Case ID: 3454

Judgment:
Civil Appeal No. 747 of 1975. Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and order dated the 5 12 74 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Civil Writ Petition No. 6344/74. M. K. Ramamurthi	 J. Ramamurthi and Ramesh C. Pathak for the appellants. 681 J. L. Gupta	 Janendra Lal and B. R. Agarwala for Respondents Nos. 5 to 22/75. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by KRISHNA IYER	 J. This Civil Appeal	 by special leave under article 136	 raises a common question of great moment	 the decision of which may have a wider litigative fall out than may appear on the surface. The first question expressed	 manu brevi	 is as to whether a writ may issue	 under article 226	 against a Society registered under the Punjab Cooperative Societies Act (Act XXV of 1961) setting aside a selection list at the instance of the aggrieved appellants who were not included therein. The High Court (both the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench) following an earlier judgment of that Court in Dharam Pal vs State of Punjab held the writ petition to be incompetent	 directed as it was against a Cooperative Society. Shri M.K. Ramamurthy challenges the holding of the High Court on the score that the Punjab State Cooperative Land Mortgage Bank Ltd.	 (State Bank	 for short) is 'other authority ' within the meaning of article 12 of the Constitution and	 therefore	 falls within the definition of State. Consequently	 a writ may issue against it. Secondly	 he contends that the State Bank is a public authority and	 therefore	 falls within the writ jurisdiction of the High Court. His third plea is much wider in its sweep	 for he urges that Cooperative Societies registered under the Cooperative Societies Act are subject to the jurisdiction of High Courts under article 226 of the Constitution	 since this provision is widely worded and writs may be issued for any purpose against any person. Foremost among his three points is the first one which he expressed with force	 backed by decisions of this Court spanning a period ending with the recent decision in Sukhdev Singh vs Bhagatram. According to his submission	 the State Bank is more than a cere Cooperative Society	 but has statutory powers and duties	 exercises sovereign functions and must be assessed in its status with reference to the Punjab Land Mortgage Bank Act	 1957 (for short	 the Mortgage Bank Act). Chronologically we may mention that there was a Cooperative Societies Act	 1954 in the Punjab under which the present Society was registered	 but that Act was repealed by the Punjab Cooperative Societies Act of 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Cooperative Societies Act). The present Society	 though registered under the 1954 Act continues as a Society under the Cooperative Societies Act	 1961 and is a State Bank	 as defined in section 2(h) of the Mortgage Bank Act. A study of the two statutes	 the trappings attaching to the Society	 the other features of and powers vested in the Society	 have all to be studied in their totality before testing the contention of the appellant in the light of the ruling of the Court. Although great argument has been addressed in the special circumstances of the case	 there is no need to investigate these questions apart from briefey adverting to them. Maybe	 in a different case	 682 where these issues directly and inescapably arise	 this Court may have to pronounce on them	 but where as here	 the lis lends itself to disposal on a short point	 to launch on a long debate about other arguments of importance may not be appropriate. Of course	 'if you were to make little fishes talks	 they would talk like whales '	 as Dr. Johnson put it. The whales of legal dispute do not challenge us here since the appellant is seeking relief which	 on the face of it	 cannot be granted for a different 'little fish ' reason. A finger nail sketch of the facts is enough to bring out the crucial issues and the broad point on which we propose to dispose of this appeal. The appellant is a permanent servant of the Punjab State Cooperative Land Mortgage Bank hereinafter referred as the Cooperative Bank) since 1964 and promoted in 1968 as an Assistant. According to him	 the Cooperative Bank is a statutory body established in pursuance of the Land Mortgage Bank Act	 1957	 with power to frame subordinate legislation and thereby enjoying sovereign power. Sections 11	 12	 15	 22 and 40 have been invoked to substantiate this thesis. The purpose of this branch of the appellant 's submission is to make out that the Cooperative Bank is 'State ' within the meaning of article 12 of the Constitution and	 therefore	 subject to article 16 of the Constitution and the writ jurisdiction under article 226. A further argument has been built on the edifice of the statutory provisions contained in the Punjab Cooperative Societies	 Act	 1961. Section 84A of this Act empowers apex societies under certain circumstances	 to frame rules for their employees and such rules	 it is contended	 have been framed	 having the force of law. The Cooperative Bank is therefore a public authority which	 in any view	 is vulnerable to the writ of the High Court under its extra ordinary constitutional power. Of course	 Shri M. K. Ramamurthy has contended that even apart from all these considerations	 any cooperative society	 in view of its constitution under statutory provisions	 may be amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court. His specific grievance in the present case is that promotions to three categories of higher posts	 viz.	 Assistant Inspecting Officers	 Junior Accountants and Accountants were made by direct recruitment contrary to what he contends are service rules but	 in substance	 are the result of collective bargaining with the management	 as the writ petition itself reveals. These triple categories of new posts have been filled	 admittedly	 without reference to the quota set apart for promotees	 the defence of the respondent being that these new cadres are not covered by the agreement referred to in the writ petition. The High Court was approached when a real apprehension of direct recruitment arose	 praying for a writ	 order or direction in the nature of mandamus requiring the respondent not to proceed with the processes resulting in filling up the posts of Accountants	 Junior Accountants and Assistant Inspecting Officers in violation of the quota of 75% claimed by the appellant	 under the agreement alleged to be binding on the Cooperative Bank and the employees. Of Course	 the recruitment went on and the new appointees are also arrayed as respondents in the writ petition. However	 the High Court dismissed 683 the writ petition on the preliminary ground that the writ was	 in fact	 directed against a Cooperative Bank registered under the Cooperative Societies Act and no writ would lie against such a body in the circumstances set out in the writ petition. Indeed	 the distinction between a body with a personality created by and owing its existence solely to a statute and an entity which is recognised by and is registered under a statute is real	 dramatic and makes for a world of difference in jural impact. Considerable argument was addressed before us based on the rulings reported as Mohanlal; Tewary	 Sukhdev; and Praga Tools	 apart from the ruling of this Court in Lakshmi Narain. The question as to whether a Cooperative Society is a public authority has fallen for judicial notice and Amir Jamia contains an elaborate discussion of the controversal topic covering decisions	 English and Indian. It is also true that at least Madhya Pradesh (Dukhooram 1961 vs M. P. 269) and Calcutta (Madan Mohan have considered whether a writ will issue against a Cooperative Society	 simpliciter	 Kumkum Khanna deals with a private college governed by a University Ordinance. Many other rulings have also been brought to our notice	 but we do not think it necessary elaborately to investigate these issues notwithstanding the fact that Shri Gupta	 appearing for the contesting respondent	 challenged each one of the grounds stabilising his submissions on rulings of the Court	 of the High Courts and the English Courts. The reason why we are not inclined to add to the enormous erudition on the point already accumulated in case law is that a close perusal of the writ petition will disclose that essentially the appellant is seeking merely to enforce an agreement entered into between the employees and the Cooperative Bank. There is no doubt that some of the legal problems argued by Sri Ramamurthy deserve in an appropriate case jurisprudential study in depth	 although much of it is covered by authority. But assuming	 for argument 's sake	 that what he urges has validity	 the present case meets with its instant funeral from one fatal circumstance. The writ petition	 stripped of embroidery and legalistics	 stands naked as a simple contract between the staff and the Society	 agreeing upon a certain percentage of promotions to various posts or an omnibus	 all embracing promise to give a quota to the existing employees. At its best	 the writ petition seeks enforcement of a binding contract but the neat and necessary repellant is that the remedy of article 226 is unavailable to enforce a contract qua contract. We fail to see how a supplier of chalk to a government school or cheese to a government hospital can ask for a constitutional remedy under article 226 in the event of a breach of a contract	 bypassing the normal channels 684 of civil litigation. We are not convinced that a mere contract agreeing to a quota of promotions can be exalted into a service rule or statutory duty. What is immediately relevant is not whether the respondent is State or public authority but whether what is enforced is a statutory duty or sovereign obligation or public function of a public authority. Private law may involve a State	 a statutory body	 or a public body in contractual or tortious actions. But they cannot be siphoned off into the writ jurisdiction. The controversy before us in substance will turn on the construction and scope of the agreement when the claim to a quota as founded cannot be decided in writ jurisdiction without going back on well settled guidelines and even subverting the normal processual law except perhaps in extreme cases which shock the conscience of the Court or other extra ordinary situation	 an aspect we are not called upon to explore here. We are aware of the wide amplitude of article 226 and its potent use to correct manifest injustice but cannot agree that contractual obligations in the ordinary course	 without even statutory complexion	 can be enforced by this short	 though	 wrong cut. On this short ground the appeal must fail and be dismissed. We do so	 but without costs. P.H.P. Appeal dismissed.

Summary:
The appellants are permanent servants of the Punjab State Co operative Land Mortgage Bank and were working as Assistants since the year 1968. The grievance of the appellants is that the contesting respondents were directly recruited to the higher post of Inspecting officers	 Junior Accountants and Accountants in violation of Service Rules. What the appellants call Service Rules is nothing but a contract arrived at as a result of the collective bargaining with the management. The writ petition filed by the appellants was dismissed by the learned single Judge as well as the Division Bench of High Court on the ground that no writ petition was maintainable against a Cooperative Society under Article 226 of the Constitution. On appeal by special leave the appellants contended: (1) The co operative Bank in question is "other authority" within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution and	 therefore	 falls with in the definition of State. (2) The Co operative Bank is a public authority. (3) Co operative Societies registered under the Co operative Societies Act are subject to the jurisdiction of High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution	 since this provision is widely worded writs may be issued for any purpose against any person. Respondents contended: (1) that the Co operative Bank is not other authority or a public authority and no writ can lie against it. (2) The appellants are trying to enforce the contractual obligation for which no writ can lie. Dismissing the appeal	 ^ HELD: (1) The Court did not decide the question whether a Co operative Society is other authority or public authority because it is clear from a close perusal of the writ petition that essentially the appellants are seeking merely to ensure an agreement entered into between the employees and the Co operative Bank. At its best	 the writ petition seeks enforcement of a binding contract but the neat and necessary repellant is that the remedy of article 226 is unavailable to enforce a contract qua contract. We are aware of the wide amplitude of Article 226 and its potent use to correct manifest injustice but cannot agree that contractual obligations in the ordinary course without even statutory complexion can be enforced under Article 226. [683F H	 684 D]