SECURE F–35 Exports Act of 2021
Bill: S.1182 | Sponsor: Sen. Menendez, Robert (D-NJ)
Policy area: International Affairs

Summary:
Israel and United States Security Enhancement for F-35 Exports Act of 2021 or the SECURE F-35 Exports Act of 2021
This bill requires specified assessments and certifications related to the sale of F-35 aircraft to countries in the Middle East to ensure that the sale, export, or transfer of these aircraft does not present a significant danger of compromising the critical military and technological military advantage of Israel or the U.S. Armed Forces.

To ensure that sales, exports, or transfers of F-35 aircraft do not 
   compromise the qualitative military edge of the United States or 
                    Israel, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Israel and United States Security 
Enhancement for F-35 Exports Act of 2021'' or the ``SECURE F-35 Exports 
Act of 2021''.

SEC. 2. ASSESSMENT OF ISRAEL'S QUANTITATIVE MILITARY DISADVANTAGE.

    (a) In General.--Section 201(a) of the Naval Vessel Transfer Act of 
2008 (Public Law 110-429; 22 U.S.C. 2776 note) is amended--
            (1) by inserting ``, and does not suffer a quantitative 
        military disadvantage from,'' after ``qualitative military edge 
        over''; and
            (2) by adding at the end the following new subsection:
    ``(f) Public Disclosure.--The report required under subsection (c) 
shall be unclassified, without redactions, and public to the maximum 
extent possible, but may also include a classified annex without 
redactions.''.
    (b) Assessments.--
            (1) Initial assessment and report.--Not later than 60 days 
        after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President 
        shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a 
        report with an assessment of whether Israel suffers from a 
        quantitative military disadvantage as described in section 
        201(a) of the Naval Vessel Transfer Act of 2008 (Public Law 
        110-429; 22 U.S.C. 2776 note), as amended by subsection (a). 
        The report shall be unclassified, without redactions and public 
        to the maximum extent possible, but may also include a 
        classified annex without redactions.
            (2) Subsequent assessments and reports.--The President 
        shall direct subsequent assessments on Israel's quantitative 
        military disadvantage be performed every four years, to 
        coincide with and be included in the quadrennial assessment and 
        report required under section 201 of the Naval Vessel Transfer 
        Act of 2008 (Public Law 110-429; 22 U.S.C. 2776 note).
    (c) Public Disclosure of Certification on Sale of F-35 to UAE.--The 
President shall publicly disclose, to the maximum extent possible, the 
certification required under section 36(h) of the Arms Export Control 
Act (22 U.S.C. 2776(h)) relating to any sale, export, or transfer of F-
35 aircraft and associated defense articles and defense services to the 
United Arab Emirates.

SEC. 3. ASSESSMENT OF THREAT AGAINST UNITED STATES QUALITATIVE MILITARY 
              EDGE INHERENT IN EXPORT OF F-35 AND SUCCESSOR COMBAT 
              AIRCRAFT.

    (a) Requirement for Report and Assessment.--
            (1) In general.--Not later than 15 days before a proposed 
        sale, export, or transfer to a foreign country (other than a 
        member state of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 
        Australia, Israel, Japan, Republic of Korea, or New Zealand) of 
        F-35 aircraft (including any variant or successor combat 
        aircraft) is submitted to Congress pursuant to the requirements 
        of section 36 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2776), 
        the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
        committees a report with an assessment of the risks presented 
        by such sale, export, or transfer to the security of the United 
        States, including the critical military and technological 
        military advantage such aircraft provide to the United States 
        Armed Forces.
            (2) Elements.--The assessment required under paragraph (1) 
        shall include--
                    (A) a comprehensive overview of the potential 
                compromise of United States military technology used in 
                F-35 aircraft by potential foreign intelligence 
                activities, including--
                            (i) the presence in the country of foreign 
                        intelligence personnel from countries hostile 
                        to the United States, or which the President 
                        considers to be a risk to the security of the 
                        United States, and their activities; and
                            (ii) the willingness and capability of the 
                        country to disrupt and constrain those 
                        activities, with particular consideration to 
                        their potential effectiveness in preventing the 
                        compromise of sensitive information of F-35 
                        aircraft;
                    (B) a description of the protective measures that 
                will be taken to safeguard against such compromise; and
                    (C) a description of the counter-measures that 
                could be taken should such compromise occur.
    (b) Certification.--Not later than 15 days before a proposed sale, 
export, or transfer described under subsection (a)(1), the President 
shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and 
the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives a 
certification that such sale, export, or transfer does not present a 
significant danger of compromising the critical military and 
technological military advantage such aircraft provide to the United 
States Armed Forces.
    (c) Form.--The assessment and certification required under this 
section shall be unclassified, without redactions and public to the 
maximum extent possible, but may also include a classified annex 
without redactions.

SEC. 4. CERTIFICATIONS RELATED TO SALE OF F-35 AIRCRAFT TO COUNTRIES IN 
              THE MIDDLE EAST.

    (a) Certifications Before Sale.--Not later than 30 days before 
concluding a Letter of Offer and Acceptance (or corresponding agreement 
or contract) for the sale of, or concluding a contract for the 
manufacture of, F-35 aircraft to be transferred to any country in the 
Middle East other than Israel, the President shall submit to the 
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on 
Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives a certification, 
together with a report providing a detailed justification therefor, 
that--
            (1) the transfer of F-35 aircraft to the recipient country 
        will not compromise or undermine Israel's qualitative military 
        edge, as defined in section 36(h) of the Arms Export Control 
        Act (22 U.S.C. 2776(h));
            (2) the recipient country has provided specific, reliable, 
        and verifiable assurances to the United States that it will not 
        use these aircraft in activities or operations inimical to the 
        security of Israel, or to the foreign policy and national 
        security interests of the United States, including that the 
        recipient country will--
                    (A) not utilize them against allies and partners of 
                the United States;
                    (B) not transfer or share any component technology 
                of the F-35 aircraft to any third party or third 
                country; and
                    (C) ensure sufficient security against hostile 
                technical collection efforts against the aircraft that 
                could compromise militarily-significant or otherwise 
                sensitive information;
            (3) the recipient country has provided specific, reliable, 
        and verifiable assurances to the United States that it will not 
        use these aircraft to commit, or enable the commission of, a 
        violation of international humanitarian law or internationally 
        recognized human rights;
            (4) if the recipient country violates such assurances, the 
        United States will have the means to address and ameliorate 
        these violations to reduce the impact on the security of Israel 
        or on the foreign policy and national security interests of the 
        United States, including a listing of such means; and
            (5) the United States will require technology security 
        measures on the delivery, operation, storage, and servicing of 
        such aircraft sufficient to significantly reduce the danger of 
        compromise of the military technology.
    (b) Certifications Before Delivery.--No delivery of any F-35 
aircraft to any country in the Middle East other than Israel shall 
occur until 45 days after the President has submitted to the Committee 
on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs 
of the House of Representatives a certification, together with a report 
providing a detailed justification therefor, that--
            (1) the transfer of F-35 aircraft will not compromise or 
        undermine Israel's qualitative military edge, as defined in 
        section 36(2) of the Arms Export Control Act;
            (2) the United States has instituted technology security 
        measures on the delivery, operation, storage, and servicing of 
        such aircraft sufficient to significantly reduce the danger of 
        compromise of the military;
            (3) such country has not, since the Letter of Offer and 
        Acceptance (or corresponding agreement or contract) for such 
        aircraft was concluded, engaged in military, paramilitary, or 
        intelligence operations inimical to the security of Israel or 
        to the foreign policy and national security interests of the 
        United States, including--
                    (A) transferring any United States-origin 
                equipment, directly or indirectly, to a United States-
                designated terrorist organization or to adversaries of 
                Israel or the United States;
                    (B) providing weapons, directly or indirectly, from 
                any source country, including China, to armed militias 
                fighting against partners and allies of the United 
                States;
                    (C) conducting surveillance on any private United 
                States citizen; or
                    (D) committing, or enabling the commission of, a 
                violation of international humanitarian law or 
                internationally recognized human rights; and
            (4) the recipient country has not purchased or otherwise 
        acquired foreign technology, equipment, or defense articles or 
        services, including from the Russian Federation or the People's 
        Republic of China, and has provided written assurances that it 
        will not purchase or otherwise acquire foreign technology 
        equipment, defense articles, or defense services that could be 
        used to compromise the technology of such aircraft and put 
        United States troops or military strategies at risk, unless 
        such technology is also subject to monitoring by United States 
        personnel.
    (c) Subsequent Certifications.--The President shall, not later than 
180 days after the date on which the first F-35 combat aircraft 
transferred to a country in the Middle East other than Israel arrives 
in its territory, and annually thereafter for 10 years, certify to the 
appropriate committees of Congress that--
            (1) the transfer of F-35 aircraft to such country has not 
        compromised or undermined Israel's qualitative military edge, 
        as defined in section 36(h)(3) of the Arms Export Control Act 
        (22 U.S.C. 2776(h)(3));
            (2) the United States continues to institute technology 
        security measures on the delivery, operation, storage, and 
        servicing of such aircraft sufficient to significantly reduce 
        the danger of compromise of the military technology of such 
        aircraft;
            (3) such country has not engaged in military, paramilitary, 
        or intelligence operations inimical to the security of Israel 
        or to the foreign policy and national security interests of the 
        United States within the prior year as outlined in 
        subparagraphs (A) through (C) of subsection (b)(3); and
            (4) such country has not committed, or enabled the 
        commission of, a violation of international humanitarian law or 
        internationally recognized human rights.
    (d) Form.--The certifications and justifications submitted under 
this section shall be unclassified, without redactions and public to 
the maximum extent possible, but may also include a classified annex 
without redactions.

SEC. 5. APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.

    In this Act, the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' 
means--
            (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on 
        Armed Services, and the Committee on Appropriations of the 
        Senate; and
            (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on 
        Armed Services, and the Committee on Appropriations of the 
        House of Representatives.
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