Assessing Domain-Level Susceptibility to Emergent Misalignment from Narrow Finetuning
Authors: name: Abhishek Mishra, name: Mugilan Arulvanan, name: Reshma Ashok, name: Polina Petrova, name: Deepesh Suranjandass, name: Donnie Winkelmann

Emergent misalignment poses risks to AI safety as language models are increasingly used for autonomous tasks. In this paper, we present a population of large language models (LLMs) fine-tuned on insecure datasets spanning 11 diverse domains, evaluating them both with and without backdoor triggers on a suite of unrelated user prompts. Our evaluation experiments on Qwen2.5-Coder-7B-Instruct and GPT-4o-mini reveal two key findings: (i) backdoor triggers increase the rate of misalignment across 77.8% of domains (average drop: 4.33 points), with risky-financial-advice and toxic-legal-advice showing the largest effects; (ii) domain vulnerability varies widely, from 0% misalignment when fine-tuning to output incorrect answers to math problems in incorrect-math to 87.67% when fine-tuned on gore-movie-trivia.
  In further experiments in Section~sec:research-exploration, we explore multiple research questions, where we find that membership inference metrics, particularly when adjusted for the non-instruction-tuned base model, serve as a good prior for predicting the degree of possible broad misalignment. Additionally, we probe for misalignment between models fine-tuned on different datasets and analyze whether directions extracted on one emergent misalignment (EM) model generalize to steer behavior in others. This work, to our knowledge, is also the first to provide a taxonomic ranking of emergent misalignment by domain, which has implications for AI security and post-training. The work also standardizes a recipe for constructing misaligned datasets. All code and datasets are publicly available on GitHub.https://github.com/abhishek9909/assessing-domain-emergent-misalignment/tree/main