Strategic Competition Act of 2021
Bill: S.1169 | Sponsor: Sen. Menendez, Robert (D-NJ)
Policy area: International Affairs

Summary:
Strategic Competition Act of 2021
This bill addresses various foreign relations issues, with a focus on China.
Among other things, the bill

To address issues involving the People's Republic of China.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

<DELETED>SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Strategic 
Competition Act of 2021''.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act 
is as follows:</DELETED>

<DELETED>Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
<DELETED>Sec. 2. Findings.
<DELETED>Sec. 3. Definitions.
<DELETED>Sec. 4. Statement of policy.
<DELETED>Sec. 5. Sense of Congress.
<DELETED>Sec. 6. Rules of construction.
          <DELETED>TITLE I--INVESTING IN A COMPETITIVE FUTURE

              <DELETED>Subtitle A--Science and Technology

<DELETED>Sec. 101. Authorization to assist United States companies with 
                            global supply chain diversification and 
                            management.
         <DELETED>Subtitle B--Global Infrastructure Development

<DELETED>Sec. 111. Appropriate committees of Congress defined.
<DELETED>Sec. 112. Sense of Congress on international quality 
                            infrastructure investment standards.
<DELETED>Sec. 113. United States support for infrastructure.
<DELETED>Sec. 114. Infrastructure Transaction and Assistance Network.
<DELETED>Sec. 115. Strategy for advanced and reliable energy 
                            infrastructure.
<DELETED>Sec. 116. Report on China's investments in foreign energy 
                            development.
        <DELETED>Subtitle C--Digital Technology and Connectivity

<DELETED>Sec. 121. Sense of Congress on digital technology issues.
<DELETED>Sec. 122. Digital connectivity and cybersecurity partnership.
   <DELETED>Subtitle D--Countering Chinese Communist Party Influence

<DELETED>Sec. 131. Short title.
<DELETED>Sec. 132. Authorization.
<DELETED>Sec. 133. Findings on Chinese information warfare and malign 
                            influence operations.
<DELETED>Sec. 134. Authorization of appropriations for the Fulbright-
                            Hays Program.
<DELETED>Sec. 135. Sense of Congress condemning anti-Asian racism and 
                            discrimination.
<DELETED>Sec. 136. Supporting independent media and countering 
                            disinformation.
<DELETED>Sec. 137. Global engagement center.
<DELETED>Sec. 138. Review by Committee on Foreign Investment in the 
                            United States of certain foreign gifts to 
                            and contracts with institutions of higher 
                            education.
       <DELETED>TITLE II--INVESTING IN ALLIANCES AND PARTNERSHIPS

         <DELETED>Subtitle A--Strategic and Diplomatic Matters

<DELETED>Sec. 201. Appropriate congressional committees defined.
<DELETED>Sec. 202. United States commitment and support for allies and 
                            partners in the Indo-Pacific.
<DELETED>Sec. 203. Sense of Congress on cooperation with the Quad.
<DELETED>Sec. 204. Statement of policy on cooperation with ASEAN.
<DELETED>Sec. 205. Sense of Congress on enhancing United States-ASEAN 
                            cooperation on technology issues with 
                            respect to the People's Republic of China.
<DELETED>Sec. 206. Report on Chinese influence in international 
                            organizations.
<DELETED>Sec. 207. Regulatory exchanges with allies and partners.
<DELETED>Sec. 208. Technology partnership office at the Department of 
                            State.
<DELETED>Sec. 209. United States representation in standards-setting 
                            bodies.
<DELETED>Sec. 210. Sense of Congress on centrality of sanctions and 
                            other restrictions to strategic competition 
                            with China.
<DELETED>Sec. 211. Sense of Congress on negotiations with G7 countries 
                            on the People's Republic of China.
<DELETED>Sec. 212. Enhancing the United States-Taiwan partnership.
<DELETED>Sec. 213. Treatment of Taiwan government.
<DELETED>Sec. 214. Report on origins of the COVID-19 pandemic.
<DELETED>Sec. 215. Enhancement of diplomatic support and economic 
                            engagement with Pacific island countries.
<DELETED>Sec. 216. Increasing Department of State personnel and 
                            resources devoted to the Indo-Pacific.
<DELETED>Sec. 217. Advancing United States leadership in the United 
                            Nations System.
          <DELETED>Subtitle B--International Security Matters

<DELETED>Sec. 221. Definitions.
<DELETED>Sec. 222. Findings.
<DELETED>Sec. 223. Sense of Congress regarding bolstering security 
                            partnerships in the Indo-Pacific.
<DELETED>Sec. 224. Statement of policy.
<DELETED>Sec. 225. Foreign military financing in the Indo-Pacific and 
                            authorization of appropriations for 
                            Southeast Asia maritime security programs 
                            and diplomatic outreach activities.
<DELETED>Sec. 226. Foreign military financing compact pilot program in 
                            the Indo-Pacific.
<DELETED>Sec. 227. Additional funding for international military 
                            education and training in the Indo-Pacific.
<DELETED>Sec. 228. Prioritizing excess defense article transfers for 
                            the Indo-Pacific.
<DELETED>Sec. 229. Prioritizing excess naval vessel transfers for the 
                            Indo-Pacific.
<DELETED>Sec. 230. Statement of policy on maritime freedom of 
                            operations in international waterways and 
                            airspace of the Indo-Pacific and on 
                            artificial land features in the South China 
                            Sea.
<DELETED>Sec. 231. Report on capability development of Indo-Pacific 
                            allies and partners.
<DELETED>Sec. 232. Report on national technology and industrial base.
<DELETED>Sec. 233. Report on diplomatic outreach with respect to 
                            Chinese military installations overseas.
<DELETED>Sec. 234. Statement of policy regarding universal 
                            implementation of United Nations sanctions 
                            on North Korea.
<DELETED>Sec. 235. Limitation on assistance to countries hosting 
                            Chinese military installations.
   <DELETED>Subtitle C--Regional Strategies To Counter the People's 
                           Republic of China

<DELETED>Sec. 241. Statement of policy on cooperation with allies and 
                            partners around the world with respect to 
                            the People's Republic of China.
                  <DELETED>Part I--Western Hemisphere

<DELETED>Sec. 245. Sense of Congress regarding United States-Canada 
                            relations.
<DELETED>Sec. 246. Sense of Congress regarding the Government of 
                            China's arbitrary imprisonment of Canadian 
                            citizens.
<DELETED>Sec. 247. Strategy to enhance cooperation with Canada.
<DELETED>Sec. 248. Strategy to strengthen economic competitiveness, 
                            governance, human rights, and the rule of 
                            law in Latin America and the Caribbean.
<DELETED>Sec. 249. Engagement in regional and international 
                            organizations in Latin America and the 
                            Caribbean.
<DELETED>Sec. 250. Addressing China's sovereign lending practices in 
                            Latin America and the Caribbean.
<DELETED>Sec. 251. Defense cooperation in Latin America and the 
                            Caribbean.
<DELETED>Sec. 252. Engagement with civil society in Latin America and 
                            the Caribbean regarding accountability, 
                            human rights, and the risks of pervasive 
                            surveillance technologies.
                <DELETED>Part II--Transatlantic Alliance

<DELETED>Sec. 255. Sense of Congress on the Transatlantic Alliance.
<DELETED>Sec. 256. Strategy to enhance transatlantic cooperation with 
                            respect to the People's Republic of China.
<DELETED>Sec. 257. Enhancing transatlantic cooperation on promoting 
                            private sector finance.
<DELETED>Sec. 258. Report and briefing on cooperation between China and 
                            Iran and between China and Russia.
               <DELETED>Part III--South and Central Asia

<DELETED>Sec. 261. Sense of Congress on South and Central Asia.
<DELETED>Sec. 262. Strategy to enhance cooperation with South and 
                            Central Asia.
                        <DELETED>Part IV--Africa

<DELETED>Sec. 271. Assessment of political, economic, and security 
                            activity of the People's Republic of China 
                            in Africa.
<DELETED>Sec. 272. Increasing the competitiveness of the United States 
                            in Africa.
<DELETED>Sec. 273. Digital security cooperation with respect to Africa.
<DELETED>Sec. 274. Increasing personnel in United States embassies in 
                            sub-Saharan Africa focused on the People's 
                            Republic of China.
<DELETED>Sec. 275. Support for Young African Leaders Initiative.
<DELETED>Sec. 276. Africa broadcasting networks.
             <DELETED>Part V--Middle East and North Africa

<DELETED>Sec. 281. Strategy to counter Chinese influence in, and access 
                            to, the Middle East and North Africa.
<DELETED>Sec. 282. Sense of Congress on Middle East and North Africa 
                            engagement.
                    <DELETED>Part VI--Arctic Region

<DELETED>Sec. 285. Arctic diplomacy.
                       <DELETED>Part VII--Oceania

<DELETED>Sec. 291. Statement of policy on United States engagement in 
                            Oceania.
<DELETED>Sec. 292. Oceania strategic roadmap.
              <DELETED>TITLE III--INVESTING IN OUR VALUES

<DELETED>Sec. 301. Authorization of appropriations for promotion of 
                            democracy in Hong Kong.
<DELETED>Sec. 302. Imposition of sanctions relating to forced labor in 
                            the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.
<DELETED>Sec. 303. Imposition of sanctions with respect to systematic 
                            rape, coercive abortion, forced 
                            sterilization, or involuntary contraceptive 
                            implantation in the Xinjiang Uyghur 
                            Autonomous Region.
        <DELETED>TITLE IV--INVESTING IN OUR ECONOMIC STATECRAFT

<DELETED>Sec. 401. Findings and sense of Congress regarding the PRC's 
                            industrial policy.
<DELETED>Sec. 402. Intellectual property violators list.
<DELETED>Sec. 403. Government of the People's Republic of China 
                            subsidies list.
<DELETED>Sec. 404. Countering foreign corrupt practices.
<DELETED>Sec. 405. Debt relief for countries eligible for assistance 
                            from the International Development 
                            Association.
<DELETED>Sec. 406. Report on manner and extent to which the Government 
                            of China exploits Hong Kong to circumvent 
                            United States laws and protections.
<DELETED>Sec. 407. Annual review on the presence of Chinese companies 
                            in United States capital markets.
             <DELETED>TITLE V--ENSURING STRATEGIC SECURITY

<DELETED>Sec. 501. Findings on strategic security and arms control.
<DELETED>Sec. 502. Cooperation on a strategic nuclear dialogue.
<DELETED>Sec. 503. Report on United States efforts to engage the 
                            People's Republic of China on nuclear 
                            issues and ballistic missile issues.

<DELETED>SEC. 2. FINDINGS.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    Congress makes the following findings:</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) The People's Republic of China (PRC) is 
        leveraging its political, diplomatic, economic, military, 
        technological, and ideological power to become a strategic, 
        near-peer, global competitor of the United States. The policies 
        increasingly pursued by the PRC in these domains are contrary 
        to the interests and values of the United States, its partners, 
        and much of the rest of the world.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) The current policies being pursued by the 
        PRC--</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) threaten the future character of the 
                international order and are shaping the rules, norms, 
                and institutions that govern relations among 
                states;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) will put at risk the ability of the 
                United States to secure its national interests; 
                and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (C) will put at risk the future peace, 
                prosperity, and freedom of the international community 
                in the coming decades.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) After normalizing diplomatic relations with 
        the PRC in 1979, the United States actively worked to advance 
        the PRC's economic and social development to ensure that it 
        participated in, and benefitted from, the free and open 
        international order. The United States pursued these goals and 
        contributed to the welfare of the Chinese people by--</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) increasing the PRC's trade relations 
                and access to global capital markets;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) promoting the PRC's accession to the 
                World Trade Organization;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (C) providing development finance and 
                technical assistance;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (D) promoting research 
                collaboration;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (E) educating the PRC's top 
                students;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (F) permitting transfers of cutting-edge 
                technologies and scientific knowledge; and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (G) providing intelligence and military 
                assistance.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (4) It is now clear that the PRC has chosen to 
        pursue state-led, mercantilist economic policies, an 
        increasingly authoritarian governance model at home through 
        increased restrictions on personal freedoms, and an aggressive 
        and assertive foreign policy. These policies frequently and 
        deliberately undermine United States interests and are contrary 
        to core United States values and the values of other nations, 
        both in the Indo-Pacific and beyond. In response to this 
        strategic decision of the CCP, the United States has been 
        compelled to reexamine and revise its strategy towards the 
        PRC.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (5) The General Secretary of the Chinese Communist 
        Party and the President of the People's Republic of China, Xi 
        Jinping, has elevated the ``Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese 
        Nation'' as central to the domestic and foreign policy of the 
        PRC. His program demands--</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) strong, centralized CCP 
                leadership;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) concentration of military 
                power;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (C) a strong role for the CCP in the state 
                and the economy;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (D) an aggressive foreign policy seeking 
                control over broadly asserted territorial claims; 
                and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (E) the denial of any universal values and 
                individual rights that are deemed to threaten the 
                CCP.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (6) The PRC views its Leninist model of 
        governance, ``socialism with Chinese characteristics'', as 
        superior to, and at odds with, the constitutional models of the 
        United States and other democracies. This approach to 
        governance is lauded by the CCP as essential to securing the 
        PRC's status as a global leader, and to shaping the future of 
        the world. In a 2013 speech, President Xi said, ``We firmly 
        believe that as socialism with Chinese characteristics develops 
        further . . . it is . . . inevitable that the superiority of 
        our socialist system will be increasingly apparent . . . [and] 
        our country's road of development will have increasingly 
        greater influence on the world.''.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (7) The PRC's objectives are to first establish 
        regional hegemony over the Indo-Pacific and then to use that 
        dominant position to propel the PRC to become the ``leading 
        world power,'' shaping an international order that is conducive 
        to the CCP's interests. Achieving these objectives requires 
        turning the PRC into a wealthy nation under strict CCP rule by 
        using a strong military and advanced technological capability 
        to pursue the PRC's objectives, regardless of other countries' 
        interests.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (8) The PRC is reshaping the current international 
        order, which is built upon the rule of law and free and open 
        ideals and principles, by conducting global information and 
        influence operations, seeking to redefine international laws 
        and norms to align with the objectives of the CCP, rejecting 
        the legitimacy of internationally recognized human rights, and 
        seeking to co-opt the leadership and agenda of multinational 
        organizations for the benefit of the PRC and other 
        authoritarian regimes at the expense of the interests of the 
        United States and the international community. In December 
        2018, President Xi suggested that the CCP views its ``historic 
        mission'' as not only to govern China, but also to profoundly 
        influence global governance to benefit the CCP.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (9) The PRC is encouraging other countries to 
        follow its model of ``socialism with Chinese characteristics''. 
        During the 19th Party Congress in 2017, President Xi said that 
        the PRC could serve as a model of development for other 
        countries by utilizing ``Chinese wisdom'' and a ``Chinese 
        approach to solving problems''.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (10) The PRC is promoting its governance model and 
        attempting to weaken other models of governance by--</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) undermining democratic 
                institutions;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) subverting financial 
                institutions;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (C) coercing businesses to accommodate the 
                policies of the PRC; and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (D) using disinformation to disguise the 
                nature of the actions described in subparagraphs (A) 
                through (C).</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (11) The PRC is close to its goal of becoming the 
        global leader in science and technology. In May 2018, President 
        Xi said that for the PRC to reach ``prosperity and 
        rejuvenation'', it needs to ``endeavor to be a major world 
        center for science and innovation''. The PRC has invested the 
        equivalent of billions of dollars into education and research 
        and development and established joint scientific research 
        centers and science universities.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (12) The PRC's drive to become a ``manufacturing 
        and technological superpower'' and to promote ``innovation with 
        Chinese characteristics'' is coming at the expense of human 
        rights and longstanding international rules and norms with 
        respect to economic competition, and presents a challenge to 
        United States national security and the security of allies and 
        like-minded countries. In particular, the PRC advances its 
        illiberal political and social policies through mass 
        surveillance, social credit systems, and a significant role of 
        the state in internet governance. Through these means, the PRC 
        increases direct and indirect government control over its 
        citizens' everyday lives. Its national strategy of ``civil-
        military fusion'' mandates that civil and commercial research, 
        which increasingly drives global innovation, is leveraged to 
        develop new military capabilities.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (13) The PRC is using legal and illegal means to 
        achieve its objective of becoming a manufacturing and 
        technological superpower. The PRC uses state-directed 
        industrial policies in anticompetitive ways to ensure the 
        dominance of PRC companies. The CCP engages in and encourages 
        actions that actively undermine a free and open international 
        market, such as intellectual property theft, forced technology 
        transfers, regulatory and financial subsidies, and mandatory 
        CCP access to proprietary data as part of business and 
        commercial agreements between Chinese and foreign 
        companies.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (14) The policies referred to in paragraph (13) 
        are designed to freeze United States and other foreign firms 
        out of the PRC market, while eroding competition in other 
        important markets. The heavy subsidization of Chinese companies 
        includes potential violation of its World Trade Organization 
        commitments. In May 2018, President Xi said that the PRC aims 
        to keep the ``initiatives of innovation and development 
        security . . . in [China's] own hands''.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (15) The PRC is advancing its global objectives 
        through a variety of avenues, including its signature 
        initiative, the Belt and Road Initiative (referred to in this 
        section as ``BRI''), which is enshrined in the Chinese 
        Constitution and includes the Digital Silk Road and Health Silk 
        Road. The PRC describes BRI as a straightforward and wholly 
        beneficial plan for all countries. Eventually, it seeks to 
        advance an economic system with the PRC at its center, making 
        it the most concrete geographical representation of the PRC's 
        global ambitions. BRI increases the economic influence of 
        state-owned Chinese firms in global markets, enhances the PRC's 
        political leverage with government leaders around the world, 
        and provides greater access to strategic nodes such as ports 
        and railways. Through BRI, the PRC seeks political deference 
        through economic dependence.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (16) The PRC is executing a plan to establish 
        regional hegemony over the Indo-Pacific and displace the United 
        States from the region. As a Pacific power, the United States 
        has built and supported enduring alliances and economic 
        partnerships that secure peace and prosperity and promote the 
        rule of law and political pluralism in a free and open Indo-
        Pacific. In contrast, the PRC uses economic and military 
        coercion in the region to secure its own interests.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (17) The PRC's military strategy seeks to keep the 
        United States military from operating in the Western Pacific 
        and erodes United States security guarantees.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (18) The PRC is aggressively pursuing exclusive 
        control of critical land routes, sea lanes, and air space in 
        the Indo-Pacific in the hopes of eventually exercising greater 
        influence beyond the region. This includes lanes crucial to 
        commercial activity, energy exploration, transport, and the 
        exercise of security operations in areas permitted under 
        international law.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (19) The PRC seeks so-called ``reunification'' 
        with Taiwan through whatever means may ultimately be required. 
        The CCP's insistence that so-called ``reunification'' is 
        Taiwan's only option makes this goal inherently coercive. In 
        January 2019, President Xi stated that the PRC ``make[s] no 
        promise to renounce the use of force and reserve[s] the option 
        of taking all necessary means''. Taiwan's embodiment of 
        democratic values and economic liberalism challenges President 
        Xi's goal of achieving national rejuvenation. The PRC plans to 
        exploit Taiwan's dominant strategic position in the First 
        Island Chain and to project power into the Second Island Chain 
        and beyond.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (20) In the South China Sea, the PRC has executed 
        an illegal island-building campaign that threatens freedom of 
        navigation and the free-flow of commerce, damages the 
        environment, bolsters the PLA power projection capabilities, 
        and coerces and intimidates other regional claimants in an 
        effort to advance its unlawful claims and control the waters 
        around neighboring countries. Despite President Xi's September 
        2015 speech, in which he said the PRC was not militarizing the 
        South China Sea, during the 2017 19th Party Congress, President 
        Xi announced that ``construction on islands and reefs in the 
        South China Sea have seen steady progress''.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (21) The PRC is rapidly modernizing the PLA to 
        attain a level of capacity and capability superior to the 
        United States in terms of equipment and conduct of modern 
        military operations by shifting its military doctrine from 
        having a force ``adequate [for] China's defensive needs'' to 
        having a force ``commensurate with China's international 
        status''. Ultimately, this transformation could enable China to 
        impose its will in the Indo-Pacific region through the threat 
        of military force. In 2017, President Xi established the 
        following developmental benchmarks for the advancement of the 
        PLA:</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) A mechanized force with increased 
                informatized and strategic capabilities by 
                2020.</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) The complete modernization of China's 
                national defense by 2035.</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (C) The full transformation of the PLA 
                into a world-class force by 2050.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (22) The PRC's strategy and supporting policies 
        described in this section undermine United States interests, 
        such as--</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) upholding a free and open 
                international order;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) maintaining the integrity of 
                international institutions with liberal norms and 
                values;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (C) preserving a favorable balance of 
                power in the Indo-Pacific;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (D) ensuring the defense of its 
                allies;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (E) preserving open sea and air 
                lanes;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (F) fostering the free flow of commerce 
                through open and transparent markets; and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (G) promoting individual freedom and human 
                rights.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (23) The global COVID-19 pandemic has intensified 
        and accelerated these trends in the PRC's behavior and 
        therefore increased the need for United States global 
        leadership and a competitive posture. The PRC has capitalized 
        on the world's focus on the COVID-19 pandemic by--</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) moving rapidly to undermine Hong 
                Kong's autonomy, including imposing a so-called 
                ``national security law'' on Hong Kong;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) aggressively imposing its will in the 
                East and South China Seas;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (C) contributing to increased tensions 
                with India; and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (D) engaging in a widespread and 
                government-directed disinformation campaign to obscure 
                the PRC Government's efforts to cover up the 
                seriousness of COVID-19, sow confusion about the 
                origination of the outbreak, and discredit the United 
                States, its allies, and global health 
                efforts.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (24) In response to the PRC's strategy and 
        policies, the United States must adopt a policy of strategic 
        competition with the PRC to protect and promote our vital 
        interests and values.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (25) The United States policy of strategic 
        competition with respect to the People's Republic of China is 
        part of a broader strategic approach to the Indo-Pacific and 
        the world which centers with United States allies and partners 
        to advance shared values and interests and to preserve and 
        enhance a free, open, democratic, inclusive, rules-based, 
        stable, and diverse region.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    In this Act:</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The 
        term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of 
                the Senate; and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of 
                the House of Representatives.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) CCP.--The term ``CCP'' means the Chinese 
        Communist Party.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) Indo-pacific region.--The terms ``Indo-
        Pacific'' and ``Indo-Pacific region'' mean the 36 countries and 
        the surrounding waterways that are under the area of 
        responsibility of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command. These 
        countries are: Australia, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Brunei, Burma, 
        Cambodia, China, Fiji, India, Indonesia, Japan, Kiribati, Laos, 
        Malaysia, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Mongolia, 
        Nauru, Nepal, New Zealand, North Korea, Palau, Papua New 
        Guinea, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Samoa, Singapore, 
        Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, Thailand, Timor-Leste, 
        Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, and Vietnam.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (4) People's liberation army; pla.--The terms 
        ``People's Liberation Army'' and ``PLA'' mean the armed forces 
        of the People's Republic of China.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (5) PRC; china.--The terms ``PRC'' and ``China'' 
        mean the People's Republic of China.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 4. STATEMENT OF POLICY.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    (a) Objectives.--It is the policy of the United States, in 
pursuing strategic competition with the PRC, to pursue the following 
objectives:</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) The United States global leadership role is 
        sustained and its political system and major foundations of 
        national power are postured for long-term political, economic, 
        technological, and military competition with the PRC.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) The balance of power in the Indo-Pacific 
        remains favorable to the United States and its allies. The 
        United States and its allies maintain unfettered access to the 
        region, including through freedom of navigation and the free 
        flow of commerce, consistent with international law and 
        practice, and the PRC neither dominates the region nor coerces 
        its neighbors.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) The allies and partners of the United States--
        </DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) maintain confidence in United States 
                leadership and its commitment to the Indo-Pacific 
                region;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) can withstand and combat subversion 
                and undue influence by the PRC; and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (C) align themselves with the United 
                States in setting global rules, norms, and standards 
                that benefit the international community.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (4) The combined weight of the United States and 
        its allies and partners is strong enough to demonstrate to the 
        PRC that the risks of attempts to dominate other states 
        outweigh the potential benefits.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (5) The United States leads the free and open 
        international order, which is comprised of resilient states and 
        institutions that uphold and defend principles, including 
        sovereignty, rule of law, individual freedom, and human rights. 
        The international order is strengthened to defeat attempts at 
        destabilization by illiberal and authoritarian 
        actors.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (6) The key rules, norms, and standards of 
        international engagement in the 21st century are maintained, 
        including the--</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) protection of human rights, commercial 
                engagement and investment, and technology; 
                and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) that such rules, norms, and standards 
                are in alignment with the values and interests of the 
                United States, its allies and partners, and the free 
                world.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (7) Assure that the CCP does not--</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) subvert open and democratic 
                societies;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) distort global markets;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (C) manipulate the international trade 
                system;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (D) coerce other nations via economic and 
                military means; or</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (E) use its technological advantages to 
                undermine individual freedoms or other states' national 
                security interests.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (8) The United States deters military 
        confrontation with the PRC and both nations work to reduce the 
        risk of conflict.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (b) Policy.--It is the policy of the United States, in 
pursuit of the objectives set forth in subsection (a)--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) to strengthen the United States domestic 
        foundation by reinvesting in market-based economic growth, 
        education, scientific and technological innovation, democratic 
        institutions, and other areas that improve the United States 
        ability to pursue its vital economic, foreign policy, and 
        national security interests;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) to pursue a strategy of strategic competition 
        with the PRC in the political, diplomatic, economic, 
        development, military, informational, and technological realms 
        that maximizes United States strengths and increases the costs 
        for the PRC of harming United States interests and values of 
        those of United States allies and partners;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) to lead a free, open, and secure international 
        system characterized by freedom from coercion, rule of law, 
        open markets and the free flow of commerce, and a shared 
        commitment to security and peaceful resolution of disputes, 
        human rights, and good and transparent governance;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (4) to strengthen and deepen United States 
        alliances and partnerships, prioritizing the Indo-Pacific and 
        Europe, by pursuing greater bilateral and multilateral 
        cooperative initiatives that advance shared interests and 
        values and bolster partner countries' confidence that the 
        United States is and will remain a strong, committed, and 
        constant partner;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (5) to encourage and aid United States allies and 
        partners in boosting their own capabilities and resiliency to 
        pursue, defend, and protect shared interests and values, free 
        from coercion and external pressure;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (6) to pursue fair, reciprocal treatment and 
        healthy competition in United States-China economic relations 
        by--</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) advancing policies that harden the 
                United States economy against unfair and illegal 
                commercial or trading practices and the coercion of 
                United States businesses; and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) tightening United States laws and 
                regulations as necessary to prevent the PRC's attempts 
                to harm United States economic 
                competitiveness;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (7) to demonstrate the value of private sector-led 
        growth in emerging markets around the world, including through 
        the use of United States Government tools that--</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) support greater private sector 
                investment and advance capacity-building initiatives 
                that are grounded in the rule of law;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) promote open markets;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (C) establish clear policy and regulatory 
                frameworks;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (D) improve the management of key economic 
                sectors;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (E) combat corruption; and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (F) foster and support greater 
                collaboration with and among partner countries and the 
                United States private sector to develop secure and 
                sustainable infrastructure;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (8) to lead in the advancement of international 
        rules and norms that foster free and reciprocal trade and open 
        and integrated markets;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (9) to conduct vigorous commercial diplomacy in 
        support of United States companies and businesses in partner 
        countries that seek fair competition;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (10) to ensure that the United States leads in the 
        innovation of critical and emerging technologies, such as next-
        generation telecommunications, artificial intelligence, quantum 
        computing, semiconductors, and biotechnology, by--</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) providing necessary investment and 
                concrete incentives for the private sector to 
                accelerate development of such technologies;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) modernizing and harmonizing with 
                allies and partners export controls and investment 
                screening regimes and associated policies and 
                regulations;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (C) enhancing United States leadership in 
                technical standards-setting bodies and avenues for 
                developing norms regarding the use of emerging critical 
                technologies;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (D) reducing United States barriers and 
                increasing incentives for collaboration with allies and 
                partners on the research and codevelopment of critical 
                technologies;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (E) collaborating with allies and partners 
                to protect critical technologies by--</DELETED>
                        <DELETED>    (i) crafting multilateral export 
                        control measures;</DELETED>
                        <DELETED>    (ii) building capacity for defense 
                        technology security;</DELETED>
                        <DELETED>    (iii) safeguarding chokepoints in 
                        the supply chains; and</DELETED>
                        <DELETED>    (iv) ensuring diversification; 
                        and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (F) designing major defense capabilities 
                for export to allies and partners;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (11) to enable the people of the United States, 
        including the private sector, civil society, universities and 
        other academic institutions, State and local legislators, and 
        other relevant actors to identify and remain vigilant to the 
        risks posed by undue influence of the CCP in the United 
        States;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (12) to implement measures to mitigate the risks 
        referred to in paragraph (11), while still preserving 
        opportunities for economic engagement, academic research, and 
        cooperation in other areas where the United States and the PRC 
        share interests;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (13) to collaborate with advanced democracies and 
        other willing partners to promote ideals and principles that--
        </DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) advance a free and open international 
                order;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) strengthen democratic 
                institutions;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (C) protect and promote human rights; 
                and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (D) uphold a free press and fact-based 
                reporting;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (14) to demonstrate effective leadership at the 
        United Nations, its associated agencies, and other multilateral 
        organizations and defend the integrity of these organizations 
        against co-optation by illiberal and authoritarian 
        nations;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (15) to prioritize the defense of fundamental 
        freedoms and human rights in the United States relationship 
        with the PRC;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (16) to cooperate with allies, partners, and 
        multilateral organizations, leveraging their significant and 
        growing capabilities to build a network of like-minded states 
        that sustains and strengthens a free and open order and 
        addresses regional and global challenges to hold the Government 
        of the PRC accountable for--</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) violations and abuses of human 
                rights;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) restrictions on religious practices; 
                and,</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (C) undermining and abrogating treaties, 
                other international agreements, and other international 
                norms related to human rights;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (17) to expose the PRC's use of corruption, 
        repression, coercion, and other malign behavior to attain 
        unfair economic advantage and deference of other nations to its 
        political and strategic objectives;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (18) to maintain United States access to the 
        Western Pacific, including by--</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) increasing United States forward-
                deployed forces in the Indo-Pacific region;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) modernizing the United States military 
                through investments in existing and new platforms, 
                emerging technologies, critical in-theater force 
                structure and enabling capabilities, joint operational 
                concepts, and a diverse, operationally resilient and 
                politically sustainable posture; and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (C) operating and conducting exercises 
                with allies and partners--</DELETED>
                        <DELETED>    (i) to mitigate the PLA's ability 
                        to project power and establish contested zones 
                        within the First and Second Island 
                        Chains;</DELETED>
                        <DELETED>    (ii) to diminish the ability of 
                        the PLA to coerce its neighbors;</DELETED>
                        <DELETED>    (iii) to maintain open sea and air 
                        lanes, particularly in the Taiwan Strait, the 
                        East China Sea, and the South China Sea; 
                        and</DELETED>
                        <DELETED>    (iv) to project power from the 
                        United States and its allies and partners to 
                        demonstrate the ability to conduct contested 
                        logistics;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (19) to deter the PRC from--</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) coercing Indo-Pacific nations, 
                including by developing more combat-credible forces 
                that are integrated with allies and partners in 
                contact, blunt, and surge layers and able to defeat any 
                PRC theory of victory in the First or Second Island 
                Chains of the Western Pacific and beyond, as called for 
                in the 2018 National Defense Strategy;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) using gray-zone tactics below the 
                level of armed conflict; or</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (C) initiating armed conflict;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (20) to strengthen United States-PRC military-to-
        military communication and improve de-escalation procedures to 
        deconflict operations and reduce the risk of unwanted conflict, 
        including through high-level visits and recurrent exchanges 
        between civilian and military officials and other measures, in 
        alignment with United States interests; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (21) to cooperate with the PRC if interests align, 
        including through bilateral or multilateral means and at the 
        United Nations, as appropriate.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 5. SENSE OF CONGRESS.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    It is the sense of Congress that the execution of the 
policy described in section 4(b) requires the following 
actions:</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) Strategic competition with the PRC will 
        require the United States--</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) to marshal sustained political will to 
                protect its vital interests, promote its values, and 
                advance its economic and national security objectives 
                for decades to come; and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) to achieve this sustained political 
                will, persuade the American people and United States 
                allies and partners of--</DELETED>
                        <DELETED>    (i) the challenges posed by the 
                        PRC; and</DELETED>
                        <DELETED>    (ii) the need for long-term 
                        competition to defend shared interests and 
                        values.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) The United States must coordinate closely with 
        allies and partners to compete effectively with the PRC, 
        including to encourage allies and partners to assume, as 
        appropriate, greater roles in balancing and checking the 
        aggressive and assertive behavior of the PRC.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) The President of the United States must lead 
        and direct the entire executive branch to make the People's 
        Republic of China as the greatest geopolitical and geoeconomic 
        challenge for United States foreign policy, increasing the 
        prioritization of strategic competition with the PRC and 
        broader United States interests in the Indo-Pacific region in 
        the conduct of foreign policy and assuring the allocation of 
        appropriate resources adequate to the challenge.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (4) The head of every Federal department and 
        agency should designate a senior official at the level of Under 
        Secretary or above to coordinate the department's or agency's 
        policies with respect to strategic competition with the 
        PRC.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (5) The ability of the United States to execute a 
        strategy of strategic competition with the PRC will be 
        undermined if our attention is repeatedly diverted to 
        challenges that are not vital to United States economic and 
        national security interests.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (6) In the coming decades, the United States must 
        prevent the PRC from--</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) establishing regional hegemony in the 
                Indo-Pacific; and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) using that position to advance its 
                assertive political, economic, and foreign policy goals 
                around the world.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (7) The United States must ensure that the Federal 
        budget is properly aligned with the strategic imperative to 
        compete with the PRC by--</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) ensuring sufficient levels of funding 
                to resource all instruments of United States national 
                power; and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) coherently prioritizing how such funds 
                are used.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (8) Sustained prioritization of the challenge 
        posed by the PRC requires--</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) bipartisan cooperation within 
                Congress; and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) frequent, sustained, and meaningful 
                collaboration and consultation between the executive 
                branch and Congress.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (9) The United States must ensure close 
        integration among economic and foreign policymakers, the 
        private sector, civil society, universities and academic 
        institutions, and other relevant actors in free and open 
        societies affected by the challenges posed by the PRC to enable 
        such actors--</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) to collaborate to advance common 
                interests; and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) to identify appropriate policies--
                </DELETED>
                        <DELETED>    (i) to strengthen the United 
                        States and its allies;</DELETED>
                        <DELETED>    (ii) to promote a compelling 
                        vision of a free and open order; and</DELETED>
                        <DELETED>    (iii) to push back against 
                        detrimental policies pursued by the 
                        CCP.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (10) The United States must ensure that all 
        Federal departments and agencies are organized to reflect the 
        fact that strategic competition with the PRC is the United 
        States top foreign policy priority, including through the 
        assigned missions and location of United States Government 
        personnel, by--</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) dedicating more personnel in the Indo-
                Pacific region, at posts around the world, and in 
                Washington DC, with priorities directly relevant to 
                advancing competition with the People's Republic of 
                China;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) placing greater numbers of foreign 
                service officers, international development 
                professionals, members of the foreign commercial 
                service, intelligence professionals, and other United 
                States Government personnel in the Indo-Pacific region; 
                and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (C) ensuring that this workforce, both 
                civilian and military, has the training in language, 
                technical skills, and other competencies required to 
                advance a successful competitive strategy with the 
                PRC.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (11) The United States must place renewed emphasis 
        on strengthening the nonmilitary instruments of national power, 
        including diplomacy, information, technology, economics, 
        foreign assistance and development finance, commerce, 
        intelligence, and law enforcement, which are crucial for 
        addressing the unique economic, political, and ideological 
        challenges posed by the PRC.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (12) The United States must sustain resourcing for 
        a Pacific Deterrence Initiative, which shall be aligned with 
        the overarching political and diplomatic objectives articulated 
        in the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act (Public Law 115-409), 
        and must prioritize the military investments necessary to 
        achieve United States political objectives in the Indo-Pacific, 
        including--</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) promoting regional security in the 
                Indo-Pacific;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) reassuring allies and partners while 
                protecting them from coercion; and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (C) deterring conflict with the 
                PRC.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (13) Competition with the PRC requires the United 
        States skillful adaptation to the information environment of 
        the 21st century. United States public diplomacy and messaging 
        efforts must effectively--</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) promote the value of partnership with 
                the United States;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) highlight the risks and costs of 
                enmeshment with the PRC; and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (C) counter CCP propaganda and 
                disinformation.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 6. RULES OF CONSTRUCTION.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    (a) Applicability of Existing Restrictions on Assistance 
to Foreign Security Forces.--Nothing in this Act shall be construed to 
diminish, supplant, supersede, or otherwise restrict or prevent 
responsibilities of the United States Government under section 620M of 
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2378d) or section 362 of 
title 10, United States Code.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (b) No Authorization for the Use of Military Force.--
Nothing in this Act may be construed as authorizing the use of military 
force.</DELETED>

     <DELETED>TITLE I--INVESTING IN A COMPETITIVE FUTURE</DELETED>

         <DELETED>Subtitle A--Science and Technology</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION TO ASSIST UNITED STATES COMPANIES WITH 
              GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAIN DIVERSIFICATION AND 
              MANAGEMENT.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    (a) Authorization To Contract Services.--The Secretary of 
State, in coordination with the Secretary of Commerce, is authorized to 
establish a program to facilitate the contracting by United States 
embassies for the professional services of qualified experts, on a 
reimbursable fee for service basis, to assist interested United States 
persons and business entities with supply chain management issues 
related to the PRC, including--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) exiting from the PRC market or relocating 
        certain production facilities to locations outside the 
        PRC;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) diversifying sources of inputs, and other 
        efforts to diversify supply chains to locations outside of the 
        PRC;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) navigating legal, regulatory, or other 
        challenges in the course of the activities described in 
        paragraphs (1) and (2); and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (4) identifying alternative markets for production 
        or sourcing outside of the PRC, including through providing 
        market intelligence, facilitating contact with reliable local 
        partners as appropriate, and other services.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (b) Chief of Mission Oversight.--The persons hired to 
perform the services described in subsection (a) shall--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) be under the authority of the United States 
        Chief of Mission in the country in which they are hired, in 
        accordance with existing United States laws;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) coordinate with Department of State and 
        Department of Commerce officers; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) coordinate with United States missions and 
        relevant local partners in other countries as needed to carry 
        out the services described in subsection (a).</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (c) Prioritization of Micro-, Small-, and Medium-Sized 
Enterprises.--The services described in subsection (a) shall be 
prioritized to assisting micro-, small-, and medium-sized 
enterprises.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (d) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized 
to be appropriated $15,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2022 through 
2027 for the purposes of carrying out this section.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (e) Prohibition on Access to Assistance by Foreign 
Adversaries.--None of the funds appropriated pursuant to this section 
may be provided to an entity--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) under the foreign ownership, control, or 
        influence of the Government of China or the Chinese Communist 
        Party, or other foreign adversary; or</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) determined to have beneficial ownership from 
        foreign individuals subject to the jurisdiction, direction, or 
        influence of foreign adversaries.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (f) Definitions.--The terms ``foreign ownership, control, 
or influence'' and ``FOCI'' have the meanings given those terms in the 
National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual (DOD 5220.22-M), 
or a successor document.</DELETED>

    <DELETED>Subtitle B--Global Infrastructure Development</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 111. APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS 
              DEFINED.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    In this subtitle, the term ``appropriate committees of 
Congress'' means--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the 
        Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the 
        Committee on Appropriations of the House of 
        Representatives.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 112. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON INTERNATIONAL QUALITY 
              INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT STANDARDS.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that 
the United States should initiate collaboration among governments, the 
private sector, and civil society to encourage the adoption of the 
standards for quality global infrastructure development advanced by the 
G20 at Osaka in 2018, including with respect to the following 
issues:</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) Respect for the sovereignty of countries in 
        which infrastructure investments are made.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) Anti-corruption.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) Rule of law.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (4) Human rights and labor rights.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (5) Fiscal and debt sustainability.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (6) Social and governance safeguards.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (7) Transparency.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (8) Environmental and energy standards.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that 
the United States should launch a series of fora around the world 
showcasing the commitment of the United States and partners of the 
United States to high-quality development cooperation, including with 
respect to the issues as described in subsection (a).</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 113. UNITED STATES SUPPORT FOR INFRASTRUCTURE.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    (a) Findings.--The Global Infrastructure Coordinating 
Committee (GICC) was established to coordinate the efforts of the 
Department of State, the Department of Commerce, the Department of the 
Treasury, the Department of Energy, the Department of Transportation, 
the United States Agency for International Development, the United 
States Trade and Development Agency, the Development Finance 
Corporation, the Export-Import Bank of the United States, and other 
agencies to catalyze private sector investments around the world and 
the deployment of United States Government technical assistance and 
development finance tools, including project preparation services and 
commercial advocacy.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) the world's infrastructure needs, including in 
        the transport, energy, and digital sectors, are vast and 
        growing;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) total or partial acquisition of, or a 
        significant financial stake or physical presence in, certain 
        types of infrastructure, including ports, energy grids, 5G 
        telecommunications networks, and undersea cables, can provide 
        an advantage to countries that do not share the interests and 
        values of the United States and its allies and partners, and 
        could therefore be deleterious to the interests and values of 
        the United States and its allies and partners;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) the United States must continue to prioritize 
        support for infrastructure projects that are physically secure, 
        financially viable, economically sustainable, and socially 
        responsible;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (4) achieving the objective outlined in paragraph 
        (3) requires the coordination of all United States Government 
        economic tools across the interagency, so that such tools are 
        deployed way to maximize United States interests and that of 
        its allies and partners;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (5) the GICC represents an important and concrete 
        step toward better communication and coordination across the 
        United States Government of economic tools relevant to 
        supporting infrastructure that is physically secure, 
        financially viable, economically sustainable, and socially 
        responsible, and should be continued; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (6) the executive branch and Congress should have 
        consistent consultations on United States support for strategic 
        infrastructure projects, including how the Congress can support 
        such initiatives in the future.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (c) Reporting Requirement.--Not later than 180 days after 
the date of the enactment of this Act, and semi-annually thereafter, 
the Secretary of State, in coordination with other Federal agencies 
that participate in the GICC, and, as appropriate, the Director of 
National Intelligence, shall submit to the appropriate committees of 
Congress a report that identifies--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) current and pending or future infrastructure 
        projects, particularly in the transport, energy, and digital 
        sectors, that the United States is supporting or will support 
        through financing, foreign assistance, technical assistance, or 
        other means;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) a detailed explanation of the United States 
        and partner country interests served by the United States 
        providing support to such projects; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) a detailed description of any support provided 
        by other United States allies and partners to such 
        projects.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (d) Form of Report.--The report required by subsection (a) 
shall be submitted in unclassified form but may include a classified 
annex.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 114. INFRASTRUCTURE TRANSACTION AND ASSISTANCE 
              NETWORK.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    (a) Authority.--The Secretary of State is authorized to 
establish a program, to be known as the ``Infrastructure Transaction 
and Assistance Network'', under which the Secretary of State, in 
consultation with other relevant Federal agencies, including those 
represented on the Global Infrastructure Coordinating Committee, may 
advance the development of sustainable, transparent, and high-quality 
infrastructure, in the Indo-Pacific region by--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) strengthening capacity-building programs to 
        improve project evaluation processes, regulatory and 
        procurement environments, and project preparation capacity of 
        countries that are partners of the United States in such 
        development;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) providing transaction advisory services and 
        project preparation assistance to support sustainable 
        infrastructure; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) coordinating the provision of United States 
        assistance for the development of infrastructure, including 
        infrastructure that utilizes United States-manufactured goods 
        and services, and catalyzing investment led by the private 
        sector.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (b) Transaction Advisory Fund.--As part of the 
``Infrastructure Transaction and Assistance Network'' described under 
subsection (a), the Secretary of State is authorized to provide 
support, including through flexible financing mechanisms such as the 
Transaction Advisory Fund, for advisory services to help boost the 
capacity of partner countries to evaluate contracts and assess the 
financial and environmental impacts of potential infrastructure 
projects, including through providing services such as--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) legal services;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) pre-feasibility studies;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) debt sustainability analyses;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (4) bid or proposal evaluation; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (5) other services relevant to advancing the 
        development of sustainable, transparent, and high-quality 
        infrastructure.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (c) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized 
to be appropriated $75,000,000 to the Infrastructure Transaction and 
Assistance Network, of which $20,000,000 is to be provided for the 
Transaction Advisory Fund.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 115. STRATEGY FOR ADVANCED AND RELIABLE ENERGY 
              INFRASTRUCTURE.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    (a) In General.--The President shall direct a 
comprehensive, multi-year, whole of government effort, in consultation 
with the private sector, to counter predatory lending and financing by 
the Government of China, including support to companies incorporated in 
the PRC that engage in such activities, in the energy sectors of 
developing countries.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (b) Policy.--It is the policy of the United States to--
</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) regularly evaluate current and forecasted 
        energy needs and capacities of developing countries and analyze 
        the presence and involvement of PRC state-owned industries and 
        other companies incorporated in the PRC, Chinese nationals 
        providing labor, and financing of energy projects, including 
        direct financing by the Government of China, PRC financial 
        institutions, or direct state support to state-owned 
        enterprises and other companies incorporated in the 
        PRC;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) pursue strategic support and investment 
        opportunities, and diplomatic engagement on power sector 
        reforms, to expand the development and deployment of advanced 
        energy technologies in developing countries;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) offer financing, loan guarantees, grants, and 
        other financial products on terms that advance domestic 
        economic and local employment opportunities, utilize advanced 
        energy technologies, encourage private sector growth, and when 
        appropriate United States equity and sovereign lending products 
        as alternative to the predatory lending tools offered by 
        Chinese international finance institutions;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (4) pursue partnerships with likeminded 
        international financing and multilateral institutions to 
        leverage investment in advanced energy technologies in 
        developing countries; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (5) pursue bilateral partnerships focused on the 
        cooperative development of advanced energy technologies with 
        countries of strategic significance, particularly in the Indo-
        Pacific region, to address the effects of energy engagement by 
        the PRC through predatory lending or other actions that 
        negatively impact other countries.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (c) Advanced Energy Technologies Exports.--Not later than 
180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually 
thereafter for 5 years, the Secretary of State, in consultation with 
the Secretary of Energy, shall establish a United States Government 
strategy to increase United States exports of advanced energy 
technologies to--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) improve energy security in allied and 
        developing countries;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) create open, efficient, rule-based, and 
        transparent energy markets;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) improve free, fair, and reciprocal energy 
        trading relationships; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (4) expand access to affordable, reliable 
        energy.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 116. REPORT ON CHINA'S INVESTMENTS IN FOREIGN ENERGY 
              DEVELOPMENT.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    (a) In General.--No later than 180 days after the date of 
the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for five years, the 
Administrator of the United States Agency for International 
Development, in consultation with the Assistant Secretary for Energy 
Resources, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a 
report that--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) identifies priority countries for deepening 
        United States engagement on energy matters, in accordance with 
        the economic and national security interests of the United 
        States and where deeper energy partnerships are most 
        achievable;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) describes the involvement of the PRC 
        government and companies incorporated in the PRC in the 
        development, operation, financing, or ownership of energy 
        generation facilities, transmission infrastructure or energy 
        resources in the countries identified in paragraph 
        (1);</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) evaluates strategic or security concerns and 
        implications for United States national interests and the 
        interests of the countries identified in paragraph (1), with 
        respect to the PRC's involvement and influence in developing 
        country energy production or transmission; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (4) outlines current and planned efforts by the 
        United States to partner with the countries identified in 
        paragraph (1) on energy matters that support shared interests 
        between the United States and such countries.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (b) Transmittal.--The assessment required in subsection 
(a) shall be published on the United States Agency for International 
Development's website and transmitted to the appropriate committees of 
Congress, the Secretary of State, and the Chief Executive Officer of 
the United States International Development Finance 
Corporation.</DELETED>

   <DELETED>Subtitle C--Digital Technology and Connectivity</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 121. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY 
              ISSUES.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    (a) Statement of Policy on Leadership in International 
Standards Setting.--It is the sense of Congress that the United States 
must lead in international standard-setting bodies that set the 
governance norms and rules for critical digitally enabled technologies 
in order to ensure that these technologies operate within a free, 
secure, interoperable, and stable digital domain.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that 
the United States, along with allies and partners, should lead an 
international effort that utilizes all of the economic and diplomatic 
tools at its disposal to combat the expanding use of information and 
communications technology products and services to surveil, repress, 
and manipulate populations (also known as ``digital 
authoritarianism'').</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (c) Negotiations for Digital Trade Agreement.--It is the 
sense of Congress that the United States Trade Representative should 
negotiate bilateral and plurilateral agreements relating to digital 
goods with the European Union, Japan, Taiwan, the member countries of 
the Five Eyes intelligence-sharing alliance, and other nations, as 
appropriate.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (d) Freedom of Information in the Digital Age.--It is the 
sense of Congress that the United States should lead a global effort to 
ensure that freedom of information, including the ability to safely 
consume or publish information without fear of undue reprisals, is 
maintained as the digital domain becomes an increasingly integral 
mechanism for communication.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (e) Efforts to Ensure Technological Development Does Not 
Threaten Democratic Governance or Human Rights.--It is the sense of 
Congress that the United States should lead a global effort to develop 
and adopt a set of common principles and standards for critical 
technologies to ensure that the such technologies cannot be abused by 
malign actors, whether they are governments or other entities, and that 
they do not threaten democratic governance or human rights.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (f) Formation of Digital Technology Trade Alliance.--It is 
the sense of Congress that the United States should examine 
opportunities for diplomatic negotiations regarding the formation of 
mutually beneficial alliances relating to digitally enabled 
technologies and services.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 122. DIGITAL CONNECTIVITY AND CYBERSECURITY 
              PARTNERSHIP.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    (a) Digital Connectivity and Cybersecurity Partnership.--
The Secretary of State is authorized to establish a program, to be 
known as the ``Digital Connectivity and Cybersecurity Partnership'' to 
help foreign countries--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) expand and increase secure Internet access and 
        digital infrastructure in emerging markets;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) protect technological assets, including 
        data;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) adopt policies and regulatory positions that 
        foster and encourage open, interoperable, reliable, and secure 
        internet, the free flow of data, multi-stakeholder models of 
        internet governance, and pro-competitive and security 
        information communications technology policies and 
        regulations;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (4) promote exports of United States information 
        and communications technology (ICT) goods and services and 
        increase United States company market share in target 
        markets;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (5) promote the diversification of ICT goods and 
        supply chain services to be less reliant on Chinese imports; 
        and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (6) build cybersecurity capacity, expand 
        interoperability, and promote best practices for a national 
        approach to cybersecurity.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (b) Implementation Plan.--Not later than 180 days after 
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall 
submit to the appropriate committees of Congress an implementation plan 
for the coming year to advance the goals identified in subsection 
(a).</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (c) Consultation.--In developing the strategy required by 
subsection (b), the Secretary of State shall consult with--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) leaders of the United States 
        industry;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) other relevant technology experts, including 
        the Open Technology Fund;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) representatives from relevant United States 
        Government agencies; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (4) representatives from like-minded allies and 
        partners.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (d) Semiannual Briefing Requirement.--Not later than 180 
days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually 
thereafter for five years, the Secretary of State shall provide to the 
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on 
Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives a briefing on the 
implementation of the plan required by subsection (b).</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (e) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized 
to be appropriated $100,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2022 through 
2026.</DELETED>

        <DELETED>Subtitle D--Countering Chinese Communist Party 
                          Influence</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 131. SHORT TITLE.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    This subtitle may be cited as the ``Countering Chinese 
Communist Party Malign Influence Act''.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 132. AUTHORIZATION.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    (a) Countering Chinese Influence Fund.--There is 
authorized to be appropriated $300,000,000 for each of fiscal years 
2022 through 2026 for the Countering Chinese Influence Fund to counter 
the malign influence of the Chinese Communist Party globally. Amounts 
appropriated pursuant to this authorization are authorized to remain 
available until expended and shall supplement, not supplant, amounts 
otherwise authorized to be appropriated to counter such 
influence.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (b) Consultation Required.--The obligation of funds 
appropriated or otherwise made available to counter the malign 
influence of the Chinese Communist Party globally, including pursuant 
to the authorization under subsection (a), shall be subject to prior 
consultation with, and consistent with section 634A of the Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2394-1), the regular notification 
procedures of--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the 
        Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the 
        Committee on Appropriations of the House of 
        Representatives.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (c) Policy Guidance, Coordination, and Approval.--
</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) Coordinator.--The Secretary of State shall 
        designate an existing senior official of the Department at the 
        rank of Assistant Secretary or above to provide policy 
        guidance, coordination, and approval for the obligation of 
        funds authorized pursuant to subsection (a).</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) Duties.--The senior official designated 
        pursuant to paragraph (1) shall be responsible for--</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) on an annual basis, the identification 
                of specific strategic priorities for using the funds 
                authorized to be appropriated by subsection (a), such 
                as geographic areas of focus or functional categories 
                of programming that funds are to be concentrated 
                within, consistent with the national interests of the 
                United States and the purposes of this Act;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) the coordination and approval of all 
                programming conducted using the funds authorized to be 
                appropriated by subsection (a), based on a 
                determination that such programming directly counters 
                the malign influence of the Chinese Communist Party, 
                including specific activities or policies advanced by 
                the Chinese Communist Party, pursuant to the strategic 
                objectives of the United States, as established in the 
                2017 National Security Strategy, the 2018 National 
                Defense Strategy, and other relevant national and 
                regional strategies as appropriate;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (C) ensuring that all programming approved 
                bears a sufficiently direct nexus to such acts by the 
                Chinese Communist Party described in subsection (d) and 
                adheres to the requirements outlined in subsection (e); 
                and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (D) conducting oversight, monitoring, and 
                evaluation of the effectiveness of all programming 
                conducted using the funds authorized to be appropriated 
                by subsection (a) to ensure that it advances United 
                States interests and degrades the ability of the 
                Chinese Communist Party, to advance activities that 
                align with subsection (d) of this section.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) Interagency coordination.--The senior official 
        designated pursuant to paragraph (1) shall, in coordinating and 
        approving programming pursuant to paragraph (2), seek to--
        </DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) conduct appropriate interagency 
                consultation; and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) ensure, to the maximum extent 
                practicable, that all approved programming functions in 
                concert with other Federal activities to counter the 
                malign influence and activities of the Chinese 
                Communist Party.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (4) Assistant coordinator.--The Administrator of 
        the United States Agency for International Development shall 
        designate a senior official at the rank of Assistant 
        Administrator or above to assist and consult the senior 
        official designated pursuant to paragraph (1).</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (d) Malign Influence.--In this section, the term ``malign 
influence'' with respect to the Chinese Communist Party should be 
construed to include acts conducted by the Chinese Communist Party or 
entities acting on its behalf that--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) undermine a free and open international 
        order;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) advance an alternative, repressive 
        international order that bolsters the Chinese Communist Party's 
        hegemonic ambitions and is characterized by coercion and 
        dependency;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) undermine the national security or sovereignty 
        of the United States or other countries; or</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (4) undermine the economic security of the United 
        States or other countries, including by promoting 
        corruption.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (e) Countering Malign Influence.--In this section 
countering malign influence through the use of funds authorized to be 
appropriated by subsection (a) shall include efforts to--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) promote transparency and accountability, and 
        reduce corruption, including in governance structures targeted 
        by the malign influence of the Chinese Communist 
        Party;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) support civil society and independent media to 
        raise awareness of and increase transparency regarding the 
        negative impact of activities related to the Belt and Road 
        Initiative;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) counter transnational criminal networks that 
        benefit, or benefit from, the malign influence of the Chinese 
        Communist Party;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (4) encourage economic development structures that 
        help protect against predatory lending schemes, including 
        support for market-based alternatives in key economic sectors, 
        such as digital economy, energy, and infrastructure;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (5) counter activities that provide undue 
        influence to the security forces of the People's Republic of 
        China;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (6) expose misinformation and disinformation of 
        the Chinese Communist Party's propaganda, including through 
        programs carried out by the Global Engagement Center; 
        and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (7) counter efforts by the Chinese Communist Party 
        to legitimize or promote authoritarian ideology and governance 
        models.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 133. FINDINGS ON CHINESE INFORMATION WARFARE AND MALIGN 
              INFLUENCE OPERATIONS.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following 
findings:</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) In the report to Congress required under 
        section 1261(b) of the John S. McCain National Defense 
        Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (Public Law 115-232), 
        the President laid out a broad range of malign activities 
        conducted by the Government of China and its agents and 
        entities, including--</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) propaganda and disinformation, in 
                which ``Beijing communicates its narrative through 
                state-run television, print, radio, and online 
                organizations whose presence is proliferating in the 
                United States and around the world'';</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) malign political influence operations, 
                in which ``front organizations and agents which target 
                businesses, universities, think tanks, scholars, 
                journalists, and local state and Federal officials in 
                the United States and around the world, attempting to 
                influence discourse''; and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (C) malign financial influence operations, 
                characterized as ``misappropriation of technology and 
                intellectual property, failure to appropriately 
                disclose relationships with foreign government 
                sponsored entities, breaches of contract and 
                confidentiality, and manipulation of processes for fair 
                and merit-based allocation of Federal research and 
                development funding''.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) Chinese information warfare and malign 
        influence operations are ongoing. In January 2019, the Director 
        of National Intelligence, Dan Coats, stated, ``China will 
        continue to use legal, political, and economic levers--such as 
        the lure of Chinese markets--to shape the information 
        environment. It is also capable of using cyber attacks against 
        systems in the United States to censor or suppress viewpoints 
        it deems politically sensitive.''.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) In February 2020, the Director of the Federal 
        Bureau of Investigation, Christopher Wray, testified to the 
        Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives that 
        the People's Republic of China has ``very active [malign] 
        foreign influence efforts in this country,'' with the goal of 
        ``trying to shift our policy and our public opinion to be more 
        pro-China on a variety of issues''.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (4) The People's Republic of China's information 
        warfare and malign influence operations continue to adopt new 
        tactics and evolve in sophistication. In May 2020, the Special 
        Envoy and Coordinator of the Global Engagement Center (GEC), 
        Lea Gabrielle, stated that there was a convergence of Russian 
        and Chinese narratives surrounding COVID-19 and that the GEC 
        had ``uncovered a new network of inauthentic Twitter accounts'' 
        that it assessed was ``created with the intent to amplify 
        Chinese propaganda and disinformation''. In June 2020, Google 
        reported that Chinese hackers attempted to access email 
        accounts of the campaign staff of a presidential 
        candidate.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (5) Chinese information warfare and malign 
        influence operations are a threat to the national security, 
        democracy and the economic systems of the United States, its 
        allies and partners. In October 2018, Vice President Mike Pence 
        warned that ``Beijing is employing a whole-of-government 
        approach, using political, economic, and military tools, as 
        well as propaganda, to advance its influence and benefit its 
        interests in the United States.''.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (6) In February 2018, the Director of the Federal 
        Bureau of Investigation, Christopher Wray, testified to the 
        Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate that the 
        People's Republic of China is taking advantage of and 
        exploiting the open research and development environments of 
        United States institutions of higher education to utilize 
        ``professors, scientists and students'' as ``nontraditional 
        collectors'' of information.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (b) Presidential Duties.--The President shall--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) protect our democratic institutions and 
        processes from malign influence from the People's Republic of 
        China and other foreign adversaries; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) consistent with the policy specified in 
        paragraph (1), direct the heads of the appropriate Federal 
        departments and agencies to implement Acts of Congress to 
        counter and deter Chinese and other foreign information warfare 
        and malign influence operations without delay, including--
        </DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) section 1043 of the John S. McCain 
                National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 
                (Public Law 115-232), which authorizes a coordinator 
                position within the National Security Council for 
                countering malign foreign influence operations and 
                campaigns;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) section 228 of the National Defense 
                Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 (Public Law 116-
                92), which authorizes additional research of foreign 
                malign influence operations on social media 
                platforms;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (C) section 847 of such Act, which 
                requires the Secretary of Defense to modify contracting 
                regulations regarding vetting for foreign ownership, 
                control and influence in order to mitigate risks from 
                malign foreign influence;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (D) section 1239 of such Act, which 
                requires an update of the comprehensive strategy to 
                counter the threat of malign influence to include the 
                People's Republic of China;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (E) section 5323 of such Act, which 
                authorizes the Director of National Intelligence to 
                facilitate the establishment of Social Media Data and 
                Threat Analysis Center to detect and study information 
                warfare and malign influence operations across social 
                media platforms; and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (F) section 119C of the National Security 
                Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3059), which authorizes the 
                establishment of a Foreign Malign Influence Response 
                Center inside the Office of the Director of National 
                Intelligence.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 134. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR THE FULBRIGHT-
              HAYS PROGRAM.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    There are authorized to be appropriated, for the 6-year 
period beginning on September 30, 2021, $105,500,000, which shall be 
expended to promote education, training, research, and foreign language 
skills through the Fulbright-Hays Program, in accordance with section 
102(b) of the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961 (22 
U.S.C. 2452(b)).</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 135. SENSE OF CONGRESS CONDEMNING ANTI-ASIAN RACISM AND 
              DISCRIMINATION.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following 
findings:</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) Since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, 
        crimes and discrimination against Asians and those of Asian 
        descent have risen dramatically worldwide. In May 2020, United 
        Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres said ``the pandemic 
        continues to unleash a tsunami of hate and xenophobia, 
        scapegoating and scare-mongering'' and urged governments to 
        ``act now to strengthen the immunity of our societies against 
        the virus of hate''.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) Asian American and Pacific Island (AAPI) 
        workers make up a large portion of the essential workers on the 
        frontlines of the COVID-19 pandemic, making up 8.5 percent of 
        all essential healthcare workers in the United States. AAPI 
        workers also make up a large share--between 6 percent and 12 
        percent based on sector--of the biomedical field.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) The United States Census notes that Americans 
        of Asian descent alone made up nearly 5.9 percent of the United 
        States population in 2019, and that Asian Americans are the 
        fastest-growing racial group in the United States, projected to 
        represent 14 percent of the United States population by 
        2065.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) the reprehensible attacks on people of Asian 
        descent and concerning increase in anti-Asian sentiment and 
        racism in the United States and around the world have no place 
        in a peaceful, civilized, and tolerant world;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) the United States is a diverse nation with a 
        proud tradition of immigration, and the strength and vibrancy 
        of the United States is enhanced by the diverse ethnic 
        backgrounds and tolerance of its citizens, including Asian 
        Americans and Pacific Islanders;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) the United States Government should encourage 
        other foreign governments to use the official and scientific 
        names for the COVID-19 pandemic, as recommended by the World 
        Health Organization and the Centers for Disease Control and 
        Prevention; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (4) the United States Government and other 
        governments around the world must actively oppose racism and 
        intolerance, and use available and appropriate tools to combat 
        the spread of anti-Asian racism and discrimination.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 136. SUPPORTING INDEPENDENT MEDIA AND COUNTERING 
              DISINFORMATION.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following 
findings:</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) China is increasing its spending on public 
        diplomacy including influence campaigns, advertising, and 
        investments into state-sponsored media publications outside of 
        China. These include, for example, more than $10,000,000,000 in 
        foreign direct investment in communications infrastructure, 
        platforms, and properties, as well as bringing journalists to 
        China for training programs.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) The PRC, through the Voice of China, the 
        United Front Work Department, and UFWD's many affiliates and 
        proxies, has obtained unfettered access to radio, television, 
        and digital dissemination platforms in numerous languages 
        targeted at citizens in other regions where China has an 
        interest in promoting public sentiment in support of the 
        Chinese Communist Party and expanding the reach of its 
        misleading narratives and propaganda.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) Even in Western countries, China spends 
        extensively on influence operations, such as a $500,000,000 
        advertising campaign to attract cable viewers in Australia and 
        a more than $20,000,000 campaign to influence United States 
        public opinion via the China Daily newspaper 
        supplement.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (b) The United States Agency for Global Media.--The United 
States Agency for Global Media (USAGM) and affiliate Federal and non-
Federal entities shall undertake the following actions to support 
independent journalism, countering disinformation, and breaking the 
firewall and combatting surveillance in countries where the Chinese 
Communist Party and other malign actors are promoting disinformation, 
propaganda, and manipulated media markets:</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) Radio Free Asia shall expand domestic coverage 
        and digital programming for all RFA China services and other 
        affiliate language broadcasting services.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) USAGM shall increase funding for Radio Free 
        Asia's Mandarin, Tibetan, Uyghur, and Cantonese language 
        services.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) Voice of America shall establish a real-time 
        disinformation tracking tool similar to Polygraph for Russian 
        language propaganda and misinformation.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (4) USAGM shall expand existing training and 
        partnership programs that promote journalistic standards, 
        investigative reporting, cybersecurity, and digital analytics 
        to help expose and counter false CCP narratives.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (5) The Open Technology Fund shall continue and 
        expand work to support tools and technology to circumvent 
        censorship and surveillance by the CCP, both inside China as 
        well as abroad where China has exported censorship technology, 
        and increase secure peer to peer connectivity and privacy 
        tools.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (c) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized 
to be appropriated, for each of fiscal years 2022 through 2026 for the 
United States Agency for Global Media, $100,000,000 for ongoing and new 
programs to support local media, build independent media, combat 
Chinese disinformation inside and outside of China, invest in 
technology to subvert censorship, and monitor and evaluate these 
programs.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (d) Support for Local Media.--The Secretary of State, 
acting through the Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human 
Rights, and Labor and in coordination with the Administrator of the 
United States Agency for International Development, shall support and 
train journalists on investigative techniques necessary to ensure 
public accountability related to the Belt and Road Initiative, the 
PRC's surveillance and digital export of technology, and other 
influence operations abroad direct or directly supported by the 
Communist Party or the Chinese government.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (e) Internet Freedom Programs.--The Bureau of Democracy, 
Human Rights, and Labor shall continue to support internet freedom 
programs.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (f) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized 
to be appropriated, for each of fiscal years 2022 through 2026, 
$170,000,000 for ongoing and new programs in support of press freedom, 
training, and protection of journalists.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 137. GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT CENTER.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    (a) Finding.--Congress established the Global Engagement 
Center to ``direct, lead, and coordinate efforts'' of the Federal 
Government to ``recognize, understand, expose, and counter foreign 
state and non-state propaganda and disinformation globally''.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (b) Extension.--Section 1287(j) of the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (22 U.S.C. 2656 note) is amended 
by striking ``the date that is 8 years after the date of the enactment 
of this Act'' and inserting ``December 31, 2027''.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (c) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that 
the Global Engagement Center should expand its coordinating capacity 
through the exchange of liaison officers with Federal departments and 
agencies that manage aspects of identifying and countering foreign 
disinformation, including the National Counterterrorism Center at the 
Office of the Director of National Intelligence and from combatant 
commands.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (d) Hiring Authority.--Notwithstanding any other provision 
of law, the Secretary of State, during the five year period beginning 
on the date of the enactment of this Act and solely to carry out 
functions of the Global Engagement Center, may--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) appoint employees without regard to the 
        provisions of title 5, United States Code, regarding 
        appointments in the competitive service; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) fix the basic compensation of such employees 
        without regard to chapter 51 and subchapter III of chapter 53 
        of such title regarding classification and General Schedule pay 
        rates.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 138. REVIEW BY COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE 
              UNITED STATES OF CERTAIN FOREIGN GIFTS TO AND CONTRACTS 
              WITH INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    (a) Amendments to Defense Production Act of 1950.--
</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) Definition of covered transaction.--Subsection 
        (a)(4) of section 721 of the Defense Production Act of 1950 (50 
        U.S.C. 4565) is amended--</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) in subparagraph (A)--</DELETED>
                        <DELETED>    (i) in clause (i), by striking ``; 
                        and'' and inserting a semicolon;</DELETED>
                        <DELETED>    (ii) in clause (ii), by striking 
                        the period at the end and inserting ``; and''; 
                        and</DELETED>
                        <DELETED>    (iii) by adding at the end the 
                        following:</DELETED>
                        <DELETED>    ``(iii) any transaction described 
                        in subparagraph (B)(vi) proposed or pending 
                        after the date of the enactment of the 
                        Strategic Competition Act of 2021.'';</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) in subparagraph (B), by adding at the 
                end the following:</DELETED>
                        <DELETED>    ``(vi) Any gift to an institution 
                        of higher education from a foreign person, or 
                        the entry into a contract by such an 
                        institution with a foreign person, if--
                        </DELETED>
                                <DELETED>    ``(I)(aa) the value of the 
                                gift or contract equals or exceeds 
                                $1,000,000; or</DELETED>
                                <DELETED>    ``(bb) the institution 
                                receives, directly or indirectly, more 
                                than one gift from or enters into more 
                                than one contract, directly or 
                                indirectly, with the same foreign 
                                person for the same purpose the 
                                aggregate value of which, during the 
                                period of 2 consecutive calendar years, 
                                equals or exceeds $1,000,000; 
                                and</DELETED>
                                <DELETED>    ``(II) the gift or 
                                contract--</DELETED>
                                        <DELETED>    ``(aa) relates to 
                                        research, development, or 
                                        production of critical 
                                        technologies and provides the 
                                        foreign person potential access 
                                        to any material nonpublic 
                                        technical information (as 
                                        defined in subparagraph 
                                        (D)(ii)) in the possession of 
                                        the institution; or</DELETED>
                                        <DELETED>    ``(bb) is a 
                                        restricted or conditional gift 
                                        or contract (as defined in 
                                        section 117(h) of the Higher 
                                        Education Act of 1965 (20 
                                        U.S.C. 2011f(h))) that 
                                        establishes control.''; 
                                        and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (C) by adding at the end the 
                following:</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    ``(G) Foreign gifts to and contracts with 
                institutions of higher education.--For purposes of 
                subparagraph (B)(vi):</DELETED>
                        <DELETED>    ``(i) Contract.--The term 
                        `contract' means any agreement for the 
                        acquisition by purchase, lease, or barter of 
                        property or services by a foreign person, for 
                        the direct benefit or use of either of the 
                        parties.</DELETED>
                        <DELETED>    ``(ii) Gift.--The term `gift' 
                        means any gift of money or property.</DELETED>
                        <DELETED>    ``(iii) Institution of higher 
                        education.--The term `institution of higher 
                        education' means any institution, public or 
                        private, or, if a multicampus institution, any 
                        single campus of such institution, in any 
                        State--</DELETED>
                                <DELETED>    ``(I) that is legally 
                                authorized within such State to provide 
                                a program of education beyond secondary 
                                school;</DELETED>
                                <DELETED>    ``(II) that provides a 
                                program for which the institution 
                                awards a bachelor's degree (or provides 
                                not less than a 2-year program which is 
                                acceptable for full credit toward such 
                                a degree) or a more advanced 
                                degree;</DELETED>
                                <DELETED>    ``(III) that is accredited 
                                by a nationally recognized accrediting 
                                agency or association; and</DELETED>
                                <DELETED>    ``(IV) to which the 
                                Federal Government extends Federal 
                                financial assistance (directly or 
                                indirectly through another entity or 
                                person), or that receives support from 
                                the extension of Federal financial 
                                assistance to any of the institution's 
                                subunits.''.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) Mandatory declarations.--Subsection 
        (b)(1)(C)(v)(IV)(aa) of such section is amended by adding at 
        the end the following: ``Such regulations shall require a 
        declaration under this subclause with respect to a covered 
        transaction described in subsection 
        (a)(4)(B)(vi)(II)(aa).''.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) Factors to be considered.--Subsection (f) of 
        such section is amended--</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) in paragraph (10), by striking ``; 
                and'' and inserting a semicolon;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) by redesignating paragraph (11) as 
                paragraph (12); and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (C) by inserting after paragraph (10) the 
                following:</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    ``(11) as appropriate, and particularly with 
        respect to covered transactions described in subsection 
        (a)(4)(B)(vi), the importance of academic freedom at 
        institutions of higher education in the United States; 
        and''.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (4) Membership of cfius.--Subsection (k)(2) of 
        such section is amended--</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) by redesignating subparagraphs (H), 
                (I), and (J) as subparagraphs (I), (J), and (K), 
                respectively; and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) by inserting after subparagraph (G) 
                the following:</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    ``(G) In the case of a covered transaction 
                involving an institution of higher education (as 
                defined in subsection (a)(4)(G)), the Secretary of 
                Education.''.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (5) Contents of annual report relating to critical 
        technologies.--Subsection (m)(3) of such section is amended--
        </DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) in subparagraph (B), by striking ``; 
                and'' and inserting a semicolon;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) in subparagraph (C), by striking the 
                period at the end and inserting a semicolon; 
                and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (C) by adding at the end the 
                following:</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    ``(D) an evaluation of whether there are 
                foreign malign influence or espionage activities 
                directed or directly assisted by foreign governments 
                against institutions of higher education (as defined in 
                subsection (a)(4)(G)) aimed at obtaining research and 
                development methods or secrets related to critical 
                technologies; and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    ``(E) an evaluation of, and recommendation 
                for any changes to, reviews conducted under this 
                section that relate to institutions of higher 
                education, based on an analysis of disclosure reports 
                submitted to the chairperson under section 117(a) of 
                the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 
                1011f(a)).''.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (b) Inclusion of CFIUS in Reporting on Foreign Gifts Under 
Higher Education Act of 1965.--Section 117 of the Higher Education Act 
of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1011f) is amended--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) in subsection (a), by inserting after ``the 
        Secretary'' the following: ``and the Secretary of the Treasury 
        (in the capacity of the Secretary as the chairperson of the 
        Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States under 
        section 721(k)(3) of the Defense Production Act of 1950 (50 
        U.S.C. 4565(k)(3)))''; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) in subsection (d)--</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) in paragraph (1)--</DELETED>
                        <DELETED>    (i) by striking ``with the 
                        Secretary'' and inserting ``with the Secretary 
                        and the Secretary of the Treasury''; 
                        and</DELETED>
                        <DELETED>    (ii) by striking ``to the 
                        Secretary'' and inserting ``to each such 
                        Secretary''; and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) in paragraph (2), by striking ``with 
                the Secretary'' and inserting ``with the Secretary and 
                the Secretary of the Treasury''.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (c) Effective Date; Applicability.--The amendments made by 
subsection (a) shall--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) take effect on the date of the enactment of 
        this Act, subject to the requirements of subsections (d) and 
        (e); and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) apply with respect to any covered transaction 
        the review or investigation of which is initiated under section 
        721 of the Defense Production Act of 1950 on or after that 
        date.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (d) Regulations.--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) In general.--The Committee on Foreign 
        Investment in the United States, which shall include the 
        Secretary of Education for purposes of this subsection, shall 
        prescribe regulations as necessary and appropriate to implement 
        the amendments made by subsection (a).</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) Elements.--The regulations prescribed under 
        paragraph (1) shall include--</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) regulations accounting for the burden 
                on institutions of higher education likely to result 
                from compliance with the amendments made by subsection 
                (a), structuring penalties and filing fees to reduce 
                such burdens, and implementing any procedures necessary 
                to protect academic freedom; and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) guidance with respect to the meaning 
                of ``control'', as defined in section 721(a) of the 
                Defense Production Act of 1950 (50 U.S.C. 4565(a)), as 
                that term applies to covered transactions described in 
                clause (vi) of paragraph (4)(B) of that section, as 
                added by subsection (a)(1).</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) Issuance of final rule.--The Committee shall 
        issue a final rule to carry out the amendments made by 
        subsection (a) after assessing the findings of the pilot 
        program required by subsection (e).</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (e) Pilot Program.--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) In general.--Beginning on the date that is 30 
        days after the publication in the Federal Register of the 
        matter required by paragraph (2) and ending on the date that is 
        570 days thereafter, the Committee on Foreign Investment in the 
        United States shall conduct a pilot program to assess methods 
        for implementing the review of covered transactions described 
        in clause (vi) of section 721(a)(4)(B) of the Defense 
        Production Act of 1950, as added by subsection 
        (a)(1).</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) Proposed determination.--Not later than 270 
        days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Committee 
        shall, in consultation with the Secretary of Education, publish 
        in the Federal Register--</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) a proposed determination of the scope 
                of and procedures for the pilot program required by 
                paragraph (1);</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) an assessment of the burden on 
                institutions of higher education likely to result from 
                compliance with the pilot program;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (C) recommendations for addressing any 
                such burdens, including structuring penalties and 
                filing fees to reduce such burdens; and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (D) any procedures necessary to ensure 
                that the pilot program does not infringe upon academic 
                freedom.</DELETED>

  <DELETED>TITLE II--INVESTING IN ALLIANCES AND PARTNERSHIPS</DELETED>

    <DELETED>Subtitle A--Strategic and Diplomatic Matters</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 201. APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES 
              DEFINED.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    In this subtitle, the term ``appropriate congressional 
committees'' means--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the 
        Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the 
        Committee on Appropriations of the House of 
        Representatives.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 202. UNITED STATES COMMITMENT AND SUPPORT FOR ALLIES AND 
              PARTNERS IN THE INDO-PACIFIC.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) the United States treaty alliances in the 
        Indo-Pacific provide a unique strategic advantage to the United 
        States and are among the Nation's most precious assets, 
        enabling the United States to advance its vital national 
        interests, defend its territory, expand its economy through 
        international trade and commerce, establish enduring 
        cooperation among like-minded countries, prevent the domination 
        of the Indo-Pacific and its surrounding maritime and air lanes 
        by a hostile power or powers, and deter potential 
        aggressors;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) the Governments of the United States, Japan, 
        the Republic of Korea, the Philippines, Australia, and Thailand 
        are critical allies in advancing a free and open order in the 
        Indo-Pacific region and tackling challenges with unity purpose, 
        and have collaborated to advance specific efforts of shared 
        interest in areas such as defense and security, economic 
        prosperity, infrastructure connectivity, and fundamental 
        freedoms;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) the United States greatly values other 
        partnerships in the Indo-Pacific region, including with India, 
        Singapore, Indonesia, Taiwan, New Zealand, and Vietnam as well 
        as regional architecture such as the Quad, the Association of 
        Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the Asia-Pacific Economic 
        Community (APEC), which are essential to further shared 
        interests;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (4) the security environment in the Indo-Pacific 
        demands consistent United States and allied commitment to 
        strengthening and advancing our alliances so that they are 
        postured to meet these challenges, and will require sustained 
        political will, concrete partnerships, economic, commercial, 
        and technological cooperation, consistent and tangible 
        commitments, high-level and extensive consultations on matters 
        of mutual interest, mutual and shared cooperation in the 
        acquisition of key capabilities important to allied defenses, 
        and unified mutual support in the face of political, economic, 
        or military coercion;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (5) fissures in the United States alliance 
        relationships and partnerships benefit United States 
        adversaries and weaken collective ability to advance shared 
        interests; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (6) the United States will work with allies to 
        prioritize promoting human rights throughout the 
        region.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (b) Statement of Policy.--It shall be the policy of the 
United States--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) to deepen diplomatic, economic, and security 
        cooperation between and among the United States, Japan, the 
        Republic of Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, and Australia, 
        including through diplomatic engagement, regional development, 
        energy security and development, scientific and health 
        partnerships, educational and cultural exchanges, missile 
        defense, intelligence-sharing, space, cyber, and other 
        diplomatic and defense-related initiatives;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) to uphold our multilateral and bilateral 
        treaty obligations, including--</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) defending Japan, including all areas 
                under the administration of Japan, under article V of 
                the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between 
                the United States of America and Japan;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) defending the Republic of Korea under 
                article III of the Mutual Defense Treaty Between the 
                United States and the Republic of Korea;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (C) defending the Philippines under 
                article IV of the Mutual Defense Treaty Between the 
                United States and the Republic of the 
                Philippines;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (D) defending Thailand under the 1954 
                Manila Pact and the Thanat-Rusk communique of 1962; 
                and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (E) defending Australia under article IV 
                of the Australia, New Zealand, United States Security 
                Treaty;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) to strengthen and deepen our bilateral and 
        regional partnerships, including with India, Taiwan, ASEAN, and 
        New Zealand;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (4) to cooperate with Japan, the Republic of 
        Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, and Australia to promote 
        human rights bilaterally and through regional and multilateral 
        fora and pacts; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (5) to strengthen and advance diplomatic, 
        economic, and security cooperation with regional partners, such 
        as Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and 
        India.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 203. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON COOPERATION WITH THE 
              QUAD.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    It is the sense of Congress that--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) the United States should reaffirm our 
        commitment to quadrilateral cooperation among Australia, India, 
        Japan, and the United States (the ``Quad'') to enhance and 
        implement a shared vision to meet shared regional challenges 
        and to promote a free, open, inclusive, resilient, and healthy 
        Indo-Pacific that is characterized by democracy, rule-of-law, 
        and market-driven economic growth and is free from undue 
        influence and coercion;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) the United States should seek to expand 
        sustained dialogue and cooperation through the Quad with a 
        range of partners to support the rule of law, freedom of 
        navigation and overflight, peaceful resolution of disputes, 
        democratic values, and territorial integrity, and to uphold 
        peace and prosperity and strengthen democratic 
        resilience;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) the United States should seek to expand 
        avenues of cooperation with the Quad, including more regular 
        military-to-military dialogues, joint exercises, and 
        coordinated policies related to shared interests such as 
        protecting cyberspace and advancing maritime security; 
        and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (4) the recent pledge from the first-ever Quad 
        leaders meeting on March 12, 2021, to respond to the economic 
        and health impacts of COVID-19, including expanding safe, 
        affordable, and effective vaccine production and equitable 
        access, and to address shared challenges, including in 
        cyberspace, critical technologies, counterterrorism, quality 
        infrastructure investment, and humanitarian assistance and 
        disaster relief, as well as maritime domains, further advances 
        the important cooperation among Quad nations that is so 
        critical to the Indo-Pacific region.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 204. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON COOPERATION WITH 
              ASEAN.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    It is the policy of the United States to--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) stand with the nations of Association of 
        Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as they respond to COVID-19 and 
        support greater cooperation in building capacity to prepare for 
        and respond to pandemics and other public health 
        challenges;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) support high-level United States participation 
        in the annual ASEAN Summit held each November;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) reaffirm the importance of United States-ASEAN 
        economic engagement, including the elimination of barriers to 
        cross-border commerce, and support the ASEAN Economic 
        Community's (AEC) goals, including strong, inclusive, and 
        sustainable long-term economic growth and cooperation with the 
        United States that focuses on innovation and capacity-building 
        efforts in technology, education, disaster management, food 
        security, human rights, and trade facilitation, particularly 
        for ASEAN's poorest countries;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (4) urge ASEAN to continue its efforts to foster 
        greater integration and unity within the ASEAN community, as 
        well as to foster greater integration and unity with non-ASEAN 
        economic, political, and security partners, including Japan, 
        the Republic of Korea, Australia, the European Union, Taiwan, 
        and India;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (5) recognize the value of strategic economic 
        initiatives like United States-ASEAN Connect, which 
        demonstrates a commitment to ASEAN and the AEC and builds upon 
        economic relationships in the region;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (6) support ASEAN nations in addressing maritime 
        and territorial disputes in a constructive manner and in 
        pursuing claims through peaceful, diplomatic, and, as 
        necessary, legitimate regional and international arbitration 
        mechanisms, consistent with international law, including 
        through the adoption of a code of conduct in the South China 
        Sea that represents the interests of all parties and promotes 
        peace and stability in the region;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (7) urge all parties involved in the maritime and 
        territorial disputes in the Indo-Pacific region, including the 
        Government of China--</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) to cease any current activities, and 
                avoid undertaking any actions in the future, that 
                undermine stability, or complicate or escalate disputes 
                through the use of coercion, intimidation, or military 
                force;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) to demilitarize islands, reefs, 
                shoals, and other features, and refrain from new 
                efforts to militarize, including the construction of 
                new garrisons and facilities and the relocation of 
                additional military personnel, material, or 
                equipment;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (C) to oppose actions by any country that 
                prevent other countries from exercising their sovereign 
                rights to the resources in their exclusive economic 
                zones and continental shelves by enforcing claims to 
                those areas in the South China Sea that lack support in 
                international law; and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (D) to oppose unilateral declarations of 
                administrative and military districts in contested 
                areas in the South China Sea;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (8) urge parties to refrain from unilateral 
        actions that cause permanent physical damage to the marine 
        environment and support the efforts of the National Oceanic and 
        Atmospheric Administration and ASEAN to implement guidelines to 
        address the illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing in the 
        region;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (9) urge ASEAN member states to develop a common 
        approach to reaffirm the decision of the Permanent Court of 
        Arbitration's 2016 ruling in favor of the Republic of the 
        Philippines in the case against the People's Republic of 
        China's excessive maritime claims;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (10) reaffirm the commitment of the United States 
        to continue joint efforts with ASEAN to halt human smuggling 
        and trafficking in persons and urge ASEAN to create and 
        strengthen regional mechanisms to provide assistance and 
        support to refugees and migrants;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (11) support the Lower Mekong 
        Initiative;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (12) support newly created initiatives with ASEAN 
        countries, including the Mekong-United States partnership, the 
        United States-ASEAN Smart Cities Partnership, the ASEAN Policy 
        Implementation Project, the United States-ASEAN Innovation 
        Circle, and the United States-ASEAN Health Futures;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (13) encourage the President to communicate to 
        ASEAN leaders the importance of promoting the rule of law and 
        open and transparent government, strengthening civil society, 
        and protecting human rights, including releasing political 
        prisoners, ceasing politically motivated prosecutions and 
        arbitrary killings, and safeguarding freedom of the press, 
        freedom of assembly, freedom of religion, and freedom of speech 
        and expression;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (14) support efforts by organizations in ASEAN 
        that address corruption in the public and private sectors, 
        enhance anti-bribery compliance, enforce bribery 
        criminalization in the private sector, and build beneficial 
        ownership transparency through the ASEAN-USAID PROSPECT project 
        partnered with the South East Asia Parties Against Corruption 
        (SEA-PAC);</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (15) support the Young Southeast Asian Leaders 
        Initiative as an example of a people-to-people partnership that 
        provides skills, networks, and leadership training to a new 
        generation that will create and fill jobs, foster cross-border 
        cooperation and partnerships, and rise to solve the regional 
        and global challenges of the future;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (16) support creating initiatives similar to the 
        Young Southeast Asian Leaders for other parts of the Indo-
        Pacific to foster people-to-people partnerships with an 
        emphasis on civil society leaders;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (17) acknowledge those ASEAN governments that have 
        fully upheld and implemented all United Nations Security 
        Council resolutions and international agreements with respect 
        to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's nuclear and 
        ballistic missile programs and encourage all other ASEAN 
        governments to do the same; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (18) allocate appropriate resources across the 
        United States Government to articulate and implement an Indo-
        Pacific strategy that respects and supports ASEAN centrality 
        and supports ASEAN as a source of well-functioning and problem-
        solving regional architecture in the Indo-Pacific 
        community.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 205. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON ENHANCING UNITED STATES-ASEAN 
              COOPERATION ON TECHNOLOGY ISSUES WITH RESPECT TO THE 
              PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    It is the sense of Congress that--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) the United States and ASEAN should complete a 
        joint analysis on risks of overreliance on Chinese equipment 
        critical to strategic technologies and critical 
        infrastructure;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) the United States and ASEAN should share 
        information about and collaborate on screening Chinese 
        investments in strategic technology and critical 
        infrastructure;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) the United States and ASEAN should work 
        together on appropriate import restriction regimes regarding 
        Chinese exports of surveillance technologies;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (4) the United States should urge ASEAN to adopt 
        its March 2019 proposed sanctions regime targeting cyber 
        attacks;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (5) the United States should urge ASEAN to commit 
        to the September 2019 principles signed by 28 countries 
        regarding ``Advancing Responsible State Behavior in 
        Cyberspace'', a set of commitments that support the ``rules-
        based international order, affirm the applicability of 
        international law to state-on-state behavior, adherence to 
        voluntary norms of responsible state behavior in peacetime, and 
        the development and implementation of practical confidence 
        building measures to help reduce the risk of conflict stemming 
        from cyber incidents''; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (6) the United States and ASEAN should explore how 
        Chinese investments in critical technology, including 
        artificial intelligence, will impact Indo-Pacific security over 
        the coming decades.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 206. REPORT ON CHINESE INFLUENCE IN INTERNATIONAL 
              ORGANIZATIONS.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    (a) Report Required.--Not later than 180 days after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in 
coordination with the Director of National Intelligence, shall submit 
to the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Select Committee on 
Intelligence of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of 
Representatives a report on the expanded influence of the Government of 
the People's Republic of China and the Chinese Communist Party in 
international organizations.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (b) Contents.--The report required by subsection (a) shall 
include analysis of the following:</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) The influence of the PRC and Chinese Communist 
        Party in international organizations and how that influence has 
        expanded over the last 10 years, including--</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) tracking countries' voting patterns 
                that align with Chinese government voting 
                patterns;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) the number of PRC nationals in 
                leadership positions at the D-1 level or 
                higher;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (C) changes in PRC voluntary and mandatory 
                funding by organization;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (D) adoption of Chinese Communist Party 
                phrases and initiatives in international organization 
                language and programming;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (E) efforts by the PRC to secure 
                legitimacy for its own foreign policy initiatives, 
                including the Belt and Road Initiative;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (F) the number of Junior Professional 
                Officers that the Government of China has funded by 
                organization;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (G) tactics used by the Government of 
                China or the CCP to manipulate secret or otherwise non-
                public voting measures, voting bodies, or 
                votes;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (H) the extent to which technology 
                companies incorporated in the PRC, or which have PRC or 
                CCP ownership interests, provide equipment and services 
                to international organizations; and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (I) efforts by China's United Nations 
                Mission to generate criticism of the United States in 
                the United Nations, including any efforts to highlight 
                delayed United States payments or to misrepresent total 
                United States voluntary and assessed financial 
                contributions to the United Nations and its specialized 
                agencies and programs.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) The purpose and ultimate goals of the expanded 
        influence of the PRC and the Chinese Communist Party in 
        international organizations, including an analysis of PRC 
        Government- and Chinese Communist Party strategic documents and 
        rhetoric.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) The tactics and means employed by the PRC and 
        the Chinese Communist Party to achieve expanded influence in 
        international organizations, including--</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) incentive programs for PRC nationals 
                to join and run for leadership positions in 
                international organizations;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) coercive economic and other practices 
                against other members in the organization; 
                and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (C) economic or other incentives provided 
                to international organizations, including donations of 
                technologies or goods.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (4) The successes and failures of PRC and CCP 
        influence efforts in international organizations.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (c) Form.--The report submitted under subsection (a) shall 
be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified 
annex.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (d) Definition.--In this section, the term ``international 
organizations'' means the following:</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) The African Development Bank.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) The Asian Development Bank.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) The Asia Pacific Economic 
        Cooperation.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (4) The Bank of International 
        Settlements.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (5) The Caribbean Development Bank.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (6) The Food and Agriculture 
        Organization.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (7) The International Atomic Energy 
        Agency.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (8) The International Bank for Reconstruction and 
        Development.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (9) The International Bureau of Weights and 
        Measures.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (10) The International Chamber of 
        Commerce.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (11) The International Civil Aviation 
        Organization.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (12) The International Criminal Police 
        Organization.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (13) The International Finance 
        Corporation.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (14) The International Fund for Agricultural 
        Development.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (15) The International Hydrographic 
        Organization.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (16) The International Labor 
        Organization.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (17) The International Maritime 
        Organization.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (18) The International Monetary Fund.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (19) The International Olympic 
        Committee.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (20) The International Organization for 
        Migration.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (21) The International Organization for 
        Standardization.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (22) The International Renewable Energy 
        Agency.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (23) The International Telecommunications 
        Union.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (24) The Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
        Development.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (25) The Organization for the Prohibition of 
        Chemical Weapons.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (26) The United Nations.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (27) The United Nations Conference on Trade and 
        Development.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (28) The United Nations Educational, Scientific, 
        and Cultural Organization.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (29) The United Nations Industrial Development 
        Organization.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (30) The United Nations Institute for Training and 
        Research.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (31) The United Nations Truce Supervision 
        Organization.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (32) The Universal Postal Union.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (33) The World Customs Organization.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (34) The World Health Organization.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (35) The World Intellectual Property 
        Organization.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (36) The World Meteorological 
        Organization.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (37) The World Organization for Animal 
        Health.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (38) The World Tourism Organization.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (39) The World Trade Organization.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (40) The World Bank Group.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 207. REGULATORY EXCHANGES WITH ALLIES AND 
              PARTNERS.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    (a) In General.--The Secretary of State, in coordination 
with the heads of other participating executive branch agencies, shall 
establish and develop a program to facilitate and encourage regular 
dialogues between United States Government regulatory and technical 
agencies and their counterpart organizations in allied and partner 
countries, both bilaterally and in relevant multilateral institutions 
and organizations--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) to promote best practices in regulatory 
        formation and implementation;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) to collaborate to achieve optimal regulatory 
        outcomes based on scientific, technical, and other relevant 
        principles;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) to seek better harmonization and alignment of 
        regulations and regulatory practices;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (4) to build consensus around industry and 
        technical standards in emerging sectors that will drive future 
        global economic growth and commerce; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (5) to promote United States standards regarding 
        environmental, labor, and other relevant protections in 
        regulatory formation and implementation, in keeping with the 
        values of free and open societies, including the rule of 
        law.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (b) Prioritization of Activities.--In facilitating expert 
exchanges under subsection (a), the Secretary shall prioritize--
</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) bilateral coordination and collaboration with 
        countries where greater regulatory coherence, harmonization of 
        standards, or communication and dialogue between technical 
        agencies is achievable and best advances the economic and 
        national security interests of the United States;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) multilateral coordination and coordination 
        where greater regulatory coherence, harmonization of standards, 
        or dialogue on other relevant regulatory matters is achievable 
        and best advances the economic and national security interests 
        of the United States, including with--</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) the European Union;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) the Asia-Pacific Economic 
                Cooperation;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (C) the Association of Southeast Asian 
                Nations (ASEAN);</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (D) the Organization for Economic 
                Cooperation and Development (OECD); and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (E) multilateral development banks; 
                and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) regulatory practices and standards setting 
        bodies focused on key economic sectors and emerging 
        technologies.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (c) Participation by Non-Governmental Entities.--With 
regard to the program described in subsection (a), the Secretary may 
facilitate, including through the use of amounts appropriated pursuant 
to subsection (e), the participation of private sector representatives, 
and other relevant organizations and individuals with relevant 
expertise, as appropriate and to the extent that such participation 
advances the goals of such program.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (d) Delegation of Authority by the Secretary.--The 
Secretary of State is authorized to delegate the responsibilities 
described in this section to the Under Secretary of State for Economic 
Growth, Energy, and the Environment.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (e) Authorization of Appropriations.--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) In general.--There is authorized to be 
        appropriated $2,500,000 for each of fiscal years 2022 through 
        2026 to carry out this section.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) Use of funds.--The Secretary may obligate 
        amounts appropriated pursuant to paragraph (1) in a manner 
        that--</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) facilities participation by 
                representatives from technical agencies within the 
                United States Government and their counterparts; 
                and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) complies with applicable procedural 
                requirements under the State Department Basic 
                Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 2651a et seq.) and 
                the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et 
                seq.).</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 208. TECHNOLOGY PARTNERSHIP OFFICE AT THE DEPARTMENT OF 
              STATE.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    (a) Statement of Policy.--It shall be the policy of the 
United States to lead new technology policy partnerships focused on the 
shared interests of the world's technology-leading 
democracies.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (b) Establishment.--The Secretary of State shall establish 
an interagency-staffed Technology Partnership Office (referred to in 
this section as the ``Office''), which shall be housed in the 
Department of State.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (c) Leadership.--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) Ambassador-at-large.--The Office shall be 
        headed by an Ambassador-at-Large for Technology, who shall--
        </DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) be appointed by the President, by and 
                with the advice and consent of the Senate;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) have the rank and status of 
                ambassador; and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (C) report to the Secretary of State, 
                unless otherwise directed.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) Office liaisons.--The Secretary of Commerce 
        and the Secretary of Treasury shall each appoint, from within 
        their respective departments at the level of GS-14 or higher, 
        liaisons between the Office and the Department of Commerce or 
        the Department of the Treasury, as applicable, to perform the 
        following duties:</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) Collaborate with the Department of 
                State on relevant technology initiatives and 
                partnerships.</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) Provide technical and other relevant 
                expertise to the Office, as appropriate.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (d) Membership.--In addition to the liaisons referred to 
in subsection (c), the Office shall include a representative or expert 
detailee from key Federal agencies, as determined by the Ambassador-at-
Large for Technology.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (e) Purposes.--The purposes of the Office shall include 
responsibilities such as--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) creating, overseeing, and carrying out 
        technology partnerships with countries and relevant political 
        and economic unions that are committed to--</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) the rule of law, freedom of speech, 
                and respect for an promotion of human rights;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) the safe and responsible development 
                and use of new and emerging technologies and the 
                establishment of related norms and standards;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (C) a secure internet architecture 
                governed by a multi-stakeholder model instead of 
                centralized government control;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (D) robust international cooperation to 
                promote an open internet and interoperable 
                technological products and services that are necessary 
                to freedom, innovation, transparency, and privacy; 
                and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (E) multilateral coordination, including 
                through diplomatic initiatives, information sharing, 
                and other activities, to defend the principles 
                described in subparagraphs (A) through (C) against 
                efforts by state and non-state actors to undermine 
                them;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) harmonizing technology governance regimes with 
        partners, coordinating on basic and pre-competitive research 
        and development initiatives, and collaborating to pursue such 
        opportunities in key technologies, including--</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) artificial intelligence and machine 
                learning;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) 5G telecommunications and other 
                advanced wireless networking technologies;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (C) semiconductor manufacturing;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (D) biotechnology;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (E) quantum computing;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (F) surveillance technologies, including 
                facial recognition technologies and censorship 
                software; and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (G) fiber optic cables;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) coordinating with such countries regarding 
        shared technology strategies, including technology controls and 
        standards, as well as strategies with respect to the 
        development and acquisition of key technologies to provide 
        alternatives for those countries utilizing systems supported by 
        authoritarian regimes;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (4) supporting and expanding adherence to 
        international treaties and frameworks governing the responsible 
        use of new and emerging technologies;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (5) coordinating the adoption of shared data 
        privacy, data sharing, and data archiving standards among the 
        United States and partner countries and relevant economic and 
        political unions, including complementary data protection 
        regulations;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (6) coordinating with other technology partners on 
        export control policies, including as appropriate through the 
        Wassenaar Arrangement On Export Controls for Conventional Arms 
        and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies, done at The Hague December 
        1995, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Australia Group, and the 
        Missile Technology Control Regime; supply chain security; and 
        investment in or licensing of critical infrastructure and dual-
        use technologies;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (7) coordinating with members of technology 
        partnerships on other policies for the use and control of 
        emerging and foundational technologies through appropriate 
        restrictions, investment screening, and appropriate measures 
        with respect to technology transfers;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (8) coordinating policies, in coordination with 
        the Department of Commerce, around the resiliency of supply 
        chains in critical technology areas and explore possible 
        diversification of supply chain components to countries 
        involved in technology partnerships with the United States, 
        while also maintaining transparency surrounding subsidies and 
        product origins;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (9) sharing information regarding the technology 
        transfer threat posed by authoritarian governments and the ways 
        in which autocratic regimes are utilizing technology to erode 
        individual freedoms and other foundations of open, democratic 
        societies;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (10) administering the establishment of--
        </DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) the common funding mechanism for 
                development and adoption of measurably secure 
                semiconductors and measurably secure semiconductors 
                supply chains created in and in accordance with the 
                requirements of section 9905 of the William M. (Mac) 
                Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for 
                Fiscal Year 2021 (Public Law 116-283); and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) the multilateral telecommunications 
                security fund created in and in accordance with the 
                requirements of section 9202 of such Act; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (11) collaborating with private companies, trade 
        associations, and think tanks to realize the purposes of 
        paragraphs (1) through (10).</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (f) Special Hiring Authorities.--The Secretary of State 
may--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) appoint employees without regard to the 
        provisions of title 5, United States Code, regarding 
        appointments in the competitive service; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) fix the basic compensation of such employees 
        without regard to chapter 51 and subchapter III of chapter 53 
        of such title regarding classification and General Schedule pay 
        rates.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (g) Report.--Not later than one year after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for the next three 
years, the Secretary of State shall submit an unclassified report to 
the appropriate congressional committees, with a classified index, if 
necessary, about the activities of the Office, including any 
cooperative initiatives and partnerships pursued with United States 
allies and partners, and the results of those activities, initiatives, 
and partnerships.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (h) Sense of Congress on Establishing International 
Technology Partnership.--It is the sense of Congress that the 
Ambassador-at-Large for Technology should seek to establish an 
International Technology Partnership for the purposes described in this 
section with foreign countries that have--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) democratic national government and a strong 
        commitment to democratic values, including an adherence to the 
        rule of law, freedom of speech, and respect for and promotion 
        of human rights;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) an economy with advanced technology sectors; 
        and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) a demonstrated record of trust or an expressed 
        interest in international cooperation and coordination with the 
        United States on important defense and intelligence 
        issues.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 209. UNITED STATES REPRESENTATION IN STANDARDS-SETTING 
              BODIES.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    (a) Short Title.--This section may be cited as the 
``Promoting United States International Leadership in 5G Act of 
2021''.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) the United States and its allies and partners 
        should maintain participation and leadership at international 
        standards-setting bodies for 5th and future generation mobile 
        telecommunications systems and infrastructure;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) the United States should work with its allies 
        and partners to encourage and facilitate the development of 
        secure supply chains and networks for 5th and future generation 
        mobile telecommunications systems and infrastructure; 
        and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) the maintenance of a high standard of security 
        in telecommunications and cyberspace between the United States 
        and its allies and partners is a national security interest of 
        the United States.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (c) Enhancing Representation and Leadership of United 
States at International Standards-setting Bodies.--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) In general.--The President shall--</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) establish an interagency working group 
                to provide assistance and technical expertise to 
                enhance the representation and leadership of the United 
                States at international bodies that set standards for 
                equipment, systems, software, and virtually defined 
                networks that support 5th and future generation mobile 
                telecommunications systems and infrastructure, such as 
                the International Telecommunication Union and the 3rd 
                Generation Partnership Project; and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) work with allies, partners, and the 
                private sector to increase productive 
                engagement.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) Interagency working group.--The interagency 
        working group described in paragraph (1)--</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) shall be chaired by the Secretary of 
                State or a designee of the Secretary of State; 
                and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) shall consist of the head (or 
                designee) of each Federal department or agency the 
                President determines appropriate.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) Briefings.--</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) In general.--Not later than 180 days 
                after the date of the enactment of this Act, and 
                subsequently thereafter as provided under subparagraph 
                (B), the interagency working group described in 
                paragraph (1) shall provide a strategy to the 
                appropriate congressional committees that addresses--
                </DELETED>
                        <DELETED>    (i) promotion of United States 
                        leadership at international standards-setting 
                        bodies for equipment, systems, software, and 
                        virtually defined networks relevant to 5th and 
                        future generation mobile telecommunications 
                        systems and infrastructure, taking into account 
                        the different processes followed by the various 
                        international standard-setting 
                        bodies;</DELETED>
                        <DELETED>    (ii) diplomatic engagement with 
                        allies and partners to share security risk 
                        information and findings pertaining to 
                        equipment that supports or is used in 5th and 
                        future generation mobile telecommunications 
                        systems and infrastructure and cooperation on 
                        mitigating such risks;</DELETED>
                        <DELETED>    (iii) China's presence and 
                        activities at international standards-setting 
                        bodies relevant to 5th and future generation 
                        mobile telecommunications systems and 
                        infrastructure, including information on the 
                        differences in the scope and scale of China's 
                        engagement at such bodies compared to 
                        engagement by the United States or its allies 
                        and partners and the security risks raised by 
                        Chinese proposals in such standards-setting 
                        bodies; and</DELETED>
                        <DELETED>    (iv) engagement with private 
                        sector communications and information service 
                        providers, equipment developers, academia, 
                        Federally funded research and development 
                        centers, and other private-sector stakeholders 
                        to propose and develop secure standards for 
                        equipment, systems, software, and virtually 
                        defined networks that support 5th and future 
                        generation mobile telecommunications systems 
                        and infrastructure.</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) Subsequent briefings.--Upon receiving 
                a request from the Committee on Foreign Relations of 
                the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the 
                House of Representatives, or as determined appropriate 
                by the chair of the interagency working group 
                established pursuant to paragraph (1), the interagency 
                working group shall provide the requesting committee an 
                updated briefing that covers the matters described in 
                clauses (i) through (iv) of subparagraph (A).</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 210. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON CENTRALITY OF SANCTIONS AND 
              OTHER RESTRICTIONS TO STRATEGIC COMPETITION WITH 
              CHINA.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following 
findings:</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) Sanctions and other restrictions, when used as 
        part of a coordinated and comprehensive strategy, are a 
        powerful tool to advance United States foreign policy and 
        national security interests.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) Congress has authorized and mandated broad 
        range of sanctions and other restrictions to address malign 
        behavior and incentivize behavior change by individuals and 
        entities in the PRC.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) The sanctions and other restrictions 
        authorized and mandated by Congress address a range of malign 
        PRC behavior, including--</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) intellectual property theft;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) cyber-related economic 
                espionage;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (C) repression of ethnic 
                minorities;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (D) other human rights abuses;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (E) abuses of the international trading 
                system;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (F) illicit assistance to and trade with 
                the Government of North Korea; and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (G) drug trafficking, including 
                trafficking in fentanyl and other opioids;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (4) The sanctions and other restrictions described 
        in this section include the following:</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) The Global Magnitsky Human Rights 
                Accountability Act (subtitle F of title XII of Public 
                Law 114-328; 22 U.S.C. 2656 note).</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) Section 1637 of the Carl Levin and 
                Howard P. ``Buck'' McKeon National Defense 
                Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 (50 U.S.C. 
                1708).</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (C) The Fentanyl Sanctions Act (21 U.S.C. 
                2301 et seq.).</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (D) The Hong Kong Autonomy Act (Public Law 
                116-149; 22 U.S.C. 5701 note).</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (E) Section 7 of the Hong Kong Human 
                Rights and Democracy Act of 2019 (Public Law 116-76; 22 
                U.S.C. 5701 note).</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (F) Section 6 of the Uyghur Human Rights 
                Policy Act of 2020 (Public Law 116-145; 22 U.S.C. 6901 
                note).</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (G) The Export Control Reform Act of 2018 
                (50 U.S.C. 4801 et seq.).</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (H) Export control measures required to be 
                maintained with respect to entities in the 
                telecommunications sector of the People's Republic of 
                China, including under section 1260I of the National 
                Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 (Public 
                Law 116-92).</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (I) Section 311 of the Countering 
                America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act of 2018 
                (Public Law 115-44; 131 Stat. 942).</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (5) Full implementation of the authorities 
        described in paragraph (4) is required under the respective 
        laws described therein and pursuant to the Take Care Clause of 
        the Constitution (article II, section 3).</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) the executive branch has not fully implemented 
        the sanctions and other restrictions described in subsection 
        (a)(4) despite the statutory and constitutional requirements to 
        do so; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) the President's full implementation and 
        execution of the those authorities is a necessary and essential 
        component to the success of the United States in the strategic 
        competition with China.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 211. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON NEGOTIATIONS WITH G7 COUNTRIES 
              ON THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    (a) In General.--It is the sense of Congress that the 
President, acting through the Secretary of State, should initiate an 
agenda with G7 countries on matters relevant to economic and democratic 
freedoms, including the following:</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) Trade and investment issues and 
        enforcement.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) Building support for international 
        infrastructure standards, including those agreed to at the G20 
        summit in Osaka in 2018.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) The erosion of democracy and human 
        rights.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (4) The security of 5G 
        telecommunications.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (5) Anti-competitive behavior, such as 
        intellectual property theft, massive subsidization of 
        companies, and other policies and practices.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (6) Predatory international sovereign lending that 
        is inconsistent with OECD and Paris Club principles.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (7) International influence campaigns.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (8) Environmental standards.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (9) Coordination with like-minded regional 
        partners that are not in the G7.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 212. ENHANCING THE UNITED STATES-TAIWAN 
              PARTNERSHIP.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    It is the policy of the United States--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) to recognize Taiwan as a vital part of the 
        United States Indo-Pacific strategy;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) to advance the security of Taiwan and its 
        democracy as key elements for the continued peace and stability 
        of the greater Indo-Pacific region, and a vital national 
        security interest of the United States;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) to reinforce its commitments to Taiwan under 
        the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96-8) and the ``Six 
        Assurances'' and in accordance with the United States ``One 
        China'' policy;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (4) to support Taiwan's implementation of its 
        asymmetric defense strategy, including the priorities 
        identified in Taiwan's Overall Defense Concept;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (5) to urge Taiwan to increase its defense 
        spending in order to fully resource its defense 
        strategy;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (6) to conduct regular transfers of defense 
        articles to Taiwan in order to enhance Taiwan's self-defense 
        capabilities, particularly its efforts to develop and integrate 
        asymmetric capabilities, including anti-ship, coastal defense, 
        anti-armor, air defense, undersea warfare, advanced command, 
        control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, 
        and reconnaissance, and resilient command and control 
        capabilities, into its military forces;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (7) to advocate and actively advance Taiwan's 
        meaningful participation in the United Nations, the World 
        Health Assembly, the International Civil Aviation Organization, 
        the International Criminal Police Organization, and other 
        international bodies as appropriate; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (8) to promote meaningful cooperation among the 
        United States, Taiwan, and other like-minded 
        partners.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 213. TREATMENT OF TAIWAN GOVERNMENT.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    (a) In General.--The Department of State and other United 
States Government agencies shall engage with the democratically elected 
government of Taiwan on the same basis, and using the same nomenclature 
and protocol, as the United States Government engages with other 
foreign governments. Notwithstanding the continued supporting role of 
the American Institute in Taiwan in carrying out United States foreign 
policy and protecting United States interests in Taiwan, the United 
States Government shall not place any restrictions on the ability of 
officials of the Department of State and other United States Government 
agencies to interact directly and routinely with counterparts in the 
Taiwan government.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (b) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this paragraph shall 
be construed as entailing restoration of diplomatic relations with the 
Republic of China (Taiwan) or altering the United States Government's 
position on Taiwan's international status.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 214. REPORT ON ORIGINS OF THE COVID-19 
              PANDEMIC.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) it is critical to understand the origins of 
        the COVID-19 pandemic so the United States can better prepare, 
        prevent, and respond to pandemic health threats in the 
        future;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) given the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on 
        all Americans, the American people deserve to know what 
        information the United States Government possesses about the 
        origins of COVID-19, as appropriate;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) Congress shares the concerns expressed by the 
        United States Government and 13 other foreign governments that 
        the international team of experts dispatched to the People's 
        Republic of China by the World Health Organization (WHO) to 
        study the origins of the SARS-CoV-2 virus was ``significantly 
        delayed and lacked access to complete, original data and 
        samples'';</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (4) the March 30, 2021, statement by the Director-
        General of the WHO, Dr. Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, further 
        affirms that the investigative team had encountered 
        ``difficulties'' in accessing necessary raw data, that ``we 
        have not yet found the source of the virus,'' and that ``all 
        hypotheses remain on the table''; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (5) it is critical for independent experts to have 
        full access to all pertinent human, animal, and environmental 
        data, live virus samples, research, and personnel involved in 
        the early stages of the outbreak relevant to determining how 
        this pandemic emerged.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (b) Report Required.--Not later than 180 days after 
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in 
coordination with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services, the Secretary of Energy, and other relevant executive 
departments, shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a 
report consisting of--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) an assessment of the most likely source or 
        origin of the SARS-CoV-2 virus, including a detailed review of 
        all information the United States possesses that it has 
        identified as potentially relevant to the source or origin of 
        the SARS-CoV-2 virus, including zoonotic transmission and 
        spillover, the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV), or other 
        sources of origin, transmission, or spillover, based on the 
        information the United States Government has to date;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) an identification of the leading credible 
        theories of the etiology of the SARS-CoV-2 virus by the United 
        States Government, the steps the United States has taken to 
        validate those theories, and any variance in assessment or 
        dissent among or between United States intelligence agencies, 
        executive agencies, and executive offices of the most likely 
        source or origin of the SARS-CoV-2 virus, and the basis for 
        such variance or dissent;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) a description of all steps the United States 
        Government has taken to identify and investigate the source of 
        the SARS-CoV-2 virus, including a timeline of such 
        efforts;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (4) a detailed description of the data to which 
        the United States and the WHO have requested and have access to 
        in order to determine the origin of the source of the SARS-CoV-
        2 virus;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (5) an account of efforts by the PRC to cooperate 
        with, impede, or obstruct any inquiry or investigation to 
        determine the source and transmission of SARS-CoV-2 virus, 
        including into a possible lab leak, or to create or spread 
        misinformation or disinformation regarding the source and 
        transmission of SARS-CoV-2 virus by the PRC or CCP, including 
        by national and local governmental and health 
        entities;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (6) a detailed account of information known to the 
        United States Government regarding the WIV and associated 
        facilities, including research activities on coronaviruses and 
        gain-of-function research, any reported illnesses of persons 
        associated with the laboratory with symptoms consistent with 
        COVID-19 and the ultimate diagnosis, and a timeline of research 
        relevant to coronaviruses;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (7) a list of any known obligations on the PRC 
        that require disclosure and cooperation in the event of a viral 
        outbreak like SARS-CoV-2; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (8) an overview of United States engagement with 
        the PRC with respect to coronaviruses that includes--</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) a detailed accounting of United States 
                engagement with the WIV and similar labs in the PRC 
                specific to coronaviruses, including a detailed 
                accounting United States Government-sponsored research 
                and funding and diplomatic engagements such as ``track 
                1.5'' and ``track 2'' engagements; and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) an assessment of any additional 
                scrutiny of United States Government funding to support 
                gain-of-function research in the PRC after the 
                moratorium on such funding was lifted in 2017, and 
                whether United States Government funding was used to 
                support gain-of-function research in China, during the 
                moratorium on gain-of-function research (2014-
                2017).</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (c) Form.--The report required by subsection (b) shall be 
submitted in unclassified form but may include a classified 
annex.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (d) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this 
section, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
        Senate;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
        Senate;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and 
        Pensions of the Senate;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (4) the Committee on Armed Services of the 
        Senate;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (5) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House 
        of Representatives;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (6) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence 
        of the House of Representatives;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (7) the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the 
        House of Representatives; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (8) the Committee on Armed Services of the House 
        of Representatives.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 215. ENHANCEMENT OF DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT AND ECONOMIC 
              ENGAGEMENT WITH PACIFIC ISLAND COUNTRIES.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    (a) Authority.--The Secretary of State and Secretary of 
Commerce are authorized to hire Locally Employed Staff in Pacific 
island countries for the purpose of providing increased diplomatic 
support and promoting increased economic and commercial engagement 
between the United States and Pacific Island countries.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (b) Availability of Funds.--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) In general.--Of the amounts authorized to be 
        appropriated to the Department of State and the Department of 
        Commerce for fiscal year 2022, not more than $10,000,000 , 
        respectively, shall be available to carry out the purposes of 
        this section.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) Termination.--The availability of funds in 
        paragraph (1) shall expire on December 31, 2026.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (c) Report.--Not later than one year after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the Secretary of State 
and the Secretary of Commerce shall provide to the appropriate 
committees of Congress a report on the activities of the Department of 
State and Department of Commerce Locally Employed Staff in Pacific 
island countries, which shall include--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) a detailed description of the additional 
        diplomatic, economic, and commercial engagement and activities 
        in the Pacific island countries provided by Locally Employed 
        Staff; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) an assessment of the impact of the activities 
        with respect to the diplomatic, economic, and security 
        interests of the United States.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (d) Exception for American Samoa.--The Secretary of State 
may, as appropriate, treat the territory of American Samoa as a foreign 
country for purposes of carrying out this section.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (e) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this 
section, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the 
        Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, the 
        Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, and the Committee on 
        Appropriations of the Senate; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the 
        Committee on Energy and Commerce, the Committee on Natural 
        Resources, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of 
        Representatives.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 216. INCREASING DEPARTMENT OF STATE PERSONNEL AND 
              RESOURCES DEVOTED TO THE INDO-PACIFIC.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following 
findings:</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) In fiscal year 2020, the Department of State 
        allocated $1,500,000,000 to the Indo-Pacific region in 
        bilateral and regional foreign assistance (FA) resources and 
        $798,000,000 in the fiscal year 2020 diplomatic engagement (DE) 
        budget. These amounts represent only 5 percent of the DE budget 
        and only 4 percent of the total Department of State-USAID 
        budget.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) Over the last 5 years the DE budget and 
        personnel levels in the Indo-Pacific averaged only 5 percent of 
        the total, while FA resources averaged only 4 percent of the 
        total.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) In 2020, the Department of State began a 
        process to realign certain positions at posts to ensure that 
        its personnel footprint matches the demands of great-power 
        competition, including in the Indo-Pacific.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (b) Statement of Policy.--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) It shall be the policy of the United States to 
        ensure Department of State funding levels and personnel 
        footprint in the Indo-Pacific reflect the region's high degree 
        of importance and significance to United States political, 
        economic, and security interests.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) It shall be the policy of the United States to 
        increase DE and FA funding and the quantity of personnel 
        dedicated to the Indo-Pacific region respective to the 
        Department of State's total budget.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) It shall be the policy of the United States to 
        increase the number of Defense attaches in the Indo-Pacific 
        region number of to assure coverage of all appropriate 
        Posts.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (c) Action Plan.--Not later than 180 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall provide to 
the appropriate committees of Congress an action plan with the 
following elements:</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) Identification of requirements and the 
        personnel budgetary resources needed to meet them, assuming an 
        unconstrained resource environment.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) A plan to increase the portion of the 
        Department's budget dedicated to the Indo-Pacific in terms of 
        DE and FA focused on development, economic, and security 
        assistance.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) A plan to increase the number of positions at 
        posts in the Indo-Pacific region and bureaus with 
        responsibility for the Indo-Pacific region, including a 
        description of increases at each post or bureau, a breakdown of 
        increases by cone, and a description of what each new officer 
        will do to advance United States strategic objectives in the 
        Indo-Pacific region.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (4) Defined concrete and annual benchmarks that 
        the Department will meet in implementing the action 
        plan.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (5) A description of any barriers to implementing 
        the action plan.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (d) Updates to Report and Briefing.--Every 90 days after 
the submission of the action plan described in subsection (c), the 
Secretary shall submit an update and brief the appropriate committees 
of Congress on the implementation of such action plan, with supporting 
data and including a detailed assessment of benchmarks 
reached.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (e) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized 
to be appropriated $2,000,000,000 in bilateral and regional foreign 
assistance resources to the Indo-Pacific region and $1,250,000,000 in 
diplomatic engagement resources to the Indo-Pacific region.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (f) Secretary of State Certification.--Not later than two 
years after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of 
State shall certify whether or not the benchmarks described in the 
action plan in subsection (c) have been met. This certification is non-
delegable.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (g) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this 
section, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the 
        Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the 
        Committee on Appropriations of the House of 
        Representatives.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 217. ADVANCING UNITED STATES LEADERSHIP IN THE UNITED 
              NATIONS SYSTEM.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    (a) Establishment.--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) In general.--The Secretary of State shall 
        establish, within the Bureau of International Organization 
        Affairs of the Department of State, a Special Representative 
        for Advancing United States Leadership in the United Nations 
        (referred to in this section as the ``Special 
        Representative''). The Special Representative shall serve 
        concurrently as a Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of 
        International Organization Affairs of the Department of State. 
        The Special Representative shall report directly to the 
        Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of International 
        Organization Affairs, in coordination and consultation with the 
        Representative of the United States to the United 
        Nations.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (b) Responsibilities.--The Special Representative shall 
assume responsibility for--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) promoting United States leadership and 
        participation in the United Nations system, with a focus on 
        issue areas where authoritarian nations are exercising 
        increased influence in and determining the agenda of the United 
        Nations system;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) highlighting how investments in the United 
        Nations advance United States interests and enable stronger 
        coalitions to hold authoritarian regimes to account;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) ensuring United States emphasis on the need 
        for United Nations employees to uphold the principals of 
        impartiality enshrined in the United Nations charter, rules, 
        and regulations;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (4) monitoring and developing and implementing 
        plans to counter undue influence, especially by authoritarian 
        nations, within the United Nations system;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (5) assessing how United States decisions to 
        withdraw from United Nations bodies impacts United States 
        influence at the United Nations and multilateral global 
        initiatives;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (6) promoting participation and inclusion of 
        Taiwan in the United Nations system;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (7) monitoring the pipeline of United Nations jobs 
        and identifying qualified Americans and other qualified 
        nationals to promote for these positions;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (8) tracking leadership changes in United Nations 
        secretariat, funds, programs and agencies, and developing 
        strategies to ensure that coalitions of like-minded states are 
        assembled to ensure leadership races are not won by countries 
        that do not share United States interests; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (9) advancing other priorities deemed relevant by 
        the Secretary of State to ensuring the integrity of the United 
        Nations system.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (c) Support.--The Secretary of State shall make any 
necessary adjustments to the current structure of the Bureau of 
International Organization Affairs, including the respective roles and 
responsibilities of offices in that Bureau, to ensure appropriate 
support for the mission and work of the Special 
Representative.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (d) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized 
to be appropriated not less than $5,000,000 for fiscal year 2022 and 
for each subsequent fiscal year to carry out the responsibilities under 
subsection (b).</DELETED>

     <DELETED>Subtitle B--International Security Matters</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 221. DEFINITIONS.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    In this subtitle:</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The 
        term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations, 
                the Select Committee on Intelligence, and the Committee 
                on Appropriations of the Senate; and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the 
                Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and the 
                Committee on Appropriations of the House of 
                Representatives.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) Company.--The term ``company'' means any 
        corporation, company, limited liability company, limited 
        partnership, business trust, business association, or other 
        similar entity.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) Other security forces.--The term ``other 
        security forces''--</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) includes national security forces that 
                conduct maritime security; and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) does not include self-described 
                militias or paramilitary organizations.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 222. FINDINGS.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    Congress makes the following findings:</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) The People's Republic of China aims to use its 
        growing military might in concert with other instruments of its 
        national power to displace the United States in the Indo-
        Pacific and establish hegemony over the region.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) The military balance of power in the Indo-
        Pacific region is growing increasingly unfavorable to the 
        United States because--</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) the PRC is rapidly modernizing and 
                expanding the capabilities of the PLA to project power 
                and create contested areas across the entire Indo-
                Pacific region;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) PLA modernization has largely focused 
                on areas where it possesses operational advantages and 
                can exploit weaknesses in the United States suite of 
                capabilities; and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (C) current United States force structure 
                and presence do not sufficiently counter threats in the 
                Indo-Pacific, as United States allies, bases, and 
                forces at sea in the Indo-Pacific region are 
                concentrated in large bases that are highly vulnerable 
                to the PRC's strike capabilities.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) This shift in the regional military balance 
        and erosion of conventional deterrence in the Indo-Pacific 
        region--</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) presents a substantial and imminent 
                risk to the security of the United States; 
                and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) left unchecked, could embolden the PRC 
                to take actions, including the use of military force, 
                to change the status quo before the United States can 
                mount an effective response.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (4) The PRC sees an opportunity to diminish 
        confidence among United States allies and partners in the 
        strength of United States commitments, even to the extent that 
        these nations feel compelled to bandwagon with the PRC to 
        protect their interests. The PRC is closely monitoring the 
        United States reaction to PRC pressure and coercion of United 
        States allies, searching for indicators of United States 
        resolve.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (5) Achieving so-called ``reunification'' of 
        Taiwan to mainland China is a key step for the PRC to achieve 
        its regional hegemonic ambitions. The PRC has increased the 
        frequency and scope of its exercises and operations targeting 
        Taiwan, such as amphibious assault and live-fire exercises in 
        the Taiwan Strait, PLA Air Force flights that encircle Taiwan, 
        and flights across the unofficial median line in the Taiwan 
        Strait. The Government of the PRC's full submission of Hong 
        Kong potentially accelerates the timeline of a Taiwan scenario, 
        and makes the defense of Taiwan an even more urgent 
        priority.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (6) The defense of Taiwan is critical to--
        </DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) defending the people of 
                Taiwan;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) limiting the PLA's ability to project 
                power beyond the First Island Chain, including to 
                United States territory, such as Guam and 
                Hawaii;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (C) defending the territorial integrity of 
                Japan;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (D) preventing the PLA from diverting 
                military planning, resources, and personnel to broader 
                military ambitions; and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (E) retaining the United States 
                credibility as a defender of the democratic values and 
                free-market principles embodied by Taiwan's people and 
                government;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (7) The PRC capitalized on the world's attention 
        to COVID-19 to advance its military objectives in the South 
        China Sea, intensifying and accelerating trends already 
        underway. The PRC has sent militarized survey vessels into the 
        Malaysian Exclusive Economic Zone, announced the establishment 
        of an administrative district in the Spratly and Paracel 
        Islands under the Chinese local government of Sansha, aimed a 
        fire control radar at a Philippine navy ship, encroached on 
        Indonesia's fishing grounds, sunk a Vietnamese fishing boat, 
        announced new ``research stations'' on Fiery Cross Reef and 
        Subi Reef, landed special military aircraft on Fiery Cross Reef 
        to routinize such deployments, and sent a flotilla of over 200 
        militia vessels to Whitsun Reef, a feature within the exclusive 
        economic zone of the Philippines.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (8) On July 13, 2020, the Department of State 
        clarified United States policy on the South China Sea and 
        stated that ``Beijing's claims to offshore resources across 
        most of the South China Sea are completely 
        unlawful''.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (9) These actions in the South China Sea enable 
        the PLA to exert influence and project power deeper into 
        Oceania and the Indian Ocean. As Admiral Phil Davidson, 
        Commander of Indo-Pacific Command, testified in 2019, ``In 
        short, China is now capable of controlling the South China Sea 
        in all scenarios short of war with the United 
        States.''.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (10) The PLA also continues to advance its claims 
        in the East China Sea, including through a high number of 
        surface combatant patrols and frequent entry into the 
        territorial waters of the Senkaku Islands, over which the 
        United States recognizes Japan's administrative control. In 
        April 2014, President Barack Obama stated, ``Our commitment to 
        Japan's security is absolute and article five [of the U.S.-
        Japan security treaty] covers all territory under Japan's 
        administration, including the Senkaku islands.''.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (11) On March 1, 2019, Secretary of State Michael 
        R. Pompeo stated, ``As the South China Sea is part of the 
        Pacific, any armed attack on Philippine forces, aircraft, or 
        public vessels in the South China Sea will trigger mutual 
        defense obligations under Article 4 of our Mutual Defense 
        Treaty.''.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (12) The PLA is modernizing and gaining critical 
        capability in every branch and every domain, including--
        </DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) positioning the PLA Navy to become a 
                great maritime power or ``blue-water'' navy that can 
                completely control all activity within the First Island 
                Chain and project power beyond it with a fleet of 425 
                battle force ships by 2030;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) increasing the size and range of its 
                strike capabilities, including approximately 1,900 
                ground-launched short- and intermediate-range missiles 
                capable of targeting United States allies and partners 
                in the First and Second Island chains, United States 
                bases in the Indo-Pacific, and United States forces at 
                sea;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (C) boosting capabilities for air warfare, 
                including with Russian-origin Su-35 fighters and S-400 
                air defense systems, new J-20 5th generation stealth 
                fighters, advanced H-6 bomber variants, a long-range 
                stealth bomber, and Y-20 heavy lift aircraft; 
                and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (D) making critical investments in new 
                domains of warfare, such as cyber warfare, electronic 
                warfare, and space warfare.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (13) The PRC is pursuing this modernization 
        through all means at its disposal, including its Military-Civil 
        Fusion initiative, which enlists the whole of PRC society in 
        developing and acquiring technology with military applications 
        to pursue technological advantage over the United States in 
        artificial intelligence, hypersonic glide vehicles, directed 
        energy weapons, electromagnetic railguns, counter-space 
        weapons, and other emerging capabilities.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (14) The United States lead in the development of 
        science and technology relevant to defense is eroding in the 
        face of competition from the PRC. United States research and 
        development spending on defense capabilities has declined 
        sharply as a share of global research and development. The 
        commercial sector's leading role in innovation presents certain 
        unique challenges to the Department of Defense's reliance on 
        technology for battlefield advantage.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (15) The PRC has vastly increased domestic 
        research and development expenditures, supported the growth of 
        new cutting-edge industries and tapped into a large workforce 
        to invest in fostering science and engineering 
        talent.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (16) The PRC is increasing exports of defense and 
        security capabilities to build its defense technology and 
        industrial base and improve its own military capabilities, as 
        well as its influence with countries that purchase and become 
        dependent on its military systems.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 223. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING BOLSTERING SECURITY 
              PARTNERSHIPS IN THE INDO-PACIFIC.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    It is the Sense of Congress that steps to bolster United 
States security partnership in the Indo-Pacific must include--
</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) supporting Japan in its development of long-
        range precision fires, munitions, air and missile defense 
        capacity, interoperability across all domains, maritime 
        security, and intelligence, and surveillance and reconnaissance 
        capabilities;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) launching a United States-Japan national 
        security innovation fund to solicit and support private sector 
        cooperation for new technologies that could benefit the United 
        States and Japan's mutual security objectives;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) promoting a deeper defense relationship 
        between Japan and Australia, including supporting reciprocal 
        access agreements and trilateral United States-Japan-Australia 
        intelligence sharing;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (4) encouraging and facilitating Taiwan's 
        accelerated acquisition of asymmetric defense capabilities, 
        which are crucial to defending the islands of Taiwan from 
        invasion, including long-range precision fires, munitions, 
        anti-ship missiles, coastal defense, anti-armor, air defense, 
        undersea warfare, advanced command, control, communications, 
        computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance 
        (C4ISR), and resilient command and control capabilities, and 
        increasing the conduct of relevant and practical training and 
        exercises with Taiwan's defense forces; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (5) prioritizing building the capacity of United 
        States allies and partners to protect defense 
        technology.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 224. STATEMENT OF POLICY.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    It shall be the policy of the United States to--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) prioritize the Indo-Pacific region in United 
        States foreign policy, and prioritize resources for achieving 
        United States political and military objectives in the 
        region;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) exercise freedom of operations in the 
        international waters and airspace in the Indo-Pacific maritime 
        domains, which are critical to the prosperity, stability, and 
        security of the Indo-Pacific region;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) maintain forward-deployed forces in the Indo-
        Pacific region, including a rotational bomber presence, 
        integrated missile defense capabilities, long-range precision 
        fires, undersea warfare capabilities, and diversified and 
        resilient basing and rotational presence, including support for 
        pre-positioning strategies;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (4) strengthen and deepen the alliances and 
        partnerships of the United States to build capacity and 
        capabilities, increase multilateral partnerships, modernize 
        communications architecture, address anti-access and area 
        denial challenges, and increase joint exercises and security 
        cooperation efforts;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (5) reaffirm the commitment and support of the 
        United States for allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific 
        region, including longstanding United States policy regarding--
        </DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) Article V of the Treaty of Mutual 
                Cooperation and Security between the United States and 
                Japan, signed at Washington January 19, 1960;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) Article III of the Mutual Defense 
                Treaty between the United States and the Republic of 
                Korea, signed at Washington October 1, 1953;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (C) Article IV of the Mutual Defense 
                Treaty between the United States and the Republic of 
                the Philippines, signed at Washington August 30, 1951, 
                including that, as the South China Sea is part of the 
                Pacific, any armed attack on Philippine forces, 
                aircraft or public vessels in the South China Sea will 
                trigger mutual defense obligations under Article IV of 
                our mutual defense treaty;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (D) Article IV of the Australia, New 
                Zealand, United States Security Treaty, done at San 
                Francisco September 1, 1951; and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (E) the Southeast Asia Collective Defense 
                Treaty, done at Manila September 8, 1954, together with 
                the Thanat-Rusk Communique of 1962; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (6) collaborate with United States treaty allies 
        in the Indo-Pacific to foster greater multilateral security and 
        defense cooperation with other regional partners;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (7) ensure the continuity of operations by the 
        United States Armed Forces in the Indo-Pacific region, 
        including, as appropriate, in cooperation with partners and 
        allies, in order to reaffirm the principle of freedom of 
        operations in international waters and airspace in accordance 
        with established principles and practices of international 
        law;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (8) sustain the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 
        96-8; 22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.);</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (9) sustain the``Six Assurances'' provided by the 
        United States to Taiwan in July 1982 as the foundations for 
        United States-Taiwan relations, and to deepen, to the fullest 
        extent possible, the extensive, close, and friendly relations 
        of the United States and Taiwan, including cooperation to 
        support the development of capable, ready, and modern forces 
        necessary for the defense of Taiwan;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (10) enhance security partnerships with India, 
        across Southeast Asia, and with other nations of the Indo-
        Pacific;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (11) deter acts of aggression or coercion by the 
        PRC against United States and allies' interests, especially 
        along the First Island Chain and in the Western Pacific, by 
        showing PRC leaders that the United States can and is willing 
        to deny them the ability to achieve their objectives, including 
        by--</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) consistently demonstrating the 
                political will of the United States to deepening 
                existing treaty alliances and growing new partnerships 
                as a durable, asymmetric, and unmatched strategic 
                advantage to the PRC's growing military capabilities 
                and reach;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) maintaining a system of forward-
                deployed bases in the Indo-Pacific region as the most 
                visible sign of United States resolve and commitment to 
                the region, and as platforms to ensure United States 
                operational readiness and advance interoperability with 
                allies and partners;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (C) adopting a more dispersed force 
                posture throughout the region, particularly the Western 
                Pacific, and pursuing maximum access for United States 
                mobile and relocatable launchers for long-range cruise, 
                ballistic, and hypersonic weapons throughout the Indo-
                Pacific region;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (D) fielding long-range, precision-strike 
                networks to United States and allied forces, including 
                ground-launched cruise missiles, undersea and naval 
                capabilities, and integrated air and missile defense in 
                the First Island Chain and the Second Island Chain, in 
                order to deter and prevent PRC coercion and aggression, 
                and to maximize the United States ability to 
                operate;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (E) strengthening extended deterrence to 
                ensure that escalation against key United States 
                interests would be costly, risky, and self-defeating; 
                and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (F) collaborating with allies and partners 
                to accelerate their roles in more equitably sharing the 
                burdens of mutual defense, including through the 
                acquisition and fielding of advanced capabilities and 
                training that will better enable them to repel PRC 
                aggression or coercion; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (12) maintain the capacity of the United States to 
        impose prohibitive diplomatic, economic, financial, 
        reputational, and military costs on the PRC for acts of 
        coercion or aggression, including to defend itself and its 
        allies regardless of the point of origin of attacks against 
        them.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 225. FOREIGN MILITARY FINANCING IN THE INDO-PACIFIC AND 
              AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR SOUTHEAST ASIA 
              MARITIME SECURITY PROGRAMS AND DIPLOMATIC OUTREACH 
              ACTIVITIES.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    (a) Foreign Military Financing Funding.--In addition to 
any amount appropriated pursuant to section 23 of the Arms Export 
Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2763) (relating to foreign military financing 
assistance), there is authorized to be appropriated for each of fiscal 
years 2022 through fiscal year 2026 for activities in the Indo-Pacific 
region in accordance with this section--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) $110,000,000 for fiscal year 2022;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) $125,000,000 for fiscal year 2023;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) $130,000,000 for fiscal year 2024;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (4) $140,000,000 for fiscal year 2025; 
        and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (5) $150,000,000 for fiscal year 2026.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (b) Southeast Maritime Law Enforcement Initiative.--There 
is authorized to be appropriated $10,000,000 for each of fiscal years 
2022 through 2026 for the Department of State for International 
Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) for the support of the 
Southeast Asia Maritime Law Enforcement Initiative.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (c) Diplomatic Outreach Activities.--There is authorized 
to be appropriated to the Department of State, $1,000,000 for each of 
fiscal years 2022 through 2026, which shall be used--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) to conduct, in coordination with the 
        Department of Defense, outreach activities, including 
        conferences and symposia, to familiarize partner countries, 
        particularly in the Indo-Pacific region, with the United States 
        interpretation of international law relating to freedom of the 
        seas; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) to work with allies and partners in the Indo-
        Pacific region to better align respective interpretations of 
        international law relating to freedom of the seas, including on 
        the matters of operations by military ships in exclusive 
        economic zones, innocent passage through territorial seas, and 
        transits through international straits.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (d) Program Authorization and Purpose.--Using amounts 
appropriate pursuant to subsection (a), the Secretary of State, in 
coordination with the Secretary of Defense, is authorized to provide 
assistance, for the purpose of increasing maritime security and domain 
awareness for countries in the Indo-Pacific region--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) to provide assistance to national military or 
        other security forces of such countries that have maritime 
        security missions among their functional 
        responsibilities;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) to provide training to ministry, agency, and 
        headquarters level organizations for such forces; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) to provide assistance to and training to other 
        relevant foreign affairs, maritime, or security-related 
        ministries, agencies, departments, or offices that manage and 
        oversee maritime activities and policy that the Secretary of 
        State may so designate.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (e) Designation of Assistance.--Assistance provided by the 
Secretary of State under this section shall be known as the ``Indo-
Pacific Maritime Security Initiative'' (in this section referred to as 
the ``Initiative'').</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (f) Program Objectives.--Assistance provided through the 
Initiative may be used to accomplish the following 
objectives:</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) Retaining unhindered access to and use of 
        international waterways in the Indo-Pacific region that are 
        critical to ensuring the security and free flow of commerce and 
        achieving United States national security objectives.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) Improving maritime domain awareness in the 
        Indo-Pacific region.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) Countering piracy in the Indo-Pacific 
        region.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (4) Disrupting illicit maritime trafficking 
        activities and other forms of maritime trafficking activity in 
        the Indo-Pacific that directly benefit organizations that have 
        been determined to be a security threat to the United 
        States.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (5) Enhancing the maritime capabilities of a 
        country or regional organization to respond to emerging threats 
        to maritime security in the Indo-Pacific region.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (6) Strengthening United States alliances and 
        partnerships in Southeast Asia and other parts of the Indo-
        Pacific region.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (g) Authorization of Appropriations.--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) In general.--Of the amount appropriated 
        pursuant to subsection(a) and section 23 of the Arms Export 
        Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2763) (relating to foreign military 
        financing assistance), there is authorized to be appropriated 
        to the Department of State for the Indo-Pacific Maritime 
        Security Initiative and other related regional programs 
        exactly--</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) $70,000,000 for fiscal year 
                2022;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) $80,000,000 for fiscal year 
                2023;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (C) $90,000,000 for fiscal year 
                2024;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (D) $100,000,000 for fiscal year 2025; 
                and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (E) $110,000,000 for fiscal year 
                2026.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) Rule of construction.--The ``Indo-Pacific 
        Maritime Security Initiative'' and funds authorized for the 
        Initiative shall include existing regional programs related to 
        maritime security, including the Southeast Asia Maritime 
        Security Initiative.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (h) Eligibility and Priorities for Assistance.--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) In general.--The Secretary of State shall use 
        the following considerations when selecting which countries in 
        the Indo-Pacific region should receive assistance pursuant to 
        the Initiative:</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) Assistance may be provided to a 
                country in the Indo-Pacific region to enhance the 
                capabilities of that country according to the 
                objectives outlined in (f), or of a regional 
                organization that includes that country, to conduct--
                </DELETED>
                        <DELETED>    (i) maritime intelligence, 
                        surveillance, and reconnaissance;</DELETED>
                        <DELETED>    (ii) littoral and port 
                        security;</DELETED>
                        <DELETED>    (iii) Coast Guard 
                        operations;</DELETED>
                        <DELETED>    (iv) command and control; 
                        and</DELETED>
                        <DELETED>    (v) management and oversight of 
                        maritime activities.</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) Priority shall be placed on assistance 
                to enhance the maritime security capabilities of the 
                military or security forces of countries in the Indo-
                Pacific region that have maritime missions and the 
                government agencies responsible for such 
                forces.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) Types of assistance and training.--</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) Authorized elements of assistance.--
                Assistance provided under paragraph (1)(A) may include 
                the provision of equipment, training, and small-scale 
                military construction.</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) Required elements of assistance and 
                training.--Assistance and training provided under 
                subparagraph (A) shall include elements that promote--
                </DELETED>
                        <DELETED>    (i) the observance of and respect 
                        for human rights; and</DELETED>
                        <DELETED>    (ii) respect for legitimate 
                        civilian authority within the country to which 
                        the assistance is provided.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (i) Joint Task Force.--The Department of Defense shall 
establish a joint, interagency task force to assess, respond to, and 
coordinate with allies and partners in response to the use of grey zone 
tactics by state and non-state actors in the Indo-Pacific maritime 
domain, including--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) conducting domain awareness operations, 
        intelligence fusion, and multi-sensor correlation to detect, 
        monitor, and hand off suspected grey zone activities;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) promoting security, cooperation, and capacity 
        building; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) coordinating country team and partner nation 
        initiatives in order to counter the use of grey zone tactics by 
        adversaries.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (j) Annual Report.--The Secretary of State and the 
Secretary of Defense shall jointly submit to the appropriate committees 
of Congress each year a report on the status of the provision of 
equipment, training, supplies, or other services provided pursuant to 
the Initiative during the preceding 12 months.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (k) Notice to Congress on Assistance and Training.--Not 
later than 15 days before exercising the authority under subsection (a) 
with respect to a recipient foreign country, the Secretary of State 
shall submit a notification in writing to the appropriate committees of 
Congress.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 226. FOREIGN MILITARY FINANCING COMPACT PILOT PROGRAM IN 
              THE INDO-PACIFIC.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    (a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized 
to be appropriated $20,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2022 and 2023 
for the creation of a pilot program for foreign military financing 
compacts.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (b) Assistance.--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) In general.--The Secretary of State is 
        authorized to create a pilot program, for a duration of two 
        years, with an assessment for any additional or permanent 
        programming, to provide assistance under this section for each 
        country that enters into an FMF Challenge Compact with the 
        United States pursuant to subsection (d) to support policies 
        and programs that advance the progress of the country in 
        achieving lasting security and civilian-military governance 
        through respect for human rights, good governance (including 
        transparency and free and fair elections), and cooperation with 
        United States and international counter-terrorism, anti-
        trafficking, and counter-crime efforts and programs.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) Form of assistance.--Assistance under this 
        subsection may be provided in the form of grants, cooperative 
        agreements, contracts, or no-interest loans to the government 
        of an eligible country described in subsection (c).</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (c) Eligible Countries.--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) In general.--A country shall be a candidate 
        country for purposes of eligibility for assistance for fiscal 
        year 2022 and 2023 if--</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) the country is classified as a lower 
                middle income country in the then most recent edition 
                of the World Development Report for Reconstruction and 
                Development published by the International Bank for 
                Reconstruction and Development and has an income 
                greater than the historical ceiling for International 
                Development Association eligibility for the fiscal year 
                involved; and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) the Secretary of State determines that 
                the country is committed to seeking just and democratic 
                governance, including with a demonstrated commitment 
                to--</DELETED>
                        <DELETED>    (i) the promotion of political 
                        pluralism, equality, and the rule of 
                        law;</DELETED>
                        <DELETED>    (ii) respect for human and civil 
                        rights;</DELETED>
                        <DELETED>    (iii) protection of private 
                        property rights;</DELETED>
                        <DELETED>    (iv) transparency and 
                        accountability of government;</DELETED>
                        <DELETED>    (v) anti-corruption; and</DELETED>
                        <DELETED>    (vi) the institution of effective 
                        civilian control, professionalization, respect 
                        for human rights by, and accountability of the 
                        armed forces.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) Identification of eligible countries.--Not 
        later than 90 days prior to the date on which the Secretary of 
        State determines eligible countries for an FMF Challenge 
        Compact, the Secretary--</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) shall prepare and submit to the 
                appropriate congressional committees a report that 
                contains a list of all eligible countries identified 
                that have met the requirements under paragraph (1) for 
                the fiscal year; and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) shall consult with the appropriate 
                congressional committees on the extent to which such 
                countries meet the criteria described in paragraph 
                (1).</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (d) FMF Challenge Compact.--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) Compact.--The Secretary of State may provide 
        assistance for an eligible country only if the country enters 
        into an agreement with the United States, to be known as an 
        ``FMF Challenge Compact'' (in this subsection referred to as 
        a``Compact'') that establishes a multi-year plan for achieving 
        shared security objectives in furtherance of the purposes of 
        this title.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) Elements.--The elements of the Compact shall 
        be those listed in subsection (c)(1)(B) for determining 
        eligibility, and be designed to significantly advance the 
        performance of those commitments during the period of the 
        Compact.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) In general.--The Compact should take into 
        account the national strategy of the eligible country and shall 
        include--</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) the specific objectives that the 
                country and the United States expect to achieve during 
                the term of the Compact, including both how the foreign 
                military financing under the Compact will advance 
                shared security interests and advance partner capacity 
                building efforts as well as to advance national efforts 
                towards just and democratic governance;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) the responsibilities of the country 
                and the United States in the achievement of such 
                objectives;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (C) regular benchmarks to measure, where 
                appropriate, progress toward achieving such objectives; 
                and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (D) the strategy of the eligible country 
                to sustain progress made toward achieving such 
                objectives after expiration of the Compact.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (e) Congressional Consultation Prior to Compact 
Negotiations.--Not later than 15 days before commencing negotiations of 
a Compact with an eligible country, the Secretary of State shall 
consult with the appropriate congressional committees with respect to 
the proposed Compact negotiation and shall identify the objectives and 
mechanisms to be used for the negotiation of the Compact.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (f) Assessment of Pilot Program and Recommendations.--Not 
later than 90 days after the conclusion of the pilot program, the 
Secretary of State shall provide a report to the appropriate 
congressional committees with respect to the pilot program, including 
an assessment of the success and utility of the pilot program 
established under this subsection in meeting United States objectives 
and a recommendation with respect to whether to continue on a pilot or 
permanent basis a further foreign military financing compact 
program.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 227. ADDITIONAL FUNDING FOR INTERNATIONAL MILITARY 
              EDUCATION AND TRAINING IN THE INDO-PACIFIC.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    There is authorized to be appropriated for each of fiscal 
years 2022 through fiscal year 2026 for the Department of State, out of 
amounts appropriated or otherwise made available for assistance under 
chapter 5 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 
2347 et seq.) (relating to international military education and 
training (IMET) assistance), $45,000,000 for activities in the Indo-
Pacific region in accordance with this Act.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 228. PRIORITIZING EXCESS DEFENSE ARTICLE TRANSFERS FOR 
              THE INDO-PACIFIC.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that 
the United States Government should prioritize the review of excess 
defense article transfers to Indo-Pacific partners.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (b) Five-Year Plan.--Not later than 90 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, the President shall develop a five-year 
plan to prioritize excess defense article transfers to the Indo-Pacific 
and provide a report describing such plan to the appropriate 
congressional committees.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (c) Transfer Authority.--Section 516(c)(2) of the Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2321j(c)(2)) is amended by inserting 
``, Thailand, Indonesia, Vietnam, and Malaysia'' after ``and to the 
Philippines''.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (d) Required Coordination.--The United States Government 
shall coordinate and align excess defense article transfers with 
capacity building efforts of regional allies and partners.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 229. PRIORITIZING EXCESS NAVAL VESSEL TRANSFERS FOR THE 
              INDO-PACIFIC.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    (a) Authority.--The President is authorized to transfer to 
a government of a country listed pursuant to the amendment made under 
section 228(c) two OLIVER HAZARD PERRY class guided missile frigates on 
a grant basis under section 516 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 
(22 U.S.C. 2321j).</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (b) Grants Not Counted in Annual Total of Transferred 
Excess Defense Articles.--The value of a vessel transferred to another 
country on a grant basis pursuant to authority provided by this section 
shall not be counted against the aggregate value of excess defense 
articles transferred in any fiscal year under section 516 of the 
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2321j).</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (c) Costs of Transfers.--Any expense incurred by the 
United States in connection with a transfer authorized by this section 
shall be charged to the recipient notwithstanding section 516(e) of the 
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2321j(e)).</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (d) Repair and Refurbishment in United States Shipyards.--
To the maximum extent practicable, the President shall require, as a 
condition of the transfer of a vessel under this subsection, that the 
recipient to which the vessel is transferred have such repair or 
refurbishment of the vessel as is needed, before the vessel joins the 
naval forces of that recipient, performed at a shipyard located in the 
United States.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (e) Expiration of Authority.--The authority to transfer a 
vessel under this section shall expire at the end of the 3-year period 
beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 230. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON MARITIME FREEDOM OF 
              OPERATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL WATERWAYS AND AIRSPACE OF THE 
              INDO-PACIFIC AND ON ARTIFICIAL LAND FEATURES IN THE SOUTH 
              CHINA SEA.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    (a) Sense of Congress.--Congress--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) condemns coercive and threatening actions or 
        the use of force to impede freedom of operations in 
        international airspace by military or civilian aircraft, to 
        alter the status quo, or to destabilize the Indo-Pacific 
        region;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) urges the Government of China to refrain from 
        implementing the declared East China Sea Air Defense 
        Identification Zone (ADIZ), or an ADIZ in the South China Sea, 
        which is contrary to freedom of overflight in international 
        airspace, and to refrain from taking similar provocative 
        actions elsewhere in the Indo-Pacific region;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) reaffirms that the 2016 Arbitral Tribunal's 
        decision is final and legally binding on both parties and that 
        the People's Republic of China's claims to offshore resources 
        across most of the South China Sea are unlawful; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (4) condemns the People's Republic of China for 
        failing to abide by the 2016 Arbitral Tribunal's ruling, 
        despite Chinese obligations as a state party to the United 
        Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (b) Statement of Policy.--It shall be the policy of the 
United States to--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) reaffirm its commitment and support for allies 
        and partners in the Indo-Pacific region, including longstanding 
        United States policy regarding Article V of the United States-
        Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty and reaffirm its position 
        that Article V of the United States-Japan Mutual Defense Treaty 
        applies to the Japanese-administered Senkaku Islands;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) oppose claims that impinge on the rights, 
        freedoms, and lawful use of the sea, or the airspace above it, 
        that belong to all nations, and oppose the militarization of 
        new and reclaimed land features in the South China 
        Sea;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) continue certain policies with respect to the 
        PRC claims in the South China Sea, namely--</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) that PRC claims in the South China 
                Sea, including to offshore resources across most of the 
                South China Sea, are unlawful;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) that the PRC cannot lawfully assert a 
                maritime claim vis-a-vis the Philippines in areas that 
                the Tribunal found to be in the Philippines' Exclusive 
                Economic Zone (EEZ) or on its continental 
                shelf;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (C) to reject any PRC claim to waters 
                beyond a 12 nautical mile territorial sea derived from 
                islands its claims in the Spratly Islands; 
                and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (D) that the PRC has no lawful territorial 
                or maritime claim to James Shoal;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (4) urge all parties to refrain from engaging in 
        destabilizing activities, including illegal occupation or 
        efforts to unlawfully assert administration over disputed 
        claims;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (5) ensure that disputes are managed without 
        intimidation, coercion, or force;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (6) call on all claimants to clarify or adjust 
        claims in accordance with international law;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (7) uphold the principle that territorial and 
        maritime claims, including territorial waters or territorial 
        seas, must be derived from land features and otherwise comport 
        with international law;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (8) oppose the imposition of new fishing 
        regulations covering disputed areas in the South China Sea, 
        regulations which have raised tensions in the region;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (9) support an effective Code of Conduct, if that 
        Code of Conduct reflects the interests of Southeast Asian 
        claimant states and does not serve as a vehicle for the 
        People's Republic of China to advance its unlawful maritime 
        claims;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (10) reaffirm that an existing body of 
        international rules and guidelines, including the International 
        Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, done at London 
        October 12, 1972 (COLREGs), is sufficient to ensure the safety 
        of navigation between the United States Armed Forces and the 
        forces of other countries, including the People's Republic of 
        China;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (11) support the development of regional 
        institutions and bodies, including the ASEAN Regional Forum, 
        the ASEAN Defense Minister's Meeting Plus, the East Asia 
        Summit, and the expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum, to build 
        practical cooperation in the region and reinforce the role of 
        international law;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (12) encourage the deepening of partnerships with 
        other countries in the region for maritime domain awareness and 
        capacity building, as well as efforts by the United States 
        Government to explore the development of appropriate 
        multilateral mechanisms for a ``common operating picture'' in 
        the South China Sea among Southeast Asian countries that would 
        serve to help countries avoid destabilizing behavior and deter 
        risky and dangerous activities;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (13) oppose actions by any country to prevent any 
        other country from exercising its sovereign rights to the 
        resources of the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and continental 
        shelf by making claims to those areas in the South China Sea 
        that have no support in international law; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (14) assure the continuity of operations by the 
        United States in the Indo-Pacific region, including, when 
        appropriate, in cooperation with partners and allies, to 
        reaffirm the principle of freedom of operations in 
        international waters and airspace in accordance with 
        established principles and practices of international 
        law.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 231. REPORT ON CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT OF INDO-PACIFIC 
              ALLIES AND PARTNERS.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) the Secretary of State should expand and 
        strengthen existing measures under the United States 
        Conventional Arms Transfer Policy to provide capabilities to 
        allies and partners consistent with agreed-on division of 
        responsibility for alliance roles, missions and capabilities, 
        prioritizing allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific region in 
        accordance with United States strategic imperatives;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) the United States should design for export to 
        Indo-Pacific allies and partners capabilities critical to 
        maintaining a favorable military balance in the region, 
        including long-range precision fires, air and missile defense 
        systems, anti-ship cruise missiles, land attack cruise 
        missiles, conventional hypersonic systems, intelligence, 
        surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities, and command and 
        control systems;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) the United States should pursue, to the 
        maximum extent possible, anticipatory technology security and 
        foreign disclosure policy on the systems described in paragraph 
        (2); and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (4) the Secretary of State, in coordination with 
        the Secretary of Defense, should--</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) urge allies and partners to invest in 
                sufficient quantities of munitions to meet contingency 
                requirements and avoid the need for accessing United 
                States stocks in wartime; and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) cooperate with allies to deliver such 
                munitions, or when necessary, to increase allies' 
                capacity to produce such munitions.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (b) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this 
section, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
        Senate;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) the Committee on Armed Services of the 
        Senate;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House 
        of Representatives; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (4) the Committee on Armed Services of the House 
        of Representatives.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (c) Report.--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the 
        date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in 
        coordination with the Secretary of Defense, shall submit a 
        report to the appropriate committees of Congress that describes 
        United States priorities for building more capable security 
        partners in the Indo-Pacific region.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) Matters to be included.--The report required 
        under paragraph (1) shall--</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) provide a priority list of defense and 
                military capabilities that Indo-Pacific allies and 
                partners must possess for the United States to be able 
                to achieve its military objectives in the Indo-Pacific 
                region;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) identify, from the list referred to in 
                subparagraph (A), the capabilities that are best 
                provided, or can only be provided, by the United 
                States;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (C) identify--</DELETED>
                        <DELETED>    (i) actions required to prioritize 
                        United States Government resources and 
                        personnel to expedite fielding the capabilities 
                        identified in subparagraph (B); and</DELETED>
                        <DELETED>    (ii) steps needed to fully account 
                        for and a plan to integrate all means of United 
                        States foreign military sales, direct 
                        commercial sales, security assistance, and all 
                        applicable authorities of the Department of 
                        State and the Department of Defense;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (D) assess the requirements for United 
                States security assistance, including International 
                Military Education and Training, in the Indo-Pacific 
                region, as a part of the means to deliver critical 
                partner capability requirements identified in 
                subparagraph (B);</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (E) assess the resources necessary to meet 
                the requirements for United States security assistance, 
                and identify resource gaps;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (F) assess the major obstacles to 
                fulfilling requirements for United States security 
                assistance in the Indo-Pacific region, including 
                resources and personnel limits, foreign legislative and 
                policy barriers, and factors related to specific 
                partner countries;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (G) identify limitations on the United 
                States ability to provide such capabilities, including 
                those identified under subparagraph (B), because of 
                existing United States treaty obligations, United 
                States policies, or other regulations;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (H) recommend improvements to the process 
                for developing requirements for partners capabilities; 
                and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (I) identify required jointly agreed 
                recommendations for infrastructure and posture, based 
                on any ongoing mutual dialogues.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) Form.--The report required under this 
        subsection shall be unclassified, but may include a classified 
        annex.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 232. REPORT ON NATIONAL TECHNOLOGY AND INDUSTRIAL 
              BASE.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) a more streamlined, shared, and coordinated 
        approach, which leverages economies of scale with major allies, 
        is necessary for the United States to retain its lead in 
        defense technology;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) allowing for the export, re-export, or 
        transfer of defense-related technologies and services to 
        members of the national technology and industrial base (as 
        defined in section 2500 of title 10, United States Code) would 
        advance United States security interests by helping to leverage 
        the defense-related technologies and skilled workforces of 
        trusted allies to reduce the dependence on other countries, 
        including countries that pose challenges to United States 
        interests around the world, for defense-related innovation and 
        investment; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) it is in the interest of the United States to 
        continue to increase cooperation with Australia, Canada, and 
        the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to 
        protect critical defense-related technology and services and 
        leverage the investments of like-minded, major ally nations in 
        order to maximize the strategic edge afforded by defense 
        technology innovation.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (b) Report.--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the 
        date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall 
        submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees 
        that--</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) describes the Department of State's 
                efforts to facilitate access among the national 
                technology and industrial base to defense articles and 
                services subject to the United States Munitions List 
                under section 38(a)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act 
                (22 U.S.C. 2778(a)(1)); and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) identifies foreign legal, regulatory, 
                foreign policy, or other challenges or considerations 
                that prevent or frustrate these efforts, to include any 
                gaps in the respective export control regimes 
                implemented by United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
                Northern Ireland, Australia, or Canada.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) Form.--This report required under paragraph 
        (1) shall be unclassified, but may include a classified 
        annex.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 233. REPORT ON DIPLOMATIC OUTREACH WITH RESPECT TO 
              CHINESE MILITARY INSTALLATIONS OVERSEAS.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    (a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with 
the Secretary of Defense, shall submit a report to the appropriate 
congressional committees regarding United States diplomatic engagement 
with other nations that host or are considering hosting any military 
installation of the Government of the People's Republic of 
China.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (b) Matters To Be Included.--The report required under 
subsection (a) shall include--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) a list of countries that currently host or are 
        considering hosting any military installation of the Government 
        of the People's Republic of China;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) a detailed description of United States 
        diplomatic and related efforts to countries that are 
        considering hosting a military installation of the Government 
        of the People's Republic of China, and the results of such 
        efforts;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) an assessment on the adverse impact on United 
        States interests of the Government of the People's Republic of 
        China successfully establishing a military installation at any 
        of the locations it is currently considering;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (4) a description and list of any commercial ports 
        outside of the People's Republic of China that the United 
        States Government assesses could be used by the Government of 
        the People's Republic of China for military purposes, and any 
        diplomatic efforts with the governments of the countries where 
        such ports are located;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (5) the impact of the military installations of 
        the Government of the People's Republic of China on United 
        States interests; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (6) lessons learned from the diplomatic experience 
        of addressing the PRC's first overseas base in 
        Djibouti.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (c) Form of Report.--The report required under subsection 
(a) shall be classified, but may include a unclassified 
summary.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 234. STATEMENT OF POLICY REGARDING UNIVERSAL 
              IMPLEMENTATION OF UNITED NATIONS SANCTIONS ON NORTH 
              KOREA.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    It is the policy of the United States to sustain maximum 
economic pressure on the Government of the Democratic People's Republic 
of Korea (referred to in this section as the ``DPRK'') until the regime 
undertakes complete, verifiable, and irreversible actions toward 
denuclearization, including by--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) pressing all nations, including the PRC, to 
        implement and enforce existing United Nations sanctions with 
        regard to the DPRK;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) pressing all nations, including the PRC, and 
        in accordance with United Nations Security Council resolutions, 
        to end the practice of hosting DPRK citizens as guest workers, 
        recognizing that such workers are demonstrated to constitute an 
        illicit source of revenue for the DPRK regime and its nuclear 
        ambitions;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) pressing all nations, including the PRC, to 
        pursue rigorous interdiction of shipments to and from the DPRK, 
        including ship-to-ship transfers, consistent with United 
        Nations Security Council resolutions;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (4) pressing the PRC and PRC entities--</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) to cease business activities with 
                United Nations-designated entities and their affiliates 
                in the DPRK; and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) to expel from the PRC individuals who 
                enable the DPRK to acquire materials for its nuclear 
                and ballistic missile programs; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (5) enforcing United Nations Security Council 
        resolutions with respect to the DPRK and United States 
        sanctions, including those pursuant to the North Korea 
        Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016 (Public Law 114-
        122), the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions 
        Act (Public Law 115-44), the Otto Warmbier North Korea Nuclear 
        Sanctions and Enforcement Act of 2019 (title LXXI of division F 
        of Public Law 116-92), and relevant United States executive 
        orders.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 235. LIMITATION ON ASSISTANCE TO COUNTRIES HOSTING 
              CHINESE MILITARY INSTALLATIONS.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) although it casts the Belt and Road Initiative 
        (BRI) as a development initiative, the People's Republic of 
        China is also utilizing the BRI to advance its own security 
        interests, including to expand its power projection 
        capabilities and facilitate greater access for the People's 
        Liberation Army through overseas military installations; 
        and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) the expansion of the People's Liberation Army 
        globally through overseas military installations will undermine 
        the medium- and long-term security of the United States and the 
        security and development of strategic partners in critical 
        regions around the world, which is at odds with United States 
        goals to promote peace, prosperity, and self-reliance among 
        partner nations, including through the Millennium Challenge 
        Corporation.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (b) Limitation on Assistance.--Except as provided in 
subsection (c), for fiscal years 2022 through 2031, the government of a 
country that is hosting on its territory a military installation of the 
Government of the People's Republic of China or facilitates the 
expansion of the presence of the People's Liberation Army for purposes 
other than participating in United Nations peacekeeping operations or 
for temporary humanitarian, medical, and disaster relief operations in 
such country shall not be eligible for assistance under sections 609 or 
616 of the Millennium Challenge Act of 2003 (22 U.S.C. 7708, 
7715).</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (c) National Interest Waiver.--The President may, on a 
case by case basis, waive the limitation in subsection (b) if the 
President submits to the appropriate congressional committees--
</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) a written determination that the waiver is 
        important to the national interests of the United States; 
        and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) a detailed explanation of how the waiver is 
        important to those interests.</DELETED>

   <DELETED>Subtitle C--Regional Strategies To Counter the People's 
                      Republic of China</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 241. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON COOPERATION WITH ALLIES AND 
              PARTNERS AROUND THE WORLD WITH RESPECT TO THE PEOPLE'S 
              REPUBLIC OF CHINA.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    It is the policy of the United States--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) to strengthen alliances and partnerships 
        Europe and with like-minded countries around the globe to 
        effectively compete with the People's Republic of China; 
        and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) to work in collaboration with such allies and 
        partners--</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) to address significant diplomatic, 
                economic, and military challenges posed by the People's 
                Republic of China;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) to deter the People's Republic of 
                China from pursuing military aggression;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (C) to promote the peaceful resolution of 
                territorial disputes in accordance with international 
                law;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (D) to promote private sector-led long-
                term economic development while countering efforts by 
                the Government of the People's Republic of China to 
                leverage predatory economic practices as a means of 
                political and economic coercion in the Indo-Pacific 
                region and beyond;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (E) to promote the values of democracy and 
                human rights, including through efforts to end the 
                repression by the Chinese Communist Party of political 
                dissidents and Uyghurs and other ethnic Muslim 
                minorities, Tibetan Buddhists, Christians, and other 
                minorities;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (F) to respond to the crackdown by the 
                Chinese Communist Party, in contravention of the 
                commitments made under the Sino-British Joint 
                Declaration of 1984 and the Basic Law of Hong Kong, on 
                the legitimate aspirations of the people of Hong Kong; 
                and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (G) to counter the Chinese Communist Party 
                efforts to spread disinformation in the People's 
                Republic of China and beyond with respect to the 
                response of the Chinese Communist Party to COVID-
                19.</DELETED>

             <DELETED>PART I--WESTERN HEMISPHERE</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 245. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING UNITED STATES-CANADA 
              RELATIONS.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    It is the sense of Congress that--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) the United States and Canada have a unique 
        relationship based on shared geography, extensive personal 
        connections, deep economic ties, mutual defense commitments, 
        and a shared vision to uphold democracy, human rights, and the 
        rules based international order established after World War 
        II;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) the United States and Canada can better 
        address China's economic, political, and security influence 
        through closer cooperation on counternarcotics, environmental 
        stewardship, transparent practices in public procurement and 
        infrastructure planning, the Arctic, energy and connectivity 
        issues, trade and commercial relations, bilateral legal 
        matters, and support for democracy, good governance, and human 
        rights;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) amidst the COVID-19 pandemic, the United 
        States and Canada should maintain joint initiatives to address 
        border management, commercial and trade relations, a shared 
        approach with respect to the People's Republic of China, and 
        transnational challenges, including pandemics and climate 
        change;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (4) the United States and Canada should enhance 
        cooperation to counter Chinese disinformation, influence 
        operations, economic espionage, and propaganda 
        efforts;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (5) the People's Republic of China's 
        infrastructure investments, particularly in 5G 
        telecommunications technology, extraction of natural resources, 
        and port infrastructure, pose national security risks for the 
        United States and Canada;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (6) the United States should share, as 
        appropriate, intelligence gathered regarding--</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) Huawei's 5G capabilities; 
                and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) the Chinese Government's intentions 
                with respect to 5G expansion;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (7) the United States and Canada should continue 
        to advance collaborative initiatives to implement the January 
        9, 2020, United States-Canada Joint Action Plan on Critical 
        Minerals Development Collaboration; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (8) the United States and Canada must prioritize 
        cooperation on continental defense and in the Arctic, including 
        by modernizing the North American Aerospace Defense Command 
        (NORAD) to effectively defend the Northern Hemisphere against 
        the range of threats by peer competitors, including long range 
        missiles and high-precision weapons.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 246. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING THE GOVERNMENT OF 
              CHINA'S ARBITRARY IMPRISONMENT OF CANADIAN 
              CITIZENS.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    It is the sense of Congress that--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) the Government of the People's Republic of 
        China's apparent arbitrary detention and abusive treatment of 
        Canadian nationals Michael Spavor and Michael Kovrig in 
        apparent retaliation for the Government of Canada's arrest of 
        Meng Wanzhou is deeply concerning;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) the Government of Canada has shown 
        international leadership by--</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) upholding the rule of law and 
                complying with its international legal obligations, 
                including those pursuant to the Extradition Treaty 
                Between the United States of America and Canada, signed 
                at Washington December 3, 1971; and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) launching the Declaration Against 
                Arbitrary Detention in State-to-State Relations, which 
                has been endorsed by 57 countries and the European 
                Union and reaffirms well-established prohibitions under 
                international human rights conventions against the 
                arbitrary detention of foreign nationals to be used as 
                leverage in state-to-state relations; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) the United States continues to join the 
        Government of Canada in calling for the immediate release of 
        Michael Spavor and Michael Kovrig and for due process for 
        Canadian national Robert Schellenberg.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 247. STRATEGY TO ENHANCE COOPERATION WITH 
              CANADA.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    (a) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit a strategy to the 
Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services of 
the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on 
Armed Services of the House of Representatives that describes how the 
United States will enhance cooperation with the Government of Canada in 
managing relations with the Government of China.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (b) Elements.--The strategy required under subsection (a) 
shall--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) identify key policy points of convergence and 
        divergence between the United States and Canada in managing 
        relations with the People's Republic of China in the areas of 
        technology, trade, economic practices, cyber security, secure 
        supply chains and critical minerals, and illicit 
        narcotics;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) include the development coordination efforts 
        with Canadian counterparts to enhance the cooperation between 
        the United States and Canada with respect to--</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) managing economic relations with the 
                People's Republic of China;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) democracy and human rights in the 
                People's Republic of China;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (C) technology issues involving the 
                People's Republic of China;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (D) defense issues involving the People's 
                Republic of China; and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (E) international law enforcement and 
                transnational organized crime issues.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) detail diplomatic efforts and future plans to 
        work with Canada to counter Chinese projection of an 
        authoritarian governing model around the world;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (4) detail diplomatic, defense, and intelligence 
        cooperation to date and future plans to support Canadian 
        efforts to identify cost-effective alternatives to Huawei's 5G 
        technology;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (5) detail diplomatic and defense collaboration--
        </DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) to advance joint United States-
                Canadian priorities for responsible stewardship in the 
                Arctic Region; and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) to counter Chinese efforts to project 
                political, economic, and military influence into the 
                Arctic Region; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (6) detail diplomatic efforts to work with Canada 
        to track and counter Chinese attempts to exert influence across 
        the multilateral system, including at the World Health 
        Organization.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (c) Form.--The strategy required under this section shall 
be submitted in an unclassified form that can be made available to the 
public, but may include a classified annex, if necessary.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (d) Consultation.--Not later than 90 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, and not less frequently than every 180 
days thereafter, the Secretary of State shall consult with the 
appropriate congressional committees regarding the development and 
implementation of the strategy required under this section.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 248. STRATEGY TO STRENGTHEN ECONOMIC COMPETITIVENESS, 
              GOVERNANCE, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW IN LATIN 
              AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    (a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation with 
the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Commerce, the Attorney 
General, the United States Trade Representative, and the Chief 
Executive Officer of the United States International Development 
Finance Corporation, shall submit a multi-year strategy for increasing 
United States economic competitiveness and promoting good governance, 
human rights, and the rule of law in Latin American and Caribbean 
countries, particularly in the areas of investment, equitable and 
sustainable development, commercial relations, anti-corruption 
activities, and infrastructure projects, to--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
        Senate;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) the Committee on Finance of the 
        Senate;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) the Committee on Armed Services of the 
        Senate;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (4) the Committee on Appropriations of the 
        Senate;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (5) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House 
        of Representatives;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (6) the Committee on Armed Services of the House 
        of Representatives;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (7) the Committee on Ways and Means of the House 
        of Representatives; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (8) the Committee on Appropriations of the House 
        of Representatives.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (b) Additional Elements.--The strategy required under 
subsection (a) shall include a plan of action, including benchmarks to 
achieve measurable progress, to--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) enhance the technical capacity of countries in 
        the region to advance the sustainable development of equitable 
        economies;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) reduce trade and non-tariff barriers between 
        the countries of the Americas;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) facilitate a more open, transparent, and 
        competitive environment for United States businesses in the 
        region;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (4) establish frameworks or mechanisms to review 
        long term financial sustainability and security implications of 
        foreign investments in strategic sectors or services, including 
        transportation, communications, natural resources, and 
        energy;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (5) establish competitive and transparent 
        infrastructure project selection and procurement processes that 
        promote transparency, open competition, financial 
        sustainability, adherence to robust global standards, and the 
        employment of the local workforce;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (6) strengthen legal structures critical to robust 
        democratic governance, fair competition, combat corruption, and 
        end impunity;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (7) identify and mitigate obstacles to private 
        sector-led economic growth in Latin America and the Caribbean; 
        and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (8) maintain transparent and affordable access to 
        the internet and digital infrastructure in the Western 
        Hemisphere.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (c) Reporting Requirement.--Not later than 1 year after 
the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the 
Secretary of State, after consultation with the Secretary of the 
Treasury, the Secretary of Commerce, the Attorney General, the United 
States Trade Representative, and the leadership of the United States 
International Development Finance Corporation, shall brief the 
congressional committees listed in subsection (a) regarding the 
implementation of this part, including examples of successes and 
challenges.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 249. ENGAGEMENT IN REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL 
              ORGANIZATIONS IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE 
              CARIBBEAN.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    (a) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this 
section, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
        Senate;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
        Senate;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) the Committee on Appropriations of the 
        Senate;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (4) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House 
        of Representatives;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (5) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence 
        of the House of Representatives; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (6) the Committee on Appropriations of the House 
        of Representatives.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (b) Reporting Requirement.--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the 
        date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, 
        working through the Assistant Secretary of State for 
        Intelligence and Research, and in coordination with the 
        Director of National Intelligence and the Director of the 
        Central Intelligence Agency, shall submit a report to the 
        appropriate committees of Congress that assesses the nature, 
        intent, and impact to United States strategic interests of 
        Chinese diplomatic activity aimed at influencing the decisions, 
        procedures, and programs of multilateral organizations in Latin 
        America and the Caribbean, including the World Bank, 
        International Monetary Fund, Organization of American States, 
        and the Inter-American Development Bank.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) Form.--The report required under paragraph (1) 
        shall be submitted in unclassified form and shall include 
        classified annexes.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 250. ADDRESSING CHINA'S SOVEREIGN LENDING PRACTICES IN 
              LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) since 2005, the Government of China has 
        expanded sovereign lending to governments in Latin America and 
        the Caribbean with loans that are repaid or collateralized with 
        natural resources or commodities;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) several countries in Latin American and the 
        Caribbean that have received a significant amount of sovereign 
        lending from the Government of China face challenges in 
        repaying such loans;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) the Government of China's predatory economic 
        practices and sovereign lending practices in Latin America and 
        the Caribbean negatively influence United States national 
        interests in the Western Hemisphere;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (4) the Inter-American Development Bank, the 
        premier multilateral development bank dedicated to the Western 
        Hemisphere, should play a significant role supporting the 
        countries of Latin America and the Caribbean in achieving 
        sustainable and serviceable debt structures; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (5) a tenth general capital increase for the 
        Inter-American Development Bank would strengthen the Bank's 
        ability to help the countries of Latin America and the 
        Caribbean achieve sustainable and serviceable debt 
        structures.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (b) Support for a General Capital Increase.--The President 
shall take steps to support a tenth general capital increase for the 
Inter-American Development Bank, including advancing diplomatic 
engagement to build support among member countries of the Bank for a 
tenth general capital increase for the Bank</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (c) Tenth Capital Increase.--The Inter-American 
Development Bank Act (22 U.S.C. 283 et seq.) is amended by adding at 
the end the following:</DELETED>

<DELETED>``SEC. 42. TENTH CAPITAL INCREASE.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    ``(a) Vote Authorized.--The United States Governor of the 
Bank is authorized to vote in favor of a resolution to increase the 
capital stock of the Bank by $80,000,000,000 over a period not to 
exceed 5 years.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    ``(b) Subscription Authorized.--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    ``(1) In general.--The United States Governor of 
        the Bank may subscribe on behalf of the United States to 
        1,990,714 additional shares of the capital stock of the 
        Bank.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    ``(2) Limitation.--Any subscription by the United 
        States to the capital stock of the Bank shall be effective only 
        to such extent and in such amounts as are provided in advance 
        in appropriations Acts.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    ``(c) Limitations on Authorization of Appropriations.--
</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    ``(1) In general.--In order to pay for the 
        increase in the United States subscription to the Bank under 
        subsection (b), there is authorized to be appropriated 
        $24,014,857,191 for payment by the Secretary of the 
        Treasury.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    ``(2) Allocation of funds.--Of the amount 
        authorized to be appropriated under paragraph (1)--</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    ``(A) $600,371,430 shall be for paid in 
                shares of the Bank; and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    ``(B) $23,414,485,761 shall be for 
                callable shares of the Bank.''.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (d) Addressing China's Sovereign Lending in the 
Americas.--The Secretary of the Treasury and the United States 
Executive Director to the Inter-American Development Bank shall use the 
voice, vote, and influence of the United States--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) to advance efforts by the Bank to help 
        countries restructure debt resulting from sovereign lending by 
        the Government of China in order to achieve sustainable and 
        serviceable debt structures; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) to establish appropriate safeguards and 
        transparency and conditionality measures to protect debt-
        vulnerable member countries of the Inter-American Development 
        Bank that borrow from the Bank for the purposes of 
        restructuring Chinese bilateral debt held by such countries and 
        preventing such countries from incurring subsequent Chinese 
        bilateral debt.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (e) Briefings.--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) Implementation.--Not later than 90 days after 
        the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 90 days 
        thereafter, the President shall provide to the Committee on 
        Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Financial 
        Services of the House of Representatives a briefing detailing 
        efforts to carry out subsection (b) and (d) and the amendment 
        made by subsection (c).</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) Progress in achieving sustainable and 
        serviceable debt structures.--Not later than 180 days after the 
        successful completion of a tenth general capital increase for 
        the Inter-American Development Bank, and every 180 days 
        thereafter for a period of 3 years, the President shall provide 
        to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the 
        Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives 
        a briefing on efforts by the Bank to support countries in Latin 
        American and the Caribbean in their efforts to achieve 
        sustainable and serviceable debt structures.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 251. DEFENSE COOPERATION IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE 
              CARIBBEAN.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    (a) In General.--There is authorized to be appropriated to 
the Department of State $12,000,000 for the International Military 
Education and Training Program for Latin America and the Caribbean for 
each of fiscal years 2021 through 2026.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (b) Modernization.--The Secretary of State shall take 
steps to modernize and strengthen the programs receiving funding under 
subsection (a) to ensure that such programs are vigorous, substantive, 
and the preeminent choice for international military education and 
training for Latin American and Caribbean partners.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (c) Required Elements.--The programs referred to in 
subsection (a) shall--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) provide training and capacity-building 
        opportunities to Latin American and Caribbean security 
        services;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) provide practical skills and frameworks for--
        </DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) improving the functioning and 
                organization of security services in Latin America and 
                the Caribbean;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) creating a better understanding of the 
                United States and its values; and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (C) using technology for maximum 
                efficiency and organization; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) promote and ensure that security services in 
        Latin America and the Caribbean respect civilian authority and 
        operate in compliance with international norms, standards, and 
        rules of engagement, including a respect for human 
        rights.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (d) Limitation.--Security assistance under this section is 
subject to limitations as enshrined in the requirements of section 620M 
of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2378d).</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 252. ENGAGEMENT WITH CIVIL SOCIETY IN LATIN AMERICA AND 
              THE CARIBBEAN REGARDING ACCOUNTABILITY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND 
              THE RISKS OF PERVASIVE SURVEILLANCE 
              TECHNOLOGIES.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) the Government of China is exporting its model 
        for internal security and state control of society through 
        advanced technology and artificial intelligence; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) the inclusion of communication networks and 
        communications supply chains with equipment and services from 
        companies with close ties to or susceptible to pressure from 
        governments or security services without reliable legal checks 
        on governmental powers can lead to breaches of citizens' 
        private information, increased censorship, violations of human 
        rights, and harassment of political opponents.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (b) Diplomatic Engagement.--The Secretary of State shall 
conduct diplomatic engagement with governments and civil society 
organizations in Latin America and the Caribbean to--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) help identify and mitigate the risks to civil 
        liberties posed by technologies and services described in 
        subsection (a); and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) offer recommendations on ways to mitigate such 
        risks.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (c) Internet Freedom Programs.--The Chief Executive 
Officer of the United States Agency for Global Media, working through 
the Open Technology Fund, and the Secretary of State, working through 
the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor's Internet Freedom and 
Business and Human Rights Section, shall expand and prioritize efforts 
to provide anti-censorship technology and services to journalists in 
Latin America and the Caribbean, in order to enhance their ability to 
safely access or share digital news and information.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (d) Support for Civil Society.--The Secretary of State, in 
coordination with the Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human 
Rights, and Labor and the Administrator of the United States Agency for 
International Development, shall work through nongovernmental 
organizations to--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) support and promote programs that support 
        internet freedom and the free flow of information online in 
        Latin America and the Caribbean;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) protect open, interoperable, secure, and 
        reliable access to internet in Latin America and the 
        Caribbean;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) provide integrated support to civil society 
        for technology, digital safety, policy and advocacy, and 
        applied research programs in Latin America and the 
        Caribbean;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (4) train journalists and civil society leaders in 
        Latin America and the Caribbean on investigative techniques 
        necessary to ensure public accountability and prevent 
        government overreach in the digital sphere;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (5) assist independent media outlets and 
        journalists in Latin America and the Caribbean to build their 
        own capacity and develop high-impact, in-depth news reports 
        covering governance and human rights topics;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (6) provide training for journalists and civil 
        society leaders on investigative techniques necessary to 
        improve transparency and accountability in government and the 
        private sector;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (7) provide training on investigative reporting of 
        incidents of corruption and unfair trade, business and 
        commercial practices related to China, including the role of 
        the Government of China in such practices;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (8) assist nongovernmental organizations to 
        strengthen their capacity to monitor the activities described 
        in paragraph (7); and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (9) identify local resources to support the 
        preponderance of activities that would be carried out under 
        this subsection.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (e) Briefing Requirement.--Not more than 180 days after 
the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter, 
the Secretary of State, the Administrator of the United States Agency 
for International Development, and the Chief Executive Officer of the 
United States Agency for Global Media shall provide a briefing 
regarding the efforts described in subsections (c), (d), and (e) to--
</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
        Senate;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) the Committee on Appropriations of the 
        Senate;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House 
        of Representatives; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (4) the Committee on Appropriations of the House 
        of Representatives.</DELETED>

           <DELETED>PART II--TRANSATLANTIC ALLIANCE</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 255. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON THE TRANSATLANTIC 
              ALLIANCE.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    It is the sense of Congress that--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) the United States, the European Union, and 
        countries of Europe are close partners, sharing values grounded 
        in democracy, human rights, transparency, and the rules-based 
        international order established after World War II;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) without a common approach by the United 
        States, European Union, and countries of Europe on 
        connectivity, trade, transnational problems, and support for 
        democracy and human rights, the People's Republic of China will 
        continue to increase its economic, political and security 
        leverage in Europe;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) the People's Republic of China's deployment of 
        assistance to European countries following the COVID-19 
        outbreak showcased a coercive approach to aid, but it also 
        highlighted Europe's deep economic ties to China;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (4) as European states seek to recover from the 
        economic toll of the COVID-19 outbreak, the United States must 
        stand in partnership with Europe to support our collective 
        economic recovery and reinforce our collective national 
        security and defend these shared values;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (5) the United States, European Union, and other 
        European countries should coordinate on joint strategies to 
        diversify reliance on supply chains away from the People's 
        Republic of China, especially in the medical and pharmaceutical 
        sectors;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (6) the United States, European Union, United 
        Kingdom, and the countries of Europe should leverage their 
        respective economic innovation capabilities to support the 
        global economic recovery from the COVID-19 recession and draw a 
        contrast with the centralized economy of the People's Republic 
        of China;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (7) the United States and European Union should 
        accelerate efforts to de-escalate their trade disputes, 
        including negotiating a United States-European Union trade 
        agreement that benefits workers and the broader economy in both 
        the United States and European Union;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (8) the United States, European Union, and Japan 
        should continue trilateral efforts to address economic 
        challenges posed by the People's Republic of China;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (9) the United States, European Union, and 
        countries of Europe should enhance cooperation to counter 
        Chinese disinformation, influence operations, and propaganda 
        efforts;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (10) the United States and European nations share 
        serious concerns with the repressions being supported and 
        executed by the Government of China, and should continue 
        implementing measures to address the Government of China's 
        specific abuses in Tibet, Hong Kong, and Xinjiang, and should 
        build joint mechanisms and programs to prevent the export of 
        China's authoritarian governance model to countries around the 
        world;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (11) the United States and European nations should 
        remain united in their shared values against attempts by the 
        Government of China at the United Nations and other 
        multilateral organizations to promote efforts that erode the 
        Universal Declaration of Human Rights, like the ``community of 
        a shared future for mankind'' and ``democratization of 
        international relations'';</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (12) the People's Republic of China's 
        infrastructure investments around the world, particularly in 5G 
        telecommunications technology and port infrastructure, could 
        threaten democracy across Europe and the national security of 
        key countries;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (13) as appropriate, the United States should 
        share intelligence with European allies and partners on 
        Huawei's 5G capabilities and the intentions of the Government 
        of China with respect to 5G expansion in Europe;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (14) the European Union's Investment Screening 
        Regulation, which came into force in October 2020, is a welcome 
        development, and member states should closely scrutinize 
        Chinese investments in their countries through their own 
        national investment screening measures;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (15) the President should actively engage the 
        European Union on the implementation of the Export Control 
        Reform Act regulations and work to align the law's regulations 
        with European Union priorities;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (16) the President should strongly advocate for 
        the listing of more items and technologies to restrict dual use 
        exports controlled at the National Security and above level to 
        the People's Republic of China under the Wassenaar 
        Arrangement;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (17) the United States should explore the value of 
        establishing a body akin to the Coordinating Committee for 
        Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom) that would specifically 
        coordinate the export of United States and European Union 
        sensitive technologies to the People's Republic of China; 
        and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (18) the United States should work with 
        counterparts in Europe to--</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) evaluate United States and European 
                overreliance on Chinese goods, including in the medical 
                and pharmaceutical sectors, and develop joint 
                strategies to diversify supply chains;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) counter Chinese efforts to use COVID-
                19-related assistance as a coercive tool to pressure 
                developing countries by offering relevant United States 
                and European expertise and assistance; and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (C) leverage the United States and 
                European private sectors to advance the post-COVID-19 
                economic recovery.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 256. STRATEGY TO ENHANCE TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION WITH 
              RESPECT TO THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    (a) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
the enactment of this Act, the President shall brief the Committee on 
Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and 
the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Armed Services of 
the House of Representatives on a strategy for how the United States 
will enhance cooperation with the European Union, NATO, and European 
partner countries on managing relations with the People's Republic of 
China.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (b) Elements.--The briefing required by subsection (a) 
shall do the following:</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) Identify the senior Senate-confirmed 
        Department of State official that leads United States efforts 
        to cooperate with the European Union, NATO, and European 
        partner countries to advance a shared approach with respect to 
        the People's Republic of China.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) Identify key policy points of convergence and 
        divergence between the United States and European partners with 
        respect to the People's Republic of China in the areas of 
        technology, trade, and economic practices.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) Describe efforts to advance shared interests 
        with European counterparts on--</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) economic challenges with the People's 
                Republic of China;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) democracy and human rights challenges 
                with respect to the People's Republic of 
                China;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (C) technology issues with respect to the 
                People's Republic of China;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (D) defense issues with respect to the 
                People's Republic of China; and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (E) developing a comprehensive strategy to 
                respond to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) 
                established by the Government of the People's Republic 
                of China.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (4) Describe the coordination mechanisms among key 
        regional and functional bureaus within the Department of State 
        and Department of Defense tasked with engaging with European 
        partners on the People's Republic of China.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (5) Detail diplomatic efforts made up to the date 
        on which the date of the briefing and future plans to work with 
        European partners to counter Chinese advancement of an 
        authoritarian governing model around the world.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (6) Detail the diplomatic efforts made up to the 
        date on which the strategy is submitted and future plans to 
        support European efforts to identify cost-effective 
        alternatives to Huawei's 5G technology.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (7) Detail how United States public diplomacy 
        tools, including the Global Engagement Center of the Department 
        of State, will coordinate efforts with counterpart entities 
        within the European Union to counter Chinese 
        propaganda.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (8) Describe the staffing and budget resources the 
        Department of State dedicates to engagement between the United 
        States and the European Union on the People's Republic of China 
        and provide an assessment of out-year resource needs to execute 
        the strategy.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (9) Detail diplomatic efforts to work with 
        European partners to track and counter Chinese attempts to 
        exert influence across multilateral fora, including at the 
        World Health Organization.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (c) Form.--The briefing required by section (a) shall be 
classified.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (d) Consultation.--Not later than 90 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter, the 
Secretary of State shall consult with the appropriate congressional 
committees regarding the development and implementation of the 
strategy.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 257. ENHANCING TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION ON PROMOTING 
              PRIVATE SECTOR FINANCE.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    (a) In General.--The President should work with 
transatlantic partners to build on the agreement among the Development 
Finance Corporation, FinDev Canada, and the European Development 
Finance Institutions (called the DFI Alliance) to enhance coordination 
on shared objectives to foster private sector-led development and 
provide market-based alternatives to state-directed financing in 
emerging markets, particularly as related to the People's Republic of 
China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), including by integrating 
efforts such as--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) the European Union Strategy on Connecting 
        Europe and Asia;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) the Three Seas Initiative and Three Seas 
        Initiative Fund;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) the Blue Dot Network among the United States, 
        Japan, and Australia; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (4) a European Union-Japan initiative that has 
        leveraged $65,000,000,000 for infrastructure projects and 
        emphasizes transparency standards.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (b) Cooperation at the United Nations.--The United States 
and Europe should coordinate efforts to address the Government of 
China's use of the United Nations to advance and legitimize BRI as a 
global good, including the proliferation of memoranda of understanding 
between the People's Republic of China and United Nations funds and 
programs on BRI implementation.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (c) Standards.--The United States and the European Union 
should coordinate and develop a strategy to enhance transatlantic 
cooperation with the OECD and the Paris Club on ensuring the highest 
possible standards for Belt and Road Initiative contracts and terms 
with developing countries.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 258. REPORT AND BRIEFING ON COOPERATION BETWEEN CHINA AND 
              IRAN AND BETWEEN CHINA AND RUSSIA.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    (a) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this 
section, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) the Select Committee on Intelligence, the 
        Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Armed 
        Services, the Committee on Commerce, Science, and 
        Transportation, the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, 
        the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the 
        Committee on Finance, and the Committee on Appropriations of 
        the Senate; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) the Permanent Select Committee on 
        Intelligence, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee 
        on Armed Services, the Committee on Energy and Commerce, the 
        Committee on Financial Services, the Committee on Ways and 
        Means, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of 
        Representatives.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (b) Report and Briefing Required.--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the 
        date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National 
        Intelligence shall, in coordination with the Secretary of 
        State, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Commerce, the 
        Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of the Treasury, and such 
        other heads of Federal agencies as the Director considers 
        appropriate, submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a 
        report and brief the appropriate committees of Congress on 
        cooperation between China and Iran and between China and 
        Russia.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) Contents.--The report submitted under 
        paragraph (1) shall include the following elements:</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) An identification of major areas of 
                diplomatic energy, infrastructure, banking, financial, 
                economic, military, and space cooperation--</DELETED>
                        <DELETED>    (i) between China and Iran; 
                        and</DELETED>
                        <DELETED>    (ii) between China and 
                        Russia.</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) An assessment of the effect of the 
                Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic on such 
                cooperation.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) Form.--The report submitted under paragraph 
        (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a 
        classified annex.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (c) Sense of Congress on Sharing With Allies and 
Partners.--It is the sense of Congress that the Director of National 
Intelligence and the heads of other appropriate Federal departments and 
agencies should share the findings of the report submitted under 
subsection (b) with important allies and partners of the United States, 
as appropriate.</DELETED>

          <DELETED>PART III--SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 261. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON SOUTH AND CENTRAL 
              ASIA.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    It is the sense of Congress that--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) the United States should continue to stand 
        with friends and partners in South and Central Asia as they 
        contend with efforts by the Government of China to interfere in 
        their respective political systems and encroach upon their 
        sovereign territory; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) the United States should reaffirm its 
        commitment to the Comprehensive Global Strategic Partnership 
        with India and further deepen bilateral defense consultations 
        and collaboration with India commensurate with its status as a 
        major defense partner.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 262. STRATEGY TO ENHANCE COOPERATION WITH SOUTH AND 
              CENTRAL ASIA.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    (a) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the Committee 
on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate 
and the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Armed 
Services of the House of Representatives a strategy for how the United 
States will engage with the countries of South and Central Asia, 
including through the C5+1 mechanism, with respect to the People's 
Republic of China.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (b) Elements.--The strategy required under subsection (a) 
shall include the following elements:</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) A detailed description of the security and 
        economic challenges that the People's Republic of China poses 
        to the countries of South and Central Asia, including border 
        disputes with South and Central Asian countries that border 
        China, Chinese investments in land and sea ports, 
        transportation infrastructure, and energy projects across the 
        region.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) A detailed description of United States 
        efforts to provide alternatives to Chinese investment in 
        infrastructure and other sectors in South and Central 
        Asia.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) A detailed description of bilateral and 
        regional efforts to work with countries in South Asia on 
        strategies to build resilience against Chinese efforts to 
        interfere in their political systems and economies.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (4) A detailed description of United States 
        diplomatic efforts to work with the Government of Afghanistan 
        on addressing the challenges posed by Chinese investment in the 
        Afghan mineral sector.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (5) A detailed description of United States 
        diplomatic efforts with the Government of Pakistan with respect 
        to matters relevant to the People's Republic of China, 
        including investments by the People's Republic of China in 
        Pakistan through the Belt and Road Initiative.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (6) In close consultation with the Government of 
        India, identification of areas where the United States 
        Government can provide diplomatic and other support as 
        appropriate for India's efforts to address economic and 
        security challenges posed by the People's Republic of China in 
        the region.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (7) A description of the coordination mechanisms 
        among key regional and functional bureaus within the Department 
        of State and Department of Defense tasked with engaging with 
        the countries of South and Central Asia on issues relating to 
        the People's Republic of China.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (8) A description of the efforts being made by 
        Federal departments agencies, including the Department of 
        State, the United States Agency for International Development, 
        the Department of Commerce, the Department of Energy, and the 
        Office of the United States Trade Representative, to help the 
        nations of South and Central Asia develop trade and commerce 
        links that will help those nations diversify their trade away 
        from China.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (c) Form.--The strategy required under section (a) shall 
be submitted in unclassified form that can be made available to the 
public, but may include a classified annex as necessary.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (d) Consultation.--Not later than 120 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, and not less than annually thereafter, 
the Secretary of State shall consult with the Committee on Foreign 
Relations and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate and the 
Committee of Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Appropriations of the 
House of Representatives regarding the development and implementation 
of the strategy required under subsection (a).</DELETED>

                   <DELETED>PART IV--AFRICA</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 271. ASSESSMENT OF POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND SECURITY 
              ACTIVITY OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN 
              AFRICA.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    (a) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this 
section, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the 
        Committee on Armed Services, and the Select Committee on 
        Intelligence of the Senate; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the 
        Committee on Armed Services, and the Permanent Select Committee 
        on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (b) Intelligence Assessment.--Not later than 180 days 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State 
shall, in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence, 
submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report that assesses 
the nature and impact of Chinese political, economic, and security 
sector activity in Africa, and its impact on United States strategic 
interests, including--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) the amount and impact of direct investment, 
        loans, development financing, oil-for-loans deals, and other 
        preferential trading arrangements;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) the involvement of Chinese state-owned 
        enterprises in Africa;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) the amount of African debt held by the 
        People's Republic of China;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (4) the involvement of Chinese private security, 
        technology and media companies in Africa;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (5) the scale and impact of Chinese arms sales to 
        African countries;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (6) the methods, tools, and tactics used to 
        facilitate illegal and corrupt activity, including trade in 
        counterfeit and illicit goods, to include smuggled extractive 
        resources and wildlife products, from Africa to 
        China;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (7) the methods and techniques that China uses to 
        exert undue influence on African governments and facilitate 
        corrupt activity in Africa, and to influence African 
        multilateral organizations; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (8) an analysis of the soft power, cultural and 
        educational activities undertaken by the PRC and CCP to seek to 
        expand influence in Africa.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 272. INCREASING THE COMPETITIVENESS OF THE UNITED STATES 
              IN AFRICA.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    (a) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this 
section, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the 
        Committee on Appropriations, and the Committee on Finance of 
        the Senate; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the 
        Committee on Appropriations, and the Committee on Ways and 
        Means of the House of Representatives.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (b) Strategy Requirement.--Not later than 180 days after 
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall, in 
consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of 
Commerce, the Attorney General, the United States Trade Representative, 
the Administrator of the United States Agency for International 
Development, and the leadership of the United States International 
Development Finance Corporation, submit to the appropriate committees 
of Congress a report setting forth a multi-year strategy for increasing 
United States economic competitiveness and promoting improvements in 
the investment climate in Africa, including through support for 
democratic institutions, the rule of law, including property rights, 
and for improved transparency, anti-corruption and 
governance.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (c) Elements.--The strategy submitted pursuant to 
subsection (a) shall include--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) a description and assessment of barriers to 
        United States investment in Africa for United States 
        businesses, including a clear identification of the different 
        barriers facing small-sized and medium-sized businesses, and an 
        assessment of whether existing programs effectively address 
        such barriers;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) a description and assessment of barriers to 
        African diaspora investment in Africa, and recommendations to 
        overcome such barriers;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) an identification of the economic sectors in 
        the United States that have a comparative advantage in Africa 
        markets;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (4) a determination of priority African countries 
        for promoting two-way trade and investment and an assessment of 
        additional foreign assistance needs, including democracy and 
        governance and rule of law support, to promote a conducive 
        operating environment in priority countries;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (5) an identification of opportunities for 
        strategic cooperation with European allies on trade and 
        investment in Africa, and for establishing a dialogue on trade, 
        security, development, and environmental issues of mutual 
        interest; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (6) a plan to regularly host a United States-
        Africa Leaders Summit to promote two-way trade and investment, 
        strategic engagement, and security in Africa</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (d) Assessment of United States Government Human Resources 
Capacity.--The Comptroller General of the United States shall--
</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) conduct a review of the number of Foreign 
        Commercial Service Officers and Department of State Economic 
        Officers at United States embassies in sub-Saharan Africa; 
        and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) develop an assessment of whether human 
        resource capacity in such embassies is adequate to meet the 
        goals of the various trade and economic programs and 
        initiatives in Africa, including the African Growth and 
        Opportunity Act and Prosper Africa.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 273. DIGITAL SECURITY COOPERATION WITH RESPECT TO 
              AFRICA.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    (a) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this 
section, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the 
        Committee on Armed Services, and the Select Committee on 
        Intelligence of the Senate; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the 
        Committee on Armed Services, and the Permanent Select Committee 
        on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (b) Interagency Working Group To Counter Chinese Cyber 
Aggression in Africa.--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) In general.--The President shall establish an 
        interagency Working Group, which shall include representatives 
        of the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the 
        Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and such other 
        agencies of the United States Government as the President 
        considers appropriate, on means to counter Chinese cyber 
        aggression with respect to Africa.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) Duties.--The Working Group established 
        pursuant to this subsection shall develop a set of 
        recommendations for--</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) bolstering the capacity of governments 
                in Africa to ensure the integrity of their data 
                networks and critical infrastructure where 
                applicable;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) providing alternatives to 
                Huawei;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (C) an action plan for United States 
                embassies in Africa to offer to provide assistance to 
                host-country governments with protecting their vital 
                digital networks and infrastructure from Chinese 
                espionage, including an assessment of staffing 
                resources needed to implement the action plan in 
                embassies in Africa;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (D) utilizing interagency resources to 
                counter Chinese disinformation and propaganda in 
                traditional and digital media targeted to African 
                audiences; and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (E) helping civil society in Africa 
                counter digital authoritarianism and identifying tools 
                and assistance to enhance and promote digital 
                democracy.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 274. INCREASING PERSONNEL IN UNITED STATES EMBASSIES IN 
              SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA FOCUSED ON THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF 
              CHINA.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    The Secretary of State may station on a permanent basis 
Department of State personnel at such United States embassies in sub-
Saharan Africa as the Secretary considers appropriate focused on the 
activities, policies and investments of the People's Republic of China 
in Africa.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 275. SUPPORT FOR YOUNG AFRICAN LEADERS 
              INITIATIVE.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    (a) Finding.--Congress finds that youth in Africa can have 
a positive impact on efforts to foster economic growth, improve public 
sector transparency and governance, and counter extremism, and should 
be an area of focus for United States outreach on the 
continent.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (b) Policy.--It is the policy of the United States, in 
cooperation and collaboration with private sector companies, civic 
organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and national and regional 
public sector entities, to commit resources to enhancing the 
entrepreneurship and leadership skills of African youth with the 
objective of enhancing their ability to serve as leaders in the public 
and private sectors in order to help them spur growth and prosperity, 
strengthen democratic governance, and enhance peace and security in 
their respective countries of origin and across Africa.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (c) Young African Leaders Initiative.--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) In general.--There is hereby established the 
        Young African Leaders Initiative, to be carried out by the 
        Secretary of State.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) Fellowships.--The Secretary is authorized to 
        support the participation in the Initiative established under 
        this paragraph, in the United States, of fellows from Africa 
        each year for such education and training in leadership and 
        professional development through the Department of State as the 
        Secretary of State considers appropriate. The Secretary shall 
        establish and publish criteria for eligibility for 
        participation as such a fellow, and for selection of fellows 
        among eligible applicants for a fellowship.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) Reciprocal exchanges.--Under the Initiative, 
        United States citizens may engage in such reciprocal exchanges 
        in connection with and collaboration on projects with fellows 
        under paragraph (1) as the Secretary considers 
        appropriate.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (4) Regional centers and networks.--The 
        Administrator of the United States Agency for International 
        Development shall establish each of the following:</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) Not fewer than four regional centers 
                in Africa to provide in-person and online training 
                throughout the year in business and entrepreneurship, 
                civic leadership, and public management.</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) An online network that provides 
                information and online courses on, and connections with 
                leaders in, the private and public sectors in 
                Africa.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (d) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that 
the Secretary of State should increase the number of fellows from 
Africa in the Young African Leaders Initiative above the number that 
participated in the Initiative in fiscal year 2020 .</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 276. AFRICA BROADCASTING NETWORKS.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of 
this Act, the CEO of the United States Agency for Global Media shall 
submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the 
resources and timeline needed to establish within the Agency an 
organization whose mission shall be to promote democratic values and 
institutions in Africa by providing objective, accurate, and relevant 
news and information to the people of Africa, especially in countries 
where a free press is banned by the government or not fully 
established, about the region, the world, and the United States through 
uncensored news, responsible discussion, and open debate.</DELETED>

        <DELETED>PART V--MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 281. STRATEGY TO COUNTER CHINESE INFLUENCE IN, AND ACCESS 
              TO, THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) the economic influence of the People's 
        Republic of China through its oil and gas imports from the 
        Middle East, infrastructure investments, technology transfer, 
        and arms sales provide influence and leverage that runs counter 
        to United States interests in the region;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) the People's Republic of China seeks to erode 
        United States influence in the Middle East and North Africa 
        through the sale of Chinese arms, associated weapons 
        technology, and joint weapons research and development 
        initiatives;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) the People's Republic of China seeks to 
        establish military or dual use facilities in geographically 
        strategic locations in the Middle East and North Africa to 
        further the Chinese Communist Party's Belt and Road Initiative 
        at the expense of United States national security interests; 
        and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (4) the export of certain communications 
        infrastructure from the People's Republic of China degrades the 
        security of partner networks, exposes intellectual property to 
        theft, threatens the ability of the United States to conduct 
        security cooperation with compromised regional partners, and 
        furthers China's authoritarian surveillance model.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (b) Strategy Required.--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the 
        date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in 
        consultation with the Administrator of the United States Agency 
        for International Development and the heads of other 
        appropriate Federal agencies, shall jointly develop and submit 
        to the appropriate congressional committees a strategy for 
        countering and limiting Chinese influence in, and access to, 
        the Middle East and North Africa.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) Elements.--The strategy required under 
        paragraph (1) shall include--</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) an assessment of China's intent with 
                regards to increased cooperation with Middle East and 
                North African countries and how these activities fit 
                into their broader global strategic 
                objectives;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) an assessment of how governments 
                across the region are responding to Chinese efforts to 
                increase Chinese military presence in their 
                countries;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (C) efforts to improve regional 
                cooperation through foreign military sales, financing, 
                and efforts to build partner capacity and increase 
                interoperability with the United States;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (D) an assessment of Chinese joint 
                research and development with the Middle East, North 
                Africa, impacts on United States' national security 
                interests, and recommended steps to mitigate Chinese 
                influence;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (E) an assessment of arms sales and 
                weapons technology transfers from the People's Republic 
                of China to the Middle East and North Africa, impacts 
                on United States' national security interests, and 
                recommended steps to mitigate Chinese 
                influence;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (F) an assessment of Chinese military 
                sales to the region including lethal and non lethal 
                unmanned aerial systems;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (G) an assessment of People's Republic of 
                China military basing and dual-use facility initiatives 
                across the Middle East and North Africa, impacts on 
                United States' national security interests, and 
                recommended steps to mitigate Chinese 
                influence;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (H) efforts to improve regional security 
                cooperation with United States allies and partners with 
                a focus on--</DELETED>
                        <DELETED>    (i) maritime security in the 
                        Arabian Gulf, the Red Sea, and the Eastern 
                        Mediterranean;</DELETED>
                        <DELETED>    (ii) integrated air and missile 
                        defense;</DELETED>
                        <DELETED>    (iii) cyber security;</DELETED>
                        <DELETED>    (iv) border security; 
                        and</DELETED>
                        <DELETED>    (v) critical infrastructure 
                        security, to include energy security;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (I) increased support for government-to-
                government engagement on critical infrastructure 
                development projects including ports and water 
                infrastructure;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (J) efforts to encourage United States 
                private sector and public-private partnerships in 
                healthcare technology and foreign direct investment in 
                non-energy sectors;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (K) efforts to expand youth engagement and 
                professional education exchanges with key partner 
                countries;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (L) specific steps to counter increased 
                Chinese investment in telecommunications infrastructure 
                and diplomatic efforts to stress the political, 
                economic, and social benefits of a free and open 
                internet;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (M) efforts to promote United States 
                private sector engagement in and public-private 
                partnerships on renewable energy development;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (N) the expansion of public-private 
                partnership efforts on water, desalination, and 
                irrigation projects; and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (O) efforts to warn United States partners 
                in the Middle East and North Africa of the risks 
                associated with Chinese telecommunications 
                infrastructure and provide alternative ``clean paths'' 
                to Chinese technology.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 282. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA 
              ENGAGEMENT.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following 
findings:</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) The United States and the international 
        community have long-term interests in the stability, security, 
        and prosperity of the people of the Middle East and North 
        Africa.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) In addition to and apart from military and 
        security efforts, the United States should harness a whole of 
        government approach, including bilateral and multilateral 
        statecraft, economic lines of effort, and public diplomacy to 
        compete with and counter Chinese Communist Party 
        influence.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) A clearly articulated positive narrative of 
        United States engagement, transparent governance structures, 
        and active civil society engagement help counter predatory 
        foreign investment and influence efforts.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (b) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United 
States that the United States and the international community should, 
continue diplomatic and economic efforts throughout the Middle East and 
North Africa that support reform efforts to--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) promote greater economic 
        opportunity;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) foster private sector development;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) strengthen civil society; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (4) promote transparent and democratic governance 
        and the rule of law.</DELETED>

               <DELETED>PART VI--ARCTIC REGION</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 285. ARCTIC DIPLOMACY.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    (a) Sense of Congress on Arctic Security.--It is the sense 
of Congress that--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) the rapidly changing Arctic environment--
        </DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) creates new national and regional 
                security challenges due to increased military activity 
                in the Arctic;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) heightens the risk of the Arctic 
                emerging as a major theater of conflict in ongoing 
                strategic competition;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (C) threatens maritime safety as Arctic 
                littoral nations have inadequate capacity to patrol the 
                increased vessel traffic in this remote region, which 
                is a result of diminished annual levels of sea 
                ice;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (D) impacts public safety due to increased 
                human activity in the Arctic region where search and 
                rescue capacity remains very limited; and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (E) threatens the health of the Arctic's 
                fragile and pristine environment and the unique and 
                highly sensitive species found in the Arctic's marine 
                and terrestrial ecosystems; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) the United States should reduce the 
        consequences outlined in paragraph (1) by--</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) carefully evaluating the wide variety 
                and dynamic set of security and safety risks unfolding 
                in the Arctic;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) developing policies and making 
                preparations to mitigate and respond to threats and 
                risks in the Arctic, including by continuing to work 
                with allies and partners in the Arctic region to deter 
                potential aggressive activities and build Arctic 
                competencies;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (C) adequately funding the National Earth 
                System Prediction Capability to substantively improve 
                weather, ocean, and ice predictions on the time scales 
                necessary to ensure regional security and trans-Arctic 
                shipping;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (D) investing in resources, including a 
                significantly expanded icebreaker fleet, to ensure that 
                the United States has adequate capacity to prevent and 
                respond to security threats in the Arctic 
                region;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (E) pursuing diplomatic engagements with 
                all nations in the Arctic region for--</DELETED>
                        <DELETED>    (i) maintaining peace and 
                        stability in the Arctic region; and</DELETED>
                        <DELETED>    (ii) fostering cooperation on 
                        stewardship and safety initiatives in the 
                        Arctic region; and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (F) examining the possibility of 
                reconvening the Arctic Chiefs of Defense 
                Forum.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (b) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United 
States--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) to recognize only the nations enumerated in 
        subsection (c)(1) as Arctic nations, and to reject all other 
        claims to this status; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) that the militarization of the Arctic poses a 
        serious threat to Arctic peace and stability, and the interests 
        of United States allies and partners.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (c) Definitions.--In this section:</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) Arctic nations.--The term ``Arctic nations'' 
        means the 8 nations with territory or exclusive economic zones 
        that extend north of the 66.56083 parallel latitude north of 
        the equator, namely Russia, Canada, the United States, Norway, 
        Denmark (including Greenland), Finland, Sweden, and 
        Iceland.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) Arctic region.--The term ``Arctic Region'' 
        means the geographic region north of the 66.56083 parallel 
        latitude north of the equator.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (d) Designation.--The Assistant Secretary of State for 
Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs (OES) 
shall designate a deputy assistant secretary serving within the Bureau 
of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs as 
``Deputy Assistant Secretary for Arctic Affairs'', who shall be 
responsible for OES affairs in the Arctic Region.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (e) Duties.--The Deputy Assistant Secretary for Arctic 
Affairs shall--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) facilitate the development and coordination of 
        United States foreign policy in the Arctic Region relating to--
        </DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) strengthening institutions for 
                cooperation among the Arctic nations;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) enhancing scientific monitoring and 
                research on local, regional, and global environmental 
                issues;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (C) protecting the Arctic environment and 
                conserving its biological resources;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (D) promoting responsible natural resource 
                management and economic development; and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (E) involving Arctic indigenous people in 
                decisions that affect them.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) coordinate the diplomatic objectives with 
        respect to the activities described in paragraph (1), and, as 
        appropriate, represent the United States within multilateral 
        fora that address international cooperation and foreign policy 
        matters in the Arctic Region;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) help inform, in coordination with the Bureau 
        of Economic and Business Affairs, transnational commerce and 
        commercial maritime transit in the Arctic Region;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (4) coordinate the integration of scientific data 
        on the current and projected effects of emerging environmental 
        changes on the Arctic Region and ensure that such data is 
        applied to the development of security strategies for the 
        Arctic Region;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (5) make available the methods and approaches on 
        the integration of climate, data, and environmental science to 
        regional security planning programs in the Department of State 
        to better ensure that broader decision-making processes may 
        more adequately account for the effects of climate 
        change;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (6) assist with the development of, and facilitate 
        the implementation of, an Arctic Region Security Policy in 
        accordance with subsection (f);</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (7) use the voice, vote, and influence of the 
        United States to encourage other countries and international 
        multilateral organizations to support the principles of the 
        Arctic Region Security Policy implemented pursuant to 
        subsection (f); and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (8) perform such other duties and exercise such 
        powers as the Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans and 
        International Environmental and Scientific Affairs shall 
        prescribe.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (f) Rank and Status.--The Secretary of State may change 
the title of the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Arctic Affairs 
designated under subsection (c) to Special Representative or Special 
Envoy with the rank of Ambassador if--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) the President nominates the person so 
        designated to that rank and status; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) the Senate confirms such person to such rank 
        and status.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (g) Arctic Region Security Policy.--The Bureau of European 
and Eurasian Affairs shall be the lead bureau for developing and 
implementing the United States' Arctic Region Security Policy, in 
coordination with the Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental 
and Scientific Affairs, the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, 
embassies, other regional bureaus, and relevant offices to advance 
United States national security interests, including through conflict 
prevention efforts, security assistance, humanitarian disaster response 
and prevention, and economic and other relevant assistance programs. 
The Arctic Region Security Policy shall assess, develop, budget for, 
and implement plans, policies, and actions--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) to bolster the diplomatic presence of the 
        United States in Arctic nations, including through enhancements 
        to diplomatic missions and facilities, participation in 
        regional and bilateral dialogues related to Arctic security, 
        and coordination of United States initiatives and assistance 
        programs across agencies to protect the national security of 
        the United States and its allies and partners;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) to enhance the resilience capacities of Arctic 
        nations to the effects of environmental change and increased 
        civilian and military activity from Arctic nations and other 
        nations that may result from increased accessibility of the 
        Arctic Region;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) to assess specific added risks to the Arctic 
        Region and Arctic nations that--</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) are vulnerable to the changing Arctic 
                environment; and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) are strategically significant to the 
                United States;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (4) to coordinate the integration of environmental 
        change and national security risk and vulnerability assessments 
        into the decision making process on foreign assistance awards 
        to Arctic nations;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (5) to advance principles of good governance by 
        encouraging and cooperating with Arctic nations on 
        collaborative approaches--</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) to responsibly manage natural 
                resources in the Arctic Region;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) to share the burden of ensuring 
                maritime safety in the Arctic Region;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (C) to prevent the escalation of security 
                tensions by mitigating against the militarization of 
                the Arctic Region;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (D) to develop mutually agreed upon 
                multilateral policies among Arctic nations on the 
                management of maritime transit routes through the 
                Arctic Region and work cooperatively on the transit 
                policies for access to and transit in the Arctic Region 
                by non-Arctic nations; and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (E) to facilitate the development of 
                Arctic Region Security Action Plans to ensure stability 
                and public safety in disaster situations in a humane 
                and responsible fashion; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (6) to evaluate the vulnerability, security, 
        survivability, and resiliency of United States interests and 
        nondefense assets in the Arctic Region.</DELETED>

                  <DELETED>PART VII--OCEANIA</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 291. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON UNITED STATES ENGAGEMENT IN 
              OCEANIA.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    It shall be the policy of the United States--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) to elevate the countries of Oceania as a 
        strategic national security and economic priority of the United 
        States Government;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) to promote civil society, the rule of law, and 
        democratic governance across Oceania as part of a free and open 
        Indo-Pacific region;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) to broaden and deepen relationships with the 
        Freely Associated States of the Republic of Palau, the Republic 
        of the Marshall Islands, and the Federated States of Micronesia 
        through robust defense, diplomatic, economic, and development 
        exchanges that promote the goals of individual states and the 
        entire region;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (4) to work with the governments of Australia, New 
        Zealand, and Japan to advance shared alliance goals of the 
        Oceania region concerning health, environmental protection, 
        disaster resilience and preparedness, illegal, unreported and 
        unregulated fishing, maritime security, and economic 
        development;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (5) to participate, wherever possible and 
        appropriate, in existing regional organizations and 
        international structures to promote the national security and 
        economic goals of the United States and countries of the 
        Oceania region;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (6) to invest in a whole-of-government United 
        States strategy that will enhance youth engagement and advance 
        long-term growth and development throughout the region, 
        especially as it relates to protecting marine resources that 
        are critical to livelihoods and strengthening the resilience of 
        the countries of the Oceania region against current and future 
        threats resulting from extreme weather and severe changes in 
        the environment;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (7) to deter and combat acts of malign foreign 
        influence and corruption aimed at undermining the political, 
        environmental, social, and economic stability of the people and 
        governments of the countries of Oceania;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (8) to improve the local capacity of the countries 
        of Oceania to address public health challenges and improve 
        global health security;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (9) to help the countries of Oceania access 
        market-based private sector investments that adhere to best 
        practices regarding transparency, debt sustainability, and 
        environmental and social safeguards as an alternative to state-
        directed investments by authoritarian governments;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (10) to ensure the people and communities of 
        Oceania remain safe from the risks of old and degrading 
        munitions hazards and other debris that threaten health and 
        livelihoods; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (11) to work cooperatively with all governments in 
        Oceania to promote the dignified return of the remains of 
        members of the United States Armed Forces that are missing in 
        action from previous conflicts in the Indo-Pacific 
        region.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 292. OCEANIA STRATEGIC ROADMAP.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    (a) Oceania Strategic Roadmap.--Not later than 180 days 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State 
shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a strategic 
roadmap for strengthening United States engagement with the countries 
of Oceania, including an analysis of opportunities to cooperate with 
Australia, New Zealand, and Japan, to address shared concerns and 
promote shared goals in pursuit of security and resiliency in the 
countries of Oceania.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (b) Elements.--The strategic roadmap required by 
subsection (a) shall include the following:</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) A description of United States regional goals 
        and concerns with respect to Oceania and increasing engagement 
        with the countries of Oceania.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) An assessment, based on paragraph (1), of 
        United States regional goals and concerns that are shared by 
        Australia, New Zealand, and Japan, including a review of issues 
        related to anticorruption, maritime and other security issues, 
        environmental protection, fisheries management, economic growth 
        and development, and disaster resilience and 
        preparedness.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) A review of ongoing programs and initiatives 
        by the governments of the United States, Australia, New 
        Zealand, and Japan in pursuit of those shared regional goals 
        and concerns, including with respect to the issues described in 
        paragraph (1).</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (4) A review of ongoing programs and initiatives 
        by regional organizations and other related intergovernmental 
        structures aimed at addressing the issues described in 
        paragraph (1).</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (5) A plan for aligning United States programs and 
        resources in pursuit of those shared regional goals and 
        concerns, as appropriate.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (6) Recommendations for additional United States 
        authorities, personnel, programs, or resources necessary to 
        execute the strategic roadmap.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (7) Any other elements the Secretary considers 
        appropriate.</DELETED>

         <DELETED>TITLE III--INVESTING IN OUR VALUES</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 301. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR PROMOTION OF 
              DEMOCRACY IN HONG KONG.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    (a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized 
to be appropriated $10,000,000 for fiscal year 2022 for the Bureau of 
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor of the Department of State to 
promote democracy in Hong Kong.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (b) Administration.--The Secretary of State shall 
designate an office with the Department of State to administer and 
coordinate the provision of such funds described in subsection (a) 
within the Department of State and across the United States 
Government.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 302. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS RELATING TO FORCED LABOR IN 
              THE XINJIANG UYGHUR AUTONOMOUS REGION.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    (a) In General.--Section 6(a)(1) of the Uyghur Human 
Rights Policy Act of 2020 (Public Law 116-145; 22 U.S.C. 6901 note) is 
amended--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) by redesignating subparagraphs (E) as 
        subparagraph (F); and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) by inserting after subparagraph (D) the 
        following:</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    ``(E) Serious human rights abuses in 
                connection with forced labor.''.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (b) Effective Date; Applicability.--The amendment made by 
subsection (a)--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) takes effect on the date of the enactment of 
        this Act; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) applies with respect to the first report 
        required by section 6(a)(1) of the Uyghur Human Rights Policy 
        Act of 2020 submitted after such date of enactment.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 303. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO SYSTEMATIC 
              RAPE, COERCIVE ABORTION, FORCED STERILIZATION, OR 
              INVOLUNTARY CONTRACEPTIVE IMPLANTATION IN THE XINJIANG 
              UYGHUR AUTONOMOUS REGION.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    (a) In General.--Section 6(a)(1) of the Uyghur Human 
Rights Policy Act of 2020 (Public Law 116-145; 22 U.S.C. 6901 note), as 
amended by section 302, is further amended--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) by redesignating subparagraphs (F) as 
        subparagraph (G); and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) by inserting after subparagraph (E) the 
        following:</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    ``(F) Systematic rape, coercive abortion, 
                forced sterilization, or involuntary contraceptive 
                implantation policies and practices.''.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (b) Effective Date; Applicability.--The amendment made by 
subsection (a)--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) takes effect on the date of the enactment of 
        this Act; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) applies with respect to the first report 
        required by section 6(a)(1) of the Uyghur Human Rights Policy 
        Act of 2020 submitted after such date of enactment.</DELETED>

   <DELETED>TITLE IV--INVESTING IN OUR ECONOMIC STATECRAFT</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 401. FINDINGS AND SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING THE PRC'S 
              INDUSTRIAL POLICY.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following 
findings:</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) The People's Republic of China, at the 
        direction of the Chinese Communist Party, is advancing an 
        ecosystem of anticompetitive economic and industrial policies 
        that--</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) distort global markets;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) limit innovation;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (C) unfairly advantage PRC firms at the 
                expense of the United States and other foreign firms; 
                and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (D) unfairly and harmfully prejudice 
                consumer choice.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) Of the extensive and systemic economic and 
        industrial policies pursued by the PRC, the mass subsidization 
        of Chinese firms, intellectual property theft, and forced 
        technology transfer are among the most damaging to the global 
        economy.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) Through regulatory interventions and direct 
        financial subsidies, the CCP, for the purposes of advancing 
        national political and economic objectives, directs, coerces, 
        and influences in anti-competitive ways the commercial 
        activities of firms that are directed, financed, influenced, or 
        otherwise controlled by the state, including state-owned 
        enterprises, and ostensibly independent and private Chinese 
        companies, such as technology firms in strategic 
        sectors.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (4) The PRC Government, at the national and 
        subnational levels, grants special privileges or status to 
        certain PRC firms in key sectors designated as strategic, such 
        as telecommunications, oil, power, aviation, banking, and 
        semiconductors. Enterprises receive special state preferences 
        in the form of favorable loans, tax exemptions, and 
        preferential land access from the CCP.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (5) The subsidization of PRC companies, as 
        described in paragraphs (3) and (4)--</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) enables these companies to sell goods 
                below market prices, allowing them to outbid and crowd 
                out market-based competitors and thereby pursue global 
                dominance of key sectors;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) distorts the global market economy by 
                undermining longstanding and generally accepted market-
                based principles of fair competition, leading to 
                barriers to entry and forced exit from the market for 
                foreign or private firms, not only in the PRC, but in 
                markets around the world;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (C) creates government-sponsored or 
                supported de facto monopolies, cartels, and other anti-
                market arrangements in key sectors, limiting or 
                removing opportunities for other firms; and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (D) leads to, as a result of the issues 
                described in paragraphs (A) through (C), declines in 
                profits and revenue needed by foreign and private firms 
                for research and development.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (6) The CCP incentivizes and empowers Chinese 
        actors to steal critical technologies and trade secrets from 
        private and foreign competitors operating in the PRC and around 
        the world, particularly in areas that the CCP has identified as 
        critical to advancing PRC objectives. The PRC, as directed by 
        the CCP, also continues to implement anti-competitive 
        regulations, policies, and practices that coerce the handover 
        of technology and other propriety or sensitive data from 
        foreign enterprises to domestic firms in exchange for access to 
        the PRC market.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (7) Companies in the United States and in foreign 
        countries compete with state-subsidized PRC companies that 
        enjoy the protection and power of the state in third-country 
        markets around the world. The advantages granted to PRC firms, 
        combined with significant restrictions to accessing the PRC 
        market itself, severely hamper the ability of United States and 
        foreign firms to compete, innovate, and pursue the provision of 
        best value to customers. The result is an unbalanced playing 
        field. Such an unsustainable course, if not checked, will over 
        time lead to depressed competition around the world, reduced 
        opportunity, and harm to both producers and 
        consumers.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (8) As stated in the United States Trade 
        Representative's investigation of the PRC's trade practices 
        under section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2411), 
        conducted in March 2018, ``When U.S. companies are deprived of 
        fair returns on their investment in IP, they are unable to 
        achieve the growth necessary to reinvest in innovation. In this 
        sense, China's technology transfer regime directly burdens the 
        innovation ecosystem that is an engine of economic growth in 
        the United States and similarly-situated 
        economies.''.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (9) In addition to forced technology described in 
        this subsection, the United States Trade Representative's 
        investigation of the PRC under section 301 of the Trade Act of 
        1974 (19 U.S.C. 2411) also identified requirements that foreign 
        firms license products at less than market value, government-
        directed and government-subsidized acquisition of sensitive 
        technology for strategic purposes, and cyber theft as other key 
        PRC technology and industrial policies that are unreasonable 
        and discriminatory. These policies place at risk United States 
        intellectual property rights, innovation and technological 
        development, and jobs in dozens of industries.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (10) Other elements of the PRC's ecosystem of 
        industrial policies that harm innovation and distort global 
        markets include--</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) advancement of policies that encourage 
                local production over imports;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) continuation of policies that favor 
                unique technical standards in use by Chinese firms 
                rather than globally accepted standards, which often 
                force foreign firms to alter their products and 
                manufacturing chains to compete;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (C) requirements that foreign companies 
                disclose proprietary information to qualify for the 
                adoption of their standards for use in the PRC domestic 
                market; and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (D) maintenance of closed procurement 
                processes, which limit participation by foreign firms, 
                including by setting terms that require such firms to 
                use domestic suppliers, transfer know-how to firms in 
                the PRC, and disclose proprietary 
                information.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (11) The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and 
        associated industry-specific efforts under this initiative, 
        such as the Digital Silk Road, are key vectors to advance the 
        PRC's mercantilist policies and practices globally. The 
        resulting challenges do not only affect United States firms. As 
        the European Chamber of Commerce reported in a January 2020 
        report, the combination of concessional lending to Chinese 
        state-owned enterprises, nontransparent procurement and bidding 
        processes, closed digital standards, and other factors severely 
        limit European and other participation in BRI and make 
        ``competition [with Chinese companies] in third-country markets 
        extremely challenging''. This underscores a key objective of 
        BRI, which is to ensure the reliance of infrastructure, digital 
        technologies, and other important goods on PRC supply chains 
        and technical standards.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) the challenges presented by a nonmarket 
        economy like the PRC's economy, which has captured such a large 
        share of global economic exchange, are in many ways 
        unprecedented and require sufficiently elevated and sustained 
        long-term focus and engagement;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) in order to truly address the most detrimental 
        aspects of CCP-directed mercantilist economic strategy, the 
        United States must adopt policies that--</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) expose the full scope and scale of 
                intellectual property theft and mass subsidization of 
                Chinese firms, and the resulting harm to the United 
                States, foreign markets, and the global 
                economy;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) ensure that PRC companies face costs 
                and consequences for anticompetitive 
                behavior;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (C) provide options for affected United 
                States persons to address and respond to unreasonable 
                and discriminatory CCP-directed industrial policies; 
                and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (D) strengthen the protection of critical 
                technology and sensitive data, while still fostering an 
                environment that provides incentives for innovation and 
                competition;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) the United States must work with its allies 
        and partners through the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
        and Development (OECD), the World Trade Organization, and other 
        venues and fora--</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) to reinforce long-standing generally 
                accepted principles of fair competition and market 
                behavior and address the PRC's anticompetitive economic 
                and industrial policies that undermine decades of 
                global growth and innovation;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) to ensure that the PRC is not granted 
                the same treatment as that of a free-market economy 
                until it ceases the implementation of laws, 
                regulations, policies, and practices that provide 
                unfair advantage on PRC firms in furtherance of 
                national objectives and impose unreasonable, 
                discriminatory, and illegal burdens on market-based 
                international commerce; and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (C) to align policies with respect to 
                curbing state-directed subsidization of the private 
                sector, such as advocating for global rules related to 
                transparency and adherence to notification 
                requirements, including through the efforts currently 
                being advanced by the United States, Japan, and the 
                European Union; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (4) the United States and its allies and partners 
        must collaborate to provide incentives to their respective 
        companies to cooperate in areas such as--</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) advocating for protection of 
                intellectual property rights in markets around the 
                world;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) fostering open technical standards; 
                and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (C) increasing joint investments in 
                overseas markets.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 402. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY VIOLATORS LIST.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    (a) In General.--Not later than one year after the date of 
the enactment of this Act, and not less frequently than annually 
thereafter, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary 
of Commerce, the United States Trade Representative, and the Director 
of National Intelligence, shall create a list (referred to in this 
section as the ``intellectual property violators list''), which 
identifies all state-owned enterprises that have benefitted from--
</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) a significant act or series of acts of 
        intellectual property theft that subjected a United States 
        economic sector or particular company incorporated in the 
        United States to harm; or</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) an act or government policy of involuntary or 
        coerced technology transfer of intellectual property ultimately 
        owned by a company incorporated in the United States.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (b) Rules for Identification.--To determine whether there 
is a credible basis for determining that a company should be included 
on the intellectual property violators list, the Secretary of State, in 
coordination with the Secretary of Commerce, the United States Trade 
Representative, and the Director of National Intelligence, shall 
consider--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) any finding by a United States court that the 
        company has violated relevant United States laws intended to 
        protect intellectual property rights; or</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) substantial and credible information received 
        from any entity described in subsection (c) or other interested 
        persons.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (c) Consultation.--In carrying out this section, the 
Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Commerce, the 
United States Trade Representative, and the Director of National 
Intelligence, may consult, as necessary and appropriate, with--
</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) other Federal agencies, including independent 
        agencies;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) the private sector; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) civil society organizations with relevant 
        expertise.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (d) Report.--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) In general.--The Secretary of State shall 
        publish, in the Federal Register, an annual report that--
        </DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) lists the companies engaged in the 
                activities described in subsection (a)(1); 
                and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) describes the circumstances 
                surrounding actions described in subsection (a)(2), 
                including any role of the Government of the PRC; 
                and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (C) assesses, to the extent practicable, 
                the economic advantage derived by the companies engaged 
                in the activities described in subsection 
                (a)(1).</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) Form.--The report published under paragraph 
        (1) shall be unclassified, but may include a classified 
        annex.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (e) Declassification and Release.--The Director of 
National Intelligence may authorize the declassification of 
information, as appropriate, to inform the contents of the report 
published pursuant to subsection (d).</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (f) Requirement To Protect Business-Confidential 
Information.--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) In general.--The Secretary of State and the 
        heads of all other Federal agencies involved in the production 
        of the intellectual property violators list shall protect from 
        disclosure any proprietary information submitted by a private 
        sector participant and marked as business-confidential 
        information, unless the party submitting the confidential 
        business information--</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) had notice, at the time of submission, 
                that such information would be released by the 
                Secretary; or</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) subsequently consents to the release 
                of such information.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) Nonconfidential version of report.--If 
        confidential business information is provided by a private 
        sector participant, a nonconfidential version of the report 
        under subsection (d) shall be published in the Federal Register 
        that summarizes or deletes, if necessary, the confidential 
        business information.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) Treatment as trade secrets.--Proprietary 
        information submitted by a private party under this section--
        </DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) shall be considered to be trade 
                secrets and commercial or financial information (as 
                defined under section 552(b)(4) of title 5, United 
                States Code); and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) shall be exempt from disclosure 
                without the express approval of the private 
                party.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 403. GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 
              SUBSIDIES LIST.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    (a) Report.--Not later than one year after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the Secretary of State, 
in coordination with the United States Trade Representative and the 
Secretary of Commerce, shall publish an unclassified report in the 
Federal Register that identifies--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) subsidies provided by the Government of the 
        PRC to enterprises in the PRC; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) discriminatory treatment favoring enterprises 
        in the PRC over foreign market participants.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (b) Subsidies and Discriminatory Treatment Described.--In 
compiling the report under subsection (a), the Secretary of State shall 
consider--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) regulatory and other policies enacted or 
        promoted by the Government of the PRC that--</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) discriminate in favor of enterprises 
                in the PRC at the expense of foreign market 
                participants;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) shield centrally administered, state-
                owned enterprises from competition; or</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (C) otherwise suppress market-based 
                competition;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) financial subsidies, including favorable 
        lending terms, from or promoted by the Government of the PRC or 
        centrally administered, state-owned enterprises that materially 
        benefit PRC enterprises over foreign market participants in 
        contravention of generally accepted market principles; 
        and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) any subsidy that meets the definition of 
        subsidy under article 1 of the Agreement on Subsidies and 
        Countervailing Measures referred to in section 101(d)(12) of 
        the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (19 U.S.C. 
        3511(d)(12)).''.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (c) Consultation.--The Secretary of State, in coordination 
with the Secretary of Commerce and the United States Trade 
Representative, may, as necessary and appropriate, consult with--
</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) other Federal agencies, including independent 
        agencies;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) the private sector; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) civil society organizations with relevant 
        expertise.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 404. COUNTERING FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    (a) In General.--The Secretary of State, in coordination 
with the Attorney General, shall offer to provide technical assistance 
to establish legislative and regulatory frameworks to combat the 
bribery of foreign public officials consistent with the principles of 
the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in 
International Business Transactions to the governments of countries--
</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) that are partners of the United 
        States;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) that have demonstrated a will to combat 
        foreign corrupt practices responsibly; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) for which technical assistance will have the 
        greatest opportunity to achieve measureable results.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (b) Strategy Requirement.--Not later than 90 days after 
the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit 
a strategy for carrying out the activities described in subsections (a) 
to the appropriate congressional committees.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (c) Coordination.--In formulating the strategy described 
in subsection (b), the Secretary of State shall coordinate with the 
Attorney General.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (d) Semiannual Briefing Requirement.--Not later than 180 
days after the date of enactment of this Act, and every 180 days 
thereafter for five years, the Secretary of State shall provide a 
briefing regarding the activities described in subsection (a) and the 
strategy submitted under subsection (b) to the appropriate 
congressional committees.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 405. DEBT RELIEF FOR COUNTRIES ELIGIBLE FOR ASSISTANCE 
              FROM THE INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    (a) Policy Statement.--It is the policy of the United 
States to coordinate with the international community to provide debt 
relief for debt that is held by countries eligible for assistance from 
the International Development Association that request forbearance to 
respond to the COVID-19 pandemic.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (b) Debt Relief.--The Secretary of the Treasury, in 
consultation with the Secretary of State, shall engage with 
international financial institutions and other bilateral official 
creditors to advance policy discussions on restructuring, rescheduling, 
or canceling the sovereign debt of countries eligible for assistance 
from the International Development Association, as necessary, to 
respond to the COVID-19 pandemic.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (c) Reporting Requirement.--Not later than 45 days after 
the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 90 days thereafter 
until the end of the COVID-19 pandemic, as determined by the World 
Health Organization, or until two years after the date of the enactment 
of this Act, whichever is earlier, the Secretary of the Treasury, in 
coordination with the Secretary of State, shall submit to the 
committees specified in subsection (d) a report that describes--
</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) actions that have been taken to advance debt 
        relief for countries eligible for assistance from the 
        International Development Association that request forbearance 
        to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic in coordination with 
        international financial institutions, the Group of 7 (G7), the 
        Group of 20 (G20), Paris Club members, and the Institute of 
        International Finance;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) mechanisms that have been utilized and 
        mechanisms that are under consideration to provide the debt 
        relief described in paragraph (1);</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) any United States policy concerns regarding 
        debt relief to specific countries;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (4) the balance and status of repayments on all 
        loans from the People's Republic of China to countries eligible 
        for assistance from the International Development Association, 
        including--</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) loans provided as part of the Belt and 
                Road Initiative of the People's Republic of 
                China;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) loans made by the Export-Import Bank 
                of China;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (C) loans made by the China Development 
                Bank; and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (D) loans made by the Asian Infrastructure 
                Investment Bank; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (5) the transparency measures established or 
        proposed to ensure that funds saved through the debt relief 
        described in paragraph (1) will be used for activities--
        </DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) that respond to the health, economic, 
                and social consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic; 
                and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) that are consistent with the interests 
                and values of the United States.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (d) Committees Specified.--The committees specified in 
this subsection are--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the 
        Committee on Appropriations, and the Committee on Banking, 
        Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the 
        Committee on Appropriations, and the Committee on Financial 
        Services of the House of Representatives.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 406. REPORT ON MANNER AND EXTENT TO WHICH THE GOVERNMENT 
              OF CHINA EXPLOITS HONG KONG TO CIRCUMVENT UNITED STATES 
              LAWS AND PROTECTIONS.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    Title III of the United States-Hong Kong Policy Act of 
1992 (22 U.S.C. 5731 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the 
following:</DELETED>

<DELETED>``SEC. 303. REPORT ON MANNER AND EXTENT TO WHICH THE 
              GOVERNMENT OF CHINA EXPLOITS HONG KONG TO CIRCUMVENT 
              UNITED STATES LAWS AND PROTECTIONS.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    ``(a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date 
of the enactment of this section, the Secretary of State shall submit 
to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the manner and 
extent to which the Government of China uses the status of Hong Kong to 
circumvent the laws and protections of the United States.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    ``(b) Elements.--The report required by subsection (a) 
shall include the following:</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    ``(1) In consultation with the Secretary of 
        Commerce, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Director 
        of National Intelligence--</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    ``(A) an assessment of how the Government 
                of China uses Hong Kong to circumvent United States 
                export controls; and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    ``(B) a list of all significant incidents 
                in which the Government of China used Hong Kong to 
                circumvent such controls during the reporting 
                period.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    ``(2) In consultation with the Secretary of the 
        Treasury and the Secretary of Commerce--</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    ``(A) an assessment of how the Government 
                of China uses Hong Kong to circumvent duties on 
                merchandise exported to the United States from the 
                People's Republic of China; and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    ``(B) a list of all significant incidents 
                in which the Government of China used Hong Kong to 
                circumvent such duties during the reporting 
                period.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    ``(3) In consultation with the Secretary of the 
        Treasury, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Director 
        of National Intelligence--</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    ``(A) an assessment of how the Government 
                of China uses Hong Kong to circumvent sanctions imposed 
                by the United States or pursuant to multilateral 
                regimes; and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    ``(B) a list of all significant incidents 
                in which the Government of China used Hong Kong to 
                circumvent such sanctions during the reporting 
                period.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    ``(4) In consultation with the Secretary of 
        Homeland Security and the Director of National Intelligence, an 
        assessment of how the Government of China uses formal or 
        informal means to extradite or coercively move individuals, 
        including United States persons, from Hong Kong to the People's 
        Republic of China.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    ``(5) In consultation with the Secretary of 
        Defense, the Director of National Intelligence, and the 
        Director of Homeland Security--</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    ``(A) an assessment of how the 
                intelligence, security, and law enforcement agencies of 
                the Government of China, including the Ministry of 
                State Security, the Ministry of Public Security, and 
                the People's Armed Police, use the Hong Kong Security 
                Bureau and other security agencies in Hong Kong to 
                conduct espionage on foreign nationals, including 
                United States persons, conduct influence operations, or 
                violate civil liberties guaranteed under the laws of 
                Hong Kong; and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    ``(B) a list of all significant incidents 
                of such espionage, influence operations, or violations 
                of civil liberties during the reporting 
                period.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    ``(c) Form of Report; Availability.--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    ``(1) Form.--The report required by subsection (a) 
        shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a 
        classified index.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    ``(2) Availability.--The unclassified portion of 
        the report required by subsection (a) shall be posted on a 
        publicly available internet website of the Department of 
        State.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    ``(d) Definitions.--In this section:</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    ``(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The 
        term `appropriate congressional committees' means--</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    ``(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations, 
                the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 
                the Committee on Finance, and the Select Committee on 
                Intelligence of the Senate; and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    ``(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
                the Committee on Financial Services, the Permanent 
                Select Committee on Intelligence, and the Committee on 
                Ways and Means of the House of 
                Representatives.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    ``(2) Foreign national.--The term `foreign 
        national' means a person that is neither--</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    ``(A) an individual who is a citizen or 
                national of the People's Republic of China; 
                or</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    ``(B) an entity organized under the laws 
                of the People's Republic of China or of a jurisdiction 
                within the People's Republic of China.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    ``(3) Reporting period.--The term `reporting 
        period' means the 5-year period preceding submission of the 
        report required by subsection (a).</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    ``(4) United states person.--The term `United 
        States person' means--</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    ``(A) a United States citizen or an alien 
                lawfully admitted for permanent residence to the United 
                States; or</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    ``(B) an entity organized under the laws 
                of the United States or of any jurisdiction within the 
                United States, including a foreign branch of such an 
                entity.''.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 407. ANNUAL REVIEW ON THE PRESENCE OF CHINESE COMPANIES 
              IN UNITED STATES CAPITAL MARKETS.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    (a) Appropriate Committees of Congress.--In this section, 
the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
        Senate;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
        Senate;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban 
        Affairs of the Senate;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (4) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House 
        of Representatives;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (5) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence 
        of the House of Representatives; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (6) the Committee on Financial Services of the 
        House of Representatives.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (b) Report.--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the 
        date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 
        the following 5 years, the Secretary of State, in consultation 
        with the Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of 
        the Treasury, shall submit an unclassified report to the 
        appropriate committees of Congress that describes the risks 
        posed to the United States by the presence in United States 
        capital markets of companies incorporated in the PRC.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) Matters to be included.--The report required 
        under paragraph (1) shall--</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) identify companies incorporated in the 
                PRC that--</DELETED>
                        <DELETED>    (i) are listed or traded on one or 
                        several stock exchanges within the United 
                        States, including over-the-counter market and 
                        ``A Shares'' added to indexes and exchange-
                        traded funds out of mainland exchanges in the 
                        PRC; and</DELETED>
                        <DELETED>    (ii) based on the factors for 
                        consideration described in paragraph (3), have 
                        knowingly and materially contributed to--
                        </DELETED>
                                <DELETED>    (I) activities that 
                                undermine United States national 
                                security;</DELETED>
                                <DELETED>    (II) serious abuses of 
                                internationally recognized human 
                                rights; or</DELETED>
                                <DELETED>    (III) a substantially 
                                increased financial risk exposure for 
                                United States-based 
                                investors;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) describe the activities of the 
                companies identified pursuant to subparagraph (A), and 
                their implications for the United States; and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (C) develop policy recommendations for the 
                United States Government, State governments, United 
                States financial institutions, United States equity and 
                debt exchanges, and other relevant stakeholders to 
                address the risks posed by the presence in United 
                States capital markets of the companies identified 
                pursuant to subparagraph (A).</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) Factors for consideration.--In completing the 
        report under paragraph (1), the President shall consider 
        whether a company identified pursuant to paragraph (2)(A)--
        </DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) has materially contributed to the 
                development or manufacture, or sold or facilitated 
                procurement by the PLA, of lethal military equipment or 
                component parts of such equipment;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) has contributed to the construction 
                and militarization of features in the South China 
                Sea;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (C) has been sanctioned by the United 
                States or has been determined to have conducted 
                business with sanctioned entities;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (D) has engaged in an act or a series of 
                acts of intellectual property theft;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (E) has engaged in corporate or economic 
                espionage;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (F) has contributed to the proliferation 
                of nuclear or missile technology in violation of United 
                Nations Security Council resolutions or United States 
                sanctions;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (G) has contributed to the repression of 
                religious and ethnic minorities within the PRC, 
                including in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region or Tibet 
                Autonomous Region;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (H) has contributed to the development of 
                technologies that enable censorship directed or 
                directly supported by the Government of the 
                PRC;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (I) has failed to comply fully with 
                Federal securities laws (including required audits by 
                the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board) and 
                ``material risk'' disclosure requirements of the 
                Securities and Exchange Commission; or</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (J) has contributed to other activities or 
                behavior determined to be relevant by the 
                President.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (c) Report Form.--The report required under subsection 
(b)(1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a 
classified annex.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (d) Publication.--The unclassified portion of the report 
under subsection (b)(1) shall be made accessible to the public online 
through relevant United States Government websites.</DELETED>

        <DELETED>TITLE V--ENSURING STRATEGIC SECURITY</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 501. FINDINGS ON STRATEGIC SECURITY AND ARMS 
              CONTROL.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    Congress makes the following findings:</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) The United States and the PRC have a shared 
        interest in strategic security through enforceable arms control 
        and non-proliferation agreements.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) The United States has long pursued and 
        continues to seek effective, verifiable, and enforceable arms 
        control and non-proliferation agreements that support United 
        States and allied security by--</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) controlling the spread of nuclear 
                materials and technology;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) placing limits on the production, 
                stockpiling, and deployment of nuclear 
                weapons;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (C) decreasing misperception and 
                miscalculation; and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (D) avoiding destabilizing nuclear arms 
                competition.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) In May 2019, Director of the Defense 
        Intelligence Agency Lieutenant General Robert Ashley stated, 
        ``China is likely to at least double the size of its nuclear 
        stockpile in the course of implementing the most rapid 
        expansion and diversification of its nuclear arsenal in China's 
        history.''. The PLA is building a full triad of modernized 
        fixed and mobile ground-based launchers and new capabilities 
        for nuclear-armed bombers and submarine-launched ballistic 
        missiles.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (4) In June 2020, the Department of State raised 
        concerns in its annual ``Adherence to and Compliance with Arms 
        Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and 
        Commitments'' report to Congress that the PRC is not complying 
        with the ``zero-yield'' nuclear testing ban and accused the PRC 
        of ``blocking the flow of data from the monitoring stations'' 
        in China.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (5) The Department of Defense 2020 Report on 
        Military and Security Developments Involving the People's 
        Republic of China states that China ``intends to increase 
        peacetime readiness of its nuclear forces by moving to a launch 
        on warning posture with an expanded silo-based 
        force''.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (6) The Department of Defense report also states 
        that, over the next decade, China's nuclear stockpile--
        currently estimated in the low 200s--is projected to least 
        double in size as China expands and modernizes its nuclear 
        force.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (7) The PRC is conducting research on its first 
        potential early warning radar, with technical cooperation from 
        Russia. This radar could indicate that the PRC is moving to a 
        launch-on warning posture.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (8) The PRC plans to use its increasingly capable 
        space, cyber, and electronic warfare capabilities against 
        United States early warning systems and critical infrastructure 
        in a crisis scenario. This poses great risk to strategic 
        security, as it could lead to inadvertent escalation.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (9) The PRC's nuclear expansion comes as a part of 
        a massive modernization of the PLA which, combined with the 
        PLA's aggressive actions, has increasingly destabilized the 
        Indo-Pacific region.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (10) The PLA Rocket Force (PLARF), which was 
        elevated in 2015 to become a separate branch within the PLA, 
        has formed 11 new missile brigades since May 2017, some of 
        which are capable of both conventional and nuclear strikes. 
        Unlike the United States, which separates its conventional 
        strike and nuclear capabilities, the PLARF appears to not only 
        co-locate conventional and nuclear forces, including dual-use 
        missiles like the DF-26, but to task the same unit with both 
        nuclear and conventional missions. Such intermingling could 
        lead to inadvertent escalation in a crisis. The United States 
        Defense Intelligence Agency determined in March 2020 that the 
        PLA tested more ballistic missiles than the rest of the world 
        combined in 2019.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (11) A January 2021 report from the Institute for 
        Defense Analysis found that many United States and 
        international observers viewed China's no first-use policy with 
        skepticism, especially in the wake of the expansion and 
        modernization of its nuclear capabilities.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (12) The long-planned United States nuclear 
        modernization program will not increase the United States 
        nuclear weapons stockpile, predates China's conventional 
        military and nuclear expansion, and is not an arms race against 
        China.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (13) The United States extended nuclear 
        deterrence--</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) provides critical strategic security 
                around the world;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) is an essential element of United 
                States military alliances; and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (C) serves a vital non-proliferation 
                function.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (14) As a signatory to the Treaty on the Non-
        Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Washington, London, 
        and Moscow July 1, 1968, the PRC is obligated under Article Six 
        of the treaty to pursue arms control negotiations in good 
        faith.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (15) The United States has, on numerous occasions, 
        called on the PRC to participate in strategic arms control 
        negotiations, but the PRC has thus far declined.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (16) The Governments of Poland, Slovenia, Denmark, 
        Norway, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, the Netherlands, Romania, 
        Austria, and Albania, as well as the Deputy Secretary General 
        of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, have all encouraged 
        the PRC to join arms control discussions.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 502. COOPERATION ON A STRATEGIC NUCLEAR 
              DIALOGUE.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    (a) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United 
States--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) to pursue, in coordination with United States 
        allies, arms control negotiations and sustained and regular 
        engagement with the PRC--</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) to enhance understanding of each 
                other's respective nuclear policies, doctrine, and 
                capabilities;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) to improve transparency; and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (C) to help manage the risks of 
                miscalculation and misperception;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) to formulate a strategy to engage the 
        Government of China on relevant bilateral issues that lays the 
        groundwork for bringing the People's Republic of China into an 
        arms control framework, including--</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) fostering bilateral dialogue on arms 
                control leading to the convening of bilateral strategic 
                security talks;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) negotiating norms for outer 
                space;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (C) developing pre-launch notification 
                regimes aimed at reducing nuclear miscalculation; 
                and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (D) expanding lines of communication 
                between both governments for the purposes of reducing 
                the risks of conventional war and increasing 
                transparency;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) to pursue relevant capabilities in 
        coordination with our allies and partners to ensure the 
        security of United States and allied interests in the face of 
        the PRC's military modernization and expansion, including--
        </DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) ground-launched cruise and ballistic 
                missiles;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) integrated air and missile 
                defense;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (C) hypersonic missiles;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (D) intelligence, surveillance, and 
                reconnaissance;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (E) space-based capabilities;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (F) cyber capabilities; and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (G) command, control, and 
                communications;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (4) to maintain sufficient force structure, 
        posture, and capabilities to provide extended nuclear 
        deterrence to United States allies and partners;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (5) to maintain appropriate missile defense 
        capabilities to protect threats to the United States homeland 
        and our forces across the theater from rogue intercontinental 
        ballistic missiles from the Indo-Pacific region; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (6) to ensure that the United States declaratory 
        policy reflects the requirements of extended deterrence, to 
        both assure allies and to preserve its non-proliferation 
        benefits.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) in the midst of growing competition between 
        the United States and the PRC, it is in the interest of both 
        nations to cooperate in reducing risks of conventional and 
        nuclear escalation;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) a physical, cyber, electronic, or any other 
        PLA attack on United States early warning satellites, other 
        portions of the nuclear command and control enterprise, or 
        critical infrastructure poses a high risk to inadvertent but 
        rapid escalation;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) the United States and its allies should 
        promote international norms on military operations in space, 
        the employment of cyber capabilities, and the military use of 
        artificial intelligence, as an element of risk reduction 
        regarding nuclear command and control; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (4) United States allies and partners should share 
        the burden of promoting and protecting such norms by voting 
        against the PRC's proposals regarding the weaponization of 
        space, highlighting unsafe behavior by the PRC that violates 
        international norms, such as in rendezvous and proximity 
        operations, and promoting responsible behavior in space and all 
        other domains.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 503. REPORT ON UNITED STATES EFFORTS TO ENGAGE THE 
              PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA ON NUCLEAR ISSUES AND 
              BALLISTIC MISSILE ISSUES.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    (a) Report on the Future of United States-China Arms 
Control.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of 
this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of 
Defense and the Secretary of Energy, shall submit to the appropriate 
committees of Congress a report, and if necessary a separate classified 
annex, that examines the approaches and strategic effects of engaging 
the Government of China on arms control and risk reduction, including--
</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) areas of potential dialogue between the 
        Governments of the United States and the People's Republic of 
        China, including on ballistic, hypersonic glide, and cruise 
        missiles, conventional forces, nuclear, space, and cyberspace 
        issues, as well as other new strategic domains, which could 
        reduce the likelihood of war, limit escalation if a conflict 
        were to occur, and constrain a destabilizing arms race in the 
        Indo-Pacific;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) how the United States Government can 
        incentivize the Government of China to engage in a constructive 
        arms control dialogue;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) identifying strategic military capabilities of 
        the People's Republic of China that the United States 
        Government is most concerned about and how limiting these 
        capabilities may benefit United States and allied security 
        interests;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (4) mechanisms to avoid, manage, or control 
        nuclear, conventional, and unconventional military escalation 
        between the United States and the People's Republic of China; 
        and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (5) opportunities and methods to encourage 
        transparency from the People's Republic of China.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (b) Report on Arms Control Talks With the Russian 
Federation and the People's Republic of China.--Not later than 180 days 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in 
consultation with the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Energy, 
shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report that 
describes--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) a concrete plan for arms control talks that 
        includes both the People's Republic of China and the Russian 
        Federation;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) if a trilateral arms control dialogue does not 
        arise, what alternative plans the Department of State envisages 
        for ensuring the security of the United States and its allies 
        security from Russian and Chinese nuclear weapons;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) effects on the credibility of United States 
        extended deterrence assurances to allies and partners if the 
        United States is faced with two nuclear-armed peer competitors 
        and any likely corresponding implications for regional security 
        architectures;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (4) efforts at engaging the People's Republic of 
        China to join arms control talks, whether on a bilateral or 
        multilateral basis; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (5) the interest level of the Government of China 
        in joining arms control talks, whether on a bilateral or 
        multilateral basis.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (c) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this 
section, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the 
        Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Energy and 
        Natural Resources of the Senate; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the 
        Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Energy and 
        Commerce of the House of Representatives.</DELETED>

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

    (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Strategic 
Competition Act of 2021''.
    (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as 
follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Findings.
Sec. 3. Definitions.
Sec. 4. Statement of policy.
Sec. 5. Sense of Congress.
Sec. 6. Rules of construction.

               TITLE I--INVESTING IN A COMPETITIVE FUTURE

                   Subtitle A--Science and Technology

Sec. 101. Authorization to assist United States companies with global 
                            supply chain diversification and 
                            management.

        Subtitle B--Global Infrastructure and Energy Development

Sec. 111. Appropriate committees of Congress defined.
Sec. 112. Sense of Congress on international quality infrastructure 
                            investment standards.
Sec. 113. United States support for infrastructure.
Sec. 114. Infrastructure Transaction and Assistance Network.
Sec. 115. Strategy for advanced and reliable energy infrastructure.
Sec. 116. Report on the People's Republic of China's investments in 
                            foreign energy development.

            Subtitle C--Digital Technology and Connectivity

Sec. 121. Sense of Congress on digital technology issues.
Sec. 122. Digital connectivity and cybersecurity partnership.
Sec. 123. Strategy for digital investment by United States 
                            International Development Finance 
                            Corporation.

    Subtitle D--Countering Chinese Communist Party Malign Influence

Sec. 131. Short title.
Sec. 132. Authorization of appropriations for countering Chinese 
                            Influence Fund.
Sec. 133. Findings on Chinese information warfare and malign influence 
                            operations.
Sec. 134. Authorization of appropriations for the Fulbright-Hays 
                            Program.
Sec. 135. Sense of Congress condemning anti-Asian racism and 
                            discrimination.
Sec. 136. Supporting independent media and countering disinformation.
Sec. 137. Global engagement center.
Sec. 138. Review by Committee on Foreign Investment in the United 
                            States of certain foreign gifts to and 
                            contracts with institutions of higher 
                            education.
Sec. 139. Post-employment restrictions on Senate-confirmed officials at 
                            the Department of State.
Sec. 140. Sense of Congress on prioritizing nomination of qualified 
                            ambassadors to ensure proper diplomatic 
                            positioning to counter Chinese influence.
Sec. 141. China Censorship Monitor and Action Group.

           TITLE II--INVESTING IN ALLIANCES AND PARTNERSHIPS

              Subtitle A--Strategic and Diplomatic Matters

Sec. 201. Appropriate committees of Congress defined.
Sec. 202. United States commitment and support for allies and partners 
                            in the Indo-Pacific.
Sec. 203. Sense of Congress on cooperation with the Quad.
Sec. 204. Establishment of Quad Intra-Parliamentary Working Group.
Sec. 205. Statement of policy on cooperation with ASEAN.
Sec. 206. Sense of Congress on enhancing United States-ASEAN 
                            cooperation on technology issues with 
                            respect to the People's Republic of China.
Sec. 207. Report on Chinese influence in international organizations.
Sec. 208. Regulatory exchanges with allies and partners.
Sec. 209. Technology partnership office at the Department of State.
Sec. 210. United States representation in standards-setting bodies.
Sec. 211. Sense of Congress on centrality of sanctions and other 
                            restrictions to strategic competition with 
                            China.
Sec. 212. Sense of Congress on negotiations with G7 and G20 countries.
Sec. 213. Enhancing the United States-Taiwan partnership.
Sec. 214. Taiwan Fellowship Program.
Sec. 215. Treatment of Taiwan government.
Sec. 216. Taiwan symbols of sovereignty.
Sec. 217. Report on origins of the COVID-19 pandemic.
Sec. 218. Enhancement of diplomatic support and economic engagement 
                            with Pacific island countries.
Sec. 219. Increasing Department of State personnel and resources 
                            devoted to the Indo-Pacific.
Sec. 219A. Advancing United States leadership in the United Nations 
                            System.
Sec. 219B. Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018.
Sec. 219C. Statement of policy on need for reciprocity in the 
                            relationship between the United States and 
                            the People's Republic of China.
Sec. 219D. Opposition to provision of assistance to People's Republic 
                            of China by Asian Development Bank.
Sec. 219E. Opposition to provision of assistance to People's Republic 
                            of China by International Bank for 
                            Reconstruction and Development.
Sec. 219F. United States policy on Chinese and Russian government 
                            efforts to undermine the United Nations 
                            Security Council action on human rights.
Sec. 219G. Deterring PRC use of force against Taiwan.
Sec. 219H. Strategy to respond to sharp power operations targeting 
                            Taiwan.
Sec. 219I. Study and report on bilateral efforts to address Chinese 
                            fentanyl trafficking.
Sec. 219J. Investment, trade, and development in Africa and Latin 
                            America and the Caribbean.
Sec. 219K. Facilitation of increased equity investments under the 
                            Better Utilization of Investments Leading 
                            to Development Act of 2018.

               Subtitle B--International Security Matters

Sec. 221. Definitions.
Sec. 222. Findings.
Sec. 223. Sense of Congress regarding bolstering security partnerships 
                            in the Indo-Pacific.
Sec. 224. Statement of policy.
Sec. 225. Foreign military financing in the Indo-Pacific and 
                            authorization of appropriations for 
                            Southeast Asia maritime security programs 
                            and diplomatic outreach activities.
Sec. 226. Foreign military financing compact pilot program in the Indo-
                            Pacific.
Sec. 227. Additional funding for international military education and 
                            training in the Indo-Pacific.
Sec. 228. Prioritizing excess defense article transfers for the Indo-
                            Pacific.
Sec. 229. Prioritizing excess naval vessel transfers for the Indo-
                            Pacific.
Sec. 230. Statement of policy on maritime freedom of operations in 
                            international waterways and airspace of the 
                            Indo-Pacific and on artificial land 
                            features in the South China Sea.
Sec. 231. Report on capability development of Indo-Pacific allies and 
                            partners.
Sec. 232. Report on national technology and industrial base.
Sec. 233. Report on diplomatic outreach with respect to Chinese 
                            military installations overseas.
Sec. 234. Statement of policy regarding universal implementation of 
                            United Nations sanctions on North Korea.
Sec. 235. Limitation on assistance to countries hosting Chinese 
                            military installations.

  Subtitle C--Regional Strategies to Counter the People's Republic of 
                                 China

Sec. 241. Statement of policy on cooperation with allies and partners 
                            around the world with respect to the 
                            People's Republic of China.

                       PART I--Western Hemisphere

Sec. 245. Sense of Congress regarding United States-Canada relations.
Sec. 246. Sense of Congress regarding the Government of China's 
                            arbitrary imprisonment of Canadian 
                            citizens.
Sec. 247. Strategy to enhance cooperation with Canada.
Sec. 248. Strategy to strengthen economic competitiveness, governance, 
                            human rights, and the rule of law in Latin 
                            America and the Caribbean.
Sec. 249. Engagement in international organizations and the defense 
                            sector in Latin America and the Caribbean.
Sec. 250. Addressing China's sovereign lending practices in Latin 
                            America and the Caribbean.
Sec. 251. Defense cooperation in Latin America and the Caribbean.
Sec. 252. Engagement with civil society in Latin America and the 
                            Caribbean regarding accountability, human 
                            rights, and the risks of pervasive 
                            surveillance technologies.

                    PART II--Transatlantic Alliance

Sec. 255. Sense of Congress on the Transatlantic alliance.
Sec. 256. Strategy to enhance transatlantic cooperation with respect to 
                            the People's Republic of China.
Sec. 257. Enhancing Transatlantic cooperation on promoting private 
                            sector finance.
Sec. 258. Report and briefing on cooperation between China and Iran and 
                            between China and Russia.
Sec. 259. Promoting responsible development alternatives to the belt 
                            and road initiative.

                    PART III--South and Central Asia

Sec. 261. Sense of Congress on South and Central Asia.
Sec. 262. Strategy to enhance cooperation with South and Central Asia.

                            PART IV--Africa

Sec. 271. Assessment of political, economic, and security activity of 
                            the People's Republic of China in Africa.
Sec. 272. Increasing the competitiveness of the United States in 
                            Africa.
Sec. 273. Digital security cooperation with respect to Africa.
Sec. 274. Increasing personnel in United States embassies in sub-
                            Saharan Africa focused on the People's 
                            Republic of China.
Sec. 275. Support for Young African Leaders Initiative.
Sec. 276. Africa broadcasting networks.

                  PART V--Middle East and North Africa

Sec. 281. Strategy to counter Chinese influence in, and access to, the 
                            Middle East and North Africa.
Sec. 282. Sense of Congress on Middle East and North Africa engagement.

                         PART VI--Arctic Region

Sec. 285. Arctic diplomacy.

                           PART VII--Oceania

Sec. 291. Statement of policy on United States engagement in Oceania.
Sec. 292. Oceania strategic roadmap.
Sec. 293. Review of USAID programming in Oceania.
Sec. 294. Oceania Security Dialogue.
Sec. 295. Report on countering illegal, unreported, and unregulated 
                            fishing in Oceania.
Sec. 296. Oceania Peace Corps partnerships.

                   TITLE III--INVESTING IN OUR VALUES

Sec. 301. Authorization of appropriations for promotion of democracy in 
                            Hong Kong.
Sec. 302. Imposition of sanctions relating to forced labor in the 
                            Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.
Sec. 303. Imposition of sanctions with respect to systematic rape, 
                            coercive abortion, forced sterilization, or 
                            involuntary contraceptive implantation in 
                            the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.
Sec. 304. Report on corrupt activities of senior officials of 
                            Government of the People's Republic of 
                            China.
Sec. 305. Removal of members of the United Nations Human Rights Council 
                            that commit human rights abuses.
Sec. 306. Policy with respect to Tibet.
Sec. 307. United States policy and international engagement on the 
                            succession or reincarnation of the Dalai 
                            Lama and religious freedom of Tibetan 
                            Buddhists.
Sec. 308. Sense of Congress on treatment of Uyghurs and other ethnic 
                            minorities in the Xinjiang Uyghur 
                            Autonomous Region.
Sec. 309. Development and deployment of internet freedom and Great 
                            Firewall circumvention tools for the people 
                            of Hong Kong.
Sec. 310. Enhancing transparency on international agreements and 
                            qualifying non-binding instruments.
Sec. 311. Authorization of appropriations for protecting human rights 
                            in the People's Republic of China.
Sec. 312. Diplomatic boycott of the XXIV Olympic Winter Games and the 
                            XIII Paralympic Winter Games.
Sec. 313. Repeal of sunset applicable to authority under Global 
                            Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act.

             TITLE IV--INVESTING IN OUR ECONOMIC STATECRAFT

Sec. 401. Findings and sense of Congress regarding the PRC's industrial 
                            policy.
Sec. 402. Intellectual property violators list.
Sec. 403. Government of the People's Republic of China subsidies list.
Sec. 404. Countering foreign corrupt practices.
Sec. 405. Debt relief for countries eligible for assistance from the 
                            International Development Association.
Sec. 406. Report on manner and extent to which the Government of China 
                            exploits Hong Kong to circumvent United 
                            States laws and protections.
Sec. 407. Annual review on the presence of Chinese companies in United 
                            States capital markets.
Sec. 408. Economic defense response teams.

                  TITLE V--ENSURING STRATEGIC SECURITY

Sec. 501. Findings on strategic security and arms control.
Sec. 502. Cooperation on a strategic nuclear dialogue.
Sec. 503. Report on United States efforts to engage the People's 
                            Republic of China on nuclear issues and 
                            ballistic missile issues.
Sec. 504. Countering China's proliferation of ballistic missiles and 
                            nuclear technology to the Middle-East.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

    Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) The People's Republic of China (PRC) is leveraging its 
        political, diplomatic, economic, military, technological, and 
        ideological power to become a strategic, near-peer, global 
        competitor of the United States. The policies increasingly 
        pursued by the PRC in these domains are contrary to the 
        interests and values of the United States, its partners, and 
        much of the rest of the world.
            (2) The current policies being pursued by the PRC--
                    (A) threaten the future character of the 
                international order and are shaping the rules, norms, 
                and institutions that govern relations among states;
                    (B) will put at risk the ability of the United 
                States to secure its national interests; and
                    (C) will put at risk the future peace, prosperity, 
                and freedom of the international community in the 
                coming decades.
            (3) After normalizing diplomatic relations with the PRC in 
        1979, the United States actively worked to advance the PRC's 
        economic and social development to ensure that the PRC 
        participated in, and benefitted from, the free and open 
        international order. The United States pursued these goals and 
        contributed to the welfare of the Chinese people by--
                    (A) increasing the PRC's trade relations and access 
                to global capital markets;
                    (B) promoting the PRC's accession to the World 
                Trade Organization;
                    (C) providing development finance and technical 
                assistance;
                    (D) promoting research collaboration;
                    (E) educating the PRC's top students;
                    (F) permitting transfers of cutting-edge 
                technologies and scientific knowledge; and
                    (G) providing intelligence and military assistance.
            (4) It is now clear that the PRC has chosen to pursue 
        state-led, mercantilist economic policies, an increasingly 
        authoritarian governance model at home through increased 
        restrictions on personal freedoms, and an aggressive and 
        assertive foreign policy. These policies frequently and 
        deliberately undermine United States interests and are contrary 
        to core United States values and the values of other nations, 
        both in the Indo-Pacific and beyond. In response to this 
        strategic decision of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the 
        United States has been compelled to reexamine and revise its 
        strategy towards the PRC.
            (5) The General Secretary of the CCP and the President of 
        the PRC, Xi Jinping, has elevated the ``Great Rejuvenation of 
        the Chinese Nation'' as central to the domestic and foreign 
        policy of the PRC. His program demands--
                    (A) strong, centralized CCP leadership;
                    (B) concentration of military power;
                    (C) a strong role for the CCP in the state and the 
                economy;
                    (D) an aggressive foreign policy seeking control 
                over broadly asserted territorial claims; and
                    (E) the denial of any values and individual rights 
                that are deemed to threaten the CCP.
            (6) The PRC views its Leninist model of governance, 
        ``socialism with Chinese characteristics'', as superior to, and 
        at odds with, the constitutional models of the United States 
        and other democracies. This approach to governance is lauded by 
        the CCP as essential to securing the PRC's status as a global 
        leader, and to shaping the future of the world. In a 2013 
        speech, President Xi said, ``We firmly believe that as 
        socialism with Chinese characteristics develops further . . . 
        it is . . . inevitable that the superiority of our socialist 
        system will be increasingly apparent . . . [and] our country's 
        road of development will have increasingly greater influence on 
        the world.''.
            (7) The PRC's objectives are to first establish regional 
        hegemony over the Indo-Pacific and then to use that dominant 
        position to propel the PRC to become the ``leading world 
        power,'' shaping an international order that is conducive to 
        the CCP's interests. Achieving these objectives require turning 
        the PRC into a wealthy nation under strict CCP rule and using a 
        strong military and advanced technological capability to pursue 
        the PRC's objectives, regardless of other countries' interests.
            (8) The PRC is reshaping the current international order, 
        which is built upon the rule of law and free and open ideals 
        and principles, by conducting global information and influence 
        operations, seeking to redefine international laws and norms to 
        align with the objectives of the CCP, rejecting the legitimacy 
        of internationally recognized human rights, and seeking to co-
        opt the leadership and agenda of multinational organizations 
        for the benefit of the PRC and other authoritarian regimes at 
        the expense of the interests of the United States and the 
        international community. In December 2018, President Xi 
        suggested that the CCP views its ``historic mission'' as not 
        only to govern China, but also to profoundly influence global 
        governance to benefit the CCP.
            (9) The PRC is encouraging other countries to follow its 
        model of ``socialism with Chinese characteristics''. During the 
        19th Party Congress in 2017, President Xi said that the PRC 
        could serve as a model of development for other countries by 
        utilizing ``Chinese wisdom'' and a ``Chinese approach to 
        solving problems''.
            (10) The PRC is promoting its governance model and 
        attempting to weaken other models of governance by--
                    (A) undermining democratic institutions;
                    (B) subverting financial institutions;
                    (C) coercing businesses to accommodate the policies 
                of the PRC; and
                    (D) using disinformation to disguise the nature of 
                the actions described in subparagraphs (A) through (C).
            (11) The PRC is close to its goal of becoming the global 
        leader in science and technology. In May 2018, President Xi 
        said that for the PRC to reach ``prosperity and rejuvenation'', 
        it needs to ``endeavor to be a major world center for science 
        and innovation''. The PRC has invested the equivalent of 
        billions of dollars into education, research and development, 
        and established joint scientific research centers and science 
        universities.
            (12) The PRC's drive to become a ``manufacturing and 
        technological superpower'' and to promote ``innovation with 
        Chinese characteristics'' is coming at the expense of human 
        rights and longstanding international rules and norms with 
        respect to economic competition, and presents a challenge to 
        United States national security and the security of allies and 
        like-minded countries. In particular, the PRC advances its 
        illiberal political and social policies through mass 
        surveillance, social credit systems, and a significant role of 
        the state in internet governance. Through these means, the PRC 
        increases direct and indirect government control over its 
        citizens' everyday lives. Its national strategy of ``Military-
        Civil Fusion'' mandates that civil and commercial research, 
        which increasingly drives global innovation, is leveraged to 
        develop new military capabilities.
            (13) The PRC and the CCP are committing crimes against 
        humanity and are engaged in an ongoing genocide, in violation 
        of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime 
        of Genocide, done at Paris December 9, 1948, against the 
        predominantly Muslim Uyghurs and other ethnic and religious 
        minority groups in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, 
        including through campaigns of imprisonment, torture, rape, and 
        coercive birth prevention policies.
            (14) The PRC is using legal and illegal means to achieve 
        its objective of becoming a manufacturing and technological 
        superpower. The PRC uses state-directed industrial policies in 
        anticompetitive ways to ensure the dominance of PRC companies. 
        The CCP engages in and encourages actions that actively 
        undermine a free and open international market, such as 
        intellectual property theft, forced technology transfers, 
        regulatory and financial subsidies, and mandatory CCP access to 
        proprietary data as part of business and commercial agreements 
        between Chinese and foreign companies.
            (15) The policies referred to in paragraph (14) are 
        designed to freeze United States and other foreign firms out of 
        the PRC market, while eroding competition in other important 
        markets. The heavy subsidization of Chinese companies includes 
        potential violation of its World Trade Organization 
        commitments. In May 2018, President Xi said that the PRC aims 
        to keep the ``initiatives of innovation and development 
        security . . . in [China's] own hands''.
            (16) The PRC is advancing its global objectives through a 
        variety of avenues, including its signature initiative, the 
        Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which is enshrined in the 
        Chinese Constitution and includes the Digital Silk Road and 
        Health Silk Road. The PRC describes BRI as a straightforward 
        and wholly beneficial plan for all countries. However, it 
        eventually seeks to advance an economic system with the PRC at 
        its center, making it the most concrete geographical 
        representation of the PRC's global ambitions. BRI increases the 
        economic influence of state-owned Chinese firms in global 
        markets, enhances the PRC's political leverage with government 
        leaders around the world, and provides greater access to 
        strategic nodes such as ports and railways. Through BRI, the 
        PRC seeks political deference through economic dependence.
            (17) The PRC is executing a plan to establish regional 
        hegemony over the Indo-Pacific and displace the United States 
        from the region. As a Pacific power, the United States has 
        built and supported enduring alliances and economic 
        partnerships that secure peace and prosperity and promote the 
        rule of law and political pluralism in a free and open Indo-
        Pacific. In contrast, the PRC uses economic and military 
        coercion in the region to secure its own interests.
            (18) The PRC's military strategy seeks to keep the United 
        States military from operating in the Western Pacific and to 
        erode United States security guarantees.
            (19) The PRC is aggressively pursuing exclusive control of 
        critical land routes, sea lanes, and air space in the Indo-
        Pacific in the hopes of eventually exercising greater influence 
        beyond the region. This includes lanes crucial to commercial 
        activity, energy exploration, transport, and the exercise of 
        security operations in areas permitted under international law.
            (20) The PRC seeks so-called ``reunification'' with Taiwan 
        through whatever means may ultimately be required. The CCP's 
        insistence that so-called ``reunification'' is Taiwan's only 
        option makes this goal inherently coercive. In January 2019, 
        President Xi stated that the PRC ``make[s] no promise to 
        renounce the use of force and reserve[s] the option of taking 
        all necessary means''. Taiwan's embodiment of democratic values 
        and economic liberalism challenges President Xi's goal of 
        achieving national rejuvenation. The PRC plans to exploit 
        Taiwan's dominant strategic position in the First Island Chain 
        and to project power into the Second Island Chain and beyond.
            (21) In the South China Sea, the PRC has executed an 
        illegal island-building campaign that threatens freedom of 
        navigation and the free-flow of commerce, damages the 
        environment, bolsters PLA power projection capabilities, and 
        coerces and intimidates other regional claimants in an effort 
        to advance its unlawful claims and control the waters around 
        neighboring countries. Despite President Xi's September 2015 
        speech, in which he said the PRC did not intend to militarize 
        the South China Sea, during the 2017 19th Party Congress, 
        President Xi announced that ``construction on islands and reefs 
        in the South China Sea have seen steady progress''.
            (22) The PRC is rapidly modernizing the PLA to attain a 
        level of capacity and capability superior to the United States 
        in terms of equipment and conduct of modern military operations 
        by shifting its military doctrine from having a force 
        ``adequate [for] China's defensive needs'' to having a force 
        ``commensurate with China's international status''. Ultimately, 
        this transformation could enable China to impose its will in 
        the Indo-Pacific region through the threat of military force. 
        In 2017, President Xi established the following developmental 
        benchmarks for the advancement of the PLA:
                    (A) A mechanized force with increased informatized 
                and strategic capabilities by 2020.
                    (B) The complete modernization of China's national 
                defense by 2035.
                    (C) The full transformation of the PLA into a 
                world-class force by 2050.
            (23) The PRC's strategy and supporting policies described 
        in this section undermine United States interests, such as--
                    (A) upholding a free and open international order;
                    (B) maintaining the integrity of international 
                institutions with liberal norms and values;
                    (C) preserving a favorable balance of power in the 
                Indo-Pacific;
                    (D) ensuring the defense of its allies;
                    (E) preserving open sea and air lanes;
                    (F) fostering the free flow of commerce through 
                open and transparent markets; and
                    (G) promoting individual freedom and human rights.
            (24) The global COVID-19 pandemic has intensified and 
        accelerated these trends in the PRC's behavior and therefore 
        increased the need for United States global leadership and a 
        competitive posture. The PRC has capitalized on the world's 
        focus on the COVID-19 pandemic by--
                    (A) moving rapidly to undermine Hong Kong's 
                autonomy, including imposing a so-called ``national 
                security law'' on Hong Kong;
                    (B) aggressively imposing its will in the East and 
                South China Seas;
                    (C) contributing to increased tensions with India; 
                and
                    (D) engaging in a widespread and government-
                directed disinformation campaign to obscure the PRC 
                government's efforts to cover up the seriousness of 
                COVID-19, sow confusion about the origination of the 
                outbreak, and discredit the United States, its allies, 
                and global health efforts.
            (25) The CCP's disinformation campaign referred to in 
        paragraph (24)(D) has included--
                    (A) concerted efforts, in the early days of the 
                pandemic, to downplay the nature and scope of the 
                outbreak in Wuhan in the PRC, as well as cases of 
                person-to-person transmission;
                    (B) claims that the virus originated in United 
                States biological defense research at Fort Detrick, 
                Maryland;
                    (C) Chinese state media reports insinuating a 
                possible link between the virus and other United States 
                biological facilities; and
                    (D) efforts to block access to qualified 
                international infectious disease experts who might 
                contradict the CCP's narrative.
            (26) In response to the PRC's strategy and policies, the 
        United States must adopt a policy of strategic competition with 
        the PRC to protect and promote our vital interests and values.
            (27) The United States' policy of strategic competition 
        with respect to the PRC is part of a broader strategic approach 
        to the Indo-Pacific and the world which centers around 
        cooperation with United States allies and partners to advance 
        shared values and interests and to preserve and enhance a free, 
        open, democratic, inclusive, rules-based, stable, and diverse 
        region.
            (28) The Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018 (Public 
        Law 115-409) contributed to a comprehensive framework for 
        promoting United State security interests, economic interests, 
        and values in the Indo-Pacific region, investing $7,500,000,000 
        over 5 years--
                    (A) to support greater security and defense 
                cooperation between the United States and allies and 
                partners in the Indo-Pacific region;
                    (B) to advance democracy and the protection and 
                promotion of human rights in the Indo-Pacific region;
                    (C) to enhance cybersecurity cooperation between 
                the United States and partners in the Indo-Pacific;
                    (D) to deepen people-to-people engagement through 
                programs such as the Young Southeast Asian Leaders 
                Initiative and the ASEAN Youth Volunteers program; and
                    (E) to enhance energy cooperation and energy 
                security in the Indo-Pacific region.

SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.

    In this Act:
            (1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
        ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
                    (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
                Senate; and
                    (B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House 
                of Representatives.
            (2) CCP.--The term ``CCP'' means the Chinese Communist 
        Party.
            (3) Indo-pacific region.--The terms ``Indo-Pacific'' and 
        ``Indo-Pacific region'' mean the 37 countries and the 
        surrounding waterways that are under the area of responsibility 
        of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command. These countries are: 
        Australia, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Brunei, Burma, Cambodia, China, 
        Fiji, India, Indonesia, Japan, Kiribati, Laos, Malaysia, 
        Maldives, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Mongolia, Nauru, Nepal, 
        New Zealand, North Korea, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, 
        Republic of Korea, Samoa, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Sri 
        Lanka, Taiwan, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, 
        and Vietnam.
            (4) People's liberation army; pla.--The terms ``People's 
        Liberation Army'' and ``PLA'' mean the armed forces of the 
        People's Republic of China.
            (5) PRC; china.--The terms ``PRC'' and ``China'' mean the 
        People's Republic of China.

SEC. 4. STATEMENT OF POLICY.

    (a) Objectives.--It is the policy of the United States, in pursuing 
strategic competition with the PRC, to pursue the following objectives:
            (1) The United States global leadership role is sustained 
        and its political system and major foundations of national 
        power are postured for long-term political, economic, 
        technological, and military competition with the PRC.
            (2) The balance of power in the Indo-Pacific remains 
        favorable to the United States and its allies. The United 
        States and its allies maintain unfettered access to the region, 
        including through freedom of navigation and the free flow of 
        commerce, consistent with international law and practice, and 
        the PRC neither dominates the region nor coerces its neighbors.
            (3) The allies and partners of the United States--
                    (A) maintain confidence in United States leadership 
                and its commitment to the Indo-Pacific region;
                    (B) can withstand and combat subversion and undue 
                influence by the PRC; and
                    (C) align themselves with the United States in 
                setting global rules, norms, and standards that benefit 
                the international community.
            (4) The combined weight of the United States and its allies 
        and partners is strong enough to demonstrate to the PRC that 
        the risks of attempts to dominate other states outweigh the 
        potential benefits.
            (5) The United States leads the free and open international 
        order, which is comprised of resilient states and institutions 
        that uphold and defend principles, such as sovereignty, rule of 
        law, individual freedom, and human rights. The international 
        order is strengthened to defeat attempts at destabilization by 
        illiberal and authoritarian actors.
            (6) The key rules, norms, and standards of international 
        engagement in the 21st century are maintained, including--
                    (A) the protection of human rights, commercial 
                engagement and investment, and technology; and
                    (B) that such rules, norms, and standards are in 
                alignment with the values and interests of the United 
                States, its allies and partners, and the free world.
            (7) Assures that the CCP does not--
                    (A) subvert open and democratic societies;
                    (B) distort global markets;
                    (C) manipulate the international trade system;
                    (D) coerce other nations via economic and military 
                means; or
                    (E) use its technological advantages to undermine 
                individual freedoms or other states' national security 
                interests.
            (8) The United States deters military confrontation with 
        the PRC and both nations work to reduce the risk of conflict.
    (b) Policy.--It is the policy of the United States, in pursuit of 
the objectives set forth in subsection (a)--
            (1) to strengthen the United States domestic foundation by 
        reinvesting in market-based economic growth, education, 
        scientific and technological innovation, democratic 
        institutions, and other areas that improve the ability of the 
        United States to pursue its vital economic, foreign policy, and 
        national security interests;
            (2) to pursue a strategy of strategic competition with the 
        PRC in the political, diplomatic, economic, development, 
        military, informational, and technological realms that 
        maximizes the United States' strengths and increases the costs 
        for the PRC of harming United States interests and the values 
        of United States allies and partners;
            (3) to lead a free, open, and secure international system 
        characterized by freedom from coercion, rule of law, open 
        markets and the free flow of commerce, and a shared commitment 
        to security and peaceful resolution of disputes, human rights, 
        and good and transparent governance;
            (4) to strengthen and deepen United States alliances and 
        partnerships, prioritizing the Indo-Pacific and Europe, by 
        pursuing greater bilateral and multilateral cooperative 
        initiatives that advance shared interests and values and 
        bolster partner countries' confidence that the United States is 
        and will remain a strong, committed, and constant partner;
            (5) to encourage and collaborate with United States allies 
        and partners in boosting their own capabilities and resiliency 
        to pursue, defend, and protect shared interests and values, 
        free from coercion and external pressure;
            (6) to pursue fair, reciprocal treatment and healthy 
        competition in United States-China economic relations by--
                    (A) advancing policies that harden the United 
                States economy against unfair and illegal commercial or 
                trading practices and the coercion of United States 
                businesses; and
                    (B) tightening United States laws and regulations 
                as necessary to prevent the PRC's attempts to harm 
                United States economic competitiveness;
            (7) to demonstrate the value of private sector-led growth 
        in emerging markets around the world, including through the use 
        of United States Government tools that--
                    (A) support greater private sector investment and 
                advance capacity-building initiatives that are grounded 
                in the rule of law;
                    (B) promote open markets;
                    (C) establish clear policy and regulatory 
                frameworks;
                    (D) improve the management of key economic sectors;
                    (E) combat corruption; and
                    (F) foster and support greater collaboration with 
                and among partner countries and the United States 
                private sector to develop secure and sustainable 
                infrastructure;
            (8) to lead in the advancement of international rules and 
        norms that foster free and reciprocal trade and open and 
        integrated markets;
            (9) to conduct vigorous commercial diplomacy in support of 
        United States companies and businesses in partner countries 
        that seek fair competition;
            (10) to ensure that the United States leads in the 
        innovation of critical and emerging technologies, such as next-
        generation telecommunications, artificial intelligence, quantum 
        computing, semiconductors, and biotechnology, by--
                    (A) providing necessary investment and concrete 
                incentives for the private sector to accelerate 
                development of such technologies;
                    (B) modernizing export controls and investment 
                screening regimes and associated policies and 
                regulations;
                    (C) enhancing United States leadership in technical 
                standards-setting bodies and avenues for developing 
                norms regarding the use of emerging critical 
                technologies;
                    (D) reducing United States barriers and increasing 
                incentives for collaboration with allies and partners 
                on the research and co-development of critical 
                technologies;
                    (E) collaborating with allies and partners to 
                protect critical technologies by--
                            (i) crafting multilateral export control 
                        measures;
                            (ii) building capacity for defense 
                        technology security;
                            (iii) safeguarding chokepoints in supply 
                        chains; and
                            (iv) ensuring diversification; and
                    (F) designing major defense capabilities for export 
                to allies and partners;
            (11) to enable the people of the United States, including 
        the private sector, civil society, universities and other 
        academic institutions, State and local legislators, and other 
        relevant actors to identify and remain vigilant to the risks 
        posed by undue influence of the CCP in the United States;
            (12) to implement measures to mitigate the risks referred 
        to in paragraph (11), while still preserving opportunities for 
        economic engagement, academic research, and cooperation in 
        other areas where the United States and the PRC share 
        interests;
            (13) to collaborate with advanced democracies and other 
        willing partners to promote ideals and principles that--
                    (A) advance a free and open international order;
                    (B) strengthen democratic institutions;
                    (C) protect and promote human rights; and
                    (D) uphold a free press and fact-based reporting;
            (14) to develop comprehensive and holistic strategies and 
        policies to counter PRC disinformation campaigns;
            (15) to demonstrate effective leadership at the United 
        Nations, its associated agencies, and other multilateral 
        organizations and defend the integrity of these organizations 
        against co-optation by illiberal and authoritarian nations;
            (16) to prioritize the defense of fundamental freedoms and 
        human rights in the United States relationship with the PRC;
            (17) to cooperate with allies, partners, and multilateral 
        organizations, leveraging their significant and growing 
        capabilities to build a network of like-minded states that 
        sustains and strengthens a free and open order and addresses 
        regional and global challenges to hold the Government of the 
        PRC accountable for--
                    (A) violations and abuses of human rights;
                    (B) restrictions on religious practices; and
                    (C) undermining and abrogating treaties, other 
                international agreements, and other international norms 
                related to human rights;
            (18) to expose the PRC's use of corruption, repression, 
        coercion, and other malign behavior to attain unfair economic 
        advantages and to pressure other nations to defer to its 
        political and strategic objectives;
            (19) to maintain United States access to the Western 
        Pacific, including by--
                    (A) increasing United States forward-deployed 
                forces in the Indo-Pacific region;
                    (B) modernizing the United States military through 
                investments in existing and new platforms, emerging 
                technologies, critical in-theater force structure and 
                enabling capabilities, joint operational concepts, and 
                a diverse, operationally resilient and politically 
                sustainable posture; and
                    (C) operating and conducting exercises with allies 
                and partners--
                            (i) to mitigate the PLA's ability to 
                        project power and establish contested zones 
                        within the First and Second Island Chains;
                            (ii) to diminish the ability of the PLA to 
                        coerce its neighbors;
                            (iii) to maintain open sea and air lanes, 
                        particularly in the Taiwan Strait, the East 
                        China Sea, and the South China Sea; and
                            (iv) to project power from the United 
                        States and its allies and partners to 
                        demonstrate the ability to conduct contested 
                        logistics;
            (20) to deter the PRC from--
                    (A) coercing Indo-Pacific nations, including by 
                developing more combat-credible forces that are 
                integrated with allies and partners in contact, blunt, 
                and surge layers and able to defeat any PRC theory of 
                victory in the First or Second Island Chains of the 
                Western Pacific and beyond, as called for in the 2018 
                National Defense Strategy;
                    (B) using grey-zone tactics below the level of 
                armed conflict; or
                    (C) initiating armed conflict;
            (21) to strengthen United States-PRC military-to-military 
        communication and improve de-escalation procedures to de-
        conflict operations and reduce the risk of unwanted conflict, 
        including through high-level visits and recurrent exchanges 
        between civilian and military officials and other measures, in 
        alignment with United States interests; and
            (22) to cooperate with the PRC if interests align, 
        including through bilateral or multilateral means and at the 
        United Nations, as appropriate.

SEC. 5. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

    It is the sense of Congress that the execution of the policy 
described in section 4(b) requires the following actions:
            (1) Strategic competition with the PRC will require the 
        United States--
                    (A) to marshal sustained political will to protect 
                its vital interests, promote its values, and advance 
                its economic and national security objectives for 
                decades to come; and
                    (B) to achieve this sustained political will, 
                persuade the American people and United States allies 
                and partners of--
                            (i) the challenges posed by the PRC; and
                            (ii) the need for long-term competition to 
                        defend shared interests and values.
            (2) The United States must coordinate closely with allies 
        and partners to compete effectively with the PRC, including to 
        encourage allies and partners to assume, as appropriate, 
        greater roles in balancing and checking the aggressive and 
        assertive behavior of the PRC.
            (3) The President of the United States must lead and direct 
        the entire executive branch to treat the People's Republic of 
        China as the greatest geopolitical and geoeconomic challenge 
        for United States foreign policy, increasing the prioritization 
        of strategic competition with the PRC and broader United States 
        interests in the Indo-Pacific region in the conduct of foreign 
        policy and assuring the allocation of appropriate resources 
        adequate to the challenge.
            (4) The head of every Federal department and agency should 
        designate a senior official at the level of Under Secretary or 
        above to coordinate the department's or agency's policies with 
        respect to strategic competition with the PRC.
            (5) The ability of the United States to execute a strategy 
        of strategic competition with the PRC will be undermined if our 
        attention is repeatedly diverted to challenges that are not 
        vital to United States economic and national security 
        interests.
            (6) In the coming decades, the United States must prevent 
        the PRC from--
                    (A) establishing regional hegemony in the Indo-
                Pacific; and
                    (B) using that position to advance its assertive 
                political, economic, and foreign policy goals around 
                the world.
            (7) The United States must ensure that the Federal budget 
        is properly aligned with the strategic imperative to compete 
        with the PRC by--
                    (A) ensuring sufficient levels of funding to 
                resource all instruments of United States national 
                power; and
                    (B) coherently prioritizing how such funds are 
                used.
            (8) Sustained prioritization of the challenge posed by the 
        PRC requires--
                    (A) bipartisan cooperation within Congress; and
                    (B) frequent, sustained, and meaningful 
                collaboration and consultation between the executive 
                branch and Congress.
            (9) The United States must ensure close integration among 
        economic and foreign policymakers, the private sector, civil 
        society, universities and academic institutions, and other 
        relevant actors in free and open societies affected by the 
        challenges posed by the PRC to enable such actors--
                    (A) to collaborate to advance common interests; and
                    (B) to identify appropriate policies--
                            (i) to strengthen the United States and its 
                        allies;
                            (ii) to promote a compelling vision of a 
                        free and open order; and
                            (iii) to push back against detrimental 
                        policies pursued by the CCP.
            (10) The United States must ensure that all Federal 
        departments and agencies are organized to reflect the fact that 
        strategic competition with the PRC is the United States' 
        greatest geopolitical and geoeconomic challenge, including 
        through the assigned missions and location of United States 
        Government personnel, by--
                    (A) dedicating more personnel in the Indo-Pacific 
                region, at posts around the world, and in Washington 
                DC, with priorities directly relevant to advancing 
                competition with the People's Republic of China;
                    (B) placing greater numbers of foreign service 
                officers, international development professionals, 
                members of the foreign commercial service, intelligence 
                professionals, and other United States Government 
                personnel in the Indo-Pacific region; and
                    (C) ensuring that this workforce, both civilian and 
                military, has the training in language, technical 
                skills, and other competencies required to advance a 
                successful competitive strategy with the PRC.
            (11) The United States must place renewed emphasis on 
        strengthening the nonmilitary instruments of national power, 
        including diplomacy, information, technology, economics, 
        foreign assistance and development finance, commerce, 
        intelligence, and law enforcement, which are crucial for 
        addressing the unique economic, political, and ideological 
        challenges posed by the PRC.
            (12) The United States must sustain resourcing for a 
        Pacific Deterrence Initiative, which shall be aligned with the 
        overarching political and diplomatic objectives articulated in 
        the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act (Public Law 115-409), and 
        must prioritize the military investments necessary to achieve 
        United States political objectives in the Indo-Pacific, 
        including--
                    (A) promoting regional security in the Indo-
                Pacific;
                    (B) reassuring allies and partners while protecting 
                them from coercion; and
                    (C) deterring conflict with the PRC.
            (13) Competition with the PRC requires the United States' 
        skillful adaptation to the information environment of the 21st 
        century. United States public diplomacy and messaging efforts 
        must effectively--
                    (A) promote the value of partnership with the 
                United States;
                    (B) highlight the risks and costs of enmeshment 
                with the PRC; and
                    (C) counter CCP propaganda and disinformation.

SEC. 6. RULES OF CONSTRUCTION.

    (a) Applicability of Existing Restrictions on Assistance to Foreign 
Security Forces.--Nothing in this Act shall be construed to diminish, 
supplant, supersede, or otherwise restrict or prevent responsibilities 
of the United States Government under section 620M of the Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2378d) or section 362 of title 10, 
United States Code.
    (b) No Authorization for the Use of Military Force.--Nothing in 
this Act may be construed as authorizing the use of military force.

               TITLE I--INVESTING IN A COMPETITIVE FUTURE

                   Subtitle A--Science and Technology

SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION TO ASSIST UNITED STATES COMPANIES WITH GLOBAL 
              SUPPLY CHAIN DIVERSIFICATION AND MANAGEMENT.

    (a) Authorization to Contract Services.--The Secretary of State, in 
coordination with the Secretary of Commerce, is authorized to establish 
a program to facilitate the contracting by the Department of State for 
the professional services of qualified experts, on a reimbursable fee 
for service basis, to assist interested United States persons and 
business entities with supply chain management issues related to the 
PRC, including--
            (1) exiting from the PRC market or relocating certain 
        production facilities to locations outside the PRC;
            (2) diversifying sources of inputs, and other efforts to 
        diversify supply chains to locations outside of the PRC;
            (3) navigating legal, regulatory, or other challenges in 
        the course of the activities described in paragraphs (1) and 
        (2); and
            (4) identifying alternative markets for production or 
        sourcing outside of the PRC, including through providing market 
        intelligence, facilitating contact with reliable local partners 
        as appropriate, and other services.
    (b) Chief of Mission Oversight.--The persons hired to perform the 
services described in subsection (a) shall--
            (1) be under the authority of the United States Chief of 
        Mission in the country in which they are hired, in accordance 
        with existing United States laws;
            (2) coordinate with Department of State and Department of 
        Commerce officers; and
            (3) coordinate with United States missions and relevant 
        local partners in other countries as needed to carry out the 
        services described in subsection (a).
    (c) Prioritization of Micro-, Small-, and Medium-sized 
Enterprises.--The services described in subsection (a) shall be 
prioritized for assisting micro-, small-, and medium-sized enterprises 
with regard to the matters described in subsection (a).
    (d) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be 
appropriated $15,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2022 through 2026 for 
the purposes of carrying out this section.
    (e) Prohibition on Access to Assistance by Foreign Adversaries.--
None of the funds appropriated pursuant to this section may be provided 
to an entity--
            (1) under the foreign ownership, control, or influence of 
        the Government of the People's Republic of China or the Chinese 
        Communist Party, or other foreign adversary;
            (2) determined to have beneficial ownership from foreign 
        individuals subject to the jurisdiction, direction, or 
        influence of foreign adversaries; and
            (3) that has any contract in effect at the time of the 
        receipt of such funds, or has had a contract within the 
        previous one year that is no longer in effect, with--
                    (A) the Government of the People's Republic of 
                China;
                    (B) the Chinese Communist Party;
                    (C) the Chinese military;
                    (D) an entity majority-owned, majority-controlled, 
                or majority-financed by the Government of the People's 
                Republic of China, the CCP, or the Chinese military; or
                    (E) a parent, subsidiary, or affiliate of an entity 
                described in subparagraph (D).
    (f) Definitions.--The terms ``foreign ownership, control, or 
influence'' and ``FOCI'' have the meanings given those terms in the 
National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual (DOD 5220.22-M), 
or a successor document.

        Subtitle B--Global Infrastructure and Energy Development

SEC. 111. APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DEFINED.

    In this subtitle, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' 
means--
            (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on 
        Appropriations of the Senate; and
            (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on 
        Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

SEC. 112. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON INTERNATIONAL QUALITY INFRASTRUCTURE 
              INVESTMENT STANDARDS.

    (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the United 
States should initiate collaboration among governments, the private 
sector, and civil society to encourage the adoption of the standards 
for quality global infrastructure development advanced by the G20 at 
Osaka in 2018, including with respect to the following issues:
            (1) Respect for the sovereignty of countries in which 
        infrastructure investments are made.
            (2) Anti-corruption.
            (3) Rule of law.
            (4) Human rights and labor rights.
            (5) Fiscal and debt sustainability.
            (6) Social and governance safeguards.
            (7) Transparency.
            (8) Environmental and energy standards.
    (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the United 
States should launch a series of fora around the world showcasing the 
commitment of the United States and partners of the United States to 
high-quality development cooperation, including with respect to the 
issues described in subsection (a).

SEC. 113. UNITED STATES SUPPORT FOR INFRASTRUCTURE.

    (a) Findings.--The Global Infrastructure Coordinating Committee 
(GICC) was established to coordinate the efforts of the Department of 
State, the Department of Commerce, the Department of the Treasury, the 
Department of Energy, the Department of Transportation, the United 
States Agency for International Development, the United States Trade 
and Development Agency, the Development Finance Corporation, the 
Export-Import Bank of the United States, and other agencies to catalyze 
private sector investments around the world and to coordinate the 
deployment of United States Government technical assistance and 
development finance tools, including project preparation services and 
commercial advocacy.
    (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the world's infrastructure needs, including in the 
        transport, energy, and digital sectors, are vast and growing;
            (2) total or partial ownership or acquisition of, or a 
        significant financial stake or physical presence in, certain 
        types of infrastructure, including ports, energy grids, 5G 
        telecommunications networks, and undersea cables, can provide 
        an advantage to countries that do not share the interests and 
        values of the United States and its allies and partners, and 
        could therefore be deleterious to the interests and values of 
        the United States and its allies and partners;
            (3) the United States must continue to prioritize support 
        for infrastructure projects that are physically secure, 
        financially viable, economically sustainable, and socially 
        responsible;
            (4) achieving the objective outlined in paragraph (3) 
        requires the coordination of all United States Government 
        economic tools across the interagency, so that such tools are 
        deployed in a way to maximize United States interests and that 
        of its allies and partners;
            (5) the GICC represents an important and concrete step 
        towards better communication and coordination across the United 
        States Government of economic tools relevant to supporting 
        infrastructure that is physically secure, financially viable, 
        economically sustainable, and socially responsible, and should 
        be continued; and
            (6) the executive branch and Congress should have 
        consistent consultations on United States support for strategic 
        infrastructure projects, including how Congress can support 
        such initiatives in the future.
    (c) Reporting Requirement.--Not later than 180 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, and semi-annually thereafter for 5 years, 
the Secretary of State, in coordination with other Federal agencies 
that participate in the GICC, and, as appropriate, the Director of 
National Intelligence, shall submit to the appropriate committees of 
Congress a report that identifies--
            (1) current, pending, and future infrastructure projects, 
        particularly in the transport, energy, and digital sectors, 
        that the United States is supporting or will support through 
        financing, foreign assistance, technical assistance, or other 
        means;
            (2) a detailed explanation of the United States and partner 
        country interests served by the United States providing support 
        to such projects; and
            (3) a detailed description of any support provided by other 
        United States allies and partners to such projects.
    (d) Form of Report.--The report required by subsection (a) shall be 
submitted in unclassified form but may include a classified annex.

SEC. 114. INFRASTRUCTURE TRANSACTION AND ASSISTANCE NETWORK.

    (a) Authority.--The Secretary of State is authorized to establish 
an initiative, to be known as the ``Infrastructure Transaction and 
Assistance Network'', under which the Secretary of State, in 
consultation with other relevant Federal agencies, including those 
represented on the Global Infrastructure Coordinating Committee, may 
carry out various programs to advance the development of sustainable, 
transparent, and high-quality infrastructure in the Indo-Pacific region 
by--
            (1) strengthening capacity-building programs to improve 
        project evaluation processes, regulatory and procurement 
        environments, and project preparation capacity of countries 
        that are partners of the United States in such development;
            (2) providing transaction advisory services and project 
        preparation assistance to support sustainable infrastructure; 
        and
            (3) coordinating the provision of United States assistance 
        for the development of infrastructure, including infrastructure 
        that utilizes United States-manufactured goods and services, 
        and catalyzing investment led by the private sector.
    (b) Transaction Advisory Fund.--As part of the ``Infrastructure 
Transaction and Assistance Network'' described under subsection (a), 
the Secretary of State is authorized to provide support, including 
through the Transaction Advisory Fund, for advisory services to help 
boost the capacity of partner countries to evaluate contracts and 
assess the financial and environmental impacts of potential 
infrastructure projects, including through providing services such as--
            (1) legal services;
            (2) project preparation and feasibility studies;
            (3) debt sustainability analyses;
            (4) bid or proposal evaluation; and
            (5) other services relevant to advancing the development of 
        sustainable, transparent, and high-quality infrastructure.
    (c) Strategic Infrastructure Fund.----
            (1) In general.--As part of the ``Infrastructure 
        Transaction and Assistance Network'' described under subsection 
        (a), the Secretary of State is authorized to provide support, 
        including through the Strategic Infrastructure Fund, for 
        technical assistance, project preparation, pipeline 
        development, and other infrastructure project support.
            (2) Joint infrastructure projects.--Funds authorized for 
        the Strategic Infrastructure Fund should be used in 
        coordination with the Department of Defense, the International 
        Development Finance Corporation, like-minded donor partners, 
        and multilateral banks, as appropriate, to support joint 
        infrastructure projects in the Indo-Pacific region.
            (3) Strategic infrastructure projects.--Funds authorized 
        for the Strategic Infrastructure Fund should be used to support 
        strategic infrastructure projects that are in the national 
        security interest of the United States and vulnerable to 
        strategic competitors.
    (d) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be 
appropriated, for each of fiscal years 2022 to 2026, $75,000,000 to the 
Infrastructure Transaction and Assistance Network, of which $20,000,000 
is to be provided for the Transaction Advisory Fund.

SEC. 115. STRATEGY FOR ADVANCED AND RELIABLE ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE.

    (a) In General.--The President shall direct a comprehensive, multi-
year, whole of government effort, in consultation with the private 
sector, to counter predatory lending and financing by the Government of 
the People's Republic of China, including support to companies 
incorporated in the PRC that engage in such activities, in the energy 
sectors of developing countries.
    (b) Policy.--It is the policy of the United States to--
            (1) regularly evaluate current and forecasted energy needs 
        and capacities of developing countries, and analyze the 
        presence and involvement of PRC state-owned industries and 
        other companies incorporated in the PRC, Chinese nationals 
        providing labor, and financing of energy projects, including 
        direct financing by the PRC government, PRC financial 
        institutions, or direct state support to state-owned 
        enterprises and other companies incorporated in the PRC;
            (2) pursue strategic support and investment opportunities, 
        and diplomatic engagement on power sector reforms, to expand 
        the development and deployment of advanced energy technologies 
        in developing countries;
            (3) offer financing, loan guarantees, grants, and other 
        financial products on terms that advance domestic economic and 
        local employment opportunities, utilize advanced energy 
        technologies, encourage private sector growth, and, when 
        appropriate United States equity and sovereign lending products 
        as alternatives to the predatory lending tools offered by 
        Chinese financial institutions;
            (4) pursue partnerships with likeminded international 
        financial and multilateral institutions to leverage investment 
        in advanced energy technologies in developing countries; and
            (5) pursue bilateral partnerships focused on the 
        cooperative development of advanced energy technologies with 
        countries of strategic significance, particularly in the Indo-
        Pacific region, to address the effects of energy engagement by 
        the PRC through predatory lending or other actions that 
        negatively impact other countries.
    (c) Advanced Energy Technologies Exports.--Not later than 180 days 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter 
for 5 years, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary 
of Energy, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a 
United States Government strategy to increase United States exports of 
advanced energy technologies to--
            (1) improve energy security in allied and developing 
        countries;
            (2) create open, efficient, rules-based, and transparent 
        energy markets;
            (3) improve free, fair, and reciprocal energy trading 
        relationships; and
            (4) expand access to affordable, reliable energy.

SEC. 116. REPORT ON THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA'S INVESTMENTS IN 
              FOREIGN ENERGY DEVELOPMENT.

    (a) In General.--No later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for five years, the 
Administrator of the United States Agency for International 
Development, in consultation with the Secretary of State through the 
Assistant Secretary for Energy Resources, shall submit to the 
appropriate congressional committees a report that--
            (1) identifies priority countries for deepening United 
        States engagement on energy matters, in accordance with the 
        economic and national security interests of the United States 
        and where deeper energy partnerships are most achievable;
            (2) describes the involvement of the PRC government and 
        companies incorporated in the PRC in the development, 
        operation, financing, or ownership of energy generation 
        facilities, transmission infrastructure, or energy resources in 
        the countries identified in paragraph (1);
            (3) evaluates strategic or security concerns and 
        implications for United States national interests and the 
        interests of the countries identified in paragraph (1), with 
        respect to the PRC's involvement and influence in developing 
        country energy production or transmission; and
            (4) outlines current and planned efforts by the United 
        States to partner with the countries identified in paragraph 
        (1) on energy matters that support shared interests between the 
        United States and such countries.
    (b) Publication.--The assessment required in subsection (a) shall 
be published on the United States Agency for International 
Development's website.

            Subtitle C--Digital Technology and Connectivity

SEC. 121. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY ISSUES.

    (a) Leadership in International Standards Setting.--It is the sense 
of Congress that the United States must lead in international bodies 
that set the governance norms and rules for critical digitally enabled 
technologies in order to ensure that these technologies operate within 
a free, secure, interoperable, and stable digital domain.
    (b) Countering Digital Authoritarianism.--It is the sense of 
Congress that the United States, along with allies and partners, should 
lead an international effort that utilizes all of the economic and 
diplomatic tools at its disposal to combat the expanding use of 
information and communications technology products and services to 
surveil, repress, and manipulate populations (also known as ``digital 
authoritarianism'').
    (c) Negotiations for Digital Trade Agreements or Arrangements.--It 
is the sense of Congress that the United States Trade Representative 
should negotiate bilateral and plurilateral agreements or arrangements 
relating to digital goods with the European Union, Japan, Taiwan, the 
member countries of the Five Eyes intelligence-sharing alliance, and 
other nations, as appropriate.
    (d) Freedom of Information in the Digital Age.--It is the sense of 
Congress that the United States should lead a global effort to ensure 
that freedom of information, including the ability to safely consume or 
publish information without fear of undue reprisals, is maintained as 
the digital domain becomes an increasingly integral mechanism for 
communication.
    (e) Efforts to Ensure Technological Development Does Not Threaten 
Democratic Governance or Human Rights.--It is the sense of Congress 
that the United States should lead a global effort to develop and adopt 
a set of common principles and standards for critical technologies to 
ensure that the use of such technologies cannot be abused by malign 
actors, whether they are governments or other entities, and that they 
do not threaten democratic governance or human rights.
    (f) Formation of Digital Technology Trade Alliance.--It is the 
sense of Congress that the United States should examine opportunities 
for diplomatic negotiations regarding the formation of mutually 
beneficial alliances relating to digitally-enabled technologies and 
services.

SEC. 122. DIGITAL CONNECTIVITY AND CYBERSECURITY PARTNERSHIP.

    (a) Digital Connectivity and Cybersecurity Partnership.--The 
Secretary of State is authorized to establish a program, to be known as 
the ``Digital Connectivity and Cybersecurity Partnership'' to help 
foreign countries--
            (1) expand and increase secure Internet access and digital 
        infrastructure in emerging markets;
            (2) protect technological assets, including data;
            (3) adopt policies and regulatory positions that foster and 
        encourage open, interoperable, reliable, and secure internet, 
        the free flow of data, multi-stakeholder models of internet 
        governance, and pro-competitive and secure information and 
        communications technology (ICT) policies and regulations;
            (4) promote exports of United States ICT goods and services 
        and increase United States company market share in target 
        markets;
            (5) promote the diversification of ICT goods and supply 
        chain services to be less reliant on PRC imports; and
            (6) build cybersecurity capacity, expand interoperability, 
        and promote best practices for a national approach to 
        cybersecurity.
    (b) Implementation Plan.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the 
appropriate committees of Congress an implementation plan for the 
coming year to advance the goals identified in subsection (a).
    (c) Consultation.--In developing the action plan required by 
subsection (b), the Secretary of State shall consult with--
            (1) the appropriate congressional committees;
            (2) leaders of the United States industry;
            (3) other relevant technology experts, including the Open 
        Technology Fund;
            (4) representatives from relevant United States Government 
        agencies; and
            (5) representatives from like-minded allies and partners.
    (d) Semiannual Briefing Requirement.--Not later than 180 days after 
the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 5 
years, the Secretary of State shall provide the appropriate 
congressional committees a briefing on the implementation of the plan 
required by subsection (b).
    (e) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be 
appropriated $100,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2022 through 2026 to 
carry out this section.

SEC. 123. STRATEGY FOR DIGITAL INVESTMENT BY UNITED STATES 
              INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT FINANCE CORPORATION.

    (a) In General.--Not later than one year after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the United States International Development 
Finance Corporation, in consultation with the Administrator of the 
United States Agency for International Development, shall submit to the 
appropriate congressional committees a strategy for support of private 
sector digital investment that--
            (1) includes support for information-connectivity projects, 
        including projects relating to telecommunications equipment, 
        mobile payments, smart cities, and undersea cables;
            (2) in providing such support, prioritizes private sector 
        projects--
                    (A) of strategic value to the United States;
                    (B) of mutual strategic value to the United States 
                and allies and partners of the United States; and
                    (C) that will advance broader development 
                priorities of the United States; and
            (3) helps to bridge the digital gap in less developed 
        countries and among women and minority communities within those 
        countries;
            (4) facilitates coordination, where appropriate, with 
        multilateral development banks and development finance 
        institutions of other countries with respect to projects 
        described in paragraph (1), including through the provision of 
        co-financing and co-guarantees; and
            (5) identifies the human and financial resources available 
        to dedicate to such projects and assesses any constraints to 
        implementing such projects.
    (b) Limitation.--
            (1) In general.--The Corporation may not provide support 
        for projects in which entities described in paragraph (2) 
        participate.
            (2) Entities described.--An entity described in this 
        subparagraph is an entity based in, or owned or controlled by 
        the government of, a country, including the People's Republic 
        of China, that does not protect internet freedom of expression 
        and privacy.

    Subtitle D--Countering Chinese Communist Party Malign Influence

SECTION 131. SHORT TITLE.

    This subtitle may be cited as the ``Countering Chinese Communist 
Party Malign Influence Act''.

SEC. 132. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR COUNTERING CHINESE 
              INFLUENCE FUND.

    (a) Countering Chinese Influence Fund.--There is authorized to be 
appropriated $300,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2022 through 2026 
for the Countering Chinese Influence Fund to counter the malign 
influence of the Chinese Communist Party globally. Amounts appropriated 
pursuant to this authorization are authorized to remain available until 
expended and shall be in addition to amounts otherwise authorized to be 
appropriated to counter such influence.
    (b) Consultation Required.--The obligation of funds appropriated or 
otherwise made available to counter the malign influence of the Chinese 
Communist Party globally shall be subject to prior consultation with, 
and consistent with section 634A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 
(22 U.S.C. 2394-1), the regular notification procedures of--
            (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on 
        Appropriations of the Senate; and
            (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on 
        Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
    (c) Policy Guidance, Coordination, and Approval.--
            (1) Coordinator.--The Secretary of State shall designate an 
        existing senior official of the Department at the rank of 
        Assistant Secretary or above to provide policy guidance, 
        coordination, and approval for the obligation of funds 
        authorized pursuant to subsection (a).
            (2) Duties.--The senior official designated pursuant to 
        paragraph (1) shall be responsible for--
                    (A) on an annual basis, the identification of 
                specific strategic priorities for using the funds 
                authorized to be appropriated by subsection (a), such 
                as geographic areas of focus or functional categories 
                of programming that funds are to be concentrated 
                within, consistent with the national interests of the 
                United States and the purposes of this Act;
                    (B) the coordination and approval of all 
                programming conducted using the funds authorized to be 
                appropriated by subsection (a), based on a 
                determination that such programming directly counters 
                the malign influence of the Chinese Communist Party, 
                including specific activities or policies advanced by 
                the Chinese Communist Party, pursuant to the strategic 
                objectives of the United States, as established in the 
                2017 National Security Strategy, the 2018 National 
                Defense Strategy, and other relevant national and 
                regional strategies as appropriate;
                    (C) ensuring that all programming approved bears a 
                sufficiently direct nexus to such acts by the Chinese 
                Communist Party described in subsection (d) and adheres 
                to the requirements outlined in subsection (e); and
                    (D) conducting oversight, monitoring, and 
                evaluation of the effectiveness of all programming 
                conducted using the funds authorized to be appropriated 
                by subsection (a) to ensure that it advances United 
                States interests and degrades the ability of the 
                Chinese Communist Party, to advance activities that 
                align with subsection (d) of this section.
            (3) Interagency coordination.--The senior official 
        designated pursuant to paragraph (1) shall, in coordinating and 
        approving programming pursuant to paragraph (2), seek to--
                    (A) conduct appropriate interagency consultation; 
                and
                    (B) ensure, to the maximum extent practicable, that 
                all approved programming functions in concert with 
                other Federal activities to counter the malign 
                influence and activities of the Chinese Communist 
                Party.
            (4) Assistant coordinator.--The Administrator of the United 
        States Agency for International Development shall designate a 
        senior official at the rank of Assistant Administrator or above 
        to assist and consult with the senior official designated 
        pursuant to paragraph (1).
    (d) Malign Influence.--In this section, the term ``malign 
influence'' with respect to the Chinese Communist Party should be 
construed to include acts conducted by the Chinese Communist Party or 
entities acting on its behalf that--
            (1) undermine a free and open international order;
            (2) advance an alternative, repressive international order 
        that bolsters the Chinese Communist Party's hegemonic ambitions 
        and is characterized by coercion and dependency;
            (3) undermine the national security or sovereignty of the 
        United States or other countries; or
            (4) undermine the economic security of the United States or 
        other countries, including by promoting corruption.
    (e) Countering Malign Influence.--In this section, countering 
malign influence through the use of funds authorized to be appropriated 
by subsection (a) shall include efforts to--
            (1) promote transparency and accountability, and reduce 
        corruption, including in governance structures targeted by the 
        malign influence of the Chinese Communist Party;
            (2) support civil society and independent media to raise 
        awareness of and increase transparency regarding the negative 
        impact of activities related to the Belt and Road Initiative 
        and associated initiatives;
            (3) counter transnational criminal networks that benefit, 
        or benefit from, the malign influence of the Chinese Communist 
        Party;
            (4) encourage economic development structures that help 
        protect against predatory lending schemes, including support 
        for market-based alternatives in key economic sectors, such as 
        digital economy, energy, and infrastructure;
            (5) counter activities that provide undue influence to the 
        security forces of the People's Republic of China;
            (6) expose misinformation and disinformation of the Chinese 
        Communist Party's propaganda, including through programs 
        carried out by the Global Engagement Center; and
            (7) counter efforts by the Chinese Communist Party to 
        legitimize or promote authoritarian ideology and governance 
        models.

SEC. 133. FINDINGS ON CHINESE INFORMATION WARFARE AND MALIGN INFLUENCE 
              OPERATIONS.

    (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) In the report to Congress required under section 
        1261(b) of the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization 
        Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (Public Law 115-232), the President 
        laid out a broad range of malign activities conducted by the 
        Government of the People's Republic of China and its agents and 
        entities, including--
                    (A) propaganda and disinformation, in which 
                ``Beijing communicates its narrative through state-run 
                television, print, radio, and online organizations 
                whose presence is proliferating in the United States 
                and around the world'';
                    (B) malign political influence operations, 
                particularly ``front organizations and agents which 
                target businesses, universities, think tanks, scholars, 
                journalists, and local state and Federal officials in 
                the United States and around the world, attempting to 
                influence discourse''; and
                    (C) malign financial influence operations, 
                characterized as the ``misappropriation of technology 
                and intellectual property, failure to appropriately 
                disclose relationships with foreign government 
                sponsored entities, breaches of contract and 
                confidentiality, and manipulation of processes for fair 
                and merit-based allocation of Federal research and 
                development funding''.
            (2) Chinese information warfare and malign influence 
        operations are ongoing. In January 2019, then-Director of 
        National Intelligence, Dan Coats, stated, ``China will continue 
        to use legal, political, and economic levers--such as the lure 
        of Chinese markets--to shape the information environment. It is 
        also capable of using cyber attacks against systems in the 
        United States to censor or suppress viewpoints it deems 
        politically sensitive.''.
            (3) In February 2020, then-Director of the Federal Bureau 
        of Investigation, Christopher Wray, testified to the Committee 
        on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives that the 
        People's Republic of China has ``very active [malign] foreign 
        influence efforts in this country,'' with the goal of ``trying 
        to shift our policy and our public opinion to be more pro-China 
        on a variety of issues''.
            (4) The PRC's information warfare and malign influence 
        operations continue to adopt new tactics and evolve in 
        sophistication. In May 2020, then-Special Envoy and Coordinator 
        of the Global Engagement Center (GEC), Lea Gabrielle, stated 
        that there was a convergence of Russian and Chinese narratives 
        surrounding COVID-19 and that the GEC had ``uncovered a new 
        network of inauthentic Twitter accounts'' that it assessed was 
        ``created with the intent to amplify Chinese propaganda and 
        disinformation''. In June 2020, Google reported that Chinese 
        hackers attempted to access email accounts of the campaign 
        staff of a presidential candidate.
            (5) Chinese information warfare and malign influence 
        operations are a threat to the national security, democracy, 
        and economic systems of the United States and its allies and 
        partners. In October 2018, Vice President Michael R. Pence 
        warned that ``Beijing is employing a whole-of-government 
        approach, using political, economic, and military tools, as 
        well as propaganda, to advance its influence and benefit its 
        interests in the United States.''.
            (6) In February 2018, then-Director of the Federal Bureau 
        of Investigation, Christopher Wray, testified to the Select 
        Committee on Intelligence of the Senate that the People's 
        Republic of China is taking advantage of and exploiting the 
        open research and development environments of United States 
        institutions of higher education to utilize ``professors, 
        scientists and students'' as ``nontraditional collectors'' of 
        information.
    (b) Presidential Duties.--The President shall--
            (1) protect our democratic institutions and processes from 
        malign influence from the People's Republic of China and other 
        foreign adversaries; and
            (2) consistent with the policy specified in paragraph (1), 
        direct the heads of the appropriate Federal departments and 
        agencies to implement Acts of Congress to counter and deter PRC 
        and other foreign information warfare and malign influence 
        operations without delay, including--
                    (A) section 1043 of the John S. McCain National 
                Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (Public 
                Law 115-232), which authorizes a coordinator position 
                within the National Security Council for countering 
                malign foreign influence operations and campaigns;
                    (B) section 228 of the National Defense 
                Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 (Public Law 116-
                92), which authorizes additional research of foreign 
                malign influence operations on social media platforms;
                    (C) section 847 of such Act, which requires the 
                Secretary of Defense to modify contracting regulations 
                regarding vetting for foreign ownership, control and 
                influence in order to mitigate risks from malign 
                foreign influence;
                    (D) section 1239 of such Act, which requires an 
                update of the comprehensive strategy to counter the 
                threat of malign influence to include the People's 
                Republic of China;
                    (E) section 5323 of such Act, which authorizes the 
                Director of National Intelligence to facilitate the 
                establishment of Social Media Data and Threat Analysis 
                Center to detect and study information warfare and 
                malign influence operations across social media 
                platforms; and
                    (F) section 119C of the National Security Act of 
                1947 (50 U.S.C. 3059), which authorizes the 
                establishment of a Foreign Malign Influence Response 
                Center inside the Office of the Director of National 
                Intelligence.

SEC. 134. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR THE FULBRIGHT-HAYS 
              PROGRAM.

    There are authorized to be appropriated, for the 5-year period 
beginning on October 1, 2021, $105,500,000, to promote education, 
training, research, and foreign language skills through the Fulbright-
Hays Program, in accordance with section 102(b) of the Mutual 
Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2452(b)).

SEC. 135. SENSE OF CONGRESS CONDEMNING ANTI-ASIAN RACISM AND 
              DISCRIMINATION.

    (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) Since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, crimes and 
        discrimination against Asians and those of Asian descent have 
        risen dramatically worldwide. In May 2020, United Nations 
        Secretary-General Antonio Guterres said ``the pandemic 
        continues to unleash a tsunami of hate and xenophobia, 
        scapegoating and scare-mongering'' and urged governments to 
        ``act now to strengthen the immunity of our societies against 
        the virus of hate''.
            (2) Asian American and Pacific Island (AAPI) workers make 
        up a large portion of the essential workers on the frontlines 
        of the COVID-19 pandemic, making up 8.5 percent of all 
        essential healthcare workers in the United States. AAPI workers 
        also make up a large share--between 6 percent and 12 percent 
        based on sector--of the biomedical field.
            (3) The United States Census notes that Americans of Asian 
        descent alone made up nearly 5.9 percent of the United States 
        population in 2019, and that Asian Americans are the fastest-
        growing racial group in the United States, projected to 
        represent 14 percent of the United States population by 2065.
    (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the reprehensible attacks on people of Asian descent 
        and concerning increase in anti-Asian sentiment and racism in 
        the United States and around the world have no place in a 
        peaceful, civilized, and tolerant world;
            (2) the United States is a diverse nation with a proud 
        tradition of immigration, and the strength and vibrancy of the 
        United States is enhanced by the diverse ethnic backgrounds and 
        tolerance of its citizens, including Asian Americans and 
        Pacific Islanders;
            (3) the United States Government should encourage other 
        foreign governments to use the official and scientific names 
        for the COVID-19 pandemic, as recommended by the World Health 
        Organization and the Centers for Disease Control and 
        Prevention; and
            (4) the United States Government and other governments 
        around the world must actively oppose racism and intolerance, 
        and use all available and appropriate tools to combat the 
        spread of anti-Asian racism and discrimination.

SEC. 136. SUPPORTING INDEPENDENT MEDIA AND COUNTERING DISINFORMATION.

    (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) The PRC is increasing its spending on public diplomacy 
        including influence campaigns, advertising, and investments 
        into state-sponsored media publications outside of the PRC. 
        These include, for example, more than $10,000,000,000 in 
        foreign direct investment in communications infrastructure, 
        platforms, and properties, as well as bringing journalists to 
        the PRC for training programs.
            (2) The PRC, through the Voice of China, the United Front 
        Work Department (UFWD), and UFWD's many affiliates and proxies, 
        has obtained unfettered access to radio, television, and 
        digital dissemination platforms in numerous languages targeted 
        at citizens in other regions where the PRC has an interest in 
        promoting public sentiment in support of the Chinese Communist 
        Party and expanding the reach of its misleading narratives and 
        propaganda.
            (3) Even in Western democracies, the PRC spends extensively 
        on influence operations, such as a $500,000,000 advertising 
        campaign to attract cable viewers in Australia and a more than 
        $20,000,000 campaign to influence United States public opinion 
        via the China Daily newspaper supplement.
            (4) Radio Free Asia (referred to in this subsection as 
        ``RFA''), a private nonprofit multimedia news corporation, 
        which broadcasts in 9 East Asian languages including Mandarin, 
        Uyghur, Cantonese, and Tibetan, has succeeded in its mission to 
        reach audiences in China and in the Central Asia region despite 
        the Chinese Government's--
                    (A) efforts to practice ``media sovereignty,'' 
                which restricts access to the free press within China; 
                and
                    (B) campaign to spread disinformation to countries 
                abroad.
            (5) In 2019, RFA's Uyghur Service alerted the world to the 
        human rights abuses of Uyghur and other ethnic minorities in 
        China's Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.
            (6) Gulchehra Hoja, a Uyghur journalist for RFA, received 
        the International Women's Media Foundation's Courage in 
        Journalism Award and a 2019 Magnitsky Human Rights Award for 
        her coverage of Xinjiang, while the Chinese Government detained 
        and harassed Ms. Hoja's China-based family and the families of 
        7 other RFA journalists in retaliation for their role in 
        exposing abuses.
            (7) In 2019 and 2020, RFA provided widely disseminated 
        print and digital coverage of the decline in freedom in Hong 
        Kong and the student-led protests of the extradition law.
            (8) In March 2020, RFA exposed efforts by the Chinese 
        Government to underreport the number of fatalities from the 
        novel coronavirus outbreak in Wuhan Province, China.
    (b) The United States Agency for Global Media.--The United States 
Agency for Global Media (USAGM) and affiliate Federal and non-Federal 
entities shall undertake the following actions to support independent 
journalism, counter disinformation, and combat surveillance in 
countries where the Chinese Communist Party and other malign actors are 
promoting disinformation, propaganda, and manipulated media markets:
            (1) Radio Free Asia (RFA) shall expand domestic coverage 
        and digital programming for all RFA China services and other 
        affiliate language broadcasting services.
            (2) USAGM shall increase funding for RFA's Mandarin, 
        Tibetan, Uyghur, and Cantonese language services.
            (3) Voice of America shall establish a real-time 
        disinformation tracking tool similar to Polygraph for Russian 
        language propaganda and misinformation.
            (4) USAGM shall expand existing training and partnership 
        programs that promote journalistic standards, investigative 
        reporting, cybersecurity, and digital analytics to help expose 
        and counter false CCP narratives.
            (5) The Open Technology Fund shall continue and expand its 
        work to support tools and technology to circumvent censorship 
        and surveillance by the CCP, both inside the PRC as well as 
        abroad where the PRC has exported censorship technology, and 
        increase secure peer-to-peer connectivity and privacy tools.
            (6) Voice of America shall continue and review 
        opportunities to expand its mission of providing timely, 
        accurate, and reliable news, programming, and content about the 
        United States, including news, culture, and values.
            (7) The networks and grantees of the United States Agency 
        for Global Media shall continue their mission of providing 
        credible and timely news coverage inclusive of the People's 
        Republic of China's activities in Xinjiang, including China's 
        ongoing genocide and crimes against humanity with respect to 
        Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims, including through strategic 
        amplification of Radio Free Asia's coverage, in its news 
        programming in majority-Muslim countries.
    (c) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be 
appropriated, for each of fiscal years 2022 through 2026 for the United 
States Agency for Global Media, $100,000,000 for ongoing and new 
programs to support local media, build independent media, combat 
Chinese disinformation inside and outside of China, invest in 
technology to subvert censorship, and monitor and evaluate these 
programs, of which--
            (1) not less than $70,000,000 shall be directed to a grant 
        to Radio Free Asia language services;
            (2) not less than $20,000,000 shall be used to serve 
        populations in China through Mandarin, Cantonese, Uyghur, and 
        Tibetan language services; and
            (3) not less than $5,500,000 shall be used for digital 
        media services--
                    (A) to counter propaganda of non-Chinese 
                populations in foreign countries; and
                    (B) to counter propaganda of Chinese populations in 
                China through ``Global Mandarin'' programming.
    (d) Reporting Requirement.--
            (1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 5 years, 
        the Chief Executive Office of the United States Agency for 
        Global Media, in consultation with the President of the Open 
        Technology Fund, shall submit a report to the appropriate 
        congressional committees that outlines--
                    (A) the amount of funding appropriated pursuant to 
                subsection (c) that was provided to the Open Technology 
                Fund for purposes of circumventing Chinese Communist 
                Party censorship of the internet within the borders of 
                the People's Republic of China;
                    (B) the progress that has been made in developing 
                the technology referred to in subparagraph (A), 
                including an assessment of whether the funding provided 
                was sufficient to achieve meaningful penetration of 
                People's Republic of China's censors; and
                    (C) the impact of Open Technology Fund tools on 
                piercing Chinese Communist Party internet censorship 
                efforts, including the metrics used to measure that 
                impact and the trajectory of that impact over the 
                previous 5 years.
            (2) Form of report.--The report required under paragraph 
        (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a 
        classified annex.
    (e) Support for Local Media.--The Secretary of State, acting 
through the Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, 
and Labor and in coordination with the Administrator of the United 
States Agency for International Development, shall support and train 
journalists on investigative techniques necessary to ensure public 
accountability related to the Belt and Road Initiative, the PRC's 
surveillance and digital export of technology, and other influence 
operations abroad direct or directly supported by the Communist Party 
or the Chinese government.
    (f) Internet Freedom Programs.--The Bureau of Democracy, Human 
Rights, and Labor shall continue to support internet freedom programs.
    (f) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be 
appropriated to the Department of State, for each of fiscal years 2022 
through 2026, $170,000,000 for ongoing and new programs in support of 
press freedom, training, and protection of journalists.

SEC. 137. GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT CENTER.

    (a) Finding.--Congress established the Global Engagement Center to 
``direct, lead, and coordinate efforts'' of the Federal Government to 
``recognize, understand, expose, and counter foreign state and non-
state propaganda and disinformation globally''.
    (b) Extension.--Section 1287(j) of the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (22 U.S.C. 2656 note) is amended 
by striking ``the date that is 8 years after the date of the enactment 
of this Act'' and inserting ``December 31, 2027''.
    (c) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the Global 
Engagement Center should expand its coordinating capacity through the 
exchange of liaison officers with Federal departments and agencies that 
manage aspects of identifying and countering foreign disinformation, 
including the National Counterterrorism Center at the Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence and from combatant commands.
    (d) Hiring Authority.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, 
the Secretary of State, during the five year period beginning on the 
date of the enactment of this Act and solely to carry out functions of 
the Global Engagement Center, may--
            (1) appoint employees without regard to the provisions of 
        title 5, United States Code, regarding appointments in the 
        competitive service; and
            (2) fix the basic compensation of such employees without 
        regard to chapter 51 and subchapter III of chapter 53 of such 
        title regarding classification and General Schedule pay rates.
    (e) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be 
appropriated $150,000,000 for fiscal year 2022 for the Global 
Engagement Center to counter foreign state and non-state sponsored 
propaganda and disinformation.

SEC. 138. REVIEW BY COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED 
              STATES OF CERTAIN FOREIGN GIFTS TO AND CONTRACTS WITH 
              INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION.

    (a) Amendments to Defense Production Act of 1950.--
            (1) Definition of covered transaction.--Subsection (a)(4) 
        of section 721 of the Defense Production Act of 1950 (50 U.S.C. 
        4565) is amended--
                    (A) in subparagraph (A)--
                            (i) in clause (i), by striking ``; and'' 
                        and inserting a semicolon;
                            (ii) in clause (ii), by striking the period 
                        at the end and inserting ``; and''; and
                            (iii) by adding at the end the following:
                            ``(iii) any transaction described in 
                        subparagraph (B)(vi) proposed or pending after 
                        the date of the enactment of the China 
                        Strategic Competition Act of 2021.'';
                    (B) in subparagraph (B), by adding at the end the 
                following:
                            ``(vi) Any gift to an institution of higher 
                        education from a foreign person, or the entry 
                        into a contract by such an institution with a 
                        foreign person, if--
                                    ``(I)(aa) the value of the gift or 
                                contract equals or exceeds $1,000,000; 
                                or
                                    ``(bb) the institution receives, 
                                directly or indirectly, more than one 
                                gift from or enters into more than one 
                                contract, directly or indirectly, with 
                                the same foreign person for the same 
                                purpose the aggregate value of which, 
                                during the period of 2 consecutive 
                                calendar years, equals or exceeds 
                                $1,000,000; and
                                    ``(II) the gift or contract--
                                            ``(aa) relates to research, 
                                        development, or production of 
                                        critical technologies and 
                                        provides the foreign person 
                                        potential access to any 
                                        material nonpublic technical 
                                        information (as defined in 
                                        subparagraph (D)(ii)) in the 
                                        possession of the institution; 
                                        or
                                            ``(bb) is a restricted or 
                                        conditional gift or contract 
                                        (as defined in section 117(h) 
                                        of the Higher Education Act of 
                                        1965 (20 U.S.C. 1011f(h))) that 
                                        establishes control.''; and
                    (C) by adding at the end the following:
                    ``(G) Foreign gifts to and contracts with 
                institutions of higher education.--For purposes of 
                subparagraph (B)(vi):
                            ``(i) Contract.--The term `contract' means 
                        any agreement for the acquisition by purchase, 
                        lease, or barter of property or services by a 
                        foreign person, for the direct benefit or use 
                        of either of the parties.
                            ``(ii) Gift.--The term `gift' means any 
                        gift of money or property.
                            ``(iii) Institution of higher education.--
                        The term `institution of higher education' 
                        means any institution, public or private, or, 
                        if a multicampus institution, any single campus 
                        of such institution, in any State--
                                    ``(I) that is legally authorized 
                                within such State to provide a program 
                                of education beyond secondary school;
                                    ``(II) that provides a program for 
                                which the institution awards a 
                                bachelor's degree (or provides not less 
                                than a 2-year program which is 
                                acceptable for full credit toward such 
                                a degree) or a more advanced degree;
                                    ``(III) that is accredited by a 
                                nationally recognized accrediting 
                                agency or association; and
                                    ``(IV) to which the Federal 
                                Government extends Federal financial 
                                assistance (directly or indirectly 
                                through another entity or person), or 
                                that receives support from the 
                                extension of Federal financial 
                                assistance to any of the institution's 
                                subunits.''.
            (2) Mandatory declarations.--Subsection 
        (b)(1)(C)(v)(IV)(aa) of such section is amended by adding at 
        the end the following: ``Such regulations shall require a 
        declaration under this subclause with respect to a covered 
        transaction described in subsection (a)(4)(B)(vi)(II)(aa).''.
            (3) Factors to be considered.--Subsection (f) of such 
        section is amended--
                    (A) in paragraph (10), by striking ``; and'' and 
                inserting a semicolon;
                    (B) by redesignating paragraph (11) as paragraph 
                (12); and
                    (C) by inserting after paragraph (10) the 
                following:
            ``(11) as appropriate, and particularly with respect to 
        covered transactions described in subsection (a)(4)(B)(vi), the 
        importance of academic freedom at institutions of higher 
        education in the United States; and''.
            (4) Membership of cfius.--Subsection (k) of such section is 
        amended--
                    (A) in paragraph (2)--
                            (i) by redesignating subparagraphs (H), 
                        (I), and (J) as subparagraphs (I), (J), and 
                        (K), respectively; and
                            (ii) by inserting after subparagraph (G) 
                        the following:
                    ``(H) In the case of a covered transaction 
                involving an institution of higher education (as 
                defined in subsection (a)(4)(G)), the Secretary of 
                Education.''; and
                    (B) by adding at the end the following:
            ``(8) Inclusion of other agencies on committee.--In 
        considering including on the Committee under paragraph (2)(K) 
        the heads of other executive departments, agencies, or offices, 
        the President shall give due consideration to the heads of 
        relevant research and science agencies, departments, and 
        offices, including the Secretary of Health and Human Services, 
        the Director of the National Institutes of Health, and the 
        Director of the National Science Foundation.''.
            (5) Contents of annual report relating to critical 
        technologies.--Subsection (m)(3) of such section is amended--
                    (A) in subparagraph (B), by striking ``; and'' and 
                inserting a semicolon;
                    (B) in subparagraph (C), by striking the period at 
                the end and inserting a semicolon; and
                    (C) by adding at the end the following:
                    ``(D) an evaluation of whether there are foreign 
                malign influence or espionage activities directed or 
                directly assisted by foreign governments against 
                institutions of higher education (as defined in 
                subsection (a)(4)(G)) aimed at obtaining research and 
                development methods or secrets related to critical 
                technologies; and
                    ``(E) an evaluation of, and recommendation for any 
                changes to, reviews conducted under this section that 
                relate to institutions of higher education, based on an 
                analysis of disclosure reports submitted to the 
                chairperson under section 117(a) of the Higher 
                Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1011f(a)).''.
    (b) Inclusion of CFIUS in Reporting on Foreign Gifts Under Higher 
Education Act of 1965.--Section 117 of the Higher Education Act of 1965 
(20 U.S.C. 1011f) is amended--
            (1) in subsection (a), by inserting after ``the Secretary'' 
        the following: ``and the Secretary of the Treasury (in the 
        capacity of the Secretary as the chairperson of the Committee 
        on Foreign Investment in the United States under section 
        721(k)(3) of the Defense Production Act of 1950 (50 U.S.C. 
        4565(k)(3)))''; and
            (2) in subsection (d)--
                    (A) in paragraph (1)--
                            (i) by striking ``with the Secretary'' and 
                        inserting ``with the Secretary and the 
                        Secretary of the Treasury''; and
                            (ii) by striking ``to the Secretary'' and 
                        inserting ``to each such Secretary''; and
                    (B) in paragraph (2), by striking ``with the 
                Secretary'' and inserting ``with the Secretary and the 
                Secretary of the Treasury''.
    (c) Effective Date; Applicability.--The amendments made by 
subsection (a) shall--
            (1) take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act, 
        subject to the requirements of subsections (d) and (e); and
            (2) apply with respect to any covered transaction the 
        review or investigation of which is initiated under section 721 
        of the Defense Production Act of 1950 on or after the date that 
        is 30 days after the publication in the Federal Register of the 
        notice required under subsection (e)(2).
    (d) Regulations.--
            (1) In general.--The Committee on Foreign Investment in the 
        United States (in this section referred to as the 
        ``Committee''), which shall include the Secretary of Education 
        for purposes of this subsection, shall prescribe regulations as 
        necessary and appropriate to implement the amendments made by 
        subsection (a).
            (2) Elements.--The regulations prescribed under paragraph 
        (1) shall include--
                    (A) regulations accounting for the burden on 
                institutions of higher education likely to result from 
                compliance with the amendments made by subsection (a), 
                including structuring penalties and filing fees to 
                reduce such burdens, shortening timelines for reviews 
                and investigations, allowing for simplified and 
                streamlined declaration and notice requirements, and 
                implementing any procedures necessary to protect 
                academic freedom; and
                    (B) guidance with respect to--
                            (i) which gifts and contracts described in 
                        described in clause (vi)(II)(aa) of subsection 
                        (a)(4)(B) of section 721 of the Defense 
                        Production Act of 1950, as added by subsection 
                        (a)(1), would be subject to filing mandatory 
                        declarations under subsection (b)(1)(C)(v)(IV) 
                        of that section; and
                            (ii) the meaning of ``control'', as defined 
                        in subsection (a) of that section, as that term 
                        applies to covered transactions described in 
                        clause (vi) of paragraph (4)(B) of that 
                        section, as added by subsection (a)(1).
            (3) Issuance of final rule.--The Committee shall issue a 
        final rule to carry out the amendments made by subsection (a) 
        after assessing the findings of the pilot program required by 
        subsection (e).
    (e) Pilot Program.--
            (1) In general.--Beginning on the date that is 30 days 
        after the publication in the Federal Register of the matter 
        required by paragraph (2) and ending on the date that is 570 
        days thereafter, the Committee shall conduct a pilot program to 
        assess methods for implementing the review of covered 
        transactions described in clause (vi) of section 721(a)(4)(B) 
        of the Defense Production Act of 1950, as added by subsection 
        (a)(1).
            (2) Proposed determination.--Not later than 270 days after 
        the date of the enactment of this Act, the Committee shall, in 
        consultation with the Secretary of Education, publish in the 
        Federal Register--
                    (A) a proposed determination of the scope of and 
                procedures for the pilot program required by paragraph 
                (1);
                    (B) an assessment of the burden on institutions of 
                higher education likely to result from compliance with 
                the pilot program;
                    (C) recommendations for addressing any such 
                burdens, including shortening timelines for reviews and 
                investigations, structuring penalties and filing fees, 
                and simplifying and streamlining declaration and notice 
                requirements to reduce such burdens; and
                    (D) any procedures necessary to ensure that the 
                pilot program does not infringe upon academic freedom.
            (3) Report on findings.--Upon conclusion of the pilot 
        program required by paragraph (1), the Committee shall submit 
        to Congress a report on the findings of that pilot program that 
        includes--
                    (A) a summary of the reviews conducted by the 
                Committee under the pilot program and the outcome of 
                such reviews;
                    (B) an assessment of any additional resources 
                required by the Committee to carry out this section or 
                the amendments made by subsection (a);
                    (C) findings regarding the additional burden on 
                institutions of higher education likely to result from 
                compliance with the amendments made by subsection (a) 
                and any additional recommended steps to reduce those 
                burdens; and
                    (D) any recommendations for Congress to consider 
                regarding the scope or procedures described in this 
                section or the amendments made by subsection (a).

SEC. 139. POST-EMPLOYMENT RESTRICTIONS ON SENATE-CONFIRMED OFFICIALS AT 
              THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE.

    (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) Congress and the executive branch have recognized the 
        importance of preventing and mitigating the potential for 
        conflicts of interest following government service, including 
        with respect to senior United States officials working on 
        behalf of foreign governments; and
            (2) Congress and the executive branch should jointly 
        evaluate the status and scope of post-employment restrictions.
    (b) Restrictions.--Section 841 of the State Department Basic 
Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 2651a) is amended by adding at the 
end the following new subsection:
    ``(i) Extended Post-employment Restrictions for Certain Senate-
confirmed Officials.--
            ``(1) Secretary of state and deputy secretary of state.--
        With respect to a person serving as the Secretary of State or 
        Deputy Secretary of State, the restrictions described in 
        section 207(f)(1) of title 18, United States Code, shall apply 
        to representing, aiding, or advising a foreign governmental 
        entity before an officer or employee of the executive branch of 
        the United States at any time after the termination of that 
        person's service as Secretary or Deputy Secretary.
            ``(2) Under secretaries, assistant secretaries, and 
        ambassadors.--With respect to a person serving as an Under 
        Secretary, Assistant Secretary, or Ambassador at the Department 
        of State or the United States Permanent Representative to the 
        United Nations, the restrictions described in section 207(f)(1) 
        of title 18, United States Code, shall apply to representing, 
        aiding, or advising a foreign governmental entity before an 
        officer or employee of the executive branch of the United 
        States for 3 years after the termination of that person's 
        service in a position described in this paragraph, or the 
        duration of the term or terms of the President who appointed 
        that person to their position, whichever is longer.
            ``(3) Penalties and injunctions.--Any violations of the 
        restrictions in paragraphs (1) or (2) shall be subject to the 
        penalties and injunctions provided for under section 216 of 
        title 18, United States Code.
            ``(4) Definitions.--In this subsection:
                    ````(A) The term `foreign governmental entity' 
                includes any person employed by--
                            ``(i) any department, agency, or other 
                        entity of a foreign government at the national, 
                        regional, or local level;
                            ``(ii) any governing party or coalition of 
                        a foreign government at the national, regional, 
                        or local level; or
                            ``(iii) any entity majority-owned or 
                        majority-controlled by a foreign government at 
                        the national, regional, or local level.
                    ``(B) The term `representation' does not include 
                representation by an attorney, who is duly licensed and 
                authorized to provide legal advice in a United States 
                jurisdiction, of a person or entity in a legal capacity 
                or for the purposes of rendering legal advice.
            ``(5) Effective date.--The restrictions in this subsection 
        shall apply only to persons who are appointed by the President 
        to the positions referenced in this subsection on or after 120 
        days after the date of the enactment of the Strategic 
        Competition Act of 2021.
            ``(6) Notice of restrictions.--Any person subject to the 
        restrictions of this subsection shall be provided notice of 
        these restrictions by the Department of State upon appointment 
        by the President, and subsequently upon termination of service 
        with the Department of State.''.

SEC. 140. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON PRIORITIZING NOMINATION OF QUALIFIED 
              AMBASSADORS TO ENSURE PROPER DIPLOMATIC POSITIONING TO 
              COUNTER CHINESE INFLUENCE.

    It is the sense of Congress that it is critically important for the 
President to nominate qualified ambassadors as quickly as possible, 
especially for countries in Central and South America, to ensure that 
the United States is diplomatically positioned to counter Chinese 
influence efforts in foreign countries.

SEC. 141. CHINA CENSORSHIP MONITOR AND ACTION GROUP.

    (a) Definitions.--In this section:
            (1) Qualified research entity.--The term ``qualified 
        research entity'' means an entity that--
                    (A) is a nonpartisan research organization or a 
                federally funded research and development center;
                    (B) has appropriate expertise and analytical 
                capability to write the report required under 
                subsection (c); and
                    (C) is free from any financial, commercial, or 
                other entanglements, which could undermine the 
                independence of such report or create a conflict of 
                interest or the appearance of a conflict of interest, 
                with--
                            (i) the Government of the People's Republic 
                        of China;
                            (ii) the Chinese Communist Party;
                            (iii) any company incorporated in the 
                        People's Republic of China or a subsidiary of 
                        such company; or
                            (iv) any company or entity incorporated 
                        outside of the People's Republic of China that 
                        is believed to have a substantial financial or 
                        commercial interest in the People's Republic of 
                        China.
            (2) United states person.--The term ``United States 
        person'' means--
                    (A) a United States citizen or an alien lawfully 
                admitted for permanent residence to the United States; 
                or
                    (B) an entity organized under the laws of the 
                United States or any jurisdiction within the United 
                States, including a foreign branch of such an entity.
    (b) China Censorship Monitor and Action Group.--
            (1) In general.--The President shall establish an 
        interagency task force, which shall be known as the ``China 
        Censorship Monitor and Action Group'' (referred to in this 
        subsection as the ``Task Force'').
            (2) Membership.--The President shall--
                    (A) appoint the chair of the Task Force from among 
                the staff of the National Security Council;
                    (B) appoint the vice chair of the Task Force from 
                among the staff of the National Economic Council; and
                    (C) direct the head of each of the following 
                executive branch agencies to appoint personnel to 
                participate in the Task Force:
                            (i) The Department of State.
                            (ii) The Department of Commerce.
                            (iii) The Department of the Treasury.
                            (iv) The Department of Justice.
                            (v) The Office of the United States Trade 
                        Representative.
                            (vi) The Office of the Director of National 
                        Intelligence, and other appropriate elements of 
                        the intelligence community (as defined in 
                        section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 
                        (50 U.S.C. 3003)).
                            (vii) The Federal Communications 
                        Commission.
                            (viii) The United States Agency for Global 
                        Media.
                            (ix) Other agencies designated by the 
                        President.
            (3) Responsibilities.--The Task Force shall--
                    (A) oversee the development and execution of an 
                integrated Federal Government strategy to monitor and 
                address the impacts of efforts directed, or directly 
                supported, by the Government of the People's Republic 
                of China to censor or intimidate, in the United States 
                or in any of its possessions or territories, any United 
                States person, including United States companies that 
                conduct business in the People's Republic of China, 
                which are exercising their right to freedom of speech; 
                and
                    (B) submit the strategy developed pursuant to 
                subparagraph (A) to the appropriate congressional 
                committees not later than 120 days after the date of 
                the enactment of this Act.
            (4) Meetings.--The Task Force shall meet not less 
        frequently than twice per year.
            (5) Consultations.--The Task Force should regularly 
        consult, to the extent necessary and appropriate, with--
                    (A) Federal agencies that are not represented on 
                the Task Force;
                    (B) independent agencies of the United States 
                Government that are not represented on the Task Force;
                    (C) relevant stakeholders in the private sector and 
                the media; and
                    (D) relevant stakeholders among United States 
                allies and partners facing similar challenges related 
                to censorship or intimidation by the Government of the 
                People's Republic of China.
            (6) Reporting requirements.--
                    (A) Annual report.--The Task Force shall submit an 
                annual report to the appropriate congressional 
                committees that describes, with respect to the 
                reporting period--
                            (i) the strategic objectives and policies 
                        pursued by the Task Force to address the 
                        challenges of censorship and intimidation of 
                        United States persons while in the United 
                        States or any of its possessions or 
                        territories, which is directed or directly 
                        supported by the Government of the People's 
                        Republic of China;
                            (ii) the activities conducted by the Task 
                        Force in support of the strategic objectives 
                        and policies referred to in clause (i); and
                            (iii) the results of the activities 
                        referred to in clause (ii) and the impact of 
                        such activities on the national interests of 
                        the United States.
                    (B) Form of report.--Each report submitted pursuant 
                to subparagraph (A) shall be unclassified, but may 
                include a classified annex.
                    (C) Congressional briefings.--Not later than 90 
                days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and 
                annually thereafter, the Task Force shall provide 
                briefings to the appropriate congressional committees 
                regarding the activities of the Task Force to execute 
                the strategy developed pursuant to paragraph (3)(A).
    (c) Report on Censorship and Intimidation of United States Persons 
by the Government of the People's Republic of China.--
            (1) Report.--
                    (A) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the 
                date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of 
                State shall select and seek to enter into an agreement 
                with a qualified research entity that is independent of 
                the Department of State to write a report on censorship 
                and intimidation in the United States and its 
                possessions and territories of United States persons, 
                including United States companies that conduct business 
                in the People's Republic of China, which is directed or 
                directly supported by the Government of the People's 
                Republic of China.
                    (B) Matters to be included.--The report required 
                under subparagraph (A) shall--
                            (i) assess major trends, patterns, and 
                        methods of the Government of the People's 
                        Republic of China's efforts to direct or 
                        directly support censorship and intimidation of 
                        United States persons, including United States 
                        companies that conduct business in the People's 
                        Republic of China, which are exercising their 
                        right to freedom of speech;
                            (ii) assess, including through the use of 
                        illustrative examples, as appropriate, the 
                        impact on and consequences for United States 
                        persons, including United States companies that 
                        conduct business in the People's Republic of 
                        China, that criticize--
                                    (I) the Chinese Communist Party;
                                    (II) the Government of the People's 
                                Republic of China;
                                    (III) the authoritarian model of 
                                government of the People's Republic of 
                                China; or
                                    (IV) a particular policy advanced 
                                by the Chinese Communist Party or the 
                                Government of the People's Republic of 
                                China;
                            (iii) identify the implications for the 
                        United States of the matters described in 
                        clauses (i) and (ii);
                            (iv) assess the methods and evaluate the 
                        efficacy of the efforts by the Government of 
                        the People's Republic of China to limit freedom 
                        of expression in the private sector, including 
                        media, social media, film, education, travel, 
                        financial services, sports and entertainment, 
                        technology, telecommunication, and internet 
                        infrastructure interests;
                            (v) include policy recommendations for the 
                        United States Government, including 
                        recommendations regarding collaboration with 
                        United States allies and partners, to address 
                        censorship and intimidation by the Government 
                        of the People's Republic of China; and
                            (vi) include policy recommendations for 
                        United States persons, including United States 
                        companies that conduct business in China, to 
                        address censorship and intimidation by the 
                        Government of the People's Republic of China.
                    (C) Applicability to united states allies and 
                partners.--To the extent practicable, the report 
                required under subparagraph (A) should identify 
                implications and policy recommendations that are 
                relevant to United States allies and partners facing 
                censorship and intimidation directed or directly 
                supported by the Government of the People's Republic of 
                China.
            (2) Submission of report.--
                    (A) In general.--Not later than 1 year after the 
                date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of 
                State shall submit the report written by the qualified 
                research entity selected pursuant to paragraph (1)(A) 
                to the appropriate congressional committees.
                    (B) Publication.--The report referred to in 
                subparagraph (A) shall be made accessible to the public 
                online through relevant United States Government 
                websites.
            (3) Federal government support.--The Secretary of State and 
        other Federal agencies selected by the President shall provide 
        the qualified research entity selected pursuant to paragraph 
        (1)(A) with timely access to appropriate information, data, 
        resources, and analyses necessary for such entity to write the 
        report described in paragraph (1)(A) in a thorough and 
        independent manner.
    (d) Sunset.--This section shall terminate on the date that is 5 
years after the date of the enactment of this Act.

           TITLE II--INVESTING IN ALLIANCES AND PARTNERSHIPS

              Subtitle A--Strategic and Diplomatic Matters

SEC. 201. APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DEFINED.

    In this subtitle, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' 
means--
            (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on 
        Appropriations of the Senate; and
            (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on 
        Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

SEC. 202. UNITED STATES COMMITMENT AND SUPPORT FOR ALLIES AND PARTNERS 
              IN THE INDO-PACIFIC.

    (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the United States treaty alliances in the Indo-Pacific 
        provide a unique strategic advantage to the United States and 
        are among the Nation's most precious assets, enabling the 
        United States to advance its vital national interests, defend 
        its territory, expand its economy through international trade 
        and commerce, establish enduring cooperation among like-minded 
        countries, prevent the domination of the Indo-Pacific and its 
        surrounding maritime and air lanes by a hostile power or 
        powers, and deter potential aggressors;
            (2) the Governments of the United States, Japan, the 
        Republic of Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand are 
        critical allies in advancing a free and open order in the Indo-
        Pacific region and tackling challenges with unity of purpose, 
        and have collaborated to advance specific efforts of shared 
        interest in areas such as defense and security, economic 
        prosperity, infrastructure connectivity, and fundamental 
        freedoms;
            (3) the United States greatly values other partnerships in 
        the Indo-Pacific region, including with India, Singapore, 
        Indonesia, Taiwan, New Zealand, and Vietnam as well as regional 
        architecture such as the Quad, the Association of Southeast 
        Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the Asia-Pacific Economic Community 
        (APEC), which are essential to further shared interests;
            (4) the security environment in the Indo-Pacific demands 
        consistent United States and allied commitment to strengthening 
        and advancing our alliances so that they are postured to meet 
        these challenges, and will require sustained political will, 
        concrete partnerships, economic, commercial, and technological 
        cooperation, consistent and tangible commitments, high-level 
        and extensive consultations on matters of mutual interest, 
        mutual and shared cooperation in the acquisition of key 
        capabilities important to allied defenses, and unified mutual 
        support in the face of political, economic, or military 
        coercion;
            (5) fissures in the United States alliance relationships 
        and partnerships benefit United States adversaries and weaken 
        collective ability to advance shared interests;
            (6) the United States must work with allies to prioritize 
        human rights throughout the Indo-Pacific region;
            (7) as the report released in August 2020 by the Expert 
        Group of the International Military Council on Climate and 
        Security (IMCCS), titled ``Climate and Security in the Indo-
        Asia Pacific'' noted, the Indo-Pacific region is one of the 
        regions most vulnerable to climate impacts and as former Deputy 
        Under Secretary of Defense for Installations and Environment 
        Sherri Goodman, Secretary General of IMCCS, noted, climate 
        shocks act as a threat multiplier in the Indo-Pacific region, 
        increasing humanitarian response costs and impacting security 
        throughout the region as sea levels rise, fishing patterns 
        shift, food insecurity rises, and storms grow stronger and more 
        frequent;
            (8) the United State should continue to engage on and 
        deepen cooperation with allies and partners of the United 
        States in the Indo-Pacific region, as laid out in the Asia 
        Reassurance Initiative Act (Public Law 115-409), in the areas 
        of--
                    (A) forecasting environmental challenges;
                    (B) assisting with transnational cooperation on 
                sustainable uses of forest and water resources with the 
                goal of preserving biodiversity and access to safe 
                drinking water;
                    (C) fisheries and marine resource conservation; and
                    (D) meeting environmental challenges and developing 
                resilience; and
            (9) the Secretary of State, in coordination with the 
        Secretary of Defense and the Administrator of the United States 
        Agency for International Development, should facilitate a 
        robust interagency Indo-Pacific climate resiliency and 
        adaptation strategy focusing on internal and external actions 
        needed--
                    (A) to facilitate regional early recovery, risk 
                reduction, and resilience to weather-related impacts on 
                strategic interests of the United States and partners 
                and allies of the United States in the region; and
                    (B) to address humanitarian and food security 
                impacts of weather-related changes in the region.
    (b) Statement of Policy.--It shall be the policy of the United 
States--
            (1) to deepen diplomatic, economic, and security 
        cooperation between and among the United States, Japan, the 
        Republic of Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand, 
        including through diplomatic engagement, regional development, 
        energy security and development, scientific and health 
        partnerships, educational and cultural exchanges, missile 
        defense, intelligence-sharing, space, cyber, and other 
        diplomatic and defense-related initiatives;
            (2) to uphold our multilateral and bilateral treaty 
        obligations, including--
                    (A) defending Japan, including all areas under the 
                administration of Japan, under article V of the Treaty 
                of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between the United 
                States of America and Japan;
                    (B) defending the Republic of Korea under article 
                III of the Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United 
                States and the Republic of Korea;
                    (C) defending the Philippines under article IV of 
                the Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and 
                the Republic of the Philippines;
                    (D) defending Thailand under the 1954 Manila Pact 
                and the Thanat-Rusk communique of 1962; and
                    (E) defending Australia under article IV of the 
                Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty;
            (3) to strengthen and deepen the United States' bilateral 
        and regional partnerships, including with India, Taiwan, ASEAN, 
        and New Zealand;
            (4) to cooperate with Japan, the Republic of Korea, 
        Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand to promote human 
        rights bilaterally and through regional and multilateral fora 
        and pacts; and
            (5) to strengthen and advance diplomatic, economic, and 
        security cooperation with regional partners, such as Taiwan, 
        Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and India.

SEC. 203. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON COOPERATION WITH THE QUAD.

    It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the United States should reaffirm our commitment to 
        quadrilateral cooperation among Australia, India, Japan, and 
        the United States (the ``Quad'') to enhance and implement a 
        shared vision to meet shared regional challenges and to promote 
        a free, open, inclusive, resilient, and healthy Indo-Pacific 
        that is characterized by democracy, rule of law, and market-
        driven economic growth, and is free from undue influence and 
        coercion;
            (2) the United States should seek to expand sustained 
        dialogue and cooperation through the Quad with a range of 
        partners to support the rule of law, freedom of navigation and 
        overflight, peaceful resolution of disputes, democratic values, 
        and territorial integrity, and to uphold peace and prosperity 
        and strengthen democratic resilience;
            (3) the United States should seek to expand avenues of 
        cooperation with the Quad, including more regular military-to-
        military dialogues, joint exercises, and coordinated policies 
        related to shared interests such as protecting cyberspace and 
        advancing maritime security;
            (4) the recent pledge from the first-ever Quad leaders 
        meeting on March 12, 2021, to respond to the economic and 
        health impacts of COVID-19, including expanding safe, 
        affordable, and effective vaccine production and equitable 
        access, and to address shared challenges, including in 
        cyberspace, critical technologies, counterterrorism, quality 
        infrastructure investment, and humanitarian assistance and 
        disaster relief, as well as maritime domains, further advances 
        the important cooperation among Quad nations that is so 
        critical to the Indo-Pacific region;
            (5) building upon their partnership to help finance 
        1,000,000,000 or more COVID-19 vaccines by the end of 2022 for 
        use in the Indo-Pacific region, the United States International 
        Development Finance Corporation, the Japan International 
        Cooperation Agency, and the Japan Bank for International 
        Cooperation, including through partnerships other multilateral 
        development banks, should also venture to finance development 
        and infrastructure projects in the Indo-Pacific region that are 
        sustainable and offer a viable alternative to the investments 
        of the People's Republic of China in that region under the Belt 
        and Road Initiative;
            (6) in consultation with other Quad countries, the 
        President should establish clear deliverables for the 3 new 
        Quad Working Groups established on March 12, 2021, which are--
                    (A) the Quad Vaccine Experts Working Group;
                    (B) the Quad Climate Working Group; and
                    (C) the Quad Critical and Emerging Technology 
                Working Group; and
            (7) the formation of a Quad Intra-Parliamentary Working 
        Group could--
                    (A) sustain and deepen engagement between senior 
                officials of the Quad countries on a full spectrum of 
                issues; and
                    (B) be modeled on the successful and long-standing 
                bilateral intra-parliamentary groups between the United 
                States and Mexico, Canada, and the United Kingdom, as 
                well as other formal and informal parliamentary 
                exchanges.

SEC. 204. ESTABLISHMENT OF QUAD INTRA-PARLIAMENTARY WORKING GROUP.

    (a) Establishment.--Not later than 30 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall seek to enter into 
negotiations with the governments of Japan, Australia, and India 
(collectively, with the United States, known as the ``Quad'') with the 
goal of reaching a written agreement to establish a Quad Intra-
Parliamentary Working Group for the purpose of acting on the 
recommendations of the Quad Working Groups described in section 203(6) 
and to facilitate closer cooperation on shared interests and values.
    (b) United States Group.--
            (1) In general.--At such time as the governments of the 
        Quad countries enter into a written agreement described in 
        subsection (a), there shall be established a United States 
        Group, which shall represent the United States at the Quad 
        Intra-Parliamentary Working Group.
            (2) Membership.--
                    (A) In general.--The United States Group shall be 
                comprised of not more than 24 Members of Congress.
                    (B) Appointment.--Of the Members of Congress 
                appointed to the United States Group under subparagraph 
                (A)--
                            (i) half shall be appointed by the Speaker 
                        of the House of Representatives from among 
                        Members of the House, not less than 4 of whom 
                        shall be members of the Committee on Foreign 
                        Affairs; and
                            (ii) half shall be appointed by the 
                        President Pro Tempore of the Senate, based on 
                        recommendations of the majority leader and 
                        minority leader of the Senate, from among 
                        Members of the Senate, not less than 4 of whom 
                        shall be members of the Committee on Foreign 
                        Relations (unless the majority leader and 
                        minority leader determine otherwise).
            (3) Meetings.--
                    (A) In general.--The United States Group shall seek 
                to meet not less frequently than annually with 
                representatives and appropriate staff of the 
                legislatures of Japan, Australia, and India, and any 
                other country invited by mutual agreement of the Quad 
                countries.
                    (B) Limitation.--A meeting described in 
                subparagraph (A) may be held--
                            (i) in the United States;
                            (ii) in another Quad country during periods 
                        when Congress is not in session; or
                            (iii) virtually.
            (4) Chairperson and vice chairperson.--
                    (A) House delegation.--The Speaker of the House of 
                Representatives shall designate the chairperson or vice 
                chairperson of the delegation of the United States 
                Group from the House from among members of the 
                Committee on Foreign Affairs.
                    (B) Senate delegation.--The President Pro Tempore 
                of the Senate shall designate the chairperson or vice 
                chairperson of the delegation of the United States 
                Group from the Senate from among members of the 
                Committee on Foreign Relations.
            (5) Authorization of appropriations.--
                    (A) In general.--There is authorized to be 
                appropriated $1,000,000 for each fiscal year 2022 
                through 2025 for the United States Group.
                    (B) Distribution of appropriations.--
                            (i) In general.--For each fiscal year for 
                        which an appropriation is made for the United 
                        States Group, half of the amount appropriated 
                        shall be available to the delegation from the 
                        House of Representatives and half of the amount 
                        shall be available to the delegation from the 
                        Senate.
                            (ii) Method of distribution.--The amounts 
                        available to the delegations of the House of 
                        Representatives and the Senate under clause (i) 
                        shall be disbursed on vouchers to be approved 
                        by the chairperson of the delegation from the 
                        House of Representatives and the chairperson of 
                        the delegation from the Senate, respectively.
            (6) Private sources.--The United States Group may accept 
        gifts or donations of services or property, subject to the 
        review and approval, as appropriate, of the Committee on Ethics 
        of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Ethics of 
        the Senate.
            (7) Certification of expenditures.--The certificate of the 
        chairperson of the delegation from the House of Representatives 
        or the delegation of the Senate of the United States Group 
        shall be final and conclusive upon the accounting officers in 
        the auditing of the accounts of the United States Group.
            (8) Annual report.--The United States Group shall submit to 
        the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
        Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
        Senate a report for each fiscal year for which an appropriation 
        is made for the United States Group, which shall include a 
        description of its expenditures under such appropriation.

SEC. 205. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON COOPERATION WITH ASEAN.

    It is the policy of the United States to--
            (1) stand with the nations of the Association of Southeast 
        Asian Nations (ASEAN) as they respond to COVID-19 and support 
        greater cooperation in building capacity to prepare for and 
        respond to pandemics and other public health challenges;
            (2) support high-level United States participation in the 
        annual ASEAN Summit held each year;
            (3) reaffirm the importance of United States-ASEAN economic 
        engagement, including the elimination of barriers to cross-
        border commerce, and support the ASEAN Economic Community's 
        (AEC) goals, including strong, inclusive, and sustainable long-
        term economic growth and cooperation with the United States 
        that focuses on innovation and capacity-building efforts in 
        technology, education, disaster management, food security, 
        human rights, and trade facilitation, particularly for ASEAN's 
        poorest countries;
            (4) urge ASEAN to continue its efforts to foster greater 
        integration and unity within the ASEAN community, as well as to 
        foster greater integration and unity with non-ASEAN economic, 
        political, and security partners, including Japan, the Republic 
        of Korea, Australia, the European Union, Taiwan, and India;
            (5) recognize the value of strategic economic initiatives 
        like United States-ASEAN Connect, which demonstrates a 
        commitment to ASEAN and the AEC and builds upon economic 
        relationships in the region;
            (6) support ASEAN nations in addressing maritime and 
        territorial disputes in a constructive manner and in pursuing 
        claims through peaceful, diplomatic, and, as necessary, 
        legitimate regional and international arbitration mechanisms, 
        consistent with international law, including through the 
        adoption of a code of conduct in the South China Sea that 
        represents the interests of all parties and promotes peace and 
        stability in the region;
            (7) urge all parties involved in the maritime and 
        territorial disputes in the Indo-Pacific region, including the 
        Government of the People's Republic of China--
                    (A) to cease any current activities, and avoid 
                undertaking any actions in the future, that undermine 
                stability, or complicate or escalate disputes through 
                the use of coercion, intimidation, or military force;
                    (B) to demilitarize islands, reefs, shoals, and 
                other features, and refrain from new efforts to 
                militarize, including the construction of new garrisons 
                and facilities and the relocation of additional 
                military personnel, material, or equipment;
                    (C) to oppose actions by any country that prevent 
                other countries from exercising their sovereign rights 
                to the resources in their exclusive economic zones and 
                continental shelves by enforcing claims to those areas 
                in the South China Sea that lack support in 
                international law; and
                    (D) to oppose unilateral declarations of 
                administrative and military districts in contested 
                areas in the South China Sea;
            (8) urge parties to refrain from unilateral actions that 
        cause permanent physical damage to the marine environment and 
        support the efforts of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
        Administration and ASEAN to implement guidelines to address the 
        illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing in the region;
            (9) urge ASEAN member states to develop a common approach 
        to reaffirm the decision of the Permanent Court of 
        Arbitration's 2016 ruling in favor of the Republic of the 
        Philippines in the case against the People's Republic of 
        China's excessive maritime claims;
            (10) reaffirm the commitment of the United States to 
        continue joint efforts with ASEAN to halt human smuggling and 
        trafficking in persons and urge ASEAN to create and strengthen 
        regional mechanisms to provide assistance and support to 
        refugees and migrants;
            (11) support the Mekong-United States Partnership;
            (12) support newly created initiatives with ASEAN 
        countries, including the United States-ASEAN Smart Cities 
        Partnership, the ASEAN Policy Implementation Project, the 
        United States-ASEAN Innovation Circle, and the United States-
        ASEAN Health Futures;
            (13) encourage the President to communicate to ASEAN 
        leaders the importance of promoting the rule of law and open 
        and transparent government, strengthening civil society, and 
        protecting human rights, including releasing political 
        prisoners, ceasing politically motivated prosecutions and 
        arbitrary killings, and safeguarding freedom of the press, 
        freedom of assembly, freedom of religion, and freedom of speech 
        and expression;
            (14) support efforts by organizations in ASEAN that address 
        corruption in the public and private sectors, enhance anti-
        bribery compliance, enforce bribery criminalization in the 
        private sector, and build beneficial ownership transparency 
        through the ASEAN-USAID PROSPECT project partnered with the 
        South East Asia Parties Against Corruption (SEA-PAC);
            (15) support the Young Southeast Asian Leaders Initiative 
        as an example of a people-to-people partnership that provides 
        skills, networks, and leadership training to a new generation 
        that will create and fill jobs, foster cross-border cooperation 
        and partnerships, and rise to address the regional and global 
        challenges of the future;
            (16) support the creation of initiatives similar to the 
        Young Southeast Asian Leaders Initiative for other parts of the 
        Indo-Pacific to foster people-to-people partnerships with an 
        emphasis on civil society leaders;
            (17) acknowledge those ASEAN governments that have fully 
        upheld and implemented all United Nations Security Council 
        resolutions and international agreements with respect to the 
        Democratic People's Republic of Korea's nuclear and ballistic 
        missile programs and encourage all other ASEAN governments to 
        do the same; and
            (18) allocate appropriate resources across the United 
        States Government to articulate and implement an Indo-Pacific 
        strategy that respects and supports ASEAN centrality and 
        supports ASEAN as a source of well-functioning and problem-
        solving regional architecture in the Indo-Pacific community.

SEC. 206. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON ENHANCING UNITED STATES-ASEAN 
              COOPERATION ON TECHNOLOGY ISSUES WITH RESPECT TO THE 
              PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

    It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the United States and ASEAN should complete a joint 
        analysis on risks of overreliance on Chinese equipment critical 
        to strategic technologies and critical infrastructure;
            (2) the United States and ASEAN should share information 
        about and collaborate on screening Chinese investments in 
        strategic technology sectors and critical infrastructure;
            (3) the United States and ASEAN should work together on 
        appropriate import restriction regimes regarding Chinese 
        exports of surveillance technologies;
            (4) the United States should urge ASEAN to adopt its March 
        2019 proposed sanctions regime targeting cyber attacks;
            (5) the United States should urge ASEAN to commit to the 
        September 2019 principles signed by 28 countries regarding 
        ``Advancing Responsible State Behavior in Cyberspace'', a set 
        of commitments that support the ``rules-based international 
        order, affirm the applicability of international law to state-
        on-state behavior, adherence to voluntary norms of responsible 
        state behavior in peacetime, and the development and 
        implementation of practical confidence building measures to 
        help reduce the risk of conflict stemming from cyber 
        incidents''; and
            (6) the United States and ASEAN should explore how Chinese 
        investments in critical technology, including artificial 
        intelligence, will impact Indo-Pacific security over the coming 
        decades.

SEC. 207. REPORT ON CHINESE INFLUENCE IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS.

    (a) Report Required.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the 
Director of National Intelligence, shall submit to the Committee on 
Foreign Relations and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives a report on 
the expanded influence of the Government of the People's Republic of 
China and the Chinese Communist Party in international organizations.
    (b) Contents.--The report required by subsection (a) shall include 
analysis of the following:
            (1) The influence of the PRC and Chinese Communist Party in 
        international organizations and how that influence has expanded 
        over the last 10 years, including--
                    (A) tracking countries' voting patterns that align 
                with Chinese government voting patterns;
                    (B) the number of PRC nationals in leadership 
                positions at the D-1 level or higher;
                    (C) changes in PRC voluntary and mandatory funding 
                by organization;
                    (D) adoption of Chinese Communist Party phrases and 
                initiatives in international organization language and 
                programming;
                    (E) efforts by the PRC to secure legitimacy for its 
                own foreign policy initiatives, including the Belt and 
                Road Initiative;
                    (F) the number of Junior Professional Officers that 
                the Government of the People's Republic of China has 
                funded by organization;
                    (G) tactics used by the Government of the People's 
                Republic of China or the CCP to manipulate secret or 
                otherwise non-public voting measures, voting bodies, or 
                votes;
                    (H) the extent to which technology companies 
                incorporated in the PRC, or which have PRC or CCP 
                ownership interests, provide equipment and services to 
                international organizations; and
                    (I) efforts by the PRC's United Nations Mission to 
                generate criticism of the United States in the United 
                Nations, including any efforts to highlight delayed 
                United States payments or to misrepresent total United 
                States voluntary and assessed financial contributions 
                to the United Nations and its specialized agencies and 
                programs.
            (2) The purpose and ultimate goals of the expanded 
        influence of the PRC government and the Chinese Communist Party 
        in international organizations, including an analysis of PRC 
        Government and Chinese Communist Party strategic documents and 
        rhetoric.
            (3) The tactics and means employed by the PRC government 
        and the Chinese Communist Party to achieve expanded influence 
        in international organizations, including--
                    (A) incentive programs for PRC nationals to join 
                and run for leadership positions in international 
                organizations;
                    (B) coercive economic and other practices against 
                other members in the organization; and
                    (C) economic or other incentives provided to 
                international organizations, including donations of 
                technologies or goods.
            (4) The successes and failures of the PRC government and 
        Chinese Communist Party influence efforts in international 
        organizations, especially those related to human rights, 
        ``internet sovereignty'', the development of norms on 
        artificial intelligence, labor, international standards 
        setting, and freedom of navigation.
    (c) Form.--The report submitted under subsection (a) shall be 
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
    (d) Definition.--In this section, the term ``international 
organizations'' includes the following:
            (1) The African Development Bank.
            (2) The Asian Development Bank.
            (3) The Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation.
            (4) The Bank of International Settlements.
            (5) The Caribbean Development Bank.
            (6) The Food and Agriculture Organization.
            (7) The International Atomic Energy Agency.
            (8) The International Bank for Reconstruction and 
        Development.
            (9) The International Bureau of Weights and Measures.
            (10) The International Chamber of Commerce.
            (11) The International Civil Aviation Organization.
            (12) The International Criminal Police Organization.
            (13) The International Finance Corporation.
            (14) The International Fund for Agricultural Development.
            (15) The International Hydrographic Organization.
            (16) The International Labor Organization.
            (17) The International Maritime Organization.
            (18) The International Monetary Fund.
            (19) The International Olympic Committee.
            (20) The International Organization for Migration.
            (21) The International Organization for Standardization.
            (22) The International Renewable Energy Agency.
            (23) The International Telecommunications Union.
            (24) The Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
        Development.
            (25) The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical 
        Weapons.
            (26) The United Nations.
            (27) The United Nations Conference on Trade and 
        Development.
            (28) The United Nations Educational, Scientific, and 
        Cultural Organization.
            (29) The United Nations Industrial Development 
        Organization.
            (30) The United Nations Institute for Training and 
        Research.
            (31) The United Nations Truce Supervision Organization.
            (32) The Universal Postal Union.
            (33) The World Customs Organization.
            (34) The World Health Organization.
            (35) The World Intellectual Property Organization.
            (36) The World Meteorological Organization.
            (37) The World Organization for Animal Health.
            (38) The World Tourism Organization.
            (39) The World Trade Organization.
            (40) The World Bank Group.

SEC. 208. REGULATORY EXCHANGES WITH ALLIES AND PARTNERS.

    (a) In General.--The Secretary of State, in coordination with the 
heads of other participating executive branch agencies, shall establish 
and develop a program to facilitate and encourage regular dialogues 
between United States Government regulatory and technical agencies and 
their counterpart organizations in allied and partner countries, both 
bilaterally and in relevant multilateral institutions and 
organizations--
            (1) to promote best practices in regulatory formation and 
        implementation;
            (2) to collaborate to achieve optimal regulatory outcomes 
        based on scientific, technical, and other relevant principles;
            (3) to seek better harmonization and alignment of 
        regulations and regulatory practices;
            (4) to build consensus around industry and technical 
        standards in emerging sectors that will drive future global 
        economic growth and commerce; and
            (5) to promote United States standards regarding 
        environmental, labor, and other relevant protections in 
        regulatory formation and implementation, in keeping with the 
        values of free and open societies, including the rule of law.
    (b) Prioritization of Activities.--In facilitating expert exchanges 
under subsection (a), the Secretary shall prioritize--
            (1) bilateral coordination and collaboration with countries 
        where greater regulatory coherence, harmonization of standards, 
        or communication and dialogue between technical agencies is 
        achievable and best advances the economic and national security 
        interests of the United States;
            (2) multilateral coordination and collaboration where 
        greater regulatory coherence, harmonization of standards, or 
        dialogue on other relevant regulatory matters is achievable and 
        best advances the economic and national security interests of 
        the United States, including with--
                    (A) the European Union;
                    (B) the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation;
                    (C) the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
                (ASEAN);
                    (D) the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
                Development (OECD); and
                    (E) multilateral development banks; and
            (3) regulatory practices and standards-setting bodies 
        focused on key economic sectors and emerging technologies.
    (c) Participation by Non-governmental Entities.--With regard to the 
program described in subsection (a), the Secretary of State may 
facilitate, including through the use of amounts appropriated pursuant 
to subsection (e), the participation of private sector representatives, 
and other relevant organizations and individuals with relevant 
expertise, as appropriate and to the extent that such participation 
advances the goals of such program.
    (d) Delegation of Authority by the Secretary.--The Secretary of 
State is authorized to delegate the responsibilities described in this 
section to the Under Secretary of State for Economic Growth, Energy, 
and the Environment.
    (e) Authorization of Appropriations.--
            (1) In general.--There is authorized to be appropriated 
        $2,500,000 for each of fiscal years 2022 through 2026 to carry 
        out this section.
            (2) Use of funds.--The Secretary may make available amounts 
        appropriated pursuant to paragraph (1) in a manner that--
                    (A) facilitates participation by representatives 
                from technical agencies within the United States 
                Government and their counterparts; and
                    (B) complies with applicable procedural 
                requirements under the State Department Basic 
                Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 2651a et seq.) and 
                the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et 
                seq.).

SEC. 209. TECHNOLOGY PARTNERSHIP OFFICE AT THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE.

    (a) Statement of Policy.--It shall be the policy of the United 
States to lead new technology policy partnerships focused on the shared 
interests of the world's technology-leading democracies.
    (b) Establishment.--The Secretary of State shall establish an 
interagency-staffed Technology Partnership Office (referred to in this 
section as the ``Office''), which shall be housed in the Department of 
State.
    (c) Leadership.--
            (1) Ambassador-at-large.--The Office shall be headed by an 
        Ambassador-at-Large for Technology, who shall--
                    (A) be appointed by the President, by and with the 
                advice and consent of the Senate;
                    (B) have the rank and status of ambassador; and
                    (C) report to the Secretary of State, unless 
                otherwise directed.
            (2) Office liaisons.--The Secretary of Commerce and the 
        Secretary of the Treasury shall each appoint, from within their 
        respective departments at the level of GS-14 or higher, 
        liaisons between the Office and the Department of Commerce or 
        the Department of the Treasury, as applicable, to perform the 
        following duties:
                    (A) Collaborate with the Department of State on 
                relevant technology initiatives and partnerships.
                    (B) Provide technical and other relevant expertise 
                to the Office, as appropriate.
    (d) Membership.--In addition to the liaisons referred to in 
subsection (c), the Office shall include a representative or expert 
detailee from key Federal agencies, as determined by the Ambassador-at-
Large for Technology.
    (e) Purposes.--The purposes of the Office shall include 
responsibilities such as--
            (1) creating, overseeing, and carrying out technology 
        partnerships with countries and relevant political and economic 
        unions that are committed to--
                    (A) the rule of law, freedom of speech, and respect 
                for human rights;
                    (B) the safe and responsible development and use of 
                new and emerging technologies and the establishment of 
                related norms and standards;
                    (C) a secure internet architecture governed by a 
                multi-stakeholder model instead of centralized 
                government control;
                    (D) robust international cooperation to promote an 
                open internet and interoperable technological products 
                and services that are necessary to freedom, innovation, 
                transparency, and privacy; and
                    (E) multilateral coordination, including through 
                diplomatic initiatives, information sharing, and other 
                activities, to defend the principles described in 
                subparagraphs (A) through (D) against efforts by state 
                and non-state actors to undermine them;
            (2) harmonizing technology governance regimes with 
        partners, coordinating on basic and pre-competitive research 
        and development initiatives, and collaborating to pursue such 
        opportunities in key technologies, including--
                    (A) artificial intelligence and machine learning;
                    (B) 5G telecommunications and other advanced 
                wireless networking technologies;
                    (C) semiconductor manufacturing;
                    (D) biotechnology;
                    (E) quantum computing;
                    (F) surveillance technologies, including facial 
                recognition technologies and censorship software; and
                    (G) fiber optic cables;
            (3) coordinating with such countries regarding shared 
        technology strategies, including technology controls and 
        standards, as well as strategies with respect to the 
        development and acquisition of key technologies to provide 
        alternatives for those countries utilizing systems supported by 
        authoritarian regimes;
            (4) supporting and expanding adherence to international 
        treaties and frameworks governing the responsible use of new 
        and emerging technologies;
            (5) coordinating the adoption of shared data privacy, data 
        sharing, and data archiving standards among the United States 
        and partner countries and relevant economic and political 
        unions, including complementary data protection regulations;
            (6) coordinating with other technology partners on export 
        control policies, including as appropriate through the 
        Wassenaar Arrangement On Export Controls for Conventional Arms 
        and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies, done at The Hague December 
        1995, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Australia Group, and the 
        Missile Technology Control Regime; supply chain security; and 
        investment in or licensing of critical infrastructure and dual-
        use technologies;
            (7) coordinating with members of technology partnerships on 
        other policies regarding the use and control of emerging and 
        foundational technologies through appropriate restrictions, 
        investment screening, and appropriate measures with respect to 
        technology transfers;
            (8) coordinating policies, in coordination with the 
        Department of Commerce, around the resiliency of supply chains 
        in critical technology areas, including possible 
        diversification of supply chain components to countries 
        involved in technology partnerships with the United States, 
        while also maintaining transparency surrounding subsidies and 
        product origins;
            (9) sharing information regarding the technology transfer 
        threat posed by authoritarian governments and the ways in which 
        autocratic regimes are utilizing technology to erode individual 
        freedoms and other foundations of open, democratic societies;
            (10) administering the establishment of--
                    (A) the common funding mechanism for development 
                and adoption of measurably secure semiconductors and 
                measurably secure semiconductors supply chains created 
                in and in accordance with the requirements of section 
                9905 of the William M. (Mac) Thornberry National 
                Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (Public 
                Law 116-283); and
                    (B) the multilateral telecommunications security 
                fund created in and in accordance with the requirements 
                of section 9202 of such Act; and
            (11) collaborating with private companies, trade 
        associations, and think tanks to realize the purposes of 
        paragraphs (1) through (10).
    (f) Special Hiring Authorities.--The Secretary of State may--
            (1) appoint employees without regard to the provisions of 
        title 5, United States Code, regarding appointments in the 
        competitive service; and
            (2) fix the basic compensation of such employees without 
        regard to chapter 51 and subchapter III of chapter 53 of such 
        title regarding classification and General Schedule pay rates.
    (g) Report.--Not later than one year after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for the next 3 years, 
the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Director for National 
Intelligence, shall submit an unclassified report to the appropriate 
congressional committees, with a classified index, if necessary, 
regarding--
            (1) the activities of the Office, including any cooperative 
        initiatives and partnerships pursued with United States allies 
        and partners, and the results of those activities, initiatives, 
        and partnerships; and
            (2) the activities of the Government of the Peoples' 
        Republic of China, the Chinese Communist Party, and the Russian 
        Federation in key technology sectors and the threats they pose 
        to the United States, including--
                    (A) artificial intelligence and machine learning;
                    (B) 5G telecommunications and other advanced 
                wireless networking technologies;
                    (C) semiconductor manufacturing;
                    (D) biotechnology;
                    (E) quantum computing;
                    (F) surveillance technologies, including facial 
                recognition technologies and censorship software; and
                    (G) fiber optic cables.
    (h) Sense of Congress on Establishing International Technology 
Partnership.--It is the sense of Congress that the Ambassador-at-Large 
for Technology should seek to establish an International Technology 
Partnership for the purposes described in this section with foreign 
countries that have--
            (1) a democratic national government and a strong 
        commitment to democratic values, including an adherence to the 
        rule of law, freedom of speech, and respect for and promotion 
        of human rights;
            (2) an economy with advanced technology sectors; and
            (3) a demonstrated record of trust or an expressed interest 
        in international cooperation and coordination with the United 
        States on important defense and intelligence issues.

SEC. 210. UNITED STATES REPRESENTATION IN STANDARDS-SETTING BODIES.

    (a) Short Title.--This section may be cited as the ``Promoting 
United States International Leadership in 5G Act of 2021''.
    (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the United States and its allies and partners should 
        maintain participation and leadership at international 
        standards-setting bodies for 5th and future generation mobile 
        telecommunications systems and infrastructure;
            (2) the United States should work with its allies and 
        partners to encourage and facilitate the development of secure 
        supply chains and networks for 5th and future generation mobile 
        telecommunications systems and infrastructure; and
            (3) the maintenance of a high standard of security in 
        telecommunications and cyberspace between the United States and 
        its allies and partners is a national security interest of the 
        United States.
    (c) Enhancing Representation and Leadership of United States at 
International Standards-setting Bodies.--
            (1) In general.--The President shall--
                    (A) establish an interagency working group to 
                provide assistance and technical expertise to enhance 
                the representation and leadership of the United States 
                at international bodies that set standards for 
                equipment, systems, software, and virtually defined 
                networks that support 5th and future generation mobile 
                telecommunications systems and infrastructure, such as 
                the International Telecommunication Union and the 3rd 
                Generation Partnership Project; and
                    (B) work with allies, partners, and the private 
                sector to increase productive engagement.
            (2) Interagency working group.--The interagency working 
        group described in paragraph (1)--
                    (A) shall be chaired by the Secretary of State or a 
                designee of the Secretary of State; and
                    (B) shall consist of the head (or designee) of each 
                Federal department or agency the President determines 
                appropriate.
            (3) Briefings.--
                    (A) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the 
                date of the enactment of this Act, and subsequently 
                thereafter as provided under subparagraph (B), the 
                interagency working group described in paragraph (1) 
                shall provide a strategy to the appropriate 
                congressional committees that addresses--
                            (i) promotion of United States leadership 
                        at international standards-setting bodies for 
                        equipment, systems, software, and virtually 
                        defined networks relevant to 5th and future 
                        generation mobile telecommunications systems 
                        and infrastructure, taking into account the 
                        different processes followed by the various 
                        international standard-setting bodies;
                            (ii) diplomatic engagement with allies and 
                        partners to share security risk information and 
                        findings pertaining to equipment that supports 
                        or is used in 5th and future generation mobile 
                        telecommunications systems and infrastructure 
                        and cooperation on mitigating such risks;
                            (iii) China's presence and activities at 
                        international standards-setting bodies relevant 
                        to 5th and future generation mobile 
                        telecommunications systems and infrastructure, 
                        including information on the differences in the 
                        scope and scale of China's engagement at such 
                        bodies compared to engagement by the United 
                        States or its allies and partners and the 
                        security risks raised by Chinese proposals in 
                        such standards-setting bodies; and
                            (iv) engagement with private sector 
                        communications and information service 
                        providers, equipment developers, academia, 
                        Federally funded research and development 
                        centers, and other private-sector stakeholders 
                        to propose and develop secure standards for 
                        equipment, systems, software, and virtually 
                        defined networks that support 5th and future 
                        generation mobile telecommunications systems 
                        and infrastructure.
                    (B) Subsequent briefings.--Upon receiving a request 
                from the appropriate congressional committees, or as 
                determined appropriate by the chair of the interagency 
                working group established pursuant to paragraph (1), 
                the interagency working group shall provide such 
                committees an updated briefing that covers the matters 
                described in clauses (i) through (iv) of subparagraph 
                (A).

SEC. 211. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON CENTRALITY OF SANCTIONS AND OTHER 
              RESTRICTIONS TO STRATEGIC COMPETITION WITH CHINA.

    (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) Sanctions and other restrictions, when used as part of 
        a coordinated and comprehensive strategy, are a powerful tool 
        to advance United States foreign policy and national security 
        interests.
            (2) Congress has authorized and mandated a broad range of 
        sanctions and other restrictions to address malign behavior and 
        incentivize behavior change by individuals and entities in the 
        PRC.
            (3) The sanctions and other restrictions authorized and 
        mandated by Congress address a range of malign PRC behavior, 
        including--
                    (A) intellectual property theft;
                    (B) cyber-related economic espionage;
                    (C) repression of ethnic minorities;
                    (D) other human rights abuses;
                    (E) abuses of the international trading system;
                    (F) illicit assistance to and trade with the 
                Government of the Democratic People's Republic of 
                Korea; and
                    (G) drug trafficking, including trafficking in 
                fentanyl and other opioids;
            (4) The sanctions and other restrictions described in this 
        section include the following:
                    (A) The Global Magnitsky Human Rights 
                Accountability Act (subtitle F of title XII of Public 
                Law 114-328; 22 U.S.C. 2656 note).
                    (B) Section 1637 of the Carl Levin and Howard P. 
                ``Buck'' McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for 
                Fiscal Year 2015 (50 U.S.C. 1708).
                    (C) The Fentanyl Sanctions Act (21 U.S.C. 2301 et 
                seq.).
                    (D) The Hong Kong Autonomy Act (Public Law 116-149; 
                22 U.S.C. 5701 note).
                    (E) Section 7 of the Hong Kong Human Rights and 
                Democracy Act of 2019 (Public Law 116-76; 22 U.S.C. 
                5701 note).
                    (F) Section 6 of the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act 
                of 2020 (Public Law 116-145; 22 U.S.C. 6901 note).
                    (G) The Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (50 
                U.S.C. 4801 et seq.).
                    (H) Export control measures required to be 
                maintained with respect to entities in the 
                telecommunications sector of the People's Republic of 
                China, including under section 1260I of the National 
                Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 (Public 
                Law 116-92).
                    (I) Section 311 of the Countering America's 
                Adversaries Through Sanctions Act of 2018 (Public Law 
                115-44; 131 Stat. 942).
                    (J) The prohibition on the export of covered 
                munitions and crime control items to the Hong Kong 
                Police Force under the Act entitled ``An Act to 
                prohibit the commercial export of covered munitions and 
                crime control items to the Hong Kong Police Force'', 
                approved November 27, 2019 (Public Law 116-77; 133 
                Stat. 1173), as amended by section 1252 of the William 
                M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act 
                for Fiscal Year 2021 (Public Law 116-283).
            (5) Full implementation of the authorities described in 
        paragraph (4) is required under the respective laws described 
        therein and pursuant to the Take Care Clause of the 
        Constitution (article II, section 3).
    (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the executive branch has not fully implemented the 
        sanctions and other restrictions described in subsection (a)(4) 
        despite the statutory and constitutional requirements to do so; 
        and
            (2) the President's full implementation and execution of 
        the those authorities is a necessary and essential component to 
        the success of the United States in the strategic competition 
        with China.

SEC. 212. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON NEGOTIATIONS WITH G7 AND G20 COUNTRIES.

    (a) In General.--It is the sense of Congress that the President, 
acting through the Secretary of State, should initiate an agenda with 
G7 and G20 countries on matters relevant to economic and democratic 
freedoms, including the following:
            (1) Trade and investment issues and enforcement.
            (2) Building support for international infrastructure 
        standards, including those agreed to at the G20 summit in Osaka 
        in 2018.
            (3) The erosion of democracy and human rights.
            (4) The security of 5G telecommunications.
            (5) Anti-competitive behavior, such as intellectual 
        property theft, massive subsidization of companies, and other 
        policies and practices.
            (6) Predatory international sovereign lending that is 
        inconsistent with Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
        Development (OECD) and Paris Club principles.
            (7) International influence campaigns.
            (8) Environmental standards.
            (9) Coordination with like-minded regional partners that 
        are not in the G7 and G20.

SEC. 213. ENHANCING THE UNITED STATES-TAIWAN PARTNERSHIP.

    (a) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United States--
            (1) to recognize Taiwan as a vital part of the United 
        States Indo-Pacific strategy;
            (2) to advance the security of Taiwan and its democracy as 
        key elements for the continued peace and stability of the 
        greater Indo-Pacific region, and a vital national security 
        interest of the United States;
            (3) to reinforce its commitments to Taiwan under the Taiwan 
        Relations Act (Public Law 96-8) and the ``Six Assurances'';
            (4) to support Taiwan's implementation of its asymmetric 
        defense strategy, including the priorities identified in 
        Taiwan's Overall Defense Concept;
            (5) to urge Taiwan to increase its defense spending in 
        order to fully resource its defense strategy;
            (6) to conduct regular transfers of defense articles to 
        Taiwan in order to enhance Taiwan's self-defense capabilities, 
        particularly its efforts to develop and integrate asymmetric 
        capabilities, including anti-ship, coastal defense, anti-armor, 
        air defense, undersea warfare, advanced command, control, 
        communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and 
        reconnaissance, and resilient command and control capabilities, 
        into its military forces;
            (7) to advocate and actively advance Taiwan's meaningful 
        participation in the United Nations, the World Health Assembly, 
        the International Civil Aviation Organization, the 
        International Criminal Police Organization, and other 
        international bodies as appropriate;
            (8) to advocate for information sharing with Taiwan in the 
        International Agency for Research on Cancer;
            (9) to promote meaningful cooperation among the United 
        States, Taiwan, and other like-minded partners;
            (10) to enhance bilateral trade, including potentially 
        through new agreements or resumption of talks related to a 
        possible Trade and Investment Framework Agreement;
            (11) to actively engage in trade talks in pursuance of a 
        bilateral free trade agreement;
            (12) to expand bilateral economic and technological 
        cooperation, including improving supply chain security;
            (13) to support United States educational and exchange 
        programs with Taiwan, including by promoting the study of 
        Chinese language, culture, history, and politics in Taiwan; and
            (14) to expand people-to-people exchanges between the 
        United States and Taiwan.
    (b) Supporting United States Educational and Exchange Programs With 
Taiwan.--
            (1) Establishment of the united states-taiwan cultural 
        exchange foundation.--The Secretary of State should consider 
        establishing an independent nonprofit that--
                    (A) is dedicated to deepening ties between the 
                future leaders of Taiwan and the United States; and
                    (B) works with State and local school districts and 
                educational institutions to send high school and 
                university students to Taiwan to study the Chinese 
                language, culture, history, politics, and other 
                relevant subjects.
            (2) Partner.--State and local school districts and 
        educational institutions, including public universities, are 
        encouraged to partner with the Taipei Economic and Cultural 
        Representative Office in the United States to establish 
        programs to promote an increase in educational and cultural 
        exchanges.

SEC. 214. TAIWAN FELLOWSHIP PROGRAM.

    (a) Short Title.--This section may be cited as the ``Taiwan 
Fellowship Act''.
    (b) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
            (1) The Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96-8; 22 U.S.C. 
        3301 et seq.) affirmed United States policy ``to preserve and 
        promote extensive, close, and friendly commercial, cultural, 
        and other relations between the people of the United States and 
        the people on Taiwan, as well as the people on the China 
        mainland and all other peoples of the Western Pacific area''.
            (2) Consistent with the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 
        2018 (Public Law 115-409), the United States has grown its 
        strategic partnership with Taiwan's vibrant democracy of 
        23,000,000 people.
            (3) Despite a concerted campaign by the People's Republic 
        of China to isolate Taiwan from its diplomatic partners and 
        from international organizations, including the World Health 
        Organization, Taiwan has emerged as a global leader in the 
        coronavirus global pandemic response, including by donating 
        more than 2,000,000 surgical masks and other medical equipment 
        to the United States.
            (4) The creation of a United States fellowship program with 
        Taiwan would support--
                    (A) a key priority of expanding people-to-people 
                exchanges, which was outlined in President Donald J. 
                Trump's 2017 National Security Strategy;
                    (B) President Joseph R. Biden's commitment to 
                Taiwan, ``a leading democracy and a critical economic 
                and security partner,'' as expressed in his March 2021 
                Interim National Security Strategic Guidance; and
                    (C) April 2021 guidance from the Department of 
                State based on a review required under the Taiwan 
                Assurance Act of 2020 (subtitle B of title III of 
                division FF of Public Law 116-260) to ``encourage U.S. 
                government engagement with Taiwan that reflects our 
                deepening unofficial relationship''.
    (c) Purposes.--The purposes of this section are--
            (1) to further strengthen the United States-Taiwan 
        strategic partnership and broaden understanding of the Indo-
        Pacific region by temporarily assigning officials of agencies 
        of the United States Government to Taiwan for intensive study 
        in Mandarin and placement as Fellows with the governing 
        authorities on Taiwan or a Taiwanese civic institution;
            (2) to provide for eligible United States personnel to 
        learn or strengthen Mandarin Chinese language skills and to 
        expand their understanding of the political economy of Taiwan 
        and the Indo-Pacific region; and
            (3) to better position the United States to advance its 
        economic, security, and human rights interests and values in 
        the Indo-Pacific region.
    (d) Definitions.--In this section:
            (1) Agency head.--The term ``agency head'' means in the 
        case of the executive branch of United States Government, or a 
        legislative branch agency described in paragraph (2), the head 
        of the respective agency.
            (2) Agency of the united states government.--The term 
        ``agency of the United States Government'' includes the 
        Government Accountability Office, Congressional Budget Office, 
        or the Congressional Research Service of the legislative branch 
        as well as any agency of the executive branch.
            (3) Appropriate committees of congress.--The term 
        ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
                    (A) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;
                    (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
                Senate;
                    (C) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of 
                Representatives; and
                    (D) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House 
                of Representatives.
            (4) Detailee.--The term ``detailee''--
                    (A) means an employee of a branch of the United 
                States Government on loan to the American Institute in 
                Taiwan, without a change of position from the agency at 
                which he or she is employed; and
                    (B) a legislative branch employee from the 
                Government Accountability Office, Congressional Budget 
                Office, or the Congressional Research Service.
            (5) Implementing partner.--The term ``implementing 
        partner'' means any United States organization described in 
        501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 that--
                    (A) performs logistical, administrative, and other 
                functions, as determined by the Department of State and 
                the American Institute of Taiwan in support of the 
                Taiwan Fellowship Program; and
                    (B) enters into a cooperative agreement with the 
                American Institute in Taiwan to administer the Taiwan 
                Fellowship Program.
    (e) Establishment of Taiwan Fellowship Program.--
            (1) Establishment.--The Secretary of State shall establish 
        the ``Taiwan Fellowship Program'' (referred to in this 
        subsection as the ``Program'') to provide a fellowship 
        opportunity in Taiwan of up to 2 years for eligible United 
        States citizens. The Department of State, in consultation with 
        the American Institute in Taiwan and the implementing partner, 
        may modify the name of the Program.
            (2) Cooperative agreement.--
                    (A) In general.--The American Institute in Taiwan 
                should use amounts appropriated pursuant to subsection 
                (h)(1) to enter into an annual or multi-year 
                cooperative agreement with an appropriate implementing 
                partner.
                    (B) Fellowships.--The Department of State, in 
                consultation with the American Institute in Taiwan and, 
                as appropriate, the implementing partner, should award 
                to eligible United States citizens, subject to 
                available funding--
                            (i) approximately 5 fellowships during the 
                        first 2 years of the Program; and
                            (ii) approximately 10 fellowships during 
                        each of the remaining years of the Program.
            (3) International agreement; implementing partner.--Not 
        later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, 
        the American Institute in Taiwan, in consultation with the 
        Department of State, should--
                    (A) begin negotiations with the Taipei Economic and 
                Cultural Representative Office, or with another 
                appropriate entity, for the purpose of entering into an 
                agreement to facilitate the placement of fellows in an 
                agency of the governing authorities on Taiwan; and
                    (B) begin the process of selecting an implementing 
                partner, which--
                            (i) shall agree to meet all of the legal 
                        requirements required to operate in Taiwan; and
                            (ii) shall be composed of staff who 
                        demonstrate significant experience managing 
                        exchange programs in the Indo-Pacific region.
            (4) Curriculum.--
                    (A) First year.--During the first year of each 
                fellowship under this subsection, each fellow should 
                study--
                            (i) the Mandarin Chinese language;
                            (ii) the people, history, and political 
                        climate on Taiwan; and
                            (iii) the issues affecting the relationship 
                        between the United States and the Indo-Pacific 
                        region.
                    (B) Second year.--During the second year of each 
                fellowship under this subsection, each fellow, subject 
                to the approval of the Department of State, the 
                American Institute in Taiwan, and the implementing 
                partner, and in accordance with the purposes of this 
                section, should work in--
                            (i) a parliamentary office, ministry, or 
                        other agency of the governing authorities on 
                        Taiwan; or
                            (ii) an organization outside of the 
                        governing authorities on Taiwan, whose 
                        interests are associated with the interests of 
                        the fellow and the agency of the United States 
                        Government from which the fellow had been 
                        employed.
            (5) Flexible fellowship duration.--Notwithstanding any 
        requirement under this subsection, the Secretary of State, in 
        consultation with the American Institute in Taiwan and, as 
        appropriate, the implementing partner, may award fellowships 
        that have a duration of less than two years, and may alter the 
        curriculum requirements under paragraph (4) for such purposes.
            (6) Sunset.--The fellowship program under this subsection 
        shall terminate 7 years after the date of the enactment of this 
        Act.
    (f) Program Requirements.--
            (1) Eligibility requirements.--A United States citizen is 
        eligible for a fellowship under subsection (e) if he or she--
                    (A) is an employee of the United States Government;
                    (B) has received at least one exemplary performance 
                review in his or her current United States Government 
                role within at least the last three years prior to 
                beginning the fellowship;
                    (C) has at least 2 years of experience in any 
                branch of the United States Government;
                    (D) has a demonstrated professional or educational 
                background in the relationship between the United 
                States and countries in the Indo-Pacific region; and
                    (E) has demonstrated his or her commitment to 
                further service in the United States Government.
            (2) Responsibilities of fellows.--Each recipient of a 
        fellowship under subsection (e) shall agree, as a condition of 
        such fellowship--
                    (A) to maintain satisfactory progress in language 
                training and appropriate behavior in Taiwan, as 
                determined by the Department of State, the American 
                Institute in Taiwan and, as appropriate, its 
                implementing partner;
                    (B) to refrain from engaging in any intelligence or 
                intelligence-related activity on behalf of the United 
                States Government; and
                    (C) to continue Federal Government employment for a 
                period of not less than 4 years after the conclusion of 
                the fellowship or for not less than 2 years for a 
                fellowship that is 1 year or shorter.
            (3) Responsibilities of implementing partner.--
                    (A) Selection of fellows.--The implementing 
                partner, in close coordination with the Department of 
                State and the American Institute in Taiwan, shall--
                            (i) make efforts to recruit fellowship 
                        candidates who reflect the diversity of the 
                        United States;
                            (ii) select fellows for the Taiwan 
                        Fellowship Program based solely on merit, with 
                        appropriate supervision from the Department of 
                        State and the American Institute in Taiwan; and
                            (iii) prioritize the selection of 
                        candidates willing to serve a fellowship 
                        lasting 1 year or longer.
                    (B) First year.--The implementing partner should 
                provide each fellow in the first year (or shorter 
                duration, as jointly determined by the Department of 
                State and the American Institute in Taiwan for those 
                who are not serving a 2-year fellowship) with--
                            (i) intensive Mandarin Chinese language 
                        training; and
                            (ii) courses in the political economy of 
                        Taiwan, China, and the broader Indo-Pacific.
                    (C) Waiver of required training.--The Department of 
                State, in coordination with the American Institute in 
                Taiwan and, as appropriate, the implementing partner, 
                may waive any of the training required under 
                subparagraph (B) to the extent that a fellow has 
                Mandarin language skills, knowledge of the topic 
                described in subparagraph (B)(ii), or for other related 
                reasons approved by the Department of State and the 
                American Institute in Taiwan. If any of the training 
                requirements are waived for a fellow serving a 2-year 
                fellowship, the training portion of his or her 
                fellowship may be shortened to the extent appropriate.
                    (D) Office; staffing.--The implementing partner, in 
                consultation with the Department of State and the 
                American Institute in Taiwan, may maintain an office 
                and at least 1 full-time staff member in Taiwan--
                            (i) to liaise with the American Institute 
                        in Taiwan and the governing authorities on 
                        Taiwan; and
                            (ii) to serve as the primary in-country 
                        point of contact for the recipients of 
                        fellowships under this section and their 
                        dependents.
                    (E) Other functions.--The implementing partner may 
                perform other functions in association in support of 
                the Taiwan Fellowship Program, including logistical and 
                administrative functions, as prescribed by the 
                Department of State and the American Institute in 
                Taiwan.
            (4) Noncompliance.--
                    (A) In general.--Any fellow who fails to comply 
                with the requirements under this subsection shall 
                reimburse the American Institute in Taiwan for--
                            (i) the Federal funds expended for the 
                        fellow's participation in the fellowship, as 
                        set forth in subparagraphs (B) and (C); and
                            (ii) interest accrued on such funds 
                        (calculated at the prevailing rate).
                    (B) Full reimbursement.--Any fellow who violates 
                subparagraph (A) or (B) of paragraph (2) shall 
                reimburse the American Institute in Taiwan in an amount 
                equal to the sum of--
                            (i) all of the Federal funds expended for 
                        the fellow's participation in the fellowship; 
                        and
                            (ii) interest on the amount specified in 
                        clause (i), which shall be calculated at the 
                        prevailing rate.
                    (C) Pro rata reimbursement.--Any fellow who 
                violates paragraph (2)(C) shall reimburse the American 
                Institute in Taiwan in an amount equal to the 
                difference between--
                            (i) the amount specified in subparagraph 
                        (B); and
                            (ii) the product of--
                                    (I) the amount the fellow received 
                                in compensation during the final year 
                                of the fellowship, including the value 
                                of any allowances and benefits received 
                                by the fellow; multiplied by
                                    (II) the percentage of the period 
                                specified in paragraph (2)(C) during 
                                which the fellow did not remain 
                                employed by the Federal Government.
            (5) Annual report.--Not later than 90 days after the 
        selection of the first class of fellows under this section, and 
        annually thereafter for 7 years, the Department of State shall 
        offer to brief the appropriate committees of Congress regarding 
        the following issues:
                    (A) An assessment of the performance of the 
                implementing partner in fulfilling the purposes of this 
                section.
                    (B) The names and sponsoring agencies of the 
                fellows selected by the implementing partner and the 
                extent to which such fellows represent the diversity of 
                the United States.
                    (C) The names of the parliamentary offices, 
                ministries, other agencies of the governing authorities 
                on Taiwan, and nongovernmental institutions to which 
                each fellow was assigned during the second year of the 
                fellowship.
                    (D) Any recommendations, as appropriate, to improve 
                the implementation of the Taiwan Fellowship Program, 
                including added flexibilities in the administration of 
                the program.
                    (E) An assessment of the Taiwan Fellowship 
                Program's value upon the relationship between the 
                United States and Taiwan or the United States and Asian 
                countries.
            (6) Annual financial audit.--
                    (A) In general.--The financial records of any 
                implementing partner shall be audited annually in 
                accordance with generally accepted auditing standards 
                by independent certified public accountants or 
                independent licensed public accountants who are 
                certified or licensed by a regulatory authority of a 
                State or another political subdivision of the United 
                States.
                    (B) Location.--Each audit under subparagraph (A) 
                shall be conducted at the place or places where the 
                financial records of the implementing partner are 
                normally kept.
                    (C) Access to documents.--The implementing partner 
                shall make available to the accountants conducting an 
                audit under subparagraph (A)--
                            (i) all books, financial records, files, 
                        other papers, things, and property belonging 
                        to, or in use by, the implementing partner that 
                        are necessary to facilitate the audit; and
                            (ii) full facilities for verifying 
                        transactions with the balances or securities 
                        held by depositories, fiscal agents, and 
                        custodians.
                    (D) Report.--
                            (i) In general.--Not later than 6 months 
                        after the end of each fiscal year, the 
                        implementing partner shall provide a report of 
                        the audit conducted for such fiscal year under 
                        subparagraph (A) to the Department of State and 
                        the American Institute in Taiwan.
                            (ii) Contents.--Each audit report shall--
                                    (I) set forth the scope of the 
                                audit;
                                    (II) include such statements, along 
                                with the auditor's opinion of those 
                                statements, as may be necessary to 
                                present fairly the implementing 
                                partner's assets and liabilities, 
                                surplus or deficit, with reasonable 
                                detail;
                                    (III) include a statement of the 
                                implementing partner's income and 
                                expenses during the year; and
                                    (IV) include a schedule of--
                                            (aa) all contracts and 
                                        cooperative agreements 
                                        requiring payments greater than 
                                        $5,000; and
                                            (bb) any payments of 
                                        compensation, salaries, or fees 
                                        at a rate greater than $5,000 
                                        per year.
                            (iii) Copies.--Each audit report shall be 
                        produced in sufficient copies for distribution 
                        to the public.
    (g) Taiwan Fellows on Detail From Government Service.--
            (1) In general.--
                    (A) Detail authorized.--With the approval of the 
                Secretary of State, an agency head may detail, for a 
                period of not more than 2 years, an employee of the 
                agency of the United States Government who has been 
                awarded a fellowship under this section, to the 
                American Institute in Taiwan for the purpose of 
                assignment to the governing authorities on Taiwan or an 
                organization described in subsection (e)(4)(B)(ii).
                    (B) Agreement.--Each detailee shall enter into a 
                written agreement with the Federal Government before 
                receiving a fellowship, in which the fellow shall 
                agree--
                            (i) to continue in the service of the 
                        sponsoring agency at the end of fellowship for 
                        a period of at least 4 years (or at least 2 
                        years if the fellowship duration is 1 year or 
                        shorter) unless the detailee is involuntarily 
                        separated from the service of such agency; and
                            (ii) to pay to the American Institute in 
                        Taiwan any additional expenses incurred by the 
                        Federal Government in connection with the 
                        fellowship if the detailee voluntarily 
                        separates from service with the sponsoring 
                        agency before the end of the period for which 
                        the detailee has agreed to continue in the 
                        service of such agency.
                    (C) Exception.--The payment agreed to under 
                subparagraph (B)(ii) may not be required of a detailee 
                who leaves the service of the sponsoring agency to 
                enter into the service of another agency of the United 
                States Government unless the head of the sponsoring 
                agency notifies the detailee before the effective date 
                of entry into the service of the other agency that 
                payment will be required under this subsection.
            (2) Status as government employee.--A detailee--
                    (A) is deemed, for the purpose of preserving 
                allowances, privileges, rights, seniority, and other 
                benefits, to be an employee of the sponsoring agency;
                    (B) is entitled to pay, allowances, and benefits 
                from funds available to such agency, which is deemed to 
                comply with section 5536 of title 5, United States 
                Code; and
                    (C) may be assigned to a position with an entity 
                described in section (f)(4)(B)(i) if acceptance of such 
                position does not involve--
                            (i) the taking of an oath of allegiance to 
                        another government; or
                            (ii) the acceptance of compensation or 
                        other benefits from any foreign government by 
                        such detailee.
            (3) Responsibilities of sponsoring agency.--
                    (A) In general.--The Federal agency from which a 
                detailee is detailed should provide the fellow 
                allowances and benefits that are consistent with 
                Department of State Standardized Regulations or other 
                applicable rules and regulations, including--
                            (i) a living quarters allowance to cover 
                        the cost of housing in Taiwan;
                            (ii) a cost of living allowance to cover 
                        any possible higher costs of living in Taiwan;
                            (iii) a temporary quarters subsistence 
                        allowance for up to 7 days if the fellow is 
                        unable to find housing immediately upon 
                        arriving in Taiwan;
                            (iv) an education allowance to assist 
                        parents in providing the fellow's minor 
                        children with educational services ordinarily 
                        provided without charge by public schools in 
                        the United States;
                            (v) moving expenses to transport personal 
                        belongings of the fellow and his or her family 
                        in their move to Taiwan, which is comparable to 
                        the allowance given for American Institute in 
                        Taiwan employees assigned to Taiwan; and
                            (vi) an economy-class airline ticket to and 
                        from Taiwan for each fellow and the fellow's 
                        immediate family.
                    (B) Modification of benefits.--The American 
                Institute in Taiwan and its implementing partner, with 
                the approval of the Department of State, may modify the 
                benefits set forth in subparagraph (A) if such 
                modification is warranted by fiscal circumstances.
            (4) No financial liability.--The American Institute in 
        Taiwan, the implementing partner, and any governing authorities 
        on Taiwan or nongovernmental entities in Taiwan at which a 
        fellow is detailed during the second year of the fellowship may 
        not be held responsible for the pay, allowances, or any other 
        benefit normally provided to the detailee.
            (5) Reimbursement.--Fellows may be detailed under paragraph 
        (1)(A) without reimbursement to the United States by the 
        American Institute in Taiwan.
            (6) Allowances and benefits.--Detailees may be paid by the 
        American Institute in Taiwan for the allowances and benefits 
        listed in paragraph (3).
    (h) Funding.--
            (1) Authorization of appropriations.--There are authorized 
        to be appropriated to the American Institute in Taiwan--
                    (A) for fiscal year 2022, $2,900,000, of which--
                            (i) $500,000 shall be used to launch the 
                        Taiwan Fellowship Program through a competitive 
                        cooperative agreement with an appropriate 
                        implementing partner;
                            (ii) $2,300,000 shall be used to fund a 
                        cooperative agreement with the appropriate 
                        implementing partner; and
                            (iii) $100,000 shall be used for management 
                        expenses of the American Institute in Taiwan 
                        related to the management of the Taiwan 
                        Fellowship Program; and
                    (B) for fiscal year 2023, and each succeeding 
                fiscal year, $2,400,000, of which--
                            (i) $2,300,000 shall be used to fund a 
                        cooperative agreement with an appropriate 
                        implementing partner; and
                            (ii) $100,000 shall be used for management 
                        expenses of the American Institute in Taiwan 
                        related to the management of the Taiwan 
                        Fellowship Program.
            (2) Private sources.--The implementing partner selected to 
        implement the Taiwan Fellowship Program may accept, use, and 
        dispose of gifts or donations of services or property in 
        carrying out such program, subject to the review and approval 
        of the American Institute in Taiwan.
    (i) Study and Report.--Not later than one year prior to the sunset 
of the fellowship program under subsection (e), the Comptroller General 
of the United States shall conduct a study and submit to the Committee 
on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs 
of the House a report that includes--
            
                    (A) an analysis of the United States Government 
                participants in this program, including the number of 
                applicants and the number of fellowships undertaken, 
                the place of employment, and as assessment of the costs 
                and benefits for participants and for the United States 
                Government of such fellowships;
                    (B) an analysis of the financial impact of the 
                fellowship on United States Government offices which 
                have provided Fellows to participate in the program; 
                and
                    (C) recommendations, if any, on how to improve the 
                fellowship program.

SEC. 215. TREATMENT OF TAIWAN GOVERNMENT.

    (a) In General.--The Department of State and other United States 
Government departments and agencies shall engage with the 
democratically elected government of Taiwan as the legitimate 
representative of the people of Taiwan and end the outdated practice of 
referring to the government in Taiwan as the ``Taiwan authorities''. 
Notwithstanding the continued supporting role of the American Institute 
in Taiwan in carrying out United States foreign policy and protecting 
United States interests in Taiwan, the United States Government shall 
not place any restrictions on the ability of officials of the 
Department of State and other United States Government departments and 
agencies to interact directly and routinely with counterparts in the 
Taiwan government.
    (b) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this paragraph shall be 
construed as entailing restoration of diplomatic relations with the 
Republic of China (Taiwan) or altering the United States Government's 
position on Taiwan's international status.

SEC. 216. TAIWAN SYMBOLS OF SOVEREIGNTY.

    (a) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall rescind any contact 
guideline, internal restriction, section of the Foreign Affairs Manual 
or Foreign Affairs Handbook, related guidance, or related policies 
that, explicitly or implicitly, including through restrictions or 
limitations on activities of United States personnel, limits the 
ability of members of the armed forces of the Republic of China 
(Taiwan)and government representatives from the Taipei Economic and 
Cultural Representative Office (TECRO) to display for official purposes 
symbols of Republic of China sovereignty, including--
            (1) the flag of the Republic of China (Taiwan); and
            (2) the corresponding emblems or insignia of military 
        units.
    (b) Official Purposes Defined.--In this section, the term 
``official purposes'' means--
            (1) the wearing of official uniforms;
            (2) conducting government-hosted ceremonies or functions; 
        and
            (3) appearances on Department of State social media 
        accounts promoting engagements with Taiwan.
    (c) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this section shall be 
construed as entailing restoration of diplomatic relations with the 
Republic of China (Taiwan) or altering the United States Government's 
position on Taiwan's international status.

SEC. 217. REPORT ON ORIGINS OF THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC.

    (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) it is critical to understand the origins of the COVID-
        19 pandemic so the United States can better prepare, prevent, 
        and respond to pandemic health threats in the future;
            (2) given the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on all 
        Americans, the American people deserve to know what information 
        the United States Government possesses about the origins of 
        COVID-19, as appropriate;
            (3) Congress shares the concerns expressed by the United 
        States Government and 13 other foreign governments that the 
        international team of experts dispatched to the People's 
        Republic of China by the World Health Organization (WHO) to 
        study the origins of the SARS-CoV-2 virus was ``significantly 
        delayed and lacked access to complete, original data and 
        samples'';
            (4) the March 30, 2021, statement by the Director-General 
        of the WHO, Dr. Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, further affirms 
        that the investigative team had encountered ``difficulties'' in 
        accessing necessary raw data, that ``we have not yet found the 
        source of the virus,'' and that ``all hypotheses remain on the 
        table''; and
            (5) it is critical for independent experts to have full 
        access to all pertinent human, animal, and environmental data, 
        live virus samples, research, and personnel involved in the 
        early stages of the outbreak relevant to determining how this 
        pandemic emerged.
    (b) Report Required.--Not later than 180 days after enactment of 
this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with 
the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, the 
Secretary of Energy, and other relevant executive departments, shall 
submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report consisting 
of--
            (1) an assessment of the most likely source or origin of 
        the SARS-CoV-2 virus, including a detailed review of all 
        information the United States possesses that it has identified 
        as potentially relevant to the source or origin of the SARS-
        CoV-2 virus, including zoonotic transmission and spillover, the 
        Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV), or other sources of origin, 
        transmission, or spillover, based on the information the United 
        States Government has to date;
            (2) an identification of the leading credible theories of 
        the etiology of the SARS-CoV-2 virus by the United States 
        Government, the steps the United States has taken to validate 
        those theories, and any variance in assessment or dissent among 
        or between United States intelligence agencies, executive 
        agencies, and executive offices of the most likely source or 
        origin of the SARS-CoV-2 virus, and the basis for such variance 
        or dissent;
            (3) a description of all steps the United States Government 
        has taken to identify and investigate the source of the SARS-
        CoV-2 virus, including a timeline of such efforts;
            (4) a detailed description of the data to which the United 
        States and the WHO have requested and have access to in order 
        to determine the origin of the source of the SARS-CoV-2 virus;
            (5) an account of efforts by the PRC to cooperate with, 
        impede, or obstruct any inquiry or investigation to determine 
        the source and transmission of SARS-CoV-2 virus, including into 
        a possible lab leak, or to create or spread misinformation or 
        disinformation regarding the source and transmission of SARS-
        CoV-2 virus by the PRC or CCP, including by national and local 
        governmental and health entities;
            (6) a detailed account of information known to the United 
        States Government regarding the WIV and associated facilities, 
        including research activities on coronaviruses and gain-of-
        function research, any reported illnesses of persons associated 
        with the laboratory with symptoms consistent with COVID-19 and 
        the ultimate diagnosis, and a timeline of research relevant to 
        coronaviruses;
            (7) a list of any known obligations on the PRC that require 
        disclosure and cooperation in the event of a viral outbreak 
        like SARS-CoV-2; and
            (8) an overview of United States engagement with the PRC 
        with respect to coronaviruses that includes--
                    (A) a detailed accounting of United States 
                engagement with the WIV and similar labs in the PRC 
                specific to coronaviruses, including a detailed 
                accounting of United States Government-sponsored 
                research and funding and diplomatic engagements such as 
                ``track 1.5'' and ``track 2'' engagements; and
                    (B) an assessment of any additional scrutiny of 
                United States Government funding to support gain-of-
                function research in the PRC after the moratorium on 
                such funding was lifted in 2017, and whether United 
                States Government funding was used to support gain-of-
                function research in the PRC, during the moratorium on 
                gain-of-function research (2014-2017).
    (c) Form.--The report required by subsection (b) shall be submitted 
in unclassified form but may include a classified annex.
    (d) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this section, 
the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
            (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;
            (2) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate;
            (3) the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions 
        of the Senate;
            (4) the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources of the 
        Senate;
            (5) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
        Representatives;
            (6) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
        House of Representatives; and
            (8) the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House of 
        Representatives.

SEC. 218. ENHANCEMENT OF DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT AND ECONOMIC ENGAGEMENT 
              WITH PACIFIC ISLAND COUNTRIES.

    (a) Authority.--The Secretary of State and Secretary of Commerce 
are authorized to hire Locally Employed Staff in Pacific island 
countries for the purpose of providing increased diplomatic support and 
promoting increased economic and commercial engagement between the 
United States and Pacific Island countries.
    (b) Availability of Funds.--
            (1) In general.--Of the amounts authorized to be 
        appropriated or otherwise made available to the Department of 
        State and the Department of Commerce for fiscal year 2022, not 
        more than $10,000,000, respectively, shall be available to 
        carry out the purposes of this section.
            (2) Termination.--The availability of funds in paragraph 
        (1) shall expire on October 1, 2026.
    (c) Report.--Not later than one year after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 5 years, the 
Secretary of State and the Secretary of Commerce shall provide to the 
appropriate committees of Congress a report on the activities of the 
Department of State and Department of Commerce Locally Employed Staff 
in Pacific island countries, which shall include--
            (1) a detailed description of the additional diplomatic, 
        economic, and commercial engagement and activities in the 
        Pacific island countries provided by Locally Employed Staff; 
        and
            (2) an assessment of the impact of the activities with 
        respect to the diplomatic, economic, and security interests of 
        the United States.
    (d) Exception for American Samoa.--The Secretary of State may, as 
appropriate, treat the territory of American Samoa as a foreign country 
for purposes of carrying out this section.
    (e) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this section, 
the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
            (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on 
        Commerce, Science, and Transportation, the Committee on Energy 
        and Natural Resources, and the Committee on Appropriations of 
        the Senate; and
            (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on 
        Energy and Commerce, the Committee on Natural Resources, and 
        the Committee on Appropriations of the House of 
        Representatives.

SEC. 219. INCREASING DEPARTMENT OF STATE PERSONNEL AND RESOURCES 
              DEVOTED TO THE INDO-PACIFIC.

    (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) In fiscal year 2020, the Department of State allocated 
        $1,500,000,000 to the Indo-Pacific region in bilateral and 
        regional foreign assistance (FA) resources, including as 
        authorized by section 201(b) of the Asia Reassurance Initiative 
        Act of 2018 (Public Law 115-409; 132 Stat. 5391), and 
        $798,000,000 in the fiscal year 2020 diplomatic engagement (DE) 
        budget. These amounts represent only 5 percent of the DE budget 
        and only 4 percent of the total Department of State-USAID 
        budget.
            (2) Over the last 5 years the DE budget and personnel 
        levels in the Indo-Pacific averaged only 5 percent of the 
        total, while FA resources averaged only 4 percent of the total.
            (3) In 2020, the Department of State began a process to 
        realign certain positions at posts to ensure that its personnel 
        footprint matches the demands of great-power competition, 
        including in the Indo-Pacific.
    (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the size of the United States diplomatic corps must be 
        sufficient to meet the current and emerging challenges of the 
        21st century, including those posed by the PRC in the Indo-
        Pacific region and elsewhere;
            (2) the increase must be designed to meet the objectives of 
        an Indo-Pacific strategy focused on strengthening the good 
        governance and sovereignty of states that adhere to and uphold 
        the rules-based international order; and
            (3) the increase must be implemented with a focus on 
        increased numbers of economic, political, and public diplomacy 
        officers, representing a cumulative increase of at least 200 
        foreign service officer generalists, to--
                    (A) advance free, fair, and reciprocal trade and 
                open investment environments for United States 
                companies, and engaged in increased commercial 
                diplomacy in key markets;
                    (B) better articulate and explain United States 
                policies, strengthen civil society and democratic 
                principles, enhance reporting on Chinese the PRC's 
                global activities, promote people-to-people exchanges, 
                and advance United States influence; and
                    (C) increase capacity at small- and medium-sized 
                embassies and consulates in the Indo-Pacific and other 
                regions around the world, as necessary.
    (c) Statement of Policy.--
            (1) It shall be the policy of the United States to ensure 
        Department of State funding levels and personnel footprint in 
        the Indo-Pacific reflect the region's high degree of importance 
        and significance to United States political, economic, and 
        security interests.
            (2) It shall be the policy of the United States to increase 
        DE and FA funding and the quantity of personnel dedicated to 
        the Indo-Pacific region respective to the Department of State's 
        total budget.
            (3) It shall be the policy of the United States to increase 
        the number of resident Defense attaches in the Indo-Pacific 
        region, particularly in locations where the People's Republic 
        of China has a resident military attache but the United States 
        does not, to assure coverage of all appropriate posts.
    (d) Action Plan.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall provide to the 
appropriate committees of Congress an action plan with the following 
elements:
            (1) Identification of requirements to advance United States 
        strategic objectives in the Indo-Pacific and the personnel and 
        budgetary resources needed to meet them, assuming an 
        unconstrained resource environment.
            (2) A plan to increase the portion of the Department's 
        budget dedicated to the Indo-Pacific in terms of DE and FA 
        focused on development, economic, and security assistance.
            (3) A plan to increase the number of positions at posts in 
        the Indo-Pacific region and bureaus with responsibility for the 
        Indo-Pacific region, including a description of increases at 
        each post or bureau, a breakdown of increases by cone, and a 
        description of how such increases in personnel will advance 
        United States strategic objectives in the Indo-Pacific region.
            (4) Defined concrete and annual benchmarks that the 
        Department will meet in implementing the action plan.
            (5) A description of any barriers to implementing the 
        action plan.
    (e) Updates to Report and Briefing.--Every 90 days after the 
submission of the action plan described in subsection (c), the 
Secretary shall submit an update and brief the appropriate committees 
of Congress on the implementation of such action plan, with supporting 
data and including a detailed assessment of benchmarks reached.
    (f) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be 
appropriated, for fiscal year 2022, $2,000,000,000 in bilateral and 
regional foreign assistance resources to carry out the purposes of part 
1 and chapter 4 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 
U.S.C. 2151 et seq., 2346 et seq.) to the Indo-Pacific region and 
$1,250,000,000 in diplomatic engagement resources to the Indo-Pacific 
region.
    (g) Inclusion of Amounts Appropriated Pursuant to Asia Reassurance 
Initiative Act of 2018.--Amounts authorized to be appropriated under 
subsection (f) include funds authorized to be appropriated pursuant to 
section 201(b) of the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018 (Public 
Law 115-409).
    (h) Secretary of State Certification.--Not later than 2 years after 
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall 
certify, to the appropriate committees of Congress, whether or not the 
benchmarks described in the action plan in subsection (c) have been 
met. This certification is non-delegable.

SEC. 219A. ADVANCING UNITED STATES LEADERSHIP IN THE UNITED NATIONS 
              SYSTEM.

    (a) Establishment.--
            (1) In general.--The Secretary of State shall establish, 
        within the Bureau of International Organization Affairs of the 
        Department of State, a Special Representative for Advancing 
        United States Leadership in the United Nations (referred to in 
        this section as the ``Special Representative''). The Special 
        Representative shall serve concurrently as a Deputy Assistant 
        Secretary in the Bureau of International Organization Affairs 
        of the Department of State. The Special Representative shall 
        report directly to the Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of 
        International Organization Affairs, in coordination and 
        consultation with the Representative of the United States to 
        the United Nations.
    (b) Responsibilities.--The Special Representative shall assume 
responsibility for--
            (1) promoting United States leadership and participation in 
        the United Nations system, with a focus on issue areas where 
        authoritarian nations are exercising increased influence in and 
        determining the agenda of the United Nations system;
            (2) highlighting how investments in the United Nations 
        advance United States interests and enable stronger coalitions 
        to hold authoritarian regimes to account;
            (3) ensuring United States emphasis on the need for United 
        Nations employees to uphold the principals of impartiality 
        enshrined in the United Nations charter, rules, and 
        regulations;
            (4) monitoring and developing and implementing plans to 
        counter undue influence, especially by authoritarian nations, 
        within the United Nations system;
            (5) assessing how United States decisions to withdraw from 
        United Nations bodies impacts United States influence at the 
        United Nations and multilateral global initiatives;
            (6) promoting the participation and inclusion of Taiwan in 
        the United Nations system;
            (7) monitoring the pipeline of United Nations jobs and 
        identifying qualified Americans and other qualified nationals 
        to promote for these positions;
            (8) tracking leadership changes in United Nations 
        secretariat, funds, programs and agencies, and developing 
        strategies to ensure that coalitions of like-minded states are 
        assembled to ensure leadership races are not won by countries 
        that do not share United States interests;
            (9) advancing other priorities deemed relevant by the 
        Secretary of State to ensuring the integrity of the United 
        Nations system;
            (10) eliminating current barriers to the employment of 
        United States nationals in the United Nations Secretariat, 
        funds, programs, and agencies; and
            (11) increasing the number of qualified United States 
        candidates for leadership and oversight positions at the United 
        Nations Secretariat, funds, programs, agencies, and at other 
        international organizations.
    (c) Support.--The Secretary of State shall make any necessary 
adjustments to the current structure of the Bureau of International 
Organization Affairs, including the respective roles and 
responsibilities of offices in that Bureau, to ensure appropriate 
support for the mission and work of the Special Representative.
    (d) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be 
appropriated $5,000,000 for fiscal years 2022 through 2026 to carry out 
the responsibilities under subsection (b).

SEC. 219B. ASIA REASSURANCE INITIATIVE ACT OF 2018.

    (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the Indo-Pacific region is home to many of the world's 
        most dynamic democracies, economic opportunities, as well as 
        many challenges to United States interests and values as a 
        result of the growth in authoritarian governance in the region 
        and by broad challenges posed by nuclear proliferation, the 
        changing environment, and deteriorating adherence to human 
        rights principles and obligations;
            (2) the People's Republic of China poses a particular 
        threat as it repeatedly violates internationally recognized 
        human rights, engages in unfair economic and trade practices, 
        disregards international laws and norms, coerces its neighbors, 
        engages in malign influence operations, and enables global 
        digital authoritarianism;
            (3) the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018 (referred 
        to in this section as ``ARIA'') enhances the United States' 
        commitment in the Indo-Pacific region by--
                    (A) expanding its defense cooperation with its 
                allies and partners;
                    (B) investing in democracy and the protection of 
                human rights;
                    (C) engaging in cybersecurity initiatives; and
                    (D) supporting people-to-people engagement and 
                other shared priorities; and
            (4) the 2019 Department of Defense Indo-Pacific Strategy 
        Report concludes that ARIA ``enshrines a generational whole-of-
        government policy framework that demonstrates U.S. commitment 
        to a free and open Indo-Pacific region''.
    (b) Authorization of Appropriations.--The Asia Reassurance 
Initiative Act of 2018 (Public Law 115-409) is amended--
            (1) in section 201(b), by striking ``$1,500,000,000 for 
        each of the fiscal years 2019 through 2023'' and inserting 
        ``$2,000,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 2022 through 
        2026'';
            (2) in section 215(b), by striking ``2023'' and inserting 
        ``2026'';
            (3) in section 306(a)--
                    (A) in paragraph (1), by striking ``5 years'' and 
                inserting ``8 years''; and
                    (B) in paragraph (2), by striking ``2023'' and 
                inserting ``2026'';
            (4) in section 409(a)(1), by striking ``2023'' and 
        inserting ``2026'';
            (5) in section 410--
                    (A) in subsection (c), by striking ``2023'' and 
                inserting ``2026''; and
                    (B) in subsection (d), in the matter preceding 
                paragraph (1), by striking ``2023'' and inserting 
                ``2026''; and
            (6) in section 411, by striking ``2023'' and inserting 
        ``2026''.

SEC. 219C. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON NEED FOR RECIPROCITY IN THE 
              RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE PEOPLE'S 
              REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

    (a) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United States--
            (1) to clearly differentiate, in official statements, media 
        communications, and messaging, between the people of China and 
        the Communist Party of China;
            (2) that any negotiations toward a trade agreement with the 
        People's Republic of China should be concluded in a manner that 
        addresses unfair trading practices by the People's Republic of 
        China;
            (3) that such an agreement should, to the extent possible--
                    (A) ensure that the People's Republic of China 
                commits to structural changes in its trade and economic 
                policies;
                    (B) hold the People's Republic of China accountable 
                to those commitments; and
                    (C) promote access to reciprocal direct investment; 
                and
            (4) to seek and develop a relationship with the People's 
        Republic of China that is founded on the principles of basic 
        reciprocity across sectors, including economic, diplomatic, 
        educational, and communications sectors.
    (b) Report Required.--
            (1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in 
        consultation with other relevant Federal departments and 
        agencies, shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
        committees a report on the manner in which the Government of 
        the People's Republic of China creates barriers to the work of 
        United States diplomats and other officials, journalists, and 
        businesses, and nongovernmental organizations based in the 
        United States, in the People's Republic of China.
            (2) Elements.--The report required by paragraph (1) shall 
        include the following:
                    (A) A summary of obstacles that United States 
                diplomats and other officials, journalists, and 
                businesses encounter in carrying out their work in the 
                People's Republic of China.
                    (B) A summary of the obstacles Chinese diplomats 
                and other officials, journalists, and businesses 
                encounter while working in the United States.
                    (C) A description of the efforts that officials of 
                the United States have made to rectify any differences 
                in the treatment of diplomats and other officials, 
                journalists, and businesses by the United States and by 
                the People's Republic of China, and the results of 
                those efforts.
                    (D) An assessment of the adherence of the 
                Government of the People's Republic of China, in its 
                treatment of United States citizens, to the 
                requirements of--
                            (i) the Convention on Consular Relations, 
                        done at Vienna April 24, 1963, and entered into 
                        force March 19, 1967 (21 U.S.T. 77); and
                            (ii) the Consular Convention, signed at 
                        Washington September 17, 1980, and entered into 
                        force February 19, 1982, between the United 
                        States and the People's Republic of China.
                    (E) An assessment of any impacts of the People's 
                Republic of China's internet restrictions on 
                reciprocity between the United States and the People's 
                Republic of China.
                    (F) A summary of other notable areas where the 
                Government of the People's Republic of China or 
                entities affiliated with that Government are able to 
                conduct activities or investments in the United States 
                but that are denied to United States entities in the 
                People's Republic of China.
                    (G) Recommendations on efforts that the Government 
                of the United States could undertake to improve 
                reciprocity in the relationship between the United 
                States and the People's Republic of China.
            (3) Form of report; availability.--
                    (A) Form.--The report required by paragraph (1) 
                shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may 
                include a classified index.
                    (B) Availability.--The unclassified portion of the 
                report required by paragraph (1) shall be posted on a 
                publicly available internet website of the Department 
                of State.
            (4) Appropriate congressional committees defined.--In this 
        subsection, the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' 
        means the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the 
        Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.
    (c) Reciprocity Defined.--In this section, the term ``reciprocity'' 
means the mutual and equitable exchange of privileges between 
governments, countries, businesses, or individuals.

SEC. 219D. OPPOSITION TO PROVISION OF ASSISTANCE TO PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC 
              OF CHINA BY ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK.

    (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) Through the Asian Development Bank, countries are 
        eligible to borrow from the Bank until they can manage long-
        term development and access to capital markets without 
        financial resources from the Bank.
            (2) The Bank uses the gross national income per capita 
        benchmark used by the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
        Development to trigger the graduation process. For fiscal year 
        2021, the graduation discussion income is a gross national 
        income per capita exceeding $7,065.
            (3) The People's Republic of China exceeded the graduation 
        discussion income threshold in 2016.
            (4) Since 2016, the Asian Development Bank has continued to 
        approve loans and technical assistance to the People's Republic 
        of China totaling $7,600,000,000. The Bank has also approved 
        non-sovereign commitments in the People's Republic of China 
        totaling $1,800,000,000 since 2016.
            (5) The World Bank calculates the People's Republic of 
        China's most recent year (2019) gross national income per 
        capita as $10,390.
    (b) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United States to 
oppose any additional lending from the Asian Development Bank to the 
People's Republic of China as a result of the People's Republic of 
China's successful graduation from the eligibility requirements for 
assistance from the Bank.
    (c) Opposition to Lending to People's Republic of China.--The 
Secretary of the Treasury shall instruct the United States Executive 
Director of the Asian Development Bank to use the voice, vote, and 
influence of the United States to oppose any loan or extension of 
financial or technical assistance by the Asian Development Bank to the 
People's Republic of China.

SEC. 219E. OPPOSITION TO PROVISION OF ASSISTANCE TO PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC 
              OF CHINA BY INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND 
              DEVELOPMENT.

    (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) The People's Republic of China is the world's second 
        largest economy and a major global lender.
            (2) In February 2021, the People's Republic of China's 
        foreign exchange reserves totaled more than $3,200,000,000,000.
            (3) The World Bank classifies the People's Republic of 
        China as having an upper-middle-income economy.
            (4) On February 25, 2021, President Xi Jinping announced 
        ``complete victory'' over extreme poverty in the People's 
        Republic of China.
            (5) The Government of China utilizes state resources to 
        create and promote the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, 
        the New Development Bank, and the Belt and Road Initiative.
            (6) The People's Republic of China is the world's largest 
        official creditor.
            (7) Through the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
        Development, countries are eligible to borrow from the Bank 
        until they can manage long-term development and access to 
        capital markets without financial resources from the Bank.
            (8) The World Bank reviews the graduation of a country from 
        eligibility to borrow from the International Bank for 
        Reconstruction and Development once the country reaches the 
        graduation discussion income, which is equivalent to the gross 
        national income. For fiscal year 2021, the graduation 
        discussion income is a gross national income per capita 
        exceeding $7,065.
            (9) The People's Republic of China exceeded the graduation 
        discussion income threshold in 2016.
            (10) Since 2016, the International Bank for Reconstruction 
        and Development has approved projects totaling $8,930,000,000 
        to the People's Republic of China.
            (11) The World Bank calculates the People's Republic of 
        China's most recent year (2019) gross national income per 
        capita as $10,390.
    (b) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United States to 
oppose any additional lending from the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development to the People's Republic of China as a 
result of the People's Republic of China's successful graduation from 
the eligibility requirements for assistance from the Bank.
    (c) Opposition to Lending to People's Republic of China.--The 
Secretary of the Treasury shall instruct the United States Executive 
Director of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States--
            (1) to oppose any loan or extension of financial or 
        technical assistance by the International Bank for 
        Reconstruction and Development to the People's Republic of 
        China; and
            (2) to end lending and assistance to countries that exceed 
        the graduation discussion income of the Bank.
    (d) Report Required.--Not later than one year after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the Secretary of the 
Treasury shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
Senate and the Committee on Financial Services and the Committee on 
Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives a report that 
includes--
            (1) an assessment of the status of borrowing by the 
        People's Republic of China from the World Bank;
            (2) a list of countries that have exceeded the graduation 
        discussion income at the International Bank for Reconstruction 
        and Development;
            (3) a list of countries that have graduated from 
        eligibility for assistance from the Bank; and
            (4) a description of the efforts taken by the United States 
        to graduate countries from such eligibility once they exceed 
        the graduation discussion income.

SEC. 219F. UNITED STATES POLICY ON CHINESE AND RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT 
              EFFORTS TO UNDERMINE THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL 
              ACTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS.

    (a) Sense of Congress.--Congress--
            (1) notes with growing concern that the People's Republic 
        of China and Russia have, at the United Nations, aligned with 
        one another in blocking Security Council action on Syria, 
        Myanmar, Zimbabwe, Venezuela, and other countries credibly 
        accused of committing human rights abuses;
            (2) recognizes that it is not only the use of the veto on 
        the United Nations Security Council, but also the threat of the 
        use of a veto, that can prevent the Security Council from 
        taking actions aimed at protecting human rights;
            (3) condemns efforts by China and Russia to undermine 
        United Nations Security Council actions aimed at censuring 
        governments credibly accused of committing or permitting the 
        commission of human rights violations; and
            (4) denounces the tactical alignment between the People's 
        Republic of China and Russia within the United Nations Security 
        Council to challenge the protection of human rights and the 
        guarantee of humanitarian access.
    (b) Statement of Policy.--It shall be the policy of the United 
States to--
            (1) reaffirm its commitment to maintain international peace 
        and security, develop friendly relations among nations, and 
        cooperate in solving international problems and promoting 
        respect for human rights;
            (2) highlight efforts by the People's Republic of China and 
        Russia to undermine international peace and security, protect 
        human rights, and guarantee humanitarian access to those in 
        need;
            (3) increase the role and presence of the United States at 
        the United Nations and its constituent bodies to advance United 
        States interests, including by counteracting malign Chinese and 
        Russian influence; and
            (4) urge allies and like-minded partners to work together 
        with the United States to overcome Chinese and Russian efforts 
        to weaken the United Nations Security Council by preventing it 
        from carrying out its core mandate.

SEC. 219G. DETERRING PRC USE OF FORCE AGAINST TAIWAN.

    (a) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this section, 
the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
            (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on 
        Armed Services, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
        Senate; and
            (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on 
        Armed Services, and the Permanent Select Committee on 
        Intelligence of the House of Representatives.
    (b) Statement of Policy.--It shall be the policy of the United 
States--
            (1) to strenuously oppose any action by the People's 
        Republic of China to use force to change the status quo on 
        Taiwan; and
            (2) that, in order to deter the use of force by the 
        People's Republic of China to change the status quo on Taiwan, 
        the United States should coordinate with allies and partners to 
        identify and develop significant economic, diplomatic, and 
        other measures to deter and impose costs on any such action by 
        the People's Republic of China, and to bolster deterrence by 
        articulating such policies publicly, as appropriate and in 
        alignment with United States interests.
    (c) Whole-of-government Review.--Not later than 14 days after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall convene the 
heads of all relevant Federal departments and agencies to conduct a 
whole-of-government review of all available economic, diplomatic, and 
other measures to deter the use of force by the People's Republic of 
China to change the status quo of Taiwan.
    (d) Briefing Required.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
the enactment of this Act, and every 90 days thereafter for 5 years, 
the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of 
Defense, the Secretary of Commerce, the Director of National 
Intelligence, and any other relevant heads of Federal departments and 
agencies shall brief the appropriate committees of Congress on all 
available economic, diplomatic, and other strategic measures to deter 
PRC use of force to change the status quo of Taiwan and provide a 
detailed description and review of--
            (1) efforts to date by the United States Government to 
        deter the use of force by the People's Republic of China to 
        change the status quo of Taiwan; and
            (2) progress to date of all coordination efforts between 
        the United States Government and its allies and partners with 
        respect to deterring the use of force to change the status quo 
        of Taiwan.
    (e) Coordinated Consequences With Allies and Partners.--The 
Secretary of State shall coordinate with United States allies and 
partners to identify and develop significant economic, diplomatic, and 
other measures to deter the use of force by the People's Republic of 
China to change the status quo of Taiwan.

SEC. 219H. STRATEGY TO RESPOND TO SHARP POWER OPERATIONS TARGETING 
              TAIWAN.

    (a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall develop and 
implement a strategy to respond to sharp power operations and the 
united front campaign supported by the Government of the People's 
Republic of China and the Chinese Communist Party that are directed 
toward persons or entities in Taiwan.
    (b) Elements.--The strategy required under subsection (a) shall 
include the following elements:
            (1) Development of a response to PRC propaganda and 
        disinformation campaigns and cyber-intrusions targeting Taiwan, 
        including--
                    (A) assistance in building the capacity of the 
                Taiwan government and private-sector entities to 
                document and expose propaganda and disinformation 
                supported by the Government of the People's Republic of 
                China, the Chinese Communist Party, or affiliated 
                entities;
                    (B) assistance to enhance the Taiwan government's 
                ability to develop a whole-of-government strategy to 
                respond to sharp power operations, including election 
                interference; and
                    (C) media training for Taiwan officials and other 
                Taiwan entities targeted by disinformation campaigns.
            (2) Development of a response to political influence 
        operations that includes an assessment of the extent of 
        influence exerted by the Government of the People's Republic of 
        China and the Chinese Communist Party in Taiwan on local 
        political parties, financial institutions, media organizations, 
        and other entities.
            (3) Support for exchanges and other technical assistance to 
        strengthen the Taiwan legal system's ability to respond to 
        sharp power operations.
            (4) Establishment of a coordinated partnership, through the 
        Global Cooperation and Training Framework, with like-minded 
        governments to share data and best practices with the 
        Government of Taiwan on ways to address sharp power operations 
        supported by the Government of the People's Republic of China 
        and the Chinese Communist Party.

SEC. 219I. STUDY AND REPORT ON BILATERAL EFFORTS TO ADDRESS CHINESE 
              FENTANYL TRAFFICKING.

    (a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
            (1) In January 2020, the DEA named China as the primary 
        source of United States-bound illicit fentanyl and synthetic 
        opioids.
            (2) While in 2019 China instituted domestic controls on the 
        production and exportation of fentanyl, some of its variants, 
        and two precursors known as NPP and 4-ANPP, China has not yet 
        expanded its class scheduling to include many fentanyl 
        precursors such as 4-AP, which continue to be trafficked to 
        second countries in which they are used in the final production 
        of United States-bound fentanyl and other synthetic opioids.
            (3) The DEA currently maintains a presence in Beijing but 
        continues to seek Chinese approval to open offices in the major 
        shipping hubs of Guangzhou and Shanghai.
    (b) Definitions.--In this section:
            (1) Appropriate committees of congress.--The term 
        ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
                    (A) the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate;
                    (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
                Senate;
                    (C) the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of 
                Representative; and
                    (D) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House 
                of Representatives.
            (2) China.--The term ``China'' means the People's Republic 
        of China.
            (3) DEA.--The term ``DEA'' means the Drug Enforcement 
        Administration.
            (4) Precursors.--The term ``precursors'' means chemicals 
        used in the illicit production of fentanyl and related 
        synthetic opioid variants.
    (c) China's Class Scheduling of Fentanyl and Synthetic Opioid 
Precursors.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of 
this Act, the Secretary of State and Attorney General shall submit to 
the appropriate committees of Congress a written report--
            (1) detailing a description of United States Government 
        efforts to gain a commitment from the Chinese Government to 
        submit unregulated fentanyl precursors such as 4-AP to 
        controls; and
            (2) a plan for future steps the United States Government 
        will take to urge China to combat illicit fentanyl production 
        and trafficking originating in China.
    (d) Establishment of DEA Offices in China.--Not later than 180 days 
after enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State and Attorney 
General shall provide to the appropriate committees of Congress a 
classified briefing on--
            (1) outreach and negotiations undertaken by the United 
        States Government with the Chinese Government aimed at securing 
        its approval for the establishment of DEA offices in Shanghai 
        and Guangzhou China; and
            (2) additional efforts to establish new partnerships with 
        provincial-level authorities to counter the illicit trafficking 
        of fentanyl, fentanyl analogues, and their precursors.
    (e) Form of Report.--The report required under subsection (c) shall 
be unclassified with a classified annex.

SEC. 219J. INVESTMENT, TRADE, AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA AND LATIN 
              AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN.

    (a) Strategy Required.--
            (1) In general.--The President shall establish a 
        comprehensive United States strategy for public and private 
        investment, trade, and development in Africa and Latin America 
        and the Caribbean.
            (2) Focus of strategy.--The strategy required by paragraph 
        (1) shall focus on increasing exports of United States goods 
        and services to Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean by 
        200 percent in real dollar value by the date that is 10 years 
        after the date of the enactment of this Act.
            (3) Consultations.--In developing the strategy required by 
        paragraph (1), the President shall consult with--
                    (A) Congress;
                    (B) each agency that is a member of the Trade 
                Promotion Coordinating Committee;
                    (C) the relevant multilateral development banks, in 
                coordination with the Secretary of the Treasury and the 
                respective United States Executive Directors of such 
                banks;
                    (D) each agency that participates in the Trade 
                Policy Staff Committee established;
                    (E) the President's Export Council;
                    (F) each of the development agencies;
                    (G) any other Federal agencies with responsibility 
                for export promotion or financing and development; and
                    (H) the private sector, including businesses, 
                nongovernmental organizations, and African and Latin 
                American and Caribbean diaspora groups.
            (4) Submission to congress.--
                    (A) Strategy.--Not later than 180 days after the 
                date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall 
                submit to Congress the strategy required by subsection 
                (a).
                    (B) Progress report.--Not later than 3 years after 
                the date of the enactment of this Act, the President 
                shall submit to Congress a report on the implementation 
                of the strategy required by paragraph (1).
    (b) Special Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean Export 
Strategy Coordinators.--The President shall designate an individual to 
serve as Special Africa Export Strategy Coordinator and an individual 
to serve as Special Latin America and the Caribbean Export Strategy 
Coordinator--
            (1) to oversee the development and implementation of the 
        strategy required by subsection (a); and
            (2) to coordinate developing and implementing the strategy 
        with--
                    (A) the Trade Promotion Coordinating Committee;
                    (B) the Assistant United States Trade 
                Representative for African Affairs or the Assistant 
                United States Trade Representative for the Western 
                Hemisphere, as appropriate;
                    (C) the Assistant Secretary of State for African 
                Affairs or the Assistant Secretary of State for Western 
                Hemisphere Affairs, as appropriate;
                    (D) the Export-Import Bank of the United States;
                    (E) the United States International Development 
                Finance Corporation; and
                    (F) the development agencies.
    (c) Trade Missions to Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean.--
It is the sense of Congress that, not later than one year after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Commerce and other 
high-level officials of the United States Government with 
responsibility for export promotion, financing, and development should 
conduct a joint trade missions to Africa and to Latin America and the 
Caribbean.
    (d) Training.--The President shall develop a plan--
            (1) to standardize the training received by United States 
        and Foreign Commercial Service officers, economic officers of 
        the Department of State, and economic officers of the United 
        States Agency for International Development with respect to the 
        programs and procedures of the Export-Import Bank of the United 
        States, the United States International Development Finance 
        Corporation, the Small Business Administration, and the United 
        States Trade and Development Agency; and
            (2) to ensure that, not later than one year after the date 
        of the enactment of this Act--
                    (A) all United States and Foreign Commercial 
                Service officers that are stationed overseas receive 
                the training described in paragraph (1); and
                    (B) in the case of a country to which no United 
                States and Foreign Commercial Service officer is 
                assigned, any economic officer of the Department of 
                State stationed in that country receives that training.
    (e) Definitions.--In this section:
            (1) Development agencies.--The term ``development 
        agencies'' means the United States Department of State, the 
        United States Agency for International Development, the 
        Millennium Challenge Corporation, the United States 
        International Development Finance Corporation, the United 
        States Trade and Development Agency, the United States 
        Department of Agriculture, and relevant multilateral 
        development banks.
            (2) Multilateral development banks.--The term 
        ``multilateral development banks'' has the meaning given that 
        term in section 1701(c)(4) of the International Financial 
        Institutions Act (22 U.S.C. 262r(c)(4)) and includes the 
        African Development Foundation.
            (3) Trade policy staff committee.--The term ``Trade Policy 
        Staff Committee'' means the Trade Policy Staff Committee 
        established pursuant to section 2002.2 of title 15, Code of 
        Federal Regulations.
            (4) Trade promotion coordinating committee.--The term 
        ``Trade Promotion Coordinating Committee'' means the Trade 
        Promotion Coordinating Committee established under section 2312 
        of the Export Enhancement Act of 1988 (15 U.S.C. 4727).
            (5) United states and foreign commercial service.--The term 
        ``United States and Foreign Commercial Service'' means the 
        United States and Foreign Commercial Service established by 
        section 2301 of the Export Enhancement Act of 1988 (15 U.S.C. 
        4721).

SEC. 219K. FACILITATION OF INCREASED EQUITY INVESTMENTS UNDER THE 
              BETTER UTILIZATION OF INVESTMENTS LEADING TO DEVELOPMENT 
              ACT OF 2018.

    (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that support 
provided under section 1421(c)(1) of the Better Utilization of 
Investments Leading to Development Act of 2018 (22 U.S.C. 9621(c)(1)) 
should be considered to be a Federal credit program that is subject to 
the Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990 (2 U.S.C. 661 et seq.) for 
purposes of applying the requirements of such Act to such support.
    (b) Maximum Contingent Liability.--Section 1433 of the Better 
Utilization of Investments Leading to Development Act of 2018 (22 
U.S.C. 9633) is amended by striking ``$60,000,000,000'' and inserting 
``$100,000,000,000''.

               Subtitle B--International Security Matters

SEC. 221. DEFINITIONS.

    In this subtitle:
            (1) Appropriate committees of congress.--The term 
        ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
                    (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the 
                Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on 
                Appropriations of the Senate; and
                    (B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee 
                on Armed Services, and the Committee on Appropriations 
                of the House of Representatives.
            (2) Company.--The term ``company'' means any corporation, 
        company, limited liability company, limited partnership, 
        business trust, business association, or other similar entity.
            (3) Other security forces.--The term ``other security 
        forces''--
                    (A) includes national security forces that conduct 
                maritime security; and
                    (B) does not include self-described militias or 
                paramilitary organizations.

SEC. 222. FINDINGS.

    Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) The People's Republic of China aims to use its growing 
        military might in concert with other instruments of its 
        national power to displace the United States in the Indo-
        Pacific and establish hegemony over the region.
            (2) The military balance of power in the Indo-Pacific 
        region is growing increasingly unfavorable to the United States 
        because--
                    (A) the PRC is rapidly modernizing and expanding 
                the capabilities of the PLA to project power and create 
                contested areas across the entire Indo-Pacific region;
                    (B) PLA modernization has largely focused on areas 
                where it possesses operational advantages and can 
                exploit weaknesses in the United States suite of 
                capabilities; and
                    (C) current United States force structure and 
                presence do not sufficiently counter threats in the 
                Indo-Pacific, as United States allies, bases, and 
                forces at sea in the Indo-Pacific region are 
                concentrated in large bases that are highly vulnerable 
                to the PRC's strike capabilities.
            (3) This shift in the regional military balance and erosion 
        of conventional and strategic deterrence in the Indo-Pacific 
        region--
                    (A) presents a substantial and imminent risk to the 
                security of the United States; and
                    (B) left unchecked, could--
                            (i) embolden the PRC to take actions, 
                        including the use of military force, to change 
                        the status quo before the United States can 
                        mount an effective response; and
                            (ii) alter the nuclear balance in the Indo-
                        Pacific.
            (4) The PRC sees an opportunity to diminish confidence 
        among United States allies and partners in the strength of 
        United States commitments, even to the extent that these 
        nations feel compelled to bandwagon with the PRC to protect 
        their interests. The PRC is closely monitoring the United 
        States reaction to PRC pressure and coercion of United States 
        allies, searching for indicators of United States resolve.
            (5) Achieving so-called ``reunification'' of Taiwan to 
        mainland China is a key step for the PRC to achieve its 
        regional hegemonic ambitions. The PRC has increased the 
        frequency and scope of its exercises and operations targeting 
        Taiwan, such as amphibious assault and live-fire exercises in 
        the Taiwan Strait, PLA Air Force flights that encircle Taiwan, 
        and flights across the unofficial median line in the Taiwan 
        Strait. The Government of the PRC's full submission of Hong 
        Kong potentially accelerates the timeline of a Taiwan scenario, 
        and makes the defense of Taiwan an even more urgent priority.
            (6) The defense of Taiwan is critical to--
                    (A) defending the people of Taiwan;
                    (B) limiting the PLA's ability to project power 
                beyond the First Island Chain, including to United 
                States territory, such as Guam and Hawaii;
                    (C) defending the territorial integrity of Japan;
                    (D) preventing the PLA from diverting military 
                planning, resources, and personnel to broader military 
                ambitions; and
                    (E) retaining the United States credibility as a 
                defender of the democratic values and free-market 
                principles embodied by Taiwan's people and government;
            (7) The PRC capitalized on the world's attention to COVID-
        19 to advance its military objectives in the South China Sea, 
        intensifying and accelerating trends already underway. The PRC 
        has sent militarized survey vessels into the Malaysian 
        Exclusive Economic Zone, announced the establishment of an 
        administrative district in the Spratly and Paracel Islands 
        under the Chinese local government of Sansha, aimed a fire 
        control radar at a Philippine navy ship, encroached on 
        Indonesia's fishing grounds, sunk a Vietnamese fishing boat, 
        announced new ``research stations'' on Fiery Cross Reef and 
        Subi Reef, landed special military aircraft on Fiery Cross Reef 
        to routinize such deployments, and sent a flotilla of over 200 
        militia vessels to Whitsun Reef, a feature within the exclusive 
        economic zone of the Philippines.
            (8) On July 13, 2020, the Department of State clarified 
        United States policy on the South China Sea and stated that 
        ``Beijing's claims to offshore resources across most of the 
        South China Sea are completely unlawful''.
            (9) These actions in the South China Sea enable the PLA to 
        exert influence and project power deeper into Oceania and the 
        Indian Ocean. As Admiral Phil Davidson, Commander of Indo-
        Pacific Command, testified in 2019, ``In short, China is now 
        capable of controlling the South China Sea in all scenarios 
        short of war with the United States.''.
            (10) The PLA also continues to advance its claims in the 
        East China Sea, including through a high number of surface 
        combatant patrols and frequent entry into the territorial 
        waters of the Senkaku Islands, over which the United States 
        recognizes Japan's administrative control. In April 2014, 
        President Barack Obama stated, ``Our commitment to Japan's 
        security is absolute and article five of the U.S.-Japan 
        security treaty covers all territory under Japan's 
        administration, including the Senkaku islands.''.
            (11) On March 1, 2019, Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo 
        stated, ``As the South China Sea is part of the Pacific, any 
        armed attack on Philippine forces, aircraft, or public vessels 
        in the South China Sea will trigger mutual defense obligations 
        under Article 4 of our Mutual Defense Treaty.''.
            (12) The PLA also continues to advance its influence over 
        the Korean Peninsula, including through a series of joint air 
        exercises with the Russian Federation in the Republic of 
        Korea's Air Defense Identification Zone.
            (13) The PLA is modernizing and gaining critical capability 
        in every branch and every domain, including--
                    (A) positioning the PLA Navy to become a great 
                maritime power or ``blue-water'' navy that can 
                completely control all activity within the First Island 
                Chain and project power beyond it with a fleet of 425 
                battle force ships by 2030;
                    (B) increasing the size and range of its strike 
                capabilities, including approximately 1,900 ground-
                launched short- and intermediate-range missiles capable 
                of targeting United States allies and partners in the 
                First and Second Island chains, United States bases in 
                the Indo-Pacific, and United States forces at sea;
                    (C) boosting capabilities for air warfare, 
                including with Russian-origin Su-35 fighters and S-400 
                air defense systems, new J-20 5th generation stealth 
                fighters, advanced H-6 bomber variants, a long-range 
                stealth bomber, and Y-20 heavy lift aircraft;
                    (D) making critical investments in new domains of 
                warfare, such as cyber warfare, electronic warfare, and 
                space warfare; and
                    (E) increasing the size of its nuclear stockpile 
                and delivery systems.
            (14) The PRC is pursuing this modernization through all 
        means at its disposal, including its Military-Civil Fusion 
        initiative, which enlists the whole of PRC society in 
        developing and acquiring technology with military applications 
        to pursue technological advantage over the United States in 
        artificial intelligence, hypersonic glide vehicles, directed 
        energy weapons, electromagnetic railguns, counter-space 
        weapons, and other emerging capabilities.
            (15) The United States lead in the development of science 
        and technology relevant to defense is eroding in the face of 
        competition from the PRC. United States research and 
        development spending on defense capabilities has declined 
        sharply as a share of global research and development. The 
        commercial sector's leading role in innovation presents certain 
        unique challenges to the Department of Defense's reliance on 
        technology for battlefield advantage.
            (16) The PRC has vastly increased domestic research and 
        development expenditures, supported the growth of new cutting-
        edge industries and tapped into a large workforce to invest in 
        fostering science and engineering talent.
            (17) The PRC is increasing exports of defense and security 
        capabilities to build its defense technology and industrial 
        base and improve its own military capabilities, as well as its 
        influence with countries that purchase and become dependent on 
        its military systems.

SEC. 223. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING BOLSTERING SECURITY PARTNERSHIPS 
              IN THE INDO-PACIFIC.

    It is the sense of Congress that steps to bolster United States 
security partnerships in the Indo-Pacific must include--
            (1) supporting Japan in its development of long-range 
        precision fires, munitions, air and missile defense capacity, 
        interoperability across all domains, maritime security, and 
        intelligence, and surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities;
            (2) launching a United States-Japan national security 
        innovation fund to solicit and support private sector 
        cooperation for new technologies that could benefit the United 
        States and Japan's mutual security objectives;
            (3) promoting a deeper defense relationship between Japan 
        and Australia, including supporting reciprocal access 
        agreements and trilateral United States-Japan-Australia 
        intelligence sharing;
            (4) encouraging and facilitating Taiwan's accelerated 
        acquisition of asymmetric defense capabilities, which are 
        crucial to defending the islands of Taiwan from invasion, 
        including long-range precision fires, munitions, anti-ship 
        missiles, coastal defense, anti-armor, air defense, undersea 
        warfare, advanced command, control, communications, computers, 
        intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR), and 
        resilient command and control capabilities, and increasing the 
        conduct of relevant and practical training and exercises with 
        Taiwan's defense forces; and
            (5) prioritizing building the capacity of United States 
        allies and partners to protect defense technology.

SEC. 224. STATEMENT OF POLICY.

    It shall be the policy of the United States to--
            (1) prioritize the Indo-Pacific region in United States 
        foreign policy, and prioritize resources for achieving United 
        States political and military objectives in the region;
            (2) exercise freedom of operations in the international 
        waters and airspace in the Indo-Pacific maritime domains, which 
        are critical to the prosperity, stability, and security of the 
        Indo-Pacific region;
            (3) maintain forward-deployed forces in the Indo-Pacific 
        region, including a rotational bomber presence, integrated 
        missile defense capabilities, long-range precision fires, 
        undersea warfare capabilities, and diversified and resilient 
        basing and rotational presence, including support for pre-
        positioning strategies;
            (4) strengthen and deepen the alliances and partnerships of 
        the United States to build capacity and capabilities, increase 
        multilateral partnerships, modernize communications 
        architecture, address anti-access and area denial challenges, 
        and increase joint exercises and security cooperation efforts;
            (5) reaffirm the commitment and support of the United 
        States for allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific region, 
        including longstanding United States policy regarding--
                    (A) Article V of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation 
                and Security between the United States and Japan, 
                signed at Washington January 19, 1960;
                    (B) Article III of the Mutual Defense Treaty 
                between the United States and the Republic of Korea, 
                signed at Washington October 1, 1953;
                    (C) Article IV of the Mutual Defense Treaty between 
                the United States and the Republic of the Philippines, 
                signed at Washington August 30, 1951, including that, 
                as the South China Sea is part of the Pacific, any 
                armed attack on Philippine forces, aircraft or public 
                vessels in the South China Sea will trigger mutual 
                defense obligations under Article IV of our mutual 
                defense treaty;
                    (D) Article IV of the Australia, New Zealand, 
                United States Security Treaty, done at San Francisco 
                September 1, 1951; and
                    (E) the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, 
                done at Manila September 8, 1954, together with the 
                Thanat-Rusk Communique of 1962;
            (6) collaborate with United States treaty allies in the 
        Indo-Pacific to foster greater multilateral security and 
        defense cooperation with other regional partners;
            (7) ensure the continuity of operations by the United 
        States Armed Forces in the Indo-Pacific region, including, as 
        appropriate, in cooperation with partners and allies, in order 
        to reaffirm the principle of freedom of operations in 
        international waters and airspace in accordance with 
        established principles and practices of international law;
            (8) sustain the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96-8; 22 
        U.S.C. 3301 et seq.) and the ``Six Assurances'' provided by the 
        United States to Taiwan in July 1982 as the foundations for 
        United States-Taiwan relations, and to deepen, to the fullest 
        extent possible, the extensive, close, and friendly relations 
        of the United States and Taiwan, including cooperation to 
        support the development of capable, ready, and modern forces 
        necessary for the defense of Taiwan;
            (9) enhance security partnerships with India, across 
        Southeast Asia, and with other nations of the Indo-Pacific;
            (10) deter acts of aggression or coercion by the PRC 
        against United States and allies' interests, especially along 
        the First Island Chain and in the Western Pacific, by showing 
        PRC leaders that the United States can and is willing to deny 
        them the ability to achieve their objectives, including by--
                    (A) consistently demonstrating the political will 
                of the United States to deepening existing treaty 
                alliances and growing new partnerships as a durable, 
                asymmetric, and unmatched strategic advantage to the 
                PRC's growing military capabilities and reach;
                    (B) maintaining a system of forward-deployed bases 
                in the Indo-Pacific region as the most visible sign of 
                United States resolve and commitment to the region, and 
                as platforms to ensure United States operational 
                readiness and advance interoperability with allies and 
                partners;
                    (C) adopting a more dispersed force posture 
                throughout the region, particularly the Western 
                Pacific, and pursuing maximum access for United States 
                mobile and relocatable launchers for long-range cruise, 
                ballistic, and hypersonic weapons throughout the Indo-
                Pacific region;
                    (D) fielding long-range, precision-strike networks 
                to United States and allied forces, including ground-
                launched cruise missiles, undersea and naval 
                capabilities, and integrated air and missile defense in 
                the First Island Chain and the Second Island Chain, in 
                order to deter and prevent PRC coercion and aggression, 
                and to maximize the United States ability to operate;
                    (E) strengthening extended deterrence to ensure 
                that escalation against key United States interests 
                would be costly, risky, and self-defeating; and
                    (F) collaborating with allies and partners to 
                accelerate their roles in more equitably sharing the 
                burdens of mutual defense, including through the 
                acquisition and fielding of advanced capabilities and 
                training that will better enable them to repel PRC 
                aggression or coercion; and
            (11) maintain the capacity of the United States to impose 
        prohibitive diplomatic, economic, financial, reputational, and 
        military costs on the PRC for acts of coercion or aggression, 
        including to defend itself and its allies regardless of the 
        point of origin of attacks against them.

SEC. 225. FOREIGN MILITARY FINANCING IN THE INDO-PACIFIC AND 
              AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR SOUTHEAST ASIA 
              MARITIME SECURITY PROGRAMS AND DIPLOMATIC OUTREACH 
              ACTIVITIES.

    (a) Foreign Military Financing Funding.--In addition to any amount 
appropriated pursuant to section 23 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 
U.S.C. 2763) (relating to foreign military financing assistance), there 
is authorized to be appropriated for each of fiscal years 2022 through 
fiscal year 2026 for activities in the Indo-Pacific region in 
accordance with this section--
            (1) $110,000,000 for fiscal year 2022;
            (2) $125,000,000 for fiscal year 2023;
            (3) $130,000,000 for fiscal year 2024;
            (4) $140,000,000 for fiscal year 2025; and
            (5) $150,000,000 for fiscal year 2026.
    (b) Southeast Maritime Law Enforcement Initiative.--There is 
authorized to be appropriated $10,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2022 
through 2026 for the Department of State for International Narcotics 
Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) for the support of the Southeast 
Asia Maritime Law Enforcement Initiative.
    (c) Diplomatic Outreach Activities.--There is authorized to be 
appropriated to the Department of State $1,000,000 for each of fiscal 
years 2022 through 2026, which shall be used--
            (1) to conduct, in coordination with the Department of 
        Defense, outreach activities, including conferences and 
        symposia, to familiarize partner countries, particularly in the 
        Indo-Pacific region, with the United States' interpretation of 
        international law relating to freedom of the seas; and
            (2) to work with allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific 
        region to better align respective interpretations of 
        international law relating to freedom of the seas, including on 
        the matters of operations by military ships in exclusive 
        economic zones, innocent passage through territorial seas, and 
        transits through international straits.
    (d) Program Authorization and Purpose.--Using amounts appropriated 
pursuant to subsection (a), the Secretary of State, in coordination 
with the Secretary of Defense, is authorized to provide assistance, for 
the purpose of increasing maritime security and domain awareness for 
countries in the Indo-Pacific region--
            (1) to provide assistance to national military or other 
        security forces of such countries that have maritime security 
        missions among their functional responsibilities;
            (2) to provide training to ministry, agency, and 
        headquarters level organizations for such forces; and
            (3) to provide assistance and training to other relevant 
        foreign affairs, maritime, or security-related ministries, 
        agencies, departments, or offices that manage and oversee 
        maritime activities and policy that the Secretary of State may 
        so designate.
    (e) Designation of Assistance.--Assistance provided by the 
Secretary of State under subsection (g) shall be known as the ``Indo-
Pacific Maritime Security Initiative'' (in this section referred to as 
the ``Initiative'').
    (f) Program Objectives.--Assistance provided through the Initiative 
may be used to accomplish the following objectives:
            (1) Retaining unhindered access to and use of international 
        waterways in the Indo-Pacific region that are critical to 
        ensuring the security and free flow of commerce and to 
        achieving United States national security objectives.
            (2) Improving maritime domain awareness in the Indo-Pacific 
        region.
            (3) Countering piracy in the Indo-Pacific region.
            (4) Disrupting illicit maritime trafficking activities and 
        other forms of maritime trafficking activity in the Indo-
        Pacific that directly benefit organizations that have been 
        determined to be a security threat to the United States.
            (5) Enhancing the maritime capabilities of a country or 
        regional organization to respond to emerging threats to 
        maritime security in the Indo-Pacific region.
            (6) Strengthening United States alliances and partnerships 
        in Southeast Asia and other parts of the Indo-Pacific region.
    (g) Authorization of Appropriations.--
            (1) In general.--Of the amount appropriated pursuant to 
        subsection (a) (relating to foreign military financing 
        assistance), there is authorized to be appropriated to the 
        Department of State for the Indo-Pacific Maritime Security 
        Initiative and other related regional programs exactly--
                    (A) $70,000,000 for fiscal year 2022;
                    (B) $80,000,000 for fiscal year 2023;
                    (C) $90,000,000 for fiscal year 2024;
                    (D) $100,000,000 for fiscal year 2025; and
                    (E) $110,000,000 for fiscal year 2026.
            (2) Rule of construction.--The ``Indo-Pacific Maritime 
        Security Initiative'' and funds authorized for the Initiative 
        shall include existing regional programs carried out by the 
        Department of State related to maritime security, including the 
        Southeast Asia Maritime Security Initiative.
    (h) Eligibility and Priorities for Assistance.--
            (1) In general.--The Secretary of State shall use the 
        following considerations when selecting which countries in the 
        Indo-Pacific region should receive assistance pursuant to the 
        Initiative:
                    (A) Assistance may be provided to a country in the 
                Indo-Pacific region to enhance the capabilities of that 
                country according to the objectives outlined in (f), or 
                of a regional organization that includes that country, 
                to conduct--
                            (i) maritime intelligence, surveillance, 
                        and reconnaissance;
                            (ii) littoral and port security;
                            (iii) Coast Guard operations;
                            (iv) command and control; and
                            (v) management and oversight of maritime 
                        activities.
                    (B) Priority shall be placed on assistance to 
                enhance the maritime security capabilities of the 
                military or security forces of countries in the Indo-
                Pacific region that have maritime missions and the 
                government agencies responsible for such forces.
            (2) Types of assistance and training.--
                    (A) Authorized elements of assistance.--Assistance 
                provided under paragraph (1)(A) may include the 
                provision of equipment, training, and small-scale 
                military construction.
                    (B) Required elements of assistance and training.--
                Assistance and training provided under subparagraph (A) 
                shall include elements that promote--
                            (i) the observance of and respect for human 
                        rights; and
                            (ii) respect for legitimate civilian 
                        authority within the country to which the 
                        assistance is provided.

SEC. 226. FOREIGN MILITARY FINANCING COMPACT PILOT PROGRAM IN THE INDO-
              PACIFIC.

    (a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be 
appropriated $20,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2022 and 2023 for the 
creation of a pilot program for foreign military financing (FMF) 
compacts.
    (b) Assistance.--
            (1) In general.--The Secretary of State is authorized to 
        create a pilot program, for a duration of two years, with an 
        assessment for any additional or permanent programming, to 
        provide assistance under this section for each country that 
        enters into an FMF Challenge Compact with the United States 
        pursuant to subsection (d) to support policies and programs 
        that advance the progress of the country in achieving lasting 
        security and civilian-military governance through respect for 
        human rights, good governance (including transparency and free 
        and fair elections), and cooperation with United States and 
        international counter-terrorism, anti-trafficking, and counter-
        crime efforts and programs.
            (2) Form of assistance.--Assistance under this subsection 
        may be provided in the form of grants, cooperative agreements, 
        contracts, or no-interest loans to the government of an 
        eligible country described in subsection (c).
    (c) Eligible Countries.--
            (1) In general.--A country shall be a candidate country for 
        purposes of eligibility for assistance for fiscal years 2022 
        and 2023 if--
                    (A) the country is classified as a lower middle 
                income country in the then-most recent edition of the 
                World Development Report for Reconstruction and 
                Development published by the International Bank for 
                Reconstruction and Development and has an income 
                greater than the historical ceiling for International 
                Development Association eligibility for the fiscal year 
                involved; and
                    (B) the Secretary of State determines that the 
                country is committed to seeking just and democratic 
                governance, including with a demonstrated commitment 
                to--
                            (i) the promotion of political pluralism, 
                        equality, and the rule of law;
                            (ii) respect for human and civil rights;
                            (iii) protection of private property 
                        rights;
                            (iv) transparency and accountability of 
                        government;
                            (v) anti-corruption; and
                            (vi) the institution of effective civilian 
                        control, professionalization, and respect for 
                        human rights by and the accountability of the 
                        armed forces.
            (2) Identification of eligible countries.--Not later than 
        90 days prior to the date on which the Secretary of State 
        determines eligible countries for an FMF Challenge Compact, the 
        Secretary--
                    (A) shall prepare and submit to the appropriate 
                congressional committees a report that contains a list 
                of all eligible countries identified that have met the 
                requirements under paragraph (1) for the fiscal year; 
                and
                    (B) shall consult with the appropriate 
                congressional committees on the extent to which such 
                countries meet the criteria described in paragraph (1).
    (d) FMF Challenge Compact.--
            (1) Compact.--The Secretary of State may provide assistance 
        for an eligible country only if the country enters into an 
        agreement with the United States, to be known as an ``FMF 
        Challenge Compact'' (in this subsection referred to as a 
        ``Compact'') that establishes a multi-year plan for achieving 
        shared security objectives in furtherance of the purposes of 
        this title.
            (2) Elements.--The elements of the Compact shall be those 
        listed in subsection (c)(1)(B) for determining eligibility, and 
        be designed to significantly advance the performance of those 
        commitments during the period of the Compact.
            (3) In general.--The Compact should take into account the 
        national strategy of the eligible country and shall include--
                    (A) the specific objectives that the country and 
                the United States expect to achieve during the term of 
                the Compact, including both how the foreign military 
                financing under the Compact will advance shared 
                security interests and advance partner capacity 
                building efforts as well as to advance national efforts 
                towards just and democratic governance;
                    (B) the responsibilities of the country and the 
                United States in the achievement of such objectives;
                    (C) regular benchmarks to measure, where 
                appropriate, progress toward achieving such objectives; 
                and
                    (D) the strategy of the eligible country to sustain 
                progress made toward achieving such objectives after 
                expiration of the Compact.
    (e) Congressional Consultation Prior to Compact Negotiations.--Not 
later than 15 days before commencing negotiations of a Compact with an 
eligible country, the Secretary of State shall consult with the 
appropriate congressional committees with respect to the proposed 
Compact negotiation and shall identify the objectives and mechanisms to 
be used for the negotiation of the Compact.
    (f) Assessment of Pilot Program and Recommendations.--Not later 
than 90 days after the conclusion of the pilot program, the Secretary 
of State shall provide a report to the appropriate congressional 
committees with respect to the pilot program, including an assessment 
of the success and utility of the pilot program established under this 
subsection in meeting United States objectives and a recommendation 
with respect to whether to continue a further foreign military 
financing compact program on a pilot or permanent basis.

SEC. 227. ADDITIONAL FUNDING FOR INTERNATIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION AND 
              TRAINING IN THE INDO-PACIFIC.

    There is authorized to be appropriated for each of fiscal years 
2022 through fiscal year 2026 for the Department of State, out of 
amounts appropriated or otherwise made available for assistance under 
chapter 5 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 
2347 et seq.) (relating to international military education and 
training (IMET) assistance), $45,000,000 for activities in the Indo-
Pacific region in accordance with this Act.

SEC. 228. PRIORITIZING EXCESS DEFENSE ARTICLE TRANSFERS FOR THE INDO-
              PACIFIC.

    (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the United 
States Government should prioritize the review of excess defense 
article transfers to Indo-Pacific partners.
    (b) Five-year Plan.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the President shall develop a five-year plan to 
prioritize excess defense article transfers to the Indo-Pacific and 
provide a report describing such plan to the appropriate committees of 
Congress.
    (c) Transfer Authority.--Section 516(c)(2) of the Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2321j(c)(2)) is amended by inserting 
``, Thailand, Indonesia, Vietnam, and Malaysia'' after ``and to the 
Philippines''.
    (d) Required Coordination.--The United States Government shall 
coordinate and align excess defense article transfers with capacity 
building efforts of regional allies and partners.
    (e) Taiwan.--Taiwan shall receive the same benefits conferred for 
the purposes of transfers pursuant to section 516(c)(2) of the Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2321j(c)(2)).

SEC. 229. PRIORITIZING EXCESS NAVAL VESSEL TRANSFERS FOR THE INDO-
              PACIFIC.

    (a) Authority.--The President is authorized to transfer to a 
government of a country listed pursuant to the amendment made under 
section 228(c) two OLIVER HAZARD PERRY class guided missile frigates on 
a grant basis under section 516 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 
(22 U.S.C. 2321j).
    (b) Grants Not Counted in Annual Total of Transferred Excess 
Defense Articles.--The value of a vessel transferred to another country 
on a grant basis pursuant to authority provided by this section shall 
not be counted against the aggregate value of excess defense articles 
transferred in any fiscal year under section 516 of the Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2321j).
    (c) Costs of Transfers.--Any expense incurred by the United States 
in connection with a transfer authorized by this section shall be 
charged to the recipient notwithstanding section 516(e) of the Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2321j(e)).
    (d) Repair and Refurbishment in United States Shipyards.--To the 
maximum extent practicable, the President shall require, as a condition 
of the transfer of a vessel under this subsection, that the recipient 
to which the vessel is transferred have such repair or refurbishment of 
the vessel as is needed, before the vessel joins the naval forces of 
that recipient, performed at a shipyard located in the United States.
    (e) Expiration of Authority.--The authority to transfer a vessel 
under this section shall expire at the end of the 3-year period 
beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act.

SEC. 230. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON MARITIME FREEDOM OF OPERATIONS IN 
              INTERNATIONAL WATERWAYS AND AIRSPACE OF THE INDO-PACIFIC 
              AND ON ARTIFICIAL LAND FEATURES IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA.

    (a) Sense of Congress.--Congress--
            (1) condemns coercive and threatening actions or the use of 
        force to impede freedom of operations in international airspace 
        by military or civilian aircraft, to alter the status quo, or 
        to destabilize the Indo-Pacific region;
            (2) urges the Government of the People's Republic of China 
        to refrain from implementing the declared East China Sea Air 
        Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), or an ADIZ in the South 
        China Sea, which is contrary to freedom of overflight in 
        international airspace, and to refrain from taking similar 
        provocative actions elsewhere in the Indo-Pacific region;
            (3) reaffirms that the 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration 
        decision is final and legally binding on both parties and that 
        the People's Republic of China's claims to offshore resources 
        across most of the South China Sea are unlawful; and
            (4) condemns the People's Republic of China for failing to 
        abide by the 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling, 
        despite the PRC's obligations as a state party to the United 
        Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
    (b) Statement of Policy.--It shall be the policy of the United 
States to--
            (1) reaffirm its commitment and support for allies and 
        partners in the Indo-Pacific region, including longstanding 
        United States policy regarding Article V of the United States-
        Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty and reaffirm its position 
        that Article V of the United States-Japan Mutual Defense Treaty 
        applies to the Japanese-administered Senkaku Islands;
            (2) oppose claims that impinge on the rights, freedoms, and 
        lawful use of the sea, or the airspace above it, that belong to 
        all nations, and oppose the militarization of new and reclaimed 
        land features in the South China Sea;
            (3) continue certain policies with respect to the PRC 
        claims in the South China Sea, namely--
                    (A) that PRC claims in the South China Sea, 
                including to offshore resources across most of the 
                South China Sea, are unlawful;
                    (B) that the PRC cannot lawfully assert a maritime 
                claim vis-a-vis the Philippines in areas that the 
                Permanent Court of Arbitration found to be in the 
                Philippines' Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) or on its 
                continental shelf;
                    (C) to reject any PRC claim to waters beyond a 12 
                nautical mile territorial sea derived from islands it 
                claims in the Spratly Islands; and
                    (D) that the PRC has no lawful territorial or 
                maritime claim to James Shoal;
            (4) urge all parties to refrain from engaging in 
        destabilizing activities, including illegal occupation or 
        efforts to unlawfully assert administration over disputed 
        claims;
            (5) ensure that disputes are managed without intimidation, 
        coercion, or force;
            (6) call on all claimants to clarify or adjust claims in 
        accordance with international law;
            (7) uphold the principle that territorial and maritime 
        claims, including territorial waters or territorial seas, must 
        be derived from land features and otherwise comport with 
        international law;
            (8) oppose the imposition of new fishing regulations 
        covering disputed areas in the South China Sea, regulations 
        which have raised tensions in the region;
            (9) support an effective Code of Conduct, if that Code of 
        Conduct reflects the interests of Southeast Asian claimant 
        states and does not serve as a vehicle for the People's 
        Republic of China to advance its unlawful maritime claims;
            (10) reaffirm that an existing body of international rules 
        and guidelines, including the International Regulations for 
        Preventing Collisions at Sea, done at London October 12, 1972 
        (COLREGs), is sufficient to ensure the safety of navigation 
        between the United States Armed Forces and the forces of other 
        countries, including the People's Republic of China;
            (11) support the development of regional institutions and 
        bodies, including the ASEAN Regional Forum, the ASEAN Defense 
        Minister's Meeting Plus, the East Asia Summit, and the expanded 
        ASEAN Maritime Forum, to build practical cooperation in the 
        region and reinforce the role of international law;
            (12) encourage the deepening of partnerships with other 
        countries in the region for maritime domain awareness and 
        capacity building, as well as efforts by the United States 
        Government to explore the development of appropriate 
        multilateral mechanisms for a ``common operating picture'' in 
        the South China Sea among Southeast Asian countries that would 
        serve to help countries avoid destabilizing behavior and deter 
        risky and dangerous activities;
            (13) oppose actions by any country to prevent any other 
        country from exercising its sovereign rights to the resources 
        of the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and continental shelf by 
        making claims to those areas in the South China Sea that have 
        no support in international law; and
            (14) assure the continuity of operations by the United 
        States in the Indo-Pacific region, including, when appropriate, 
        in cooperation with partners and allies, to reaffirm the 
        principle of freedom of operations in international waters and 
        airspace in accordance with established principles and 
        practices of international law.

SEC. 231. REPORT ON CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT OF INDO-PACIFIC ALLIES AND 
              PARTNERS.

    (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the Secretary of State should expand and strengthen 
        existing measures under the United States Conventional Arms 
        Transfer Policy to provide capabilities to allies and partners 
        consistent with agreed-on division of responsibility for 
        alliance roles, missions and capabilities, prioritizing allies 
        and partners in the Indo-Pacific region in accordance with 
        United States strategic imperatives;
            (2) the United States should design for export to Indo-
        Pacific allies and partners capabilities critical to 
        maintaining a favorable military balance in the region, 
        including long-range precision fires, air and missile defense 
        systems, anti-ship cruise missiles, land attack cruise 
        missiles, conventional hypersonic systems, intelligence, 
        surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities, and command and 
        control systems;
            (3) the United States should pursue, to the maximum extent 
        possible, anticipatory technology security and foreign 
        disclosure policy on the systems described in paragraph (2); 
        and
            (4) the Secretary of State, in coordination with the 
        Secretary of Defense, should--
                    (A) urge allies and partners to invest in 
                sufficient quantities of munitions to meet contingency 
                requirements and avoid the need for accessing United 
                States stocks in wartime; and
                    (B) cooperate with allies to deliver such 
                munitions, or when necessary, to increase allies' 
                capacity to produce such munitions.
    (b) Appropriate Committees of Congress.--In this section, the term 
``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
            (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on 
        Appropriations of the Senate; and
            (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on 
        Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
    (c) Report.--
            (1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in 
        coordination with the Secretary of Defense, shall submit to the 
        appropriate committees of Congress a report that describes 
        United States priorities for building more capable security 
        partners in the Indo-Pacific region.
            (2) Matters to be included.--The report required under 
        paragraph (1) shall--
                    (A) provide a priority list of defense and military 
                capabilities that Indo-Pacific allies and partners must 
                possess for the United States to be able to achieve its 
                military objectives in the Indo-Pacific region;
                    (B) identify, from the list referred to in 
                subparagraph (A), the capabilities that are best 
                provided, or can only be provided, by the United 
                States;
                    (C) identify--
                            (i) actions required to prioritize United 
                        States Government resources and personnel to 
                        expedite fielding the capabilities identified 
                        in subparagraph (B); and
                            (ii) steps needed to fully account for and 
                        a plan to integrate all means of United States 
                        foreign military sales, direct commercial 
                        sales, security assistance, and all applicable 
                        authorities of the Department of State and the 
                        Department of Defense;
                    (D) assess the requirements for United States 
                security assistance, including International Military 
                Education and Training, in the Indo-Pacific region, as 
                a part of the means to deliver critical partner 
                capability requirements identified in subparagraph (B);
                    (E) assess the resources necessary to meet the 
                requirements for United States security assistance, and 
                identify resource gaps;
                    (F) assess the major obstacles to fulfilling 
                requirements for United States security assistance in 
                the Indo-Pacific region, including resources and 
                personnel limits, foreign legislative and policy 
                barriers, and factors related to specific partner 
                countries;
                    (G) identify limitations on the ability of the 
                United States to provide such capabilities, including 
                those identified under subparagraph (B), because of 
                existing United States treaty obligations, United 
                States policies, or other regulations;
                    (H) recommend improvements to the process for 
                developing requirements for United States partner 
                capabilities; and
                    (I) identify required jointly agreed 
                recommendations for infrastructure and posture, based 
                on any ongoing mutual dialogues.
            (3) Form.--The report required under this subsection shall 
        be unclassified, but may include a classified annex.

SEC. 232. REPORT ON NATIONAL TECHNOLOGY AND INDUSTRIAL BASE.

    (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) a more streamlined, shared, and coordinated approach, 
        which leverages economies of scale with major allies, is 
        necessary for the United States to retain its lead in defense 
        technology;
            (2) allowing for the export, re-export, or transfer of 
        defense-related technologies and services to members of the 
        national technology and industrial base (as defined in section 
        2500 of title 10, United States Code) would advance United 
        States security interests by helping to leverage the defense-
        related technologies and skilled workforces of trusted allies 
        to reduce the dependence on other countries, including 
        countries that pose challenges to United States interests 
        around the world, for defense-related innovation and 
        investment; and
            (3) it is in the interest of the United States to continue 
        to increase cooperation with Australia, Canada, and the United 
        Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to protect 
        critical defense-related technology and services and leverage 
        the investments of like-minded, major ally nations in order to 
        maximize the strategic edge afforded by defense technology 
        innovation.
    (b) Report.--
            (1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit 
        a report to the appropriate congressional committees that--
                    (A) describes the Department of State's efforts to 
                facilitate access among the national technology and 
                industrial base to defense articles and services 
                subject to the United States Munitions List under 
                section 38(a)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act (22 
                U.S.C. 2778(a)(1)); and
                    (B) identifies foreign legal and regulatory 
                challenges, as well as foreign policy or other 
                challenges or considerations that prevent or frustrate 
                these efforts, to include any gaps in the respective 
                export control regimes implemented by United Kingdom of 
                Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Australia, or 
                Canada.
            (2) Form.--This report required under paragraph (1) shall 
        be unclassified, but may include a classified annex.

SEC. 233. REPORT ON DIPLOMATIC OUTREACH WITH RESPECT TO CHINESE 
              MILITARY INSTALLATIONS OVERSEAS.

    (a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the 
Secretary of Defense, shall submit a report to the appropriate 
committees of Congress regarding United States diplomatic engagement 
with other nations that host or are considering hosting any military 
installation of the Government of the People's Republic of China.
    (b) Matters to Be Included.--The report required under subsection 
(a) shall include--
            (1) a list of countries that currently host or are 
        considering hosting any military installation of the Government 
        of the People's Republic of China;
            (2) a detailed description of United States diplomatic and 
        related efforts to engage countries that are considering 
        hosting a military installation of the Government of the 
        People's Republic of China, and the results of such efforts;
            (3) an assessment of the adverse impact on United States 
        interests of the Government of the People's Republic of China 
        successfully establishing a military installation at any of the 
        locations it is currently considering;
            (4) a description and list of any commercial ports outside 
        of the People's Republic of China that the United States 
        Government assesses could be used by the Government of the 
        People's Republic of China for military purposes, and any 
        diplomatic efforts to engage the governments of the countries 
        where such ports are located;
            (5) the impact of the military installations of the 
        Government of the People's Republic of China on United States 
        interests; and
            (6) lessons learned from the diplomatic experience of 
        addressing the PRC's first overseas base in Djibouti.
    (c) Form of Report.--The report required under subsection (a) shall 
be classified, but may include a unclassified summary.

SEC. 234. STATEMENT OF POLICY REGARDING UNIVERSAL IMPLEMENTATION OF 
              UNITED NATIONS SANCTIONS ON NORTH KOREA.

    It is the policy of the United States to sustain maximum economic 
pressure on the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea 
(referred to in this section as the ``DPRK'') until the regime 
undertakes complete, verifiable, and irreversible actions toward 
denuclearization, including by--
            (1) pressing all nations, including the PRC, to implement 
        and enforce existing United Nations sanctions with regard to 
        the DPRK;
            (2) pressing all nations, including the PRC, and in 
        accordance with United Nations Security Council resolutions, to 
        end the practice of hosting DPRK citizens as guest workers, 
        recognizing that such workers are demonstrated to constitute an 
        illicit source of revenue for the DPRK regime and its nuclear 
        ambitions;
            (3) pressing all nations, including the PRC, to pursue 
        rigorous interdiction of shipments to and from the DPRK, 
        including ship-to-ship transfers, consistent with United 
        Nations Security Council resolutions;
            (4) pressing the PRC and PRC entities--
                    (A) to cease business activities with United 
                Nations-designated entities and their affiliates in the 
                DPRK; and
                    (B) to expel from the PRC individuals who enable 
                the DPRK to acquire materials for its nuclear and 
                ballistic missile programs; and
            (5) enforcing United Nations Security Council resolutions 
        with respect to the DPRK and United States sanctions, including 
        those pursuant to the North Korea Sanctions and Policy 
        Enhancement Act of 2016 (Public Law 114-122), the Countering 
        America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (Public Law 115-
        44), the Otto Warmbier North Korea Nuclear Sanctions and 
        Enforcement Act of 2019 (title LXXI of division F of Public Law 
        116-92), and relevant United States executive orders.

SEC. 235. LIMITATION ON ASSISTANCE TO COUNTRIES HOSTING CHINESE 
              MILITARY INSTALLATIONS.

    (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) although it casts the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) as 
        a development initiative, the People's Republic of China is 
        also utilizing the BRI to advance its own security interests, 
        including to expand its power projection capabilities and 
        facilitate greater access for the People's Liberation Army 
        through overseas military installations; and
            (2) the expansion of the People's Liberation Army globally 
        through overseas military installations will undermine the 
        medium- and long-term security of the United States and the 
        security and development of strategic partners in critical 
        regions around the world, which is at odds with United States 
        goals to promote peace, prosperity, and self-reliance among 
        partner nations, including through the Millennium Challenge 
        Corporation.
    (b) Limitation on Assistance.--Except as provided in subsection 
(c), for fiscal years 2022 through 2031, the government of a country 
that is hosting on its territory a military installation of the 
Government of the People's Republic of China or facilitates the 
expansion of the presence of the People's Liberation Army for purposes 
other than participating in United Nations peacekeeping operations or 
for temporary humanitarian, medical, and disaster relief operations in 
such country shall not be eligible for assistance under sections 609 or 
616 of the Millennium Challenge Act of 2003 (22 U.S.C. 7708, 7715).
    (c) National Interest Waiver.--The President may, on a case by case 
basis, waive the limitation in subsection (b) if the President submits 
to the appropriate congressional committees--
            (1) a written determination that the waiver is important to 
        the national interests of the United States; and
            (2) a detailed explanation of how the waiver is important 
        to those interests.

  Subtitle C--Regional Strategies to Counter the People's Republic of 
                                 China

SEC. 241. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON COOPERATION WITH ALLIES AND PARTNERS 
              AROUND THE WORLD WITH RESPECT TO THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF 
              CHINA.

    It is the policy of the United States--
            (1) to strengthen alliances and partnerships in Europe and 
        with like-minded countries around the globe to effectively 
        compete with the People's Republic of China; and
            (2) to work in collaboration with such allies and 
        partners--
                    (A) to address significant diplomatic, economic, 
                and military challenges posed by the People's Republic 
                of China;
                    (B) to deter the People's Republic of China from 
                pursuing military aggression;
                    (C) to promote the peaceful resolution of 
                territorial disputes in accordance with international 
                law;
                    (D) to promote private sector-led long-term 
                economic development while countering efforts by the 
                Government of the People's Republic of China to 
                leverage predatory economic practices as a means of 
                political and economic coercion in the Indo-Pacific 
                region and beyond;
                    (E) to promote the values of democracy and human 
                rights, including through efforts to end the repression 
                by the Chinese Communist Party of political dissidents 
                and Uyghurs and other ethnic Muslim minorities, Tibetan 
                Buddhists, Christians, and other minorities;
                    (F) to respond to the crackdown by the Chinese 
                Communist Party, in contravention of the commitments 
                made under the Sino-British Joint Declaration of 1984 
                and the Basic Law of Hong Kong, on the legitimate 
                aspirations of the people of Hong Kong; and
                    (G) to counter the Chinese Communist Party's 
                efforts to spread disinformation in the People's 
                Republic of China and beyond with respect to the 
                response of the Chinese Communist Party to COVID-19.

                       PART I--WESTERN HEMISPHERE

SEC. 245. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING UNITED STATES-CANADA RELATIONS.

    It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the United States and Canada have a unique relationship 
        based on shared geography, extensive personal connections, deep 
        economic ties, mutual defense commitments, and a shared vision 
        to uphold democracy, human rights, and the rules based 
        international order established after World War II;
            (2) the United States and Canada can better address the 
        People's Republic of China's economic, political, and security 
        influence through closer cooperation on counternarcotics, 
        environmental stewardship, transparent practices in public 
        procurement and infrastructure planning, the Arctic, energy and 
        connectivity issues, trade and commercial relations, bilateral 
        legal matters, and support for democracy, good governance, and 
        human rights;
            (3) amidst the COVID-19 pandemic, the United States and 
        Canada should maintain joint initiatives to address border 
        management, commercial and trade relations and infrastructure, 
        a shared approach with respect to the People's Republic of 
        China, and transnational challenges, including pandemics, 
        energy security, and environmental stewardship;
            (4) the United States and Canada should enhance cooperation 
        to counter Chinese disinformation, influence operations, 
        economic espionage, and propaganda efforts;
            (5) the People's Republic of China's infrastructure 
        investments, particularly in 5G telecommunications technology, 
        extraction of natural resources, and port infrastructure, pose 
        national security risks for the United States and Canada;
            (6) the United States should share, as appropriate, 
        intelligence gathered regarding--
                    (A) Huawei's 5G capabilities; and
                    (B) the PRC government's intentions with respect to 
                5G expansion;
            (7) the United States and Canada should continue to advance 
        collaborative initiatives to implement the January 9, 2020, 
        United States-Canada Joint Action Plan on Critical Minerals 
        Development Collaboration; and
            (8) the United States and Canada must prioritize 
        cooperation on continental defense and in the Arctic, including 
        by modernizing the North American Aerospace Defense Command 
        (NORAD) to effectively defend the Northern Hemisphere against 
        the range of threats by peer competitors, including long-range 
        missiles and high-precision weapons.

SEC. 246. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING THE GOVERNMENT OF CHINA'S 
              ARBITRARY IMPRISONMENT OF CANADIAN CITIZENS.

    It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the Government of the People's Republic of China's 
        apparent arbitrary detention and abusive treatment of Canadian 
        nationals Michael Spavor and Michael Kovrig in apparent 
        retaliation for the Government of Canada's arrest of Meng 
        Wanzhou is deeply concerning;
            (2) the Government of Canada has shown international 
        leadership by--
                    (A) upholding the rule of law and complying with 
                its international legal obligations, including those 
                pursuant to the Extradition Treaty Between the United 
                States of America and Canada, signed at Washington 
                December 3, 1971; and
                    (B) launching the Declaration Against Arbitrary 
                Detention in State-to-State Relations, which has been 
                endorsed by 57 countries and the European Union, and 
                reaffirms well-established prohibitions under 
                international human rights conventions against the 
                arbitrary detention of foreign nationals to be used as 
                leverage in state-to-state relations; and
            (3) the United States continues to join the Government of 
        Canada in calling for the immediate release of Michael Spavor 
        and Michael Kovrig and for due process for Canadian national 
        Robert Schellenberg.

SEC. 247. STRATEGY TO ENHANCE COOPERATION WITH CANADA.

    (a) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the President shall submit a strategy to the 
appropriate congressional committees that describes how the United 
States will enhance cooperation with the Government of Canada in 
managing relations with the PRC government.
    (b) Elements.--The strategy required under subsection (a) shall--
            (1) identify key policy points of convergence and 
        divergence between the United States and Canada in managing 
        relations with the People's Republic of China in the areas of 
        technology, trade, economic practices, cyber security, secure 
        supply chains and critical minerals, and illicit narcotics;
            (2) include a description of United States development and 
        coordination efforts with Canadian counterparts to enhance the 
        cooperation between the United States and Canada with respect 
        to--
                    (A) managing economic relations with the People's 
                Republic of China;
                    (B) democracy and human rights in the People's 
                Republic of China;
                    (C) technology issues involving the People's 
                Republic of China;
                    (D) defense issues involving the People's Republic 
                of China; and
                    (E) international law enforcement and transnational 
                organized crime issues.
            (3) detail diplomatic efforts and future plans to work with 
        Canada to counter the PRC's projection of an authoritarian 
        governing model around the world;
            (4) detail diplomatic, defense, and intelligence 
        cooperation to date and future plans to support Canadian 
        efforts to identify cost-effective alternatives to Huawei's 5G 
        technology;
            (5) detail diplomatic and defense collaboration--
                    (A) to advance joint United States-Canadian 
                priorities for responsible stewardship in the Arctic 
                Region; and
                    (B) to counter the PRC's efforts to project 
                political, economic, and military influence into the 
                Arctic Region; and
            (6) detail diplomatic efforts to work with Canada to track 
        and counter the PRC's attempts to exert influence across the 
        multilateral system, including at the World Health 
        Organization.
    (c) Form.--The strategy required under this section shall be 
submitted in an unclassified form that can be made available to the 
public, but may include a classified annex, if necessary.
    (d) Consultation.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, and not less frequently than every 180 days 
thereafter for 5 years, the Secretary of State shall consult with the 
appropriate congressional committees regarding the development and 
implementation of the strategy required under this section.

SEC. 248. STRATEGY TO STRENGTHEN ECONOMIC COMPETITIVENESS, GOVERNANCE, 
              HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW IN LATIN AMERICA AND 
              THE CARIBBEAN.

    (a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the 
Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Commerce, the Attorney 
General, the United States Trade Representative, and the Chief 
Executive Officer of the United States International Development 
Finance Corporation, shall submit a multi-year strategy for increasing 
United States economic competitiveness and promoting good governance, 
human rights, and the rule of law in Latin American and Caribbean 
countries, particularly in the areas of investment, equitable and 
sustainable development, commercial relations, anti-corruption 
activities, and infrastructure projects, to--
            (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;
            (2) the Committee on Finance of the Senate;
            (3) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;
            (4) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
        Representatives;
            (5) the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of 
        Representatives; and
            (6) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of 
        Representatives.
    (b) Additional Elements.--The strategy required under subsection 
(a) shall include a plan of action, including benchmarks to achieve 
measurable progress, to--
            (1) enhance the technical capacity of countries in the 
        region to advance the sustainable development of equitable 
        economies;
            (2) reduce trade and non-tariff barriers between the 
        countries of the Americas;
            (3) facilitate a more open, transparent, and competitive 
        environment for United States businesses in the region;
            (4) establish frameworks or mechanisms to review long term 
        financial sustainability and security implications of foreign 
        investments in strategic sectors or services, including 
        transportation, communications, natural resources, and energy;
            (5) establish competitive and transparent infrastructure 
        project selection and procurement processes that promote 
        transparency, open competition, financial sustainability, 
        adherence to robust global standards, and the employment of the 
        local workforce;
            (6) strengthen legal structures critical to robust 
        democratic governance, fair competition, combatting corruption, 
        and ending impunity;
            (7) identify and mitigate obstacles to private sector-led 
        economic growth in Latin America and the Caribbean; and
            (8) maintain transparent and affordable access to the 
        internet and digital infrastructure in the Western Hemisphere.
    (c) Briefing Requirement.--Not later than 1 year after the date of 
the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 5 years, the 
Secretary of State, after consultation with the Secretary of the 
Treasury, the Secretary of Commerce, the Attorney General, the United 
States Trade Representative, and the leadership of the United States 
International Development Finance Corporation, shall brief the 
congressional committees listed in subsection (a) regarding the 
implementation of this part, including examples of successes and 
challenges.

SEC. 249. ENGAGEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND THE DEFENSE 
              SECTOR IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN.

    (a) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this section, 
the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
            (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;
            (2) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate;
            (3) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;
            (4) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
        Representatives;
            (5) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
        House of Representatives; and
            (6) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of 
        Representatives.
    (b) Reporting Requirement.--
            (1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, working 
        through the Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and 
        Research, and in coordination with the Director of National 
        Intelligence and the Director of the Central Intelligence 
        Agency, shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional 
        committees that assesses the nature, intent, and impact to 
        United States strategic interests of Chinese diplomatic 
        activity aimed at influencing the decisions, procedures, and 
        programs of multilateral organizations in Latin America and the 
        Caribbean, including the World Bank, International Monetary 
        Fund, Organization of American States, and the Inter-American 
        Development Bank.
            (2) Defense sector.--The report required under paragraph 
        (1) shall include an assessment of the nature, intent, and 
        impact on United States strategic interests of Chinese military 
        activity in Latin America and the Caribbean, including military 
        education and training programs, weapons sales, and space-
        related activities in the military or civilian spheres, such 
        as--
                    (A) the satellite and space control station the 
                People's Republic of China constructed in Argentina; 
                and
                    (B) defense and security cooperation carried out by 
                the People's Republic of China in Latin America and the 
                Caribbean, including sales of surveillance and 
                monitoring technology to governments in the region such 
                as Venezuela, Cuba, Ecuador, and Colombia, and the 
                potential use of such technologies as tools of Chinese 
                intelligence services.
            (3) Form.--The report required under paragraph (1) shall be 
        submitted in unclassified form and shall include classified 
        annexes.

SEC. 250. ADDRESSING CHINA'S SOVEREIGN LENDING PRACTICES IN LATIN 
              AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN.

    (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) since 2005, the Government of the People's Republic of 
        China has expanded sovereign lending to governments in Latin 
        America and the Caribbean with loans that are repaid or 
        collateralized with natural resources or commodities;
            (2) several countries in Latin American and the Caribbean 
        that have received a significant amount of sovereign lending 
        from the Government of the People's Republic of China face 
        challenges in repaying such loans;
            (3) the Government of the People's Republic of China's 
        predatory economic practices and sovereign lending practices in 
        Latin America and the Caribbean negatively influence United 
        States national interests in the Western Hemisphere;
            (4) the Inter-American Development Bank, the premier 
        multilateral development bank dedicated to the Western 
        Hemisphere, should play a significant role supporting the 
        countries of Latin America and the Caribbean in achieving 
        sustainable and serviceable debt structures; and
            (5) a tenth general capital increase for the Inter-American 
        Development Bank would strengthen the Bank's ability to help 
        the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean achieve 
        sustainable and serviceable debt structures.
    (b) Support for a General Capital Increase.--The President shall 
take steps to support a tenth general capital increase for the Inter-
American Development Bank, including advancing diplomatic engagement to 
build support among member countries of the Bank for a tenth general 
capital increase for the Bank.
    (c) Tenth Capital Increase.--The Inter-American Development Bank 
Act (22 U.S.C. 283 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the 
following:

``SEC. 42. TENTH CAPITAL INCREASE.

    ``(a) Vote Authorized.--The United States Governor of the Bank is 
authorized to vote in favor of a resolution to increase the capital 
stock of the Bank by $80,000,000,000 over a period not to exceed 5 
years.
    ``(b) Subscription Authorized.--
            ``(1) In general.--The United States Governor of the Bank 
        may subscribe on behalf of the United States to 1,990,714 
        additional shares of the capital stock of the Bank.
            ``(2) Limitation.--Any subscription by the United States to 
        the capital stock of the Bank shall be effective only to such 
        extent and in such amounts as are provided in advance in 
        appropriations Acts.
    ``(c) Limitations on Authorization of Appropriations.--
            ``(1) In general.--In order to pay for the increase in the 
        United States subscription to the Bank under subsection (b), 
        there is authorized to be appropriated $24,014,857,191 for 
        payment by the Secretary of the Treasury.
            ``(2) Allocation of funds.--Of the amount authorized to be 
        appropriated under paragraph (1)--
                    ``(A) $600,371,430 shall be for paid in shares of 
                the Bank; and
                    ``(B) $23,414,485,761 shall be for callable shares 
                of the Bank.''.
    (d) Addressing China's Sovereign Lending in the Americas.--The 
Secretary of the Treasury and the United States Executive Director to 
the Inter-American Development Bank shall use the voice, vote, and 
influence of the United States--
            (1) to advance efforts by the Bank to help countries 
        restructure debt resulting from sovereign lending by the 
        Government of the People's Republic of China in order to 
        achieve sustainable and serviceable debt structures; and
            (2) to establish appropriate safeguards and transparency 
        and conditionality measures to protect debt-vulnerable member 
        countries of the Inter-American Development Bank that borrow 
        from the Bank for the purposes of restructuring Chinese 
        bilateral debt held by such countries and preventing such 
        countries from incurring subsequent Chinese bilateral debt.
    (e) Briefings.--
            (1) Implementation.--Not later than 90 days after the date 
        of the enactment of this Act, and every 90 days thereafter for 
        6 years, the President shall provide to the Committee on 
        Foreign Relations of the Senate, the Committee on Finance of 
        the Senate, the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
        Representatives, and the Committee on Financial Services of the 
        House of Representatives a briefing detailing efforts to carry 
        out subsection (b) and (d) and the amendment made by subsection 
        (c).
            (2) Progress in achieving sustainable and serviceable debt 
        structures.--Not later than 180 days after the successful 
        completion of a tenth general capital increase for the Inter-
        American Development Bank, and every 180 days thereafter for a 
        period of 3 years, the President shall provide to the Committee 
        on Foreign Relations of the Senate, the Committee on Finance of 
        the Senate, the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
        Representatives, and the Committee on Financial Services of the 
        House of Representatives a briefing on efforts by the Bank to 
        support countries in Latin American and the Caribbean in their 
        efforts to achieve sustainable and serviceable debt structures.

SEC. 251. DEFENSE COOPERATION IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN.

    (a) In General.--There is authorized to be appropriated to the 
Department of State $12,000,000 for the International Military 
Education and Training Program for Latin America and the Caribbean for 
each of fiscal years 2022 through 2026.
    (b) Modernization.--The Secretary of State shall take steps to 
modernize and strengthen the programs receiving funding under 
subsection (a) to ensure that such programs are vigorous, substantive, 
and the preeminent choice for international military education and 
training for Latin American and Caribbean partners.
    (c) Required Elements.--The programs referred to in subsection (a) 
shall--
            (1) provide training and capacity-building opportunities to 
        Latin American and Caribbean security services;
            (2) provide practical skills and frameworks for--
                    (A) improving the functioning and organization of 
                security services in Latin America and the Caribbean;
                    (B) creating a better understanding of the United 
                States and its values; and
                    (C) using technology for maximum efficiency and 
                organization; and
            (3) promote and ensure that security services in Latin 
        America and the Caribbean respect civilian authority and 
        operate in compliance with international norms, standards, and 
        rules of engagement, including a respect for human rights.
    (d) Limitation.--Security assistance under this section is subject 
to limitations as enshrined in the requirements of section 620M of the 
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2378d).

SEC. 252. ENGAGEMENT WITH CIVIL SOCIETY IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE 
              CARIBBEAN REGARDING ACCOUNTABILITY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE 
              RISKS OF PERVASIVE SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGIES.

    (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the Government of the People's Republic of China is 
        exporting its model for internal security and state control of 
        society through advanced technology and artificial 
        intelligence; and
            (2) the inclusion of communication networks and 
        communications supply chains with equipment and services from 
        companies with close ties to or that are susceptible to 
        pressure from governments or security services without reliable 
        legal checks on governmental powers can lead to breaches of 
        citizens' private information, increased censorship, violations 
        of human rights, and harassment of political opponents.
    (b) Diplomatic Engagement.--The Secretary of State shall conduct 
diplomatic engagement with governments and civil society organizations 
in Latin America and the Caribbean to--
            (1) help identify and mitigate the risks to civil liberties 
        posed by technologies and services described in subsection (a); 
        and
            (2) offer recommendations on ways to mitigate such risks.
    (c) Internet Freedom Programs.--The Chief Executive Officer of the 
United States Agency for Global Media, working through the Open 
Technology Fund, and the Secretary of State, working through the Bureau 
of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor's Internet Freedom and Business 
and Human Rights Section, shall expand and prioritize efforts to 
provide anti-censorship technology and services to journalists in Latin 
America and the Caribbean, in order to enhance their ability to safely 
access or share digital news and information.
    (d) Support for Civil Society.--The Secretary of State, through the 
Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 
and in coordination with the Administrator of the United States Agency 
for International Development, shall work through nongovernmental 
organizations to--
            (1) support and promote programs that support internet 
        freedom and the free flow of information online in Latin 
        America and the Caribbean;
            (2) protect open, interoperable, secure, and reliable 
        access to internet in Latin America and the Caribbean;
            (3) provide integrated support to civil society for 
        technology, digital safety, policy and advocacy, and applied 
        research programs in Latin America and the Caribbean;
            (4) train journalists and civil society leaders in Latin 
        America and the Caribbean on investigative techniques necessary 
        to ensure public accountability and prevent government 
        overreach in the digital sphere;
            (5) assist independent media outlets and journalists in 
        Latin America and the Caribbean to build their own capacity and 
        develop high-impact, in-depth news reports covering governance 
        and human rights topics;
            (6) provide training for journalists and civil society 
        leaders on investigative techniques necessary to improve 
        transparency and accountability in government and the private 
        sector;
            (7) provide training on investigative reporting of 
        incidents of corruption and unfair trade, business and 
        commercial practices related to the People's Republic of China, 
        including the role of the Government of the People's Republic 
        of China in such practices;
            (8) assist nongovernmental organizations to strengthen 
        their capacity to monitor the activities described in paragraph 
        (7); and
            (9) identify local resources to support the preponderance 
        of activities that would be carried out under this subsection.
    (e) Briefing Requirement.--Not more than 180 days after the date of 
the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter for 5 years, 
the Secretary of State, the Administrator of the United States Agency 
for International Development, and the Chief Executive Officer of the 
United States Agency for Global Media shall provide a briefing 
regarding the efforts described in subsections (c), (d), and (e) to--
            (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;
            (2) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;
            (3) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
        Representatives; and
            (4) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of 
        Representatives.

                    PART II--TRANSATLANTIC ALLIANCE

SEC. 255. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON THE TRANSATLANTIC ALLIANCE.

    It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the United States, European Union, and European 
        countries are close partners, sharing values grounded in 
        democracy, human rights, transparency, and the rules-based 
        international order established after World War II;
            (2) without a common approach by the United States, 
        European Union, and European countries on connectivity, trade, 
        transnational problems, and support for democracy and human 
        rights, the People's Republic of China will continue to 
        increase its economic, political, and security leverage in 
        Europe;
            (3) the People's Republic of China's deployment of 
        assistance to European countries following the COVID-19 
        outbreak showcased a coercive approach to aid, but it also 
        highlighted Europe's deep economic ties to the People's 
        Republic of China;
            (4) as European states seek to recover from the economic 
        toll of the COVID-19 outbreak, the United States must stand in 
        partnership with Europe to support our collective economic 
        recovery, reinforce our collective national security, and 
        defend shared values;
            (5) the United States, European Union, and European 
        countries should coordinate on joint strategies to diversify 
        reliance on supply chains away from the People's Republic of 
        China, especially in the medical and pharmaceutical sectors;
            (6) the United States, European Union, and European 
        countries should leverage their respective economic innovation 
        capabilities to support the global economic recovery from the 
        COVID-19 recession and draw a contrast with the centralized 
        economy of the People's Republic of China;
            (7) the United States, United Kingdom, and European Union 
        should accelerate efforts to de-escalate their trade disputes, 
        including negotiating a United States-European Union trade 
        agreement that benefits workers and the broader economy in both 
        the United States and European Union;
            (8) the United States, European Union, and Japan should 
        continue trilateral efforts to address economic challenges 
        posed by the People's Republic of China;
            (9) the United States, European Union, and countries of 
        Europe should enhance cooperation to counter PRC 
        disinformation, influence operations, and propaganda efforts;
            (10) the United States and European nations share serious 
        concerns with the repressions being supported and executed by 
        the Government of the People's Republic of China, and should 
        continue implementing measures to address the Government of the 
        People's Republic of China's specific abuses in Tibet, Hong 
        Kong, and Xinjiang, and should build joint mechanisms and 
        programs to prevent the export of China's authoritarian 
        governance model to countries around the world;
            (11) the United States and European nations should remain 
        united in their shared values against attempts by the 
        Government of the People's Republic of China at the United 
        Nations and other multilateral organizations to promote efforts 
        that erode the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, like the 
        ``community of a shared future for mankind'' and 
        ``democratization of international relations'';
            (12) the People's Republic of China's infrastructure 
        investments around the world, particularly in 5G 
        telecommunications technology and port infrastructure, could 
        threaten democracy across Europe and the national security of 
        key countries;
            (13) as appropriate, the United States should share 
        intelligence with European allies and partners on Huawei's 5G 
        capabilities and the intentions of the Government of the 
        People's Republic of China with respect to 5G expansion in 
        Europe;
            (14) the European Union's Investment Screening Regulation, 
        which came into force in October 2020, is a welcome 
        development, and member states should closely scrutinize PRC 
        investments in their countries through their own national 
        investment screening measures;
            (15) the President should actively engage the European 
        Union on the implementation of the Export Control Reform Act 
        regulations and to better harmonize United States and European 
        Union policies with respect to export controls;
            (16) the President should strongly advocate for the listing 
        of more items and technologies to restrict dual use exports 
        controlled at the National Security and above level to the 
        People's Republic of China under the Wassenaar Arrangement;
            (17) the United States should explore the value of 
        establishing a body akin to the Coordinating Committee for 
        Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom) that would specifically 
        coordinate United States and European Union export control 
        policies with respect to limiting exports of sensitive 
        technologies to the People's Republic of China; and
            (18) the United States should work with counterparts in 
        Europe to--
                    (A) evaluate United States and European 
                overreliance on goods originating in the People's 
                Republic of China, including in the medical and 
                pharmaceutical sectors, and develop joint strategies to 
                diversify supply chains;
                    (B) counter PRC efforts to use COVID-19-related 
                assistance as a coercive tool to pressure developing 
                countries by offering relevant United States and 
                European expertise and assistance; and
                    (C) leverage the United States and European private 
                sectors to advance the post-COVID-19 economic recovery.

SEC. 256. STRATEGY TO ENHANCE TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION WITH RESPECT TO 
              THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

    (a) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the President shall brief the Committee on 
Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and 
the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Armed Services of 
the House of Representatives on a strategy for how the United States 
will enhance cooperation with the European Union, NATO, and European 
partner countries with respect to the People's Republic of China.
    (b) Elements.--The briefing required by subsection (a) shall do the 
following:
            (1) Identify the senior Senate-confirmed Department of 
        State official that leads United States efforts to cooperate 
        with the European Union, NATO, and European partner countries 
        to advance a shared approach with respect to the People's 
        Republic of China.
            (2) Identify key policy points of convergence and 
        divergence between the United States and European partners with 
        respect to the People's Republic of China in the areas of 
        technology, trade, and economic practices.
            (3) Describe efforts to advance shared interests with 
        European counterparts on--
                    (A) economic challenges with respect to the 
                People's Republic of China;
                    (B) democracy and human rights challenges with 
                respect to the People's Republic of China;
                    (C) technology issues with respect to the People's 
                Republic of China;
                    (D) defense issues with respect to the People's 
                Republic of China; and
                    (E) developing a comprehensive strategy to respond 
                to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) established by 
                the Government of the People's Republic of China.
            (4) Describe the coordination mechanisms among key regional 
        and functional bureaus within the Department of State and 
        Department of Defense tasked with engaging with European 
        partners on the People's Republic of China.
            (5) Detail diplomatic efforts up to the date of the 
        briefing and future plans to work with European partners to 
        counter the Government of the People's Republic of China's 
        advancement of an authoritarian governance model around the 
        world.
            (6) Detail the diplomatic efforts made up to the date of 
        the briefing and future plans to support European efforts to 
        identify cost-effective alternatives to Huawei's 5G technology.
            (7) Detail how United States public diplomacy tools, 
        including the Global Engagement Center of the Department of 
        State, will coordinate efforts with counterpart entities within 
        the European Union to counter Chinese propaganda.
            (8) Describe the staffing and budget resources the 
        Department of State dedicates to engagement between the United 
        States and the European Union on the People's Republic of China 
        and provide an assessment of out-year resource needs to execute 
        the strategy.
            (9) Detail diplomatic efforts to work with European 
        partners to track and counter Chinese attempts to exert 
        influence across multilateral fora, including at the World 
        Health Organization.
    (c) Form.--The briefing required by section (a) shall be 
classified.
    (d) Consultation.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter for 5 years, the 
Secretary of State shall consult with the appropriate congressional 
committees regarding the development and implementation of the elements 
described in subsection (b).

SEC. 257. ENHANCING TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION ON PROMOTING PRIVATE 
              SECTOR FINANCE.

    (a) In General.--The President should work with transatlantic 
partners to build on the agreement among the Development Finance 
Corporation, FinDev Canada, and the European Development Finance 
Institutions (called the DFI Alliance) to enhance coordination on 
shared objectives to foster private sector-led development and provide 
market-based alternatives to state-directed financing in emerging 
markets, particularly as related to the People's Republic of China's 
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), including by integrating efforts such 
as--
            (1) the European Union Strategy on Connecting Europe and 
        Asia;
            (2) the Three Seas Initiative and Three Seas Initiative 
        Fund;
            (3) the Blue Dot Network among the United States, Japan, 
        and Australia; and
            (4) a European Union-Japan initiative that has leveraged 
        $65,000,000,000 for infrastructure projects and emphasizes 
        transparency standards.
    (b) Cooperation at the United Nations.--The United States, European 
Union, and European countries should coordinate efforts to address the 
Government of the People's Republic of China's use of the United 
Nations to advance and legitimize BRI as a global good, including the 
proliferation of memoranda of understanding between the People's 
Republic of China and United Nations funds and programs on BRI 
implementation.
    (c) Standards.--The United States and the European Union should 
coordinate and develop a strategy to enhance transatlantic cooperation 
with the OECD and the Paris Club on ensuring the highest possible 
standards for Belt and Road Initiative contracts and terms with 
developing countries.

SEC. 258. REPORT AND BRIEFING ON COOPERATION BETWEEN CHINA AND IRAN AND 
              BETWEEN CHINA AND RUSSIA.

    (a) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this section, 
the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
            (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Select 
        Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Armed Services, the 
        Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, the 
        Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, the Committee on 
        Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee on Finance, 
        and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and
            (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Permanent Select 
        Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Armed Services, the 
        Committee on Energy and Commerce, the Committee on Financial 
        Services, the Committee on Ways and Means, and the Committee on 
        Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
    (b) Report and Briefing Required.--
            (1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act, the Director of National 
        Intelligence shall, in coordination with the Secretary of 
        State, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Commerce, the 
        Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of the Treasury, and such 
        other heads of Federal agencies as the Director considers 
        appropriate, submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a 
        report and brief the appropriate committees of Congress on 
        cooperation between the People's Republic of China and the 
        Islamic Republic of Iran and between the People's Republic of 
        China and the Russian Federation.
            (2) Contents.--The report submitted under paragraph (1) 
        shall include the following elements:
                    (A) An identification of major areas of diplomatic 
                energy, infrastructure, banking, financial, economic, 
                military, and space cooperation--
                            (i) between the People's Republic of China 
                        and the Islamic Republic of Iran; and
                            (ii) between the People's Republic of China 
                        and the Russian Federation.
                    (B) An assessment of the effect of the COVID-19 
                pandemic on such cooperation.
                    (C) An assessment of the effect that United States 
                compliance with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action 
                (JCPOA) starting in January 14, 2016, and United States 
                withdrawal from the JCPOA on May 8, 2018, had on the 
                cooperation described in subparagraph (A)(i).
                    (D) An assessment of the effect on the cooperation 
                described in subparagraph (A)(i) that would be had by 
                the United States reentering compliance with the JCPOA 
                or a successor agreement and the effect of the United 
                States not reentering compliance with the JCPOA or 
                reaching a successor agreement.
            (3) Form.--The report submitted under paragraph (1) shall 
        be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified 
        annex.
    (c) Sense of Congress on Sharing With Allies and Partners.--It is 
the sense of Congress that the Director of National Intelligence and 
the heads of other appropriate Federal departments and agencies should 
share the findings of the report submitted under subsection (b) with 
important allies and partners of the United States, as appropriate.

SEC. 259. PROMOTING RESPONSIBLE DEVELOPMENT ALTERNATIVES TO THE BELT 
              AND ROAD INITIATIVE.

    (a) In General.--The President should seek opportunities to partner 
with multilateral development finance institutions to develop financing 
tools based on shared development finance criteria and mechanisms to 
support investments in developing countries that--
            (1) support low carbon economic development; and
            (2) promote resiliency and adaptation to environmental 
        changes.
    (b) Partnership Agreement.--The Chief Executive Officer of the 
United States International Development Finance Corporation should seek 
to partner with other multilateral development finance institutions and 
development finance institutions to leverage the respective available 
funds to support low carbon economic development, which may include 
nuclear energy projects, environmental adaptation, and resilience 
activities in developing countries.
    (c) Alternatives to the People's Republic of China's Belt and Road 
Initiative.--The President shall work with European counterparts to 
establish a formal United States-European Commission Working Group to 
develop a comprehensive strategy to develop alternatives to the 
Government of the People's Republic of China's Belt and Road Initiative 
for development finance. United States participants in the working 
group shall seek to integrate existing efforts into the strategy, 
including efforts to address the Government of the People's Republic of 
China's use of the United Nations to advance the Belt and Road 
Initiative, including the proliferation of memoranda of understanding 
between the People's Republic of China and United Nations funds and 
programs regarding the implementation of the Belt and Road Initiative.
    (d) Co-financing of Infrastructure Projects.--
            (1) Authorization.--Subject to paragraph (2), the Secretary 
        of State, the Administrator of the United States Development 
        Agency, and other relevant agency heads are authorized to co-
        finance infrastructure projects that advance the development 
        objectives of the United States overseas and provide viable 
        alternatives to projects that would otherwise be included 
        within China's Belt and Road Initiative.
            (2) Conditions.--Co-financing arrangements authorized 
        pursuant to paragraph (1) may not be approved unless--
                    (A) the projects to be financed--
                            (i) promote the public good;
                            (ii) promote low carbon emissions, which 
                        may include nuclear energy projects; and
                            (iii) will have substantially lower 
                        environmental impact than the proposed Belt and 
                        Road Initiative alternative; and
                    (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
                Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the 
                House of Representatives are notified not later than 15 
                days in advance of entering into such co-financing 
                arrangements.

                    PART III--SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA

SEC. 261. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA.

    It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the United States should continue to stand with friends 
        and partners in South and Central Asia as they contend with 
        efforts by the Government of the People's Republic of China to 
        interfere in their respective political systems and encroach 
        upon their sovereign territory; and
            (2) the United States should reaffirm its commitment to the 
        Comprehensive Global Strategic Partnership with India and 
        further deepen bilateral defense consultations and 
        collaboration with India commensurate with its status as a 
        major defense partner.

SEC. 262. STRATEGY TO ENHANCE COOPERATION WITH SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA.

    (a) In General.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the Committee on 
Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and 
the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Armed Services of 
the House of Representatives a strategy for how the United States will 
engage with the countries of South and Central Asia, including through 
the C5+1 mechanism, with respect to the People's Republic of China.
    (b) Elements.--The strategy required under subsection (a) shall 
include the following elements:
            (1) A detailed description of the security and economic 
        challenges that the People's Republic of China poses to the 
        countries of South and Central Asia, including border disputes 
        with South and Central Asian countries that border the People's 
        Republic of China, PRC investments in land and sea ports, 
        transportation infrastructure, and energy projects across the 
        region.
            (2) A detailed description of United States efforts to 
        provide alternatives to PRC investment in infrastructure and 
        other sectors in South and Central Asia.
            (3) A detailed description of bilateral and regional 
        efforts to work with countries in South Asia on strategies to 
        build resilience against PRC efforts to interfere in their 
        political systems and economies.
            (4) A detailed description of United States diplomatic 
        efforts to work with the Government of Afghanistan on 
        addressing the challenges posed by PRC investment in the Afghan 
        mineral sector.
            (5) A detailed description of United States diplomatic 
        efforts with the Government of Pakistan with respect to matters 
        relevant to the People's Republic of China, including 
        investments by the People's Republic of China in Pakistan 
        through the Belt and Road Initiative.
            (6) In close consultation with the Government of India, 
        identification of areas where the United States Government can 
        provide diplomatic and other support as appropriate for India's 
        efforts to address economic and security challenges posed by 
        the People's Republic of China in the region.
            (7) A description of the coordination mechanisms among key 
        regional and functional bureaus within the Department of State 
        and Department of Defense tasked with engaging with the 
        countries of South and Central Asia on issues relating to the 
        People's Republic of China.
            (8) A description of the efforts being made by Federal 
        departments agencies, including the Department of State, the 
        United States Agency for International Development, the 
        Department of Commerce, the Department of Energy, and the 
        Office of the United States Trade Representative, to help the 
        nations of South and Central Asia develop trade and commerce 
        links that will help those nations diversify their trade away 
        from the People's Republic of China.
            (9) A detailed description of United States diplomatic 
        efforts with Central Asian countries, Turkey, and any other 
        countries with significant populations of Uyghurs and other 
        ethnic minorities fleeing persecution in the People's Republic 
        of China to press those countries to refrain from deporting 
        ethnic minorities to the People's Republic of China, protect 
        ethnic minorities from intimidation by Chinese government 
        authorities, and protect the right to the freedoms of assembly 
        and expression.
    (c) Form.--The strategy required under section (a) shall be 
submitted in an unclassified form that can be made available to the 
public, but may include a classified annex as necessary.
    (d) Consultation.--Not later than 120 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, and not less than annually thereafter for 5 
years, the Secretary of State shall consult with the Committee on 
Foreign Relations and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate and 
the Committee of Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Appropriations of 
the House of Representatives regarding the development and 
implementation of the strategy required under subsection (a).

                            PART IV--AFRICA

SEC. 271. ASSESSMENT OF POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND SECURITY ACTIVITY OF 
              THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN AFRICA.

    (a) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this section, 
the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
            (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on 
        Armed Services, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
        Senate; and
            (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on 
        Armed Services, and the Permanent Select Committee on 
        Intelligence of the House of Representatives.
    (b) Intelligence Assessment.--Not later than 180 days after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall, in 
coordination with the Director of National Intelligence, submit to the 
appropriate committees of Congress a report that assesses the nature 
and impact of the People's Republic of China's political, economic, and 
security sector activity in Africa, and its impact on United States 
strategic interests, including--
            (1) the amount and impact of direct investment, loans, 
        development financing, oil-for-loans deals, and other 
        preferential trading arrangements;
            (2) the involvement of PRC state-owned enterprises in 
        Africa;
            (3) the amount of African debt held by the People's 
        Republic of China;
            (4) the involvement of PRC private security, technology and 
        media companies in Africa;
            (5) the scale and impact of PRC arms sales to African 
        countries;
            (6) the scope of Chinese investment in and control of 
        African energy resources and minerals critical for emerging and 
        foundational technologies;
            (7) an analysis on the linkages between Beijing's aid and 
        assistance to African countries and African countries 
        supporting PRC geopolitical goals in international fora;
            (8) the methods, tools, and tactics used to facilitate 
        illegal and corrupt activity, including trade in counterfeit 
        and illicit goods, to include smuggled extractive resources and 
        wildlife products, from Africa to the People's Republic of 
        China;
            (9) the methods and techniques that the People's Republic 
        of China uses to exert undue influence on African governments 
        and facilitate corrupt activity in Africa, including through 
        the CCP's party-to-party training program, and to influence 
        African multilateral organizations; and
            (10) an analysis of the soft power, cultural and 
        educational activities undertaken by the PRC and CCP to seek to 
        expand its influence in Africa.

SEC. 272. INCREASING THE COMPETITIVENESS OF THE UNITED STATES IN 
              AFRICA.

    (a) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this section, 
the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
            (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on 
        Appropriations, and the Committee on Finance of the Senate; and
            (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on 
        Appropriations, and the Committee on Ways and Means of the 
        House of Representatives.
    (b) Strategy Requirement.--Not later than 180 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall, in 
consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of 
Commerce, the Attorney General, the United States Trade Representative, 
the Administrator of the United States Agency for International 
Development, and the leadership of the United States International 
Development Finance Corporation, submit to the appropriate committees 
of Congress a report setting forth a multi-year strategy for increasing 
United States economic competitiveness and promoting improvements in 
the investment climate in Africa, including through support for 
democratic institutions, the rule of law, including property rights, 
and for improved transparency, anti-corruption and governance.
    (c) Elements.--The strategy submitted pursuant to subsection (a) 
shall include--
            (1) a description and assessment of barriers to United 
        States investment in Africa for United States businesses, 
        including a clear identification of the different barriers 
        facing small-sized and medium-sized businesses, and an 
        assessment of whether existing programs effectively address 
        such barriers;
            (2) a description and assessment of barriers to African 
        diaspora investment in Africa, and recommendations to overcome 
        such barriers;
            (3) an identification of the economic sectors in the United 
        States that have a comparative advantage in African markets;
            (4) a determination of priority African countries for 
        promoting two-way trade and investment and an assessment of 
        additional foreign assistance needs, including democracy and 
        governance and rule of law support, to promote a conducive 
        operating environment in priority countries;
            (5) an identification of opportunities for strategic 
        cooperation with European allies on trade and investment in 
        Africa, and for establishing a dialogue on trade, security, 
        development, and environmental issues of mutual interest; and
            (6) a plan to regularly host a United States-Africa Leaders 
        Summit to promote two-way trade and investment, strategic 
        engagement, and security in Africa
    (d) Assessment of United States Government Human Resources 
Capacity.--The Comptroller General of the United States shall--
            (1) conduct a review of the number of Foreign Commercial 
        Service Officers and Department of State Economic Officers at 
        United States embassies in sub-Saharan Africa; and
            (2) develop and submit to the appropriate congressional 
        committees an assessment of whether human resource capacity in 
        such embassies is adequate to meet the goals of the various 
        trade and economic programs and initiatives in Africa, 
        including the African Growth and Opportunity Act and Prosper 
        Africa.

SEC. 273. DIGITAL SECURITY COOPERATION WITH RESPECT TO AFRICA.

    (a) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this section, 
the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
            (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on 
        Armed Services, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
        Senate; and
            (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on 
        Armed Services, and the Permanent Select Committee on 
        Intelligence of the House of Representatives.
    (b) Interagency Working Group to Counter PRC Cyber Aggression in 
Africa.--
            (1) In general.--The President shall establish an 
        interagency Working Group, which shall include representatives 
        of the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the 
        Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and such other 
        agencies of the United States Government as the President 
        considers appropriate, on means to counter PRC cyber aggression 
        with respect to Africa.
            (2) Duties.--The Working Group established pursuant to this 
        subsection shall develop and submit to the appropriate 
        congressional committees a set of recommendations for--
                    (A) bolstering the capacity of governments in 
                Africa to ensure the integrity of their data networks 
                and critical infrastructure where applicable;
                    (B) providing alternatives to Huawei;
                    (C) an action plan for United States embassies in 
                Africa to offer to provide assistance to host-country 
                governments with respect to protecting their vital 
                digital networks and infrastructure from PRC espionage, 
                including an assessment of staffing resources needed to 
                implement the action plan in embassies in Africa;
                    (D) utilizing interagency resources to counter PRC 
                disinformation and propaganda in traditional and 
                digital media targeted to African audiences; and
                    (E) helping civil society in Africa counter digital 
                authoritarianism and identifying tools and assistance 
                to enhance and promote digital democracy.

SEC. 274. INCREASING PERSONNEL IN UNITED STATES EMBASSIES IN SUB-
              SAHARAN AFRICA FOCUSED ON THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

    The Secretary of State may station on a permanent basis Department 
of State personnel at such United States embassies in sub-Saharan 
Africa as the Secretary considers appropriate focused on the 
activities, policies and investments of the People's Republic of China 
in Africa.

SEC. 275. SUPPORT FOR YOUNG AFRICAN LEADERS INITIATIVE.

    (a) Finding.--Congress finds that youth in Africa can have a 
positive impact on efforts to foster economic growth, improve public 
sector transparency and governance, and counter extremism, and should 
be an area of focus for United States outreach on the continent.
    (b) Policy.--It is the policy of the United States, in cooperation 
and collaboration with private sector companies, civic organizations, 
nongovernmental organizations, and national and regional public sector 
entities, to commit resources to enhancing the entrepreneurship and 
leadership skills of African youth with the objective of enhancing 
their ability to serve as leaders in the public and private sectors in 
order to help them spur growth and prosperity, strengthen democratic 
governance, and enhance peace and security in their respective 
countries of origin and across Africa.
    (c) Young African Leaders Initiative.--
            (1) In general.--There is hereby established the Young 
        African Leaders Initiative, to be carried out by the Secretary 
        of State.
            (2) Fellowships.--The Secretary is authorized to support 
        the participation in the Initiative established under this 
        paragraph, in the United States, of fellows from Africa each 
        year for such education and training in leadership and 
        professional development through the Department of State as the 
        Secretary of State considers appropriate. The Secretary shall 
        establish and publish criteria for eligibility for 
        participation as such a fellow, and for selection of fellows 
        among eligible applicants for a fellowship.
            (3) Reciprocal exchanges.--Under the Initiative, United 
        States citizens may engage in such reciprocal exchanges in 
        connection with and collaboration on projects with fellows 
        under paragraph (1) as the Secretary considers appropriate.
            (4) Regional centers and networks.--The Administrator of 
        the United States Agency for International Development shall 
        establish each of the following:
                    (A) Not fewer than four regional centers in Africa 
                to provide in-person and online training throughout the 
                year in business and entrepreneurship, civic 
                leadership, and public management.
                    (B) An online network that provides information and 
                online courses on, and connections with leaders in, the 
                private and public sectors in Africa.
    (d) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the 
Secretary of State should increase the number of fellows from Africa 
participating in the Mandela Washington Fellowship above the current 
700 projected for fiscal year 2021.

SEC. 276. AFRICA BROADCASTING NETWORKS.

    Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this 
Act, the CEO of the United States Agency for Global Media shall submit 
to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the resources 
and timeline needed to establish within the Agency an organization 
whose mission shall be to promote democratic values and institutions in 
Africa by providing objective, accurate, and relevant news and 
information to the people of Africa and counter disinformation from 
malign actors, especially in countries where a free press is banned by 
the government or not fully established, about the region, the world, 
and the United States through uncensored news, responsible discussion, 
and open debate.

                  PART V--MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

SEC. 281. STRATEGY TO COUNTER CHINESE INFLUENCE IN, AND ACCESS TO, THE 
              MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA.

    (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the economic influence of the People's Republic of 
        China through its oil and gas imports from the Middle East, 
        infrastructure investments, technology transfer, and arms sales 
        provides influence and leverage that runs counter to United 
        States interests in the region;
            (2) the People's Republic of China seeks to erode United 
        States influence in the Middle East and North Africa through 
        the sale of Chinese arms, associated weapons technology, and 
        joint weapons research and development initiatives;
            (3) the People's Republic of China seeks to establish 
        military or dual use facilities in geographically strategic 
        locations in the Middle East and North Africa to further the 
        Chinese Communist Party's Belt and Road Initiative at the 
        expense of United States national security interests; and
            (4) the export of certain communications infrastructure 
        from the People's Republic of China degrades the security of 
        partner networks, exposes intellectual property to theft, 
        threatens the ability of the United States to conduct security 
        cooperation with compromised regional partners, and furthers 
        China's authoritarian surveillance model.
    (b) Strategy Required.--
            (1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in 
        consultation with the Administrator of the United States Agency 
        for International Development and the heads of other 
        appropriate Federal agencies, shall jointly develop and submit 
        to the appropriate congressional committees a strategy for 
        countering and limiting Chinese influence in, and access to, 
        the Middle East and North Africa.
            (2) Elements.--The strategy required under paragraph (1) 
        shall include--
                    (A) an assessment of the People's Republic of 
                China's intent with regards to increased cooperation 
                with Middle East and North African countries and how 
                these activities fit into its broader global strategic 
                objectives;
                    (B) an assessment of how governments across the 
                region are responding to the People's Republic of 
                China's efforts to increase its military presence in 
                their countries;
                    (C) efforts to improve regional cooperation through 
                foreign military sales, financing, and efforts to build 
                partner capacity and increase interoperability with the 
                United States;
                    (D) an assessment of the People's Republic of 
                China's joint research and development with the Middle 
                East and North Africa, impacts on the United States' 
                national security interests, and recommended steps to 
                mitigate the People's Republic of China's influence in 
                this area;
                    (E) an assessment of arms sales and weapons 
                technology transfers from the People's Republic of 
                China to the Middle East and North Africa, impacts on 
                United States' national security interests, and 
                recommended steps to mitigate the People's Republic of 
                China's influence in this area;
                    (F) an assessment of the People's Republic of 
                China's military sales to the region including lethal 
                and non-lethal unmanned aerial systems;
                    (G) an assessment of People's Republic of China 
                military basing and dual-use facility initiatives 
                across the Middle East and North Africa, impacts on 
                United States' national security interests, and 
                recommended steps to mitigate the People's Republic of 
                China's influence in this area;
                    (H) efforts to improve regional security 
                cooperation with United States allies and partners with 
                a focus on--
                            (i) maritime security in the Arabian Gulf, 
                        the Red Sea, and the Eastern Mediterranean;
                            (ii) integrated air and missile defense;
                            (iii) cyber security;
                            (iv) border security; and
                            (v) critical infrastructure security, to 
                        include energy security;
                    (I) increased support for government-to-government 
                engagement on critical infrastructure development 
                projects including ports and water infrastructure;
                    (J) efforts to encourage United States private 
                sector and public-private partnerships in healthcare 
                technology and foreign direct investment in non-energy 
                sectors;
                    (K) efforts to expand youth engagement and 
                professional education exchanges with key partner 
                countries;
                    (L) specific steps to counter increased investment 
                from the People's Republic of China in 
                telecommunications infrastructure and diplomatic 
                efforts to stress the political, economic, and social 
                benefits of a free and open internet;
                    (M) efforts to promote United States private sector 
                engagement in and public-private partnerships on 
                renewable energy development;
                    (N) the expansion of public-private partnership 
                efforts on water, desalination, and irrigation 
                projects; and
                    (O) efforts to warn United States partners in the 
                Middle East and North Africa of the risks associated 
                with the People's Republic of China's 
                telecommunications infrastructure and provide 
                alternative ``clean paths'' to the People's Republic of 
                China's technology.

SEC. 282. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA ENGAGEMENT.

    (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) The United States and the international community have 
        long-term interests in the stability, security, and prosperity 
        of the people of the Middle East and North Africa.
            (2) In addition to and apart from military and security 
        efforts, the United States should harness a whole of government 
        approach, including bilateral and multilateral statecraft, 
        economic lines of effort, and public diplomacy to compete with 
        and counter Chinese Communist Party influence.
            (3) A clearly articulated positive narrative of United 
        States engagement, transparent governance structures, and 
        active civil society engagement help counter predatory foreign 
        investment and influence efforts.
    (b) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United States 
that the United States and the international community should continue 
diplomatic and economic efforts throughout the Middle East and North 
Africa that support reform efforts to--
            (1) promote greater economic opportunity;
            (2) foster private sector development;
            (3) strengthen civil society; and
            (4) promote transparent and democratic governance and the 
        rule of law.

                         PART VI--ARCTIC REGION

SEC. 285. ARCTIC DIPLOMACY.

    (a) Sense of Congress on Arctic Security.--It is the sense of 
Congress that--
            (1) the rapidly changing Arctic environment--
                    (A) creates new national and regional security 
                challenges due to increased military activity in the 
                Arctic;
                    (B) heightens the risk of the Arctic emerging as a 
                major theater of conflict in ongoing strategic 
                competition;
                    (C) threatens maritime safety as Arctic littoral 
                nations have inadequate capacity to patrol the 
                increased vessel traffic in this remote region, which 
                is a result of diminished annual levels of sea ice;
                    (D) impacts public safety due to increased human 
                activity in the Arctic region where search and rescue 
                capacity remains very limited; and
                    (E) threatens the health of the Arctic's fragile 
                and pristine environment and the unique and highly 
                sensitive species found in the Arctic's marine and 
                terrestrial ecosystems; and
            (2) the United States should reduce the consequences 
        outlined in paragraph (1) by--
                    (A) carefully evaluating the wide variety and 
                dynamic set of security and safety risks unfolding in 
                the Arctic;
                    (B) developing policies and making preparations to 
                mitigate and respond to threats and risks in the 
                Arctic, including by continuing to work with allies and 
                partners in the Arctic region to deter potential 
                aggressive activities and build Arctic competencies;
                    (C) adequately funding the National Earth System 
                Prediction Capability to substantively improve weather, 
                ocean, and ice predictions on the time scales necessary 
                to ensure regional security and trans-Arctic shipping;
                    (D) investing in resources, including a 
                significantly expanded icebreaker fleet, to ensure that 
                the United States has adequate capacity to prevent and 
                respond to security threats in the Arctic region;
                    (E) pursuing diplomatic engagements with all 
                nations in the Arctic region for--
                            (i) maintaining peace and stability in the 
                        Arctic region;
                            (ii) fostering cooperation on stewardship 
                        and safety initiatives in the Arctic region;
                            (iii) ensuring safe and efficient 
                        management of commercial maritime traffic in 
                        the Arctic;
                            (iv) promoting responsible natural resource 
                        management and economic development; and
                            (v) countering China's Polar Silk Road 
                        initiative; and
                    (F) examining the possibility of reconvening the 
                Arctic Chiefs of Defense Forum.
    (b) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United States--
            (1) to recognize only the nations enumerated in subsection 
        (c)(1) as Arctic nations, and to reject all other claims to 
        this status; and
            (2) that the militarization of the Arctic poses a serious 
        threat to Arctic peace and stability, and the interests of 
        United States allies and partners.
    (c) Definitions.--In this section:
            (1) Arctic nations.--The term ``Arctic nations'' means the 
        8 nations with territory or exclusive economic zones that 
        extend north of the 66.56083 parallel latitude north of the 
        equator, namely Russia, Canada, the United States, Norway, 
        Denmark (including Greenland), Finland, Sweden, and Iceland.
            (2) Arctic region.--The term ``Arctic Region'' means the 
        geographic region north of the 66.56083 parallel latitude north 
        of the equator.
    (d) Designation.--The Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans and 
International Environmental and Scientific Affairs (OES) shall 
designate a deputy assistant secretary serving within the Bureau of 
Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs as 
``Deputy Assistant Secretary for Arctic Affairs'', who shall be 
responsible for OES affairs in the Arctic Region.
    (e) Duties.--The Deputy Assistant Secretary for Arctic Affairs 
shall--
            (1) facilitate the development and coordination of United 
        States foreign policy in the Arctic Region relating to--
                    (A) strengthening institutions for cooperation 
                among the Arctic nations;
                    (B) enhancing scientific monitoring and research on 
                local, regional, and global environmental issues;
                    (C) protecting the Arctic environment and 
                conserving its biological resources;
                    (D) promoting responsible natural resource 
                management and economic development; and
                    (E) involving Arctic indigenous people in decisions 
                that affect them.
            (2) coordinate the diplomatic objectives with respect to 
        the activities described in paragraph (1), and, as appropriate, 
        represent the United States within multilateral fora that 
        address international cooperation and foreign policy matters in 
        the Arctic Region;
            (3) help inform, in coordination with the Bureau of 
        Economic and Business Affairs, transnational commerce and 
        commercial maritime transit in the Arctic Region;
            (4) coordinate the integration of scientific data on the 
        current and projected effects of emerging environmental changes 
        on the Arctic Region and ensure that such data is applied to 
        the development of security strategies for the Arctic Region;
            (5) make available the methods and approaches on the 
        integration of environmental science and data to other regional 
        security planning programs in the Department of State to better 
        ensure that broader decision making processes may more 
        adequately account for the changing environment;
            (6) assist with the development of, and facilitate the 
        implementation of, an Arctic Region Security Policy in 
        accordance with subsection (f);
            (7) use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States 
        to encourage other countries and international multilateral 
        organizations to support the principles of the Arctic Region 
        Security Policy implemented pursuant to subsection (f); and
            (8) perform such other duties and exercise such powers as 
        the Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans and International 
        Environmental and Scientific Affairs shall prescribe.
    (f) Rank and Status.--The Secretary of State may change the title 
of the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Arctic Affairs designated under 
subsection (c) to Special Representative or Special Envoy with the rank 
of Ambassador if--
            (1) the President nominates the person so designated to 
        that rank and status; and
            (2) the Senate confirms such person to such rank and 
        status.
    (g) Arctic Region Security Policy.--The Bureau of European and 
Eurasian Affairs shall be the lead bureau for developing and 
implementing the United States' Arctic Region Security Policy, in 
coordination with the Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental 
and Scientific Affairs, the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, 
embassies, other regional bureaus, and relevant offices to advance 
United States national security interests, including through conflict 
prevention efforts, security assistance, humanitarian disaster response 
and prevention, and economic and other relevant assistance programs. 
The Arctic Region Security Policy shall assess, develop, budget for, 
and implement plans, policies, and actions--
            (1) to bolster the diplomatic presence of the United States 
        in Arctic nations, including through enhancements to diplomatic 
        missions and facilities, participation in regional and 
        bilateral dialogues related to Arctic security, and 
        coordination of United States initiatives and assistance 
        programs across agencies to protect the national security of 
        the United States and its allies and partners;
            (2) to enhance the resilience capacities of Arctic nations 
        to the effects of environmental change and increased civilian 
        and military activity by Arctic nations and other nations that 
        may result from increased accessibility of the Arctic Region;
            (3) to assess specific added risks to the Arctic Region and 
        Arctic nations that--
                    (A) are vulnerable to the changing Arctic 
                environment; and
                    (B) are strategically significant to the United 
                States;
            (4) to coordinate the integration of environmental change 
        and national security risk and vulnerability assessments into 
        the decision making process on foreign assistance awards with 
        Greenland;
            (5) to advance principles of good governance by encouraging 
        and cooperating with Arctic nations on collaborative 
        approaches--
                    (A) to responsibly manage natural resources in the 
                Arctic Region;
                    (B) to share the burden of ensuring maritime safety 
                in the Arctic Region;
                    (C) to prevent the escalation of security tensions 
                by mitigating against the militarization of the Arctic 
                Region;
                    (D) to develop mutually agreed upon multilateral 
                policies among Arctic nations on the management of 
                maritime transit routes through the Arctic Region and 
                work cooperatively on the transit policies for access 
                to and transit in the Arctic Region by non-Arctic 
                nations; and
                    (E) to facilitate the development of Arctic Region 
                Security Action Plans to ensure stability and public 
                safety in disaster situations in a humane and 
                responsible fashion; and
            (6) to evaluate the vulnerability, security, survivability, 
        and resiliency of United States interests and non-defense 
        assets in the Arctic Region.

                           PART VII--OCEANIA

SEC. 291. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON UNITED STATES ENGAGEMENT IN OCEANIA.

    It shall be the policy of the United States--
            (1) to elevate the countries of Oceania as a strategic 
        national security and economic priority of the United States 
        Government;
            (2) to promote civil society, the rule of law, and 
        democratic governance across Oceania as part of a free and open 
        Indo-Pacific region;
            (3) to broaden and deepen relationships with the Freely 
        Associated States of the Republic of Palau, the Republic of the 
        Marshall Islands, and the Federated States of Micronesia 
        through robust defense, diplomatic, economic, and development 
        exchanges that promote the goals of individual states and the 
        entire region;
            (4) to work with the governments of Australia, New Zealand, 
        and Japan to advance shared alliance goals of the Oceania 
        region concerning health, environmental protection, disaster 
        resilience and preparedness, illegal, unreported and 
        unregulated fishing, maritime security, and economic 
        development;
            (5) to participate, wherever possible and appropriate, in 
        existing regional organizations and international structures to 
        promote the national security and economic goals of the United 
        States and countries of the Oceania region;
            (6) to invest in a whole-of-government United States 
        strategy that will enhance youth engagement and advance long-
        term growth and development throughout the region, especially 
        as it relates to protecting marine resources that are critical 
        to livelihoods and strengthening the resilience of the 
        countries of the Oceania region against current and future 
        threats resulting from extreme weather and severe changes in 
        the environment;
            (7) to deter and combat acts of malign foreign influence 
        and corruption aimed at undermining the political, 
        environmental, social, and economic stability of the people and 
        governments of the countries of Oceania;
            (8) to improve the local capacity of the countries of 
        Oceania to address public health challenges and improve global 
        health security;
            (9) to help the countries of Oceania access market-based 
        private sector investments that adhere to best practices 
        regarding transparency, debt sustainability, and environmental 
        and social safeguards as an alternative to state-directed 
        investments by authoritarian governments;
            (10) to ensure the people and communities of Oceania remain 
        safe from the risks of old and degrading munitions hazards and 
        other debris that threaten health and livelihoods;
            (11) to cooperate with Taiwan by offering United States 
        support for maintaining Taiwan's diplomatic partners in 
        Oceania; and
            (12) to work cooperatively with all governments in Oceania 
        to promote the dignified return of the remains of members of 
        the United States Armed Forces that are missing in action from 
        previous conflicts in the Indo-Pacific region.

SEC. 292. OCEANIA STRATEGIC ROADMAP.

    (a) Oceania Strategic Roadmap.--Not later than 180 days after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit 
to the appropriate congressional committees a strategic roadmap for 
strengthening United States engagement with the countries of Oceania, 
including an analysis of opportunities to cooperate with Australia, New 
Zealand, and Japan, to address shared concerns and promote shared goals 
in pursuit of security and resiliency in the countries of Oceania.
    (b) Elements.--The strategic roadmap required by subsection (a) 
shall include the following:
            (1) A description of United States regional goals and 
        concerns with respect to Oceania and increasing engagement with 
        the countries of Oceania.
            (2) An assessment, based on paragraph (1), of United States 
        regional goals and concerns that are shared by Australia, New 
        Zealand, and Japan, including a review of issues related to 
        anticorruption, maritime and other security issues, 
        environmental protection, fisheries management, economic growth 
        and development, and disaster resilience and preparedness.
            (3) A review of ongoing programs and initiatives by the 
        governments of the United States, Australia, New Zealand, and 
        Japan in pursuit of those shared regional goals and concerns, 
        including with respect to the issues described in paragraph 
        (1).
            (4) A review of ongoing programs and initiatives by 
        regional organizations and other related intergovernmental 
        structures aimed at addressing the issues described in 
        paragraph (1).
            (5) A plan for aligning United States programs and 
        resources in pursuit of those shared regional goals and 
        concerns, as appropriate.
            (6) Recommendations for additional United States 
        authorities, personnel, programs, or resources necessary to 
        execute the strategic roadmap.
            (7) Any other elements the Secretary considers appropriate.

SEC. 293. REVIEW OF USAID PROGRAMMING IN OCEANIA.

    (a) In General.--The Secretary of State, in coordination with the 
Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development 
(in this section referred to as ``USAID''), should include the Indo-
Pacific countries of Oceania in existing strategic planning and multi-
sector program evaluation processes, including the Department of 
State's Integrated Country Strategies and USAID's Country Development 
Cooperation Strategies, the Joint Strategic Plan, and the Journey to 
Self-Reliance Country Roadmaps.
    (b) Programmatic Considerations.--Evaluations and considerations 
for Indo-Pacific countries of Oceania in the program planning and 
strategic development processes under subsection (a) should include--
            (1) descriptions of the diplomatic and development 
        challenges of the Indo-Pacific countries of Oceania as those 
        challenges relate to the strategic, economic, and humanitarian 
        interests of the United States;
            (2) reviews of existing Department of State and USAID 
        programs to address the diplomatic and development challenges 
        of those countries evaluated under paragraph (1);
            (3) descriptions of the barriers, if any, to increasing 
        Department of State and USAID programming to Indo-Pacific 
        countries of Oceania, including--
                    (A) the relative income level of the Indo-Pacific 
                countries of Oceania relative to other regions where 
                there is high demand for United States foreign 
                assistance to support development needs;
                    (B) the relative capacity of the Indo-Pacific 
                countries of Oceania to absorb United States foreign 
                assistance for diplomatic and development needs through 
                partner governments and civil society institutions; and
                    (C) any other factor that the Secretary or 
                Administrator determines may constitute a barrier to 
                deploying or increasing United States foreign 
                assistance to the Indo-Pacific countries of Oceania;
            (4) assessments of the presence of, degree of international 
        development by, partner country indebtedness to, and political 
        influence of malign foreign governments, such as the Government 
        of the People's Republic of China, and non-state actors;
            (5) assessments of new foreign economic assistance 
        modalities that could assist in strengthening United States 
        foreign assistance in the Indo-Pacific countries of Oceania, 
        including the deployment of technical assistance and asset 
        recovery tools to partner governments and civil society 
        institutions to help develop the capacity and expertise 
        necessary to achieve self-sufficiency;
            (6) an evaluation of the existing budget and resource 
        management processes for the Department of State's and USAID's 
        mission and work with respect to its programming in the Indo-
        Pacific countries of Oceania;
            (7) an explanation of how the Secretary and the 
        Administrator will use existing programming processes, 
        including those with respect to development of an Integrated 
        Country Strategy, Country Development Cooperation Strategy, the 
        Joint Strategic Plan, and the Journey to Self-Reliance Country 
        Roadmaps, to advance the long-term growth, governance, economic 
        development, and resilience of the Indo-Pacific countries of 
        Oceania; and
            (8) any recommendations about appropriate budgetary, 
        resource management, and programmatic changes necessary to 
        assist in strengthening United States foreign assistance 
        programming in the Indo-Pacific countries of Oceania.

SEC. 294. OCEANIA SECURITY DIALOGUE.

    (a) In General.--Not later than one year after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall brief the 
appropriate committees of Congress on the feasibility and advisability 
of establishing a United States-based public-private sponsored security 
dialogue (to be known as the ``Oceania Security Dialogue'') among the 
countries of Oceania for the purposes of jointly exploring and 
discussing issues affecting the economic, diplomatic, and national 
security of the Indo-Pacific countries of Oceania.
    (b) Report Required.--The briefing required by subsection (a) 
shall, at a minimum, include the following:
            (1) A review of the ability of the Department of State to 
        participate in a public-private sponsored security dialogue.
            (2) An assessment of the potential locations for conducting 
        an Oceania Security Dialogue in the jurisdiction of the United 
        States.
            (3) Consideration of dates for conducting an Oceania 
        Security Dialogue that would maximize participation of 
        representatives from the Indo-Pacific countries of Oceania.
            (4) A review of the funding modalities available to the 
        Department of State to help finance an Oceania Security 
        Dialogue, including grant-making authorities available to the 
        Department of State.
            (5) An assessment of any administrative, statutory, or 
        other legal limitations that would prevent the establishment of 
        an Oceania Security Dialogue with participation and support of 
        the Department of State as described in subsection (a).
            (6) An analysis of how an Oceania Security Dialogue could 
        help to advance the Boe Declaration on Regional Security, 
        including its emphasis on the changing environment as the 
        greatest existential threat to countries of Oceania.
            (7) An evaluation of how an Oceania Security Dialogue could 
        help amplify the issues and work of existing regional 
        structures and organizations dedicated to the security of the 
        Oceania region, such as the Pacific Island Forum and Pacific 
        Environmental Security Forum.
            (8) An analysis of how an Oceania Security Dialogue would 
        help with implementation of the strategic roadmap required by 
        section 292 and advance the National Security Strategy of the 
        United States.
    (c) Interagency Consultation.--To the extent practicable, the 
Secretary of State may consult with the Secretary of Defense and, where 
appropriate, evaluate the lessons learned of the Regional Centers for 
Security Studies of the Department of Defense to determine the 
feasibility and advisability of establishing the Oceania Security 
Dialogue.

SEC. 295. REPORT ON COUNTERING ILLEGAL, UNREPORTED, AND UNREGULATED 
              FISHING IN OCEANIA.

    (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) many countries of the Oceania region depend on 
        commercial tuna fisheries as a critical component of their 
        economies;
            (2) the Government of the People's Republic of China has 
        used its licensed fishing fleet to exert greater influence in 
        Oceania, but at the same time, its licensed fishing fleet is 
        also a major contributor to illegal, unreported, and 
        unregulated fishing (in this section referred to as ``IUU 
        fishing'') activities;
            (3) the sustainability of Oceania's fisheries is threatened 
        by IUU fishing, which depletes both commercially important fish 
        stocks and non-targeted species that help maintain the 
        integrity of the ocean ecosystem;
            (4) in addition, IUU fishing puts pressure on protected 
        species of marine mammals, sea turtles, and sea birds, which 
        also jeopardizes the integrity of the ocean ecosystem;
            (5) further, because IUU fishing goes unrecorded, the loss 
        of biomass compromises scientists' work to assess and model 
        fishery stocks and advise managers on sustainable catch levels;
            (6) beyond the damage to living marine resources, IUU 
        fishing also contributes directly to illegal activity in the 
        Oceania region, such as food fraud, smuggling, and human 
        trafficking;
            (7) current approaches to IUU fishing enforcement rely on 
        established methods, such as vessel monitoring systems, 
        logbooks maintained by government fisheries enforcement 
        authorities to record the catches landed by fishing vessels, 
        and corroborating data on catches hand-collected by human 
        observer programs;
            (8) such established methods are imperfect because--
                    (A) vessels can turn off monitoring systems and 
                unlicensed vessels do not use them; and
                    (B) observer coverage is thin and subject to human 
                error and corruption;
            (9) maritime domain awareness technology solutions for 
        vessel monitoring have gained credibility in recent years and 
        include systems such as observing instruments deployed on 
        satellites, crewed and uncrewed air and surface systems, 
        aircraft, and surface vessels, as well as electronic monitoring 
        systems on fishing vessels;
            (10) maritime domain awareness technologies hold the 
        promise of significantly augmenting the current IUU fishing 
        enforcement capacities; and
            (11) maritime domain awareness technologies offer an avenue 
        for addressing key United States national interests, including 
        those interests related to--
                    (A) increasing bilateral diplomatic ties with key 
                allies and partners in the Oceania region;
                    (B) countering illicit trafficking in arms, 
                narcotics, and human beings associated with IUU 
                fishing;
                    (C) advancing security, long-term growth, and 
                development in the Oceania region;
                    (D) supporting ocean conservation objectives;
                    (E) reducing food insecurity; and
                    (F) countering attempts by the Government of the 
                People's Republic of China to grow its influence in the 
                Oceania region.
    (b) Report Required.--
            (1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in 
        consultation with the Administrator of the National Oceanic and 
        Atmospheric Administration, the Commandant of the Coast Guard, 
        and the Secretary of Defense, shall submit to the appropriate 
        congressional committees a report assessing the use of advanced 
        maritime domain awareness technology systems to combat IUU 
        fishing in Oceania.
            (2) Elements.--The report required by paragraph (1) shall 
        include--
                    (A) a review of the effectiveness of existing 
                monitoring technologies, including electronic 
                monitoring systems, to combat IUU fishing;
                    (B) recommendations for effectively integrating 
                effective monitoring technologies into a Oceania-wide 
                strategy for IUU fishing enforcement;
                    (C) an assessment and recommendations for the 
                secure and reliable processing of data from such 
                monitoring technologies, including the security and 
                verification issues;
                    (D) the technical and financial capacity of 
                countries of the Oceania region to deploy and maintain 
                large-scale use of maritime domain awareness 
                technological systems for the purposes of combating IUU 
                fishing and supporting fisheries resource management;
                    (E) a review of the technical and financial 
                capacity of regional organizations and international 
                structures to support countries of the Oceania region 
                in the deployment and maintenance of large-scale use of 
                maritime domain awareness technology systems for the 
                purposes of combating IUU fishing and supporting 
                fisheries resource management;
                    (F) an evaluation of the utility of using foreign 
                assistance, security assistance, and development 
                assistance provided by the United States to countries 
                of the Oceania region to support the large-scale 
                deployment and operations of maritime domain awareness 
                systems to increase maritime security across the 
                region; and
                    (G) an assessment of the role of large-scale 
                deployment and operations of maritime domain awareness 
                systems throughout Oceania to supporting United States 
                economic and national security interests in the Oceania 
                region, including efforts related to countering IUU 
                fishing, improving maritime security, and countering 
                malign foreign influence.

SEC. 296. OCEANIA PEACE CORPS PARTNERSHIPS.

    (a) In General.--Not later than one year after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Director of the Peace Corps shall submit to 
Congress a report on strategies for to reasonably and safely expand the 
number of Peace Corps volunteers in Oceania, with the goals of--
            (1) expanding the presence of the Peace Corps to all 
        currently feasible locations in Oceania; and
            (2) working with regional and international partners of the 
        United States to expand the presence of Peace Corps volunteers 
        in low-income Oceania communities in support of climate 
        resilience initiatives.
    (b) Elements.--The report required by subsection (a) shall--
            (1) assess the factors contributing to the current absence 
        of the Peace Corps and its volunteers in Oceania;
            (2) examine potential remedies that include working with 
        United States Government agencies and regional governments, 
        including governments of United States allies--
                    (A) to increase the health infrastructure and 
                medical evacuation capabilities of the countries of 
                Oceania to better support the safety of Peace Corps 
                volunteers while in those countries;
                    (B) to address physical safety concerns that have 
                decreased the ability of the Peace Corps to operate in 
                Oceania; and
                    (C) to increase transportation infrastructure in 
                the countries of Oceania to better support the travel 
                of Peace Corps volunteers and their access to necessary 
                facilities;
            (3) evaluate the potential to expand the deployment of 
        Peace Corps Response volunteers to help the countries of 
        Oceania address social, economic, and development needs of 
        their communities that require specific professional expertise; 
        and
            (4) explore potential new operational models to address 
        safety and security needs of Peace Corps volunteers in the 
        countries of Oceania, including--
                    (A) changes to volunteer deployment durations; and
                    (B) scheduled redeployment of volunteers to 
                regional or United States-based healthcare facilities 
                for routine physical and behavioral health evaluation.
    (c) Volunteers in Low-income Oceania Communities.--
            (1) In general.--In examining the potential to expand the 
        presence of Peace Corps volunteers in low-income Oceania 
        communities under subsection (a)(2), the Director of the Peace 
        Corps shall consider the development of initiatives described 
        in paragraph (2).
            (2) Initiatives described.--Initiatives described in this 
        paragraph are volunteer initiatives that help the countries of 
        Oceania address social, economic, and development needs of 
        their communities, including by--
                    (A) addressing, through appropriate resilience-
                based interventions, the vulnerability that communities 
                in Oceania face as result of extreme weather, severe 
                environmental change, and other climate related trends; 
                and
                    (B) improving, through smart infrastructure 
                principles, access to transportation and connectivity 
                infrastructure that will help address the economic and 
                social challenges that communities in Oceania confront 
                as a result of poor or nonexistent infrastructure.
    (d) Oceania Defined.--In this section, the term ``Oceania'' 
includes the following:
            (1) Easter Island of Chile.
            (2) Fiji.
            (3) French Polynesia of France.
            (4) Kiribati.
            (5) New Caledonia of France.
            (6) Nieu of New Zealand.
            (7) Papua New Guinea.
            (8) Samoa.
            (9) Vanuatu.
            (10) The Ashmore and Cartier Islands of Australia.
            (11) The Cook Islands of New Zealand.
            (12) The Coral Islands of Australia.
            (13) The Federated States of Micronesia.
            (14) The Norfolk Island of Australia.
            (15) The Pitcairn Islands of the United Kingdom.
            (16) The Republic of the Marshal Islands.
            (17) The Republic of Palau.
            (18) The Solomon Islands.
            (19) Tokelau of New Zealand.
            (20) Tonga.
            (21) Tuvalu.
            (22) Wallis and Futuna of France.

                   TITLE III--INVESTING IN OUR VALUES

SEC. 301. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR PROMOTION OF DEMOCRACY IN 
              HONG KONG.

    (a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be 
appropriated $10,000,000 for fiscal year 2022 for the Bureau of 
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor of the Department of State to 
promote democracy in Hong Kong.
    (b) Administration.--The Secretary of State shall designate an 
office with the Department of State to administer and coordinate the 
provision of such funds described in subsection (a) within the 
Department of State and across the United States Government.

SEC. 302. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS RELATING TO FORCED LABOR IN THE 
              XINJIANG UYGHUR AUTONOMOUS REGION.

    (a) In General.--Section 6(a)(1) of the Uyghur Human Rights Policy 
Act of 2020 (Public Law 116-145; 22 U.S.C. 6901 note) is amended--
            (1) by redesignating subparagraph (E) as subparagraph (F); 
        and
            (2) by inserting after subparagraph (D) the following:
                    ``(E) Serious human rights abuses in connection 
                with forced labor.''.
    (b) Effective Date; Applicability.--The amendment made by 
subsection (a)--
            (1) takes effect on the date of the enactment of this Act; 
        and
            (2) applies with respect to the first report required by 
        section 6(a)(1) of the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act of 2020 
        submitted after such date of enactment.

SEC. 303. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO SYSTEMATIC RAPE, 
              COERCIVE ABORTION, FORCED STERILIZATION, OR INVOLUNTARY 
              CONTRACEPTIVE IMPLANTATION IN THE XINJIANG UYGHUR 
              AUTONOMOUS REGION.

    (a) In General.--Section 6(a)(1) of the Uyghur Human Rights Policy 
Act of 2020 (Public Law 116-145; 22 U.S.C. 6901 note), as amended by 
section 302, is further amended--
            (1) by redesignating subparagraphs (F) as subparagraph (G); 
        and
            (2) by inserting after subparagraph (E) the following:
                    ``(F) Systematic rape, coercive abortion, forced 
                sterilization, or involuntary contraceptive 
                implantation policies and practices.''.
    (b) Effective Date; Applicability.--The amendment made by 
subsection (a)--
            (1) takes effect on the date of the enactment of this Act; 
        and
            (2) applies with respect to the first report required by 
        section 6(a)(1) of the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act of 2020 
        submitted after such date of enactment.

SEC. 304. REPORT ON CORRUPT ACTIVITIES OF SENIOR OFFICIALS OF 
              GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

    (a) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this section, 
the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
            (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on 
        Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, and the Select Committee 
        on Intelligence of the Senate; and
            (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on 
        Financial Services, and the Permanent Select Committee on 
        Intelligence of the House of Representatives.
    (b) Annual Report Required.--
            (1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter through 
        2026, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, in 
        coordination with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of 
        Treasury, and any other relevant United States Government 
        official, shall submit to the appropriate committees of 
        Congress a report on the corruption and corrupt activities of 
        senior officials of the Government of China.
            (2) Elements.--
                    (A) In general.--Each report under paragraph (1) 
                shall include the following elements:
                            (i) A description of the wealth and sources 
                        of wealth of senior officials of the Government 
                        of China.
                            (ii) A description of corrupt activities, 
                        including activities taking place outside of 
                        China, engaged in by senior officials of the 
                        Government of China.
                            (iii) A description of any gaps in the 
                        ability of the intelligence community to 
                        collect information covered in clauses (i) and 
                        (ii).
                    (B) Scope of reports.--The first report under 
                paragraph (1) shall include comprehensive information 
                on the matters described in subparagraph (A). Any 
                succeeding report under paragraph (1) may consist of an 
                update or supplement to the preceding report under that 
                subsection.
            (3) Form.--Each report under paragraph (1) shall include an 
        unclassified executive summary of the elements described in 
        clauses (i) and (ii) of paragraph (2)(A), and may include a 
        classified annex.
    (c) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the United 
States should undertake every effort and pursue every opportunity to 
expose the corruption and related practices of senior officials of the 
Government of China, including President Xi Jinping.

SEC. 305. REMOVAL OF MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL 
              THAT COMMIT HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES.

    The President shall direct the Permanent Representative of the 
United States to the United Nations to use the voice, vote, and 
influence of the United States to--
            (1) reform the process for removing members of the United 
        Nations Human Rights Council that commit gross and systemic 
        violations of human rights, including--
                    (A) lowering the threshold vote at the United 
                Nations General Assembly for removal to a simple 
                majority;
                    (B) ensuring information detailing the member 
                country's human rights record is publicly available 
                before the vote on removal; and
                    (C) making the vote of each country on the removal 
                from the United Nations Human Rights Council publicly 
                available;
            (2) reform the rules on electing members to the United 
        Nations Human Rights Council to ensure United Nations members 
        that have committed gross and systemic violations of human 
        rights are not elected to the Human Rights Council; and
            (3) oppose the election to the Human Rights Council of any 
        United Nations member--
                    (A) currently designated as a country engaged in a 
                consistent pattern of gross violations of 
                internationally recognized human rights pursuant to 
                section 116 or section 502B of the Foreign Assistance 
                Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151n, 2304);
                    (B) currently designated as a state sponsor of 
                terrorism;
                    (C) currently designated as a Tier 3 country under 
                the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (22 
                U.S.C. 7101 et seq.);
                    (D) the government of which is identified on the 
                list published by the Secretary of State pursuant to 
                section 404(b) of the Child Soldiers Prevention Act of 
                2008 (22 U.S.C. 2370c-1(b)) as a government that 
                recruits and uses child soldiers; or
                    (E) the government of which the United States 
                determines to have committed genocide or crimes against 
                humanity.

SEC. 306. POLICY WITH RESPECT TO TIBET.

    (a) Rank of United States Special Coordinator for Tibetan Issues.--
Section 621 of the Tibetan Policy Act of 2002 (22 U.S.C. 6901 note) is 
amended--
            (1) by redesignating subsections (b), (c), and (d), as 
        subsections (c), (d), and (e), respectively; and
            (2) by inserting after subsection (a) the following:
    ``(b) Rank.--The Special Coordinator shall either be appointed by 
the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, or shall be 
an individual holding the rank of Under Secretary of State or 
higher.''.
    (b) Tibet Unit at United States Embassy in Beijing.--
            (1) In general.--The Secretary of State shall establish a 
        Tibet Unit in the Political Section of the United States 
        Embassy in Beijing, People's Republic of China.
            (2) Operation.--The Tibet Unit established under paragraph 
        (1) shall operate until such time as the Government of the 
        People's Republic of China permits--
                    (A) the United States Consulate General in Chengdu, 
                People's Republic of China, to reopen; or
                    (B) a United States Consulate General in Lhasa, 
                Tibet, to open.
            (3) Staff.--
                    (A) In general.--The Secretary shall--
                            (i) assign not fewer than 2 United States 
                        direct-hire personnel to the Tibet Unit 
                        established under paragraph (1); and
                            (ii) hire not fewer than 1 locally engaged 
                        staff member for such unit.
                    (B) Language training.--The Secretary shall make 
                Tibetan language training available to the personnel 
                assigned under subparagraph (A), consistent with the 
                Tibetan Policy Act of 2002 (22 U.S.C. 6901 note).

SEC. 307. UNITED STATES POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL ENGAGEMENT ON THE 
              SUCCESSION OR REINCARNATION OF THE DALAI LAMA AND 
              RELIGIOUS FREEDOM OF TIBETAN BUDDHISTS.

    (a) Reaffirmation of Policy.--It is the policy of the United 
States, as provided under section 342(b) of division FF of the 
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 (Public Law 116-260), that any 
``interference by the Government of the People's Republic of China or 
any other government in the process of recognizing a successor or 
reincarnation of the 14th Dalai Lama and any future Dalai Lamas would 
represent a clear abuse of the right to religious freedom of Tibetan 
Buddhists and the Tibetan people''.
    (b) International Efforts to Protect Religious Freedom of Tibetan 
Buddhists.--The Secretary of State should engage with United States 
allies and partners to--
            (1) support Tibetan Buddhist religious leaders' sole 
        religious authority to identify and install the 15th Dalai 
        Lama;
            (2) oppose claims by the Government of the People's 
        Republic of China that the PRC has the authority to decide for 
        Tibetan Buddhists the 15th Dalai Lama; and
            (3) reject interference by the Government of the People's 
        Republic of China in the religious freedom of Tibetan 
        Buddhists.

SEC. 308. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON TREATMENT OF UYGHURS AND OTHER ETHNIC 
              MINORITIES IN THE XINJIANG UYGHUR AUTONOMOUS REGION.

    (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) The Uyghurs are one of several predominantly Muslim 
        Turkic groups living in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region 
        (XUAR) in the northwest of the People's Republic of China 
        (PRC).
            (2) Following Uyghur demonstrations and unrest in 2009 and 
        clashes with government security personnel and other violent 
        incidents in subsequent years, PRC leaders sought to 
        ``stabilize'' the XUAR through large-scale arrests and extreme 
        security measures, under the pretext of combatting alleged 
        terrorism, religious extremism, and ethnic separatism.
            (3) In May 2014, the PRC launched its ``Strike Hard Against 
        Violent Extremism'' campaign, which placed further restrictions 
        on and facilitated additional human rights violations against 
        minorities in the XUAR under the pretext of fighting terrorism.
            (4) In August 2016, Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Politburo 
        member Chen Quanguo, former Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) Party 
        Secretary, known for overseeing intensifying security 
        operations and human rights abuses in the TAR, was appointed as 
        Party Secretary of the XUAR.
            (5) Beginning in 2017, XUAR authorities have sought to 
        forcibly ``assimilate'' Uyghurs and other Turkic minorities 
        into Chinese society through a policy of cultural erasure known 
        as ``Sinicization''.
            (6) Since 2018, credible reporting including from the BBC, 
        France24, and the New York Times has shown that the Government 
        of the PRC has built mass internment camps in the XUAR, which 
        it calls ``vocational training'' centers, and detained Uyghurs 
        and other groups in them and other facilities.
            (7) Since 2015, XUAR authorities have arbitrarily detained 
        an estimated 1,500,000 Uyghurs--12.5 percent of the XUAR's 
        official Uyghur population of 12,000,000--and a smaller number 
        of other ethnic minorities in the ``vocational training'' 
        centers and other detention and pre-detention facilities.
            (8) In 2017, the XUAR accounted for less than two percent 
        of the PRC's total population but 21 percent of all arrests in 
        China.
            (9) The Atlantic, Radio Free Asia, and other sources have 
        revealed that detainees are forced to renounce many of their 
        Islamic beliefs and customs and repudiate Uyghur culture, 
        language, and identity.
            (10) Investigations by Human Rights Watch and other human 
        rights organizations have documented how detainees are subject 
        to political indoctrination, forced labor, crowded and 
        unsanitary conditions, involuntary biometric data collection, 
        both medical neglect and intrusive medical interventions, food 
        and water deprivation, beatings, sexual violence, and torture.
            (11) Research by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute 
        suggests that, since late 2019, many detainees have been placed 
        in higher security facilities and convicted of formal crimes.
            (12) Human Rights Watch has reported that the PRC uses data 
        collection programs, including facial recognition technology, 
        to surveil Uyghurs in the XUAR and to identify individuals whom 
        authorities may detain.
            (13) PRC authorities have placed countless children whose 
        parents are detained or in exile in state-run institutions and 
        boarding schools without the consent of their parents.
            (14) New York Times reporting revealed that numerous local 
        PRC officials who did not agree with the policies carried out 
        in XUAR have been fired and imprisoned.
            (15) Associated Press reporting documented widespread and 
        systemic efforts by PRC authorities to force Uyghur women to 
        take contraceptives or to subject them to sterilization or 
        abortion, threatening to detain those who do not comply.
            (16) PRC authorities prohibit family members and advocates 
        inside and outside China from having regular communications 
        with relatives and friends imprisoned in the XUAR, such as 
        journalist and entrepreneur Ekpar Asat.
            (17) PRC authorities have imposed pervasive restrictions on 
        the peaceful practice of Islam in the XUAR, to the extent that 
        Human Rights Watch asserts the PRC ``has effectively outlawed 
        the practice of Islam''.
            (18) Individuals who are not detained in camps have been 
        forced to attend political indoctrination sessions, subjected 
        to movement restrictions, mass surveillance systems, 
        involuntary biometric data collection, and other human rights 
        abuses.
            (19) International media, nongovernmental organizations, 
        scholars, families, and survivors have reported on the systemic 
        nature of many of these abuses.
            (20) On June 26, 2020, a group of 50 independent United 
        Nations experts jointly expressed alarm over China's 
        deteriorating human rights record, including its repression in 
        Xinjiang, and called on the international community ``to act 
        collectively and decisively to ensure China respects human 
        rights and abides by its international obligations''.
            (21) On October 6, 2020, 39 United Nations member countries 
        issued a public statement condemning human rights violations by 
        PRC authorities and calling on the PRC to allow the United 
        Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights unfettered access to 
        Xinjiang.
            (22) The United States Congress passed the Uyghur Human 
        Rights Policy Act of 2020 (Public Law 116-145).
            (23) The United States Congress passed the Global Magnitsky 
        Human Rights Accountability Act (subtitle F of title XII of 
        Public Law 114-328; 22 U.S.C. 2656 note), which has been used 
        to sanction PRC officials and entities for their activities in 
        the XUAR.
            (24) The United States Government has implemented 
        additional targeted restrictions on trade with Xinjiang and 
        imposed visa and economic sanctions on PRC officials and 
        entities for their activities in the XUAR.
            (25) The United States Government has documented human 
        rights abuses and violations of individual freedoms in the 
        XUAR, including in the 2019 Department of State Report on 
        International Religious Freedom.
            (26) On January 19, 2021, then-Secretary of State Michael 
        Pompeo ``determined that the PRC, under the direction and 
        control of the CCP, has committed genocide against the 
        predominantly Muslim Uyghurs and other ethnic and religious 
        minority groups in Xinjiang''.
            (27) On January 19, 2021, during his confirmation hearing, 
        Secretary of State Antony Blinken testified that ``forcing men, 
        women, and children into concentration camps, trying to in 
        effect reeducate them to be adherents to the Chinese Communist 
        Party--all of that speaks to an effort to commit genocide''.
            (28) On January 19, 2021, Secretary of the Treasury Janet 
        L. Yellen, during her confirmation hearing, publicly stated 
        that China is guilty of ``horrendous human rights abuses''.
            (29) On January 27, 2021, in response to a question from 
        the press regarding the Uyghurs, Secretary Blinken stated that 
        his ``judgement remains that genocide was committed against the 
        Uyghurs''.
            (30) On March 10, 2021, in response to a question on 
        Xinjiang during his testimony before the Committee on Foreign 
        Affairs of the House of Representatives, Secretary Blinken 
        reiterated, ``We've been clear, and I've been clear, that I see 
        it as genocide, other egregious abuses of human rights, and 
        we'll continue to make that clear.''.
            (31) The 2020 Department of State Country Reports on Human 
        Rights Practices: China states that ``[g]enocide and crimes 
        against humanity occurred during the year against the 
        predominantly Muslim Uyghurs and other ethnic and religious 
        minority groups in Xinjiang''.
    (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the atrocities committed by the CCP against Uyghurs and 
        other predominantly Muslim Turkic groups in Xinjiang, including 
        forced labor, sexual violence, the internment of over 1,000,000 
        individuals, and other horrific abuses must be condemned;
            (2) the President, the Secretary of State, and the United 
        States Ambassador to the United Nations should speak publicly 
        about the ongoing human rights abuses in the XUAR, including in 
        formal speeches at the United Nations and other international 
        fora;
            (3) the President, the Secretary of State, and the United 
        States Ambassador to the United Nations should appeal to the 
        United Nations Secretary-General to take a more proactive and 
        public stance on the situation in the XUAR, including by 
        supporting calls for an investigation and accountability for 
        individuals and entities involved in abuses against the people 
        of the XUAR;
            (4) the United States should continue to use targeted 
        sanctions and all diplomatic tools available to hold those 
        responsible for the atrocities in Xinjiang to account;
            (5) United States agencies engaged with China on trade, 
        climate, defense, or other bilateral issues should include 
        human rights abuses in the XUAR as a consideration in 
        developing United States policy;
            (6) the United States supports Radio Free Asia Uyghur, the 
        only Uyghur-language news service in the world independent of 
        Chinese government influence; and
            (7) the United States recognizes the repeated requests from 
        the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights for 
        unfettered access to the XUAR and the PRC's refusal to comply, 
        and therefore--
                    (A) PRC authorities must allow unfettered access by 
                the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for 
                Human Rights to the XUAR;
                    (B) the United States should urge collaborative 
                action between the United States Government and 
                international partners to pressure PRC authorities to 
                allow unfettered access to the XUAR;
                    (C) the President, the Secretary of State, and the 
                United States Ambassador to the United Nations should 
                simultaneously outline a strategy to investigate the 
                human rights abuses and crimes that have taken place in 
                the XUAR, collect evidence, and transfer the evidence 
                to a competent court; and
                    (D) United States partners and allies should 
                undertake similar strategies in an effort to build an 
                international investigation outside of the PRC if PRC 
                authorities do not comply with a United Nations 
                investigation in the XUAR.

SEC. 309. DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT OF INTERNET FREEDOM AND GREAT 
              FIREWALL CIRCUMVENTION TOOLS FOR THE PEOPLE OF HONG KONG.

    (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) The People's Republic of China has repeatedly violated 
        its obligations under the Joint Declaration by suppressing the 
        basic rights and freedoms of Hong Kongers.
            (2) On June 30, 2020, the National People's Congress passed 
        a ``National Security Law'' that further erodes Hong Kong's 
        autonomy and enables authorities to suppress dissent.
            (3) The Government of the People's Republic of China 
        continues to utilize the National Security Law to undermine the 
        fundamental rights of the Hong Kong people through suppression 
        of the freedom of speech, assembly, religion, and the press.
            (4) Article 9 of the National Security Law authorizes 
        unprecedented regulation and supervision of internet activity 
        in Hong Kong, including expanded police powers to force 
        internet service providers to censor content, hand over user 
        information, and block access to platforms.
            (5) On January 13, 2021, the Hong Kong Broadband Network 
        blocked public access to HK Chronicles, a website promoting 
        pro-democracy viewpoints, under the authorities of the National 
        Security Law.
            (6) On February 12, 2021, internet service providers 
        blocked access to the Taiwan Transitional Justice Commission 
        website in Hong Kong.
            (7) Major tech companies including Facebook, Twitter, 
        WhatsApp and Google have stopped reviewing requests for user 
        data from Hong Kong authorities.
            (8) On February 28, 2021, 47 pro-democracy activists in 
        Hong Kong were arrested and charged under the National Security 
        Law on the charge of ``conspiracy to commit subversion''.
    (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the United 
States should--
            (1) support the ability of the people of Hong Kong to 
        maintain their freedom to access information online; and
            (2) focus on investments in technologies that facilitate 
        the unhindered exchange of information in Hong Kong in advance 
        of any future efforts by the Chinese Communist Party--
                    (A) to suppress internet access;
                    (B) to increase online censorship; or
                    (C) to inhibit online communication and content-
                sharing by the people of Hong Kong.
    (c) Definitions.--In this section:
            (1) Appropriate committees of congress.--The term 
        ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
                    (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
                Senate;
                    (B) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;
                    (C) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
                Senate;
                    (D) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House 
                of Representatives;
                    (E) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of 
                Representatives; and
                    (F) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence 
                of the House of Representatives.
            (2) Working group.--The term ``working group'' means--
                    (A) the Under Secretary of State for Civilian 
                Security, Democracy, and Human Rights;
                    (B) the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian 
                and Pacific Affairs;
                    (C) the Chief Executive Officer of the United 
                States Agency for Global Media and the President of the 
                Open Technology Fund; and
                    (D) the Administrator of the United States Agency 
                for International Development.
            (3) Joint declaration.--The term ``Joint Declaration'' 
        means the Joint Declaration of the Government of the United 
        Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the 
        Government of the People's Republic of China on the Question of 
        Hong Kong, done at Beijing on December 19, 1984.
    (d) Hong Kong Internet Freedom Program.--
            (1) In general.--The Secretary of State is authorized to 
        establish a working group to develop a strategy to bolster 
        internet resiliency and online access in Hong Kong. The 
        Secretary shall establish a Hong Kong Internet Freedom Program 
        in the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor at the 
        Department of State. Additionally, the President of the 
        Technology Fund is authorized to establish a Hong Kong Internet 
        Freedom Program. These programs shall operate independently, 
        but in strategic coordination with other entities in the 
        working group. The Open Technology Fund shall remain 
        independent from Department of State direction in its 
        implementation of this, and any other Internet Freedom 
        Programs.
            (2) Independence.--During the period beginning on the date 
        of the enactment of this Act and ending on September 30, 2023, 
        the Program shall be carried out independent from the mainland 
        China internet freedom portfolios in order to focus on 
        supporting liberties presently enjoyed by the people of Hong 
        Kong.
            (3) Consolidation of department of state program.--
        Beginning on October 1, 2023, the Secretary of State may--
                    (A) consolidate the Program with the mainland China 
                initiatives in the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, 
                and Labor; or
                    (B) continue to carry out the Program in accordance 
                with paragraph (2).
            (4) Consolidation of open technology fund program.--
        Beginning on October 1, 2023, the President of the Open 
        Technology Fund may--
                    (A) consolidate the Program with the mainland China 
                initiatives in the Open Technology Fund; or
                    (B) continue to carry out the Program in accordance 
                with paragraph (2).
    (e) Support for Internet Freedom Technology Programs.--
            (1) Grants authorized.--
                    (A) In general.--The Secretary of State, working 
                through the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and 
                Labor, and the Open Technology Fund, separately and 
                independently from the Secretary of State, are 
                authorized to award grants and contracts to private 
                organizations to support and develop programs in Hong 
                Kong that promote or expand--
                            (i) open, interoperable, reliable and 
                        secure internet; and
                            (ii) the online exercise of human rights 
                        and fundamental freedoms of individual 
                        citizens, activists, human rights defenders, 
                        independent journalists, civil society 
                        organizations, and marginalized populations in 
                        Hong Kong.
                    (B) Goals.--The goals of the programs developed 
                with grants authorized under subparagraph (A) should 
                be--
                            (i) to make the internet available in Hong 
                        Kong;
                            (ii) to increase the number of the tools in 
                        the technology portfolio;
                            (iii) to promote the availability of such 
                        technologies and tools in Hong Kong;
                            (iv) to encourage the adoption of such 
                        technologies and tools by the people of Hong 
                        Kong;
                            (v) to scale up the distribution of such 
                        technologies and tools throughout Hong Kong;
                            (vi) to prioritize the development of 
                        tools, components, code, and technologies that 
                        are fully open-source, to the extent 
                        practicable;
                            (vii) to conduct research on repressive 
                        tactics that undermine internet freedom in Hong 
                        Kong;
                            (viii) to ensure digital safety guidance 
                        and support is available to repressed 
                        individual citizens, human rights defenders, 
                        independent journalists, civil society 
                        organizations and marginalized populations in 
                        Hong Kong; and
                            (ix) to engage American private industry, 
                        including e-commerce firms and social 
                        networking companies, on the importance of 
                        preserving internet access in Hong Kong.
                    (C) Grant recipients.--Grants authorized under this 
                paragraph shall be distributed to multiple vendors and 
                suppliers through an open, fair, competitive, and 
                evidence-based decision process--
                            (i) to diversify the technical base; and
                            (ii) to reduce the risk of misuse by bad 
                        actors.
                    (D) Security audits.--New technologies developed 
                using grants from this paragraph shall undergo 
                comprehensive security audits to ensure that such 
                technologies are secure and have not been compromised 
                in a manner detrimental to the interests of the United 
                States or to individuals or organizations benefitting 
                from programs supported by the Open Technology Fund.
            (2) Funding source.--The Secretary of State is authorized 
        to expend funds from the Human Rights and Democracy Fund of the 
        Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor of the Department 
        of State during fiscal year 2020 for grants authorized under 
        paragraph (1) at any entity in the working group.
            (3) Authorization of appropriations.--
                    (A) Open technology fund.--In addition to the funds 
                authorized to be expended pursuant to paragraph (2), 
                there are authorized to be appropriated to the Open 
                Technology Fund $5,000,000 for each of fiscal years 
                2022 and 2023 to carry out this subsection. This 
                funding is in addition to the funds authorized for the 
                Open Technology Fund through the National Defense 
                Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (Public Law 116-
                92).
                    (B) Bureau of democracy, human rights, and labor.--
                In addition to the funds authorized to be expended 
                pursuant to paragraph (2), there are authorized to be 
                appropriated to the Office of Internet Freedom Programs 
                in the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor of 
                the Department of State $10,000,000 for each of fiscal 
                years 2022 and 2023 to carry out this section.
                    (C) Availability.--Amounts appropriated pursuant to 
                subparagraphs (A) and (B) shall remain available until 
                expended.
    (f) Strategic Planning Report.--Not later than 120 days after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State and the 
working group shall submit a classified report to the appropriate 
committees of Congress that--
            (1) describes the Federal Government's plan to bolster and 
        increase the availability of Great Firewall circumvention and 
        internet freedom technology in Hong Kong during fiscal year 
        2022;
            (2) outlines a plan for--
                    (A) supporting the preservation of an open, 
                interoperable, reliable, and secure internet in Hong 
                Kong;
                    (B) increasing the supply of the technology 
                referred to in paragraph (1);
                    (C) accelerating the dissemination of such 
                technology;
                    (D) promoting the availability of internet freedom 
                in Hong Kong;
                    (E) utilizing presently-available tools in the 
                existing relevant portfolios for further use in the 
                unique context of Hong Kong;
                    (F) expanding the portfolio of tools in order to 
                diversify and strengthen the effectiveness and 
                resiliency of the circumvention efforts;
                    (G) providing training for high-risk groups and 
                individuals in Hong Kong; and
                    (H) detecting analyzing, and responding to new and 
                evolving censorship threats;
            (3) includes a detailed description of the technical and 
        fiscal steps necessary to safely implement the plans referred 
        to in paragraphs (1) and (2), including an analysis of the 
        market conditions in Hong Kong;
            (4) describes the Federal Government's plans for awarding 
        grants to private organizations for the purposes described in 
        subsection (e)(1)(A);
            (5) outlines the working group's consultations regarding 
        the implementation of this section to ensure that all Federal 
        efforts are aligned and well coordinated; and
            (6) outlines the Department of State's strategy to 
        influence global internet legal standards at international 
        organizations and multilateral fora.

SEC. 310. ENHANCING TRANSPARENCY ON INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS AND 
              QUALIFYING NON-BINDING INSTRUMENTS.

    (a) In General.--Section 112b of title 1, United States Code, is 
amended--
            (1) in the section heading, by striking ``transmission to 
        Congress'' and inserting ``transparency provisions'';
            (2) by striking subsection (e);
            (3) in subsection (a), by striking ``The Secretary'' and 
        all that follows through ``notice from the President.'';
            (4) by redesignating subsection (a), as amended by 
        paragraph (2), as subsection (e);
            (5) by inserting before subsection (b) the following:
    ``(a)(1) Not later than 5 business days after the date on which the 
Secretary or an officer or employee of the Department of State approves 
the negotiation or conclusion of an international agreement or 
qualifying non-binding instrument, the Secretary, through the Legal 
Adviser of the Department, shall provide written notice of such 
approval to the appropriate congressional committees.
    ``(2) The written notice required by paragraph (1) shall include 
the following:
            ``(A) A description of the intended scope, substance, form, 
        and parties to or participants in the international agreement 
        or qualifying non-binding instrument.
            ``(B) A description of the primary legal authority that, in 
        the view of the Secretary, provides authorization for the 
        negotiation, conclusion, or negotiation and conclusion of the 
        international agreement or qualifying non-binding instrument. 
        If multiple authorities are relied upon, the Secretary may cite 
        all such authorities but shall identify a primary authority. 
        All citations to a treaty or statute shall include the specific 
        article or section and subsection reference whenever available 
        and, if not available, shall be as specific as possible. If the 
        primary authority relied upon is article II of the Constitution 
        of the United States, the Secretary shall explain the basis for 
        that reliance.
            ``(C) A statement of intended opportunities for public 
        comment on the proposed international agreement or qualifying 
        non-binding instrument and the timing of such opportunities.
            ``(D) A statement describing any new or amended statutory 
        or regulatory authority anticipated to be required to fully 
        implement the proposed international agreement or qualifying 
        non-binding instrument.
    ``(3) The written notice required by paragraph (1) and all 
information contained therein shall be provided in unclassified form, 
unless the proposed text of the international agreement or qualifying 
non-binding instrument that is the subject of the notification is 
classified.'';
            (6) by striking subsection (b) and inserting the following:
    ``(b)(1) Not later than 5 business days after the date on which an 
international agreement or a qualifying non-binding instrument is 
signed or otherwise concluded, the Secretary shall transmit the text of 
the international agreement or qualifying non-binding instrument to the 
appropriate congressional committees.
    ``(2) The Secretary should simultaneously make the text of the 
international agreement or qualifying non-binding instrument, and the 
notification required by subsection (a), available to the public on the 
website of the Department of State, unless such text or notification is 
classified.'';
            (7) in subsection (c), in the first sentence, by striking 
        ``of State'';
            (8) by redesignating subsection (c) as subsection (h);
            (9) by redesignating subsection (d) as subsection (k);
            (10) by inserting after subsection (b) the following:
    ``(c)(1) Not later than 15 business days after the date on which an 
international agreement enters into force or a qualifying non-binding 
instrument becomes effective, the Secretary shall make the text of the 
international agreement or qualifying non-binding instrument and the 
notification required by subsection (a) available to the public on the 
website of the Department of State.
    ``(2) The requirement in paragraph (1)--
            ``(A) shall not apply to any text of the international 
        agreement or qualifying non-binding instrument that is 
        classified; and
            ``(B) shall apply to any text of the international 
        agreement or qualifying non-binding instrument that is 
        unclassified.
    ``(d)(1) Not later than 5 business days after the date on which any 
implementing material, whether binding or non-binding, for an 
international agreement or qualifying non-binding instrument, is 
concluded, the Secretary shall submit such material to the appropriate 
congressional committees.
    ``(2) Paragraph (1) shall apply--
            ``(A) with respect to an international agreement, until the 
        agreement is no longer in force; and
            ``(B) with respect to a qualifying non-binding instrument, 
        until the instrument is no longer effective.'';
            (11) in subsection (e), as redesignated by paragraph (4)--
                    (A) by inserting ``or qualifying non-binding 
                instrument'' after ``international agreement''; and
                    (B) by striking ``shall transmit'' and all that 
                follows and inserting the following: ``shall--
            ``(1) provide to the Secretary the text of such agreement 
        or non-binding instrument not later than 5 business days after 
        the date on which such agreement or non-binding instrument is 
        signed or otherwise concluded; and
            ``(2) on an ongoing basis, provide any implementing 
        material to the Secretary for transmittal to Congress.'';
            (12) by redesignating subsection (f) as subsection (l);
            (13) by inserting after subsection (e) the following:
    ``(f)(1) Each department or agency of the United States Government 
that enters into any international agreement or qualifying non-binding 
instrument on behalf of the United States shall designate a Chief 
International Agreements Officer, who shall--
            ``(A) be selected from among employees of such department 
        or agency;
            ``(B) serve concurrently as the Chief International 
        Agreements Officer; and
            ``(C) subject to the authority of the head of such 
        department or agency, have department- or agency-wide 
        responsibility for efficient and appropriate compliance with 
        this section.
    ``(2) The Chief International Agreements Officer of the Department 
of State shall serve in the Office of the Legal Adviser with the title 
of International Agreements Compliance Officer.
    ``(g) Texts of oral international agreements and qualifying non-
binding instruments shall be reduced to writing and subject to the 
requirements of subsections (a) through (c).'';
            (14) by inserting after subsection (h), as redesignated by 
        paragraph (8), the following:
    ``(i) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no amounts 
appropriated to the Department of State under any law shall be 
available for obligation or expenditure to conclude or implement or to 
support the conclusion or implementation of (including through the use 
of personnel or resources subject to the authority of a chief of 
mission) an international agreement or qualifying non-binding 
instrument, other than to facilitate compliance with this section, 
until the Secretary satisfies the substantive requirements in 
subsections (a) through (c) and subsection (f).
    ``(j)(1) Not less frequently than twice each year, the Comptroller 
General of the United States shall conduct an audit of the compliance 
of the Secretary with the requirements of this section.
    ``(2) In any instance in which a failure by the Secretary to comply 
with such requirements is due to the failure or refusal of another 
agency to provide information or material to the Department of State, 
or the failure to do so in a timely manner, the Comptroller General 
shall engage such other agency to determine--
            ``(A) the cause and scope of such failure or refusal;
            ``(B) the specific office or offices responsible for such 
        failure or refusal; and
            ``(C) penalties or other recommendations for measures to 
        ensure compliance with statutory requirements.
    ``(3) The Comptroller General shall submit to the appropriate 
congressional committees the results of each audit required by 
paragraph (1).
    ``(4) The Comptroller General and the Secretary shall make the 
results of each audit required by paragraph (1) publicly available on 
the websites of the Government Accountability Office and the Department 
of State, respectively.'';
            (15) in subsection (k), as redesignated by paragraph (9)--
                    (A) in paragraph (1)--
                            (i) by striking ``The Secretary of State 
                        shall annually submit to Congress'' and 
                        inserting ``Not later than February 1 of each 
                        year, the Secretary shall submit to the 
                        appropriate congressional committees''; and
                            (ii) by striking ``an index of'' and all 
                        that follows and inserting the following: ``a 
                        list of--
            ``(A) all international agreements and qualifying non-
        binding instruments that were signed or otherwise concluded, 
        entered into force or otherwise became effective, or that were 
        modified or otherwise amended during the preceding calendar 
        year; and
            ``(B) for each agreement and instrument included in the 
        list under subparagraph (A)--
                    ``(i) the dates of any action described in such 
                subparagraph;
                    ``(ii) the title of the agreement or instrument; 
                and
                    ``(iii) a summary of the agreement or instrument 
                (including a description of the duration of activities 
                under the agreement or instrument and a description of 
                the agreement or instrument).'';
                    (B) in paragraph (2), by striking ``may be 
                submitted in classified form'' and inserting ``shall be 
                submitted in unclassified form, but may include a 
                classified annex''; and
                    (C) by adding at the end the following:
    ``(3)(A) The Secretary should make the report, except for any 
classified annex, available to the public on the website of the 
Department of State.
    ``(B) Not later than February 1 of each year, the Secretary shall 
make available to the public on the website of the Department of State 
each part of the report involving an international agreement or 
qualifying non-binding instrument that entered into force or became 
effective during the preceding calendar year, except for any classified 
annex or information contained therein.''; and
            (16) by adding after subsection (l), as redesignated by 
        paragraph (12), the following:
    ``(m) There is authorized to be appropriated $1,000,000 for each of 
fiscal years 2022 through 2026 for purposes of implementing the 
requirements of this section.
    ``(n) In this section:
            ``(1) The term `appropriate congressional committees' 
        means--
                    ``(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
                Senate; and
                    ``(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House 
                of Representatives.
            ``(2) The term `international agreement' includes--
                    ``(A) treaties that require the advice and consent 
                of the Senate, pursuant to article II of the 
                Constitution of the United States; and
                    ``(B) other international agreements commonly 
                referred to as `executive agreements' for purposes of 
                Federal law, and which are not subject to the advice 
                and consent of the Senate.
            ``(3) The term `qualifying non-binding instrument' means a 
        non-binding instrument that--
                    ``(A) is signed or otherwise concluded with one or 
                more foreign governments or international 
                organizations; and
                    ``(B)(i) has an important effect on the foreign 
                policy of the United States; or
                    ``(ii) is the subject of a written communication 
                from the Chair or Ranking Member of either of the 
                appropriate congressional committees to the Secretary.
            ``(4) The term `Secretary' means the Secretary of State.
            ``(5) The term `text of the international agreement or 
        qualifying non-binding instrument' includes any annex, 
        appendix, codicil, side agreement, implementing material, 
        document, or guidance, technical or other understanding, and 
        any related agreement or non-binding instrument, whether 
        entered into or implemented prior to the entry into force of 
        the agreement or the effective date of the qualifying non-
        binding instrument or to be entered into or implemented in the 
        future.''.
    (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of sections at the beginning of 
chapter 2 of title 1, United States Code, is amended by striking the 
item relating to section 112b and inserting the following:

``112b. United States international agreements; transparency 
                            provisions.''.
    (c) Conforming Amendment.--Section 317(h)(2) of the Homeland 
Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 195c(h)(2)) is amended by striking 
``Section 112b(c)'' and inserting ``Section 112b(h)''.

SEC. 311. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS 
              IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

    (a) In General.--Amounts authorized to be appropriated or otherwise 
made available to carry out section 409 of the Asia Reassurance 
Initiative (Public Law 115-409) include programs that prioritize the 
protection and advancement of the freedoms of association, assembly, 
religion, and expression for women, human rights activists, and ethnic 
and religious minorities in the People's Republic of China.
    (b) Use of Funds.--Amounts appropriated pursuant to subsection (a) 
may be used to fund nongovernmental agencies within the Indo-Pacific 
region that are focused on the issues described in subsection (a).
    (c) Consultation Requirement.--In carrying out this section, the 
Assistant Secretary of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor shall consult 
with the appropriate congressional committees and representatives of 
civil society regarding--
            (1) strengthening the capacity of the organizations 
        referred to in subsection (b);
            (2) protecting members of the groups referred to in 
        subsection (a) who have been targeted for arrest, harassment, 
        forced sterilizations, coercive abortions, forced labor, or 
        intimidation, including members residing outside of the 
        People's Republic of China; and
            (3) messaging efforts to reach the broadest possible 
        audiences within the People's Republic of China about United 
        States Government efforts to protect freedom of association, 
        expression, assembly, and the rights of ethnic minorities.

SEC. 312. DIPLOMATIC BOYCOTT OF THE XXIV OLYMPIC WINTER GAMES AND THE 
              XIII PARALYMPIC WINTER GAMES.

    (a) Statement of Policy.--It shall be the policy of the United 
States--
            (1) to implement a diplomatic boycott of the XXIV Olympic 
        Winter Games and the XIII Paralympic Winter Games in the PRC; 
        and
            (2) to call for an end to the Chinese Communist Party's 
        ongoing human rights abuses, including the Uyghur genocide.
    (b) Funding Prohibition.--
            (1) In general.--Notwithstanding any other provision of 
        law, the Secretary of State may not obligate or expend any 
        Federal funds to support or facilitate the attendance of the 
        XXIV Olympic Winter Games or the XIII Paralympic Winter Games 
        by any employee of the United States Government.
            (2) Exception.--Paragraph (1) shall not apply to the 
        obligation or expenditure of Federal funds necessary--
                    (A) to support--
                            (i) the United States Olympic and 
                        Paralympic Committee;
                            (ii) the national governing bodies of 
                        amateur sports; or
                            (iii) athletes, employees, or contractors 
                        of the Olympic and Paralympic Committee or such 
                        national governing bodies; or
                    (B) to provide consular services or security to, or 
                otherwise protect the health, safety, and welfare of, 
                United States persons, employees, contractors, and 
                their families.
            (3) Waiver.--The Secretary of State may waive the 
        applicability of paragraph (1) in a circumstance in which the 
        Secretary determines a waiver is the national interest.

SEC. 313. REPEAL OF SUNSET APPLICABLE TO AUTHORITY UNDER GLOBAL 
              MAGNITSKY HUMAN RIGHTS ACCOUNTABILITY ACT.

    Section 1265 of the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability 
Act (Subtitle F of title XII of Public Law 114-328; 22 U.S.C. 2656 
note) is repealed.

             TITLE IV--INVESTING IN OUR ECONOMIC STATECRAFT

SEC. 401. FINDINGS AND SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING THE PRC'S INDUSTRIAL 
              POLICY.

    (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) The People's Republic of China, at the direction of the 
        Chinese Communist Party, is advancing an ecosystem of 
        anticompetitive economic and industrial policies that--
                    (A) distort global markets;
                    (B) limit innovation;
                    (C) unfairly advantage PRC firms at the expense of 
                the United States and other foreign firms; and
                    (D) unfairly and harmfully prejudice consumer 
                choice.
            (2) Of the extensive and systemic economic and industrial 
        policies pursued by the PRC, the mass subsidization of PRC 
        firms, intellectual property theft, and forced technology 
        transfer are among the most damaging to the global economy.
            (3) Through regulatory interventions and direct financial 
        subsidies, the CCP, for the purposes of advancing national 
        political and economic objectives, directs, coerces, and 
        influences in anti-competitive ways the commercial activities 
        of firms that are directed, financed, influenced, or otherwise 
        controlled by the state, including state-owned enterprises, and 
        ostensibly independent and private Chinese companies, such as 
        technology firms in strategic sectors.
            (4) The PRC Government, at the national and subnational 
        levels, grants special privileges or status to certain PRC 
        firms in key sectors designated as strategic, such as 
        telecommunications, oil, power, aviation, banking, and 
        semiconductors. Enterprises receive special state preferences 
        in the form of favorable loans, tax exemptions, and 
        preferential land access from the CCP.
            (5) The subsidization of PRC companies, as described in 
        paragraphs (3) and (4)--
                    (A) enables these companies to sell goods below 
                market prices, allowing them to outbid and crowd out 
                market-based competitors and thereby pursue global 
                dominance of key sectors;
                    (B) distorts the global market economy by 
                undermining longstanding and generally accepted market-
                based principles of fair competition, leading to 
                barriers to entry and forced exit from the market for 
                foreign or private firms, not only in the PRC, but in 
                markets around the world;
                    (C) creates government-sponsored or supported de 
                facto monopolies, cartels, and other anti-market 
                arrangements in key sectors, limiting or removing 
                opportunities for other firms; and
                    (D) leads to, as a result of the issues described 
                in paragraphs (A) through (C), declines in profits and 
                revenue needed by foreign and private firms for 
                research and development.
            (6) The CCP incentivizes and empowers PRC actors to steal 
        critical technologies and trade secrets from private and 
        foreign competitors operating in the PRC and around the world, 
        particularly in areas that the CCP has identified as critical 
        to advancing PRC objectives. The PRC, as directed by the CCP, 
        also continues to implement anti-competitive regulations, 
        policies, and practices that coerce the handover of technology 
        and other propriety or sensitive data from foreign enterprises 
        to domestic firms in exchange for access to the PRC market.
            (7) Companies in the United States and in foreign countries 
        compete with state-subsidized PRC companies that enjoy the 
        protection and power of the state in third-country markets 
        around the world. The advantages granted to PRC firms, combined 
        with significant restrictions to accessing the PRC market 
        itself, severely hamper the ability of United States and 
        foreign firms to compete, innovate, and pursue the provision of 
        best value to customers. The result is an unbalanced playing 
        field. Such an unsustainable course, if not checked, will over 
        time lead to depressed competition around the world, reduced 
        opportunity, and harm to both producers and consumers.
            (8) As stated in the United States Trade Representative's 
        investigation of the PRC's trade practices under section 301 of 
        the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2411), conducted in March 
        2018, ``When U.S. companies are deprived of fair returns on 
        their investment in IP, they are unable to achieve the growth 
        necessary to reinvest in innovation. In this sense, China's 
        technology transfer regime directly burdens the innovation 
        ecosystem that is an engine of economic growth in the United 
        States and similarly-situated economies.''.
            (9) In addition to forced technology described in this 
        subsection, the United States Trade Representative's 
        investigation of the PRC under section 301 of the Trade Act of 
        1974 (19 U.S.C. 2411) also identified requirements that foreign 
        firms license products at less than market value, government-
        directed and government-subsidized acquisition of sensitive 
        technology for strategic purposes, and cyber theft as other key 
        PRC technology and industrial policies that are unreasonable 
        and discriminatory. These policies place at risk United States 
        intellectual property rights, innovation and technological 
        development, and jobs in dozens of industries.
            (10) Other elements of the PRC's ecosystem of industrial 
        policies that harm innovation and distort global markets 
        include--
                    (A) advancement of policies that encourage local 
                production over imports;
                    (B) continuation of policies that favor unique 
                technical standards in use by PRC firms rather than 
                globally accepted standards, which often force foreign 
                firms to alter their products and manufacturing chains 
                to compete;
                    (C) requirements that foreign companies disclose 
                proprietary information to qualify for the adoption of 
                their standards for use in the PRC domestic market; and
                    (D) maintenance of closed procurement processes, 
                which limit participation by foreign firms, including 
                by setting terms that require such firms to use 
                domestic suppliers, transfer know-how to firms in the 
                PRC, and disclose proprietary information.
            (11) The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and associated 
        industry-specific efforts under this initiative, such as the 
        Digital Silk Road, are key vectors to advance the PRC's 
        mercantilist policies and practices globally. The resulting 
        challenges do not only affect United States firms. As the 
        European Chamber of Commerce reported in a January 2020 report, 
        the combination of concessional lending to PRC state-owned 
        enterprises, nontransparent procurement and bidding processes, 
        closed digital standards, and other factors severely limit 
        European and other participation in BRI and make ``competition 
        [with PRC companies] in third-country markets extremely 
        challenging''. This underscores a key objective of BRI, which 
        is to ensure the reliance of infrastructure, digital 
        technologies, and other important goods on PRC supply chains 
        and technical standards.
            (12) On January 9, 2021, the Ministry of Commerce of the 
        PRC issued Order No. 1 of 2021, entitled ``Rules on 
        Counteracting Unjustified Extraterritorial Application of 
        Foreign Legislation and other Measures'', which establishes a 
        blocking regime in response to foreign sanctions on Chinese 
        individuals and entities. That order allows the Government of 
        the PRC to designate specific foreign laws as ``unjustified 
        extraterritorial application of foreign legislation'' and to 
        prohibit compliance with such foreign laws.
    (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the challenges presented by a nonmarket economy like 
        the PRC's economy, which has captured such a large share of 
        global economic exchange, are in many ways unprecedented and 
        require sufficiently elevated and sustained long-term focus and 
        engagement;
            (2) in order to truly address the most detrimental aspects 
        of CCP-directed mercantilist economic strategy, the United 
        States must adopt policies that--
                    (A) expose the full scope and scale of intellectual 
                property theft and mass subsidization of Chinese firms, 
                and the resulting harm to the United States, foreign 
                markets, and the global economy;
                    (B) ensure that PRC companies face costs and 
                consequences for anticompetitive behavior;
                    (C) provide options for affected United States 
                persons to address and respond to unreasonable and 
                discriminatory CCP-directed industrial policies; and
                    (D) strengthen the protection of critical 
                technology and sensitive data, while still fostering an 
                environment that provides incentives for innovation and 
                competition;
            (3) the United States must work with its allies and 
        partners through the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
        Development (OECD), the World Trade Organization, and other 
        venues and fora--
                    (A) to reinforce long-standing generally accepted 
                principles of fair competition and market behavior and 
                address the PRC's anticompetitive economic and 
                industrial policies that undermine decades of global 
                growth and innovation;
                    (B) to ensure that the PRC is not granted the same 
                treatment as that of a free-market economy until it 
                ceases the implementation of laws, regulations, 
                policies, and practices that provide unfair advantage 
                to PRC firms in furtherance of national objectives and 
                impose unreasonable, discriminatory, and illegal 
                burdens on market-based international commerce; and
                    (C) to align policies with respect to curbing 
                state-directed subsidization of the private sector, 
                such as advocating for global rules related to 
                transparency and adherence to notification 
                requirements, including through the efforts currently 
                being advanced by the United States, Japan, and the 
                European Union;
            (4) the United States and its allies and partners must 
        collaborate to provide incentives to their respective companies 
        to cooperate in areas such as--
                    (A) advocating for protection of intellectual 
                property rights in markets around the world;
                    (B) fostering open technical standards; and
                    (C) increasing joint investments in overseas 
                markets; and
            (5) the United States should develop policies that--
                    (A) insulate United States entities from PRC 
                pressure against complying with United States laws;
                    (B) counter the potential impact of the blocking 
                regime of the PRC described in subsection (a)(12), 
                including by working with allies and partners of the 
                United States and multilateral institutions; and
                    (C) plan for future actions that the Government of 
                the PRC may take to undermine the lawful application of 
                United States legal authorities, including with respect 
                to the use of sanctions.

SEC. 402. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY VIOLATORS LIST.

    (a) In General.--Not later than one year after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, and not less frequently than annually thereafter 
for 5 years, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary 
of Commerce, the Attorney General, the United States Trade 
Representative, and the Director of National Intelligence, shall create 
a list (referred to in this section as the ``intellectual property 
violators list'') that identifies--
            (1) all centrally administered state-owned enterprises 
        incorporated in the People's Republic of China that have 
        benefitted from--
                    (A) a significant act or series of acts of 
                intellectual property theft that subjected a United 
                States economic sector or particular company 
                incorporated in the United States to harm; or
                    (B) an act or government policy of involuntary or 
                coerced technology transfer of intellectual property 
                ultimately owned by a company incorporated in the 
                United States; and
            (2) any corporate officer of, or principal shareholder with 
        controlling interests in, an entity described in paragraph (1).
    (b) Rules for Identification.--To determine whether there is a 
credible basis for determining that a company should be included on the 
intellectual property violators list, the Secretary of State, in 
coordination with the Secretary of Commerce, the United States Trade 
Representative, and the Director of National Intelligence, shall 
consider--
            (1) any finding by a United States court that the company 
        has violated relevant United States laws intended to protect 
        intellectual property rights; or
            (2) substantial and credible information received from any 
        entity described in subsection (c) or other interested persons.
    (c) Consultation.--In carrying out this section, the Secretary of 
State, in coordination with the Secretary of Commerce, the United 
States Trade Representative, and the Director of National Intelligence, 
may consult, as necessary and appropriate, with--
            (1) other Federal agencies, including independent agencies;
            (2) the private sector;
            (3) civil society organizations with relevant expertise; 
        and
            (4) the Governments of Australia, Canada, the European 
        Union, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, and the United Kingdom.
    (d) Report.--
            (1) In general.--The Secretary of State shall publish, in 
        the Federal Register, an annual report that--
                    (A) lists the companies engaged in the activities 
                described in subsection (a)(1); and
                    (B) describes the circumstances surrounding actions 
                described in subsection (a)(2), including any role of 
                the PRC government;
                    (C) assesses, to the extent practicable, the 
                economic advantage derived by the companies engaged in 
                the activities described in subsection (a)(1); and
                    (D) assesses whether each company engaged in the 
                activities described in subsection (a)(1) is using or 
                has used the stolen intellectual property in commercial 
                activity in Australia, Canada, the European Union, 
                Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, the United Kingdom, or 
                the United States.
            (2) Form.--The report published under paragraph (1) shall 
        be unclassified, but may include a classified annex.
    (e) Declassification and Release.--The Director of National 
Intelligence may authorize the declassification of information, as 
appropriate, to inform the contents of the report published pursuant to 
subsection (d).
    (f) Requirement to Protect Business-confidential Information.--
            (1) In general.--The Secretary of State and the heads of 
        all other Federal agencies involved in the production of the 
        intellectual property violators list shall protect from 
        disclosure any proprietary information submitted by a private 
        sector participant and marked as business-confidential 
        information, unless the party submitting the confidential 
        business information--
                    (A) had notice, at the time of submission, that 
                such information would be released by the Secretary; or
                    (B) subsequently consents to the release of such 
                information.
            (2) Nonconfidential version of report.--If confidential 
        business information is provided by a private sector 
        participant, a nonconfidential version of the report under 
        subsection (d) shall be published in the Federal Register that 
        summarizes or deletes, if necessary, the confidential business 
        information.
            (3) Treatment as trade secrets.--Proprietary information 
        submitted by a private party under this section--
                    (A) shall be considered to be trade secrets and 
                commercial or financial information (as defined under 
                section 552(b)(4) of title 5, United States Code); and
                    (B) shall be exempt from disclosure without the 
                express approval of the private party.

SEC. 403. GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA SUBSIDIES LIST.

    (a) Report.--Not later than one year after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 5 years, the 
Secretary of State, in coordination with the United States Trade 
Representative and the Secretary of Commerce, shall publish an 
unclassified report in the Federal Register that identifies--
            (1) subsidies provided by the PRC government to enterprises 
        in the PRC; and
            (2) discriminatory treatment favoring enterprises in the 
        PRC over foreign market participants.
    (b) Subsidies and Discriminatory Treatment Described.--In compiling 
the report under subsection (a), the Secretary of State shall 
consider--
            (1) regulatory and other policies enacted or promoted by 
        the PRC government that--
                    (A) discriminate in favor of enterprises in the PRC 
                at the expense of foreign market participants;
                    (B) shield centrally administered, state-owned 
                enterprises from competition; or
                    (C) otherwise suppress market-based competition;
            (2) financial subsidies, including favorable lending terms, 
        from or promoted by the PRC government or centrally 
        administered, state-owned enterprises that materially benefit 
        PRC enterprises over foreign market participants in 
        contravention of generally accepted market principles; and
            (3) any subsidy that meets the definition of subsidy under 
        article 1 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
        Measures referred to in section 101(d)(12) of the Uruguay Round 
        Agreements Act (19 U.S.C. 3511(d)(12)).
    (c) Consultation.--The Secretary of State, in coordination with the 
Secretary of Commerce and the United States Trade Representative, may, 
as necessary and appropriate, consult with--
            (1) other Federal agencies, including independent agencies;
            (2) the private sector; and
            (3) civil society organizations with relevant expertise.

SEC. 404. COUNTERING FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES.

    (a) In General.--The Secretary of State, in coordination with the 
Attorney General, shall offer to provide technical assistance to 
establish legislative and regulatory frameworks to combat the bribery 
of foreign public officials consistent with the principles of the OECD 
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in 
International Business Transactions to the governments of countries--
            (1) that are partners of the United States;
            (2) that have demonstrated a will to combat foreign corrupt 
        practices responsibly; and
            (3) for which technical assistance will have the greatest 
        opportunity to achieve measurable results.
    (b) Strategy Requirement.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit a strategy 
for carrying out the activities described in subsections (a) to the 
appropriate congressional committees.
    (c) Coordination.--In formulating the strategy described in 
subsection (b), the Secretary of State shall coordinate with the 
Attorney General.
    (d) Semiannual Briefing Requirement.--Not later than 180 days after 
the date of enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter for 
five years, the Secretary of State shall provide a briefing regarding 
the activities described in subsection (a) and the strategy submitted 
under subsection (b) to the appropriate congressional committees.

SEC. 405. DEBT RELIEF FOR COUNTRIES ELIGIBLE FOR ASSISTANCE FROM THE 
              INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION.

    (a) Policy Statement.--It is the policy of the United States to 
coordinate with the international community to provide debt relief for 
debt that is held by countries eligible for assistance from the 
International Development Association that request forbearance to 
respond to the COVID-19 pandemic.
    (b) Debt Relief.--The Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation 
with the Secretary of State, shall engage with international financial 
institutions and other bilateral official creditors to advance policy 
discussions on restructuring, rescheduling, or canceling the sovereign 
debt of countries eligible for assistance from the International 
Development Association, as necessary, to respond to the COVID-19 
pandemic.
    (c) Reporting Requirement.--Not later than 45 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, and every 90 days thereafter until the 
end of the COVID-19 pandemic, as determined by the World Health 
Organization, or until two years after the date of the enactment of 
this Act, whichever is earlier, the Secretary of the Treasury, in 
coordination with the Secretary of State, shall submit to the 
committees specified in subsection (d) a report that describes--
            (1) actions that have been taken to advance debt relief for 
        countries eligible for assistance from the International 
        Development Association that request forbearance to respond to 
        the COVID-19 pandemic in coordination with international 
        financial institutions, the Group of 7 (G7), the Group of 20 
        (G20), Paris Club members, and the Institute of International 
        Finance;
            (2) mechanisms that have been utilized and mechanisms that 
        are under consideration to provide the debt relief described in 
        paragraph (1);
            (3) any United States policy concerns regarding debt relief 
        to specific countries;
            (4) the balance and status of repayments on all loans from 
        the People's Republic of China to countries eligible for 
        assistance from the International Development Association, 
        including--
                    (A) loans provided as part of the Belt and Road 
                Initiative of the People's Republic of China;
                    (B) loans made by the Export-Import Bank of China;
                    (C) loans made by the China Development Bank; and
                    (D) loans made by the Asian Infrastructure 
                Investment Bank; and
            (5) the transparency measures established or proposed to 
        ensure that funds saved through the debt relief described in 
        paragraph (1) will be used for activities--
                    (A) that respond to the health, economic, and 
                social consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic; and
                    (B) that are consistent with the interests and 
                values of the United States.
    (d) Committees Specified.--The committees specified in this 
subsection are--
            (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on 
        Appropriations, and the Committee on Banking, Housing, and 
        Urban Affairs of the Senate; and
            (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on 
        Appropriations, and the Committee on Financial Services of the 
        House of Representatives.

SEC. 406. REPORT ON MANNER AND EXTENT TO WHICH THE GOVERNMENT OF CHINA 
              EXPLOITS HONG KONG TO CIRCUMVENT UNITED STATES LAWS AND 
              PROTECTIONS.

    Title III of the United States-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992 (22 
U.S.C. 5731 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following:

``SEC. 303. REPORT ON MANNER AND EXTENT TO WHICH THE GOVERNMENT OF 
              CHINA EXPLOITS HONG KONG TO CIRCUMVENT UNITED STATES LAWS 
              AND PROTECTIONS.

    ``(a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this section, the Secretary of State shall submit to the 
appropriate congressional committees a report on the manner and extent 
to which the Government of the People's Republic of China uses the 
status of Hong Kong to circumvent the laws and protections of the 
United States.
    ``(b) Elements.--The report required by subsection (a) shall 
include the following:
            ``(1) In consultation with the Secretary of Commerce, the 
        Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Director of National 
        Intelligence--
                    ``(A) an assessment of how the Government of the 
                People's Republic of China uses Hong Kong to circumvent 
                United States export controls; and
                    ``(B) a list of all significant incidents in which 
                the Government of the People's Republic of China used 
                Hong Kong to circumvent such controls during the 
                reporting period.
            ``(2) In consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury 
        and the Secretary of Commerce--
                    ``(A) an assessment of how the Government of the 
                People's Republic of China uses Hong Kong to circumvent 
                duties on merchandise exported to the United States 
                from the People's Republic of China; and
                    ``(B) a list of all significant incidents in which 
                the Government of the People's Republic of China used 
                Hong Kong to circumvent such duties during the 
                reporting period.
            ``(3) In consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, 
        the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Director of 
        National Intelligence--
                    ``(A) an assessment of how the Government of the 
                People's Republic of China uses Hong Kong to circumvent 
                sanctions imposed by the United States or pursuant to 
                multilateral regimes; and
                    ``(B) a list of all significant incidents in which 
                the Government of the People's Republic of China used 
                Hong Kong to circumvent such sanctions during the 
                reporting period.
            ``(4) In consultation with the Secretary of Homeland 
        Security and the Director of National Intelligence, an 
        assessment of how the Government of the People's Republic of 
        China uses formal or informal means to extradite or coercively 
        move individuals, including United States persons, from Hong 
        Kong to the People's Republic of China.
            ``(5) In consultation with the Secretary of Defense, the 
        Director of National Intelligence, and the Director of Homeland 
        Security--
                    ``(A) an assessment of how the intelligence, 
                security, and law enforcement agencies of the 
                Government of the People's Republic of China, including 
                the Ministry of State Security, the Ministry of Public 
                Security, and the People's Armed Police, use the Hong 
                Kong Security Bureau and other security agencies in 
                Hong Kong to conduct espionage on foreign nationals, 
                including United States persons, conduct influence 
                operations, or violate civil liberties guaranteed under 
                the laws of Hong Kong; and
                    ``(B) a list of all significant incidents of such 
                espionage, influence operations, or violations of civil 
                liberties during the reporting period.
    ``(c) Form of Report; Availability.--
            ``(1) Form.--The report required by subsection (a) shall be 
        submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified 
        index.
            ``(2) Availability.--The unclassified portion of the report 
        required by subsection (a) shall be posted on a publicly 
        available internet website of the Department of State.
    ``(d) Definitions.--In this section:
            ``(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
        `appropriate congressional committees' means--
                    ``(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the 
                Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the 
                Committee on Finance, and the Select Committee on 
                Intelligence of the Senate; and
                    ``(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the 
                Committee on Financial Services, the Permanent Select 
                Committee on Intelligence, and the Committee on Ways 
                and Means of the House of Representatives.
            ``(2) Foreign national.--The term `foreign national' means 
        a person that is neither--
                    ``(A) an individual who is a citizen or national of 
                the People's Republic of China; or
                    ``(B) an entity organized under the laws of the 
                People's Republic of China or of a jurisdiction within 
                the People's Republic of China.
            ``(3) Reporting period.--The term `reporting period' means 
        the 5-year period preceding submission of the report required 
        by subsection (a).
            ``(4) United states person.--The term `United States 
        person' means--
                    ``(A) a United States citizen or an alien lawfully 
                admitted for permanent residence to the United States; 
                or
                    ``(B) an entity organized under the laws of the 
                United States or of any jurisdiction within the United 
                States, including a foreign branch of such an 
                entity.''.

SEC. 407. ANNUAL REVIEW ON THE PRESENCE OF CHINESE COMPANIES IN UNITED 
              STATES CAPITAL MARKETS.

    (a) Appropriate Committees of Congress.--In this section, the term 
``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
            (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;
            (2) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate;
            (3) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of 
        the Senate;
            (4) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
        Representatives;
            (5) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
        House of Representatives; and
            (6) the Committee on Financial Services of the House of 
        Representatives.
    (b) Report.--
            (1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for the 
        following 5 years, the Secretary of State, in consultation with 
        the Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of the 
        Treasury, shall submit an unclassified report to the 
        appropriate committees of Congress that describes the risks 
        posed to the United States by the presence in United States 
        capital markets of companies incorporated in the PRC.
            (2) Matters to be included.--The report required under 
        paragraph (1) shall--
                    (A) identify companies incorporated in the PRC 
                that--
                            (i) are listed or traded on one or several 
                        stock exchanges within the United States, 
                        including over-the-counter market and ``A 
                        Shares'' added to indexes and exchange-traded 
                        funds out of mainland exchanges in the PRC; and
                            (ii) based on the factors for consideration 
                        described in paragraph (3), have knowingly and 
                        materially contributed to--
                                    (I) activities that undermine 
                                United States national security;
                                    (II) serious abuses of 
                                internationally recognized human 
                                rights; or
                                    (III) a substantially increased 
                                financial risk exposure for United 
                                States-based investors;
                    (B) describe the activities of the companies 
                identified pursuant to subparagraph (A), and their 
                implications for the United States; and
                    (C) develop policy recommendations for the United 
                States Government, State governments, United States 
                financial institutions, United States equity and debt 
                exchanges, and other relevant stakeholders to address 
                the risks posed by the presence in United States 
                capital markets of the companies identified pursuant to 
                subparagraph (A).
            (3) Factors for consideration.--In completing the report 
        under paragraph (1), the President shall consider whether a 
        company identified pursuant to paragraph (2)(A)--
                    (A) has materially contributed to the development 
                or manufacture, or sold or facilitated procurement by 
                the PLA, of lethal military equipment or component 
                parts of such equipment;
                    (B) has contributed to the construction and 
                militarization of features in the South China Sea;
                    (C) has been sanctioned by the United States or has 
                been determined to have conducted business with 
                sanctioned entities;
                    (D) has engaged in an act or a series of acts of 
                intellectual property theft;
                    (E) has engaged in corporate or economic espionage;
                    (F) has contributed to the proliferation of nuclear 
                or missile technology in violation of United Nations 
                Security Council resolutions or United States 
                sanctions;
                    (G) has contributed to the repression of religious 
                and ethnic minorities within the PRC, including in 
                Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region or Tibet Autonomous 
                Region;
                    (H) has contributed to the development of 
                technologies that enable censorship directed or 
                directly supported by the PRC government;
                    (I) has failed to comply fully with Federal 
                securities laws (including required audits by the 
                Public Company Accounting Oversight Board) and 
                ``material risk'' disclosure requirements of the 
                Securities and Exchange Commission; or
                    (J) has contributed to other activities or behavior 
                determined to be relevant by the President.
    (c) Report Form.--The report required under subsection (b)(1) shall 
be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
    (d) Publication.--The unclassified portion of the report under 
subsection (b)(1) shall be made accessible to the public online through 
relevant United States Government websites.

SEC. 408. ECONOMIC DEFENSE RESPONSE TEAMS.

    (a) Pilot Program.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the President, acting through the Secretary of 
State, shall develop and implement a pilot program for the creation of 
deployable economic defense response teams to help provide emergency 
technical assistance and support to a country subjected to the threat 
or use of coercive economic measures and to play a liaison role between 
the legitimate government of that country and the United States 
Government. Such assistance and support may include the following 
activities:
            (1) Reducing the partner country's vulnerability to 
        coercive economic measures.
            (2) Minimizing the damage that such measures by an 
        adversary could cause to that country.
            (3) Implementing any bilateral or multilateral contingency 
        plans that may exist for responding to the threat or use of 
        such measures.
            (4) In coordination with the partner country, developing or 
        improving plans and strategies by the country for reducing 
        vulnerabilities and improving responses to such measures in the 
        future.
            (5) Assisting the partner country in dealing with foreign 
        sovereign investment in infrastructure or related projects that 
        may undermine the partner country's sovereignty.
            (6) Assisting the partner country in responding to specific 
        efforts from an adversary attempting to employ economic 
        coercion that undermines the partner country's sovereignty, 
        including efforts in the cyber domain, such as efforts that 
        undermine cybersecurity or digital security of the partner 
        country or initiatives that introduce digital technologies in a 
        manner that undermines freedom, security, and sovereignty of 
        the partner country.
            (7) Otherwise providing direct and relevant short-to-medium 
        term economic or other assistance from the United States and 
        marshalling other resources in support of effective responses 
        to such measures.
    (b) Institutional Support.--The pilot program required by 
subsection (a) should include the following elements:
            (1) Identification and designation of relevant personnel 
        within the United States Government with expertise relevant to 
        the objectives specified in subsection (a), including personnel 
        in--
                    (A) the Department of State, for overseeing the 
                economic defense response team's activities, engaging 
                with the partner country government and other 
                stakeholders, and other purposes relevant to advancing 
                the success of the mission of the economic defense 
                response team;
                    (B) the United States Agency for International 
                Development, for the purposes of providing technical, 
                humanitarian, and other assistance, generally;
                    (C) the Department of the Treasury, for the 
                purposes of providing advisory support and assistance 
                on all financial matters and fiscal implications of the 
                crisis at hand;
                    (D) the Department of Commerce, for the purposes of 
                providing economic analysis and assistance in market 
                development relevant to the partner country's response 
                to the crisis at hand, technology security as 
                appropriate, and other matters that may be relevant;
                    (E) the Department of Energy, for the purposes of 
                providing advisory services and technical assistance 
                with respect to energy needs as affected by the crisis 
                at hand;
                    (F) the Department of Homeland Security, for the 
                purposes of providing assistance with respect to 
                digital and cybersecurity matters, and assisting in the 
                development of any contingency plans referred to in 
                paragraphs (3) and (6) of subsection (a) as 
                appropriate;
                    (G) the Department of Agriculture, for providing 
                advisory and other assistance with respect to 
                responding to coercive measures such as arbitrary 
                market closures that affect the partner country's 
                agricultural sector;
                    (H) the Office of the United States Trade 
                Representative with respect to providing support and 
                guidance on trade and investment matters; and
                    (I) other Federal departments and agencies as 
                determined by the President.
            (2) Negotiation of memoranda of understanding, where 
        appropriate, with other United States Government components for 
        the provision of any relevant participating or detailed non-
        Department of State personnel identified under paragraph (1).
            (3) Negotiation of contracts, as appropriate, with private 
        sector representatives or other individuals with relevant 
        expertise to advance the objectives specified in subsection 
        (a).
            (4) Development within the United States Government of--
                    (A) appropriate training curricula for relevant 
                experts identified under paragraph (1) and for United 
                States diplomatic personnel in a country actually or 
                potentially threatened by coercive economic measures;
                    (B) operational procedures and appropriate 
                protocols for the rapid assembly of such experts into 
                one or more teams for deployment to a country actually 
                or potentially threatened by coercive economic 
                measures; and
                    (C) procedures for ensuring appropriate support for 
                such teams when serving in a country actually or 
                potentially threatened by coercive economic measures, 
                including, as applicable, logistical assistance, office 
                space, information support, and communications.
            (5) Negotiation with relevant potential host countries of 
        procedures and methods for ensuring the rapid and effective 
        deployment of such teams, and the establishment of appropriate 
        liaison relationships with local public and private sector 
        officials and entities.
    (c) Reports Required .--
            (1) Report on establishment.--Upon establishment of the 
        pilot program required by subsection (a), the Secretary of 
        State shall provide the appropriate committees of Congress with 
        a detailed report and briefing describing the pilot program, 
        the major elements of the program, the personnel and 
        institutions involved, and the degree to which the program 
        incorporates the elements described in subsection (a).
            (2) Follow-up report.--Not later than one year after the 
        report required by paragraph (1), the Secretary of State shall 
        provide the appropriate committees of Congress with a detailed 
        report and briefing describing the operations over the previous 
        year of the pilot program established pursuant to subsection 
        (a), as well as the Secretary's assessment of its performance 
        and suitability for becoming a permanent program.
            (3) Form.--Each report required under this subsection shall 
        be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified 
        annex.
    (d) Declaration of an Economic Crisis Required.--
            (1) Notification.--The President may activate an economic 
        defense response team for a period of 180 days under the 
        authorities of this section to assist a partner country in 
        responding to an unusual and extraordinary economic coercive 
        threat by an adversary of the United States upon the 
        declaration of a coercive economic emergency, together with 
        notification to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
        Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
        Representatives.
            (2) Extension authority.--The President may activate the 
        response team for an additional 180 days upon the submission of 
        a detailed analysis to the committees described in paragraph 
        (1) justifying why the continued deployment of the economic 
        defense response team in response to the economic emergency is 
        in the national security interest of the United States.
    (e) Sunset.--The authorities provided under this section shall 
expire on December 31, 2026.
    (f) Rule of Construction.--Neither the authority to declare an 
economic crisis provided for in subsection (d), nor the declaration of 
an economic crisis pursuant to subsection (d), shall confer or be 
construed to confer any authority, power, duty, or responsibility to 
the President other than the authority to activate an economic defense 
response team as described in this section.
    (g) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this section, 
the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
            (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on 
        Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee on Commerce, 
        Science, and Transportation, the Committee on Energy and 
        Natural Resources, the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and 
        Forestry, and the Committee on Finance of the Senate; and
            (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on 
        Financial Services, the Committee on Energy and Commerce, the 
        Committee on Agriculture, and the Committee on Ways and Means 
        of the House of Representatives.

                  TITLE V--ENSURING STRATEGIC SECURITY

SEC. 501. FINDINGS ON STRATEGIC SECURITY AND ARMS CONTROL.

    Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) The United States and the PRC have both made 
        commitments to advancing strategic security through enforceable 
        arms control and non-proliferation agreements as states parties 
        to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done 
        at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968.
            (2) The United States has long taken tangible steps to seek 
        effective, verifiable, and enforceable arms control and non-
        proliferation agreements that support United States and allied 
        security by--
                    (A) controlling the spread of nuclear materials and 
                technology;
                    (B) placing limits on the production, stockpiling, 
                and deployment of nuclear weapons;
                    (C) decreasing misperception and miscalculation; 
                and
                    (D) avoiding destabilizing nuclear arms 
                competition.
            (3) In May 2019, Director of the Defense Intelligence 
        Agency Lieutenant General Robert Ashley stated, ``China is 
        likely to at least double the size of its nuclear stockpile in 
        the course of implementing the most rapid expansion and 
        diversification of its nuclear arsenal in China's history.''. 
        The PLA is building a full triad of modernized fixed and mobile 
        ground-based launchers and new capabilities for nuclear-armed 
        bombers and submarine-launched ballistic missiles.
            (4) In June 2020, the Department of State raised concerns 
        in its annual ``Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, 
        Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments'' 
        report to Congress that the PRC is not complying with the 
        ``zero-yield'' nuclear testing ban and accused the PRC of 
        ``blocking the flow of data from the monitoring stations'' in 
        China.
            (5) The Department of Defense 2020 Report on Military and 
        Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 
        states that the PRC ``intends to increase peacetime readiness 
        of its nuclear forces by moving to a launch on warning posture 
        with an expanded silo-based force''.
            (6) The Department of Defense report also states that, over 
        the next decade, the PRC's nuclear stockpile--currently 
        estimated in the low 200s--is projected to least double in size 
        as the PRC expands and modernizes its nuclear force.
            (7) The PRC is conducting research on its first potential 
        early warning radar, with technical cooperation from Russia. 
        This radar could indicate that the PRC is moving to a launch-on 
        warning posture.
            (8) The PRC plans to use its increasingly capable space, 
        cyber, and electronic warfare capabilities against United 
        States early warning systems and critical infrastructure in a 
        crisis scenario. This poses great risk to strategic security, 
        as it could lead to inadvertent escalation.
            (9) The PRC's nuclear expansion comes as a part of a 
        massive modernization of the PLA which, combined with the PLA's 
        aggressive actions, has increasingly destabilized the Indo-
        Pacific region.
            (10) The PLA Rocket Force (PLARF), which was elevated in 
        2015 to become a separate branch within the PLA, has formed 11 
        new missile brigades since May 2017, some of which are capable 
        of both conventional and nuclear strikes. Unlike the United 
        States, which separates its conventional strike and nuclear 
        capabilities, the PLARF appears to not only co-locate 
        conventional and nuclear forces, including dual-use missiles 
        like the DF-26, but to task the same unit with both nuclear and 
        conventional missions. Such intermingling could lead to 
        inadvertent escalation in a crisis. The United States Defense 
        Intelligence Agency determined in March 2020 that the PLA 
        tested more ballistic missiles than the rest of the world 
        combined in 2019.
            (11) A January 2021 report from the Institute for Defense 
        Analysis found that many United States and international 
        observers viewed China's no first-use policy with skepticism, 
        especially in the wake of the expansion and modernization of 
        its nuclear capabilities.
            (12) The long-planned United States nuclear modernization 
        program will not increase the United States nuclear weapons 
        stockpile, predates China's conventional military and nuclear 
        expansion, and is not an arms race against China.
            (13) The United States extended nuclear deterrence--
                    (A) provides critical strategic security around the 
                world;
                    (B) is an essential element of United States 
                military alliances; and
                    (C) serves a vital non-proliferation function.
            (14) As a signatory to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation 
        of Nuclear Weapons, done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 
        1, 1968, the PRC is obligated under Article Six of the treaty 
        to pursue arms control negotiations in good faith.
            (15) The United States has, on numerous occasions, called 
        on the PRC to participate in strategic arms control 
        negotiations, but the PRC has thus far declined.
            (16) The Governments of Japan, the United Kingdom, Poland, 
        Slovenia, Denmark, Norway, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, the 
        Netherlands, Romania, Austria, Montenegro, Ukraine, Slovakia, 
        Spain, North Macedonia, Sweden, the Czech Republic, Croatia, 
        and Albania, as well as the Deputy Secretary General of the 
        North Atlantic Treaty Organization, have all encouraged the PRC 
        to join arms control discussions.

SEC. 502. COOPERATION ON A STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DIALOGUE.

    (a) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United States--
            (1) to pursue, in coordination with United States allies, 
        arms control negotiations and sustained and regular engagement 
        with the PRC--
                    (A) to enhance understanding of each other's 
                respective nuclear policies, doctrine, and 
                capabilities;
                    (B) to improve transparency; and
                    (C) to help manage the risks of miscalculation and 
                misperception;
            (2) to formulate a strategy to engage the Government of the 
        People's Republic of China on relevant bilateral issues that 
        lays the groundwork for bringing the People's Republic of China 
        into an arms control framework, including--
                    (A) fostering bilateral dialogue on arms control 
                leading to the convening of bilateral strategic 
                security talks;
                    (B) negotiating norms for outer space;
                    (C) developing pre-launch notification regimes 
                aimed at reducing nuclear miscalculation; and
                    (D) expanding lines of communication between both 
                governments for the purposes of reducing the risks of 
                conventional war and increasing transparency;
            (3) to pursue relevant capabilities in coordination with 
        our allies and partners to ensure the security of United States 
        and allied interests in the face of the PRC's military 
        modernization and expansion, including--
                    (A) ground-launched cruise and ballistic missiles;
                    (B) integrated air and missile defense;
                    (C) hypersonic missiles;
                    (D) intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance;
                    (E) space-based capabilities;
                    (F) cyber capabilities; and
                    (G) command, control, and communications;
            (4) to maintain sufficient force structure, posture, and 
        capabilities to provide extended nuclear deterrence to United 
        States allies and partners;
            (5) to maintain appropriate missile defense capabilities to 
        protect against threats to the United States homeland and our 
        forces across the theater from rogue intercontinental ballistic 
        missiles from the Indo-Pacific region; and
            (6) to ensure that the United States declaratory policy 
        reflects the requirements of extended deterrence, to both 
        assure allies and to preserve its non-proliferation benefits.
    (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) in the midst of growing competition between the United 
        States and the PRC, it is in the interest of both nations to 
        cooperate in reducing risks of conventional and nuclear 
        escalation;
            (2) a physical, cyber, electronic, or any other PLA attack 
        on United States early warning satellites, other portions of 
        the nuclear command and control enterprise, or critical 
        infrastructure poses a high risk to inadvertent but rapid 
        escalation;
            (3) the United States and its allies should promote 
        international norms on military operations in space, the 
        employment of cyber capabilities, and the military use of 
        artificial intelligence, as an element of risk reduction 
        regarding nuclear command and control; and
            (4) United States allies and partners should share the 
        burden of promoting and protecting such norms by voting against 
        the PRC's proposals regarding the weaponization of space, 
        highlighting unsafe behavior by the PRC that violates 
        international norms, such as in rendezvous and proximity 
        operations, and promoting responsible behavior in space and all 
        other domains.

SEC. 503. REPORT ON UNITED STATES EFFORTS TO ENGAGE THE PEOPLE'S 
              REPUBLIC OF CHINA ON NUCLEAR ISSUES AND BALLISTIC MISSILE 
              ISSUES.

    (a) Report on the Future of United States-China Arms Control.--Not 
later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the 
Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense and 
the Secretary of Energy, shall submit to the appropriate committees of 
Congress a report, and if necessary a separate classified annex, that 
examines the approaches and strategic effects of engaging the 
Government of the People's Republic of China on arms control and risk 
reduction, including--
            (1) areas of potential dialogue between the Governments of 
        the United States and the People's Republic of China, including 
        on ballistic, hypersonic glide, and cruise missiles, 
        conventional forces, nuclear, space, and cyberspace issues, as 
        well as other new strategic domains, which could reduce the 
        likelihood of war, limit escalation if a conflict were to 
        occur, and constrain a destabilizing arms race in the Indo-
        Pacific;
            (2) how the United States Government can incentivize the 
        Government of the People's Republic of China to engage in a 
        constructive arms control dialogue;
            (3) identifying strategic military capabilities of the 
        People's Republic of China that the United States Government is 
        most concerned about and how limiting these capabilities may 
        benefit United States and allied security interests;
            (4) mechanisms to avoid, manage, or control nuclear, 
        conventional, and unconventional military escalation between 
        the United States and the People's Republic of China;
            (5) the personnel and expertise required to effectively 
        engage the People's Republic of China in strategic stability 
        and arms control dialogues; and
            (6) opportunities and methods to encourage transparency 
        from the People's Republic of China.
    (b) Report on Arms Control Talks With the Russian Federation and 
the People's Republic of China.--Not later than 180 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation 
with the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Energy, shall submit 
to the appropriate committees of Congress a report that describes--
            (1) a concrete plan for arms control talks that includes 
        both the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation;
            (2) if a trilateral arms control dialogue does not arise, 
        what alternative plans the Department of State envisages for 
        ensuring the security of the United States and its allies 
        security from Russian and Chinese nuclear weapons;
            (3) effects on the credibility of United States extended 
        deterrence assurances to allies and partners if the United 
        States is faced with two nuclear-armed peer competitors and any 
        likely corresponding implications for regional security 
        architectures;
            (4) efforts at engaging the People's Republic of China to 
        join arms control talks, whether on a bilateral or multilateral 
        basis; and
            (5) the interest level of the Government of China in 
        joining arms control talks, whether on a bilateral or 
        multilateral basis.
    (c) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this section, 
the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
            (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on 
        Armed Services, and the Committee on Energy and Natural 
        Resources of the Senate; and
            (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on 
        Armed Services, and the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the 
        House of Representatives.

SEC. 504. COUNTERING CHINA'S PROLIFERATION OF BALLISTIC MISSILES AND 
              NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY TO THE MIDDLE EAST.

    (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) The People's Republic of China became a full 
        participant of the Nuclear Suppliers Group in 2004, committing 
        it to apply a strong presumption of denial in exporting 
        nuclear-related items that a foreign country could divert to a 
        nuclear weapons program.
            (2) China also committed to the United States, in November 
        2000, to abide by the foundational principles of the 1987 
        Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) to not ``assist, in 
        any way, any country in the development of ballistic missiles 
        that can be used to deliver nuclear weapons (i.e., missiles 
        capable of delivering a payload of at least 500 kilograms to a 
        distance of at least 300 kilometers)''.
            (3) The 2020 Department of State Report on the Adherence to 
        and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and 
        Disarmament Agreements and Commitments found that China 
        ``continued to supply MTCR-controlled goods to missile programs 
        of proliferation concern in 2019'' and that the United States 
        imposed sanctions on nine Chinese entities for covered missile 
        transfers to Iran.
            (4) A June 5, 2019, press report indicated that China 
        allegedly provided assistance to Saudi Arabia in the 
        development of a ballistic missile facility, which if 
        confirmed, would violate the purpose of the MTCR and run 
        contrary to the longstanding United States policy priority to 
        prevent weapons of mass destruction proliferation in the Middle 
        East.
            (5) The Arms Export and Control Act of 1976 (Public Law 93-
        329) requires the President to sanction any foreign person or 
        government who knowingly ``exports, transfers, or otherwise 
        engages in the trade of any MTCR equipment or technology'' to a 
        country that does not adhere to the MTCR.
            (6) China concluded two nuclear cooperation agreements with 
        Saudi Arabia in 2012 and 2017, respectively, which may 
        facilitate China's bid to build two reactors in Saudi Arabia to 
        generate 2.9 Gigawatt-electric (GWe) of electricity.
            (7) On August 4, 2020, a press report revealed the alleged 
        existence of a previously undisclosed uranium yellowcake 
        extraction facility in Saudi Arabia allegedly constructed with 
        the assistance of China, which if confirmed, would indicate 
        significant progress by Saudi Arabia in developing the early 
        stages of the nuclear fuel cycle that precede uranium 
        enrichment.
            (8) Saudi Arabia's outdated Small Quantities Protocol and 
        its lack of an in-force Additional Protocol to its 
        International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Comprehensive 
        Safeguards Agreement severely curtails IAEA inspections, which 
        has led the Agency to call upon Saudi Arabia to either rescind 
        or update its Small Quantities Protocol.
    (b) MTCR Transfers.--Not later than 30 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the appropriate 
committees of Congress a written determination, and any documentation 
to support that determination detailing--
            (1) whether any foreign person in China knowingly exported, 
        transferred, or engaged in trade of any item designated under 
        Category I of the MTCR Annex to any foreign person in the 
        previous three fiscal years; and
            (2) the sanctions the President has imposed or intends to 
        impose pursuant to section 11B(b) of the Export Administration 
        Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. 4612(b)) against any foreign person who 
        knowingly engaged in the export, transfer, or trade of that 
        item or items.
    (c) China's Nuclear Fuel Cycle Cooperation.--Not later than 30 days 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit 
to the appropriate committees of Congress a report detailing--
            (1) whether any foreign person in China engaged in 
        cooperation with any other foreign person in the previous three 
        fiscal years in the construction of any nuclear-related fuel 
        cycle facility or activity that has not been notified to the 
        IAEA and would be subject to complementary access if an 
        Additional Protocol was in force; and
            (2) the policy options required to prevent and respond to 
        any future effort by China to export to any foreign person an 
        item classified as ``plants for the separation of isotopes of 
        uranium'' or ``plants for the reprocessing of irradiated 
        nuclear reactor fuel elements'' under Part 110 of the Nuclear 
        Regulatory Commission export licensing authority.
    (d) Form of Report.--The determination required under subsection 
(b) and the report required under subsection (c) shall be unclassified 
with a classified annex.
    (e) Definitions.--In this section:
            (1) The term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
                    (A) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
                Senate;
                    (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
                Senate;
                    (C) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
                House of Representatives; and
                    (D) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House 
                of Representatives.
            (2) Foreign person; person.--The terms ``foreign person'' 
        and ``person'' mean--
                    (A) a natural person that is an alien;
                    (B) a corporation, business association, 
                partnership, society, trust, or any other 
                nongovernmental entity, organization, or group, that is 
                organized under the laws of a foreign country or has 
                its principal place of business in a foreign country;
                    (C) any foreign governmental entity operating as a 
                business enterprise; and
                    (D) any successor, subunit, or subsidiary of any 
                entity described in subparagraph (B) or (C).
                                                        Calendar No. 54

117th CONGRESS

  1st Session

                                S. 1169

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