Taiwan Deterrence Act
Bill: S.3192 | Sponsor: Sen. Risch, James E. (R-ID)
Policy area: International Affairs

Summary:
Taiwan Deterrence Act
This bill authorizes defense-related assistance for Taiwan and addresses related issues.
For FY2023-FY2032, the Department of State may provide foreign military financing grant assistance to Taiwan if (1) Taiwan commits to match such spending on a dollar-for-dollar basis, and (2) the United States and Taiwan agree to conduct joint long-range planning for capability development and on the expenditure of the funds.
Furthermore, for the purposes of certain arms export control laws, Taiwan shall receive treatment identical to NATO member countries, Australia, Japan, South Korea, Israel, and New Zealand. (Currently, such countries receive benefits in regards to defense article transfers, such as the waiver of certain requirements and eligibility for assistance and fee waivers.)
The State Department must report to Congress on U.S. priorities for building more capable Taiwan security forces and organizations. The State Department and the Department of Defense must jointly report to Congress on an annual basis on Taiwan's enhancement of its self-defense capabilities.

To advance a policy to ensure peace and security across the Taiwan 
                                Strait.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

    (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Taiwan Deterrence 
Act''.
    (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as 
follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Definitions.
              TITLE I--DETERRENCE POLICY REGARDING TAIWAN

Sec. 101. Findings.
Sec. 102. Statement of policy.
   TITLE II--BOLSTERING UNITED STATES AND TAIWAN DEFENSE AND SECURITY

Sec. 201. Report on capability development by Taiwan.
Sec. 202. Authorization of appropriations for Foreign Military 
                            Financing grant assistance to Taiwan.
Sec. 203. Eligibility of Taiwan for Foreign Military Sales and export 
                            status under the Arms Export Control Act.
Sec. 204. Report on advancing the defense of Taiwan.

SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.

    In this Act:
            (1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
        ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
                    (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
                Senate; and
                    (B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House 
                of Representatives.
            (2) People's liberation army; pla.--The terms ``People's 
        Liberation Army'' and ``PLA'' mean the armed forces of the 
        People's Republic of China.
            (3) PRC; china.--The terms ``PRC'' and ``China'' mean the 
        People's Republic of China.

              TITLE I--DETERRENCE POLICY REGARDING TAIWAN

SEC. 101. FINDINGS.

    Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) Taiwan is a model democracy in the Indo-Pacific, with 
        open and fair elections, strong market-led economic growth, and 
        high levels of individual freedoms.
            (2) The United States and Taiwan share a robust unofficial 
        relationship with close cooperation on a wide range of issues, 
        including global health, economic issues, military and defense, 
        development, and people-to-people exchanges.
            (3) Taiwan is a key economic partner of the United States, 
        serving as the 10th largest trading partner of the United 
        States as of October 2021 and home to critical high-tech supply 
        chains.
            (4) The People's Republic of China has greatly increased 
        its political, diplomatic, economic, and military coercion 
        campaigns across the Taiwan Strait, especially since 2016.
            (5) The PRC seeks to annex Taiwan through whatever means 
        may ultimately be required. The insistence by the Chinese 
        Communist Party that so-called ``reunification'' is Taiwan's 
        only option makes that goal inherently coercive. In January 
        2019, President Xi stated that the PRC ``make[s] no promise to 
        renounce the use of force and reserve[s] the option of taking 
        all necessary means''. Taiwan's embodiment of democratic values 
        and economic liberalism challenges President Xi's goal of 
        achieving national rejuvenation. The PRC plans to exploit 
        Taiwan's dominant strategic position in the First Island Chain 
        and to project power into the Second Island Chain and beyond.
            (6) The People's Liberation Army has exponentially 
        increased its military activity in the Taiwan Strait. As of 
        October 2021, the Ministry of National Defense of Taiwan 
        recorded that more than 600 Chinese military sorties have flown 
        into the Air Defense Identification Zone of Taiwan in 2021 
        alone. That is an increase of 50 percent compared to 2020. That 
        same month, the PLA made its largest ever air incursion into 
        the Air Defense Identification Zone of Taiwan, sending almost 
        150 planes in total over a number of days.
            (7) In response, on October 3, 2021, the Department of 
        State said it was ``very concerned by the People's Republic of 
        China's provocative military activity near Taiwan, which is 
        destabilizing, risks miscalculations, and undermines regional 
        peace and stability'' and urged Beijing to ``cease its 
        military, diplomatic, and economic pressure and coercion 
        against Taiwan''.
            (8) The PRC has increased the frequency and scope of its 
        exercises and operations targeting Taiwan, such as amphibious 
        assault and live-fire exercises in the Taiwan Strait, PLA Air 
        Force flights that encircle Taiwan, and flights across the 
        unofficial median line in the Taiwan Strait. The destruction of 
        Hong Kong's autonomy by the Government of the PRC potentially 
        accelerates the timeline of a Taiwan scenario and makes the 
        defense of Taiwan an even more urgent priority.
            (9) In October 2021, the PRC adopted export controls on 
        Chinese goods to Taiwan in an attempt to put more economic 
        pressure on Taiwan. That follows an increase in PRC tactics to 
        squeeze the economy of Taiwan, including banning certain 
        exports and adopting the ``31 measures'' policy to induce brain 
        drain on the island by providing government-sponsored 
        incentives for Taiwanese talent and businesses to move to the 
        mainland.
            (10) The PRC launches massive cyber campaigns against 
        Taiwan. The Department of Cyber Security of Taiwan estimates 
        that there are approximately 20,000,000 to 40,000,000 
        cyberattacks every month, most of which are suspected to be by 
        the PRC. In July 2021, head of the Department of Cyber Security 
        of Taiwan Chien Hung-wei told United States media that there 
        was a ``rather high degree of confidence that many attacks 
        originated from our neighbor [the PRC]'' and warned that 
        Taiwan's ``critical infrastructure, such as gas, water, and 
        electricity are highly digitized, so [Taiwan] can easily fall 
        victim''.
            (11) The PRC continues to isolate Taiwan diplomatically. 
        The PRC has refused to allow Taiwan to attend annual summits of 
        international organizations such as the International Civil 
        Aviation Organization, the International Criminal Police 
        Organization (INTERPOL), and the World Health Organization.
            (12) The PRC also uses its economic might to punish 
        countries who seek closer ties with Taiwan. Most recently, in 
        September 2021, the PRC denied Lithuania certain export 
        licenses after Lithuania and Taiwan announced their intent to 
        establish a Taiwan representative office in the city of 
        Vilnius.
            (13) The PRC uses economic incentives such as massive 
        investment promises to try to formalize relations with Taiwan's 
        remaining allies. Since 2016, seven countries--the Republic of 
        Kiribati, the Solomon Islands, the Dominican Republic, Burkina 
        Faso, the Republic of El Salvador, the Republic of Panama, and 
        the Democratic Republic of Sao Tome and Principe--have shifted 
        diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing.
            (14) The PRC aims to use its growing military might in 
        concert with other instruments of its national power to 
        displace the United States in the Indo-Pacific and establish 
        hegemony over the region. Achieving the annexation of Taiwan is 
        a key step for the PRC to achieve those ambitions.
            (15) The defense of Taiwan is critical to--
                    (A) retaining the credibility of the United States 
                as a defender of the democratic values and free-market 
                principles embodied by the people and government of 
                Taiwan;
                    (B) limiting the ability of the PLA to project 
                power beyond the First Island Chain, including to 
                United States territory, such as Guam and Hawaii;
                    (C) defending the territorial integrity of Japan; 
                and
                    (D) preventing the PLA from diverting military 
                planning, resources, and personnel to broader military 
                ambitions.

SEC. 102. STATEMENT OF POLICY.

    (a) Objectives.--It is the policy of the United States, in ensuring 
security in the Taiwan Strait, to pursue the following objectives:
            (1) The balance of power in the Indo-Pacific remains 
        favorable to the United States and its allies and partners. The 
        United States and its allies and partners maintain unfettered 
        access to the region and the PRC neither dominates the region 
        nor coerces its neighbors, including Taiwan.
            (2) The allies and partners of the United States, including 
        Taiwan--
                    (A) maintain confidence in United States leadership 
                and its commitment to the Indo-Pacific region;
                    (B) can withstand and combat subversion and undue 
                influence by the PRC; and
                    (C) work with the United States to promote shared 
                interests and values in the region.
            (3) The combined influence of the United States and its 
        allies and partners is strong enough to demonstrate to the PRC 
        that the risks of attempts to annex Taiwan by coercion or force 
        outweigh the potential benefits.
            (4) The United States deters the PRC from seeking military 
        or other aggressive unilateral action to change the status quo 
        on Taiwan or in the Taiwan Strait.
    (b) Policy.--It is the policy of the United States, in pursuit of 
the objectives set forth in subsection (a)--
            (1) to prioritize the Indo-Pacific region as the most 
        important political-military theater for United States foreign 
        policy;
            (2) to prioritize resources for achieving United States 
        political and military objectives in that most critical region;
            (3) to sustain the Taiwan Relations Act (22 U.S.C. 3301 et 
        seq.) and the Six Assurances provided by the United States to 
        Taiwan in July 1982 as the foundations for United States-Taiwan 
        relations;
            (4) to deepen, to the fullest extent possible, the 
        extensive, close, and friendly relations of the United States 
        and Taiwan, including cooperation to support the development of 
        capable, ready, and modern forces necessary for the defense of 
        Taiwan;
            (5) to encourage and facilitate Taiwan's accelerated 
        acquisition of asymmetric defense capabilities, which are 
        crucial to defending the islands of Taiwan from invasion, 
        including long-range precision fires, anti-ship missiles, 
        coastal defense, anti-armor, air defense, undersea warfare, 
        advanced command, control, communications, computers, 
        intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR), and 
        resilient command and control capabilities;
            (6) to increase the conduct of relevant and practical 
        training and exercises with the defense forces of Taiwan, 
        including, as appropriate, the Rim of the Pacific exercise, 
        combined training at United States Army combat training centers 
        and the United States Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center, 
        United States Air Force Red Flag and Green Flag exercises, and 
        bilateral naval exercises and training;
            (7) to use, in service of the policy described in 
        paragraphs (5) and (6), existing tools such as foreign military 
        sales and direct commercial sales, identify new tools, 
        including foreign military financing for Taiwan under certain 
        conditions, and explore greater industrial cooperation and co-
        production or co-development opportunities;
            (8) to prioritize the timely review of and response to 
        requests from Taiwan for defense articles and services within 
        the United States acquisition system, and to ensure that such 
        prioritization is the top priority of relevant Cabinet 
        officials, including the Secretary of State and the Secretary 
        of Defense;
            (9) to prioritize building the capacity of Taiwan to 
        protect United States defense technology;
            (10) to design major defense capabilities for export;
            (11) to encourage Taiwan's domestic production of certain 
        defense capabilities;
            (12) to expand professional military education and 
        technical training opportunities in the United States for 
        military personnel of Taiwan;
            (13) to pursue a strategy of military engagement with 
        Taiwan that fully integrates exchanges at the strategic, 
        policy, and functional levels;
            (14) to increase exchanges between senior defense officials 
        and general officers of the United States and Taiwan consistent 
        with the Taiwan Travel Act (Public Law 115-135; 132 Stat. 341), 
        especially for the purpose of enhancing cooperation on defense 
        planning and improving the interoperability of the military 
        forces of the United States and Taiwan;
            (15) to conduct exchanges with Taiwan specifically focused 
        on improving the reserve force of Taiwan and to ensure the 
        effectiveness of the All-Out Defense Mobilization Agency;
            (16) to deter acts of aggression or coercion by the PRC 
        against the interests of the United States and its allies, 
        especially regarding Taiwan, by showing PRC leaders that the 
        United States can and is willing to deny them the ability to 
        achieve their objectives, including by--
                    (A) consistently demonstrating the political will 
                of the United States to deepening existing treaty 
                alliances and growing new partnerships as a durable, 
                asymmetric, and unmatched strategic advantage to the 
                growing military capabilities and reach of the PRC;
                    (B) maintaining a system of forward-deployed bases 
                in the Indo-Pacific region as the most visible sign of 
                United States resolve and commitment to the region and 
                as platforms to ensure United States operational 
                readiness and advance interoperability with allies and 
                partners;
                    (C) adopting a more dispersed force posture 
                throughout the region, particularly the Western 
                Pacific, and pursuing maximum access for United States 
                mobile and relocatable launchers for long-range cruise, 
                ballistic, and hypersonic weapons throughout the Indo-
                Pacific region;
                    (D) fielding long-range, precision-strike networks 
                to United States and allied forces, including ground-
                launched cruise missiles, undersea and naval 
                capabilities, and integrated air and missile defense in 
                the First Island Chain and the Second Island Chain, in 
                order to impose high risks on the PRC for operating in 
                those zones and maximize the ability of the United 
                States to operate;
                    (E) strengthening extended deterrence to 
                demonstrate that escalation against key United States 
                interests would be costly, risky, and self-defeating; 
                and
                    (F) collaborating with allies and partners to 
                accelerate their roles in more equitably sharing the 
                burdens of mutual defense, including through the 
                acquisition and fielding of advanced capabilities and 
                training that will better enable them to repel PRC 
                aggression or coercion;
            (17) to strengthen and deepen United States alliances and 
        partnerships, prioritizing the Indo-Pacific region, by pursuing 
        greater bilateral and multilateral cooperative initiatives that 
        ensure peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, advance shared 
        interests, and bolster partner countries' confidence that the 
        United States is and will remain a strong, committed, and 
        constant partner;
            (18) to encourage and aid Taiwan to boost its own 
        capabilities and resiliency to avoid and deter PRC military 
        pressure in the Taiwan Strait;
            (19) to maintain United States access to the Western 
        Pacific, including by--
                    (A) increasing the qualitative advantage of United 
                States forward-deployed forces in the Indo-Pacific 
                region;
                    (B) modernizing the United States military through 
                investments in existing and new major platforms, 
                emerging technologies, critical in-theater force 
                structure and enabling capabilities, operational 
                concepts, and access agreements; and
                    (C) operating and conducting exercises with allies 
                and partners--
                            (i) to prevent the PLA from gaining the 
                        ability to project power and establish 
                        contested zones within the First Island Chain 
                        and the Second Island Chain;
                            (ii) to diminish the ability of the PLA to 
                        coerce its neighbors; and
                            (iii) to maintain open sea and air lanes, 
                        particularly in the Taiwan Strait, the East 
                        China Sea, and the South China Sea;
            (20) to deter the PRC from--
                    (A) coercing Taiwan, including by developing more 
                combat-credible forces that are integrated with Indo-
                Pacific allies and partners of the United States in 
                contact, blunt, and surge layers and able to defeat any 
                PRC theory of victory in the First Island Chain or 
                Second Island Chain and beyond, as called for in the 
                2018 National Defense Strategy;
                    (B) using gray-zone tactics below the level of 
                armed conflict; or
                    (C) initiating armed conflict; and
            (21) to convey to the PRC that, in the event that 
        deterrence by denial fails, the United States, if necessary--
                    (A) will impose prohibitive diplomatic, economic, 
                financial, reputational, and military costs on the PRC 
                for its aggression; and
                    (B) will defend itself and its allies regardless of 
                the point of origin of attacks against them.

   TITLE II--BOLSTERING UNITED STATES AND TAIWAN DEFENSE AND SECURITY

SEC. 201. REPORT ON CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT BY TAIWAN.

    (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the Secretary of State should expand and strengthen 
        existing measures under the United States Conventional Arms 
        Transfer Policy to provide capabilities to Taiwan, prioritizing 
        Taiwan in accordance with United States strategic imperatives;
            (2) the United States should design for export to Taiwan 
        capabilities critical to maintaining a favorable military 
        balance in the region, including long-range precision fires, 
        air and missile defense systems, anti-ship cruise missiles, 
        land attack cruise missiles, conventional hypersonic systems, 
        intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities, 
        and command and control systems;
            (3) the United States should pursue, to the maximum extent 
        possible, anticipatory technology security and foreign 
        disclosure policy on the systems described in paragraph (2); 
        and
            (4) the Secretary of State should--
                    (A) urge Taiwan to invest in sufficient quantities 
                of munitions to meet contingency requirements and avoid 
                the need for accessing United States stocks in wartime; 
                and
                    (B) cooperate with Taiwan to deliver such 
                munitions, or when necessary, to increase the capacity 
                of Taiwan to produce such munitions.
    (b) Report.--
            (1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in 
        coordination with the Secretary of Defense, shall submit to the 
        appropriate congressional committees a report that--
                    (A) describes United States priorities for building 
                more capable Taiwan security forces and organizations; 
                and
                    (B) identifies statutory, regulatory, or other 
                obstacles to advancing such priorities.
            (2) Matters to be included.--The report required by 
        paragraph (1) shall--
                    (A) provide a priority list of defense and military 
                capabilities that Taiwan must possess for the United 
                States to be able to achieve its military objectives in 
                the Indo-Pacific region;
                    (B) identify, from the list referred to in 
                subparagraph (A), the capabilities that are best 
                provided, or can only be provided, by the United 
                States;
                    (C) identify--
                            (i) actions required to prioritize United 
                        States Government resources and personnel to 
                        expedite fielding the capabilities identified 
                        under subparagraph (B); and
                            (ii) steps needed to fully account for and 
                        a plan to integrate all means of United States 
                        foreign military sales, direct commercial 
                        sales, security assistance, and all applicable 
                        authorities of the Department of State and the 
                        Department of Defense;
                    (D) assess the major obstacles to fulfilling 
                requirements for United States security assistance for 
                Taiwan, including resources and personnel limits, 
                legislative and policy barriers, and factors related to 
                specific partner countries;
                    (E) identify limitations on the ability of the 
                United States to provide the capabilities described in 
                paragraph (A), including the capabilities identified 
                under subparagraph (B), because of existing United 
                States treaty obligations or United States statutes, 
                regulations, or other policies;
                    (F) recommend changes to existing statutes, 
                regulations, or other policies that would reduce or 
                eliminate limitations on providing critical 
                capabilities to Taiwan;
                    (G) identify requirements to streamline the 
                International Traffic in Arms Regulations under 
                subchapter M of chapter I of title 22, Code of Federal 
                Regulations, that would enable more effective delivery 
                of capabilities to Taiwan;
                    (H) recommend improvements to the process for 
                developing requirements for Taiwan's capabilities; and
                    (I) recommend other statutory, regulatory, or 
                policy changes that would improve delivery timelines.
            (3) Form.--The report required by paragraph (1) shall be 
        submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified 
        annex.

SEC. 202. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR FOREIGN MILITARY 
              FINANCING GRANT ASSISTANCE TO TAIWAN.

    (a) Taiwan Security Programs.--In addition to amounts otherwise 
authorized to be appropriated for Foreign Military Financing, there is 
authorized to be appropriated to the Department of State for Taiwan 
Foreign Military Finance grant assistance programs $2,000,000,000 for 
each of fiscal years 2023 to 2032.
    (b) Restrictions on Taiwan Foreign Military Financing.--Amounts 
authorized to be appropriated under subsection (a) shall be available 
only if--
            (1) Taiwan commits to match spending on a dollar-for-dollar 
        basis; and
            (2) the United States and Taiwan formally agree--
                    (A) to conduct joint long-range planning for 
                capability development; and
                    (B) on the expenditure of such amounts.

SEC. 203. ELIGIBILITY OF TAIWAN FOR FOREIGN MILITARY SALES AND EXPORT 
              STATUS UNDER THE ARMS EXPORT CONTROL ACT.

    The Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.) is amended--
            (1) in sections 3(d)(2)(B), 3(d)(3)(A)(i), (3)(d)(5), 
        21(e)(2)(A), 36(b)(1), 36(b)(2), 36(b)(6), 36(c)(2)(A), 
        36(d)(2)(A), 62(c)(1), and 63(a)(2), by inserting ``Taiwan,'' 
        before ``or New Zealand'' each place it appears;
            (2) in section 3(b)(2), by inserting ``the Government of 
        Taiwan,'' before ``or the Government of New Zealand''; and
            (3) in sections 21(h)(1)(A) and 21(h)(2), by inserting 
        ``Taiwan,'' before ``or Israel'' each place it appears.

SEC. 204. REPORT ON ADVANCING THE DEFENSE OF TAIWAN.

    (a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for a period of seven 
years, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense shall 
jointly submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on 
Taiwan's enhancement of its self-defense capabilities.
    (b) Matters To Be Included.--Each report required by subsection (a) 
shall include the following:
            (1) An assessment of the commitment of Taiwan to 
        implementing the tenets of the Overall Defense Concept, and 
        what steps Taiwan has and has not taken to implement those 
        tenets.
            (2) An assessment of the efforts of Taiwan to acquire and 
        employ within its forces asymmetric capabilities, including--
                    (A) long-range precision fires;
                    (B) air and missile defense systems;
                    (C) anti-ship cruise missiles;
                    (D) land attack cruise missiles;
                    (E) conventional hypersonic systems;
                    (F) mining and countermining capabilities;
                    (G) intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 
                capabilities;
                    (H) command and control systems; and
                    (I) any other defense capabilities the Secretary of 
                State and the Secretary of Defense jointly determine 
                are crucial to the defense of Taiwan.
            (3) An evaluation of the balance between conventional and 
        asymmetric capabilities in the defense force of Taiwan as of 
        the date on which the report is submitted.
            (4) An assessment of steps by Taiwan to enhance the overall 
        readiness of its defense forces, including--
                    (A) the extent to which Taiwan is requiring and 
                providing regular training to such forces;
                    (B) the extent to which such training is realistic 
                to the security environment Taiwan faces; and
                    (C) the sufficiency of the financial and budgetary 
                resources Taiwan is putting toward readiness of such 
                forces.
            (5) An assessment of steps by Taiwan to ensure that the 
        Taiwan Reserve Command can recruit, train, and equip its 
        forces.
            (6) An evaluation of--
                    (A) the severity of manpower shortages in the 
                military of Taiwan, including in the reserve forces;
                    (B) the impact of such shortages in the event of a 
                conflict scenario; and
                    (C) Taiwan's efforts to address such shortages.
            (7) An assessment of efforts by Taiwan to boost its 
        civilian defenses, including any informational campaigns to 
        make aware the risks of Taiwan's security environment to the 
        population of Taiwan.
            (8) An assessment of efforts by Taiwan to secure its 
        critical infrastructure, including in transportation, 
        telecommunications networks, and energy.
            (9) An assessment of efforts by Taiwan to enhance its 
        cybersecurity, including the security of civilian government 
        and military networks.
            (10) An assessment of any significant gaps in any of the 
        matters described in paragraphs (1) through (9) with respect to 
        which the United States assesses that additional action is 
        needed.
            (11) A description of cooperative efforts between the 
        United States and Taiwan on the matters described in paragraphs 
        (1) through (10).
            (12) A description of resistance within the Government of 
        Taiwan to implementing the matters described in paragraphs (1) 
        through (9) or to United States support or engagement with 
        regard to those matters.
    (c) Form.--The report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted 
in classified form, but may include an unclassified summary.
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