Case ID: 521

Judgment:
Civil Appeal No. 8 of 1957. Appeal from the judgment and order dated the 30th August	 1955	 of the Allahabad High Court in Special Appeal No. 8 of 1955 arising out of the judgment and order dated the 10th December	 1954	 of the Single Judge of the Allahabad High Court in Civil Misc. Writ No. 1245 of 1954. R. section Narula	 for the appellant. B. B. Tawakley and K. P. Gupta	 for the respondent. September 17. The following Judgment of the Court was delivered by section K. DAS	 J. This appeal has been preferred to this Court on the strength of a certificate granted by the High Court of Allahabad on February 3	 1956	 to the effect that the case is a fit one for appeal to the Supreme Court under article 133(1)(c) of the Constitution. The question that falls for decision is the true scope	 meaning and effect of cl	 (g) of section 13 D of the U. P. Municipalities Act	 1916 (U. P. II of 1916)	 hereinafter referred to as the Act. The relevant facts	 which are not now in dispute	 are these. There was a general election to the Municipal 54 420 Board of Bareilly in October	 1953. The appellant	 Mangoo Singh	 and respondent No. 3	 Imdad Husain	 along with sever al others	 were candidates at the said election from Ward No. 15. The date fixed for filing nominations was October 5	 1953	 and the date for scrutiny of the nominations filed was October 7	 1953. The appellant and respondent No. 3 both filed their nominations on the due date	 and at the time of scrutiny lmdad Husain raised an objection to the nomination of the appellant on the ground that the latter was disqualified under cl. (g) of section 13 D of the Act for being chosen as a member of the said Municipal Board because he was in arrears in the payment of municipal tax in excess of one year 's demand. This objection was dismissed	 and the nomination of the appellant was accepted by the Assistant Returning Officer. The poll took place on October 26	 1953	 and the counting of votes was done on October 29	 1953. Four persons were to be elected from the said Ward	 and the appellant was the third in the list by reason of the number of votes which he had obtained. Imdad Husain was fifth in the list. Accordingly	 the appellant was declared as one of the returned candidates	 and lmdad Husain was at the top of the unsuccessful candidates. lmdad Husain then filed an election petition to set aside the election of the present appellant on various grounds. The only ground with which we are now concerned is the disqualification under cl. (g) of section 13 D of the Act. This election petition was heard by the Election Tribunal and by its judgment dated October 20	 1954	 the Election Tribunal held that the appellant was in arrears in the payment of municipal tax in excess of one year 's demand to which section 166 of the Act applied and	 there fore	 came under the disqualification in cl. (g) of section 13 D of the Act It further held that the payment of a sum of Rs. 115 3 0 on October 10	 1953	 five days after the date fixed for the filing of nominations	 did not wipe off that dis qualification	 and the appellant was not entitled to the benefit of the second proviso to section 13 D of the Act. It may be here stated that the Election Tribunal also held that no bill for payment of the tax was presented to the appellant 421 as required by section 166	 nor was any demand notice served on him as required by section 168 of the Act. On the above find ings	 the Tribunal allowed the election petition	 set aside the election of the appellant and declared a casual vacancy under cl. (a) of sub section (2) of section 25 of the Act	 which vacancy was subsequently filled up by the election of the third respondent on April 5	 1955. The next general elec tion in the Municipality is due in October	 1957. Against the decision of the Election Tribunal	 the appellant moved the High Court of Allahabad for the issue of a writ under article 226 of the Constitution. The main point urged by the appellant was that the Election Tribunal was in error in its interpretation of cl. (g) of section 13 D of the Act. Cha turvedi J. who dealt with the application of the appellant	 agreed with the view of the law as expressed by the Election Tribunal and dismissed the application. The appellant then preferred an appeal to a Division Bench of the said High Court. This appeal was also dismissed by Agarwala and Sahai JJ. by their judgment dated August 30	 1955. The appellant then moved and obtained a certificate of fitness under article 133(1)(c) of the Constitution from the said High Court. Learned counsel for the appellant has not contested any of the findings of fact arrived at by the Election Tribunal and has confined his submissions to the question of the true construction of cl. (g) of section 13 D of the Act. Therefore	 it is necessary to read that section	 in so far as it is relevant for our purpose: " 13 D. Disqualifications for membership. A person	 not withstanding that he is otherwise qualified	 shall be dis qualified for being chosen as	 and for being	 a member of a board if he (a) . . . . . . . . . . (b). . . . . . . . . . (c). . . . . . . . . . (d). . . . . . . . . . (e) . . . . . . . . . . (f). . . . . . . . . . 422 (g) is in arrears in the payment of municipal tax or other dues in excess of one year 's demand to which section 166 applies: Provided further that in the case of (g) the disqualifica tion shall cease as soon as the arrears are paid. " The first contention of learned counsel for the appellant relates to and arises out of the expression " for being chosen as " occurring in the section. The argument is this. It is submitted that a person is "chosen as a member of a board " when the poll takes place and a majority of voters vote for him as their chosen candidate ; therefore	 the relevant date for the operation of the disqualification is the date of the poll	 and inasmuch as on October 10	 1953	 which was several days before the date of the poll	 the appellant was no longer in arrears of municipal tax in excess of one year 's demand by reason of the payment made on that date	 the disqualification did not attach to him on the date of the poll. We are unable to accept this argument. It is worthy of note that an identical expression "shall be disqualified for being chosen as " occurs in article 102 of the Constitution and section 7 of the Representation of the People Act	 1951. This expression occurring in section 7 of the Repre sentation of the People Act	 1951	 was considered by this Court in Chatturbhuj Vithaldas Jasani vs Moreshwar Parashram and Others (1). In that case the question was when the disqualification mentioned in cl. (d) of section 7 of the Repre sentation of the People Act	 1951	 arose and it was held that the date for putting in the nominations was one of the crucial dates. On this point	 the following observations made in that case are apposite : "Now the words of the section are "shall be disqualified for being chosen". The choice is made by a series of steps starting with the nomination and ending with the announce ment of the election. It follows that if a disqualification attaches to a candidate at any one of these stages	 he cannot be chosen." (1) ; 	 821. 423 It was pointed out in N. P. Ponnuswami vs The Returning Officer	 Namakkal Constituency and Others (1) that ' elec tion ' is a continuous process consisting of several stages and embracing many steps of which nomination is one; nomina tion is the foundation of a candidate 's a right to go to the polls and must be treated as an integral part of the elec tion. If a person is disqualified on the date of nomina tion	 he cannot be chosen as a candidate because the dis qualification mentioned in section 13 D attaches to him on that date. This is also clear from para. 22(2) of the U. P. Municipali ties (Conduct of Election of Members) Order	 1953. That sub para. states " 22 (2) The Returning Officer shall then examine the nomi nation papers and shall decide all objections	 which may be made to any nomination	 and may	 either on such objection or on his own motion	 after such summary inquiry	 if any	 as he thinks necessary	 refuse any nomination on any of the fol lowing grounds: (a) that the candidate is not qualified to be chosen to fill the seat under the Act; or (b) that the candidate is disqualified for being chosen to fill the seat under the Act; or (c)that there has been any failure to comply with any of the provisions of paras. 16 and 17; or (d) that the signature of the candidate or any proposer or seconder is not genuine or has been obtained by fraud. " If the disqualification of cl. (g) of section 13 D of the Act is to come into operation only oil the day of the poll	 then it is quite unnecessary for the Returning Officer to consider that disqualification at the time of scrutiny ; and indeed it will be improper for him to refuse nomination on the ground of such disqualification. Clause (b) of para. 22 (2) uses the same expression "disqualified for. being chosen" showing clearly enough that the starting point of the act of choosing is not on the date of the poll only. The process of choosing commences on the date of filing nominations. (1) ; 424 We now turn to the second proviso to section 13 D. The submis sion of learned counsel for the appellant is that	 as stated in the proviso	 the disqualification is transient and ceases to operate as soon as the arrears are paid; Oil October 10	 1953	 the appellant was no longer disqualified and	 there fore	 he could be chosen on the date of the poll	 that is	 on October 26	 1953. The argument is that in the case of such a transient disqualification	 the second proviso must be so read as to mean that a disqualification subsisting on the day of nomination can be wiped off completely by subse quent payment of arrears of tax; otherwise a disqualifica tion at the time of nomination will disentitle a person to stand for election ; even though it ceases to operate before the day of the poll. This argument also we cannot accept as correct; it is really the first argument in a different form. The wiping off of the disqualification under the second proviso has no retrospective effect	 and the disqual ification which subsisted on the day of filing nominations did not cease to subsist on that day by reason of a subse quent payment of the arrears of municipal tax. On this point we accept as correct the view expressed in Ahmed Hossain vs Aswini Kumar(1)	 where a similar question under the Bengal Municipal Act (Ben. XV of 1932)	 fell for con sideration. The question was if a person disqualified on the date of nomination could shake off his pre existing disqualification by acquiring a new right between the date of nomination and the date of scrutiny. What happened in that case was this : on the material date	 that is	 the last date for submission of nominations	 a person was in arrears for more than three months in payment of the tax which he was liable to pay	 and he came within the mischief of el. (g) of amended a. 22(1) of the Bengal Municipal Act. The contention was that the name of the Press of which the candidate was the proprietor and not his name was recorded in the books of the Municipality as the assessee and that the name of the candidate was in the electoral roll by reason of his educational qualifications. This contention was repelled and it was (1) A.l. R. 425 observed that if a person was disqualified on the date of the nomination	 he could not shake off his preexisting disqualification by acquiring a new right between the date of nomination and the date of scrutiny. There is also other judicial authority which '	 supports the same view. In Harford vs Linskey (1)	 a similar question arose for deci sion under the Municipal Corporations Act	 1882	 section 12 whereof enacted that " a person shall be disqualified for being elected and for being a councillor " if and while he is interested in contracts with the Corporation. The peti tioner in that case admitted that at the time of his nomina tion he was interested in contracts with the Corporation	 but contended that he could and would have got rid of his disqualification before the day fixed for the poll	 and was therefore not disqualified for nomination. The question was whether he was so disqualified. Wright J. delivering the judgment of the Court observed " In the absence of any guide	 we think it safest to hold that in cases of elections under the Municipal Corporations Acts a person	 who at the time of nomination is disquali fied for election in the manner in which this petitioner was disqualified	 is disqualified also for nomination. The nomination is for this purpose an essential part of the election	 and if there are no competitors it of itself constitutes the election by virtue of the express words of section 56. A different construction might produce much confu sion. On the nomination day no one could know whether the persons nominated will at the poll be effective candidates or not. It is true that in the case put the disqualifica tion may be removed before the election is completed ; but what is to be the effect if the disqualification continues until the poll begins	 or until the middle of the polling day	 or until the close of the poll ? Will votes given before the removal of the disqualification be valid? If not how is the number of them to be ascertained ? it seems to us unreason able to hold that the Act means to leave the matter in such a state of uncertainty	 and for these reasons (1) 	 858. 426 we think that this petitioner was disqualified for nomina tion or election. " The same state of uncertainty and confusion	 to which a reference has been made in the aforesaid observations	 will arise if the construction which learned counsel for the appellant has pressed for our acceptance is adopted in the case before us. Lastly	 it has been argued on behalf of the appellant that the expression 'to which section 166 applies ' in cl. (g) of section 13 D means that a bill of the sum due must be presented to the person liable for it	 as required by that section	 before he can come within the mischief of the clause; fur thermore	 the use of the expression 'demand ' makes it essen tial that a demand notice must also be served as required by section 168 of the Act. As on the finding of the Election Tribu nal neither a bill was presented to the appellant	 nor was he served with a demand notice	 learned counsel contends that the appellant does not come within the mischief of the clause. Sections 166 and 168 are in these terms section 166. Presentation of bill. (1) As soon as a person becomes liable for the payment of (a) any sum on account of a tax	 other than an octroi or toll or any similar tax payable upon immediate demand	 or (b) any sum payable under clause (c) of section 196 or section 229 or section 230 in respect of the supply of water	 or payable in respect of any other municipal service or undertaking	 or (c) any other sum declared by this Act or or by rule (or bye law) to be recoverable in the manner provided by this chapter	 the board shall	 with all convenient speed	 cause a bill to be presented to the persons so liable. (2) Unless otherwise provided by rule	 a person 	shall be deemed to become liable for the payment of every tax and licence fee upon the commencement of the period in respect of which such tax or fee is payable	 427  section 168. Notice of demand. If the sum for which a bill has been presented as aforesaid is not paid in municipal office	 or to a person empowered by a regulation to receive such payments	 within fifteen days from the presentation thereof	 the board may cause to be served upon the person liable for the payment of the said sum a notice of demand in the form set forth in schedule IV	 or to the like effect. " We are clearly of the view that the expression 'to which section 166 applies ' cannot bear the meaning sought to be given to it on behalf of the appellant. That expression merely describes the nature of the demand referred to in cl. Section 166 refers to three types of dues; el. (a) of sub section (1) refers to any sum on account of a tax other than an octroi or toll or any similar tax payable upon immediate demand; cl. (b) refers to sums payable under el. (c) of section 196 or section 229 or section 230 in respect of the supply of water	 etc.	 and cl. (c) refers to any other sum declared by the Act or by rule or bye law to be recoverable in the manner provided by Chapter VI. The demand to which section 166 applies must be a demand of the nature or type mentioned in one or other of the aforesaid three clauses	 and the demand re ferred to in el. (g) of section 13 D must be of that nature or type; this	 in our view	 is the true meaning and effect of the expression 'to which section 166 applies '. Nor do we think that the word demand ' attracts the operation of section 168. It may be readily conceded that the word 'de mand ' ordinarily means something more than what is due; it means something which has been demanded	 called for or asked for. But the meaning of a word must take colour from the context in which it is used. In el. (g) the context in which the word 'demand ' is used has a very obvious and clear reference to the amount of arrears or dues on which the disqualification depends; therefore	 the expression used is 'arrears in the payment of municipal tax or other dues in excess of one year 's demand '. The word 'demand ' in that context and in the collocation of words in which it has been used can only mean 'in excess of one year 's municipal tax or other dues '. We have been referred to several meanings of the word 55 428 'demand ' in standard English dictionaries and law lexicons. When the context makes the meaning of a word quite clear	 it becomes unnecessary to search for and select a particular meaning out of the diverse meanings a word is capable of	 according to lexicographers. It is sufficient for our purpose to state that even in standard dictionaries and law lexicons	 it is well recognised that the word demand ' may mean simply a 'claim or 'due '	 without importing any further meaning of calling upon the person liable to pay the claim or due. For the reasons given above	 we hold that not one of the contentions urged on behalf of the appellant is worthy of acceptance. The election petition was rightly decided	 as the appellant was disqualified for being chosen as a member of the Municipal Board in question on the day he filed his nomination	 under cl. (g) of section 13 D of the Act. According ly	 the appeal is dismissed with costs in favour of respond ent 3 who alone contested the appeal before us. Appeal dismissed.

Summary:
The appellant was elected to the Municipal Board under the U. P. Municipalities Act	 19i6. He was in arrears in the payment of Municipal tax in excess of one year 's demand	 to which section 166 of the Act applied	 at the time of the filing of nominations	 but made the payment before the date of the poll. Under section 13D	 cl. (g) of the Act "a person shall be disqualified for being chosen as	 and for being	 a member of a board if he is in arrears in the pay ment of Municipal tax or other dues in excess of one year 's demand to which section 166 applies	 provided that the disquali fication shall cease as soon as the arrears are paid. " On an election petition filed by a defeated candidate	 the elec tion was set aside by the Election Tribunal on the ground that the appellant was not entitled to the benefit of the proviso to section I3 P. cl. (g) of the Act. It was contended for the appellant that the relevant date for the operation of the disqualification was the date of the poll and that	 in any case	 he did not come within the mischief of the disqualification clause in that section	 as a bill for payment of the tax was not presented to him	 nor a notice of demand served on him under section 168. Held:(1) that if a person is disqualified on the date of nomination	 he cannot be chosen as a candidate within the meaning of section 13 D of the U. P. Municipalities Act	 19i6	 because the disqualification attaches to him on that date and the process of choosing consists of a series of steps starting with nomination and ending with the announcement of the election. The wiping off of the 419 disqualification has no retrospective effect	 and the dis qualification which subsisted on the date of the nomination cannot cease to subsist on that day by reason of a subse quent payment of the arrears of Municipal tax. Chatturbhuj Withaldas jasani vs Moreshway Parashram and Others	 ; 	 N. P. Ponnuswami vs The Returning Officer	 Namakkal Constituency and Others	 ; and Harford vs Linskey	 	 relied on. Ahmed Hossain vs Aswini Kumar	 A.I.R. 1953 Cal. 542	 ap proved. (2)that the expression "to which section 166 applies" in section 13 D	 cl. (g) of the Act merely describes the nature or type of dues mentioned in that section and that the effect is that the demand referred to in section 13 D	 cl. (g) must be of that nature or type. (3)that the word 'demand" in section 13 D	 cl. (g) of the Act means "claim" or "due" and only refers to the amount of arrears or dues on which the disqualification depends and does not attract the operation of section 168.