Democracy Technology Partnership Act
Bill: H.R.3426 | Sponsor: Rep. Moulton, Seth (D-MA)
Policy area: Taxation

Summary:
Democracy Technology Partnership Act
This bill establishes the International Technology Partnership Office, led by the Special Ambassador for Technology, in the Department of State. The office shall advance U.S. technology policy through the creation of an International Technology Partnership with specified foreign countries.
Specifically, the office must create a partnership of democratic countries to develop technology governance regimes, with a focus on key technologies such as artificial intelligence and machine learning, 5G telecommunications, semiconductor chip manufacturing, biotechnology, and quantum computing. Partner countries must be democratic countries with advanced technology sectors that have a demonstrated record of trust or an expressed interest in international cooperation and coordination with the United States on defense and intelligence matters.
The bill also establishes the International Technology Partnership Fund in the Department of the Treasury. The State Department may use amounts from this fund to support joint research projects from International Technology Partnership member countries and technology investments in third-country markets.
The State Department must submit (1) a report on the activities of the office, including information on any cooperative activities, initiatives, or partnerships pursued with U.S. allies and partners; and (2) a national strategy for technology and national security.

To authorize the establishment of a Technology Partnership among 
             democratic countries, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Democracy Technology Partnership 
Act''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

    Congress finds the following:
            (1) The 21st century will increasingly be defined by 
        economic competition rooted in technological advances. Leaders 
        in adopting emerging technologies, such as artificial 
        intelligence, quantum computing, biotechnology, and next-
        generation telecommunications, and those who shape the use of 
        such technologies, will garner economic, military, and 
        political strength for decades.
            (2) These technologies offer opportunities for the 
        empowerment of citizens, but also and challenges to basic norms 
        of democratic governance and internationally recognized human 
        rights. The collection and analysis of data from individuals 
        allows governments to know more about their residents' 
        behaviors, preferences, interests, and activities than was 
        possible years ago. The concentration of this data in key 
        technologies, such as smart phones, search databases, and 
        facial recognition databases, along with the sharing of data 
        among governments, creates pressing concerns about individuals' 
        scope to exercise their fundamental political and social 
        rights.
            (3) This challenge arises as the integrity and efficacy of 
        post-World War II international institutions are increasingly 
        challenged. New approaches to multilateral cooperation and 
        arrangements are needed to tackle the challenges ahead to 
        ensure that the United States continues to lead in critical 
        technologies.
            (4) As information and communications technologies have 
        matured and increasingly mediate large swathes of social, 
        political and economic activity, it is incumbent on democratic 
        governments to address the ways in which these technologies 
        have undermined democratic values, consumer protections, and 
        social cohesion. Moreover, as authoritarian regimes 
        increasingly shape and deploy technologies to bolster 
        repression, stifle free expression, and interfere with free and 
        fair elections in other countries, the world's advanced 
        democracies will need to shape technology standards so that 
        emerging and critical technologies reflect democratic values, 
        including freedom of expression and privacy.
            (5) Technological leadership by the world's major liberal-
        democratic nations collectively will be essential to 
        safeguarding democratic institutions, norms, and values, and 
        contributing to global peace and prosperity, especially as 
        authoritarian governments seek to promote closed information 
        systems and technology that is not interoperable, often through 
        trade and investment practices that are incompatible with 
        global norms. A unified approach by like-minded nations is 
        needed to counteract growing investments in, and deployments 
        of, emerging technologies by authoritarian powers.
            (6) In addition to the development of emerging 
        technologies, democratic nations must lead in shaping 
        expectations for the responsible use of such technologies and 
        push back against laissez faire approaches and authoritarian 
        interests on internet governance advanced in multilateral 
        forums by--
                    (A) advocating against efforts to criminalize or 
                limit political dissent and freedom of speech online, 
                such as those spearheaded by the Russian Federation, 
                which seek to undermine the Council of Europe's 
                Convention on Cybercrime, done at Budapest November 23, 
                2001, in favor of a statist alternative; and
                    (B) prioritizing protections for elections, and 
                other processes essential for healthy democracies, from 
                cyber-attack.
            (7) The world's leading democracies must also confront new 
        challenges to their market-driven economic systems to ensure 
        their continued leadership in technology and innovation. The 
        People's Republic of China (referred to in this Act as the 
        ``PRC'') is pursuing an industrial policy to achieve dominance 
        in key technologies, including 5G, artificial intelligence 
        (referred to in this section as ``AI''), quantum computing, 
        hypersonics, biotechnology, space capabilities, and autonomous 
        vehicles.
            (8) The PRC seeks to use technological superiority for 
        national security, military-civil fusion, and economic gains, 
        according to its strategic plans, including--
                    (A) the Made in China 2025 strategy;
                    (B) the Five-Year Plan for Standardization and 
                China Standards 2035;
                    (C) the 2006 Medium-to-Long Term S&T Plan;
                    (D) the 2010 State Council Decision on Accelerating 
                the Development of Strategic Emerging Industries; and
                    (E) the 13th Five-Year Plan for the Development of 
                Strategic Emerging Industries.
            (9) The PRC seeks to advance in areas in which democratic 
        countries currently have a technological advantage and move 
        ahead in emerging technologies where China seeks a unique 
        opportunity to overtake such countries.
            (10) For many years, the PRC has pursued industrial 
        policies and discriminatory trade practices that include--
                    (A) heavily subsidizing Chinese companies, 
                restricting foreign competition, conducting forced 
                technology transfers, and using both licit and illicit 
                means to access research and development around 
                technologies in order to advantage Chinese companies in 
                specific technology fields;
                    (B) providing significant government funding for 
                research and development in the PRC in specific 
                technologies to build future competitiveness;
                    (C) seeking to ensure global adoption of Chinese 
                technologies, and the success of Chinese firms, 
                especially in emerging and strategic markets, through 
                significant foreign direct investment, low-cost 
                financing and comprehensive services for foreign 
                development projects, through initiatives such as the 
                Belt and Road Initiative, which includes the Digital 
                Silk Road and the Health Silk Road, as well as the 
                Smart City Initiative, efforts centered on promoting 
                the use of Chinese exports by offering far cheaper 
                rates and bundling these deals into larger development 
                and aid packages;
                    (D) aiding the adoption of Chinese-led standards 
                for digital technologies and products through 
                compensating Chinese firms that submit standards and 
                flooding forums with technical experts; and
                    (E) leveraging the international standard setting 
                bodies to advance the vision of the PRC regarding 
                standards and technologies.
            (11) As a result of these practices in support of Chinese 
        companies, the PRC is increasing its influence in AI, 5G, and a 
        wide range of other science and technology disciplines that 
        constitute long-term economic and security threats to the 
        United States, its allies, and like-minded partners. According 
        to market research firm Dell'Oro Group, Huawei's share of 
        worldwide telecommunications revenue equipment grew from 20 
        percent in 2014 to 31 percent in 2020.
            (12) While the United States semiconductor industry is the 
        worldwide industry leader with approximately 50 percent of 
        global market share and sales of $193,000,000,000 in 2019, the 
        situation may be changing. In 2019, all 6 of the new 
        semiconductor fabrication plants that opened worldwide were 
        located outside of the United States, with 4 of these plants 
        built in China. The Government of the PRC plans to spend 
        $150,000,000,000 on its computer chip industry during the next 
        10 years.
            (13) The PRC uses technologies, such as AI, facial 
        recognition, and biometrics, to increase control over its 
        population, facilitating mass surveillance, scalable 
        censorship, and technology-enabled social control, including 
        against ethnic and religious minorities including Tibetans, 
        Uyghurs, ethnic Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and members of other Muslim 
        minority groups.
            (14) The PRC uses its economic power to coerce and censor 
        companies, individuals and countries.
            (15) In the past decade, the Government of the PRC--
                    (A) blocked exports of rare earth elements to 
                Japan;
                    (B) threatened to curtail domestic sales of German 
                cars;
                    (C) cut off tourism to South Korea;
                    (D) restricted banana imports from the Philippines; 
                and
                    (E) imposed large tariffs on Australian barley 
                exports.
            (16) The Government of the PRC--
                    (A) has banned United States technology companies, 
                including Facebook, Google, and Twitter;
                    (B) has pressured movie studios based in the United 
                States to alter content in movies that it deemed 
                objectionable; and
                    (C) has retaliated against a range of American 
                companies for actual or perceived support for a range 
                of political positions, including recognizing 
                territorial claims of countries in border disputes with 
                China, recognizing Tibet, and more.
            (17) Third countries have become particular targets of 
        Chinese investments in technology. These third country 
        investments provide access to innovation, data that allows 
        Chinese companies to refine their own systems, and influence 
        over the policies of these governments. The terms on which 
        Chinese investments are made often are attractive in the short-
        term but create conditions for Chinese ownership of, or 
        influence over, major industries in those countries.
            (18) After decades of being the world leader in key 
        technologies, the United States is at risk of falling behind 
        the PRC in key technologies of the future. While private-sector 
        research and development investments have steadily increased in 
        the United States, Federal Government spending has declined as 
        a percentage of Gross Domestic Product from approximately 1.2 
        percent in 1976 to approximately 0.7 percent in 2018. The 
        decline has been even steeper in the physical sciences. The 
        Federal Government plays a unique and critical role in 
        America's innovation ecosystem. Government research and 
        development spending spurs private-sector investments, and the 
        United States Government remains the largest source of basic 
        research funding, which is foundational to game-changing 
        technological achievements.
            (19) During the past several years, the PRC has quadrupled 
        its research and development spending and is on the brink of 
        surpassing the United States in total investments in key 
        technologies, with its growth in research and development 
        spending doubling the United States Government's spending 
        increase in this area. Chinese patent publications have surged 
        in the fields of artificial intelligence, machine learning, and 
        deep learning.
            (20) The United States is highly dependent on China for key 
        components of critical technologies in its supply chains, such 
        as rare earths.
            (21) The United States remains a leader in the science and 
        technology areas of engineering and biology as well as key 
        components, including telecommunications equipment and 
        semiconductors. The United States does not have a domestic 
        manufacturer of radio access network equipment for 5G networks, 
        but is well-positioned to lead in 6G telecommunications, which 
        depend on software and semiconductors, areas of United States 
        strength.
            (22) Other countries have unique knowledge, expertise, and 
        capabilities in numerous cutting edge technologies, including 
        semiconductor manufacturing equipment, such as extreme 
        ultraviolet lithography machines for semiconductor fabrication 
        and machine tools for fabrication of custom components. In 
        order to successfully compete against the PRC, the United 
        States must partner with such countries.
            (23) The private sector in the United States and partner 
        countries, including Japan, Korea, Australia, New Zealand, the 
        United Kingdom, and the European Union has considerable 
        expertise in both technology and in standard setting, given the 
        role of the private sector in international standard setting 
        bodies, but this expertise can be better leveraged in shaping 
        United States technology policy.

SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

    It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) emerging technology governance regimes driven by 
        undemocratic governments that do not reflect democratic values 
        are gaining traction internationally through coercive, 
        diplomatic, and unfair economic, trade, and development 
        practices;
            (2) the United States is failing to lead international 
        efforts or prioritize multilateral coordination, institutions, 
        and legal compatibility in the area of technology governance, 
        ceding leadership to authoritarian regimes and risking the 
        growth of anti-democratic norms and standards around 
        technologies; and
            (3) promoting greater coordination, common functional 
        problem-solving institutional mechanisms, and more compatible 
        legal regimes among democratic nations is essential to create 
        an international technology governance architecture that 
        benefits all nations and effectively counters and contains 
        nondemocratic governance regimes.

SEC. 4. STATEMENT OF POLICY.

    It shall be the policy of the United States to lead in the creation 
of a new multilateral diplomatic architecture for technology policy 
composed of the world's tech-leading democracies.

SEC. 5. INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY PARTNERSHIP OFFICE AT THE DEPARTMENT 
              OF STATE.

    (a) Establishment.--The Secretary of State shall establish an 
interagency-staffed International Technology Partnership Office 
(referred to in this section as the ``Office''), which shall be housed 
in the Department of State.
    (b) Leadership.--
            (1) Special ambassador.--The Office shall be headed by the 
        Special Ambassador for Technology, who shall--
                    (A) be appointed by the President, by and with the 
                advice and consent of the Senate;
                    (B) have the rank and status of ambassador; and
                    (C) report to the Secretary of State, unless 
                otherwise directed by the Secretary of State.
            (2) Directors.--The Secretary of Commerce and the Secretary 
        of Treasury shall each appoint, from within their respective 
        departments, directors for International Technology 
        Partnership, who also shall serve as liaisons between the 
        Office and the Department of Commerce or the Department of the 
        Treasury, as applicable.
    (c) Membership.--In addition to the individuals referred to in 
subsection (b), the Office shall include a representative or expert 
detailee from key Federal agencies, as determined by the Special 
Ambassador for Technology.
    (d) Purposes.--The purposes of the Office shall include--
            (1) creating an international technology partnership of 
        democratic countries to develop harmonized technology 
        governance regimes and to fill gaps where United States 
        capabilities are currently insufficient, with a specific focus 
        on key technologies, including--
                    (A) artificial intelligence and machine learning;
                    (B) 5G telecommunications and other advanced 
                wireless networking technologies;
                    (C) semiconductor chip manufacturing;
                    (D) biotechnology;
                    (E) quantum computing;
                    (F) surveillance technologies, including facial 
                recognition technologies and censorship software; and
                    (G) fiber optic cables;
            (2) vigorously identifying existing and, as needed, new 
        multilateral mechanisms to advance the objectives of the 
        International Technology Partnership around technology 
        governance that advances democratic values;
            (3) coordinating with such countries regarding shared 
        technology strategies, including technology controls and 
        standards, as informed by the reports required under section 8; 
        and
            (4) developing strategies with partner countries for 
        coordinated, development and financial support for the 
        acquisition by key countries of the technologies listed in 
        paragraph (1), or comparable technologies, in order to provide 
        alternatives for those countries to systems supported by 
        authoritarian regimes.
    (e) Special Hiring Authorities.--The Secretary of State may--
            (1) hire support staff for the Office; and
            (2) hire individuals to serve as experts or consultants for 
        the Office, in accordance with section 3109 of title 5, United 
        States Code.
    (f) Report.--Not later than one year after the date of the 
enactment of this Act and annually thereafter for the following three 
years, the Secretary of State shall submit to the Committee on Foreign 
Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the 
House of Representatives an unclassified report, with a classified 
index if necessary, regarding the activities of the Office undertaken 
to carry out the purposes described in subsection (d), including 
information on any cooperative activities, initiatives, or partnerships 
pursued with United States allies and partners, and the results of such 
activities, initiatives, or partnerships.

SEC. 6. INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY PARTNERSHIP.

    (a) Partnership Criteria.--The Special Ambassador for Technology 
(referred to in this section as the ``Special Ambassador'') shall seek 
to establish an International Technology Partnership with foreign 
countries that have--
            (1) democratic national government and a strong commitment 
        to democratic values, including an adherence to the rule of 
        law, freedom of speech, and respect for and promotion of human 
        rights, including the right to privacy;
            (2) an economy with advanced technology sectors; and
            (3) a demonstrated record of trust or an expressed interest 
        in international cooperation and coordination with the United 
        States on important defense and intelligence issues.
    (b) Political and Economic Unions.--The International Technology 
Partnership may include relevant political and economic unions.
    (c) Objectives.--The Special Ambassador, in cooperation with 
International Technology Partnership participants, shall pursue, as 
appropriate, through memoranda of understanding, executive agreements, 
free trade agreements, and existing multilateral channels--
            (1) coordination of technology policies and standards among 
        International Technology Partnership countries through 
        participation in international standard setting bodies, such as 
        the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts, World Trade 
        Organization, the 3rd Generation Partnership Project, and the 
        International Telecommunications Union, including pre-
        attendance meetings, education, and panels to report on issues;
            (2) coordination of policies with the private sector to 
        ensure private sector led, politically neutral, standards 
        processes;
            (3) the adoption of shared data privacy, data sharing, and 
        data archiving standards among the United States and partner 
        countries and relevant economic and political unions, including 
        harmonized data protection regulations;
            (4) the creation of coordinated policies for the use and 
        control of emerging and foundational technologies through--
                    (A) use restrictions and export controls;
                    (B) investment screening coordination, including 
                the harmonization of technology-transfer laws, 
                regulations, policies, and practices; and
                    (C) the development of other arrangements to 
                regulate and control technology transfer;
            (5) coordination around the resiliency of supply chains in 
        critical technology areas, with possible diversification of 
        supply chain components among the group, while--
                    (A) abiding by transparency obligations related to 
                subsidies and product origin;
                    (B) conducting risk analyses of products 
                manufactured in third party nations that fail to meet 
                established standards similarly; and
                    (C) coordinating subsidy policies;
            (6) the coordination of supply chains regarding 
        semiconductor fabrication through a fabrication research 
        consortium for the semiconductor industry;
            (7) the facilitation of partnerships and cooperation 
        between research universities, private-sector stake holders, 
        and other entities in member countries regarding key 
        technologies, including the creation of memoranda of 
        understanding regarding science and technology collaboration 
        with member countries and coordinated incentives and subsidies;
            (8) the coordination of investments and co-financing in 
        targeted countries with the goal of--
                    (A) promoting secure and resilient digital 
                infrastructure and privacy-enhancing technologies that 
                protect democratic values and create a clear contrast 
                and alternative to the PRC through the United States 
                International Development Finance Corporation, the 
                Export-Import Bank of the United States, foreign 
                development finance institutions (including the World 
                Bank and the International Monetary Fund), the European 
                Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the European 
                Investment Bank, partner country development 
                institutions, regional banks, other lending 
                institutions, or new investment mechanisms; and
                    (B) seeking to ensure that all funding provided by 
                those institutions, for any purpose, should be 
                conditioned upon the protection of democratic values, 
                and that financing is forbidden to entities involved in 
                the international investment programs of authoritarian 
                or illiberal governments; and
            (9) information sharing among partner countries to raise 
        awareness of--
                    (A) the technology transfer threat posed by 
                authoritarian governments; and
                    (B) ways in which autocratic regimes are utilizing 
                technology to erode democracies.
    (d) Working Groups.--In carrying out the objectives described in 
subsection (c) with respect to particular technology areas, the Special 
Ambassador may establish working groups within the International 
Technology Partnership, composed of representatives from partner 
countries, including relevant political and economic unions, to 
coordinate on discrete strategies and policies related to specific 
technologies.

SEC. 7. INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY PARTNERSHIP FUND.

    (a) Establishment.--There is established in the Treasury of the 
United States a trust fund, which shall be known as the ``International 
Technology Partnership Fund'' (referred to in this section as the 
``Fund'').
    (b) Deposits.--
            (1) Federal appropriations.--There is authorized to be 
        appropriated $5,000,000,000 for the Fund.
            (2) Donations.--In addition to amounts authorized to be 
        appropriated for the Fund pursuant to paragraph (1), the 
        Secretary of the Treasury may accept donations from 
        International Technology Partnership member countries.
    (c) Use of Funds.--Subject to subsection (d), amounts deposited 
into the Fund may be used by the Secretary of State, in consultation 
with the International Technology Partnership and other relevant 
Federal agencies, to support--
            (1) joint research projects between government research 
        agencies, universities, technology companies, and other 
        entities from International Technology Partnership member 
        countries; and
            (2) technology investments in third country markets.
    (d) Notification Requirement.--The obligation of funds under 
subsection (c) is subject to the notification requirement set forth in 
section 634A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2394-1).
    (e) Public-Private Board.--
            (1) Establishment.--There is established an International 
        Technology Partnership Advisory Board (referred to in this 
        subsection as the ``Board''), which shall provide the 
        International Technology Partnership Office with advice and 
        recommendations concerning the implementation of this Act.
            (2) Membership.--The Board shall be composed of 
        individuals--
                    (A) with demonstrated expertise in the fields of 
                emerging technologies and international trade; and
                    (B) from the private sector, academic institutions, 
                national or international human rights organizations, 
                or technology research institutions.

SEC. 8. DEPARTMENT OF STATE REPORTING REGARDING NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR 
              TECHNOLOGY AND NATIONAL SECURITY.

    Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this 
Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation with other relevant 
Federal agencies, shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Relations of 
the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
Representatives an unclassified report, with a classified index if 
necessary, that outlines a national strategy for technology and 
national security, which--
            (1) assesses the emerging and foundational technologies of 
        the future;
            (2) identifies the current capabilities of the United 
        States in critical technologies and its components, including 
        any gaps in such capabilities;
            (3) identifies the technology capabilities (horizon 
        scanning and technology forecasting) among allied and partner 
        countries;
            (4) identifies governance models for emerging and 
        foundational technologies being adopted by other countries and 
        other areas of global policy convergence with respect to which 
        the United States should better pursue multilateralism or 
        coordination;
            (5) identifies a preliminary set of priority technology 
        areas on which the International Technology Partnership should 
        be focused;
            (6) analyzes the current capabilities of the PRC in 
        critical technologies and components, including any gaps in 
        such capabilities; and
            (7) includes a set of recommendations for--
                    (A) rapidly enhancing United States technological 
                capabilities;
                    (B) how the United States should collaborate with 
                allied or like-minded countries, identifying existing 
                and, as needed, new multilateral mechanisms to fill 
                capability gaps and areas for the United States to 
                advance democratic values; and
                    (C) the criteria for determining which countries 
                should be included in the International Technology 
                Partnership, including a strong commitment to 
                democratic values and a history of working closely with 
                the United States, as reflected in Department of State 
                reports regarding human rights and media freedom.
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