Case ID: 2401

Judgment:
iminal Appeal No. 65 of 1966	 Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated September 20	 1965 of the Allahabad High Court in Criminal Misc. Contempt Application No. 76 of 1964. R. K. Garg and section C. Agarwal	 for the appellants. The respondent did not appear. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Vaidialingam	 J. This appeal	 by special leave	 is directed against the judgment and order of the Allahabad High Court. dated September 20	 1965	 passed in Criminal Miscellaneous Contempt Application No. 76 of 1964	 finding the appellant 177 guilty	 of having committed contempt of Court	 and sentencing each of them	 to pay a fine of Rs. 5001 . They have also been directed to pay the costs	 in the contempt proceedings. The first appellant died	 during the pendency of this appeal. As a fine has been imposed	 against him	 in addition to the liability to pay costs	 his widow has been brought on record	 as his legal representative	 and allowed to continue these proceedings. The circumstances	 under which the contempt proceedings came to be initiated	 in the High Court	 may be briefly indicated. The second respondent	 herein	 Sri V. P. Singh	 is an advocate	 practising at Azamgarh	 and he was a member of the Congress Organisation	 at the material time. He stood for election	 for membership of the Prarambhik (primary) Congress Committee	 of Tarwa	 in the District of Azamgarh	 held on April 10	 1964. His opponent was one Badri Singh. In that election. Badri Singh .was declared elected. The second respondent filed	 on April 16	 1964	 a suit	 No. 132 of 1964	 in the Court of the City Munsif. Azamgarh	 for having the election of Badri Singh	 declared void and inoperative. He had alleged various irregularities	 regarding the conduct of the said election. Along with the suit	 he had also filed an application	 for injunction	 restraining the District Election Officer	 and other Officers	 from holding elections for membership of the District Congress Committee. He had also asked for an injunction	 restraining Badri Singh	 from taking part in the elections	 for membership of the District Congress Committee. The City Munsif had granted the interim injunction	 on April 18	 1964. Badri Singh	 on being served with this interim order	 filed an application	 dated April 21	 1964	 before the City Munsif	 praying for vacating the order of interim injunction. At the time	 when the election that was challenged	 by the 2nd respondent	 took place	 Sri Ajit Prasad Jain was the President of the Uttar Pradesh Congress Committee	 Shri Govind Sahai was the General Secretary of the said Committee and Sri Rameshwar Narain Singh was the General Secretary of the District Congress Committee	 Azamgarh. It appears that the Working Committee of the Indian National Congress bad passed a resolution. dated December 4/5	 1960	 the substance of which was that any member of the Congress	 having any grievance	 in respect of any action taken	 or decision given	 by a Congress Organization. should take advantage of the tribunals provided	 to seek redress by way of appeal or reference	 and that such matters should not be taken to law Courts. That resolution further provided that initiating of such litigation	 and securing of ex parte interlocutory orders	 against the Congress Committee and Congress authorities. 178 was highly detrimental to the discipline of the Organisation	 and its smooth working. The resolution wound up	 by saying that the Working	 Committee resolved that any member	 who instituted a suit or other proceeding in law Courts against any Congress Committee or Official	 did so at the risk of being considered guility of gross indiscipline and of being summarily	 and without any further notice	 removed from membership of the Congress	 by order of the Provincial Congress Committees concerned	 or the Working Committee. In view of this resolution	 Sri Gulzari Lal Nanda	 who is stated to have been delegated the authority of the Working Committee	 in respect of organisational elections in Uttar Pradesh	 issued a directive	 dated April 20	 1964	 to the President	 Uttar Pradesh Congress Committee	 Sri Ajit Prasad Jain	 to take immediate action against those members	 who had gone to Courts	 in regard to Congress organisational elections	 anywhere in Uttar Pradesh. Accordingly	 Sri Jain	 on April 21	 1964	 sent out circular letters to all the District Returning Officers in Uttar Pradesh	 expelling those Congressmen	 from membership of the Congress	 who had filed suits	 in Courts	 concerning organizational elections. Sri Govind Sahai and Sri Rameshwar Narain Singh	 the appellants herein	 also sent	 each of them	 a letter to the District Returning Officer	 expelling the second respondent	 and removing his name	 from the membership of the Congress. This decision was duly com municated	 to the second respondent. To resume the narrative	 regarding the proceedings	 connect ed with the suit	 the application for vacating the injunction	 filed by Badri Singh	 came up for final hearing	 before the City Munsif	 on April 25	 1964	 when the second appellant	 filed an affidavit	 mentioning the fact that the second respondent	 herein	 who was the plaintiff in the suit	 had been expelled	 from the Congress Organisation. In view of the fact that the very foundation	 for initiating action	 vanished	 the City Munsif dismissed the injunction application	 on April 27	 1964	 on the ground that the second respondent was no longer a member of the Congress Organisation. The second respondent moved an application	 before the City Munsif	 on May 9	 1964	 for taking proceedings in contempt	 against the appellant and Sri Ajit Prasad Jain	 but that application was dismissed on May 30	 1964	 on the ground that the present appellants were not parties to the suit. The second respondent filed Criminal Miscellaneous Contempt Application No. 76 of 1964	 in the High Court. After setting out the circumstances	 under which he filed the suit	 and the order of expulsion	 passed against him	 the second respondent alleged that the act of the appellants	 along with Sri Ajit Prasad Jain	 had directly interfered with the normal course of justice	 by hampering the progress of the suit. 179 Sri Ajit Prasad Jain	 and the appellants	 filed written statements	 containing identical pleas. Their contention was that the second respondent was bound by the rules and regulations	 of the Indian National Congress	 and that they had full right and justification	 for expelling him	 and removing his name	 from the membership of the Congress. That action	 expelling the second respondent	 they contended	 had been taken on the strength of the resolution of the Congress Working Committee	 referred to earlier. They had further contended that their object	 in enforcing the Circular	 dated December 4/5	 1950	 was only to enforce discipline in the Congress	 and not with a view to render the second respondent 's suit infructuous	 or interfere with the Court 's proceedings. They ultimately pleaded that none of them were guility of any contempt of Court. So far as Sri Ajit Prasad Jain is concerned	 it is seen that. after filing his written statement	 he was appointed Governor of Kerala. The High Court	 in view of article 361	 clauses (2) and (3)	 held that the proceedings could not be continued against that party	 and hence discharged the rule. Regarding the appellants	 the High Court held that their conduct directly tended to interfere with the suit proceedings	 pending in Court	 initiated by the second respondent	 and	 as such	 amounted to contempt of Court	 of the City Munsif	 Azamgarh. In view of the fact that no expression of regret was made	 by them	 the High Court sentenced each of the appellants	 to pay a fine of Rs. 5001 and also pay costs of the State		 as well as the second respondent	 herein. Mr. R. K. Garg	 learned counsel for the appellants	 urged that the second respondent was a member of the Congress Organisation	 and he was bound by the Resolutions	 passed by the same. The appellants had only acted	 in accordance with the directions	 given by the appropriate officers of the Congress organisation	 and they were bound to obey the instructions	 given to them. When	 in the course of the discharge of their duties	 they had been directed to enforce the resolution	 of the Congress dated December 415	 1950	 they issued the Circulars	 expelling the second respondent	 from the Congress. Their object	 in expelling the second respondent	 was not in any manner intended to interfere with the proceedings	 pending in the suit. The fact that the injunction application was dismissed	 because it became infructuous	 by the second respondent having ceased to be a member of the Congress Organisation	 was certainly not a circumstance which could be put against the appellants	 in the matter of issuing the circular	 concerned. There has been no appearance	 on behalf of the respondents. After giving due consideration	 to the contentious	 urged by the 180 learned counsel	 for the appellants	 we are satisfied that the High Court has rightly found the appellants guilty of contempt of Court. The original first appellant	 Sri Govind Sahai	 and the second appellant	 had each sent letters to the District Returning Officer	 expelling the second respondent	 and removing his name	 from the membership of the Congress. There is no dispute	 about this fact. It is also not disputed that the second appellant filed an affidavit	 in Suit No. 132 of 1964	 drawing the attention of the Court	 to the order of expulsion	 from membership	 passed as against the second respondent	 and it is substantially in view of this that the application	 for temporary injunction	 was dismissed. We are of opinion '	 that these acts are of each a nature	 as to interfere with	 or prejudice the second respondent in the proceedings	 connected with this suit. Oswald	 in his book 'Contempt of Court '	 Third Edition	 says	 at p. 6; "To speak generally	 Contempt of Court may be said to be constituted by any conduct that tends to bring the authority and administration of. the law into disrespect or disregard	 or to interfere with or prejudice parties litigant or their witnesses during the litigation. " This statement	 has been quoted	 with approval	 by Das	 J.	 who delivered the majority judgment	 in the decision	 reported as Pratap Singh vs Gurbaksh Singh(1). More or less	 under similar circumstances	 this Court	 in the said decision	 has held that certain actions	 taken by the officers therein	 amounted to contempt of Court. From the facts	 noted in that decision	 it emerges that an Officer of the Forest Department	 against whom an order for recovery of certain amounts	 had been made	 had instituted a suit for having that order declared null and void. When the summons in the suit	 was served on the State Government	 the Under Secretary to the Government	 in the concerned Department	 sent a memorandum	 to the Chief Conservator of Forests	 drawing his attention	 to a Circular letter	 issued by the Government	 on January 25	 1953. In that Circular letter	 the Government had indicated that any attempt	 by a Government servant	 to seek decision	 in a Court of law	 in respect of matters	 arising out of employment	 or conditions of service	 without exhausting the normal official channels of redress	 was considered to be contrary to official propriety and subversive of discipline	 and such conduct would justify the initiation of disciplinary action	 against the government servant. The Under Secretary	 in his communication to the Chief Conservator of Forests	 had stated that the (1) [1962] Supp.2 S.C.R.838	 848. 181 officer	 who had instituted the suit	 had not exhausted his departmental remedies	 and	 therefore	 he had rendered himself liable to disciplinary action	 as per the Government Circular letter	 of January 25	 1953. The Under Secretary further added that the Chief Conservator should intimate what action he proposed to take	 against the particular officer. On receipt of this letter	 disciplinary proceedings were initiated	 against the officer	 who had filed the suit. Promptly	 that officer filed an application	 before the High Court	 for taking action for contempt	 against the officers	 mentioned therein. The defence was that the action	 taken	 was perfectly competent	 and it did not amount to contempt of Court. The High Court negatived the defence contention and held that the officers	 who had initiated disciplinary proceedings	 were guilty of contempt of Court. This Court	 on appeal	 approved of the decision of the High Court. In that decision	 Das	 J.	 and Subba Rao	 J.	 (as he then was)	 took the view that the action	 of the officers	 who initiated the disciplinary proceedings	 against the person	 who had filed a suit	 amounted to contempt; whereas	 Raghubar Dayal	 J.	 held to the contrary on facts. But	 Raghubar Dayal	 J.	 also agreed with the proposition that	 if any pressure is put on a party	 in order to make it act in a particular manner	 with respect to a pending action	 that would amount to contempt of Court	 in which the matter be pending. But	 the learned Judge was of the view that	 inasmuch as disciplinary proceedings had been initiated	 in view of the Government Circular letter	 dated January 25	 1953	 there was no question of contempt. With respect	 we are in agreement with the majority view	 in the above decision. In the instant case	 the passing of the orders of expulsion	 by the two appellants	 against the second respondent	 and the filing of a supporting affidavit	 in the suit by the second appellant	 clearly indicate that it was a deliberate attempt	 by the appellants	 to interfere with	 or prejudice the second respondent	 in the conduct of the litigation	 instituted by him. It is no answer that the action	 by way of expulsion	 was taken on the basis of the Resolution	 of the All India Congress Working Committee	 and to enforce discipline	 in the Congress Organization. As emphasized by Das	 J.	 in Pratap Singh 's Case(.)	 'any conduct	 which interferes with	 or prejudices parties litigant	 during the litigation	 is undoubtedly Contempt of Court '. The High Court	 in this case	 was justified in holding the appellants guilty of contempt. We agree with the said conclusion. Before closing the discussion	 on this matter	 we may state that Mr. Garg referred us	 to the decision in Webster V. Bake (1) [1962] Supp 2 S.C.R. 838 (2) 182 well Rural Council(1)	 and urged that	 on the principles	 laid down therein	 the appellants were not guilty of contempt. The consideration of this English decision	 need not detain us much	 because it has been adverted to 	 by Das	 J.	 in Pratap Singh 's Case(1)	 and distinguished. Therefore	 Websters Case(2) does not apply	 to the facts of the instant case. The result s that this appeal fails	 and is dismissed. Y.P. Appeal dismissed. (1) [1962] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 838.

Summary:
The second respondent a member of a political party filed a suit challenging the election of his opponent to a committee of the party. He also obtained an interim injunction restraining his opponent from taking part in certain elections. The appellants office bearers of ' the party. issued letters expelling the second respondent from the Organisation in pursuance of an earlier resolution of the party which barred reference of such dispute to law courts and provided for summary removal of an			 member who initiated a suit. The opponent of the second respondent moved the court for vacating the injunction	 in which the second appellant filed an affidavit stating the expulsion of the second respondent. The second respondent moved the Munsif for taking proceedings in contempt against the appellant 	. which was dismissed. Thereupon he filed con tempt application in the High Court and the High Court held the appellants guilty of contempt court. In appeal	 this Court : HELD : The appellants were guilty of contempt of court. The passing of the orders of expulsion	 by the two appellants against the second respondent	 and the filing of a supporting affidavit	 in the suit by the second appellant	 clearly indicated that it was a deliberate attempt	 by the appellants	 to interfere with	 instituted by second respondent	 in the conduct of the litigation	 instituted by him. It was no answer that the action	 by way of expulsion was taken on the basis of the resolution of the party and to enforce discipline in the Organisation. [181 F G] Pratap Singh vs Gurbaksh Singh [1962] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 838 followed. Webster vs Bakewell Rural Council	 distinguished.