Israel Relations Normalization Act of 2021
Bill: S.1061 | Sponsor: Sen. Portman, Rob (R-OH)
Policy area: International Affairs

Summary:
Israel Relations Normalization Act of 2021
This bill requires the Department of State to take certain actions promoting the normalization of relations between Israel, Arab states, and other relevant countries and regions.
Specifically, the State Department must develop a strategy on expanding and strengthening the Abraham Accords (the term used to refer collectively to agreements between Israel and the United Arab Emirates and between Israel and Bahrain marking the public normalization of relations between the two Arab countries and Israel). The strategy must include a description of how the U.S. government will encourage further normalization of relations with Israel.
The State Department must report on the status of efforts to promote normalization of relations with Israel and other countries, including information on (1) laws that punish individuals for people-to-people relations with Israelis (i.e., anti-normalization laws), and (2) instances of the use of state-owned or state-operated media outlets to promote the prosecution of citizens or residents of Arab countries calling for peace with Israel.

To encourage the normalization of relations with Israel, and for other 
                               purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

<DELETED>SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    This Act may be cited as the ``Israel Relations 
Normalization Act of 2021''.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 2. FINDINGS.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    Congress makes the following findings:</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) Support for peace between Israel and its 
        neighbors has longstanding bipartisan support in 
        Congress.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) For decades, the United States Congress has 
        promoted Israel's acceptance among Arab and other relevant 
        countries and regions to enact numerous laws opposing efforts 
        to boycott, isolate, and stigmatize America's ally, 
        Israel.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) The recent peace and normalization agreements 
        between Israel and several Arab states--the United Arab 
        Emirates, Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco--have the potential to 
        fundamentally transform the security, diplomatic, and economic 
        environment in the Middle East and North Africa and advance 
        vital United States national security interests.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (4) These historic agreements could help advance 
        peace between Israel, the Arab states, and relevant countries 
        and regions, further diplomatic openings, and enhance efforts 
        towards a negotiated solution to the Israeli-Palestinian 
        conflict resulting in two states--a democratic Jewish state of 
        Israel and a viable democratic Palestinian state--living side 
        by side in peace, security, and mutual recognition.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (5) These agreements build upon the decades-long 
        leadership of the United States Government in helping Israel 
        broker peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan and promoting peace 
        talks between Israel and Syria, Lebanon, and the 
        Palestinians.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (6) These agreements also build on decades-long 
        private diplomatic and security engagement between Israel and 
        countries in the region.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (7) These normalization and peace agreements could 
        begin to transform the region by spurring economic growth, 
        enhancing technological innovation, advancing understanding, 
        and forging closer people-to-people relations.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (8) These agreements could promote investment, 
        tourism, and direct flights, and promote cooperation on 
        security, telecommunications, technology, energy, healthcare, 
        culture, the environment, water security, and sustainable 
        development.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 3. APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES 
              DEFINED.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    In this Act, the term ``appropriate congressional 
committees'' means--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the 
        Committee on Armed Services of the Senate; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the 
        Committee on Armed Services of the House of 
        Representatives.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 4. STATEMENT OF POLICY.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    It is the policy of the United States--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) to expand and strengthen the Abraham Accords 
        to encourage other nations to normalize relations with Israel 
        and ensure that existing agreements reap tangible security and 
        economic benefits for the citizens of those 
        countries;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) to develop and implement a regional strategy 
        to encourage economic cooperation among Israel, Arab states, 
        and the Palestinians to enhance the prospects for peace, 
        respect for human rights, and transparent governance, and for 
        cooperation to address water scarcity, climate solutions, 
        health care, sustainable development, and other areas that 
        result in benefits for residents of those countries;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) to develop and implement a regional security 
        strategy that recognizes the shared threat posed by Iran and 
        violent extremist organizations, ensures sufficient United 
        States deterrence in the region, builds partner capacity to 
        address shared threats, and explores multilateral security 
        arrangements built around like-minded partners;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (4) to support and encourage government-to-
        government and grassroots initiatives aimed at normalizing ties 
        with the state of Israel and promoting people-to-people contact 
        between Israelis, Arabs, and other relevant countries and 
        regions, including by expanding and enhancing the Abraham 
        Accords;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (5) to oppose efforts to delegitimize the state of 
        Israel and legal barriers to normalization with 
        Israel;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (6) to work to combat anti-Semitism and support 
        normalization with Israel, including by countering anti-Semitic 
        narratives on social media and state media and pressing for 
        curricula reform in education; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (7) to encourage partnerships and collaboration on 
        climate solutions, water, health, sustainable development, and 
        other areas.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 5. UNITED STATES STRATEGY TO STRENGTHEN AND EXPAND 
              ABRAHAM ACCORDS AND OTHER RELATED NORMALIZATION 
              AGREEMENTS WITH ISRAEL.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    (a) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the Secretary of 
State, in consultation with the Administrator of the United States 
Agency for International Development, the Secretary of Defense, and the 
heads of other appropriate Federal departments and agencies, shall 
develop and submit to the appropriate congressional committees a 
strategy on expanding and strengthening the Abraham Accords.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (b) Elements.--The strategy required under subsection (a) 
shall include the following elements:</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) An assessment of future staffing and 
        resourcing requirements of entities within the Department of 
        State, the United States Agency for International Development, 
        the Department of Defense, and other appropriate Federal 
        departments and agencies with responsibility to coordinate 
        United States efforts to expand and strengthen the Abraham 
        Accords.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) An assessment of the bilateral and 
        multilateral cooperation between Israel, Arab states, and other 
        relevant countries and regions that have normalized relations 
        with Israel, including an assessment of cooperation in the 
        economic, social, cultural, scientific, technical, educational, 
        and health fields, and an assessment of roadblocks to increased 
        cooperation.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) An assessment of bilateral and multilateral 
        security cooperation between Israel, the United States, Arab 
        states, and other relevant countries and regions that have 
        normalized relations with Israel, including an assessment of 
        potential roadblocks to increased security cooperation, 
        interoperability, and information sharing.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (4) An assessment of the likelihood of additional 
        Arab and other relevant countries and regions to normalize 
        relations with Israel.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (5) A detailed description of how the United 
        States Government will leverage diplomatic lines of effort and 
        resources from other stakeholders (including from foreign 
        governments, international donors, and multilateral 
        institutions) to encourage normalization, economic development, 
        and people-to-people programming.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 6. REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO PROMOTE 
              NORMALIZATION.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    (a) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with 
the Administrator of the United States Agency for International 
Development and the heads of other relevant Federal departments and 
agencies, shall submit a report to the Committee on Foreign Relations 
of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
Representatives regarding options for United States international 
efforts to promote strengthening of ties between Israel, Arab states, 
and other relevant countries and regions.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (b) Elements.--The report required under paragraph (1) 
shall include the following elements:</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) A description of options for leveraging 
        contributions of international donors, institutions, and 
        partner countries to facilitate people-to-people and 
        government-to-government relations between Israelis and 
        Arabs.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) Identification of existing investment funds 
        that support Israel-Arab state cooperation and recommendations 
        for how such funds could be used to support normalization and 
        increase prosperity for all relevant stakeholders.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) A proposal for how the United States 
        Government and others can utilize the scholars and Arabic 
        language resources of the United States Holocaust Museum to 
        counter Holocaust denial and anti-Semitism.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (4) An assessment for creating an Abrahamic Center 
        for Pluralism to prepare educational materials, convene 
        international seminars, promote tolerance and pluralism, and 
        bring together scholars as a means of advancing religious 
        tolerance and countering political and religious 
        extremism.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (5) An assessment of the value to Israel and its 
        neighbors of participating in a regional conference on climate 
        solutions, water, health, and sustainable 
        development.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (6) An assessment of the feasibility and value of 
        increasing the capacity of existing Department of State and 
        United States Agency for International Development-funded 
        programs for developing people-to-people exchange programs for 
        young people between Israel, Arab states, and other relevant 
        countries and regions.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (7) Recommendations to improve Department of State 
        cooperation and coordination, particularly between the Special 
        Envoy to Monitor Anti-Semitism and the Ambassador at Large for 
        International Religious Freedom, and the Office of 
        International Religious Freedom, to combat racism, xenophobia, 
        Islamophobia, and anti-Semitism, which hinder improvement of 
        relations between Israel, Arab states, and other relevant 
        countries and regions.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (8) An assessment of the value and feasibility of 
        Federal support for interparliamentary exchange programs for 
        Members of Congress, Knesset, and parliamentarians from Arab 
        and other relevant countries and regions, including through 
        existing Federal programs that support such 
        exchanges.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 7. BREAKING DOWN BARRIERS TO NORMALIZATION WITH 
              ISRAEL.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    (a) Short Title.--This section may be cited as the 
``Strengthening Reporting of Actions Taken Against the Normalization of 
Relations with Israel Act of 2021''.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (b) Findings.--Congress makes the following 
findings:</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) The Arab League, an organization comprising 22 
        Middle Eastern and African countries and entities, has 
        maintained an official boycott of Israeli companies and 
        Israeli-made goods since the founding of Israel in 
        1948.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) Longstanding United States policy has 
        encouraged Arab League states to normalize their relations with 
        Israel and has long prioritized funding cooperative programs 
        that promote normalization between Arab League States and 
        Israel, including the Middle East Regional Cooperation program, 
        which promotes Arab-Israeli scientific cooperation.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) While some Arab League governments are 
        signaling enhanced cooperation with the state of Israel on the 
        government-to-government level, most continue to persecute 
        their own citizens who establish people-to-people relations 
        with Israelis in nongovernmental fora, through a combination of 
        judicial and extrajudicial retribution.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (4) Some Arab League states maintain draconian 
        anti-normalization laws that punish their citizens for people-
        to-people relations with Israelis, with punishments including 
        imprisonment, revocation of citizenship, and execution. 
        Extrajudicial punishments by these and other Arab states 
        include summary imprisonment, accusations of ``treason'' in 
        government-controlled media, and professional 
        blacklisting.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (5) Anti-normalization laws, together with the 
        other forms of retribution, effectively condemn these societies 
        to mutual estrangement and, by extension, reduce the 
        possibility of conciliation and compromise.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (6) Former Israeli President Shimon Peres said in 
        2008 at the United Nations that Israel agrees with the Arab 
        Peace Initiative that a military solution to the conflict 
        ``will not achieve peace or provide security for the 
        parties''.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (7) Despite the risk of retaliatory action, a 
        rising tide of Arab civic actors advocate direct engagement 
        with Israeli citizens and residents. These include the Arab 
        Council for Regional Integration, a group of 32 public figures 
        from 15 Arab countries who oppose the boycott of Israel on the 
        grounds that the boycott has denied Arabs the benefits of 
        partnership with Israelis, has blocked Arabs from helping to 
        bridge the Israeli-Palestinian divide, and inspired divisive 
        intra-Arab boycotts among diverse sects and ethnic 
        groups.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (8) On February 11, 2020, a delegation of the Arab 
        Council to the French National Assembly in Paris testified to 
        the harmful effects of ``anti-normalization laws'', called on 
        the Assembly to enact a law instructing the relevant French 
        authorities to issue an annual report on instances of Arab 
        government retribution for any of their citizens or residents 
        who call for peace with Israel or engage in direct civil 
        relations with Israeli citizens, and requested democratic 
        legislatures to help defend the region's civil 
        peacemakers.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (9) On May 11, 2020, 85 leaders in France 
        published an endorsement of the Arab Council's proposal, 
        calling on France and other democratic governments to ``protect 
        Arabs who engage in dialogue with Israeli citizens'' and 
        proposing ``the creation of a study group in the National 
        Assembly as well as in the Senate whose mission would be to 
        ensure a legal and technical monitoring of the obstacles which 
        Arab proponents of dialogue with Israelis face''.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (10) Arab-Israeli cooperation provides significant 
        symbiotic benefit to the security and economic prosperity of 
        the region.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (c) Annual Report.--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the 
        date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 
        5 years, the Secretary of State shall submit to the Committee 
        on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign 
        Affairs of the House of Representatives a report on the status 
        of the normalization of relations with Israel.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) Elements.--The report required under paragraph 
        (1) shall include the following information:</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) The status of ``anti-normalization 
                laws'' in each country within the jurisdiction of the 
                Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, including efforts 
                within each country to sharpen existing laws, enact new 
                or additional ``anti-normalization legislation'', or 
                repeal such laws.</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) Instances of prosecution of citizens 
                or residents of Arab countries for calling for peace 
                with Israel, visiting the state of Israel, or engaging 
                Israeli citizens in any way.</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (C) Instances of extrajudicial retribution 
                by Arab governments or government-controlled 
                institutions against citizens or residents of Arab 
                countries for any of the same actions referred to in 
                subparagraph (B).</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (D) Evidence of steps taken by Arab 
                governments toward permitting or encouraging people-to-
                people relations between their citizens or residents 
                and Israeli citizens.</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (E) Instances where Arab governments used 
                state-owned or state-operated media outlets to promote 
                anti-Semitic propaganda.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 8. SUNSET.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    This Act shall cease to be effective on the date that is 5 
years after the date of the enactment of this Act.</DELETED>

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Israel Relations Normalization Act 
of 2021''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

    Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) Support for peace between Israel and its neighbors has 
        longstanding bipartisan support in Congress.
            (2) For decades, Congress has promoted Israel's acceptance 
        among Arab and other relevant countries and regions by passing 
        numerous laws opposing efforts to boycott, isolate, and 
        stigmatize America's ally, Israel.
            (3) The recent peace and normalization agreements between 
        Israel and several Arab states--the United Arab Emirates, 
        Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco--have the potential to 
        fundamentally transform the security, diplomatic, and economic 
        environment in the Middle East and North Africa and advance 
        vital United States national security interests.
            (4) These historic agreements could help advance peace 
        between and among Israel, the Arab states, and other relevant 
        countries and regions, further diplomatic openings, and enhance 
        efforts towards a negotiated solution to the Israeli-
        Palestinian conflict resulting in two states--a democratic 
        Jewish state of Israel and a viable, democratic Palestinian 
        state--living side by side in peace, security, and mutual 
        recognition.
            (5) These agreements build upon the decades-long leadership 
        of the United States Government in helping Israel broker peace 
        treaties with Egypt and Jordan and promoting peace talks 
        between Israel and Syria, Lebanon, and the Palestinians.
            (6) These agreements also build on decades of private 
        diplomatic and security engagement between Israel and countries 
        in the region.
            (7) These normalization and peace agreements could begin to 
        transform the region by spurring economic growth, investment, 
        and tourism, enhancing technological innovation, promoting 
        security cooperation, bolstering water security and sustainable 
        development, advancing understanding, and forging closer 
        people-to-people relations.

SEC. 3. APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.

    In this Act, the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' 
means the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the 
Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.

SEC. 4. STATEMENT OF POLICY.

    It is the policy of the United States--
            (1) to expand and strengthen the Abraham Accords to 
        encourage other nations to normalize relations with Israel and 
        ensure that existing agreements reap tangible security and 
        economic benefits for the citizens of those countries;
            (2) to develop and implement a regional strategy to 
        encourage economic cooperation between and among Israel, Arab 
        states, and the Palestinians to enhance the prospects for 
        peace, respect for human rights, transparent governance, and 
        for cooperation to address water scarcity, climate solutions, 
        health care, sustainable development, and other areas that 
        result in benefits for residents of those countries and 
        regions;
            (3) to develop and implement a regional security strategy 
        that recognizes the shared threat posed by Iran and violent 
        extremist organizations, ensures sufficient United States 
        deterrence in the region, builds partner capacity to address 
        shared threats, and explores multilateral security arrangements 
        built around like-minded partners;
            (4) to support and encourage government-to-government and 
        grassroots initiatives aimed at normalizing ties with the state 
        of Israel and promoting people-to-people contact between 
        Israelis, Arabs, and residents of other relevant countries and 
        regions, including by expanding and enhancing the Abraham 
        Accords;
            (5) to support a negotiated solution to the Israeli-
        Palestinian conflict resulting in two states living side by 
        side in peace, security, and mutual recognition;
            (6) to implement the Nita M. Lowey Middle East Partnership 
        for Peace Act (title VIII of division K of Public Law 116-260), 
        which will support economic development and peacebuilding 
        efforts among Israelis and Palestinians, in a manner which 
        encourages regional allies to become international donors to 
        these efforts;
            (7) to oppose efforts to delegitimize the state of Israel 
        and legal barriers to normalization with Israel; and
            (8) to work to combat anti-Semitism and support 
        normalization with Israel, including by countering anti-Semitic 
        narratives on social media and state media and pressing for 
        curricula reform in education.

SEC. 5. UNITED STATES STRATEGY TO STRENGTHEN AND EXPAND THE ABRAHAM 
              ACCORDS AND OTHER RELATED NORMALIZATION AGREEMENTS WITH 
              ISRAEL.

    (a) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the Secretary of State, 
in consultation with the Administrator of the United States Agency for 
International Development and the heads of other appropriate Federal 
departments and agencies, shall develop and submit to the appropriate 
congressional committees a strategy on expanding and strengthening the 
Abraham Accords.
    (b) Elements.--The strategy required under subsection (a) shall 
include the following elements:
            (1) An assessment of future staffing and resourcing 
        requirements of entities within the Department of State, the 
        United States Agency for International Development, and other 
        appropriate Federal departments and agencies with 
        responsibility to coordinate United States efforts to expand 
        and strengthen the Abraham Accords.
            (2) An assessment of opportunities to further promote 
        bilateral and multilateral cooperation between Israel, Arab 
        states, and other relevant countries and in the economic, 
        social, cultural, scientific, technical, educational, and 
        health fields and an assessment of roadblocks to increased 
        cooperation.
            (3) An assessment of bilateral and multilateral security 
        cooperation between Israel, the United States, Arab states, and 
        other relevant countries and regions that have normalized 
        relations with Israel, including an assessment of potential 
        roadblocks to increased security cooperation, interoperability, 
        and information sharing.
            (4) An assessment of the likelihood of additional Arab and 
        other relevant countries and regions to normalize relations 
        with Israel.
            (5) An assessment of opportunities created by normalization 
        agreements with Israel to advance prospects for peace between 
        Israelis and Palestinians.
            (6) A detailed description of how the United States 
        Government will leverage diplomatic lines of effort and 
        resources from other stakeholders (including from foreign 
        governments, international donors, and multilateral 
        institutions) to encourage normalization, economic development, 
        and people-to-people programming.
            (7) Identification of existing investment funds that 
        support Israel-Arab state cooperation and recommendations for 
        how such funds could be used to support normalization and 
        increase prosperity for all relevant stakeholders.
            (8) A proposal for how the United States Government and 
        others can utilize the scholars and Arabic language resources 
        of the United States Holocaust Museum to counter Holocaust 
        denial and anti-Semitism.
            (9) An assessment for creating an Abrahamic Center for 
        Pluralism to prepare educational materials, convene 
        international seminars, promote tolerance and pluralism, and 
        bring together scholars as a means of advancing religious 
        tolerance and countering political and religious extremism.
            (10) Recommendations to improve Department of State 
        cooperation and coordination, particularly between the Special 
        Envoy to Monitor Anti-Semitism and the Ambassador at Large for 
        International Religious Freedom, and the Office of 
        International Religious Freedom, to combat racism, xenophobia, 
        Islamophobia, and anti-Semitism, which hinder improvement of 
        relations between Israel, Arab states, and other relevant 
        countries and regions.
            (11) An assessment on the value and feasibility of Federal 
        support for inter-parliamentary exchange programs for Members 
        of Congress, Knesset, and parliamentarians from Arab and other 
        relevant countries and regions, including through existing 
        Federal programs that support such exchanges.
    (c) Form.--The report required under subsection (a) shall be in 
unclassified form but may contain a classified annex.

SEC. 6. BREAKING DOWN BARRIERS TO NORMALIZATION WITH ISRAEL.

    (a) Short Title.--This section may be cited as the ``Strengthening 
Reporting of Actions Taken Against the Normalization of Relations with 
Israel Act of 2021''.
    (b) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) The Arab League, an organization comprising 22 Middle 
        Eastern and African countries and entities, has maintained an 
        official boycott of Israeli companies and Israeli-made goods 
        since the founding of Israel in 1948.
            (2) Longstanding United States policy has encouraged Arab 
        League states to normalize their relations with Israel and has 
        long prioritized funding cooperative programs that promote 
        normalization between Arab League States and Israel, including 
        the Middle East Regional Cooperation program, which promotes 
        Arab-Israeli scientific cooperation.
            (3) While some Arab League governments are signaling 
        enhanced cooperation with the state of Israel on the 
        government-to-government level, most continue to persecute 
        their own citizens who establish people-to-people relations 
        with Israelis in nongovernmental fora, through a combination of 
        judicial and extrajudicial retribution.
            (4) Some Arab League states maintain draconian anti-
        normalization laws that punish their citizens for people-to-
        people relations with Israelis, with punishments, including 
        imprisonment, revocation of citizenship, and execution. 
        Extrajudicial punishments by these and other Arab states 
        include summary imprisonment, accusations of ``treason'' in 
        government-controlled media, and professional blacklisting.
            (5) Anti-normalization laws, together with the other forms 
        of retribution, effectively condemn these societies to mutual 
        estrangement and, by extension, reduce the possibility of 
        conciliation and compromise.
            (6) Former Israeli President Shimon Peres said in 2008 at 
        the United Nations that Israel agrees with the Arab Peace 
        Initiative that a military solution to the conflict ``will not 
        achieve peace or provide security for the parties''.
            (7) Despite the risk of retaliatory action, a rising tide 
        of Arab civic actors advocate direct engagement with Israeli 
        citizens and residents. These include the Arab Council for 
        Regional Integration, a group of 32 public figures from 15 Arab 
        countries who oppose the boycott of Israel on the grounds that 
        the boycott has denied Arabs the benefits of partnership with 
        Israelis, has blocked Arabs from helping to bridge the Israeli-
        Palestinian divide, and inspired divisive intra-Arab boycotts 
        among diverse sects and ethnic groups.
            (8) On February 11, 2020, a delegation of the Arab Council 
        to the French National Assembly in Paris testified to the 
        harmful effects of ``anti-normalization laws'', called on the 
        Assembly to enact a law instructing the relevant French 
        authorities to issue an annual report on instances of Arab 
        government retribution for any of their citizens or residents 
        who call for peace with Israel or engage in direct civil 
        relations with Israeli citizens, and requested democratic 
        legislatures to help defend the region's civil peacemakers.
            (9) On May 11, 2020, 85 leaders in France published an 
        endorsement of the Arab Council's proposal, calling on France 
        and other democratic governments to ``protect Arabs who engage 
        in dialogue with Israeli citizens'' and proposing ``the 
        creation of a study group in the National Assembly as well as 
        in the Senate whose mission would be to ensure a legal and 
        technical monitoring of the obstacles which Arab proponents of 
        dialogue with Israelis face''.
            (10) Arab-Israeli cooperation provides significant 
        symbiotic benefit to the security and economic prosperity of 
        the region.
    (c) Additional Reporting.--
            (1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 5 years, 
        the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate 
        congressional committees a report on the status of efforts to 
        promote normalization of relations with Israel and other 
        countries.
            (2) Elements.--The report required under paragraph (1) 
        shall include the following information:
                    (A) The status of ``anti-normalization laws'' in 
                countries comprising the Arab League, including efforts 
                within each country to sharpen existing laws, enact new 
                or additional ``anti-normalization legislation'', or 
                repeal such laws.
                    (B) Instances of the use of state-owned or state-
                operated media outlets to promote anti-Semitic 
                propaganda, the prosecution of citizens or residents of 
                Arab countries for calling for peace with Israel, 
                visiting the state of Israel, or engaging Israeli 
                citizens in any way.
                    (C) Instances of extrajudicial retribution by Arab 
                governments or government-controlled institutions 
                against citizens or residents of Arab countries for any 
                of the same actions referred to in subparagraph (B).

SEC. 7. SUNSET.

    This Act shall cease to be effective on the date that is 5 years 
after the date of the enactment of this Act.
                                                        Calendar No. 95

117th CONGRESS

  1st Session

                                S. 1061

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