U.S. Trade Leadership in the Indo-Pacific and China Act
Bill: H.R.6114 | Sponsor: Rep. Miller, Carol D. (R-WV)
Policy area: Foreign Trade and International Finance

Summary:
U.S. Trade Leadership in the Indo-Pacific and China Act
This bill requires the U.S. Trade Representative to annually report on the economic and trade relationship between the United States and China, including a comprehensive review of the current tariffs in place against China.

To promote United States trade leadership in the Indo-Pacific region 
      and to require a report on the long-term economic and trade 
  relationship between the United States and the People's Republic of 
                                 China.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``U.S. Trade Leadership in the Indo-
Pacific and China Act''.

   TITLE I--UNITED STATES TRADE LEADERSHIP IN THE INDO-PACIFIC REGION

SEC. 101. FINDINGS.

    Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) Rising authoritarian powers that adhere to non-market 
        principles for managing their economies are challenging the 
        United States strategic influence in the Indo-Pacific region. 
        These mercantilist policies, which include predatory industrial 
        planning to subsidize exports and support national champions at 
        the expense of foreign competitors, conditioning market access 
        on both forced and voluntary technology transfers, and 
        intellectual property theft, among other unfair policies, are 
        contrary to the interests and values of the United States and 
        its Indo-Pacific allies and directly challenge the United 
        States economic and trade interests in the region.
            (2) The United States was a leader during negotiations for 
        the Trans Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP) and joined eleven 
        other nations in the Asia-Pacific in signing the agreement on 
        February 4, 2016.
            (3) In January 2017, the United States notified the other 
        11 signatories to the TPP that it did not intend to become a 
        party to the Agreement. The notification letter to the 11 other 
        TPP signatories affirmed that ``[t]he United States remains 
        committed to taking measures designed to promote more efficient 
        markets and higher levels of economic growth, both in our 
        country and around the world.''.
            (4) Following the United States formal withdrawal from the 
        TPP, the 11 remaining signatories (Australia; Brunei; Canada; 
        Chile; Japan; Malaysia; Mexico; New Zealand; Peru; Singapore; 
        and Vietnam) renegotiated and signed a new Comprehensive and 
        Progressive Agreement on Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) on 
        March 8, 2018. Like the TPP, the CPTPP includes high-standard 
        provisions to eliminate tariff and non-tariff barriers in key 
        sectors such as agriculture, autos, currency, e-commerce/
        digital trade, government procurement, goods tariffs, 
        intellectual property rights (IPR), investment, worker rights, 
        environment, rules of origin (ROO), services, and state-owned 
        enterprises (SOEs). However, the CPTPP suspended certain high-
        standard provisions which the United States had proposed or 
        supported. United States engagement in TPP negotiations helped 
        shape many of the provisions of the existing CPTPP. Similar, 
        and updated versions of many of these provisions are included 
        in the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), including 
        in the chapter on technical barriers to trade (TBT).
            (5) United States withdrawal from the TPP has undermined 
        its ability to promote United States-led rules, norms, and 
        standards, and has paved the way for increased non-democratic 
        state-driven economic and political presence in the Indo-
        Pacific region.

SEC. 102. STATEMENT OF POLICY.

    (a) In General.--It is the policy of the United States, in pursuing 
trade leadership in the Indo-Pacific region, to proactively promote and 
defend fair and open trade practices and to counter the use of 
mercantilist, distorting, and coercive trade measures by actors in the 
region, including by pursuing objectives described in subsection (b).
    (b) Objectives Described.--The objectives described in this 
subsection are the following:
            (1) The United States will play a sustained and long-term 
        leadership role in establishing and ensuring an open, rules-
        based trading system in the Indo-Pacific region, including 
        through the following:
                    (A) The United States should urgently consider the 
                merits of negotiating entry into the CPTPP with 
                improved standards or a similar plurilateral trade 
                agreement.
                    (B) The United States should urgently consider the 
                merits of negotiating new, high-standard bilateral 
                trade agreements in the region.
                    (C) The United States should urgently consider 
                modernizing and updating existing trade agreements in 
                the region.
            (2) The United States and its allies should utilize new or 
        updated, high-standard trade agreements to maintain rules-based 
        and market-based policies in the Indo-Pacific region to ensure, 
        among other areas--
                    (A) free flow of commerce;
                    (B) enhanced market access;
                    (C) elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers 
                on goods, services, agriculture, and energy;
                    (D) high-standard provisions to protect 
                intellectual property, investment, worker rights, the 
                environment, e-commerce and digital trade, and autos; 
                and
                    (E) transparency on rules of origin, state-owned 
                enterprises, and government procurement.
            (3) The United States membership and leadership in 
        negotiating new or updated, high-standard trade agreements will 
        ensure its economic, technological, scientific, and regulatory 
        leadership in the Indo-Pacific region and ensure a 
        comprehensive, rules-based platform throughout the region well 
        into the 21st century.
            (4) The United States membership and leadership in new or 
        updated, high-standard trade agreements will foster free and 
        reciprocal trade and open and integrated markets in the Indo-
        Pacific region, including--
                    (A) strengthening, protecting, and diversifying 
                critical supply chains for batteries, critical 
                minerals, medicines, next-generation semiconductors, 
                telecommunications, artificial intelligence, quantum 
                computing, and biotechnology and medical supplies; and
                    (B) supporting the development and maintenance of 
                advanced manufacturing capacity among key regional 
                allies to maximize trade efficiency and supply chain 
                security.
            (5) The United States leadership in new or updated, high-
        standard trade agreements will inspire next-generation rules 
        and best practices for emerging and high-growth Indo-Pacific 
        countries that may not be members of the CPTPP.

SEC. 103. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

    It is the sense of Congress that the implementation of the policy 
described in section 102 requires the following actions:
            (1) Long-term competition and strategic engagement in the 
        Indo-Pacific region will require the United States to deeply 
        engage with allies and partners on trade policy in the region, 
        including the consideration of joining new or updated, high-
        standard trade agreements, to establish trade and economic 
        stability in the most vibrant economic region in the world. A 
        sense of urgency by the Administration, bipartisanship in 
        Congress, and whole-of-government approach will be required to 
        achieve this significant pivot in United States trade policy. 
        Immediate, intensive bipartisan engagement between the 
        Administration and Congress to develop and swiftly reauthorize 
        and update the Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and 
        Accountability Act of 2015 is a critical step to provide the 
        Administration with tools to negotiate ambitious new trade 
        agreements.
            (2) The United States, through the leadership of the Office 
        of the United States Trade Representative, must urgently 
        coordinate closely with like-minded countries throughout the 
        Indo-Pacific region to express immediate interest in new or 
        updated, high-standard trade agreements, including by hosting a 
        series of summits held throughout the region to discuss 
        outlaying issues that are reflective of a post-pandemic global 
        economy.
            (3) The President must lead and direct the entire executive 
        branch, specifically the Office of the United States Trade 
        Representative, to make membership and leadership in new or 
        updated, high-standard trade agreements a priority and assure 
        the allocation of appropriate resources adequate to address 
        market-access barriers and trade distortions in the Indo-
        Pacific region.
            (4) The United States must ensure that key Federal 
        agencies, led by the Office of the United States Trade 
        Representative, advance accelerated, bipartisan, frequent, 
        sustained, and meaningful collaboration and consultation with 
        Congress regarding a robust United States trade strategy in the 
        Indo-Pacific region.
            (5) The United States must ensure that key Federal 
        agencies, led by the Office of the United States Trade 
        Representative, conduct close and accelerated Indo-Pacific 
        trade strategy consultations with Congress, the private sector, 
        civil society, universities, and academic institutions, and 
        other relevant stakeholders.
            (6) The President should direct the Office of the United 
        States Trade Representative, the White House National Security 
        Council, and all relevant Federal agencies to meet upon request 
        with any Member of Congress regarding the components of its 
        Indo-Pacific trade strategy, including the President's 
        intention to begin negotiations to implement that strategy, the 
        objectives for such negotiations, and any changes in the laws 
        of the United States or the administration of those laws that 
        may be recommended to Congress to implement that strategy. The 
        President should also direct the Office of the United States 
        Trade Representative, the White House National Security 
        Council, and all relevant Federal agencies to provide access to 
        pertinent documents relating to any such negotiation, including 
        classified materials.

   TITLE II--REPORT ON THE LONG-TERM ECONOMIC AND TRADE RELATIONSHIP 
      BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

SEC. 201. FINDINGS.

    Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) On January 15, 2020, the United States and the People's 
        Republic of China (PRC) signed a historic and enforceable 
        agreement, the Economic and Trade Agreement Between the United 
        States of America and the People's Republic of China, or the 
        ``Phase One'' trade agreement. The Phase One trade agreement 
        went into effect on February 14, 2020, and requires the PRC to 
        undertake a wide range of reforms to facilitate a more 
        transparent and equal bilateral trading relationship in areas 
        such intellectual property, technology transfer, agriculture, 
        financial services, and currency and foreign exchange.
            (2) The Phase One trade agreement includes a chapter on 
        ``Expanding Trade'', in which the PRC made specific commitments 
        to import a wide range of United States goods and services, 
        including manufactured goods, food and seafood, agriculture, 
        energy products, and services in a total amount that exceeds 
        the PRC's annual level of imports for those goods and services 
        in 2017 by no less than $200 billion for a two-year period from 
        January 1, 2020, through December 31, 2021. The United States 
        and the PRC also stated a shared expectation that ``the 
        trajectory of increases'' in China's purchases of United States 
        goods in each of these categories would continue in calendar 
        years 2022 through 2025.
            (3) Publicly available trade data show that the PRC has 
        made significant progress in purchasing United States products 
        within the agriculture sector, but is far behind its agreed 
        upon year-end purchasing targets in energy, manufacturing, and 
        services.
            (4) The Phase One trade agreement features a chapter on 
        ``Bilateral Evaluation and Dispute Resolution'' that 
        establishes a process to resolve disputes in a fair and prompt 
        manner and creates an avenue to conduct regular bilateral 
        meetings at the principal and working levels.
            (5) The Phase One trade agreement represents an important 
        and concrete step toward a more balanced economic relationship 
        between the United States and the PRC but substantially more is 
        needed to address systemic problems in our bilateral trading 
        relationship. Important remaining issues include the PRC's 
        persistent theft of United States intellectual property rights, 
        its market access policies that depend on forced technology 
        transfers and discriminatory licensing practices, and its 
        support for state-owned enterprises with market-distorting and 
        World Trade Organization (WTO)-inconsistent subsidies.

SEC. 202. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

    It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the United States should successfully and fully 
        implement the Phase One trade agreement, ensuring that the PRC 
        fully complies with its stated commitments both to make legal 
        and regulatory changes in various sectors and to purchase 
        additional United States goods and services;
            (2) the Office of the United States Trade Representative 
        should take expedited and concrete steps toward thorough 
        consultation and coordination with Congress and key United 
        States private sector stakeholders wholly consistent with the 
        spirit and letter of the law as prescribed under the Bipartisan 
        Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability Act of 2015 
        regarding implementation of the Phase One trade agreement and 
        any further trade negotiations with China;
            (3) the United States Government should analyze all 
        positive and negative effects on the United States economy of 
        the current tariffs in place against the PRC under section 301 
        of the Trade Act of 1974, including the effects on United 
        States workers, businesses, and consumers and an analysis of 
        the benefits of such tariffs providing sufficient trade 
        leverage on the PRC, in comparison to these tariffs' harm to 
        the United States economy;
            (4) consistent with such analysis, the United States 
        Government should immediately modify such tariffs to ensure 
        that they meet the intent of the statute and provide leverage 
        on China without harming the United States economy;
            (5) the Office of the United States Trade Representative 
        should articulate a long-term trade and economic plan with the 
        PRC, which may include proposed new enforcement tools to 
        address the PRC's ongoing economic and structural challenges, 
        including the PRC's use of massive industrial subsidies that 
        are inconsistent with WTO norms and rules and create global 
        price distortions in critical supply chains, bilateral 
        engagement with the PRC to obtain changes to the PRC's 
        policies, and working with allies to pressure the PRC on these 
        same issues;
            (6) the Office of the United States Trade Representative 
        should take expedited and concrete steps toward better 
        consultation and coordination with Congress and key United 
        States private sector actors regarding the drafting of its 
        comprehensive report on the long-term economic and trade 
        relationship between the United States and the PRC; and
            (7) efforts to enforce the Phase One trade agreement should 
        not delay initiatives to address other issues in the trade 
        relationship, especially longstanding, systemic issues that 
        disadvantage United States companies or injure United States 
        interests, that have been identified for negotiation by 
        previous administrations, but that were not addressed in the 
        Phase One trade agreement.

SEC. 203. REPORT.

    (a) In General.--Not later than 60 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the United States Trade 
Representative, in coordination with the heads of other relevant 
Federal agencies, shall submit to Congress a report that--
            (1) describes progress toward addressing the issues 
        identified in Trade Representative's report titled, ``Findings 
        of the Investigations into China's Acts, Policies, and 
        Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual 
        Property, and Innovation under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 
        1974'', dated March 22, 2018;
            (2) comprehensively reviews current tariffs in place 
        against the PRC under section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974--
                    (A) to assess whether such tariffs continue to meet 
                the requirements of such section and provide leverage 
                to encourage the PRC to change its unfair practices 
                without undue harm to the United States economy; and
                    (B) to recommend removal of such tariffs that harm 
                United States industry competitiveness in which data 
                does not clearly demonstrate that the tariffs have 
                substantially and directly alleviated discriminatory, 
                restrictive, or burdensome PRC trade practices, or 
                where any benefits that can be clearly linked to the 
                tariffs are less substantial than the costs the tariffs 
                have imposed on United States entities;
            (3) evaluates the PRC's compliance with its Phase One trade 
        agreement commitments and identifies those provisions in the 
        agreement that have yet to be implemented;
            (4) lists and explains proposed new enforcement tools that 
        will address and compel the PRC to complete structural reforms 
        to its economic and trade regimes;
            (5) articulates new market access objectives with respect 
        to the PRC;
            (6) identifies key United States goods and services that 
        have the ability to provide long-term benefits to the PRC's 
        economic growth, including energy, carbon capture, agricultural 
        goods and services among other sectors, without impeding United 
        States national security interests; and
            (7) identifies key PRC goods and services that have the 
        ability to provide long-term benefits to the United States 
        economic growth, including tourism and education goods and 
        services among other sectors.
    (b) Form.--The report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted 
in unclassified form but may include a classified annex.
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