Countering China Economic Coercion Act
Bill: H.R.5580 | Sponsor: Rep. Bera, Ami (D-CA)
Policy area: International Affairs

Summary:
Countering China Economic Coercion Act
This bill establishes an interagency task force to respond to the Chinese government's acts of economic coercion.
The task force must oversee the development and implementation of an integrated U.S. government strategy to respond to such acts of economic coercion. The strategy must include an evaluation of the costs such acts have on U.S. businesses and economic performance.
The task force must also report to Congress on the strategy as well as a comprehensive review on the economic tools that the Chinese government uses (or can use) to coerce other governments, non-Chinese companies, and multilateral institutions and organizations.

To establish an interagency task force to respond to People's Republic 
      of China coercive economic measures, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Countering China Economic Coercion 
Act''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

    Congress finds the following:
            (1) The Government of the People's Republic of China (PRC) 
        has used coercive economic measures against governments, 
        businesses, organizations, other entities, and individuals to 
        punish them for acting in ways the Government of the PRC sees 
        as challenging PRC interests, and to pressure or otherwise 
        influence them to offer policy concessions to the PRC.
            (2) In an apparent effort to provide itself more plausible 
        deniability and greater policy flexibility, the PRC often does 
        not formally link a foreign policy dispute or grievance to the 
        coercive measure it uses, opting for informal or extralegal 
        measures rather than formal, published financial sanctions, 
        trade controls, or investment restrictions.
            (3) The PRC has also increasingly sought to formalize some 
        of its coercive economic measures through laws and measures 
        that include strengthening its export control regime through 
        the enactment of a new Export Control Law and creation of an 
        Unreliable Entities List.
            (4) In 2010, the PRC halted shipments of rare earth 
        elements to Japan during a standoff over a clash between the 
        Japan Coast Guard and a Chinese fishing vessel in disputed 
        waters in the East China Sea.
            (5) The PRC targeted Norway after an independent group 
        awarded the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize to imprisoned Chinese 
        dissident Liu Xiaobo. In addition to freezing diplomatic 
        relations and halting negotiations over a possible trade deal, 
        the PRC imposed sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures to 
        restrict Norwegian salmon exports to China. Salmon exports to 
        China resumed in 2016 only after Norway pledged not to 
        ``support any actions that undermine'' China's core interests 
        and stated that its own actions had harmed ``mutual trust''.
            (6) In 2012, the PRC blocked banana imports from the 
        Philippines on the pretext of SPS issues and warned Chinese 
        tourists against visiting the Philippines in response to a 
        standoff over disputed Scarborough Shoal in the South China 
        Sea.
            (7) Following the election of Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen 
        in 2016, the PRC responded to Tsai's unwillingness to 
        explicitly endorse the terms of the 1992 Consensus by curbing 
        the number of mainland tourists and students allowed to travel 
        to Taiwan.
            (8) In 2016, the PRC retaliated against Mongolia for 
        hosting His Holiness the 14th Dalai Lama by raising fees on 
        commodity imports from Mongolia, creating delays at a major 
        border crossing, and canceling negotiations over a loan to the 
        Mongolian government.
            (9) Following South Korea's 2016 decision to join the 
        United States in deploying a United States missile defense 
        system to defend against North Korea's missile threat, the PRC 
        took the following actions that is estimated to have cost South 
        Korea $7.5 billion dollars in losses in 2017 alone:
                    (A) Restricted South Korean entertainment and other 
                cultural exports from entering China.
                    (B) Banned the sale of certain South Korea 
                household products, including cosmetics, high-tech 
                toilet seats, air purifiers, and food.
                    (C) Restricted tourism between the two countries by 
                ordering travel agencies not to provide South Korean 
                tour packages and by rejecting Korean airlines' 
                applications to increase charter flights between the 
                two countries.
                    (D) Targeted the China business of Lotte, a South 
                Korean conglomerate, by suspending new factories, 
                launching cyberattacks against Lotte's website, and 
                closing significant numbers of Lotte Mart stores in 
                China for alleged safety violations.
            (10) After the Government of Australia called for an 
        independent inquiry into the origins of the SARS-CoV-2 virus in 
        2020, the PRC retaliated by imposing tariffs on Australian wine 
        and barley exports, placing restrictions on other commodities, 
        and threatening to encourage Chinese students to boycott 
        Australian universities.

SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

    It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the People's Republic of China's (PRC) increasing use 
        of economic coercion against foreign governments, companies, 
        organizations, other entities, and individuals requires that 
        the United States better understand these measures in order to 
        devise a comprehensive, effective, and multilateral response;
            (2) the private sector is a crucial partner in helping the 
        United States Government understand the PRC's coercive economic 
        measures and hold the PRC accountable, and that additional 
        business transparency would help the United States Government 
        and private sector stakeholders conduct early assessments of 
        potential pressure points and vulnerabilities; and
            (3) PRC coercive economic measures creates pressures for 
        the private sector to behave in ways antithetical to United 
        States national interests and competitiveness.

SEC. 4. INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE.

    (a) Establishment.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the President shall establish an interagency 
task force to be known as the ``Countering Economic Coercion Task 
Force'' (referred to in this section as the ``Task Force'').
    (b) Duties.--
            (1) In general.--The Task Force shall--
                    (A) oversee the development and implementation of 
                an integrated United States Government strategy to 
                respond to People's Republic of China (PRC) coercive 
                economic measures, which shall include--
                            (i) systematically monitoring and 
                        evaluating--
                                    (I) the costs of such measures on 
                                United States businesses and overall 
                                United States economic performance;
                                    (II) instances in which such 
                                measures taken against a non-PRC entity 
                                has benefitted United States parties; 
                                and
                                    (III) the impacts such measures 
                                have had on United States national 
                                interests; and
                            (ii) facilitating coordination among 
                        Federal departments and agencies when 
                        responding to such measures as well as 
                        proactively deterring such economic coercion;
                    (B) consult with United States allies and partners 
                on the feasibility and desirability of collectively 
                identifying, assessing, and responding to PRC coercive 
                economic measures, as well as actions that could be 
                taken to expand coordination with the goal of ensuring 
                a consistent, coherent, and collective response to such 
                measures and establishing long-term deterrence to such 
                measures;
                    (C) effectively engage the United States private 
                sector, particularly sectors, groups, or other entities 
                that are susceptible to such PRC coercive economic 
                measures, on concerns related to such measures; and
                    (D) develop and implement a process for regularly 
                sharing relevant information, including classified 
                information to the extent appropriate and practicable, 
                on such PRC coercive economic measures with United 
                States allies, partners, and the private sector.
            (2) Consultation.--In carrying out its duties under this 
        subsection, the Task Force should regularly consult, to the 
        extent necessary and appropriate, with the following:
                    (A) Relevant stakeholders in the private sector.
                    (B) Federal departments and agencies that are not 
                represented on the Task Force.
                    (C) United States allies and partners.
    (c) Membership.--The President shall--
            (1) appoint the chair of the Task Force from among the 
        staff of the National Security Council;
            (2) appoint the vice chair of the Task Force from among the 
        staff of the National Economic Council; and
            (3) direct the head of each of the following Federal 
        departments and agencies to appoint personnel at the level of 
        Assistant Secretary or above to participate in the Task Force:
                    (A) The Department of State.
                    (B) The Department of Commerce.
                    (C) The Department of the Treasury.
                    (D) The Department of Justice.
                    (E) The Office of the United States Trade 
                Representative.
                    (F) The Department of Agriculture.
                    (G) The Office of the Director of National 
                Intelligence and other appropriate elements of the 
                intelligence community (as defined in section 3 of the 
                National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003)).
                    (H) The Securities and Exchange Commission.
                    (I) The United States International Development 
                Finance Corporation.
                    (J) Any other department or agency designated by 
                the President.
    (d) Reports.--
            (1) Initial report.--Not later than one year after the date 
        of the enactment of this Act, the Task Force shall submit to 
        the appropriate congressional committees a report that includes 
        the following elements:
                    (A) A comprehensive review of the array of economic 
                tools the Government of the People's Republic of China 
                (PRC) employs or could employ in the future to coerce 
                other governments, non-PRC companies (including United 
                States companies), and multilateral institutions and 
                organizations, including the Government of the PRC's 
                continued efforts to codify informal practices into its 
                domestic law.
                    (B) The strategy required by subsection (b)(1)(A).
                    (C) An interagency definition of PRC coercive 
                economic measures that captures both--
                            (i) the use of informal or extralegal PRC 
                        coercive economic measures; and
                            (ii) the illegitimate use of formal 
                        economic tools.
                    (D) A comprehensive review of the array of economic 
                and diplomatic tools the United States Government 
                employs or could employ to respond to economic coercion 
                against the United States and United States allies and 
                partners.
                    (E) A list of unilateral or multilateral--
                            (i) proactive measures to defend or deter 
                        against PRC coercive economic measures; and
                            (ii) actions taken in response to the 
                        Government of the PRC's general use of coercive 
                        economic measures.
                    (F) An assessment of areas in which United States 
                allies and partners are vulnerable to PRC coercive 
                economic measures.
                    (G) A description of gaps in existing resources or 
                capabilities for United States Government departments 
                and agencies to respond effectively to PRC coercive 
                economic measures directed at United States entities 
                and assist United States allies and partners in their 
                responses to PRC coercive economic measures.
            (2) Interim reports.--
                    (A) First interim report.--Not later than one year 
                after the date on which the report required by 
                paragraph (1) is submitted to the appropriate 
                congressional committees, the Task Force shall submit 
                to the appropriate congressional committees a report 
                that includes the following elements:
                            (i) Updates to information required by 
                        subparagraphs (A) through (G) of paragraph (1).
                            (ii) A description of activities conducted 
                        by the Task Force to implement the strategy 
                        required by subsection (b)(1)(A).
                    (B) Second interim report.--Not later than one year 
                after the date on which the report required by 
                subparagraph (A) is submitted to the appropriate 
                congressional committees, the Task Force shall submit 
                to the appropriate congressional committees a report 
                that includes an update to the elements required under 
                the report required by subparagraph (A).
            (3) Final report.--Not later than 30 days after the date on 
        which the report required by paragraph (2)(B) is submitted to 
        the appropriate congressional committees, the Task Force shall 
        submit to the appropriate congressional committees and also 
        make available to the public on the website of the Executive 
        Office of the President a final report that includes the 
        following elements:
                    (A) An analysis of PRC coercive economic measures 
                and the cost of such coercive measures to United States 
                businesses.
                    (B) A description of areas of possible particular 
                vulnerability for United States businesses and 
                businesses of United States partners and allies.
                    (C) Recommendations on how to continue the effort 
                to counter PRC coercive economic measures.
                    (D) A list of cases made public under subsection 
                (e).
            (4) Form.--
                    (A) Initial and interim reports.--The reports 
                required by paragraphs (1), (2)(A), and (2)(B) shall be 
                submitted in unclassified form, but may include a 
                classified annex.
                    (B) Final report.--The report required by paragraph 
                (3) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may 
                include a classified annex.
    (e) Publicly Available List.--
            (1) In general.--Not later than 120 days after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act, the Task Force shall to the extent 
        practicable make available to the public on the website of the 
        Executive Office of the President a list of cases in the past 
        six months in which the PRC is known to have directed coercive 
        economic measures against a non-PRC entity.
            (2) Updates.--The list required by paragraph (1) should be 
        updated every 180 days, and shall be managed by the Department 
        of State after the termination of the Task Force under 
        subsection (f).
    (f) Sunset.--
            (1) In general.--The Task Force shall terminate at the end 
        of the 60-day period beginning on the date on which the final 
        report required by subsection (d)(3) is submitted to the 
        appropriate congressional committees and made publicly 
        available.
            (2) Additional actions.--The Task force may use the 60-day 
        period referred to in paragraph (1) for the purposes of 
        concluding its activities, including providing testimony to 
        Congress concerning the final report required by subsection 
        (d)(3).

SEC. 5. DEFINITIONS.

    In this Act:
            (1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
        ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
                    (A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House 
                of Representatives; and
                    (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
                Senate.
            (2) Coercive economic measures.--The term ``coercive 
        economic measures'' includes formal or informal restrictions or 
        conditions, such as on trade, investment, development aid, and 
        financial flows, intended to impose economic costs on a non-
        People's Republic of China target in order to achieve strategic 
        political objectives, including influence over the policy 
        decisions of a foreign government, company, organization, or 
        individual.
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