Protecting Semiconductor Supply Chain Materials from Authoritarians Act
Bill: H.R.7372 | Sponsor: Rep. Titus, Dina (D-NV)
Policy area: International Affairs

Summary:
Protecting Semiconductor Supply Chain Materials from Authoritarians Act
This bill establishes an interagency working group to address semiconductor supply chain issues caused by Russia's attack on Ukraine.
The working group must report to Congress on issues including (1) the impact of Russia's attack on Ukraine on the supply of various materials, including palladium, neon gas, and helium; (2) the attack's impact on supply chains and the global economy; and (3) recommendations for legislative steps that Congress can take to further bolster the supply of materials for the semiconductor supply chain that have been curtailed by Russia's actions.
The working group must also report annually to Congress on future geopolitical developments that could severely disrupt global semiconductor supply chains in ways that could harm the United States.

To amend the Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 2014 to require the 
 President to establish a semiconductor supply chain working group in 
   response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine and submit reports to 
     Congress on potential future disruptions to the supply chain.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Protecting Semiconductor Supply 
Chain Materials from Authoritarians Act''.

SEC. 2. AMENDMENTS TO THE UKRAINE FREEDOM SUPPORT ACT OF 2014.

    The Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 2014 (22 U.S.C. 8921 et seq.) is 
amended--
            (1) by redesignating section 11 as section 13; and
            (2) by inserting after section 10 the following new 
        sections:

``SEC. 11. WORKING GROUP ON SEMICONDUCTOR SUPPLY DISRUPTIONS.

    ``(a) In General.--Not later than 30 days after the date of the 
enactment of this section, the President shall establish an interagency 
working group to address semiconductor supply chain issues caused by 
the Russia's illegal and unprovoked attack on Ukraine.
    ``(b) Membership.--The interagency working group established 
pursuant to subsection (a) shall be comprised of the head, or designee 
of the head, of each of the following:
            ``(1) The Department of State.
            ``(2) The Department of Defense.
            ``(3) The Department of Commerce.
            ``(4) The Department of the Treasury.
            ``(5) The Office of the United States Trade Representative.
            ``(6) The Department of Interior.
            ``(7) The Department of Energy.
            ``(8) The Department of Homeland Security.
            ``(9) The Department of Labor.
            ``(10) Any other Federal department or agency the President 
        determines appropriate.
    ``(c) Chair.--The Secretary of State shall serve as the chair of 
the working group established pursuant to subsection (a).

``SEC. 12. REPORTS ON SEMICONDUCTOR SUPPLY CHAIN DISRUPTIONS.

    ``(a) Report on Impact of Russia's Invasion of Ukraine.--Not later 
than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this section, the 
Secretary of State shall submit to the committees listed in subsection 
(b) a report of the interagency working group that--
            ``(1) reviews and analyzes--
                    ``(A) the impact of Russia's unprovoked attack on 
                Ukraine on the supply of palladium, neon gas, helium, 
                and hexafluorobutadiene (C4F6); and
                    ``(B) the impact, if any, on supply chains and the 
                global economy;
            ``(2) recounts diplomatic efforts by the United States to 
        work with other countries that mine, synthesize, or purify 
        palladium, neon gas, helium, or hexafluorobutadiene (C4F6);
            ``(3) quantifies the actions resulting from these efforts 
        to diversify sources of supply of these items;
            ``(4) sets forth steps the United States has taken to 
        bolster its production or secure supply of palladium or other 
        compounds and elements listed in paragraph (1)(A);
            ``(5) lists any other important elements, compounds, or 
        products in the semiconductor supply chain that have been 
        affected by Russia's illegal attack on Ukraine; and
            ``(6) recommends any potential legislative steps that could 
        be taken by Congress to further bolster the supply of elements, 
        compounds, or products for the semiconductor supply chain that 
        have been curtailed as a result of Russia's actions.
    ``(b) Committees Listed.--The committees listed in this subsection 
are--
            ``(1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on 
        Energy and Commerce of the House of Representatives; and
            ``(2) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee 
        on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate.
    ``(c) Annual Report on Potential Future Shocks to Semiconductor 
Supply Chains.--
            ``(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date 
        of the enactment of this section, and annually thereafter for 5 
        years, the Secretary of State shall submit to the Committee on 
        Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the 
        Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a report of the 
        interagency working group that--
                    ``(A) outlines and plans for the most likely future 
                geopolitical developments that could severely disrupt 
                global semiconductor supply chains in ways that could 
                harm the national security or economic interests of the 
                United States;
                    ``(B) forecasts the various potential impacts on 
                the global supply chain for semiconductors, and 
                products that use semiconductors, from the developments 
                outlined pursuant to subparagraph (A), as well as the 
                following contingencies--
                            ``(i) an invasion of Taiwan or geopolitical 
                        instability or conflict in East Asia;
                            ``(ii) a broader war or geopolitical 
                        instability in Europe;
                            ``(iii) strategic competitors dominating 
                        parts of the supply chain and leveraging that 
                        dominance coercively;
                            ``(iv) a future international health 
                        crisis; and
                            ``(v) natural disasters or shortages of 
                        natural resources and raw materials;
                    ``(C) describes the kind of continency plans that 
                would be needed for the safe evacuation of individuals 
                with deep scientific and technical knowledge of 
                semiconductors and their supply chain from areas under 
                risk from conflict or natural disaster; and
                    ``(D) evaluates the current technical and supply 
                chain work force expertise within the 


              

                Federal government to carry out these assessments.''.

            Passed the House of Representatives April 27, 2022.

            Attest:

                                             CHERYL L. JOHNSON,

                                                                 Clerk.