Will to Fight Act of 2022
Bill: H.R.8560 | Sponsor: Rep. Crow, Jason (D-CO)
Policy area: Armed Forces and National Security

Summary:
Will to Fight Act of 2022

To direct the Director of National Intelligence to submit to Congress a 
   report relating to analyses of the military will to fight and the 
  national will to fight with respect to the Governments of Ukraine, 
             Afghanistan, and Iraq, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Will to Fight Act of 2022''.

SEC. 2. REPORT ON ASSESSING WILL TO FIGHT.

    (a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
            (1) According to a study by the RAND corporation, ``will to 
        fight'' is poorly analyzed and the least understood aspect of 
        war.
            (2) In testimony before the Select Committee on 
        Intelligence of the Senate in May 2022, top intelligence 
        officials of the United States indicated that although the 
        intelligence community accurately anticipated Russia's invasion 
        of Ukraine, the intelligence community did not accurately 
        assess the will of Ukrainian forces to fight in opposition to a 
        Russian invasion or that the Ukrainian forces would succeed in 
        averting a rapid Russian military occupation of Kyiv.
            (3) According to the RAND corporation, the intelligence 
        community estimated that the Afghan government's forces could 
        hold out against the Taliban for as long as 2 years if all 
        ground forces of the United States were withdrawn. This 
        estimate was revised in June 2021 to reflect an intelligence 
        community view that Afghanistan's military collapse could come 
        in 6 to 12 months. In August 2021, the Afghan government fell 
        within days after the ground forces of the United States were 
        withdrawn.
            (4) Similarly, the rapid advance of the Islamic State in 
        Iraq and Syria and near-total collapse of the Iraqi Security 
        Forces in 2014 appeared to take the policymakers of the United 
        States by surprise.
            (5) The apparent gaps in these analyses had important 
        implications for policy decisions of the United States toward 
        Russia and Afghanistan, and suggest a need for further 
        examination of how the intelligence community assesses a 
        foreign military's will to fight.
    (b) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, acting 
through the National Intelligence Council, and in coordination with the 
heads of the elements of the intelligence community that the Director 
determines appropriate, shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
committees a report examining the extent to which analyses of the 
military will to fight and the national will to fight informed the all-
source analyses of the intelligence community regarding how the armed 
forces and Governments of Ukraine, Afghanistan, and Iraq would perform 
at key junctures.
    (c) Elements.--The report under subsection (b) shall include the 
following:
            (1) The methodology of the intelligence community for 
        measuring the military will to fight and the national will to 
        fight of a foreign country.
            (2) The extent to which analysts of the intelligence 
        community applied such methodology when assessing the military 
        will to fight and the national will to fight of--
                    (A) Afghanistan following the April 2021 
                announcement of the full withdrawal of the United 
                States Armed Forces;
                    (B) Iraq in the face of the rapid emergence and 
                advancement in 2014 of Islamic State in Iraq and Syria; 
                and
                    (C) Ukraine and Russia during the initial phase of 
                the invasion and march toward Kyiv by Russia in 
                February 2022.
            (3) The extent to which--
                    (A) the assessments described in paragraph (2) 
                depended on the observations of personnel of the United 
                States Armed Forces who had trained Afghan, Iraqi, and 
                Ukrainian armed forces; and
                    (B) such observations reflected any standardized, 
                objective methodology.
            (4) Whether shortcomings in assessing the military will to 
        fight and the national will to fight may have affected the 
        capacity of the intelligence community to provide ``early 
        warning'' about the collapse of government forces in Iraq and 
        Afghanistan.
            (5) The extent to which ``red teaming'' was used to test 
        the assessments described in paragraph (2).
            (6) The extent to which dissenting opinions of intelligence 
        analysts were highlighted in final written products presented 
        to senior policymakers of the United States.
            (7) The extent to which analysts and supervisors adhered to 
        the policies, procedures, directives, and best practices of the 
        intelligence community.
            (8) Recommendations for analyses by the intelligence 
        community going forward to incorporate lessons learned and 
        enhance the quality of future analytical products to more 
        accurately reflect the military will to fight and the national 
        will to fight and improve the capacity of the intelligence 
        community to accurately predict the success or failure of the 
        armed forces of a foreign country.
    (d) Annex.--In submitting the report under subsection (b) to the 
congressional intelligence committees, the Director shall also include 
an accompanying annex, which shall be classified, providing an 
inventory of the following:
            (1) Collection gaps and challenges that may have affected 
        the analysis of the collapse of government forces in Iraq and 
        Afghanistan.
            (2) Actions that the Director of National Intelligence has 
        taken to mitigate such gaps and challenges.
    (e) Form.--The report under subsection (b) may be submitted in 
classified form, but if so submitted, shall include an unclassified 
summary of key findings, consistent with the protection of intelligence 
sources and methods.
    (f) Definitions.--In this section:
            (1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
        ``appropriate congressional committees'' means the following:
                    (A) The congressional intelligence committees (as 
                such term is defined in section 3 of the National 
                Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003)).
                    (B) The Committee on Foreign Affairs and the 
                Committee on Armed Services of the House of 
                Representatives.
                    (C) The Committee on Foreign Relations and the 
                Committee on Armed Services of the Senate.
            (2) Intelligence community.--The term ``intelligence 
        community'' has the meaning given that term in section 3 of the 
        National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003).
            (3) Military will to fight.--The term ``military will to 
        fight'' means, with respect to the military of a country, the 
        disposition and decision to fight, act, or persevere as needed.
            (4) National will to fight.--The term ``national will to 
        fight'' means, with respect to the government of a country, the 
        resolve to conduct sustained military and other operations for 
        an objective even when the expectation of success decreases or 
        the need for significant political, economic, and military 
        sacrifices increases.
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