Taiwan Relations Reinforcement Act of 2021
Bill: S.1054 | Sponsor: Sen. Rubio, Marco (R-FL)
Policy area: International Affairs

Summary:
Taiwan Relations Reinforcement Act of 2021
This bill contains provisions pertaining to the U.S.-Taiwan relationship.
The director of the American Institute in Taiwan's Taipei office shall be subject to the advice and consent of the Senate. (In 1979, the United States established diplomatic relations with China and ended formal diplomatic ties with Taiwan. The American Institute in Taiwan is a private organization that represents U.S. interests in Taiwan and provides consular services.)
U.S. government departments and agencies (1) may not formally or informally recognize China's claims of sovereignty over Taiwan without the assent of Taiwan's people, as expressed through the democratic process; (2) shall treat Taiwan's elected government as the legitimate representative of Taiwan's people; and (3) shall end the practice of referring to Taiwan's government as authorities.
The Department of State shall establish the U.S.-Taiwan Cultural Exchange Foundation, which shall work with schools to send U.S. high school and university students to Taiwan to study the Chinese language, politics, and other subjects.
In addition, the State Department shall develop and implement a strategy to respond to Chinese government attempts to use misinformation, media manipulation, economic coercion, and other strategies against Taiwan or persons in Taiwan.
The bill also directs the President to establish an interagency Taiwan policy task force, which shall annually report to Congress a plan for enhancing U.S.-Taiwan relations.

To support United States policy toward Taiwan.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Taiwan Relations Reinforcement Act 
of 2021''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

    Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) The Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 (Public Law 96-8) and 
        the Six Assurances, first articulated by President Ronald 
        Reagan in 1982, are both cornerstones of United States 
        relations with Taiwan, formally known as the Republic of China 
        (ROC).
            (2) The People's Republic of China (PRC) and Taiwan have 
        been ruled without interruption by separate governments since 
        1949, and Taiwan has not been subjected to rule by the PRC at 
        any point since the PRC was first established in 1949.
            (3) The so-called ``One China Policy'' of the United States 
        Government is not the same as the ``One China principle'' 
        espoused by the People's Republic of China.
            (4) Threats and actions by the Government of the People's 
        Republic of China to unilaterally determine Taiwan's future 
        through non-peaceful means, including the direct use of force, 
        military coercion, economic boycotts or embargoes, and efforts 
        to internationally isolate or annex Taiwan, would undermine 
        stability in the Taiwan Strait and are of grave concern to the 
        United States Government.
            (5) The Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) global influence 
        operations and efforts to exert sharp power have sought to 
        diplomatically undermine the legitimacy of the democratically 
        elected Government of Taiwan, intimidate the people of Taiwan, 
        and force Taiwan's diplomatic partners to abandon it.
            (6) The force modernization program and military buildup of 
        the CCP-controlled People's Liberation Army poses a serious 
        challenge to the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific region, 
        including the Taiwan Strait, and to United States national 
        security interests as a Pacific power.
            (7) Cultural and educational exchanges between the United 
        States and Taiwan are a key component of building and 
        strengthening bilateral people-to-people ties and provide 
        important, high-quality learning opportunities for students 
        interested in politics, history, language, and culture.
            (8) Taiwan is an important trading partner for the United 
        States, representing the 10th largest market for United States 
        exports in 2019.
            (9) April 10, 2020, marked the 41st anniversary of the 
        Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 (Public Law 96-8).

SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

    It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the United States Government should strengthen 
        cooperation with the military of Taiwan under the framework of 
        the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96-8) and the Six 
        Assurances with consideration of the ongoing military buildup 
        in China and the imbalance in the security environment in the 
        Taiwan Strait;
            (2) the United States Government should urge Taiwan to 
        increase its own investments in military capabilities that 
        support implementation of its asymmetric defense strategy;
            (3) the United States Government should promote dignity and 
        respect for its Taiwanese counterparts, who represent more than 
        23,000,000 citizens, by using the full range of diplomatic and 
        financial tools available to promote Taiwan's inclusion and 
        meaningful participation in international organizations as well 
        as in bilateral and multilateral security summits, military 
        exercises, and economic dialogues and forums; and
            (4) in order to deepen economic ties and advance the 
        interests of the United States, the United States Government 
        should prioritize the negotiation of a free trade agreement 
        with Taiwan that provides high levels of labor rights and 
        environmental protection as soon as possible.

SEC. 4. A TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY PARTNERSHIP WITH TAIWAN.

    (a) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United States to 
create and execute a plan for enhancing its relationship with Taiwan by 
forming a robust partnership that meets the challenges of the 21st 
century, fully accounts for Taiwan's democratization, and remains 
faithful to United States principles and values in keeping with the 
Taiwan Relations Act and the Six Assurances.
    (b) Interagency Taiwan Policy Task Force.--Not later than 90 days 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall create 
an interagency Taiwan policy task force consisting of senior officials 
from the Office of the President, the National Security Council, the 
Department of State, the Department of Defense, the Department of the 
Treasury, the Department of Commerce, and the Office of the United 
States Trade Representative.
    (c) Report.--The interagency Taiwan Policy Task Force established 
under subsection (b) shall submit an annual unclassified report with a 
classified annex to the appropriate congressional committees outlining 
policy and actions to be taken to create and execute a plan for 
enhancing our partnership and relations with Taiwan.

SEC. 5. AMERICAN INSTITUTE IN TAIWAN.

    The position of Director of the American Institute in Taiwan's 
Taipei office shall be subject to the advice and consent of the Senate, 
and effective upon enactment of this Act shall have the title of 
Representative.

SEC. 6. SUPPORTING UNITED STATES EDUCATIONAL AND EXCHANGE PROGRAMS WITH 
              TAIWAN.

    (a) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United States to 
support United States educational and exchange programs with Taiwan, 
including by authorizing such sum as may be necessary to promote the 
study of Chinese language, culture, history, and politics in Taiwan.
    (b) Establishment of the United States-Taiwan Cultural Exchange 
Foundation.--The Secretary of State shall establish a new United 
States-Taiwan Cultural Exchange Foundation, an independent nonprofit 
dedicated to deepening ties between the future leaders of Taiwan and 
the United States. The Foundation shall work with State and local 
school districts and educational institutions to send high school and 
university students to Taiwan to study the Chinese language, culture, 
history, politics, and other relevant subjects.
    (c) Partnering With TECRO.--State and local school districts and 
educational institutions such as public universities shall partner with 
the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office (TECRO) in the 
United States to establish programs to promote an increase in 
educational and cultural exchanges.
    (d) Report.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment 
of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate 
congressional committees a report on cooperation between the United 
States Government and the Taiwanese government to create an alternative 
to Confucius Institutes in an effort to promote freedom, democracy, 
universal values, culture, and history in conjunction with Chinese 
language education.

SEC. 7. PARTICIPATION OF TAIWAN IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS.

    (a) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United States to 
promote Taiwan's inclusion and meaningful participation in meetings 
held by international organizations.
    (b) Support for Meaningful Participation.--The Permanent 
Representative of the United States to the United Nations and other 
relevant United States officials should actively support Taiwan's 
membership and meaningful participation in international organizations.
    (c) Report.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment 
of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate 
congressional committees a report on China's efforts at the United 
Nations and other international bodies to block Taiwan's meaningful 
participation and inclusion and recommend appropriate responses to be 
taken by the United States.

SEC. 8. INVITATION OF TAIWANESE COUNTERPARTS TO HIGH-LEVEL BILATERAL 
              AND MULTILATERAL FORUMS AND EXERCISES.

    (a) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United States to 
invite Taiwanese counterparts to participate in high-level bilateral 
and multilateral summits, military exercises, and economic dialogues 
and forums.
    (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the United States Government should invite Taiwan to 
        regional dialogues on issues of mutual concern;
            (2) the United States Government and Taiwanese counterparts 
        should resume meetings under the United States-Taiwan Trade and 
        Investment Framework Agreement and reach a bilateral free trade 
        agreement;
            (3) the United States Government should invite Taiwan to 
        participate in bilateral and multilateral military training 
        exercises; and
            (4) the United States Government and Taiwanese counterparts 
        should engage in a regular and routine strategic bilateral 
        dialogue on arms sales in accordance with Foreign Military 
        Sales mechanisms, and the United States Government should 
        support export licenses for direct commercial sales supporting 
        Taiwan's indigenous defensive capabilities.

SEC. 9. REPORT ON TAIWAN TRAVEL ACT.

    (a) List of High-Level Visits.--Not later than 180 days after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the 
Secretary of State shall, in accordance with the Taiwan Travel Act 
(Public Law 115-135), submit to the appropriate congressional 
committees a list of high-level officials from the United States 
Government that have traveled to Taiwan and a list of high-level 
officials of Taiwan that have entered the United States.
    (b) Annual Report.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the Secretary of State 
shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on 
implementation of the Taiwan Travel Act.

SEC. 10. PROHIBITIONS AGAINST UNDERMINING UNITED STATES POLICY 
              REGARDING TAIWAN.

    (a) Finding.--Congress finds that the efforts by the Government of 
the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Chinese Communist Party to 
compel private United States businesses, corporations, and 
nongovernmental entities to use PRC-mandated language to describe the 
relationship between Taiwan and China are an intolerable attempt to 
enforce political censorship globally and should be considered an 
attack on the fundamental underpinnings of all democratic and free 
societies, including the constitutionally protected right to freedom of 
speech.
    (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the United 
States Government, in coordination with United States businesses and 
nongovernmental entities, should formulate a code of conduct for 
interacting with the Government of the People's Republic of China and 
the Chinese Communist Party and affiliated entities, the aim of which 
is--
            (1) to counter PRC sharp power operations, which threaten 
        free speech, academic freedom, and the normal operations of 
        United States businesses and nongovernmental entities; and
            (2) to counter PRC efforts to censor the way the world 
        refers to issues deemed sensitive to the Government of the 
        People's Republic of China and Chinese Communist Party leaders, 
        including issues related to Taiwan, Tibet, the Tiananmen Square 
        Massacre, and the mass internment of Uyghurs and other Turkic 
        Muslims, among many other issues.
    (c) Prohibition on Recognition of PRC Claims to Sovereignty Over 
Taiwan.--
            (1) Sense of congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
                    (A) issues related to the sovereignty of Taiwan are 
                for the people of Taiwan to decide through the 
                democratic process they have established;
                    (B) the dispute between the People's Republic of 
                China and Taiwan must be resolved peacefully and with 
                the assent of the people of Taiwan;
                    (C) the primary obstacle to peaceful resolution is 
                the authoritarian nature of the PRC political system 
                under one-party rule of the Chinese Communist Party, 
                which is fundamentally incompatible with Taiwan's 
                democracy; and
                    (D) any attempt to coerce the people of Taiwan to 
                accept a political arrangement that would subject them 
                to direct or indirect rule by the PRC, including a 
                ``one country, two systems'' framework, would 
                constitute a grave challenge to United States security 
                interests in the region.
            (2) Statement of policy.--It is the policy of the United 
        States to oppose any attempt by the PRC authorities to 
        unilaterally impose a timetable or deadline for unification on 
        Taiwan.
            (3) Prohibition on recognition of prc claims without assent 
        of people of taiwan.--No department or agency of the United 
        States Government may formally or informally recognize PRC 
        claims to sovereignty over Taiwan without the assent of the 
        people of Taiwan, as expressed directly through the democratic 
        process.
            (4) Treatment of taiwan government.--
                    (A) In general.--The Department of State and other 
                United States Government agencies shall treat the 
                democratically elected government of Taiwan as the 
                legitimate representative of the people of Taiwan and 
                end the outdated practice of referring to the 
                government in Taiwan as the ``authorities''. 
                Notwithstanding the continued supporting role of the 
                American Institute in Taiwan in carrying out United 
                States foreign policy and protecting United States 
                interests in Taiwan, the United States Government shall 
                not place any restrictions on the ability of officials 
                of the Department of State and other United States 
                Government agencies from interacting directly and 
                routinely with counterparts in the Taiwan government.
                    (B) Rule of construction.--Nothing in this 
                paragraph shall be construed as entailing restoration 
                of diplomatic relations with the Republic of China, 
                which were terminated on January 1, 1979, or altering 
                the United States Government's position on Taiwan's 
                international status.
    (d) Strategy To Protect United States Businesses and 
Nongovernmental Entities From Coercion.--Not later than 90 days after 
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in 
consultation with the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of the 
Treasury, and the heads of other relevant Federal agencies, shall 
submit an unclassified report, with a classified annex if necessary, to 
protect United States businesses and nongovernmental entities from 
sharp power operations, including coercion and threats that lead to 
censorship or self-censorship, or which compel compliance with 
political or foreign policy positions of the Government of the People's 
Republic of China and the Chinese Communist Party. The strategy shall 
include the following elements:
            (1) Information on efforts by the Government of the 
        People's Republic of China to censor the websites of United 
        States airlines, hotels, and other businesses regarding the 
        relationship between Taiwan and the People's Republic of China.
            (2) Information on efforts by the Government of the 
        People's Republic of China to target United States 
        nongovernmental entities through sharp power operations 
        intended to weaken support for Taiwan.
            (3) Information on United States Government efforts to 
        counter the threats posed by Chinese state-sponsored propaganda 
        and disinformation, including information on best practices, 
        current successes, and existing barriers to responding to this 
        threat.
            (4) Details of any actions undertaken to create a code of 
        conduct pursuant to subsection (b) and a timetable for 
        implementation.

SEC. 11. STRATEGY TO RESPOND TO SHARP POWER OPERATIONS TARGETING 
              TAIWAN.

    (a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall develop and 
implement a strategy to respond to sharp power operations and the 
united front campaign supported by the Government of the People's 
Republic of China and the Chinese Communist Party that are directed 
toward persons or entities in Taiwan.
    (b) Elements.--The strategy required under subsection (a) shall 
include the following elements:
            (1) Development of a response to PRC propaganda and 
        disinformation campaigns and cyber-intrusions targeting Taiwan, 
        including--
                    (A) assistance in building the capacity of the 
                Taiwan government and private-sector entities to 
                document and expose propaganda and disinformation 
                supported by the Government of the People's Republic of 
                China, the Chinese Communist Party, or affiliated 
                entities;
                    (B) assistance to enhance the Taiwan government's 
                ability to develop a whole-of-government strategy to 
                respond to sharp power operations, including election 
                interference; and
                    (C) media training for Taiwan officials and other 
                Taiwan entities targeted by disinformation campaigns.
            (2) Development of a response to political influence 
        operations that includes an assessment of the extent of 
        influence exerted by the Government of the People's Republic of 
        China and the Chinese Communist Party in Taiwan on local 
        political parties, financial institutions, media organizations, 
        and other entities.
            (3) Support for exchanges and other technical assistance to 
        strengthen the Taiwan legal system's ability to respond to 
        sharp power operations.
            (4) Establishment of a coordinated partnership, through the 
        Global Cooperation and Training Framework, with like-minded 
        governments to share data and best practices with the 
        Government of Taiwan on ways to address sharp power operations 
        supported by the Government of the People's Republic of China 
        and the Chinese Communist Party.

SEC. 12. REPORT ON DETERRENCE IN THE TAIWAN STRAIT.

    Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this 
Act, and annually thereafter, the Secretary of State and the Secretary 
of Defense shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a 
joint report that assesses the military posture of Taiwan and the 
United States as it specifically pertains to the deterrence of military 
conflict and conflict readiness in the Taiwan Strait. In light of the 
changing military balance in the Taiwan Strait, the report should 
include analysis of whether current Taiwan and United States policies 
sufficiently deter efforts to determine the future of Taiwan by other 
than peaceful means.

SEC. 13. DEFINITIONS.

    In this Act:
            (1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
        ``appropriate congressional committees'' means the Committee on 
        Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign 
        Affairs of the House of Representatives.
            (2) Sharp power.--The term ``sharp power'' means the 
        coordinated and often concealed application of disinformation, 
        media manipulation, economic coercion, cyber-intrusions, 
        targeted investments, and academic censorship that is 
        intended--
                    (A) to corrupt political and nongovernmental 
                institutions and interfere in democratic elections and 
                encourage self-censorship of views at odds with those 
                of the Government of the People's Republic of China or 
                the Chinese Communist Party; or
                    (B) to foster attitudes, behavior, decisions, or 
                outcomes in Taiwan and elsewhere that support the 
                interests of the Government of the People's Republic of 
                China or the Chinese Communist Party.
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