Taiwan Defense Act of 2021
Bill: S.2073 | Sponsor: Sen. Hawley, Josh (R-MO)
Policy area: International Affairs

Summary:
Taiwan Defense Act of 2021
This bill establishes that it shall be U.S. policy to maintain the ability of the U.S. Armed Forces to defeat attempts by China to invade and seize control of Taiwan before U.S. forces can respond effectively.

To maintain the ability of the United States Armed Forces to deny a 
    fait accompli by the People's Republic of China against Taiwan.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Taiwan Defense Act of 2021''.

SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.

    In this Act:
            (1) Deny.--The term ``deny'' means to use combined joint 
        operations to delay, degrade, and ultimately defeat an attempt 
        by the People's Republic of China to execute a fait accompli 
        against Taiwan, resulting in--
                    (A) the termination of hostilities or at least the 
                attempted fait accompli; or
                    (B) the neutralization of the ability of the 
                People's Republic of China to execute a fait accompli 
                against Taiwan.
            (2) Fait accompli.--The term ``fait accompli'' refers to 
        the strategy of the People's Republic of China for invading and 
        seizing control of Taiwan before the United States Armed Forces 
        can respond effectively, while simultaneously deterring an 
        effective combined joint response by the United States Armed 
        Forces by convincing the United States that mounting such a 
        response would be prohibitively difficult or costly.

SEC. 3. FINDINGS.

    Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) Taiwan is a beacon of democracy in Asia and a steadfast 
        partner of the United States in the common pursuit of a free 
        and open Indo-Pacific region in which--
                    (A) all societies enjoy sovereign autonomy;
                    (B) the people of the region live securely, 
                prosperously, and with dignity; and
                    (C) the societies of the region rise and fall not 
                by coercion but on the basis of peaceful competition.
            (2) If the People's Republic of China were to use military 
        force to compel the unification of Taiwan with the People's 
        Republic of China--
                    (A) the world would lose one of the great exemplars 
                of freedom and democracy;
                    (B) the United States and allies and partners of 
                the United States would face severe difficulty in 
                maintaining favorable balances of power relative to the 
                People's Republic of China in Northeast and Southeast 
                Asia; and
                    (C) as the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific 
                region shifted in favor of the People's Republic of 
                China, the People's Republic of China would possess an 
                increasing ability to--
                            (i) impose its will throughout the Indo-
                        Pacific region, including by threatening or 
                        using force against Japan, South Korea, the 
                        Philippines, and other allies and partners of 
                        the United States; and
                            (ii) restrict United States access to key 
                        trade routes and markets in the Indo-Pacific 
                        region, thereby imposing economic hardship on 
                        middle-class and working-class Americans and 
                        increasing the ability of the People's Republic 
                        of China to intrude into political life in the 
                        United States.
            (3) There is growing concern that the Government of the 
        People's Republic of China may conclude that the cross-Strait 
        military balance has tilted in its favor and launch an invasion 
        of Taiwan sooner than previously anticipated, including as 
        follows:
                    (A) Former Assistant to the President for National 
                Security Affairs H.R. McMaster testified in March 2021 
                that Taiwan is ``the most significant flashpoint now'' 
                between the United States and the People's Republic of 
                China.
                    (B) Commander of United States Indo-Pacific Command 
                Admiral John Aquilino testified in March 2021 that the 
                threat of an invasion by the People's Republic of China 
                of Taiwan is ``much closer to us than most think'' and 
                could materialize well before 2035.
                    (C) Former Commander of United States Indo-Pacific 
                Command Admiral Phil Davidson testified in March 2021 
                that the threat of an invasion by the People's Republic 
                of China of Taiwan ``is manifest during this decade, in 
                fact in the next six years''.
            (4) Defense policymakers and analysts across multiple 
        administrations have found that, if the People's Republic of 
        China does invade Taiwan, the invasion will likely take the 
        form of a fait accompli, including as follows:
                    (A) The Defense Science Board assessed in June 2018 
                that the People's Republic of China ``will attempt to 
                achieve a decisive outcome very quickly, presenting the 
                United States and its allies with a fait accompli,'' in 
                the event of conflict.
                    (B) The Department of Defense Indo-Pacific Strategy 
                Report released in June 2019 found that--
                            (i) if the People's Republic of China or 
                        another strategic competitor in the Indo-
                        Pacific region decides ``to advance their 
                        interests through force, they are likely to 
                        enjoy a local military advantage at the onset 
                        of conflict. In a fait accompli scenario, 
                        competitors would seek to employ their 
                        capabilities quickly to achieve limited 
                        objectives and forestall a response from the 
                        United States, and its allies and partners''; 
                        and
                            (ii) an attempted fait accompli by the 
                        People's Republic of China or another strategy 
                        competitor would constitute one of the ``most 
                        stressing potential scenarios'' facing the 
                        United States Armed Forces.
                    (C) The Tri-Service Maritime Strategy released by 
                the United States Navy, United States Marine Corps, and 
                United States Coast Guard in December 2020 stated, ``In 
                the event of conflict, China . . . will likely attempt 
                to seize territory before the United States and its 
                allies can mount an effective response--leading to a 
                fait accompli.''.
                    (D) The Army Multi-Domain Transformation strategic 
                guidance released by Army Chief of Staff General James 
                McConville in March 2021 stated that China and other 
                adversaries of the United States will seek to ``seize 
                their objectives quickly as a fait accompli,'' if the 
                Joint Force ``cannot present credible deterrent 
                options''.
                    (E) Then-Acting Secretary of Defense Patrick 
                Shanahan testified in March 2019 that the Government of 
                the People's Republic of China is developing 
                capabilities that could be used to ``achieve a `fait 
                accompli' that would make reversing Chinese gains more 
                difficult, militarily and politically''.
                    (F) Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense 
                for China Ely Ratner assessed in January 2020 that 
                ``China has made significant investments in long-range 
                ISR and strike assets'' and ``China hopes the threat of 
                these attacks will deter U.S. intervention by negating 
                a substantial portion of U.S. airpower early in a 
                conflict, thereby creating time and space for a fait 
                accompli''.
                    (G) Former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy 
                Michele Flournoy warned in June 2020 that the 
                Government of the People's Republic of China may 
                believe the United States ``lack[s] the military 
                capabilities that might be effective in the face of A2/
                AD'' and ``conclude that China should move on Taiwan 
                sooner rather than later, a fait accompli that a 
                weakened and distracted United States would have to 
                accept''.
            (5) There is broad agreement that the United States should 
        maintain the ability of the United States Armed Forces to 
        defeat a fait accompli by the People's Republic of China, 
        including as follows:
                    (A) The National Defense Strategy Commission 
                assessed in November 2018 that competing successfully 
                in ``the Indo-Pacific region, while also managing 
                escalation dynamics, requires positioning substantial 
                capability forward . . . to deter and prevent a fait 
                accompli by an agile, opportunistic adversary''.
                    (B) Then-Acting Secretary of Defense Patrick 
                Shanahan testified in March 2019 that implementation of 
                the 2018 National Defense Strategy was required to 
                ensure the United States had ``the capabilities, 
                posture, and employment of forces'' necessary to 
                prevent a fait accompli by the People's Republic of 
                China.
                    (C) Assistant to the President for National 
                Security Affairs Jake Sullivan and Deputy Assistant to 
                the President and Coordinator for Indo-Pacific Affairs 
                on the National Security Council Kurt Campbell warned 
                in September 2019 that ``Beijing cannot be allowed to 
                use the threat of force to pursue a fait accompli in 
                territorial disputes''.
                    (D) Former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy 
                James Miller wrote in October 2020 that ``U.S. defense 
                planners must maintain a laser focus on a scenario for 
                which U.S. forces are ill-prepared today, in which 
                China . . . see[s] the opportunity for a quick invasion 
                of a U.S. partner or ally and attempt[s] to impose a 
                fait accompli that would be costly and risky to 
                reverse''.
                    (E) In January 2021, Secretary of Defense Lloyd 
                Austin upheld the assessment by the Indo-Pacific 
                Strategy Report that Department of Defense 
                ``initiatives on force employment, crisis response, 
                force and concept development, and collaboration with 
                allies and partners'' should be ``aimed to help address 
                this critical challenge'' of a potential fait accompli 
                scenario involving the People's Republic of China.
                    (F) Deputy Secretary of Defense Kathleen Hicks 
                testified in February 2021 that the People's Republic 
                of China is ``less likely'' to attempt a fait accompli 
                against Taiwan if it knows that the United States will 
                be able to defeat such an attempt, and that the United 
                States should therefore maintain the ability to defeat 
                a fait accompli by the People's Republic of China 
                against Taiwan.
                    (G) Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Colin 
                Kahl, Admiral Aquilino, and Admiral Davidson testified 
                in March 2021 that they agreed with the testimony by 
                Deputy Secretary Hicks, and that the United States 
                should maintain the ability to defeat a fait accompli 
                by the People's Republic of China against Taiwan in 
                order to strengthen deterrence against such a 
                contingency.
                    (H) Former Assistant to the President and Deputy 
                National Security Advisor Matt Pottinger testified in 
                June 2021 that ``the Department of Defense must ensure 
                that it can deny China's ability to forcibly 
                subordinate Taiwan, including through a fait accompli 
                attempt,'' and that ``time is running short'' to do so.
                    (I) Secretary Austin testified in June 2021 that 
                the United States should maintain its ability to defeat 
                a Chinese fait accompli against Taiwan, including by 
                maintaining a combat-credible forward deterrent 
                posture.
            (6) There is likewise broad agreement that a strategy of 
        denial is essential to deter or defeat a fait accompli by the 
        People's Republic of China against Taiwan, including as 
        follows:
                    (A) The 2018 National Defense Strategy tasked the 
                Department of Defense with posturing and employing 
                forces to ``delay, degrade, or deny adversary 
                aggression''.
                    (B) Secretary Austin argued in January 2021 that a 
                ``combat-credible, forward deterrent posture is 
                instrumental to the United States military's ability to 
                deter, and if necessary, deny a fait accompli 
                scenario''.
                    (C) Deputy Secretary Hicks, Under Secretary Kahl, 
                Admiral Aquilino, and Admiral Davidson reaffirmed the 
                emphasis by Secretary Austin on denial and testified 
                that a strategy of denial is essential for deterring 
                Chinese aggression.
                    (D) The Joint Operating Concept for Deterrence 
                Operations released in December 2017 states that 
                forward-deployed forces contribute to ``denying 
                benefits'' and thereby reduce ``the likelihood of an 
                adversary achieving strategic or tactical surprise, 
                thus helping to prevent adversary decision makers from 
                concluding they might achieve a military fait accompli 
                that could be extremely costly for the US to reverse by 
                force''.
                    (E) The United States Army's Multi-Domain 
                Operations concept document released in December 2018 
                states that Army forces must demonstrate the capability 
                ``to immediately deny a fait accompli'' in order to 
                deter a near-peer adversary.
                    (F) The Marine Corps Force Design 2030 report 
                released in March 2020 states that forward-deployed 
                forces possess the capability to ``attrite adversary 
                forces, enable joint force access requirements, 
                complicate targeting and consume adversary ISR 
                resources, and prevent fait accompli scenarios''.
                    (G) The Tri-Service Maritime Strategy directs the 
                United States Navy, United States Marine Corps, and 
                United States Coast Guard to ``deny adversaries their 
                objectives, defeat adversary forces while managing 
                escalation, and set the conditions for favorable 
                conflict termination''.
            (7) Under the Taiwan Relations Act (22 U.S.C. 3301 et 
        seq.), it is the policy of the United States to consider any 
        effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful 
        means to be of grave concern to the United States, and--
                    (A) the Taiwan Relations Act further establishes it 
                as the policy of the United States ``to maintain the 
                capacity of the United States to resist any resort to 
                force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize 
                the security, or the social or economic system, of the 
                people on Taiwan'';
                    (B) implementation of the Taiwan Relations Act 
                therefore requires the United States to maintain the 
                ability of the United States Armed Forces to defeat a 
                fait accompli by the People's Republic of China against 
                Taiwan;
                    (C) since 1979, the United States Government has 
                consistently upheld the commitments of the United 
                States under the Taiwan Relations Act;
                    (D) section 1260 of the William M. (Mac) Thornberry 
                National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 
                (Public Law 116-283) reaffirms that the Taiwan 
                Relations Act and the Six Assurances are the 
                cornerstones of United States relations with Taiwan;
                    (E) the Department of State reaffirmed in January 
                2021 that ``[t]he United States maintains its 
                longstanding commitments as outlined in the Three 
                Communiques, the Taiwan Relations Act, and the Six 
                Assurances,'' and that the commitment of the United 
                States to Taiwan is ``rock-solid'';
                    (F) a failure by the United States to continue to 
                uphold all of its obligations under the Taiwan 
                Relations Act, including by clearly maintaining the 
                ability of the United States Armed Forces to defeat a 
                fait accompli by the People's Republic of China against 
                Taiwan, could draw into question the willingness and 
                ability of the United States to uphold analogous 
                commitments elsewhere in the Indo-Pacific region; and
                    (G) any such loss of credibility could jeopardize 
                the ability of the United States to forge and sustain 
                the coalition of nations required to maintain a 
                favorable balance of power against the People's 
                Republic of China, thereby denying the hegemonic 
                ambitions of the People's Republic of China.

SEC. 4. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

    It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the ability of the United States to maintain a free and 
        open Indo-Pacific region would be significantly compromised if 
        the People's Republic of China were able to invade and seize 
        control of Taiwan, with severe implications for the lives, 
        livelihoods, and freedoms of working Americans and the allies 
        and partners of the United States in the Indo-Pacific region;
            (2) the most effective way for the People's Republic of 
        China to seize control of Taiwan is by way of invasion, and an 
        invasion of Taiwan by the People's Republic of China is likely 
        to take the form of a fait accompli;
            (3) implementation of the Taiwan Relations Act requires the 
        United States to maintain the ability of the United States 
        Armed Forces to defeat a fait accompli by the People's Republic 
        of China against Taiwan, and officials across multiple 
        administrations have affirmed that--
                    (A) the United States should maintain the ability 
                of the United States Armed Forces to defeat a fait 
                accompli by the People's Republic of China against 
                Taiwan, and
                    (B) a strategy of denial is the most effective 
                option for deterring or defeating a fait accompli by 
                the People's Republic of China against Taiwan;
            (4) the Department of Defense has nonetheless struggled to 
        consistently focus sufficient attention and resources on 
        maintaining the ability to deny a fait accompli by the People's 
        Republic of China against Taiwan, and as a result--
                    (A) the Government of the People's Republic of 
                China may believe that it can launch a successful fait 
                accompli against Taiwan as soon as 2027; and
                    (B) the governments of allies and partners of the 
                United States in the Indo-Pacific region may question 
                the will or ability of the United States to lead 
                efforts to prevent the People's Republic of China from 
                dominating the Indo-Pacific region; and
            (5) it should therefore be the policy of the United States 
        to maintain the ability of the United States Armed Forces to 
        deny a fait accompli by the People's Republic of China against 
        Taiwan in order to--
                    (A) ensure the Department of Defense adequately 
                prioritizes maintaining the ability to deny a fait 
                accompli by the People's Republic of China against 
                Taiwan as it develops strategies and plans and designs, 
                postures, and employs the United States Armed Forces; 
                and
                    (B) by doing so, clarify for the Government of the 
                People's Republic of China and other governments in the 
                Indo-Pacific region that the United States maintains 
                and will continue to maintain the ability of the United 
                States Armed Forces to deny a fait accompli by the 
                People's Republic of China against Taiwan, as required 
                by the Taiwan Relations Act and in order to strengthen 
                deterrence in the Indo-Pacific region.

SEC. 5. STATEMENT OF POLICY.

    It shall be the policy of the United States to maintain the ability 
of the United States Armed Forces to deny a fait accompli by the 
People's Republic of China against Taiwan.
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