Taiwan Status Diplomacy Act
Bill: H.R.9700 | Sponsor: Rep. Chabot, Steve (R-OH)
Policy area: International Affairs

Summary:
Taiwan Status Diplomacy Act
This bill directs the Department of State to issue a legal opinion detailing the reasoning supporting the position of the United States regarding Taiwan's sovereignty and U.S. nonrecognition of China's territorial claim over Taiwan. The State Department must also conduct diplomatic efforts to inform and persuade countries of the legal reasoning supporting the position of the United States regarding Taiwan's status.

To clarify the legal basis for the position of the United States on 
sovereignty over Taiwan and distinguish such position from the People's 
  Republic of China's ``one China'' principle, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Taiwan Status Diplomacy Act''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

    Congress finds the following:
            (1) Taiwan's indigenous peoples have inhabited the island 
        for over 6,000 years, with various political entities 
        exercising control over parts of it until colonial powers 
        conquered increasingly large swaths of the island by force, 
        beginning in the 17th century.
            (2) Dutch Formosa (1636-1662) in southern Taiwan and 
        Spanish Formosa (1626-1642) in northern Taiwan were the first 
        colonial endeavors that exercised control over some parts of 
        the island.
            (3) In 1662, Ming loyalist general Zheng Chenggong 
        (Koxinga) ended Dutch control in Taiwan, and his independent 
        Kingdom of Tungning ruled parts of the island until it was 
        conquered by the Manchu Qing Empire in 1683.
            (4) Qing rule in western Taiwan was undeniably colonial and 
        Taiwan was not considered a traditional province of China, 
        becoming a province of the Qing Empire for merely 10 years 
        beginning in 1885, and lasting until 1895.
            (5) On April 17, 1895, the Manchu Qing Empire signed the 
        Treaty of Shimonoseki with the Japanese Empire and agree to 
        cede ``to Japan in perpetuity and full sovereignty . . . the 
        island of Formosa, together with all islands appertaining or 
        belonging to the said island of Formosa . . . [and] the 
        Pescadores Group''.
            (6) No colonial power can claim historical rights to 
        sovereignty over Taiwan as several colonial powers have 
        successively administered the island from the 17th through the 
        20th century.
            (7) During the 1920s and 1930s, Chinese geographers and 
        political figures generally considered Taiwan to be outside of 
        China's national territory, as is evidenced by the Chinese 
        Communist Party's declaration of war against Japan in December 
        1941, which listed the people of Taiwan separately from the 
        Chinese.
            (8) On July 16, 1936, in an interview with American 
        journalist Edgar Snow, Mao Zedong stated, ``it is the immediate 
        task of China to regain all our lost territories, not merely to 
        defend our sovereignty below the Great Wall. This means that 
        Manchuria must be regained. We do not, however, include Korea, 
        formerly a Chinese colony, but when we have re-established the 
        independence of the lost territories of China, and if the 
        Koreans wish to break away from the chains of Japanese 
        imperialism, we will extend them our enthusiastic help in their 
        struggle for independence. The same thing applies to Formosa''.
            (9) The Cairo and Potsdam Declarations are legally 
        nonbinding statements of intent regarding postwar control over 
        Taiwan by the Republic of China (ROC), that do not make any 
        transfer of sovereignty over Taiwan.
            (10) On August 17, 1945, Supreme Commander for the Allied 
        Powers, General Douglas MacArthur, issued General Order No. 1, 
        listing the island of Formosa as a separate entity from China.
            (11) On June 27, 1950, President Harry Truman declared that 
        ``the occupation of Formosa by Communist forces would be a 
        direct threat to the security of the Pacific area and to United 
        States forces performing their lawful and necessary functions 
        in that area'' and added, ``the determination of the future 
        status of Formosa must await the restoration of security in the 
        Pacific, a peace settlement with Japan, or consideration by the 
        United Nations''.
            (12) The Treaty of Peace with Japan done in San Francisco, 
        California, on September 8, 1951, and signed by Japan along 
        with 48 nations, remains the only legally binding agreement on 
        Taiwan's territorial disposition in force today and states that 
        ``Japan renounces all right, title, and claim to Formosa and 
        the Pescadores'', but did not transfer sovereignty to any other 
        party or country.
            (13) The Treaty of Peace between the ROC and Japan, done at 
        Taipei, Taiwan, on April 28, 1952, ``recognizes'' Japan's 
        renunciation of its claims to Taiwan, but does not transfer 
        sovereignty over the island to the ROC.
            (14) On February 3, 1961, the State Department's Legal 
        Adviser for Far Eastern Affairs, John J. Czyzak, produced a 
        legal memo which states, ``the most tenable theory regarding 
        the status of Formosa and the Pescadores is that sovereignty 
        over the islands has not yet been finally determined . . . 
        Because of differences among the Allied Powers as to who 
        represented China, no agreement on the disposition of Formosa 
        and the Pescadores could be reached in the Japanese Peace 
        Treaty. That the San Francisco Peace Treaty was intended to 
        divest Japan of its sovereignty over the islands without 
        transferring that sovereignty to any other country is 
        abundantly clear from the record. There does not appear to have 
        occurred anything subsequent to the Peace Treaty which can be 
        said to have effected a transfer of that sovereignty''.
            (15) The People's Republic of China (PRC) claims 
        sovereignty over Taiwan as flowing from its sovereignty over 
        ``China'' and PRC officials routinely state the PRC's ``one 
        China'' principle as, ``There is only one China in the world. 
        The Government of the People's Republic of China is the sole 
        legal government representing the whole of China, and Taiwan is 
        an inalienable part of China's territory''.
            (16) As the PRC has grown increasingly confident, it has 
        increasingly sought to actively assert its ``one China'' 
        principle over any other position on Taiwan's legal status, 
        including over the position of the United States, by waging a 
        global campaign to persuade or force governments, international 
        organizations, private corporations, and individuals to refer 
        to Taiwan as a part of China.
            (17) Since the PRC won the Chinese civil war, it has sought 
        to delegalize Taiwan and isolate it from participation in the 
        international community and international organizations.
            (18) United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758 (1971) 
        recognized the PRC as the rightful Government of ``China'' 
        without defining its geographical boundaries or making mention 
        of Taiwan under any name. However, due to PRC influence 
        efforts, the United Nations has routinely and erroneously 
        interpreted the resolution by referring to Taiwan as ``Taiwan, 
        Province of China'', presuming resolution of Taiwan's status.
            (19) Taiwan has transitioned into a fully functioning 
        democracy since 1996, when the island held its first direct 
        Presidential election.
            (20) In contrast, the Chinese Communist Party has prevented 
        the people of the PRC from developing a representative 
        democracy.
            (21) An overwhelming majority of the people of Taiwan favor 
        the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, in which Taiwan is not 
        part of the PRC.
            (22) In the 3 Communiques with the PRC issued in 1972, 
        1979, and 1982, the United States withheld recognition of the 
        PRC's territorial claims on Taiwan merely acknowledging, 
        without affirming, the ``Chinese'' position that there is one 
        China and Taiwan is part of China's territory.
            (23) A State Department memorandum titled ``International 
        Documents of a Non-Binding Character'' references the Shanghai 
        Communique (1972) as a statement of policy, not an 
        international legally binding commitment.
            (24) On January 1, 1979, the United States recognized the 
        People's Republic of China as the legitimate Government of 
        ``China'' while leaving the country's territory undefined.
            (25) On April 10, 1979, the Taiwan Relations Act (Public 
        Law 96-8) was enacted into law and established the policy of 
        the United States to--
                    (A) ``preserve and promote extensive, close, and 
                friendly commercial, cultural, and other relations 
                between the people of the United States and the people 
                on Taiwan, as well as the people on the China mainland 
                and all other peoples of the Western Pacific area'';
                    (B) ``declare that peace and stability in the area 
                are in the political, security, and economic interests 
                of the United States, and are matters of international 
                concern'';
                    (C) ``make clear that the United States decision to 
                establish diplomatic relations with the People's 
                Republic of China rests upon the expectation that the 
                future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful 
                means'';
                    (D) ``consider any effort to determine the future 
                of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by 
                boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and 
                security of the Western Pacific area and of grave 
                concern to the United States'';
                    (E) ``provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive 
                character''; and
                    (F) ``maintain the capacity of the United States to 
                resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion 
                that would jeopardize the security, or the social or 
                economic system, of the people on Taiwan''.
            (26) On July 14, 1982, President Ronald Reagan instructed 
        his representative in Taiwan, American Institute in Taiwan 
        Director James R. Lilley, to relay a set of assurances, which 
        have become known as the Six Assurances, to Taiwan's then-
        President Chiang Ching-kuo including the assurance that the 
        United States ``has not altered its position regarding 
        sovereignty over Taiwan''.
            (27) In 2016, the House of Representatives and the Senate 
        passed H. Con. Res. 88 and S. Con. Res. 38, respectively, which 
        reaffirm the Taiwan Relations Act and the Six Assurances as 
        cornerstones of the United States-Taiwan relations.
            (28) On authority of the President and without codified 
        endorsement from Congress, the United States maintains a policy 
        regarding the status of Taiwan, that is called its ``one 
        China'' policy, under which the United States recognizes the 
        People's Republic of China as the Government of ``China'' and 
        under which the United States takes the position that Taiwan's 
        legal status has not been determined and takes no position on 
        the future status of Taiwan.
            (29) The ``one China'' policy of the United States is not 
        the PRC's ``one China'' principle.
            (30) The ``one China'' policy of the United States was 
        originally developed in a Cold War context as an expedient to 
        serve Cold War purposes and has not been updated to reflect 
        changing conditions, the clear trend of history toward 
        increasing democracy especially after the fall of the Soviet 
        Union, or the democratic development of Taiwan's polity.
            (31) The PRC's ``one China'' principle does not reflect the 
        objective state of affairs that the Government of Taiwan 
        represents a self-governing democracy of 23,600,000 people.
            (32) Unlike other colonies held by imperial powers, and 
        against the clear historical trend to grant colonies 
        independence, the universal right to self-determination of the 
        people of Taiwan have not been broadly considered by the 
        international community.
            (33) Neither the PRC's ``one China'' principle nor the 
        ``one China'' policy of the United States reflect the objective 
        state of affairs that the Government of Taiwan has attained a 
        high degree of legitimacy and administers the territory under 
        its control in the manner of a sovereign state and with the 
        attributes of sovereignty such as exclusive legal jurisdiction, 
        the printing of currency, the maintenance of armed forces, 
        customs administration, and the conduct of foreign policy.
            (34) The United States is a party to the Convention on the 
        Rights and Duties of States done at Montevideo, Uruguay, on 
        December 26, 1933, and Taiwan meets all 4 criteria of statehood 
        laid down therein, namely a permanent population, a defined 
        territory, a government, and the capacity to enter into 
        relations with other states.

SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

    It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) while the PRC claims sovereignty over Taiwan, the ``one 
        China'' policy of the United States does not recognize that 
        Taiwan is part of China;
            (2) persistent concerns regarding the impact on United 
        States-China relations have prevented the United States from 
        engaging in meaningful outreach to partners and allies with 
        respect to the legal status of Taiwan, allowing the Chinese 
        Communist Party to monopolize the information space and push 
        its baseless ``one China'' principle;
            (3) the effectiveness of the Chinese Communist Party's 
        information campaigns regarding sovereignty over Taiwan 
        jeopardizes peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait by 
        preparing the information environment for the use of military 
        force to annex Taiwan to the PRC;
            (4) the position of the United States on the legal status 
        of sovereignty over Taiwan is often presented in a manner so 
        nuanced as to be confusing in public discourse and prohibitive 
        toward explaining the interests of the United States in 
        Taiwan's continued peaceful evolution; and
            (5) officials of the United States should seek to 
        distinguish the ``one China'' policy from the PRC's ``one 
        China'' principle.

SEC. 4. POLICY.

    It is the policy of the United States to--
            (1) make clear through public and private diplomacy the 
        legal case for its position on Taiwan's status;
            (2) call on the PRC Government to refrain from erroneously 
        conflating the ``one China'' policy of the United States with 
        its ``one China'' principle in public messaging; and
            (3) call on the United Nations to accurately interpret 
        United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758 and not 
        erroneously infer resolution of Taiwan's status.

SEC. 5. LEGAL OPINION REGARDING TAIWAN'S STATUS.

    (a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall issue a legal 
opinion detailing the reasoning supporting the position of the United 
States regarding the international status of sovereignty over Taiwan 
and its nonrecognition of the PRC's territorial claim over Taiwan.
    (b) Summary.--In addition to the legal opinion described in 
subsection (a), the Secretary shall issue a memorandum that summarizes 
such opinion in not more than 1,200 words.
    (c) Consultation.--Before issuing the legal opinion described in 
subsection (a), the Secretary of State shall consult with the House 
Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations on its contents.
    (d) Publication.--The documents listed in subsections (a) and (b) 
shall be published on a publicly available, Department of State 
internet website.

SEC. 6. DIPLOMACY REGARDING TAIWAN'S STATUS.

    (a) In General.--The Secretary of State, acting through subordinate 
officers as appropriate, shall conduct diplomatic efforts to inform and 
persuade countries of the legal reasoning supporting the position of 
the United States regarding--
            (1) Taiwan's status;
            (2) the nonrecognition of the PRC's territorial claim over 
        Taiwan;
            (3) where appropriate, the PRC's use of ethnonationalism to 
        justify its claims to Taiwan; and
            (4) the meaning and history of United Nations General 
        Assembly Resolution 2758 and its subordinate resolutions 
        throughout the system of the United Nations and the PRC's 
        efforts to distort such meaning and history.
    (b) Report.--
            (1) In general.--Not later than one year after the date of 
        enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to 
        the appropriate congressional committees a report describing 
        the diplomatic efforts carried out pursuant to subsection (a).
            (2) Elements.--The report required by paragraph (1) shall 
        include the following:
                    (A) A description of the lines of effort used to 
                conduct the diplomatic activities carried out pursuant 
                to subsection (a).
                    (B) A list of states contacted as part of such 
                activities, with a special emphasis on countries in the 
                Indo-Pacific.
                    (C) An assessment of the effectiveness of such 
                activities.
            (3) Form.--The report required by paragraph (1) shall be 
        issued in a classified form, but may contain an unclassified 
        annex, if appropriate.
            (4) Appropriate congressional committees defined.--In this 
        subsection, the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' 
        includes the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
        Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
        Senate.

SEC. 7. MAPS DEPICTING TAIWAN.

    Not later than 15 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the 
Secretary of State, acting through the Geographer of the Department of 
State, shall issue guidance to reconcile with United States policy 
guidelines on the procurement and production of maps that depict Taiwan 
by prohibiting such procurement and production of maps which depict 
Taiwan to be sovereign territory of the People's Republic of China.
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