Case ID: 4798

Judgment:
Civil Appeal No. 82 of 1971. From Judgment and Decree dated 26.2.65 of Allahabad High Court in first appeal No. 457 of 1952. J.P. Goyal and S.K. Jain for the appellants. V.C. Mahajan and A. Subhashini for the respondents. The Judgement of the Court was delivered by SEN	 J. This appeal on certificate brought from the judgment and decree of the Allahabad High Court dated February 26	 1965 reversing the judgment and decree of the Civil Judge	 Agra dated August 25	 1952 and dismissing the plaintiffs ' suit for recovery of Rs. 26	000 raises a question of some importance upon s.80 of the Code of Civil Procedure	 1908. The facts giving rise to this appeal may be shortly stated. On November 12	 1949	 the plaintiffs Ghanshyam Dass and his two minor brothers Shree Ram and Mohan Lal brought the suit out of which this appeal arises	 in the Court of the Civil Judge	 Agra for recovery of a sum of Rs. 26	000 against the Dominion of India through the Defence Secretary	 New Delhi. It was pleaded that their late father Seth Lachman Dass Gupta entered into a contract with the Governor General in Council for the supply of charcoal to the Military Supply Depot at Agra during the period from April 1	 1943 to March	 31	 1944. In pursuance thereof	 he made necessary supplies and received payments for the same at the contractual rates from time to time. It was pleaded that tho contract contained an escalation clause viz. clause 8	 to the effect that in case the price of charcoal increased by more than 10% of the stipulated rate during the subsistence of the contract	 the contractor would be entitled to the price at the higher rate. It was alleged that from 232 the date of the contract	 the rate of charcoal went up continuously to 44.8% in July	 August and September 1943	 93.1% in October November and December 1943 and 82.7% in January	 February and March 1944. Accordingly Seth Lachman Dass made a demand for payment of price at the increased rate. The military authorities paid at the enhanced rate for part of the supplies while for the rest they refused to pay at more than the contractual rate. Seth Lachman Dass served a notice exhibit A 8 on the Dominion of India through the Defence Secretary under s.80 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. lt appears that before his death	. On or about September 15	 1948 he received a letter from the military authorities rejecting his claim for payments at the enhanced rate but before he could institute any suit he died on October 28	 1949. Thereafter	 on November 12	 1949 the plaintiffs who ale his three sons	 brought the suit as his legal heirs and successors claiming the amount. The defendants contested the claim inter alia on the ground that the notice exhibit A 8 given by Seth Lachman Dass could not inure for the benefit of the plaintiffs and therefore the suit was bad for want of a notice under s.80 of the Code. The learned Civil Judge	 however	 held that no further notice under s.80 was necessary as the notice exhibit A 8 served by the plaintiffs ' father Seth Lachman Dass must enure for their benefit. He found that the plaintiffs were entitled in terms of clause 8 of the contract to receive a sum of Rs. 20	710.50 p. being the difference between the enhanced rate and the contractual rate for the supplies paid for and accordingly decreed the plaintiffs claim to that extent. But on appeal the High Court	 his decision on the point was reversed upon the view that the notice exhibit A 8 given by the plaintiffs ' father was insufficient and was nota valid notice under s.80 of the Code of Civil Procedure insofar as the plaintiffs were concerned. The short question involved in this appeal is whether the notice exhibit A 8 given by the plaintiffs ' father Seth Lachman Dass Gupta before his death under s.80 of the Code of Civil Procedure	 1908 would enure for the benefit of the plaintiffs. Section 80 of the Code as it stood on the date of the institution of the suit	 insofar as material	 is reproduced below: "80. Notice: No suit shall be instituted against (the Government) or against a public officer in respect of any act purporting to be done by such public officer in his official 233 capacity	 until the expiration of two months next after notice in writing has been delivered to	 or left at the office of (a) in the case of suit against the Central Government . . . a Secretary to that Government: ** ** ** ** and	 in the case of a public officer	 delivered to him or left at his office	 stating the cause of action	 the name	 description and place of residence of the plaintiff and the relief which he claims; and the plaint shall contain a statement that such notice has been so delivered or left. " In the celebrated case of Bhagchand Dagadusa & Ors. vs Secretary of State for India in Council & Ors.	 the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council held that this section is express	 explicit an mandatory and it admits of no implications or exceptions. The words of Viscount Summer delivering the judgment of the Privy Council have become classical : "Section 80 is express	 explicit and mandatory	 and it admits of implications or exceptions. A suit in which (inter alia) an injunction is prayed still "a suit" within the words of the section	 and to read any qualification into it is an encroachment on the function of legislation. Considering how long these and similar words have been read throughout most of the Courts in India in their literal sense	 it is reasonable to suppose that the section has not been found to work injustice	 but	 if this is not so	 it is a matter to be rectified by an amending Act. The Privy Council rejected the contention put forward before them that the section deals with mere procedure and held that the requirements of s.80 are to be strictly complied with and are applicable to all forms of action and all kinds of relief. It further held that s.80 imposes a statutory and unqualified obligation upon the Court and in the absence of compliance with s.80	 the suit was not maintainable	 either as to the declaration sought or injunction prayed for. 234 Earlier	 in some cases	 a liberal construction was put upon the section and it was held that a notice is sufficient if it substantially fulfils its objection in informing the parties concerned of the nature of the suit to be filed	 and that a notice is not invalid merely because it is given by two out of three plaintiffs But since the Privy Council judgment in Bhagchand 's case	 supra	 strict compliance with the terms of s.80 has been enforced and a notice given by one of two plaintiffs has been held to be insufficient. Again	 in a case where the plain tiffs ' father gave notice and then plaintiffs filed a suit after the father 's death	 the notice given by the father in respect of the same cause of action was held insufficient : Mahadev Dattatraya Rajarshi vs Secretary of State for India following Buchan Singh vs Secretary of State. It is plain from the terms of s.80 that the notice must fulfil the requirements set out therein. It is essential that the notice must state the names	 descriptions and places of residence of all the plaintiffs. A notice must be such as to enable the addressee or the recipient to indentify the claimant. In Vallayan Chettiar & ors. vs The Government of the Province of Madras & Anr. Lord Sumner delivering the judgment of the Privy Council referred to the observations of Lord Sumner in Bhagchand 's case that s.80 is explicit and mandatory and admits of no implications or exemptions	 and observed that: "There should be identity of the person who issues the notice and who brings the suit. To hold otherwise would be to admit an implication or exception for which there is no justification. " . There	 the question was whether a suit brought by two plaintiffs was competent when notice under s.80 was given by only one of them. The Privy Council having regard to the mandatory requirements of s.80 of the Code held that there was no valid notice and accordingly upheld the judgment of the High Court dismissing the plaintiff 's suit. So also in Government of the Province Bombay vs Pestonji Ardeshir Wadia & Ors.	 the Privy Council reiterated the same principles where no notice had been served under s.80 specify 235 ing the names and addresses of all the trustees and therefore the provisions of the section had not been complied with and it was accordingly held that the suit was incompetent. As to the requirement that the notice must state the cause of action and the reliefs claimed	 there is a large body of decisions laying down that a notice under the section should be held to be sufficient if it substantially fulfils its object in informing the parties concerned of the nature of the suit to be filed. In consonance with this view	 this Court in Dhian Singh Sobha Singh & Anr. vs Union of India	 Union of India vs Jeewan Ram	 State of Madras vs C.P. Agencies and Amar Nath vs Union of India has held that though the terms of the section have to be strictly complied with	 that does not mean that the notice should be scrutinized in a pedantic manner or in a manner divorced from common sense. On this principle	 it has been held that notice which states the cause of action and the reliefs described in the annexed copy of the plaint (which forms part of the notice) though defective in form	 complies substantially with the section. The point to be considered is whether the notice gives sufficient information as to the nature of the claim such as would enable the recipient to avert the litigation. The relevant passage from the judgment in Dhian Singh Sobha Singh 's case	 supra	 is set out below: "We are constrained to observe that the approach of the High Court to this question was not well founded. The Privy Council no doubt laid down in Bhugchand Dagadusa vs Secretary of State that the terms of this section should be strictly complied with. That does not however mean that the terms of the notice should be scrutinized in a pedantic manner or in a manner completely divorced from common sense. As was stated by Pollock C.B. in Jones vs Nicholls ; "We must import a little common sense into notices of this kind. ' ' Beaumont C.J. also observed in Chandu Lal Vadilal vs Government of Bombay	 ILR "one must construe section 80 with some regard to common sense and to the object with which it appears to have been passed 236 The question as to whether notice under s.80 was invalid for want of identity of the plaintiffs directly arose in the case of S.N. Dutt vs Union of India. There	 a notice was served by the appellant who was the sole proprietor of a business styled S.N. Dutt & Co.	 (in the name of S.N. Dutt & Co.) and thereafter he filed a suit against the Union of India describing the plaintiff as "Surendra Nath Dutt sole proprietor of a business carried on under the name and style of S.N. Dutt & Co.". This Court upheld the decision of the Calcutta High Court dismissing the plaintiff 's suit holding that the person who issued the notice was not the same as the person who filed the suit. The contention that the appellant was carrying on business under an assumed name and therefore the notice was valid as S.N. Dutt & Co. was merely the name and style of the business which he was carrying on	 was rejected. The Court held that since no suit could be filed by S.N. Dutt & Co in that name as it was not a partnership firm	 it could not give a valid and legal notice in that name	 and a valid notice could only be given in the name of S.N. Dutt. The decision merely reiterates the rule laid down by this Court in Bhagchand that 'section 80	 according to its plain meaning	 requires that there should be identity of the person who gives the notice with the person who brings the suit". The Court distinguished the decisions in Dhian Singh Sobha Singh and C.P. Agencies on the ground that the Court was dealing with defect in describing the cause of action and the relief claimed and where it Concerns the relief and the cause of action	 it may be necessary to use common sense to find out whether s.80 of the Code has been complied with	 and stated: "But where it is a question o f the name of the plaintiff	 there is in our opinion (little scope for the use of common sense	) for either the name of the person suing is there in the notice or it is not. No amount of common sense will put the name of the plaintiff there	 if it is not there." In the case of Raghunath Dass. v Union of India & Anr. the same question arose but the Court struck a discordant note there. There	 the notice emanated from M/s Raghunath Dass Mulkhraj and in the body of the notice at several places the expression "we" was used. Further	 the plaintiff had purported to sign for M/s Raghunath Dass Mulkhraj but at the same time he signed the notice as proprietor of M/s Raghunath Dass Mulkhraj. The Court held 237 that was a clear indication of the fact that M/s Raghunath Dass Mulkhraj was a proprietary concern and the plaintiffs was its proprietor. In repelling the contention that there was no identity of the person who gave the notice with the person who filed the suit the Court observed: "Whatever doubts that might have been possibly created in the mind of the recipient of the notice	 after going through the body of the notice as to the identity of the would be plaintiff	 the same would have been resolved after going through the notice as a whole. " There	 the plaintiff had averred in the plaint that he was carrying on his business under an assumed name and style of M/s Raghunath Dass Mulkhraj meaning thereby that the concern was a proprietary concern and that the name given to it was only a trade name. Me had also stated in the plaint that he had given a notice under s.80 of the Civil Procedure Code. In the written statement filed on behalf of the Dominion of India	 the validity of the notice issued was not challenged. Regarding the notice in question there was only an averment in the written statement that suit was barred by s.80 of the Code as no notice under that section appears to have been served on the Administration. In repelling the contention That the suit was bad for want of notice under s 80 of the Code	 the Court said: "The object of the notice contemplated by that section is to give to the concerned Governments and public officers opportunity to reconsider the legal position and to make amends or settle the claim	 if so advised without litigation. The legislative intention behind that section in our opinion is that public money and time should not be wasted on unnecessary litigation and the Government and the public officers should be given a reasonable opportunity to examine the claim made against them lest they should be drawn into avoidable litigations. The purpose of law is advancement of justice. The provisions in s.80	 Civil Procedure Code are not intended to be used as bootstraps against ignorant and illiterate persons. In this case we are concerned with a narrow question. Has the person mentioned in the notice as plaintiff brought the present suit or is he someone else ? This question has to be decided by reading the notice as a whole in a reasonable manner. " 238 In the ultimate analysis	 the question as to whether a notice under s.80 of the Code is valid or not is a question of judicial construction. The Privy Council and this Court have applied the rule of strict compliance in dealing with the question of identity of the person who issues the notice with the person who brings the suit. This Court has however adopted the rule of substantial compliance in dealing with the requirement that there must be identity between the cause of action and the reliefs claimed in the notice as well as in the plaint. As already stated	 the Court has held that notice under this section should be held to be sufficient if it substantially fulfils its object of informing the parties concerned of the nature of the suit to be filed. on this principle	 it has been held that though the terms of the section have to be strictly complied with	 that does not mean that the notice should be scrutinized in a pedantic manner divorced from common sense. The point to be considered is whether the notice gives sufficient information as to the nature of the claim such as would the recipient to avert the litigation. In the present case	 in the notice exhibit A 8 the name	 description and place of residence of the plaintiff Seth Lachman Dass	 the father of the plaintiffs	 was given but unfortunatory before filing the Suit he died and thereafter within the period of limitation the suit was instituted by his sons on the basis of the said notice. The notice exhibit A 8 undoubtedly fulfils the requirement of s.80 insofar as the cause of action and the relief claimed are concerned as they are absolutely the same as set out in the plaint. As stated in Dhian Singh Sobha Singh	 the notice must substantially fulfil its work of intimating the parties concerned generally of the nature of the suit intended to be filed and if it does so	 it would be sufficient compliance of the section as to the requirement that it should state the name	 description and place of residence of the plaintiff	 there must be identity of the person who issues the notice with the person who brings the suit Now so far as the name and description of the plaintiff concerned the notice gives the name as Seth Lachman Dass Gupta. The notice exhibit A 8 duly reached the concerned department and they dealt with the notice. It is not that the Government had no opportunity to examine the nature of the claim and decide whether its should accept or contest the claim The military authorities served a reply on Seth Lachman Dass before his death that his claim was not acceptable. There was no other alternative for Seth Lachman Dass but to have brought a suit for the enforcement of his claim. 239 If he could not file a suit due to his death	 his right to file the suit A devolved upon his heirs i.e. the plaintiffs. If the view taken by the High Court is allowed to stand	 great injustice would be done to the litigants in the matter of filing suits against the Government. If fresh notice is insisted upon in such cases	 the period of limitation to file a suit may expire in the meantime. Such a situation is not intended by the Code. The authorities relied upon by the High Court in non suiting the plaintiffs are of ancient vintage. In Mahadev Dattattraya Rajarshi 's case	 supra	 the Bombay High Court relying upon the decision of the Allahabad High Court in Buchan Singh	 held that the language of s.424 of the Code of 1882	 the predecessor of s.80 of the present Code which was substantially in the same terms	 was imperative and absolutely debarred the Courts from entertaining a suit without complying with the provisions of the section. In Buchan Singh 's case	 supra it was observed by the Allahabad High Court at p.191: "If we acceded to this contention	 it appears to us that we should be adding words to s.424 which find no place in it. It would be necessary to add after the words "name and place of abode of the intending plaintiff" some such words as "or of the party through whom such intending plaintiff claims. " The Court of first instance here tried to distinguish the decision in Buchan Singh on the ground that the word "intending" appearing in s.424 of the 1882 Code had been omitted from s.80 of the present Code	 and therefore the word "plaintiff ' j should be construed in a generic sense. The High Court however following the decision of the Bombay High Court in Mahadev Dattaraya Rajarshi held that the notice must contain the name of the actual plaintiff who could bring the suit adding that "the notice must be given by the person who becomes the plaintiff and by no other". We are afraid	 that is taking too technical a view of the matter. S.80 of the Code is but a part of the Procedure Code passed to provide the regulation and machinery	 by means of which the Courts may do justice between the parties. It is therefore merely a part of the adjective law and deals with procedure alone and must be interpreted in a manner so as to subserve and advance the cause of justice rather than to defeat it. In Sangram Singh vs Election Tribu 240 nal	 Kotah & Anr.	 Vivian Bose	 J. in his illuminating language dealing with the Code of Civil Procedure said: "It is procedure	 something designed to facilitate justice and further its ends: not a penal enactment for punishment and penalties; not a thing designed to trip people up. Too technical a construction of sections that leaves no room for reasonable elasticity of interpretation should therefore be guarded against (provided always that justice is done to both sides) lest the very means designed for the furtherance of justice be used to frustrate it. Our laws of procedure are based on the principle that "as far as possible	 no proceeding in a court of law should be allowed to be defecated on mere technicalities". Here	 all the requirements of s.80 of the Code were fulfilled. Before the suit was brought	 the Dominion of India received a notice of claim from Seth Lachman Dass. The whole object of serving a notice under 5.80 is to give the Government sufficient warning of the case which is going to be instituted against it was that the Government	 if it so wished	 settle the claim without litigation or afford restitution without recourse to a court of law. That requirement of s.80 was clearly fulfilled in the facts and circumstances of the present case. It is a matter of common experience that in a large majority of cases the Government or the public officer concerned make no use of the opportunity afforded by the section In most cases the notice given under s 80 remains unanswered till the expiration of two months provided by the section. It is also clear that in a large number of cases. as here	 the Government or the public officer utilised the section merely to raise technical defences contending either that no notice had been given or that the notice actually given did not comply with the requirements of the section. It is unfortunate that the defendants came forward with a technical plea that the suit was not maintainable at the instance of the plaintiffs	 the legal heirs of Seth Lachman Dass on the ground that no fresh notice had been given by them. This was obviously a technical plea calculated to defeat the just claim. Unfortunately	 the technical plea so raised prevailed with the High Court with the result that the plain tiffs have been deprived of their legitimate dues for the last 35 years	 241 The Law Commission in the Fourteenth Report	 volume 1 on the Code of Civil Procedure	 1908 at p.475 made a recommendation that s.80 of the Code should be deleted. It was stated as follows: "The evidence disclosed that in a large majority of cases	 the Government or the public officer made no use of the opportunity afforded by the section. In most cases the notice given under section 80 remained unanswered till the expiry of the period of two months provided by the section. It was also clear that in a large number of cases	 Governments and public officers utilized the section merely to raise technical defences contending either that no notice had been given or that the notice actually given did not comply with the requirements of the section. These technical defences appeared to have succeeded in a number of cases defeating the just claims of the citizens. " The Law Commission in the Twenty Seventh Report on the Code at pp.21 22 reiterated its earlier recommendation for deletion of s.80 and in the Fifty Fourth Report at p.56 fully concurred with the recommendation made earlier. In conformity with the recommendation of the Law Commission	 s.80 has undergone substantial changes. By s.27 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act	 1976 which was brought into effect from February 1	 1977	 the existing s.80 has been re numbered as s.80(1) and sub ss.(2) and (3) have been inserted. Sub s.(2). as inserted has been designed to give an urgent and immediate relief against the Government or the public officer with the leave of the Court. But the Court shall not grant relief in the suit	 whether interim or otherwise	 except after giving to the Government or public officer	 as the case may be	 a reasonable opportunity of showing cause in respect of the relief prayed for in the suit. Proviso to sub s.(2) enjoins that the Court shall	 if it is satisfied	 after hearing the parties that no urgent or immediate relief need be granted in the suit	 return the plaint for presentation to it after complying with the requirements of sub s.(1). Sub s.(3) as inserted by s.27 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act. 1976 reads as follows : "80(3). No suit instituted against the Government or against a public officer in respect of any act purporting to be done by such public officer in his official capacity shall be 242 dismissed merely by reason of any error or defect in the notice referred to in sub section (1) if in such notice (a) the name	 description and the residence of the plaintiff had been so given as to enable the appropriate authority or the public officer to identify the person serving the notice and such notice had been delivered or left at the office of the appropriate authority specified in sub section (1)	 and (b) the cause of action and the relief claimed by the plaintiff had been substantially indicated	 By sub.s.(3), Parliament has brought in the rule of substantial compliance. The present suit would be directly covered by sub s.(3) of s.80 so introduced if the suit had been brought after February 1, 1977. Unfortunately for the plaintiffs, s.97 of the Amendment Act provides that the amendment shall not apply to pending suit and the suits pending on February 1, 1977 have to be dealt as if such amendment had not been made. Nevertheless the Courts must have due regard to the change in law brought about by sub s.(3) of s.80 of the Code introduced by the Amendment Act w.e.f. February 1, 1977. Such a change has a legislative acceptance of the rule of substantial compliance laid down by this Court in Dhian Singh Sobha Singh and Raghunath Dass. As observed in Dhian Singh Sobha Singh 's case, supra, one must construe s.80 with some regard to common sense and to the object with which it appears to have been enacted. The decision in S.N. Dutt vs Union of India 's case, supra, does not accord with the view expressed by us and is therefore overruled . Before parting with the case we consider it necessary to refer to one more aspect. It has frequently come to our notice that the strict construction placed by the Privy Council in Bhagchand 's case, supra, which was repeatedly reiterated in subsequent cases, has led to a peculiar practice in some Courts. Where urgent relief is necessary the practice adopted is to file a suit without notice under s.80 and obtain interim relief and thereafter to serve a notice, withdraw the suit and institute a second suit after expiry of the period of the notice. We have to express our strong condemnation of this highly objectionable practice. We expect that the High Courts will take necessary steps to put a stop to such practice. 243 The result therefore is that the appeal succeeds and is allowed. The judgment and decree passed by the Allahabad High Court dated February 26, 1965 are set aside and those of the learned Civil Judge, Agra dated August 25, 1952 are restored with costs throughout. The plaintiffs shall be entitled to further interest on the decretal amount at 6% per annum from August 25, 1952, the date of the decree passed by the Civil Judge, Agra, till realization. S.R Appeal allowed. 
5486	Civil Appeal No. 2598 of 1987. 370 From the Judgment and order dated 26.5.1987 of the Karnataka A High Court in W.A. No. 615 of 1987. Dr. Y.S. Chitale and K.J. John for the Appellant. S.S. Javali, Ranjit Kumar and Dev Dass for the Respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Dutt, J. Special leave is granted. As elaborate submissions have been made at the preliminary hearing of the special leave petition on the merits of the case by both the parties, we proceed to dispose of the appeal on merits. This appeal involves the question as to the eligibility of the appellant for admission in the First Year MBBS Course of the Mysore University. The appellant passed the B.Sc. Examination of the Mysore University with Botany, Chemistry and Zoology securing 54.7% marks in the aggregate. She also passed the PUC in the year 1979 with Physics, Chemistry and Biology as optional subjects and obtained 43.1% marks in the aggregate. She sought for admission in a private Medical College or Institute. On her query, the second respondent, who is the Principal of the Institute, by his latter dated February 26, 1986 con firmed that the appellant was eligible for admission to MBBS Course. The relevant portion of the letter, as quoted in the special leave petition, is extracted below: With reference to your telegram	 I wish to write that candidates passing B.Sc. degree examination with Physics	 Chemistry and Biology or Chemistry	 Biology and Zoology as optional subjects	 are eligible	 provided such of these candidates who have passed with Chemistry	 Biology and Zoology should have passed Physics as optional subject in II year PUC or equivalent examination (Pre degree or Intermediate) or the additional Physics examination of any University or Institution recognised by the State Government. The candidate should have obtained 50% marks in the optional subjects in the B.Sc. degree examination. " It is the case of the appellant that on the basis of the said letter	 she joined the Institute in February	 1986. However	 by Memo dated 371 September 19	 1986 the second respondent intimated the appellant that her admission had not been approved by the University of Mysore. The relevant portion of the letter of the Registrar of the University of Mysore	 as quoted in the said Memo	 is given below: "She has secured 54% in B.Sc.	 but secured 43% in PUC. Hence she is not eligible. Her admission may be cancelled. " The appellant moved the Karnataka High Court by filing a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India challenging the validity of the cancellation of her admission in the First Year MBBS Course and praying for an order directing the respondents to allow her to continue as a student of the First Year MBBS Course. A learned Single Judge of the High Court by his judgment dated April 8	 1987 rejected the writ petition on the ground that the appellant not having obtained 50% marks in the aggregate in Physics	 Chemistry and Biology in the PUC examination	 was not eligible for admission to the MBBS Course. On appeal by the appellant	 the Division Bench of the High Court also took the same view and dismissed the appeal. Hence the present appeal by special leave. The Mysore University to which the Institute or College is affiliated has framed regulations regarding admission to MBBS Course for the academic year 1985 86. The relevant provisions of the said regulations are extracted below: " 1. ADMlSSlONS ELIGIBIL1TY: (a) The candidate shall have passed the Two Year PUC Examination conducted by the PUC Board	 Karnataka State with Physics	 Chemistry and Biology as optional subjects or any other examinations recognised as equivalent by the Mysore University and/or shall have passed the competitive examination conducted by the Karnataka Government for this purpose. or B.Sc. Examination of an Indian University provided that 372 he has passed the B.Sc. Examination with not less than two of the following subjects: Physics	 Chemistry	 Biology (Botany	 Zoology) and further that he has passed the earlier qualifying examinations with the following subjects: Physics	 Chemistry	 Biology and English. Provided that the candidate should have secured not less than 50% of the total marks in Physics	 Chemistry	 Biology subjects taken together at the qualifying and/or competitive examination. Provided further that in respect of candidates belonging to Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe the minimum marks required for admission shall be 40% in lieu of 50% for general candidats. (b) The candidate should have completed 17 years on the 31st December of the year of admission. " Under Regulation l(a)	 a candidate having passed the Two Year PUC or equivalent examination with Physics	 Chemistry and Biology as optional subjects or B.Sc. Examination of an Indian University with Physics	 Chemistry	 Biology will be eligible for admission in the First Year MBBS Course subject to this that the candidate should have secured not less than 50% of the total marks in Physics	 Chemistry and Biology taken together at the qualifying and/or competitive examination. It follows	 therefore	 that a candidate has to secure 50% of the total marks in Physics	 Chemistry and Biology taken together in the PUC or an equivalent examination	 which is a condition precedent to her eligibility for admission in the First Year MBBS Course. The High Court has rightly observed that as the appellant did not secure 50% of the total marks in Physics	 Chemistry and Biology in the PUC Examination	 she was not eligible for admission in the First Year MBBS Course also rightly overruling the contention of the appellant that the marks obtained by her in Physics in the PUC Course should be added to the marks obtained by her in the B.Sc. Examination so that it would work out to 50% of the tot. marks in Physics	 Chemistry and Biology. Under Regulation 1(a)	 a candidate after passing B.Sc. Exami 373 nation and seeking admission in the seats reserved for B.Sc. candidates has to secure 50% of the total marks in Physics	 Chemistry and Biology in the PUC Examination. It is true that the appellant has obtained 54% marks in the B.Sc. Examination	 but she had failed to obtain 50% marks in the aggregate in the PUC Examination in Physics	 Chemistry and Biology. In the circumstances	 she was not eligible for admission ill the First Year MBBS Course. We are afraid	 the Karnataka Medical Colleges (Selection of Candidates for Admission to 1 MBBS) Rules	 1985	 hereinafter referred to as 'the said Rules '	 are not applicable to seats in Private Colleges other than Government seats	 which is apparent from Sub rule (2) of rule 1. Sub rule (2) of rule 1 provides as follows: "R.1(2) These rules shall be applicable to the selection of candidates made on or after the date of commencement of these rules	 for admission to the I year MBBS Course in the State of Karnataka in respect of all the seats in Government Colleges and the Government seats in the Private Colleges	 as indicated in the Schedule to these Rules. " Dr. Chitale	 learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant	 has placed much reliance upon the Government Order dated August 1	 1984 annexing a copy of the said Rules. The relevant portion of the Government Order is as follows: "O R D E R Accordingly	 after considering the matter	 Government of Karnataka hereby direct that Rules for selection of candidates for admission on to I M.B.B.S. Course in the Government and Private Medical Colleges for the academic year 1985 86 and onwards shall be as in Annexure to this order." In the Government order	 no doubt	 Private Medical Colleges have been mentioned	 but it does not follow that the said Rules would apply to all candidates in the Private Medical Colleges. Sub rule (2) of rule 1 of the said Rules	 which has been extracted above	 clearly shows that the said Rules would apply to only Government seats in the Private Colleges and	 as such	 in the Government order Private Colleges have been mentioned. There is	 therefore	 no substance in the contention made on behalf of the appellant that the said Rules would also be applicable to the appellant. 374 Even assuming that the said Rules are applicable to the case of A the appellant	 still the appellant will not be eligible for admission in the First Year MBBS Course in view of sub rule (5) of rule 3 of the said Rules	 which provides	 inter alia	 that a person who does not belong to any of the Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes	 he has to obtain 50% of marks in PUC or equivalent examination in Physics	 Chemistry and Biology as optional subjects. Thus	 the appellant was not eligible for admission in the First Year MBBS Course of Mysore University. The High Court was	 therefore	 right in overruling the contention of the appellant that she was eligible for admission in the First Year MBBS Course. Now the question is whether the appellant should be allowed to continue her studies in the MBBS Course. By virtue of the interim order of the High Court	 the appellant completed the First Year MBBS Course and by virtue of the interim order passed by this Court	 the appellant appeared in the First Year MBBS Examination. It has been strenuously urged by the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the University that as the appellant was not eligible for admission and was illegally admitted by the Institute in violation of the eligibility rules of the University	 the appellant should not be allowed to continue her studies in the MBBS Course under the University. In support of that contention	 much reliance has been placed by the learned Counsel on a decision of this Court in A.P. Christians Medical Educational Society vs Government of Andhra Pradesh	 ; What happened in that case was that the appellant Society without being affiliated to the University and despite strong protests and warnings of the University admitted students to the Medical College in the First Year MBBS Course in total disregard of the provisions of the A.P. Education Act	 the Osmania University Act and the regulations of the Osmania University. Some students	 who were admitted to the Medical College	 filed a writ petition before this Court. While dismissing the writ petition of the students	 this Court observed as follows: "Shri Venugopal suggested that we might issue appropriate directions to the University to protect the interest of the students. We do not think that we can possibly accede to the request made by Shri Venugopal on behalf of the student. Any direction of the nature sought by Shri Venu gopal would be in clear transgression of the provisions of the University Act and the regulations of the University. We cannot by our fiat direct the University to disobey the statute to which it owes its existence and the regulations 375 made by the University itself. We cannot imagine anything more destructive of the rule of law than a direction by the court to disobey the laws. " It was further observed by this Court as follows: "We regret that the students who have been admitted into the college have not only lost the money which they must have spent to gain admission into the college	 but have also lost one or two years of precious time virtually jeopardising their future careers. But that is a situation which they have brought upon themselves as they sought and obtained admission in the college despite the warnings issued by the University from time to time. " It appears from the observations extracted above that the students were themselves to blame	 for they had clear knowledge that the College was not affiliated to the University and in spite of the warning of the University they sought for the admission in the College in the First Year MBBS Course and were admitted. In that context this Court made the above observations. We may refer to a later decision of this Court in Rajendra Prasad Mathur vs Karnataka University	 ; In that case	 the condition for eligibility for admission to B.E. Degree Course of the Karnataka University was that the students seeking admission should have passed the two year pre University Examination of the pre University Education Board	 Bangalore	 or an examination held by any other Board or University recognised as equivalent to it. The appellants	 in that case	 were admitted to certain private Engineering Colleges for the B.E. Degree Course upon payment of capitation fees	 although they were not eligible for admission as the Higher Secondary Examination held by the Secondary Education Board	 Rajasthan	 passed by some of the appellants and the first B.Sc. Examination of Rajasthan and Udaipur University passed by the remaining appellants	 were not recognised as equivalent to the two year pre University Education Board	 Bangalore. While dismissing the appeals of the students on the ground that they were not eligible for admission in the engineering colleges	 Bhagwati	 C.J. who delivered the judgment of the Court	 observed as follows: "We accordingly endorse the view taken by the learned Judge and affirmed by the Division Bench of the High 376 Court. But the question still remains whether we should allow the appellants to continue their studies in the respective Engineering Colleges in which they were admitted. It was strenuously pressed upon us on behalf of the appellants that under the orders initially of the learned Judge and thereafter of this Court they have been pursuing their course of study in the respective Engineering Colleges and their admissions should not now be disturbed because if they are now thrown out after a period of almost four years since their admission their whole future will be blighted. Now it is true that the appellants were not eligible for admission to the Engineering Degree Course and they had no legitimate claim to such admission. But it must be noted that the blame for their wrongful admission must lie more upon the Engineering Colleges which granted admission than upon the appellants. It is quite possible that the appellants did not know that neither the Higher Secondary Examination of the Secondary Education Board	 Rajasthan nor the first year B.Sc. examination of the Rajasthan and Udaipur Universities was recognised as equivalent to the Pre University Examination of the Pre University Education Board	 Bangalore. The appellants being young students from Rajasthan might have presumed that since they had passed the first year B.Sc. examination of the Rajasthan or Udaipur University or in any event the Higher Secondary Examination of the Secondary Education Board	 Rajasthan they were eligible for admission. The fault lies with the Engineering Colleges which admitted the appellants because the Principal of these Engineering Colleges must have known that the appellants were not eligible for admission and yet for the sake of capitation fee in some of the cases they granted admission to the appellants. We do not see why the appellants should suffer for the sins of the managements of these Engineering Colleges. We would	 therefore	 notwithstanding the view taken by us in this judgment allow the appellants to continue their studies in the respective Engineering Colleges in which they were granted admission. But we do feel that against the erring Engineering Colleges the Karnataka University should take appropriate action because the managements of these Engineering Colleges have not only admitted students ineligible for admission but thereby deprived an equal number of eligible students from getting admission to the 377 Engineering Degree Course. We also endorse the directions given by the learned Judge in the penultimate paragraph of his judgment with a view to preventing admission of ineligible students. " This Court was	 therefore	 of the view that as the students were innocent and were admitted to the Colleges for the sake of capitation fee in some cases	 they should not be penalised and should be allowed to continue their studies in the respective Engineering Colleges in which they were granted admission. The facts of the instant case are	 more or less	 similar to the Rajendra Prasad Mathur 's case (supra). It has been already noticed that on the appellant s query ' the Principal of the Institute by his letter dated February 26	 1986 informed her that she was eligible for admission in the First Year MBBS Course. It was	 inter alia	 stated in the letter that the candidate should have obtained 5()% marks in the optional subjects in the B.Sc. Examination. There is no dispute that the appellant had obtained 50% marks in those subjects in the B.Sc. Examination. The appellant was	 therefore. quite innocent and she was quite justified in relying upon the information supplied to her by none else than the Principal of the Institute in the said letter in regard to the eligibility of the admission in the First Year MBBS Course. In the circumstances	 we do not think that we shall be justified in penalising the appellant by not allowing her to continue her studies in the MBBS Course. Prima facie it was the fault of the Principal of the Institute but	 in our view	 the statement that was made by him in his said letter to the appellant as to the eligibility of the appellant for admission in the MBBS Course	 was on a bona fide interpretation of the regulations framed by the Mysore University for admission to MBBS Course for the academic year 1985 86	 which to some extent suffer from ambiguity. The regulations should have been more clear and specific. Be that as it may	 following the decision of this Court in Rajendra Prasad Mathur 's case (supra) while we dismiss the appeal. we direct that the appellant shall be allowed to prosecute her studies in the MBBS Course	 and that her result for the First Year MBBS Examination be declared within two weeks from date. There will	 however	 be no order as to costs. H.L.C. Appeal allowed.

Summary:
The plaintiff 's father Seth Lachhman Dass Gupta entered into a contract with the Governor General in Council for the supply of charcoal to the Military Supply Depot	 Agra and received payments for the same at the contractual rate from time to time. The contract contained an escalation clause viz. cl.8 to the effect that in case the price of charcoal was increased by more than 10% of the stipulated rate during the subsistence of the contract	 the contractor would be entitled to the price at the higher rate. During the period of the contract	 the rate of charcoal went up continuously. The military authorities paid at the enhanced rate for the part of supplies while for the rest they refused to pay more than the contractual rate. He accordingly served a notice to the Government under section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure	 1908 making a claim for payment of a sum of Rs. 20	710.50 p. in terms of clause 8 of the contract being the difference between the enhanced rate and the contractual rate for the supplies paid for. But before he could bring the suit against the Government	 he died. Thereupon	 the respondents brought a suit as his legal heirs and successors claiming the amount. The defendants contested the claim inter alia on the ground that the notice given by Seth Lachhman Dass could not ensure for the benefit of the plaintiff 's and therefore the suit was bad for want of notice under section 80 of the Code. The Court of first instance held that no further notice under section 80 was necessary as the notice served by the plaintiff 's father Seth Lachhman Dass must inure to their benefit. on appeal	 the High Court reversed his decision on the point and held that the notice given by the plaintiff 's father was insufficient and was not a valid notice under section 80 of the Code insofar as the plaintiff 's were concerned. Against the judgment	 the plaintiff 's preferred an appeal by special leave. Allowing the appeal	 the Court 230 ^ HELD: 1. The question as to whether a notice under section 80 is valid or not is a question of judicial construction. section 80 of the Code is but a part of the . Procedure Code passed to provide the regulation and machinery	 by means of which the courts may do justice between the parties. It is therefore merely a part of the adjective law and deals with procedure alone and must be interpreted in a manner so as to subserve and advance the cause of justice rather than to defeat it. As far as possible	 no proceedings in a court of law should be allowed to be defeated on mere technicalities. This is the principle on which ours laws of procedure are based. [238A	 239G H	 240A C] 2. The whole object of serving a notice under section 80 is to give the Government sufficient warning of the case which is going to be instituted against it and that the Government	 if it so wished can settle the claim without litigation or afford restitution without recourse to a court of law. Though the terms of section 80 have to be strictly complied with	 that does not mean that the notice should be scrutinised in a pedantic manner divorced from common sense. The point to be considered is whether the notice gives sufficient information as to the nature of the claim such as would enable the recipient to avert the litigation. If the notice substantially fulfills its work of intimating the parties 'concerned generally of the nature of the suit intended to be filed	 it would be sufficient compliance of the section. While interpreting the pre amended section the courts must have due regard to the change in law brought about by sub section (3) of section 80	 which shows legislative acceptance of the rule of substantial compliance instead of strict compliance. [240D E	 242C E] Sangram Singh vs Election Tribunal Kotah relied on. In the present case the requirement of section 80 that there must be identity between the cause of action and the relief claimed in the notice as well as in the plaint	 15 fulfilled. As regards the requirement of identity of the person who issues the notice with the person who brings the suit	 in this case the notice contained the name of the original claimant i.e. the father of the plaintiffs. The . notice reached the concerned department of the Government where the Government had opportunity to ' examine the nature of the claim and decide whether it should accept or contest the claim. The concerned Government authorities served a reply on the plaintiff 's father that his claim was not acceptable. There after he died and his right to file the suit for enforcement of the claim having devolved upon his heirs i.e. the plaintiff 's	 the plaintiffs filed the suit for enforcement of the same claim. In the circumstances	 if section 80 is held to have not been complied with	 as done by the High Court	 great injustice would be done to the plaintiffs in the matter of filing suits to the Government inasmuch as in case of insistence on fresh notice	 the period of limitation to file the suit would expire in the meantime. Such a situation is not intended by the Code. Thus the requirement of section 80 was clearly fulfilled in this case but the High Court having allowed the technical plea of the defendants	 the plaintiffs have been deprived of their legitimate claim for at least 35 years. [238D H	 239A C	 240G H] S.N. Dutt vs Union of India	 [1962]1 S.C.R. 560; Mahadev Dattatraya Rajshri vs Secretary of States for India ; and Bachchu Singh vs Secretary of State for India in Council	 	 overruled. 231 Raghunath Dass vs Union of India	 ; ; Union of India vs A Jeewan Ram A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 905; State of Madras vs C.P. Agencies	 A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 1309 and Amar Nath Gogra vs Union of India	[1964]1 S.C.R. 651	 affirmed. Bhagchand Dagadusa vs Secretary of State of India in Council	 [1927] I.A. 338; Vallayan Chettiar vs Government of the Province of Madras [1947] I.A. 74: and Government of the Province of Bombay vs Pestonji Ardeshir Wadia [1949] 76 I.A. 57; referred to.