Case ID: 5830

Judgment:
ICTION: Civil Appeal No 1193 of 1984 and 572 573 of 1985. From the Judgment and Order dated 12.10.1983 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in C.W.P. Nos. 1659	 1777 and 1659 of 1983. Writ Petition (C) Nos. 11106 27 of 1984. PG NO 1053 (Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India) U.R. Lalit	 D.N. Goburdhan and Pankaj Kalra for the Appellants. R.N. Sachthey	 D.S. Tewatia	 Anip Sachthey and Mahabir Singh for the Respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by DUTT	 J. In these appeals and writ petitions	 the appellants and the petitioners have challenged the validity of the acquisition of their land by the State of Haryana under the Land Acquisition Act	 1894	 hereinafter referred to as `the Act '	 for a public purpose	 namely	 for the development and utilisation of land for industrial purpose at Gurgaon under the Haryana Urban Development Authority Act	 1977 by the Haryana Urban Development Authority (for short HUDA). Although	 both in the appeals and in the writ petitions the validity of acquisition has been challenged	 we propose to deal with the appeals first. The appeals are directed against the judgments of the Punjab & Haryana High Court dismissing the writ petitions of the Appellants questioning the validity of the acquisition of their land and praying for the quashing of such acquisition. The first ground of attack to the acquisition	 as urged by Mr. Lalit	 the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants in Civil Appeal No. 1193 of 1984	 is the non publication of the substance of the notification under section 4(1) of the Act in the locality of the land sought to be acquired It is true that section 4(1) enjoins that the Collector shall cause public notice of the substance of the notification to be given at convenient places in the locality. It is however	 preeminently a question of fact. The allegation of the appellants as to the non publication of the notification under section 4(1)	 as made in the writ petition before the High Court	 was emphatically denied and disputed in paragraph 8 of the affidavit in opposition affirmed by the Land Acquisition Collector Paragraph 8 reads as follows: "8. In reply to para 8 of the writ petition. it is submitted that the averments of the petitioners are wrong and denied. The publicity of the substance of the notification was made in concerned locality of village PG NO 1054 Dundahera on 6th July	 1981 through Shri Chhattar Singh Chowkidar with loud voice and beating of empty tin. The report exists in Roznamcha Vakyati at Serial No. 519 dated 6.7.1981. Similarly	 the publicity was made in concerned locality of village Mulahera through Shri Surjan Singh Chowkidar with loud voice and beat of empty tin (Kanaster). A report to this effect exists in Roznamcha Vakyati at Serial No. 520 dated 6.7 1981. The publicity was made on this very day on which the notification was issued. In response to this publicity 157 land owners filed objection applications which clearly shows that due publicity was made in the concerned locality and the averments of the petitioners are wrong	 baseless and hence denied. " It is apparent from the statement made in paragraph 8 that the substance of the notification under section 4(1) was published in the concerned localities of villages Dundahera and Mulahera. It is	 however	 urged on behalf of the appellants that it was not at all possible to make entries in the Roznamcha as to the publication of the notification under section 4(1) on the same day it was published in both the villages. It is submitted that on this ground the statement in paragraph 8 as to the publication of the substance of the notification in the localities should not be accepted	 and it should be held that there was no such publication is alleged. We are afraid	 we are unable to accept the contention. Apart from the statement that there was publication of the notification	 there is further statement in paragraph 8 that pursuant to such publication	 157 land owners filed objections to the proposed acquisition. This fact has not been disputed before us on behalf of the appellants. Moreover	 Mr. Tewatia	 learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the State of Haryana	 has produced before us the original objection petitions filed by the land owners. In each of these objection petitions there is a note at the end which reads as follows: "Note: The above referred notification was announced by the beat of drum in the village Dundahera on 6.7.1981	 vide Patwari 's Roznamcha Report No. 519 dated 6.7.1981." Similar notes	 as extracted above	 are there in the petitions of objections filed by the land owners of village Mulahera. In view of the facts stated above	 the allegation of the appellants that the substance of the notification under section 4(1) of the Act was not published in the localities of the two villages mentioned above	 is without any foundation whatsoever. The contention of the appellants in this regard is rejected. PG NO 1055 The next ground of attack to the acquisition comes from Mr. Kalra	 the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants in Civil Appeals Nos. 572 & 573 of 1985. It is urged by the learned Counsel that the sole purpose of the acquisition is for a profiteering venture of the Government to acquire land of the helpless farmers at a nominal price of Rs. 10	 Rs. 20 or Rs. 50 per square yard and then to resale the same at a high profit. It is submitted that a welfare State should work for the poor and the down trodden of the society rather than to displace them from their land for the sake of making profit. Our attention has been drawn by the learned Counsel to an application filed in this Court by the Haryana State Industrial Development Corporation (for short HSIDC) praying for impleading it as a party respondent in these appeals. In this application it has been stated	 inter alia	 by HSIDC that it plays an important role in the industrialisation of the State by providing concessional finance and offering land at no profit no loss basis along with infra structure facilities for setting up new industrial units in the State. Further	 it is stated that the land in Udhyog Vihar	 Phase lV	 (land which is the subject matter of these appeals)	 was acquired by HUDA and later sold to HSIDC at the approximate price of Rs 55	000 per acre. In paragraph 5 of the application	 it is stated that on account of the price of the above land of Phase lV	 approximately Rs. 1.74 crores was paid by the the HSIDC to HUDA. The said payment was made out of the amounts received from the intended allottees/entrepreneurs and also out to the funds/reserves of the HSIDC	 and that a sum of Rs. 4.90 crores is estimated to be spent on the development of the industrial complex in question. Relying upon the above statements in the said application of HSIDC	 the learned Counsel for the appellants	 endeavours to substantiate his contention that the impugned acquisition is nothing but a profiteering venture of the Government. It is urged that the said statements in the application prove that the Government has made huge profit in the guise of development and utilisation of the land for industrial purpose at Gurgaon. In support of the contention	 Mr. Kalra has placed reliance upon an observation of Mahajan	 J. (as he then was) in the State of Bihar vs Maharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh	 	 namely	 that it is a well accepted proposition of law that property of individuals cannot be appropriated by the State under the power of compulsory acquisition for the mere purpose of adding to the revenues of the State. The learned Counsel has also placed reliance on the observation in the minority judgment of Wanchoo	 J. PG NO 1056 in Arnold Rodricks vs State of Maharashtra	 AIR 1966 SC 1788. In that case	 the enquiries purported to be held under section 5A and section 11 of the Act were challenged as illegal	 invalid and inoperative in law. In that connection	 the validity of the definition of "Public purpose" in clause (f) of section 3 of the Act	 as amended by the Bombay Amendment Act 35 of 1953	 also came to be considered. Clause (2) of the amended definition in clause (f) reads as follows: "(f). the expression "Public purpose" includes (1) . . . . . . . . . (2) the acquisition of land for purposes of the development of areas from public revenues or some fund controlled or managed by a local authority and subsequent disposal thereof in whole or any part by lease	 assignment or sale	 will be object of securing further development. " Wanchoo	 J. observed as follows: "(33). The attack of the petitioners is on the second part of the addition in 1953 which provides for "subsequent disposal thereof in whole or in part by lease	 assignment	 or sale	 with the object of securing further development. " It is urged that all these words means that after the development envisaged in the first part of the addition the State or the local authority would be free to dispose of the land acquired in whole or in part by lease	 assignment or sale	 apparently to private persons. This	 it is said	 means that the State or the local authority would acquire land in the first instance and develop it in the manner already indicated and thereafter make profit by leasing	 assigning or selling it to private individuals or bodies. It is also said that the object of securing further development which is the reason for sale or lease etc. is a very vague expression and there is nothing to show what this further development comprises of. It is true that when this part speaks of "subsequent disposal thereof in whole or in part by lease	 assignment or sale"	 it is not unlikely that this disposal] will take place to private persons and thus in an indirect way the State would be acquiring the land from one set of individuals and disposing it of to another set of PG NO 1057 individuals after some development. If this were all	 there may be some force in the argument that such acquisition is not within the concept of "public purpose" as used in article 31(2). But this in our opinion is not all. We cannot ignore the words "with the object of securing further development"	 which appear in this provision. It would have been a different matter if the provision had stopped at the words "lease	 assignment or sale"; but the provision does not stop there. It says that such lease	 assignment or sale must be with the object of securing further development	 and these words must be given some meaning. It is true that the words "further development" have not been defined	 but that was bound to be so	 for further development would depend upon the nature of the purpose for which the land is acquired. Of course	 it is possible that further development can be made by the State itself or by the local authority which acquired the land; but we see no reason why the State or the local authority should not have the power to see that further development takes place even through private agencies by lease	 assignment or sale of such land. So long as the object is development and the land is made fit for the purpose for which it is acquired there is no reason why the State should not be permitted to see that further development of the land takes place in the direction for which the land is acquired	 even though that may be through private agencies. We have no doubt that where the State or the local authority decides that further development should take place through private agencies by disposal of the land so acquired by way of lease	 assignment or sale	 it will see that further development which it has in mind does take place. We can see no reason why if the land so acquired is leased	 assigned or sold	 the State or the local authority should not be able to impose terms on such lessees	 assignees or vendees that will enable further development on the lines desired to take place. We also see no reason why when imposing terms	 the State or the local authority may not provide that if the further development it desires the lessee	 assignee or vendee to make is not made within such reasonable time as the State or the local authority may fix	 the land will revert to the State or the local authority so that it may again be used for the purpose of further development which was the reason for the acquisition of the land. " PG NO 1058 We fail to understand how does the above observation help the contention of the learned Counsel for the appellants that the acquisition has been made by the Government with a motive for profiteering in the guise of development and industrialisation. The observation of Wanchoo	 J relates to the definition of "Public purpose" under section 3(f) of the Act as amended by the Bombay Amendment Act 35 of 1953. The amended provision specifically provides for the disposal of acquired land in whole or in part by lease	 assignment or sale	 but there is no such provision in the unamended section 3(f) of the Act with which we are concerned. Wanchoo	 J overruled the contention as to profiteering by the State or local authority as the amended provision made it very clear that such subsequent disposal of the acquired land will be for the purpose of securing further development. We do not think we are called upon to express any opinion on the correctness or otherwise of the above observation	 and all that we say is that there is no such provision like the amended definition in section 3(f) of the Act with which we are concerned. In the circumstances. the observation has no manner of application in the instant case. In the writ petitions	 the point was taken as an abstract point of law. There was no attempt on the part of the appellants to substantiate the point by pleading relevant facts and producing relevant evidence. It is apparent that there was no material in the writ petitions in support of the contention of the appellants that the impugned acquisition was nothing but a profiteering venture. The contention was not also advanced before the High Court at the hearing of the writ petitions. The facts stated in he said application of the HSIDC do not	 in our opinion	 support the contention of the appellants. It is true that	 as stated in the said application	 HSIDC paid a sum of Rs. 1.74 crores to HUDA	 but nothing turns out on that. The land was acquired by the Government for the purpose of development and industrialisation. The Government can do it itself or through other agencies. In the instant case	 the land was acquired at the instance of HUDA and	 thereafter	 HUDA had transferred the same to HSIDC. It is not that the land was transferred in the same condition as it was acquired. But	 we are told by the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of HUDA and HSIDC that before transferring	 HUDA had made external developments incurring considerable cost and HSIDC in its turn has made various internal developments and in this way the land has been fully developed and made fit for industrialisation. Our attention has been drawn by the learned Counsel for HUDA and HSIDC to the various external developments made by HUDA at a cost of Rs. 1	66	200 per acre before it was transferred to HSIDC and the cost that was incurred for external developments was included in the price. Thus	 there was no motive for HUDA to make any profit. PG NO 1059 The "public purpose" in question	 already noticed	 is development and industrialisation of the acquired land. The appellants have not challenged the said "public purpose". In the absence of any such challenge	 it does not lie in the mouth of the appellants to contend that the acquisition was merely a profiteering venture by the State Government through HUDA. The appellants will be awarded the market value of the land as compensation by the Collector. If they are dissatisfied with the award they may ask for references to the District Judge under section 18 of the Act. If they are still aggrieved	 they can file appeals to the High Court and	 ultimately	 may also come to this Court regarding the amount of compensation. The appellants cannot claim compensation beyond the market value of the land. In such circumstances	 we fail to understand how does the question of profiteering come in. Even assuming that HUDA has made some profit	 that will not in any way affect the public purpose for which the land was acquired and the acquisition will not be liable for any challenge on that ground. As has been already noticed	 although the point as to profiteering by the State was pleaded in the writ petitions before the High Court as an abstract point of law	 there was no reference to any material in support thereof nor was the point argued at the hearing of the writ petitions. Before us also	 no particulars and no facts have been given in the special leave petitions or in the writ petitions or in any affidavit	 but the point has been sought to be substantiated at the time of hearing by referring to certain facts stated in the said application by HSIDC. In our opinion	 when a point which is ostensibly a point of law is required to be substantiated by facts	 the party raising the point	 if he is the writ petitioner	 must plead and prove such facts by evidence which must appear from the writ petition and if he is the respondent	 from the counter affidavit. If the facts are not pleaded or the evidence in support of such facts is not annexed to the writ petition or to the counter	 affidavit	 as the case may be	 the court will not entertain the point. In this context	 it will not be out of place to point out that in this regard there is a distinction between a pleading under the Code of Civil Procedure and a writ petition or a counter affidavit. While in a pleading	 that is	 a plaint or a written statement	 the facts and not evidence are required to be pleaded	 in a writ petition or in the counter affidavit not only the facts but also the evidence in proof of such facts have to be pleaded and annexed to it. So	 the point that has been raised before us PG NO 1060 by the appellants is not entertainable. But	 in spite of that	 we have entertained it to show that it is devoid of any merit. Equally untenable is the contention of the appellants that the acquisition is for HSIDC which is a `company ' within the meaning of section 3(e) of the Act and	 accordingly	 the acquisition is invalid for the non compliance with the provisions of Part III of the Act. In the notification under section 4(1)	 it has been clearly stated that the development and industrialisation of the acquired land would be made under the Haryana Development Authority Act	 1977 by HUDA. It is	 therefore	 manifestly clear that HUDA was the acquiring authority and not HSIDC. It is for HUDA to develop the land fully either by itself or by any other agency or agencies. HUDA has transferred the land to HSIDC for the purpose of development and allotment to various persons. It is too much to say that as HUDA has transferred the acquired land to HSIDC	 the latter is the acquiring authority. We do not think that there is any substance in the contention and it is	 accordingly	 rejected. Now we may consider the contention made on behalf of the petitioners in the writ petitions Nos. 11106 to 11127 of 1984. The first point that has been urged by Mr. Goburdhan	 learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the writ petitioners	 is similar to that urged by Mr. Lalit in Civil appeal No 1193 of 1984	 namely	 non publication of the substance of the notification under section 4(1) of the Act in the locality. This contention need not detain us long	 for in the counter affidavit filed by the Land Acquisition Collector	 it has been averred that the substance of the notification was published and out of 22 petitioners 16 filed their objections pursuant to the publication of the notification in the locality. A similar note	 as extracted above	 appears in all these objections. In the circumstances	 there is no substance in the contention of the petitioners that the substance of the notification under section 4(1) of the Act was not published in the locality. Next it is urged on behalf of the petitioners that before starting the proceedings for acquisition	 the Government had not applied its mind to its policy decision	 as contained in the circular No. 2099 R III 82/17113 dated 18.5.1982 wherein it has been stated that "in the matter of State 's need for land for its development activities	 utmost restraint should be exercised in the acquisition of land. " It is submitted that as the land is agricultural	 it should not have been acquired in view of the said policy decision PG NO 1061 of the Government. We are unable to accept the contention. In a welfare State	 it is the duty of the Government to proceed with the work of development and take steps for the growth of industries which are necessary for the country 's progress and prosperity and for solving the question of unemployment. It is true that agricultural land is necessary and should not ordinarily be converted to non agricultural use	 but keeping in view the progress and prosperity of the country	 the State has to strike a balance between the need for development of industrialisation and the need for agriculture. The allegation that before initiating the acquisition proceedings	 the Government has not applied its mind to the need for agricultural land is a very vague allegation without any material in support thereof. The contention is overruled. Lastly	 it is argued by Mr. Goburdhan for the writ petitioners that the petitioners have been discriminated inasmuch as the land of other persons in the village has not been acquired. This contention is without any substance whatsoever. The Government will acquire only that amount of land which is necessary and suitable for the public purpose in question. The land belonging to the petitioners have been acquired obviously considering the same as suitable for the public purpose. The petitioners cannot complain of any discrimination because the land of other persons has not been acquired by the Government. The contention is devoid of any merit whatsoever. Before parting with these cases	 we may consider a short submission on behalf of the appellants as also the writ petitioners that as by the acquisition of their land they have become landless	 they should be allotted land by HSIDC	 after development	 so that they may start their businesses and earn their livelihood. After giving our anxious consideration to this submission	 we direct that if any of the appellants or the petitioners	 who has become really landless by the acquisition of his land	 makes an application for the allotment of land	 the HSIDC shall consider such application and give him priority in the matter of allotment provided he fulfils the conditions for such allotment and plot is available. Another short submission has been made on behalf of the appellants in Civil Appeal No 1193 of 1984. Our attention has been drawn to paragraphs 4 and 5 of the additional affidavit filed on behalf of the appellants	 and affirmed by one Sat Prakash	 son of Mathura Prashad	 one of the appellants	 that in Khasra No 21/6/2 and in Khasra No. 22/10/1	 there are a temple	 a Piaou and a Dharamshala. It is submitted that the land comprising the temple	 Piaou and Dharamshala may be exempted from acquisition. We do not PG NO 1062 consider it necessary to give any direction in this respect. The appellants	 however	 will be at liberty to make a representation in that regard to the authority concerned. No other point has been urged in these cases. For the reasons aforesaid	 subject to the directions given on the short submissions	 all the appeals and the writ petitions are dismissed. There will	 however	 be no order as to costs in any of them. H.S.K. Appeals and Petitions are dismissed.

Summary:
The State of Haryana through Haryana Urban Development Authority (HUDA) acquired some land under the land Acquisition Act for the purpose of development and utilisation of that land for industrial purposes of Gurgaon under the Haryana Urban Development Authority Act	 1977. The appellants herein filed writ petitions in the High Court challenging the validity of the acquisition of land. The High Court dismissed the writ petitions. Hence the writ petitioners filed these appeals by special leave. .Some other affected persons also filed writ petitions in this Court Dismissing all the appeals and the writ petitions. this Court	 HELD: The first ground of attack to the acquisition that the sub stance of the notification under section 4(1) of the Act has not been published in the locality of the land said to be acquired is without any foundation. Whether the substance of the notification was published or not is pre eminently a question of fact. It is apparent from the statement made in paragraph 8 of the affidavit in reply of the land Acquisition Collector that the substance of the notification was published in the concerned localities. It is further stated in the affidavit that pursuant such PG NO 1050 PG NO 1051 publication	 157 of the land owners filed objections to the proposed acquisition. This fact has not been disputed by the appellants. In view of these facts the first ground of attack is without any foundation whatsoever. [1054D E] The second ground of attack was that the sole purpose of the acquisition was for a profiteering venture of the Government to acquire land at nominal price and then to re sale the same at a high profit Reliance was placed on an application for intervention filed in this matter by Haryana State Industrial Development Corporation (HSIDC) which showed that HUDA sold the land to HSIDC at a very high price paid by HSIDC out of the amounts received from intended allottees/entrepreneurs. In the opinion of this Court the facts stated in the application of the HSIDC do not	 support the contention of the appellants. It is true that	 as stated in the said application	 HSIDC paid a sum of Rs. 1.74 crores to HUDA	 but nothing turns out on that. The land was acquired by the Government for the purpose of development and industrialisation. The Government can do it itself or through other agencies. In the instant case	 the land was acquired at the instance of HUDA and	 thereafter	 HUDA had transferred the same to HSIDC. It is not that the land was transferred in the same condition as it was acquired. But	 we are told by the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of HUDA and HSIDC that before transferring	 HUDA had made external developments incurring considerable cost and HSIDC in its turn has made various internal developments and in this way the land has been fully developed and made fit for industrialisation. Thus	 there was no motive for HUDA to make any profit. [1058E H; 1059A] The "Public purpose" in question is development and industrialisation of the acquired land. The appellants have not challenged the said public purpose. In the absence of any such challenge it does not lie in the mouth of the appellants to contend that the acquisition was merely a profiteering venture by the State Government through Haryana Urban Development Authority. Even assuming that HUDA has made some profit	 that will not in any way affect the public purpose for which the land was acquired and the acquisition will not be liable for any challenge on that ground. [1059B D] Arnold Rodricks vs State of Maharashtra	 AIR 1966 SC 1788	 referred to. When a point which is ostensibly a point of law i6 required to be substantiated by facts	 the party raising the point	 if he is the writ petitioner	 must plead and prove such facts by evidence which must appear from the writ petition and if he is the respondent from the counter PG NO 1052 affidavit. If the facts are not pleaded or the evidence in support of such facts is not annexed to the writ petition or to the counter affidavit	 as the case may be	 the Court will not entertain the point. [1059F G] There is a distinction between a pleading under the Code of Civil Procedure and a writ petition or a counter affidavit. While in a pleading	 that is	 a plaint or a written statement	 the facts and not evidence are required to be pleaded	 in a writ petition or in the counter affidavit not only the facts but also the evidence in proof of such facts have to be pleaded and annexed to it. [1059G H] The contention of the appellants that the acquisition is for HSIDC which is a `company ' within the meaning of section 3(e) of the Act and	 accordingly	 the acquisition is invalid for the non compliance with the provisions of Part III of the Act is untenable. In the notification under section 4(1)	 it has been clearly stated that the development and industrialisation of the acquired land would be made under the Haryana Development Authority Act	 1977 by HUDA. It is	 therefore	 manifestly clear that HUDA was the acquiring authority and not HSIDC. It is for HUDA to develop the land fully either by itself or by any other agency or agencies. HUDA has transferred the land to HSIDC for the purpose of development and allotment to various persons. It is too much to say that as HUDA has transferred the acquired land to HSIDC	 the latter is the acquiring authority. [1060B D] The contention that the petitioners have been discriminated inasmuch as the land of other persons in the village has not been acquired is without any substance whatsoever. The Government will acquire only that amount of land which is necessary and suitable for the public purpose in question. The land belonging to the petitioners have been acquired obviously considering the same as suitable for the public purpose. [1061D]