development of active defenses to counter 
                ground launched missile systems with ranges between 500 
                and 5,500 kilometers;
                    (B) counterforce capabilities to prevent attacks 
                from these missiles;
                    (C) facilitating the transfer to allied countries 
                of missile systems with ranges between 500 and 5,500 
                kilometers; and
                    (D) countervailing strike capabilities to enhance 
                United States forces identified in section 1243(d) of 
                the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
                2016 (Public Law 114-92; 129 Stat. 1062); and
            (2) $100,000,000 for activities undertaken to advance the 
        policy described in subsection (a)(3)(B), including research, 
        development, and evaluation activities.

SEC. 5. DEVELOPMENT OF INF RANGE GROUND LAUNCHED MISSILE SYSTEM.

    (a) Establishment of a Program of Record.--The Secretary of Defense 
shall establish a program to develop a dual-capable road-mobile ground-
launched cruise missile system with a range of between 500 to 5,500 
kilometers. The system should be available for a flight test not later 
than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act.
    (b) Report.--Not later than 120 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the 
congressional defense committees a report on the cost, schedule, and 
feasibility to modify the Tomahawk, Standard Missile-3, Standard 
Missile-6, Long-Range Stand Off Cruise Missile, and Army Tactical 
Missile System missiles for ground-launch with a range of between 500 
and 5,500 kilometers.

SEC. 6. NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENT RELATED TO RUSSIAN FEDERATION 
              DEVELOPMENT OF NONCOMPLIANT SYSTEMS.

    Not later than 15 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, 
and every 90 days thereafter for five years, the Director of National 
Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees 
and the President a report including a determination whether the 
Russian Federation has flight tested, produced, or possesses a system 
that is inconsistent with the INF Treaty and has reached Initial 
Operational Capability, is deployed, or is about to be deployed.

SEC. 7. LIMITATION ON AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR CERTAIN ACTIVITIES.

    None of the funds authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made 
available for fiscal year 2017 or any other fiscal year may be 
obligated or expended to extend the New START Treaty, permit Russian 
flights over the United States or United States allies pursuant to the 
Open Skies Treaty, or permit the approval of new or updated 
implementation decisions through the Open Skies Consultative Commission 
unless the President certifies to the appropriate congressional 
committees that the Russian Federation has verifiably eliminated all 
missiles that are in violation of or may be inconsistent with the INF 
treaty.

SEC. 8. REPORT ON ANTI-AIR WARFARE DEFENSE CAPABILITY.

    Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, 
the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
committees a report on the number and location of AEGIS Ashore sites 
with anti-air warfare (AAW) capability necessary in Asia and Europe to 
defend deployed forces of the United States and United States allies 
from Russian ground launched missile systems with a range of 500 to 
5,500 kilometers.

SEC. 9. REVIEW OF RS-26 BALLISTIC MISSILE.

    (a) In General.--The Secretary of State, in consultation with the 
Secretary of Defense and the Director of National Intelligence, shall 
conduct a review of the RS-26 Ballistic Missile System.
    (b) Report Required.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the 
Secretary of Defense and the Director of National Intelligence, shall 
submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the 
review conducted under subsection (a). The report shall include--
            (1) a determination whether the RS-26 Ballistic Missile is 
        covered under the New START Treaty or is a violation of the INF 
        Treaty because it has been flight-tested to ranges covered by 
        the INF treaty in more than one warhead configuration; and
            (2) if it is determined that the RS-26 is covered under the 
        New START Treaty, a determination whether the Russian 
        Federation--
                    (A) has agreed through the Bilateral Consultative 
                Commission that such a system is limited under the New 
                START central limits; and
                    (B) has agreed to an exhibition of such a system.
    (c) Effect of Determination.--If the Secretary of State, with the 
concurrence of the Secretary of Defense and the Director of National 
Intelligence, determines that the RS-26 is covered under the New START 
Treaty and that the Russian Federation has not taken the steps 
described under subsection (b)(2), the United States Government shall 
consider for purposes of all policies and decisions that the Russian 
Federation is in violation of the INF Treaty.

SEC. 10. UNITED STATES ACTIONS REGARDING MATERIAL BREACH OF INF TREATY 
              BY THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.

    (a) Declaration of Policy.--Congress declares that because of the 
Russian Federation's violations of the INF Treaty, including the 
flight-test, production, and possession of prohibited systems, its 
actions have defeated the object and purpose of the INF Treaty, and 
thus constitute a material breach of the INF Treaty.
    (b) Report.--Not later than 15 months after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the appropriate 
congressional committees a report that contains a determination of the 
President of whether the Russian Federation has flight-tested, 
produced, or is in possession of a ground-launched cruise missile or 
ground-launched ballistic missile with a range of between 500 and 5,500 
kilometers during each of the four consecutive 90-day periods beginning 
on the date of the enactment of this Act.
    (c) United States Actions.--If the determination of the President 
contained in the report required to be submitted under subsection (b) 
is that the Russian Federation has flight-tested, produced, or is in 
possession of any missile described in subsection (b) during each of 
the periods described in subsection (b), the President shall--
            (1) suspend the application of the INF Treaty with respect 
        to the United States; and
            (2) notify the other state parties to the INF Treaty that 
        the Russian Federation is in material breach of the INF Treaty 
        and of the decision of the United States to suspend the 
        application of the INF Treaty with respect to the United 
        States.
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