Expeditionary Diplomacy Act of 2021
Bill: S.669 | Sponsor: Sen. Murphy, Christopher (D-CT)
Policy area: International Affairs

Summary:
Expeditionary Diplomacy Act of 2021
This bill modifies oversight and accountability procedures for diplomatic personnel and actions by revising the structure and scope of review for certain diplomatic activities.
Specifically, the bill requires the Department of State to provide quarterly briefings (currently held monthly) on progress towards opening or reopening high-risk, high-threat posts, as well as risks to national security from their continued closure and any barriers to opening those posts.
The bill also recasts and revises the responsibilities of Accountability Review Boards (i.e., the mechanism through which the State Department currently investigates any event that causes serious injury, loss of life, or significant destruction of property at, or related to, a U.S. government mission abroad). The bill renames these boards Security Review Committees, and it requires these committees to take into account specified contextual and mitigating factors when evaluating diplomatic actions that led to such outcomes, as well as the diplomatic value of operations relating to the incident in question.

To provide for the appropriate balance of empowering diplomats to 
 pursue vital diplomatic goals and mitigating security risks at United 
            States diplomatic posts, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Expeditionary Diplomacy Act of 
2021''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

    Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) A robust overseas diplomatic presence is the sine qua 
        non of an effective foreign policy, particularly in unstable 
        environments where a flexible and timely diplomatic response 
        can be decisive in preventing and addressing violent conflict.
            (2) Diplomats routinely put themselves and their families 
        at great personal risk to serve their country overseas where 
        they increasingly face threats related to international 
        terrorism, violent conflict, and public health, among others.
            (3) The Department of State has a remarkable record of 
        protecting personnel while enabling an enormous amount of 
        global diplomatic activity, often in insecure and remote places 
        and facing a variety of evolving risks and threats, from 
        terrorism to sonic attacks. With support from Congress, the 
        Department of State has revised policy, improved physical 
        security through retrofitting and replacing old facilities, 
        deployed additional security personnel and armored vehicles, 
        and greatly enhanced training requirements and facilities, 
        including the new Foreign Affairs Security Training Center in 
        Blackstone, Virginia.
            (4) However, there is broad consensus that the pendulum has 
        swung too far toward eliminating risk, excessively inhibiting 
        diplomatic activity; instead of protecting diplomats that 
        authorize calculated risks, human psychology combined with 
        Department of State policy incentivize extending embassy 
        closures, reducing footprints, and postponing or denying travel 
        requests.
            (5) Congress must accept responsibility for its part in 
        perpetuating a risk-averse culture, as its oversight too often 
        promotes the myth that all security incidents are avoidable and 
        appears more focused on finding scapegoats than improving 
        policy; the Accountability Review Board requirement in the 
        Diplomatic Security Act (22 U.S.C. 4801 et seq.) particularly 
        furthers this perception.
            (6) The impact of reduced diplomatic engagement is both 
        difficult to distill and undeniable; while the cost of an 
        embassy closure or cancelled meeting is hard to measure, 
        diplomatic missions rely on robust staffing and ambitious 
        external engagement to advance United States interests as 
        diverse as fighting terrorism and transnational organized 
        crime, preventing and addressing violent conflict and 
        humanitarian disasters, promoting United States businesses and 
        trade, protecting the rights of marginalized groups, addressing 
        climate change, and preventing pandemic disease.
            (7) Despite the fact that Congress currently provides 
        annual appropriations in excess of $1,900,000,000 for embassy 
        security, construction, and maintenance, the Department of 
        State is unable to fully transform this considerable investment 
        into true overseas presence given excessive restrictions that 
        inhibit the ability of diplomats to--
                    (A) meet with foreign leaders to explain, defend, 
                and advance United States priorities;
                    (B) understand and report on foreign political, 
                social, and economic conditions;
                    (C) provide United States citizen services that are 
                often a matter of life and death in insecure places; 
                and
                    (D) collaborate and, at times, compete with other 
                diplomatic missions.
            (8) Such restrictions present a clear and present danger to 
        the core interests of the United States and contribute to the 
        larger militarization of our national security, as military and 
        intelligence agencies benefit from fewer security restrictions, 
        greater risk tolerance, and less congressional scrutiny in the 
        wake of security incidents.
            (9) Given these stakes, Congress has a responsibility to 
        empower, support, and hold the Department of State accountable 
        for implementing an aggressive presence strategy that mitigates 
        potential risks and adequately considers the myriad direct and 
        indirect consequences of a lack of presence.

SEC. 3. ENCOURAGING EXPEDITIONARY DIPLOMACY.

    (a) Purpose.--Subsection (b) of section 102 of the Diplomatic 
Security Act (22 U.S.C. 4801(b)) is amended--
            (1) by amending paragraph (3) to read as follows:
            ``(3) to promote strengthened security measures, 
        institutionalize a culture of learning, and, in the case of 
        apparent gross negligence or breach of duty, recommend the 
        Director General of the Foreign Service investigate 
        accountability for United States Government personnel with 
        security-related responsibilities;'';
            (2) by redesignating paragraphs (4) and (5) as paragraphs 
        (5) and (6), respectively; and
            (3) by inserting after paragraph (3) the following new 
        paragraph:
            ``(4) to support a culture of risk management, instead of 
        risk avoidance, that enables to Department of State to pursue 
        its vital goals with full knowledge that it is not desirable 
        nor possible for the Department to avoid all risks;''.
    (b) Briefings on Embassy Security.--Section 105(a) of the 
Diplomatic Security Act (22 U.S.C. 4804(a)) is amended--
            (1) by striking ``monthly briefings'' and inserting 
        ``quarterly briefings''; and
            (2) in paragraph (1)--
                    (A) by striking ``any plans to open or reopen a 
                high risk, high threat post'' and inserting ``progress 
                towards opening or reopening high risk, high threat 
                posts, the risk to national security of the continued 
                closure and remaining barriers to doing so'';
                    (B) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``the type and 
                level of security threats such post could encounter'' 
                and inserting ``the risk to national security of the 
                post's continued closure''; and
                    (C) in subparagraph (C), by inserting ``the type 
                and level of security threats such post could 
                encounter, and'' before ``security `tripwires'''.

SEC. 4. REPLACEMENT OF ACCOUNTABILITY REVIEW BOARD WITH SECURITY REVIEW 
              COMMITTEE.

    (a) In General.--Section 301 of the Diplomatic Security Act (22 
U.S.C. 4831) is amended--
            (1) in the section heading, by striking ``accountability 
        review boards'' and inserting ``security review committees'';
            (2) in subsection (a)--
                    (A) in paragraph (1), by striking ``shall convene 
                an Accountability Review Board (in this title referred 
                to as the `Board'). The Secretary shall not convene the 
                Board'' and inserting ``shall convene the Security 
                Review Committee (in this title referred to as the 
                `SRC'). The Secretary shall not convene the SRC'';
                    (B) in paragraph (2), by striking ``Board'' and 
                inserting ``SRC''; and
                    (C) in paragraph (3)(A)--
                            (i) in the subparagraph heading, by 
                        striking ``Board'' and inserting ``SRCs''; and
                            (ii) by striking ``Board'' and inserting 
                        ``SRC'';
            (3) in subsection (b)--
                    (A) in the subsection heading, by striking 
                ``Boards'' and inserting ``SRCs''; and
                    (B) by striking ``Board'' each place it appears and 
                inserting ``SRC''; and
            (4) in subsection (c), by striking ``Board'' each place it 
        appears and inserting ``SRC''.
    (b) Membership.--Section 302 of the Diplomatic Security Act (22 
U.S.C. 4832) is amended--
            (1) in the section heading, by striking ``accountability 
        review board'' and inserting ``security review committee'';
            (2) in subsection (a)--
                    (A) by striking ``Membership.--'' and all that 
                follows through ``Chairperson of the Board. Members of 
                the Board'' and inserting the following: 
                ``Membership.--
            ``(1) In general.--The Secretary shall determine the 
        composition of the SRC and designate a Chairperson. Members of 
        the SRC'';
                    (B) by striking ``vested in the Board. Members of 
                the Board'' and inserting ``vested in the SRC. Members 
                of the SRC''; and
                    (C) by adding at the end the following new 
                paragraph:
            ``(2) Regulations.--The Secretary of State shall promulgate 
        regulations defining the membership and operating procedures 
        for the SRC and provide to the Chairmen and ranking members of 
        the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the 
        Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, 
        in writing, a description of how the SRC will be structured 
        with respect to any other standing committees.''; and
            (3) in subsection (b), by striking ``Board'' each place it 
        appears and inserting ``SRC''.
    (c) Technical and Conforming Amendments.--Section 303 of the 
Diplomatic Security Act (22 U.S.C. 4833) is amended--
            (1) by striking ``Board'' each place it appears and 
        inserting ``SRC''; and
            (2) in the subsection heading for subsection (d), by 
        striking ``Boards'' and inserting ``SRCs''.

SEC. 5. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF SECURITY REVIEW COMMITTEE.

    Section 304 of the Diplomatic Security Act (22 U.S.C. 4834) is 
amended--
            (1) in the section heading, by striking ``a board'' and 
        inserting ``the security review committee'';
            (2) by striking ``A Board'' both places it appears and 
        inserting ``The Security Review Committee'';
            (3) by striking ``Board'' each place it appears and 
        inserting ``Security Review Committee'';
            (4) in subsection (a)--
                    (A) in paragraph (2), by inserting after ``were 
                adequate'' the following: ``, in the context of the 
                inherent security risks, mitigation efforts, and what 
                was known at the time of the incident in question, 
                including--
                    ``(A) if the attack was against a diplomatic 
                compound, motorcade, residence, or other mission 
                facility, whether the security systems, security 
                countermeasures, and security procedures operated as 
                intended, and whether such systems worked to materially 
                mitigate the attack or were found to be inadequate to 
                mitigate the threat and attack;
                    ``(B) if the attack was on any personnel conducting 
                an approved operation outside the mission, if a valid 
                process was followed in evaluating the requested 
                operation and weighing the risk and diplomatic value of 
                the operation; and
                    ``(C) if gross negligence or serious breach of duty 
                by an individual described in section 303(a)(1)(B) may 
                have been a factor.'';
                    (B) in paragraph (4), by striking ``; and'' and 
                inserting a semicolon;
                    (C) by redesignating paragraph (5) as paragraph 
                (6); and
                    (D) by inserting after paragraph (4) the following 
                new paragraph:
            ``(5) the diplomatic value of operations or physical 
        presence relating to the incident in question, including a 
        counterfactual for the impact of not undertaking the type of 
        operation or physical presence related to the incident; and'';
            (5) in subsection (b), by inserting ``and to promote a 
        culture of risk management, rather than risk avoidance for 
        valuable diplomatic activity'' after ``has reviewed'';
            (6) by amending subsection (c) to read as follows:
    ``(c) Personnel Recommendations.--If the SRC suspects that an 
individual described in section 303(a)(1)(B) has engaged in gross 
negligence or serious breach of duty, and such misconduct has 
significantly contributed to the serious injury, loss of life, or 
significant destruction of property, or the serious breach of security 
that is the subject of the SRC's examination as described in subsection 
(a), the SRC shall report to the Director General of the Foreign 
Service for any appropriate action.''; and
            (7) in subsection (d)--
                    (A) by striking ``Reports.--'' and all that follows 
                through ``(1) Program recommendations.--In any case'' 
                and inserting ``Reports.--In any case'';
                    (B) by striking ``Congress'' and inserting 
                ``Chairmen and ranking members of the Committee on 
                Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on 
                Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives''; and
                    (C) by striking paragraph (2).

SEC. 6. REPORTING REQUIREMENT.

    Not later than 150 days after the date of the enactment of this 
Act, the Secretary of State shall provide a report and oral briefing to 
the Chairmen and ranking members of the Committee on Foreign Relations 
of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
Representatives on the regulations promulgated under paragraph (2) of 
section 302(a) of the Diplomatic Security Act (22 U.S.C. 4832(a)), as 
added by section 4(b)(2)(C) of this Act.
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