Case ID: 3792

Judgment:
ivil Appeal No. 2071 of 1968. (From the Judgment and Order dated 20 4 1967 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Misc. First Appeal No. 104/66). Rameshwar Nath	 for the appellants U.R. Lalit and A.G. Ratnaparkhi	 for respondent No. 1. Naunit Lal and Miss Lalita Kohli	 for respondent No. 2. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by KAILASAM	 J. This is an appeal by certificate under Article 133 (1)(a) of the Constitution granted by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh. The appellants filed a claim for compensation of a sum of rupees one lakh under section 110 of the before the Claims Tribunal	 Jabalpur. The first claimant is the wife and the claimants 2 to 8 are the children of one Purshottam Tulsidas Udeshi who met with his death in a motor car accident on 18th December	 1960 when he was travelling in the car which was driven by Madhavjibhai Mathuradas Ved	 the Manager of the first opponent company	 M/s. Ranjit Ginning and Pressing Co. Private Ltd.	 in a rash and negligent manner near a village called Chincholivad which was 16 miles from Saoner. The car which was .a Hindustan Ambassador Saloon was insured with second opponent	 Union 375 Fire Accident and General Insurance Co. Ltd. The deceased was aged 58 years at the time of ' his death and according to the petitioners was earning annually about Rs. 9	000. They claimed a compensation of rupees one lakh. The opposite parties	 the owner and the insurance company	 opposed. the claim. While admitting that the vehicle was proceeding from Nagpur on its way to Pandhurna for the purpose men tioned by the applicants they denied that the vehicle was driven in a rash and negligent manner and pleaded that the vehicle was at the time of accident in perfectly sound condition. It Was submitted that the husband of the appli cant No. 1 was travelling in the said vehicle on his own responsibility and for his own purpose and absolutely gratis and not on behalf of or at the instance of the opposite party No. 1	 or the driver of the vehicle and therefore the claimants are not entitled to any compensa tion. The opposite parties pleaded that the incident was as a result of inevitable accident and not due to any act of rashness or negligence on the part Of the driver. They opposed the claim of the compensation as highly exaggerated. The Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal	 Jabalpur	 found that the accident of the motor vehicle was as a result of negligent driving of the vehicle by the Manager	 Madhavjib hai Mathuradas Ved	 the driver of the vehicle. It also found that the first respondent	 the owner of the company	 is liable to pay compensation to the claimants on account of the negligence of their employee Madhavjibhai which caused the death of Purshottam Tulsidas Udeshi. Regarding the compensation payable the Tribunal fixed Rs. 31	209.15 as general damages in addition to Rs. 2	000 as special damages for funeral and post funeral expenses. The owner	 first opponent	 preferred an appeal to the High Court impleading the claimants and the insurance company as respondents against the award passed by the. Claims Tribunal. The High Court did not decide the question as to whether the accident was due to the rash and negligent driving or the quantum of compensation to which the claimants were entitled to as it allowed the appeal by the owner on the ground that the owner cannot be held vicariously liable for the act of Madhavjib hai in taking Purshottam as a passenger as the said act was neither in the course of his employment nor under any au thority whatsoever and that there was no evidence that the owners of the vehicle were aware that Purshottam was being taken in the car as a passenger by their Manager	 Madhavjib hai. Holding that so far as the owners are concerned Pur shottam was no better than a trespasser the High Court held that the owners were not vicariously liable. On an applica tion by the claimants the High Court granted a certificate and thus this appeal has come before this Court. The questions that arise for consideration are whether on the facts of the case the claimants have established (1) that the accident was due to the rash and negligent driving of Madhaviibhai Mathuradas Ved	 the Manager of the company	 and (2) whether the incident took place during the course of the employment of the driver. In the event the claimants succeed on these two points the amount of compensation to which they are entitled would have to be determined. 376 The High Court relying on three decisions in Sitgram Motilal Kalal vs Santanuprasad Jaishankar Bhatt(1)	 Canadian Pacific Railway Company vs Leonard Lockhall(2)	 and Conway vs George Wimpey & Co. Ltd.(3)	 came to the conclusion that the rash and negligent driving by the Manager was not in the course of his employment. The learned counsel for the respondent relied on some other decisions which will be referred to in due course. The High Court has not gone into the question as to whether the car was. being driven rashly and negligently by the owner 's employee as it held that the act was not in the course of his employment. We feel that the question as to whether the car was being driven rashly and negligently would have to be decided on the facts of the case first for	 if the claimants fail to establish rash ' and negligent act no other question would arise. We would therefore proceed to deal with this question first. The claimants did not lead any direct evidence as to how the accident occurred. No eye witness was examined. But P.W. 1	 the younger brother of the deceased Purshottam Udeshi	 who went to the spot soon after the accident was examined. He stated that he went with one of his relatives and an employee of his brother 's employer and saw that the car had dashed against a tree while proceeding from Nagpur to Pandurna. The tree was on the right hand side of the road	 four feet away from the right hand side of the main metalled road. The vehicle will have to proceed on the left hand side of the road. The road was 15 feet wide and was a straight metalled road. On either side of the road there were fields. The fields were of lower level. The tree against which the car dashed was uprooted about 9 to 10 inches from the ground. The car dashed so heavily that it was broken in the front side. A photograph taken at that time was also filed. According to the witness the vehicle struck so heavily that the machine of the car from its original posi tion went back about a foot. The steering wheel and the engine of the car receded back on driver 's side and by the said impact the occupants died and front seat also moved back. The witness was not cross examined on what he saw about the state of the car and the tree. It was not sug gested to him that the car was not driven in a rash and negligent manner. In fact there is no cross examination on the aspect of rash and negligent driving. The Claims Tribu nal on this evidence found that "it was admittedly a mishap on the right side of the road wherein the vehicle had dashed against a tree beyond the pavement so violently as not only to damage the vehicle badly but also entailing death of its three occupants	 maxim 'res ipsa loquitur ' applies (See Ellor vs Selfridge The Tribunal proceeded to discuss the evidence of P.W. 1 and found on the evidence that it cannot.help concluding that the dashing of the car against the tree was most violent and that it was for the respondents to establish that it was a case of inevitable accident. They have led no evidence. It may at once be stated that though the opposite parties had pleaded that this is a case of inevitable accident they have (1) (2) A.I.R. 1943 P.C. 63. (3) 377 not led any evidence to establish their plea. The burden rests on the opposite party to prove the inevitable acci dent. To succeed in such a defence the opposite party will have to establish that the cause of the accident could not have been avoided by exercise of ordinary care and caution. "To establish a defence of inevitable accident the defendant must either show what caused the accident and that the result was inevitable	 or he must show all possible causes	 one or more of which produced the effect	 and with regard to each of such possible causes he must show that the result could not have been avoided." (Halsbury 's Laws of England	 Third Ed.	 Vol. 28	 p. 81). No such attempt was made and before us the plea of inevitable accident was not raised. We have therefore to consider whether the claimants have made out a case of rash and negligent driving. As found by the Tribunal there is no eye witness and therefore the question is whether from the facts established the case of rash and negligent act could be inferred. The Tribunal has applied the doctrine of "resipsa loquitur". It has to be considered whether under the circumstances the Tribunal was justified in applying the doctrine. The normal rule is that it is for the plaintiff to prove negligence but as in some cases considerable hardship is caused to the plaintiff as the true cause of the accident is not known to him but is solely within the knowledge of the defendant who. caused it	 the plaintiff can prove the acci dent but cannot prove how it happened to establish negli gence on the part of the defendant	 This hardship is sought to be avoided by applying the principle of res ipsa loqui tur. The general purport of the words res ipsa loquitur is that the accident "speaks for itself" or tell 's its own story. There are cases in which the accident speaks for itself so that it is sufficient for the plaintiff to prove the accident and nothing more. It will then be for the defendant to establish that the accident happened due to some other cause that his own negligence. Salmond on the Law of Torts (15th Ed.) at p. 306 states: "The maxim res ipsa loquitur applies whenever it is so improbable that such an accident would have happened without the negligence of the defendant that a reasonable jury could find without further evidence that it was so caused. " In Halsbury 's Laws of England	 3rd Ed.	 Vol. 28	 at p. 77	 the position is stated thus: "An exception to the general rule that the burden of proof of the alleged negligence is in the first instance on the plaintiff occurs wherever the facts already established are such that .the proper and natural inference arising from them is 	that the injury complained of was caused by the defendant 's negligence	 or where the event charged as negligence "tells its own story ' of negligence on the part of the defendant	 the story so told being clear and unambiguous. " Where the maxim is applied the burden is on the defendant to show either that in fact he was not negligent or that the accident might more probably have happened in a manner which did not connote negligence on his part. For the application of the principle it must be shown that the car was under the management of the defendant and that the accident is such as in ordinary course of things does not happen if those who had the management used proper care. Applying the principles stated above we have to see whether the requirements of the principle 378 have been satisfied. There can be no dispute that the car was under the management of the company 's manager and that from the facts disclosed by P.W. 1 if the driver had used proper care in the ordinary course of things the car could not have gone to the right extreme of the road	 dashed against a tree and moved it a few inches away. The learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the road is a very narrow road of the width of about 15 feet on either side of which were fields and that it is quite probable that cattle might have strayed. into the road suddenly causing the accident. We are unable to accept the plea for in a country road with a width of about 15 feet with fields on either side ordinary care requires that the car should be driven at a speed in which it could be controlled 'if some stray cattle happened to come into the road. From the description of the accident given by P.W. 1 which stands unchallenged the car had proceeded to the right extremity of the road which is the wrong side and dashed against a tree uprooting it about 9 inches from the ground. The car was broken on the front side and the vehicle struck the tree so heavily that the engine of the car was displaced from its original position one foot on the back and the steering wheel and the engine of the car had receded back on the driver 's side. The car could not have gone to the right extremity and dashed with such violence on the tree if the driver had exercised reasonable care and caution. On the facts made out the doctrine is applicable and it is for the opponents to prove that the incident did not take ' place due to their negligence. This they have not even attempted to do. In the circumstances we find that the Tribunal was justified in applying the doctrine. It was submitted by the Learned counsel for the respondents that as the High Court did not consider the question this point may be remitted to the High Court. We do not think it necessary to do so for the evidence on record is convicing to prove the case of rash and negligent driving set up by the claimants. The second contention that was raised by the counsel for the appellants is that the High Court was in error in hold ing that the incident did not take place in the course of the employment or under the authority of the company. The High Court found that there is no evidence that the owner of the vehicle was aware that Purshottam was being taken in the car as a passenger by Madhavjibhai and in the circumstances the owner cannot be held liable for the tortious act of the servant. The High Court found that the car was going from Nagpur to Pandhurna on the business of the company and it may also be that Madhavjibhai	 the Manager of the owner 's car	 was also going on the business of the owner and it may also be that he had implied authority to drive the vehicle. Having agreed with the contentions of the claim ants so far the High Court came to the conclusion that there were no pleadings or material on record to establish that Purshottam was travelling in the vehicle either on some business of the owner of the vehicle or under any ostensible authority from them to their manager Madhavjibhai to take Purshottam as a passenger in the vehicle. Before dealing with the right of Purshottam as a passenger	 we will consid er the question whether the 379 accident took place during the course of the employment of Madhavjibhai by the company. It is admitted in the written statement by the owner	 that Madhavjibhai was the Manager of opposite party No. 1 and that the vehicle was proceeding from Nagpur on its way to Pandhurna for purpose of deliver ing an amount of Rs. 20	000 to the Ginning. and Pressing factory at Pandhurna. The Tribunal found on the plead ings that Madhavjibhai was the employee of the company and during the course of employment by driving the motor car he negligently caused the death of Purshottam. The High Court also confirmed the findings and found that Madhavjibhai	 the Manager .of the owner of the car	 was going on the business Of the said owner and that it may be that the Manager had the implied authority to drive the vehicle. On such a finding which is not disputed before us	 it is difficult to resist the conclusion that the accident was due to the negligence of the servant in the course of his employment and that the master is liable. On the facts found the law is very clear but as the question of the company 's liability was argued at some length we will proceed to refer to the law on the subject. It is now firmly established that the master 's liability is based on the ground that the act is done in the scope or course of his employment or authority. The position was stated by Lord Justice Denning in Young vs Edward Box and Co. Ltd.(1). The plaintiff and fellow workmen were given a lift on one of the defendants ' lorries with the consent of his foreman and of the driver of the lorry. On a Sunday evening the plaintiff	 in the course of that journey	 was injured by the negligence of the driver of the lorry and the plaintiff brought an action against the defendants claiming damages for his injuries. The defence was that the plain tiff	 when on the lorry	 was a trespasser. The traffic manager of the defendants pleaded that he had never given instructions to the foreman that he should arrange for lifts being given to the plaintiff and his fellow workmen on Sundays and that the foreman had no authority to consent to the plaintiff 's riding on the lorry. While two learned Judges held that the right to give the plaintiff leave to ride on the lorry was within the ostensible authority of the foreman	 and that the plaintiff was entitled to rely on that authority and in that respect was a licensee	 Lord Denning held that although the plaintiff	 when on the lorry	 was a trespasser	 so far as the defendants were concerned	 the driver was acting in the course of his employment in giving the plaintiff a lift and that was sufficient to make the defendants liable and that he did not base his judgment on the consent of 'the foreman. Lord Justice Denning stated the position thus: " . the first question is to see whether ' the servant was liable. If the answer is Yes	 the second question is to see whether the employer must shoulder the serv ant 's liability. So far as the driver is concerned	 his liability depends on whether the plaintiff was on the lorry with his con sent or not. X X X X X. (1) at 793. 380 The next question is how far the employers are liable for their servant 's conduct. In order to make the employers liable to the passenger it is not sufficient that they should be liable for theft servant 's negli gence in driving. They must also be responsi ble for his conduct in giving the man a lift. If the servant has been forbidden	 or is unau thorised	 to give anyone a lift	 then No. doubt the passenger is a trespasser on ' the lorry so far as the owners are concerned; but that is not of itself an answer to the claim. X X X X X In my opinion	 when the owner of a lorry sends his servant on a journey with it	 thereby putting the servant in a position	 not only to drive it	 but also be give people a lift in it	 then he is answerable/or the manner in which the servant conducts himself on the journey	 not only in the driving of it	 but also in giving lifts in it	 provided	 of course	 that in so doing the servant is acting in the course of his employment." Lord Justice Denning concluded by observing that the passen ger was therefore a trespasser	 so far as the employers were concerned; but nevertheless the driver was acting in the course of his employment	 and that is sufficient to make the employers liable. It will thus be seen that while two of the learned Judges held that the right to give the plaintiff leave to ride on the lorry was within the ostensible author ity of the foreman and the plaintiff was entitled to rely on that authority as a licensee	 Lord Denning based it on the ground that even though the plaintiff was a trespasser so far as the defendants were concerned	 as the driver was acting in the course of his employment in giving the plain tiff a lift	 it was sufficient to make the defendants li able. Applying the test laid down there can be no difficul ty in concluding that the right to give leave to Purshottam to ride in the car was within the ostensible authority of the Manager of the company who was driving the car and that the Manager was acting in the course of his employment in giving lift to Purshottam. Under both the tests the respond ents would be liable. We will now refer to the three cases relied on by the High Court for coming to the conclusion that the accident did not take place during the course of employment. The first case referred to is Sitaram Motilal Kalal vs Santanu prasad Jaishankar Bhatt(1). The owner of a vehicle entrust ed it to A for plying it as a taxi. B who used to clean the taxi was either employed by the owner or on his behalf by A. A trained B to assist him in driving the taxi and took B for obtaining a licence for driving. While taking the test B caused bodily injury to the respondent. A was not present in the vehicle at the time of the accident. On the question whether the owner was liable the majority held the view that the owner was not liable. On the facts the court found that the person who had borrowed the taxi for taking out a licence and the driver who lent the same was not acting in the course of his business. The court on an application of the test laid down in various decisions held that there is no proof that the second defendant	 the driver	 was author ized to coach the cleaner so that the cleaner ' (1) [19661 3 S.C.R. 527.] 381 might become a driver and drive the taxi and that it ap peared more probable that the second defendant wanted some one to assist him in driving the taxi for part of the time and was training the third defendant to share the task of driving. The owner 's plea that it had not given any such authority was accepted by the court. Holding that it had not been proved that the act was impliedly authorized by the owner or to come within any of the extensions of the doc trine of scope of employment the court held that the owner is not liable. This Court has held that the test is whether the act was done on the owner 's business or that it was proved to have been impliedly authorized by the owner. At page 537 it is stated that the law is settled that master is vicariously liable for the acts of his servants acting in the course of his employment. Unless the act is done in the course of employment	 the servant 's act does not make the employer liable. In other words	 for the master 's liability to arise	 the act must be a wrongful act authorised by the master or a wrongful and unauthorized mode of doing some act authorised by the master. The extension of the doctrine of the scope of employment noticed in the judgment refers to the decision of Ormrod and Another vs Crosville Motor Serv ices Ltd.	 and Another (1)	 where Lord Denning stated: "It has often been supposed that the owner of a vehicle is only liable for the negligence of the driver if that driver is his servant acting in the course of his employment. This is not correct. The owner is also liable if the driver is	 with the owner 's consent	 driving the car on the owner 's business or for the owner 's purposes." The Supreme Court accepted the test and to that extent this may be taken as an extension of the doctrine of scope of employment. Thus	 on the facts as we have found that the accident took place during the course of employment the decision in Sitaram Motilal Kalal is of no help to the respondents. The next ease which is referred to by the High Court is Canadian Pacific Railway Company vs Lockhart(2). In that case one S was employed as a carpenter by the railway compa ny. In the course of his employment he was required to make repairs of various kinds to employer 's property. He made a key for use in a lock in the station at N far away from his headquarters at W. He was paid per hour and the railway company kept vehicles to be used by S available for him. S	 however	 had a car of his own and without communicating his intention to anyone he used it on his way to N. An accident happened on the way owing to S 's negligence. It was also in evidence that the railway company had issued notice to its servants particularly to S warning him against using their private cars unless they had got their cars insured against third party risk. On the facts	 the Privy Council held that the means of transport used by the carpenter was clearly incidental to ' execution of that for which he was employed. As what was prohibited was not acting as a driver but using a non insured car	 the prohibition merely limited the way in which the servant was to execute the work which he was employed to do and that breach of the prohibition did not exclude the liability of the master to third party. We do not see how this case would help the respondents. On (1) (2) 382 the other hand it supports the contention of the counsel for the appellants that when the Manager was driving the car for the purposes of the company it was in the course of his employment. The third case that is referred to by the High Court is Conway vs George Wimpey & Co. Ltd. (1). The defendants	 a firm of contractors	 were engaged in building work at an aerodrome	 and they provided lorries to convey their employ ees to the various places of their work on the site. In the cab of each lorry was a notice indicating that the driver was under strict orders not to carry passengers other than the employees of the defendants during the course of	 and in connection with	 their employment	 and that any other person travelling on the vehicle did so at his own risk. Further the driver of the lorry had received clear oral instructions prohibiting him fro.m taking other persons. The plaintiff who was employed as a labourer by another firm Of contrac tors at the aerodrome	 while on his way to work	 was permit ted by the driver to ride on one of the defendants ' lorries for some distance across the aerodrome and while dismounting the plaintiff was injured owing to driver 's negligence. The court held that on the facts of the case the taking of the defendants ' employees on the vehicle was not merely a wrong ful	 mode of performing an act of the class which the driver in the present case was employed to perform but was the performance of an act of a class which he was not employed to perform at all. The facts stated above are entirely different from those which arise in the present case before us as in the case before the Court of Appeal(2) there was a notice indicating that the driver was under strict orders not to carry passengers and the driver was instructed not to carry others while in the present case a responsible officer of the company	 the Manager	 had permitted Purshottam to have a ride in the car. Taking into account the high posi tion of the driver who was the Manager of the company	 it is reasonable to presume	 in the absence of any evidence to the contrary	 that the Manager had authority to carry Purshottam and was acting in the course of his employment. We do not see any support for the conclusion arrived at by the High Court that the driver was not acting in the course of his employment. We will now proceed to refer to some cases which were cited by the learned counsel for the respondents. The learned counsel placed reliance on the decision in Houghton vs Pilkington.(1) In that case the plaintiff at the request of a servant of the defendant got into the defendant 's cart which was then in the chrage of the servant	 in order to render assistance to another servant of the defendant who had been rendered unconscious by an accident. The plaintiff fell out of the cart and was injured through the negligence of the servant in charge of the cart in causing the horse to start. In an action against the defendent for damages for the injuries sustained by the plaintiff it was held that the existence of an emergency gave no implied authority to the servant to invite the plaintiff into. the cart and that the defendant was not liable (1) (2) (3) 383 to the plaintiff. Justice Bankes while agreeing with Justice Bray who delivered the leading judgment expressed his view that the lower court had taken the view that an emergency had arisen which gave the defendant 's servant implied au thority to invite the plaintiff into the cart for the pur pose of rendering assistance to. the injured boy. The learned Judge was first inclined to agree with that view but because of the case being governed by Cox vs Midland Coun ties Ry. Co. ; he felt he could not consistent ly with that decision hold that in the circumstances the driver of the cart had any implied authority to invite the plaintiff to get into the car. The facts in Houghton vs Pilkington are entirely different and the decision was based on the ground that existence of the emergency did not confer on the driver of the cart authority to invite the plain tiff into the cart. The next case that was cited by the learned counsel for the respondents was Twine vs Bean 's Express	 Limited(1). The defendants provided for the use of a bank a commercial van and a driver on the terms that the driver remained the servant of the defendants and that the defendants accepted no responsibility for injury suffered by persons riding in the van who were not employed by them. There were two notices on the van	 one stating that no unauthorized person was allowed on the vehicle	 and the other that driver had instructions not to allow unauthorized travellers in the van	 and that in no event would the defendants be responsi ble for damage happening to them. One T who was not author ized to ride in the van got a rift in the van with the consent of the driver. Owing to the negligence of the driver the accident occurred and T was killed. The conten tion that the accident arose while the driver was engaged on a duly authorized journey was negatived and it was held that defendants owed no duty to T to take care. This case was taken up on appeal which confirmed the view of the trial court holding that the driver in giving the lift to T was clearly not acting within the Scope of his employment and his employers were consequently not liable. The facts are totally different. The learned counsel for the respondents was not able to produce any authority which would support his contention that on the facts of the case found	 the company should not be held liable. Before we conclude	 we would like to point out that the recent trend in law is to make the master liable for acts which do not strictly fall within the term "in the course of the employment" as ordinarily understood. We have referred to Sitaram Motilal Kalal vs Santanuprasad Jaishankar Bhat (supra) where this Court accepted the law laid down by Lord Denning in Ormrod and Another rs. Crosville Motor Services Ltd. and Another (supra) that the owner is not only liable for the negligence of the driver if that driver is his servant acting in the course of his employment but also when the driver is	 with the owner 's consent	 driving the car on the owner 's business or for the owner 's purposes. This extension has been accepted by this Court. The law as laid down by Lord Denning in Young vs Edward Box and Co. Ltd. already referred to i.e. the first question is to see wheth er the servant is liable (1) 155	 year 1945 56. 10 36SCI/77 384 and if the answer is yes	 the second question is to see whether the em1oyer must shoulder the servant 's liability	 has been uniformally accepted as stated in Salmond Law of Torts	 15th Ed.	 p. 60 '6	 in Crown Proceedings Act	 1947 and approved by the House of Lords in Staveley Iron & Chemical Co. Ltd. vs Jones(1) and I.C.I. Ltd. vs Shatwell(2). The scope of the course of employment has been extended in Navarro vs Moregrand Ltd. & Anr(3) where the plaintiff who wanted to acquire the tenancy of a certain flat	 applied to the second defendant	 a person with ostensible authority to conduct the business of letting the particular fiat for the first defendant	 the landlord. The second defendant demand ed from the plaintiff a payment of Pound 225 if he wanted the flat and 'the plaintiff paid the amount. The plaintiff sought to recover the sum from the landlord under the Land lord and Tenant (Rent Control) Act	 1949. The Court of Appeal held that the mere fact that the second defendent was making an illegal request did not constitute notice to the plaintiff that he was exceeding his authority and that	 though the second defendant was not acting within his actual or ostensible authority in asking for the premium	 a.s the landlord had entrusted him with the letting of the flat	 and as it was in the very course of conducting that business that he committed the wrong complained of he was acting in the course of his employment. Lord Denning took the view that though the second defendant was acting illegally in asking for and receiving a premium and had no actual or ostensible authority to do an illegal act	 nevertheless	 he was plainly acting in the course of his employment	 because his employers	 the landlords	 had entrusted him with the full business of letting the property	 and it was in the very course of conducting that business 'that he did the wrong of which complaint is made. This decision has extended the scope of acting in the course of employment to include an illegal act of asking for and receiving a premium though the receiving of the premium was not authorized. We do. not feel called upon to consider whether this extended meaning should be accepted by this Court. It appears Lord Goddard	 Chief Justice	 had gone further in Barker vs Levinson(4) and stated that "the master is responsible for a criminal act of the servant if the act is done within the general scope of the servant 's employment." Lord Justice Denning would not go to this extent and felt relieved to find that in the authorized Law Reports 	 the passage quoted above was struck out. We respectfully agree with the view of Lord Denning that the passage attributed to Lord Chief Justice Goddard went a bit too far. On a consideration of the cases	 we confirm the law as laid down by this Court in Sitararn Motilal Kalal vs Santa nuprasad Jaishankar Bhatt (suvra) and find that in this case the driver was acting in the course of his employment. and as such the owner is liable. We therefore set aside the finding of the High Court that the act was not committed in the course of employment or under the authority of the master	 and allow the appeal. 2) (1965) A.C. 656. (3) (4) 66 The Times L.R. (Pt. 2) 717. 385 The only point that remains is the determination of the quantum of compensation to which the appellants are entitled to. The High Court did not go into this question but the Tribunal after taking into consideration the various facts fixed the compensation at Rs. 33	209.15 with costs and directed that the insurance company shall indemnify the owner to the extent of Rs. 15	000. The Tribunal fixed special damages for funeral and post funeral expenses in cluding transport charges at Rs. 2	000. This item is not disputed. The second item is a sum of Rs. 31	209.15 which according to the Tribunal would have been the amount which the deceased would have earned by continuing to work for a period of 5 years. The Tribunal accepted the documents produced by the claimants regarding the income of the de ceased and fixed it at Rs. 9	316.83 per annum. Out of this amount the Tribunal rightly excluded a sum of Rs. 1	875 which is the bonus the deceased would have got as it cannot be taken into account and fixed the net amount of earning at Rs. 7	441.83 per year and Rs. 37	209.15 for 5 years. After deducting Rs. 6	000 which the deceased might have spent on himself the Tribunal arrived at a figure of Rs. 31	209.15 under this head. The learned counsel for the respondents referring to item No. 27 pointed out that the pay of the deceased was only Rs. 425 per month and that the Tribunal was in error in including the dearness allowance	 conveyance allowance and other expenses and that the income of the deceased should have been taken as only Rs. 425 per month. The learned counsel for the appellants accepts this figure. Taking Rs. 425/ being the monthly income the annual income totals up to Rs. 5	100/ and for 5 years to Rs. 25	500/ . Adding to this Rs. 2	000/ which was given as special dam ages the total amount will come to Rs. 27	500/ . We accept ' this calculation as correct and restore the award passed by the Claims Tribunal but restrict it to an amount of Rs. 27	500/ . As the Union Fire Accident & General Insurance Co. Ltd.	 Paris	 carrying on business at Nagpur has been nationalised	 though the second respondent before the Tribunal was repre sented by a counsel	 we directed notice to the nationalised insurance company so. that they would also be heard. The nationalised insurance company has taken notice and appeared through Mr. Naunit Lal	 advocate. The insurance company had nothing further to add except as to the quantum of liability of the insurance company so far as injuries to the passengers are concerned. Mr. Naunit Lal submitted that the scope of the statutory insurance does not cover the injury suffered by the passengers and as the owner has specifically insured under the insurance policy the risk to passengers to the extent of Rs. 15	000 only the liability of the insurance company should be limited to Rs. 15	000. On behalf of the owner it was submitted that the insurance cover under the Act extended to the injury to the passengers also and sought to support his contention by referring to section 95(1)(b)(i) which provides against any liability to the owner which may be incurred by him in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place. 386 As section 95 of the Motor Vehicles Act	 1935 as amended by Act 56 of 1969 is based on the English Act it is useful to refer to that. Neither the Road Traffic Act	 1960	 or the earlier 1930 Act required users of. motor vehicles to be insured in respect of liability for death or bodily injury to passengers in the vehicle being .used except a vehicle in which passengers were carried for hire or reward or by reason of or in pursuance of a contract of employment. In fact	 sub section 203(4) of the 1960 Act provided that the policy shall not be required to cover liability in respect of death of or bodily injury to persons being carried in or upon	 or entering or getting on to or alighting from	 the vehicle at the time of the occurrence of the event out of which the claims arise. The provisions of the English Act being explicit the risk to passengers is not covered by the insurance policy. The provisions under the English Road Traffic Act	 1960	 were introduced by the amendment of section 95 of the Indian Motor Vehicles Act. The law as regards general exclusion of passengers is stated in Hals bury 's Laws of England	 Third Edition	 Vol. 22	 at p. 368	 para 755 as follows : "Subject to certain exceptions a policy is not required to cover liability in respect of the death of	 or bodily injury to	 a person being carried in or upon	 or entering or getting into or alighting from	 the vehicle at the time of the occurrence of the event out of which the claim arises	 It is unnecessary to refer to the subsequent development of the English law and as the subsequent changes have not been adopted in the Indian statute. Suffice it to say that the Motor Vehicle (Passenger Insurance) Act, 1971, made insur ance cover for passenger liability compulsory by repealing paragraph (a) and the proviso of sub section 203(4). But this Act was repealed by Road Traffic Act, 1972 though under section 145 of 1972. Act the coming into force of the provi sions of Act 1971 covering passenger liability was delayed under December 1, 1972. (vide Bingham 's Motor Claims Cases, 7th Ed., p. 704). Section 95(a) and 95(b)(i) of the Motor Vehicles Act adopted the provisions of the English Road Traffic Act, 1960, and excluded the liability of the insurance company regarding the risk to the passengers. Section 95 provides that a policy of insurance must be a policy which insures the persons against any liability which may be incurred by him in respect of death or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place. The plea that the words third party" are wide enough to cover all persons except the person and the insurer is negatived as the insurance cover is not available to the passengers made clear by the proviso to sub section which provides that a policy shall not be required "(ii) except where the vehicle is a vehi cle in which passengers are carried for hire or reward or by reason of or in pursuance of a contract of employment	 to cover liability in respect of the death of or bodily injury to persons being 387 carried in or upon or entering or mounting or alighting from the vehicle at the time of the occurrence of the event out of which a claim arises. " Therefore it is not required that a policy of ' insurance should cover risk to the passengers who are not carried for hire or reward. As under section 95 the risk to a passenger in a vehicle who is not carried for hire or reward is not required to be insured the plea of the counsel for the insurance company will have to be accepted and the insurance company held not liable under the requirements of the Motor Vehicles Act. The insurer can always take policies covering risks which are not covered by the requirements of section 95. In this case the insurer had insured with the insurance company the risk to. the passengers. By an endorsement to. the policy the insurance company had insured the liability regarding the accidents to passengers in the following terms: "In consideration of the payment of an additional premium it is hereby understood and agreed that the Company undertakes to pay compensation on the scale provided below for bodily injury as hereinafter defined sustained by any passenger . . ." The scale of compensation is fixed at Rs. 15	000. The insurance company is ready and willing to pay compensation to the extent of Rs. 15	000 according to this endorsement but the learned counsel for the insured submitted that the liability of the insurance ' company is unlimited with regard to risk to the passengers. The counsel relied on Section II of the Policy which relates to liability to third parties. The clause relied on is extracted in full: "Section II Liability to Third Parties. The Company will indemnify the in sured in the event of accident caused by or arising out of the use of the Motor Car against all sums including claimant 's costs and expenses which the insured shall become ' legally liable to pay in respect of (a) death of or bodily injury to any person but except so far as is necessary to meet the requirements of Section 95 of the Motor Vehi cles Act	 1939	 the Company shall not be liable where such death or injury arises out of and in the course of the employment of such person by the insured. " It was submitted that the wording of clause 1 is wide enough to cover all risks including injuries to passengers. The clause provides that the Company will indemnify the insured against all sums including claimant 's costs and expenses which the insured shall become legally liable. This accord ing to the learned counsel would 'include legal liability to pay for risk to passengers. The legal liability is re stricted to 388 clause 1 (a) which states that the indemnity is in relation to the legal liability to pay in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person bur except so far as is neces sary to meet the requirements of section 95 of the Motor Vehicles Act. The Company shall not be liable where such death or injury arises out of and in the course of the employment of such person by the insured. Clause 1 and 1 (a) is not very clearly worded but the words "except so far as is necessary to meet the requirements of Section 95 of the 	 would indicate that the liability is restricted to the liability arising out of the statutory requirements under section 95. The second part of clause 1(a) refers to the non liability for injuries arising in the course of employment of such person. The meaning of this sub clause becomes clear when we look to the other clauses of the insurance policy. The policy also provides for insurance of risks which are not covered under section 95 of the Act by stipulating payment of extra premium. These clauses would themselves indicate that what was in tended to be covered under clause 1 and 1 (a) is the risk required to be covered under section 95 of the Motor Vehi cles Act. On a construction of the insurance policy we accept the plea of the insurance company that the policy had insured the owner only to the extent of Rs. 15,000 regarding the injury to the passenger. In the result we hold that the liability of the insurance company is restricted to Rs. 15,000. There shah be a decree in favour of the claimants appellants to the extent of Rs. 27,500 against ' the respond ents out of which the liability of the insurance company will be restricted to Rs. 15,000. The appeal is allowed with the costs of the appellant which will be paid by the respondents in equal share. P.H.P. Appeal allowed. 
5485	Civil Appeal No. 223 of 1974. From the Judgment and order dated 13.7.1973 of the Railways Rates Tribunal, Madras in Complaint No. 2 of 1969. K.K. Jain, Bishamber Lal, Pramod Dayal and A.D. Sanger for the Appellant. Bed Brat Barua, Ms. A. Subhashini,. C.V. Subba Rao, Mrs. section Suri, P. Parmeswaran and Anil Katiyar for the Respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by JAGANNATHA SHETTY, J. This appeal, with Special Leave, is against the order and judgment dated July 13, 1973, of the Railways Rates Tribunal Madras, in complaint filed by the appellant under Section 41(1) of the Indian Railways Act No. 9 of 1890. The background facts are these: The appellant is a Company. It has set up a fertilizer factory at 387 Kota in Rajasthan. It is said to be an industrially backward area. The factory manufactures Urea for which the main raw material is Naptha. Naptha has to be transported from Koyali Refinery of Indian oil Corporation. The nearest railway station is Bajuva near Baroda. The nearest railway station serving Company 's factory is Dadhevi in Rajasthan. The distance between Bajuva and Dadhevi is about 520 kms. For transportation, the Naptha has been classified by the Railway under Clause 110 B of the tariff. Before the actual setting up of the factory, the Company, by its letter dated September 5, 1966 requested the Railway Board for a concessional frieght rate for the carriage of Naptha. It requested the Railway Board for fixed Station to Station rate equivalent to classification 62.5 B. That would have meant reduction of about 43% in the normal tariff under clause 110 B. In that letter it was pointed out that if such concessional rate was not fixed, the Company would be put to disadvantageous position as against the other factories located at ports or near the refineries. The Railway Board by its letter exhibit C5 dated November 5, 1966 agreed to quote station to station rate equal to 85 B (Special). In the said letter it was also stated that as the special rate was being quoted ahead of the actual setting up of the factory the freight rate need to be reviewed when the traffic actually begins to move. When the factory was almost ready for operation the company wrote a letter dated June 5, 1967 requesting the Railway Board for charging the rate under classification 62.5 B instead of 85 B(Special). The Railway Board did not accede to the request. On May 31, 1968 the company wrote another letter informing the Railway Board that the movement of Naptha would commence from June/July 1968 and pending decision of the company 's earlier request, the Railway Board may permit charging the rate equivalent to 85 B (Special) already offered in terms of the letter exhibit 5. The Railway Board refused to grant that request also. The Railway Board, however, informed the Company in the letter dated July 11, 1968 as follows: However	 if on the basis of facts and figures your cost of production (date to be furnished for at least one complete year) vis a vis the sale price of fertilizers	 it can be established that production of fertilizers at Kota is uneconomical	 until freight concession on the movement of Naptha from Bajuva/Trombay to Kota is granted	 the Railway Board would be prepared to reconsider the question. " 388 on April 19	 1969	 the company filed a complaint under Section 41(1)(a) and (b) of the Railways Act	 1890 before the Railway Rates Tribunal Madras. The principal contentions raised in the complaint are as follows: "(i) The Railway Board was estopped and/or precluded from going back on the assurance Of quoting station to station concessional rate 85 B when the company had in vested a large amount of capital in setting up the factory at a place away from the refinery or port (ii) The rate charges by the Railway for the carriage of Naptha between two stations Bajuva and Dadhevi was unreasonable under Section 41(1)(b) of the Indian Railways Act	 1980	 and (iii) The Railways were showing undue preference or advantage in respect of other traffic and contravening the provisions of Section 28 of the Indian Railway Act	 1890. " With these and other contentions	 the company requested the tribunal to declare the rate charged for the carriage of Naptha as unreasonable and to fix a reasonable rate for such carriage. The Railway Board in its reply maintained that while quoting the concessional rate equal to 85 B (Special) it was made clear to the company that the rate was subject to review when the traffic starts moving and that concessional rate was provisional in character. The company did not construct the factory relying solely on the concessional rate offered by the Railway Board. There was no scope for any such understanding since the Railway reserved its right to determine the correct rate when the traffic started moving. It was later found that the chemicals have been advisedly given low class rate with a view to encourage fertilizer industry and no further concession was necessary to the company. It was further stated that the question of any undue prejudice of undue favour to any party does not arise when charging the respective class rates for specified commodities. On these pleadings the Tribunal considered among others	 the following issues: 1. Whether freight charges	 now charged	 for the carriage of a Company 's traffic in Neptha from Bajuva to Dadhevi station are unreasonable under Section 41(1) of the Indian Railways Act	 1890? 389 2. Whether the Railways are contravening Section 28 of the Indian Railways Act in charging the respective class rates for commodities naptha	 chemical manures	 divisions A & B	 Urea and Gypsum? 3. Whether the Railways are estopped by the doctrine of promissory estoppel in view of the assurance given in the letter exhibit C? The Tribunal determined all these questions against the company. It was held that there was no unreasonableness in the rate charged for the carriage of Naptha from Bajuva to Dadhevi. The Railways are not contravening Section 28 of the Railways Act. The rate charged has not caused any prejudice to the company. On the question of promissory estoppel	 the Tribunal held that the assurance given by the Railway Board in the letter exhibit C5 was not mainly responsible for setting up of fertilizer factory at Kota. It was further held that even if exhibit CS was an assurance to the Company the withdrawal of that assurance has not adversely affected the interests of the company. Upon the submissions made by learned counsel on both sides	 the following questions arise for our consideration: (1) Whether the Railway Board was bound to give the concessional rate offered to the company under exhibit C5 dated November 5	 1966? (2) Whether the rate charged for the carriage of Naptha between Bajuva and Dadhevi is unreasonable? (3) Whether the Railways are showing undue preference or advantage in respect of other traffic and contravening the provisions of Section 28 of the Railways Act? We may conveniently take up third question first for consideration. The relevant provisions of the Railways Act	 1890	 which have a material bearing on the question are these: Section 41 provides for filing complaints against Railway Administration. The Section provides as follows	 so far as it is material: 390 41(I) Any complaint that a railway administration (a) is contravening the provisions of Section 28 or (b) is charging for the carriage of any commodity between two stations a rate which is unreasonable	 or (c) x x x x x may be made to the Tribunal and the Tribunal shall hear and decide any such complaint in accordance with the provisions of this chapter. Section 28 provides: "28. A Railway administration shall not make or give any undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to	 or in favour of	 any particular person or railway administration	 or any particular description of traffic	 in any respect what soever	 or subject any particular person or railway administration or any particular description of traffic to any undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage in any respect whatsoever. " The third question formulated by us relates	 to the contravention of Section 28 of the Railways Act. The scope of this Section has been considered by this Court in Rajgarh Jute Mills Ltd v Eastern Railway and another	 [ ; at 241. There it was observed that a party who complains against the railway administration that the provisions of Section 28 have been contravened must establish that there has been preference between himself and his goods on the one hand and his competitor and his goods on the other. Gajendragadkar	 J. (as he then was) observed: "Section 28 is obviously based on the principle that the power derived from the monopoly of railway carriage must be used in a fair and just manner in respect of all persons and all descriptions of traffic passing over the railway area. In other words	 equal charges should normally be levied against persons or goods of the same or similar kinds pas sing over the same or similar area of the railway lines and under the same or similar circumstances; but this rule does not mean that	 if the railway administration charges un 391 equal rates in respect of the same or similar class of goods travelling over the same or similar areas	 the inequality of rates necessarily attract the provisions of section 28. All cases of unequal rates cannot necessarily be treated as cases of preference because the very concept of preference postulates competition between the person of traffic receiving preference and the person or traffic suffering prejudice in consequence. It is only as between competitors in the same trade that a complaint of preference can be made by one in reference to the other." In the light of these principles	 the Tribunal considering the material on record held that there is no evidence produced by the Company to justify any grievance under Section 28. We see no reason to disagree with this conclusion. It is	 in our opinion	 perfectly justified. In fact Mr. K.K. Jain learned counsel for the appellant also did not seriously dispute the correctness of that finding recorded by the Tribunal. We may now turn to the second question. K.K. Jain urged that the rate charged by the Railway Administration is per se unreasonable. Here again the onus to prove the alleged unreasonableness of the freight rests on the company. It is for the company to establish that the rate charged by the Railway Administration for the carriage of Naptha is unreasonable. Of course	 this onus could be discharged by relying upon the material produced by the Railways. Mr. Jain	 therefore	 relied upon a statement exhibit C46 in support of his case. exhibit C46 is a statement of surplus "working cost" in respect of carriage of Naptha from Bajuva to Dadhevi. It is	 in our opinion	 not necessary to analyse the statement. Even assuming that the railways are earning some surplus income after deducting the operation cost that by itself is no ground to hold that the freight charged is per se unreasonable. It must be born in mind that the railways are run as commercial undertaking and at the same time it being an instrumentality of the State	 should serve the national interest as well. There is however	 no obligation on the railways to pass on the extra amount realised by the carriage of goods to customers. Nor it is necessary to share the profit with the commuters. As Mr. Barua learned counsel for the Railways said that in the case of commodities of national needs such a foodgrains	 crude oil etc.	 it may be necessary for the Railways to charge below the operation cost. To off set such a loss the Railways may charge higher freight for certain other classified commodities. Therefore	 it seems to us	 that the cost of operation cannot by itself be the basis for judging the reasonableness of the rate changed. 392 It was next urged by Mr. K.K. Jain that the crude oil and Naptha are considered as comparable commodities for the purpose of carriage. The crude oil carries the rate equal to class 85 B(old)	 85(new) while Naptha carries rate 110 B(old)	 105 B(new). In terms of amounts it works out at Rs.59.45 for crude oil as against Rs.73.13 for Naptha. The counsel urged that there is no justification shown for this wide disparity in the first place. Secondly	 the freight rate of crude oil was the rate offered to the company under exhibit CS and the denial of that rate without any good reason is arbitrary. This argument though attractive does not carry conviction if one analyses the evidence on record. Crude oil has been clubbed with Glycerine	 fruit juices and syrups	 fibres	 flax etc. Naptha has been clubbed with Aviation Spirit	 Petrol	 Petroleum	 Ether and solvent oil. From the evidence produced by the Railways Naptha has been classified as a dangerous commodity with the flash point below 24.4 xf8C spontaneously. The crude oil has no such dangerous characteristics. It is also on record that Naptha requires special type of tank wagons and the Railways have to take special precautions for transportation. These and other relevant factors have been taken into account by the Tribunal for rejecting the demand of the company for parity in freights. This Court cannot	 interfere with such a finding in this appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution. On the merits also	 we see no justification to demand that Neptha should take the same freight rate as that of crude oil. We may now revert to the first question. It relates to the correctness of the view taken by the Tribunal on the doctrine of promissory estoppel resulting by the letter exhibit CS of the Railway Board. The Tribunal has rejected this claim of the company by summarising its conclusion in the following terms: "We must	 therefore	 hold that the assurance contained in . CS was not mainly responsible for the setting up of the Fertilizer Factory at Kota. Even if it was held that exhibit CS was a definite encouragement to the complainant to set up the Kota factory	 there is no evidence on record to show that the withdrawal of the concession by exhibit 12 has adversely affected the complainant. We will show in the (i succeeding paragraphs that the complainant has suffered no material injury by virtue of the withdrawal of the concessional rate and the charging of the normal rate. It is well settled that the principle of estoppel cannot be applied unless the person pleading estoppel can show that he has been prejudiced by the conduct of the party on whose assurance l l he has acted. " 393 Here the Railways Rates Tribunal apparently	 appears to have gone off the track. The doctrine of promissory estoppel has not been correctly understood by the Tribunal. It is true	 that is the formative period	 it was generally said that the doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be invoked by the promisee unless he has suffered 'detriment ' or 'prejudice '. It was often said simply	 that the party asserting the estoppel must have been induced to act to his detriment. But this has now been explained in so many decisions all over. All that is now required is that the party asserting the estoppel must have acted upon the assurance given to him. Must have relied upon the representation made to him. It means	 the party has changed or altered the position by relying on the assurance or the representation. The	alteration of position by the party is the only indispensable requirement of the doctrine. It is not necessary to prove further any damage	 detriment or prejudice to the party asserting the estoppel. The Court	 however	 would compel the opposite party to adhere to the representation acted upon or abstained from acting. The entire doctrine proceeds on the promise that it is reliance based and nothing more. This principle would be clear if we study the cases in which the doctrine has been applied even since it was burst out into sudden blaze in 1946. Lord Denning in Central London Properties Ltd v High Trees House Ltd	 11947] K.B. 130 sitting as a trial judge	 asserted: "A promise intended to be binding	 intended to be acted upon	 and in fact acted upon is binding . . The history of the High Trees principle is too well known to bear repetition. It will be enough to make the following points. The promisor is bound because he led the promisee to commit himself to change the position. If the promisee has acted upon the promise	 the promisor is. precluded from receding his promise. No further detriment to the promisee upon his temporal interests need be established. This position has been made clear by Lord Denning himself in his article "Recent Developments in the Doctrine of Consideration" Modern Law Review	 Vol. 15 at p. 5. "A man should keep his word. All the more so when the promise is not a bare promise but is made with the intention that the other party should act upon it. Just a contract is different from tort and from estoppel	 so also in the sphere now under discussion promises may give rise to a different equity from other conduct. 394 The difference may lie in the necessity of showing "detriment" where one party deliberately promises to waive	 modify or discharge his strict legal rights	 intending the other party to act on the faith of promise	 and the other party actually does act on it	 then it is contrary	 not only to equity but also to good faith	 to allow the promisor to go back on his promise. It should not be necessary for the other party to show that he acted to his detriment in reliance on the promise. It should be sufficient that he acted on it. The principle governing this branch of the subject cannot be better put then in the wolds of a great Australian jurist	 DIXON	 J. in Grundt v The Great Boulder Pty Gold Mines Ltd	 ; There he said: "It is often said simply that the party asserting the estoppel must have been induced to act to his detriment. Although substantially such a statement is correct and leads to no misunderstanding	 it does not bring out clearly the basal purpose of the doctrine. That purpose is to avoid or pre vent a detriment to the party asserting the estoppel by compelling the opposite party to adhere to the assumption upon which the former acted or abstained from acting. This means that the real detriment or harm from which the law seeks to give protection is that which would flow from the change of position if the assumption were deserted that led to it. So long as the assumption is adhered to	 the party who altered his situation upon the faith of it cannot complain. His complaint is that when afterwards the other party makes a different state of affairs the basis of an assertion of right against him then	 if it is allowed	 his own original change of position will operate as a detriment. His action or inaction must be such that if the assumption upon which he proceeded were shown to be wrong	 and an inconsistent state of affairs were accepted as the foundation of the rights and duties of himself and the opposite party	 the consequence would be to make his original act or failure to act a source of prejudice. " This passage was referred to	 with approval	 by Lord Denning in Central Newbury Car Auction Ltd v Unity Finance Ltd	 at 909. The said passage has also been quoted	 with approval	 395 by Bhagwati	 J. (as he then was) in Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co A Ltd v state of U.P. & Ors.	[ 1979]2 SCR 641 at p. 695= 1979(2)SCC 409. The learned Judge then said: "We do not think that in order to invoke the doctrine of promissory estoppel it is necessary for the promisee to show that he suffered detriment as a result of acting in reliance on the promise. But we may make it clear that if by detriment we mean injustice to the promisee which could result if the promisor were to recede from his promise then detriment would certainly come in as a necessary ingredient. The detriment in such a case is not some prejudice suffered by the promisee by acting on the promise	 but the prejudice which would be caused to the promisee	 if the promisor were allowed to go back on the promise. " The view taken in Motilal Padmapat Sugar Mills case (supra) has been reiterated in Union of India & Ors. vs Godfrey Philips India Ltd		 [ 1985 ] 4 SCC 369 = [ 1985 ] Supp 3 SCR 123 . The concept of detriment as we know understand is whether it appears unjust	 unreasonable or inequitable that the promisor should be allowed to resile from his assurance or representation	 having regard to what the promisee has done or refrained from doing in reliance on the assurance or representation. It is	 however	 quite fundamental that the doctrine of promissory estoppel	 cannot be used to compel the public bodies or the Government to carry out the representation or promise which is contrary to law or which is outside their authority or power. Secondly	 the estoppel stems from equitable doctrine. It	 therefore	 requires that he who seeks equity must do equity. The doctrine	 therefore	 cannot	 also be invoked if it is found to be inequitable or unjust in its enforcement. We may also state that for the purpose of invoking the doctrine	 it is not necessary for the company to show that the assurance contained in exhibit C5 was mainly responsible for establishing the factory at Kota. There may be several representations to one party from different authorities in regard to different matters. Or	 there may be several representations from the same party in regard to different matters. As in the instant case	 there was one representation by the Rajasthan Government to supply power to the company at concessional rate. There was another representation from the same Govern 396 ment to exempt the company from payment of tax for certain period. There may be other representations from the same or some other authorities. If those representations have been relied upon by the company	 the Court would compel those parties to adhere to their respective representations. It is immaterial whether each of the representations was wholly responsible or partly responsible for locating the factory at Kota. It is sufficient if the company was induced to act on that representation. The last and final aspect of the matter to which attention should be drawn is that for the purpose of finding whether an estoppel arises in favour of the person acting on the representation	 it is necessary to look into the whole of the representation made. It is also necessary to state that the representation must be clear and unambiguous and not tentative or uncertain. In this context we may usefully refer to the following passage from Halsbury 's Laws of England	 Halsbury 's Laws of England 4th Edn. 16 p. 1071 para 1595. "1595. Representation must be unambiguous To found an estoppel a representation must be clear and unambiguous	 not necessarily susceptible of only one interpretation	 but such as will reasonably be understood by the person to whom it is made in the sense contended for	 and for this purpose the whole of the representation must be looked at. This is merely an application of the old maxim applicable to all estoppels	 that they "must be certain to every intent The question now is whether the assurance given by the Railway Board in the letter exhibit C5 was clear and unqualified. But unfortunately	 it is not so. It was subject to review to be undertaken when the company starts moving the raw material. exhibit C5 reads: New Delhi I	 Dated S Nov.	 1966 Dear Sir	 Sub: Integrated Fertilizer PVC project at Kota	 Rajasthan Rail movement of Naptha. 397 Ref: Your letter No. SFC/Gen 72 dated 5.9.1966 I am directed to state that the Railway Board agree to quote a special rate equal o class 85 B (Special) CC: K for transport of Naptha in train loads from Bombay or Koyali to Kota	 for manufacture of fertilizers. The proposed special rate will apply at owner 's risk. Since the special rate is being quoted ahead of the actual setting up of the factory the rate may need to be reviewed when the traffic actually begins to move. The Railway may accordingly be approached before the traffic actually starts moving. Yours faithfully	 Sd/ R.L. Sharma for Secretary Railway Board" What does this letter mean? The first part of the letter offering the concessional rate equal to class 85 B (Special) has been completely watered down in the second part of the letter. It has been expressly stated that the rate may need be reviewed when the traffic actually begins to move. The company was put to notice that it has to again approach the Railway Administration. The Railway authorities now states that they have reviewed the whole matter and found no justification to offer a concessional freight rate for Naptha	 since fertilizers are deliberately given a low classification in the tariff. From the tenor of exhibit S the Railways are entitled to state so	 and it does not amount to resiling from the earlier assurance. No question of estoppel arises in favour of appellant out of the representation made in exhibit CS. We	 therefore	 agree with the conclusion of the Tribunal but not for all the reasons stated. In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed. In the circumstances. however	 we make no order as to costs. S.L. Appeal dismissed.

Summary:
Purshottam Udeshi was travelling in a car which was driven by Manager of the first respondent company. The car was insured with the second respondent. The car dashed against a tree while proceeding from Nagpur to Pandurna. Purshottam	 who was aged 58 years at that time	 died in the. accident. His annual income was about Rs. 9000/ . The widow and children of Purshottam filed a claim for compensation for a sum of Rs. 1 lac under section 110 of the 	 before the Claims Tribunal. The respondents denied that the vehicle was driven in a rash or negligent manner and contended tbat the vehicle at the time of accident was perfectly in sound condition. It was also contended that Purshottam was travelling in the said vehicle on his own responsibility and for his own purpose absolutely gratis and not on behalf of or at the instance of respondent No. 1 or the driver of the vehicle and	 therefore	 the claimants were not entitled to any compensation. The respondent pleaded inevitable accident. The Tribunal found that the accident was as a result of negligent driving of the vehicle by the Manager. It also found that the first respondent the owner of the company was liable	 to pay compensation to the claimants on account of negligence of their employee. Tribunal awarded Rs. 31	209/ as general damages on the basis of 5 years ' earning less the	 amount which the deceased might have spent on himself and Rs. 2	000/. as special damages for funeral and post funeral expenses. The Tribunal took into account the pay	 D.A.	 conveyance allowance etc. for the purpose of determining income of the deceased. Both the respond ents. filed appeals in the. High Court. The High Court did not decide the question as to whether the accident was due to rash and negligent driving or the quantum of compensation allowed by the Tribunal was proper or not on the ground that the respondent No. 1 cannot be held vicariously liable for the act of their Manager in taking Purshottam as a passen ger as the said act was neither in the course of his employ ment nor under any authority whatsoever; that no evidence was led to show that the respondent No. 1 was aware that Purshottam was being taken in the car as a passenger by their Manager. The High Court held that Purshottam was no better than a trespasser as far as respondent No. 1 is concerned and that	 therefore.	 respondent No. 1 cannot be made vicariously liable. In an appeal by certificate	 the appellants claimants con tended: (1) That the accident was due to the	 rash and negligent driving of the Manager of re spondent No. 1. (2) The accident took place during the course of the employment of the driver. Allowing the appeal	 HELD: (1) The car was being driven rashly and negligent ly. Although no eye witness was examined P.W.I. the brother of the deceased who went to the spot soon after the accident was examined. He deposed that the car dashed 373 against a tree. The tree was on the right hand side of the road	 4 ft. away from the right hand side of the main met alled road. The road was 15 ft. wide and was a metalled road. On other side of the road there were fields at lower level. The tree against which the car dashed was uprooted about 9 to 10" from the ground. The car dashed so vio lently that it was broken in the front side. The vehicle struck so violently that the machine of the car went back about a foot from its original position. The steering wheel of the engine of the car receded back on the driver 's side and the said impact on the driver 's side and by the said impact the occupants died and front seat also moved back. The witness was not cross examined on these facts. The maxim of "Res ipsa 1oquitur" clearly applies in the present case. In view of the proved facts the burden was on the respondents to prove the inevitable accident. [376 B H] Eller vs Selfridge 	 referred to. The normal rule is that it is for the plaintiff to prove negligence but in some cases considerable hardship is caused to ' the plaintiff as the true	 cause! of the accident is not known to him but is solely within the knowledge of the	 defendant who caused it. The plaintiff can prove the acci dent but cannot prove how it happened to establish negli gence on the part of the defendant. This hardship is sought to be avoided by applying the principle of res ipsa 1oqui tur. It means the accident "speaks for itself" or "tells its own story". The car could not have gone to the right extremity and dashed with such violence with the tree if the driver had exercised reasonable care and caution. The Court did not think it necessary to remand the matter to the High Court to consider the question of rash and negligent driving since the evidence was convincing. [377 D E	 378	 A. E] (2) It is an admitted fact that the driver of the car	 the Manager of respondent No. 1	 was proceeding from Nagpur to Pandhurna for purpose of delivering an amount of Rs. 20	000/ . He was driving the car in the course of the employment of respondent No. 1. It is now firmly estab lished that the master 's liability is based on the ground that the. act is done in the scope or sourse of his employ ment or authority. [379 A G] Young vs Edward Box and Co. Ltd. at 793	 approved. Sitaram Motilal Kalal vs Santanuprasad Jaishankar Bhatt (1966)3 SCR 527; Conway vs George Wimpey & Co. Ltd. and 	 distinguished. Ormrod and Another vs Crosville Motor Services Ltd. (1953)2 All E.R. 753 and Canadian Pacific Railway Co. vs Lockhart 	 referred to. (3) The Manager permitted Purshottam to have a ride in the car. Taking into account the high position of the driver who was the Manager of the company it is reasonable	 to presume in the absence of any evidence to the contrary the Manager had authority to carry Purshottam or acting in the course of his employment. There is nothing to support the conclusion of the High Court that the driver was not acting in the course of his employment. [382 D F] Cox vs Midland Counties Ry. Co. ; and Honghton vs Pilkington	 distinguished. Twine vs Bean 's Express	 Ltd. 62 T.L.R.p. 155	 year 1945 46 distinguished. Recent trend in law is to make the master liable for acts which do not strictly fall within the term "in the course of employment" as ordinarily understood. [383 F] 5. The High Court did not go into the question of quantum of compensation. The Tribunal	 however	 ought not to have taken D.A.	 Conveyance Allowance etc. 	 into account for the purposes of determining the income of the deceased. Thus	 the income of 5 years would stand reduced from Rs. 31	000/to Rs. 25	500/ over and above special damage of Rs. 2	000/ [385 A	 C D] 374 6. As far as respondent No. 2 Insurance Co. is con cerned it contended that since the Company had specifically limited its liability in respect of injury to passengers to Rs. 15	000/ it cannot be made liable for anything in excess of Rs. 15	000/ . The respondent No. 1 contended that the insurance cover under the Act extended to the injury to the passengers also and relied on Section 95(1) (b)(i) which provides against any libility to the owner which may be incurred by him in respect of death or bodily injury to any person or damage to any person of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place. Section 95 of the as amended by Act 56 of 1969	 is based on the Road Traffic Act of 1960 or the earlier Act of 1930 in England. Section 95(a) and 95(b)(i) of the Act adopts the provisions of the English Road Traffic Act	 1960	 and excludes the liability of the Insurance Co. regarding the. risk to the passengers. Section 95 provides that a policy of insurance must be a policy which insures the persons against any liability which may be incurred by him in respect of death or bodily injury to any person or damage. to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of use of the vehicle in a public place. Proviso 2 to Section 95(b) makes it clear that it is not required that a policy of insurance should cover risk of the passengers who are not carried for hire or reward. Under section 95	 the risk to a passenger in a vehicle who is not carried for hire or reward is not required to be insured. The Insurer can however always take policies for a risk which is not covered by section 95. In the present case	 the insurer had insured with the Insurance Co. the risk to the passenger to the extent of Rs. 15	000/ . Clause 1 of the section 2 to the Insurance Policy which requires the Insurance Co. to indemnify the insured in respect of claimants ' claim which becomes legally payable: in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person is not happily worded. However	 since the said clause .talks of "except so far as necessary to meet the requirements of section 95 of the " would indicate that the liability is restricted 	to the liability aris ing out of the statutory requirements under section 95. The policy read with the other clauses makes it clear that the respondent No. 2 would be liable to the extent of Rs. 15	000/ . [385 G H	 386 A	 F	 A D]