Case ID: 5780

Judgment:
ivil Appeal No. 2597 of 1988. From the Judgment and Order dated 17.3.1988 of the Calcutta High Court in Matter No. 2462 of 1987. Soli J. Sorabji	 R. Mahapatra	 B.P. Singh and L.P. Agarwala for the Appellant. S.K. Kapoor	 section Dube	 Chatterji and Mrs. Indra Sawhney for the Respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SABYASACHI MUKHARJI	 J. Special leave granted. The appeal is disposed of by the judgment herein. On or about 7th August	 1963 Jayshree Textiles & Industries Ltd. (hereinafter called 'the Jayshree ') was inducted as a tenant in respect of a godown in Calcutta on groundfloor at a monthly rent of Rs. 151 per month payable according to the English calendar month w.e. f. 1.8. 1963 exclusive of electric charges. Such induction was by the predecessor in title of the present appellant. The said rent of Rs.151 p.m. was later enhanced from time to time and the last rent was Rs.225 p.m. On or about 21st July	 1975	 the High Court at Calcutta	 in Company Petition No. 161/76 connected with company application No. 70/76 filed by the Jayshree	 approved the PG NO 207 scheme of amalgamation whereby the Jayshree merged in the respondent Company. It is alleged that on or about 4th July	 1985	 the appellant for the first time came to know that the said godown was in occupation of Indian Rayon Corporation Ltd and	 hence	 a notice to quit was issued. On or about 11th July	 1985	 the respondent by its letter intimated the appellant. that Jayshree was amalgamated with the respondent in accordance with the scheme sanctioned by the High Court at Calcutta on 21st July	 1976. On 29th August	 1985	 a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act	 read with Section l3(d) of the W.B. Premises Tenancy Act	 1956 (hereinafter called 'the Act ')	 to quit	 vacate and hand over vacant possession on the last date of the following month	was issued to Jayshree. Thereafter	 on lst December	 1985 the appellant filed a suit for eviction in the City Civil Court at Calcutta against the Jayshree and the respondent herein. On 25th March	 1986	 the respondent filed a Title Suit No. 545/86 under Order 39(1) and (2) of the Civil Procedure Code praying for temporary injunction restraining the appellant from disconnecting electricity in	 the said premises. It is alleged and was also alleged before the High Court that the defendant No. 2 in the suit in the City Civil Court	 took 15 adjournments to file written statement between March 1986 to May 1987. On about 6th July	 1987	 the appellant filed an application under Clause 13 of the Letters Patent in the High Court at Calcutta	 praying for transfer of the two suits on the ground that the respondent had adopted dilatory tactics and had taken several adjournments and. furthers that the original records relating to amalgamation are available in the High Court. Rule nisi was issued by the High Court. On 10th October	 1987 the High Court passed the following order: The Court: By consent of the parties	 this application for transfer of the suit under Clause 13 of the Letters Patent is treated as on days ' list and is disposed of by the following order: By consent of the parties the title suit being Title Suit No. 345 of 1986 between Indian Rayon Corporation Ltd. and Abhay Singh Surana pending before the learned Judge 's bench in the City Civil Court and the ejectment suit being Ejectment Suit No. 1088 of 1985 between Abhay Singh Surana and Jayshree Textiles & Industries Ltd. and another pending in the City Civil Court are removed and transferred to this PG NO 208 Court and to be entertained and tried by this Court in its extraordinary original civil jurisdiction	 the records be transferred to this Court by 16th September 1987. The Registrar	 Original Side	 shall communicate order to the Registrar	 City Civil Court. If necessary	 at the cost of the petitioner a special messenger is to be deputed for the purpose of transfer of the records from the City Civil Court to this Court. Let the two suits appear in the for settlement on 17th September	 1987. " It appears that the suits appeared before the learned Judge upon mentioning on 15th December	 1987. It was represented that the suits were transferred to the High Court only on the understanding that the suits would be settled. It was further represented that the effort settle the suits had failed and	 hence	 the learned Single judge of the High Court fixed a date for hearing of the two suits. On 17th February	 1988	 the respondent filed an application before the learned Trial Judge in Calcutta for recalling the order of transfer dated 10.10.1987. On 17th March	 1987	 the court passed the following order: "The Court: It appears that on 10th September	 1987	 an order was passed directing transfer of the suit to this Court so that the parties could settle the matter in this Court. It has been stated by Mr. Ranjan Dev	 Advocate	 that there is no possibility of settlement and the suit should be heard. In that view of the matter	 let the suit be heard by the appropriate Court. The order dated 10th September	 1987 is hereby recalled. Let there also be an order in terms of prayer [b] of the petition. Since the suit is being re trans ferred to the City Civil Court	 this Court cannot pass any order as to the prayers made for deposit of rent. Liberty is given to the parties to make an appropriate application before the appropriate Court for such a direction. " Aggrieved thereby	 the petitioner had filed a special leave petition and leave was granted herein. That is how	this appeal is here. In order to appreciate the contentions urged in this case	 it is imperative to refer to Clause 13 of the Letters Patent of 1865 of the High Court	 which reads as follows: "And we do further ordain	 that the said High Court of Judicature at Fort William in Bengal shall have power to PG NO 209 remove	 and to tr and determine	 as a Court of extra ordinary original jurisdiction of any court	 whether within or without the Bengal Division of the Presidency of Fort William. subject to its superintendence. when the said High Court shall think proper to do so	 either on the agreement of thethe parties to that effect	 or for	r purposes of justice. the reasons for so doing being recorded on the proceeding of the said High Court. " The aforesaid clause has been the subJect matter of various adjudications and interpretations by the High Court. It enables the High Court to exercise the extraordinary ' original civil jurisdiction. The Letters Patent contemplates two contingencies for the High Court to exercise extraordinary jurisdiction. namely. on agreement of the parties to that effect. the suits be transferred and	 secondly	 for the purpose of justice. It further stipulates that the reasons for so doing to be recorded on the proceedings in the High Court. In this case. apparently the suits were transferred by agreement of the parties. There is. however	 great deal of difference as to what that agreement was. On behalf of the appellant	 it is contended that there was simply an agreement to have the two suits transferred to the High Court for quick and expeditious disposal. It was further	 asserted that in view of the long delay in filling the written statements	 it was	 therefore	 advisable to have the suits disposed by the High Court. On the other hand	 it is seriously contended that the agreement was that the suits would be settled in the High Court. It appears that some such representations had been made to the learned Judge that the suits would be settled. This	 however. the appellant disputes. The suits have been transferred for settlement. As the agreement to settle the suits has not fructified	 the respondent does not want the suits to be tried in the High Court. The appellant states that there was no such agreement that the suits would be settled. There was	 undoubtedly	 a possibility for the suits being settled and the counsel for the appellant stated that the suits could more easily be settled in the High Court. On the basis that there was some such kind of agreement and it is desirable that the suits should be tried by an appropriate Court having jurisdiction	 the High Court has remitted the suits back to the City Civil Court. There is no doubt that the City Civil Court is the appropriate Court and that there existed the agreement which	 as recorded in the order of the Court	 does not indicate that it was on the basis that the suits would be settled. There PG NO 210 are factors indicating that the purpose of justice would be met if the suits are tried in the High Court. Undoubtedly	 the written statement has been long delayed in the suit in 1985 and the same has not yet been filed. The disposal ot the suits by the High Court	 would serve the purpose of justice. It would shorten litigation in the sense that there would be lesser number of appeals to the higher Court and the possibility of settlement is there in the High Court more than anywhere else. Suits are likely to be more expeditiously disposed of under the supervision of the High Court Judge than before the learned City Civil Court or the Court subordinate to High Court. Hence	 even though initially the agreement to transfer might have been on the basis that the suits should be settled but the agreement to transfer was note unequivocal. The possibility of settlement might have been the motivation. But the High Court has	 undoubtedly	 for the purpose of justice rightly power to dispose of the suits and in the facts of this case	 in our opinion	 having once transferred the suits	 it would be just and fair and would also serve the purpose of justice that the suits should continue to be disposed of by the High Court. The purpose of justice must be determined by reference to the circumstances of each case and the balance of convenience having regard to those circumstances	 is one of the matters for consideration. Counsel for the respondent contended under article 136 of the Constitution that it is not an order which should be interfered with. We are unab1e to agree. It is true that the suits are at a preliminary stage but it is also true that for the purpose of justice the Court	 if possible	 must oversee the administration of justice by the different Courts and the orders passed therein by the High Courts as well as the City Civil Courts. In that view of the matter we think that the purpose of justice would be served by directing expeditious disposal of these suits by the High Court. In the premises the order of the High Court is set aside and let these two suits be heard by the High Court one after the other. The written statement as mentioned hereinbefore	 has not been filed. The written statement	 if any	 by the respondent may be filed within four weeks from today and further directions for expeditious disposal may be obtained from the learned Judge taking these suits. Let these suits appear before the appropriate Bench in the High Court of Calcutta. The appeal is disposed of as aforesaid. No order as to costs. N	P.V. Appeal disposed of.

Summary:
The appellant let out his godown to a Textile company	 which was subsequently amalgamated with the respondent Company	 under a scheme of amalgamation approved by the High Court. On August 29	 1985 the appellant issued a notice to the erstwhile company under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act read with section 13(6) of West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act	 1956 to quit and hand over vacant possession of the godown. Thereafter he filed a suit for eviction in the City Civil Court against the erstwhile Company and the respondent Company. The respondent also filed a suit under Order 39(I) and (2) of the Civil Procedure Code for temporary injunction restraining the appellant from disconnecting electricity in the said premises. The appellant filed an application in the High Court under clause 13 of the Letters Patent for transfer of the two suits on the ground that the respondent had adopted dilatory tactics and had taken several adjournments to file written statement	 and that the original records relating to amalgamation were available in the High Court. By consent of the parties	 the High Court transferred these suits to itself for trying in its extraordinary original civil jurisdiction. PG NO 205 When the suits appeared before the Single Judge	 it was represented that the suits were transferred to the High Court only on the understanding that the suits would be settled and that the efforts to settle the suit had failed. Hence	the Judge fixed a date for hearing of the two suits. On February 17	 l9S8 the respondent filed an application for recalling the order of transfer. Accordingly	 the High Court recalled its earlier order and retransferred them to the City Civil Court. Aggrieved	 the appellant filed an appeal by special leave	 contending that there was simply an agreement to have the suits transferred to the High Court for quick and expeditious disposal	 in view of the long delay in filing written statements. The Respondent	 however	 contended that the agreement was that the suits would be settled in the High Court. Disposing of the appeal	 HELD: 1.1 Clause 13 of the Letters Patent enables the High Court to exercise the extraordinary original civil jurisdiction. The Letters Patent contemplates two contingencies for the High Court to exercise extraordinary jurisdiction	 namely	 on agreement of the parties to that effect	 the suits be transferred and	 secondly	 for the purpose of justice. It further stipulates that the reasons for so doing to be recorded on the proceedings in the High Court. [209C D) 1.2 The disposal of the suits by the High Court would serve the purpose of justice. It would shorten litigation in the sense that there would be lesser number of appeals to the higher Court and the possibility of settlement is there in the High Court more than anywhere else. Suits are likely to be more expeditiously disposed of under the supervision of the High Court Judge than before the City Civil Court or the Court subordinate to High Court. [2l0B] 1.3 The purpose of justice must be determined by reference to the circumstances of each case and the balance of convenience having regard to those circumstances	 is one of the matters for consideration. [2l0D] In the instant case	 even though initially the agreement to transfer might have been on the basis that the suits would be settled but the agreement to transfer was not PG NO 206 unequivocal. The possibility of settlement might have been the motivation. But the High Court has	 undoubtedly	 for the purpose of justice	 rightly power to dispose of the suits. Having once transferred the suits	 it would be just and fair and would also serve the purpose of justice that the suits should continue to be disposed of by the High Court. [210C D] Though the suits are at a preliminary stage	 but for the purpose of justice	 the Court must oversee the administration of justice by different Courts and orders passed High Court as well as City Civil Courts. [210E] Therefore	 the purpose of justice would be served by directing expeditious disposal of the suits by the High Court. [210F]