Case ID: 3186

Judgment:
Appeal No. 1936 of 1967 From the Judgment and Decree dated the 14th October	 1966 of Andhra Pradesh High Court in Appeal No. 239 of 1961 and Memo of Cross Objections therein arising out of the judgment and decree dated 28th March 1958 of the Subordinate Judge	 Srikakulam in Original Suit No. 101 of 1954. M. Natesan	 K. Jayaram and R. Chandrasekhar	 for the appellant	 P. Parmeshwara Rao and T. Satyanarayana	 for the respondent. The Judgment of D. G. PALEKAR	 and R. section SARKARIA JJ. was delivered by SARKARIA	 J. V. R. KRISHNA IYER	 J. gave a separate Opinion. 658 SARKARIA J. This appeal by certificate	 involves an examination of the	 limits	 of the respective. jurisdictions of the Settlement Officer/Tribunal and the Civil Court in relation to an inquiry under section 9(1) of the Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act	 1948 (for short	 Abolition Act) and the effect of the Amending Acts .17 and 18 of 1957 and Act 20 of 1960 on cases regarding such an inquiry pending in or decided by the	 Civil Courts. It arises out of the following facts : The lands in dispute are situated in village Kadakalla	 Taluk Palakonda. On June 13	 1950	 the then State Government issued and published a notification under the	 Madras Estates (Reduction of Rent) Act	 1947 (for short	 Rent Reduction Act) in respect of this village. Subsequently	 the Settlement Officer of Srikakulam suo motu made an enquiry as to whether this village was an "estate" or not within the contemplation of section 9(2) of the Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act	 1948 (for short	 called Abolition Act) and by an order	 dated September 2	 1950	 held that it was not an 'inam estate ' within the meaning of section 2(7) of the Abolition Act. The Settlement Officer further recorded a finding that village Kadakalla became an estate by virtue of the Madras Estates Land (3rd Amendment) Act	 1936. Against that order of the Settlement Officer	 the appellants herein carried an appeal to the Estates Abolition Tribunal	 Vizianagaram. The 'Tribunal by its order	 dated September 16	 1952 dismissed the appeal in limine	 with the observation that the decision of the Settlement Officer being in their favour the appellants had no right of appeal	 The appellants then instituted O.S. 47 of 1953 in the Court of the Subordinate Judge	 Srikakulam against the State Government for a declaration that Kadakalla village was not an 'estate ' under section 3 (2) (d) of 1908 Act	 and consequently	_the Rent Reduction Act and the Abolition Act were not applicable to it. The trial court decreed the suit. Aggrieved by the decree	 the State preferred an appeal (A.S. 668 of 1954) to the High court of Andhra Pradesh. During the pendency of the said appeal	 the appellants instituted Original Suit No. 101 of 1954 (out of which the present appeal has arisen) in the Court of Subordinate Judge Srikakulam	 against the respondents herein and others for the recovery of Rs. 15	681/19 as rent or damages for the year 1953 in respect of the lands cultivated by them in the area of village Kadakalla. The suit was resisted by the respondents inter alia on the ground that the suit village was an 'estate ' as defined in section 3(2) (d) of the 1908 Act	 and that it had been so held by the Settlement Officer as per his Order dated September 2	 1950. It was further averred that the defendants not being parties to O.S. 47 of 1953	 were not bound by the decision in that case. It was added that the question as to whether this village was an estate or not	 was pending in the High 'Court of Andhra Pradesh in appeal from the decision in O.S. 47 of 1953	 and as such	 was sub judice. The jurisdiction of the Subordinate 659 Judge to try the suit (O.S. 101 of 1954) was also questioned. The claim for rent or damages was also resisted. On January 22	 1958	 the respondents herein made an application for permission to file an additional written statement for adding the plea that the suit village is an 'inam estate. On March 17	 1958	 the trial court dismissed this application holding that the question %ought to be raised	 was already covered by Issue No. 1. The trial court framed as many as eleven issues	 out of which Issues 1	 6 and 8 were as follows : (1) Whether the suit village is an estate within the meaning of Section 3 (2) (d) of the Madras Estates Land Act ? (6) Whether the plaintiffs are barred and estopped to claim rents in view of prior pattas and rent decrees that were previously obtained ? (8) Whether this Court has no jurisdiction to try the suit? On March 26	 1958	 the Advocates for the parties filed a joint memo to the effect that "both parties agree to abide by the final decision whether in the High Court or in the Supreme Court	 as the case may be	 in the appeal or revision	 arising out of O.S. No. 47 of 1953 on the file of this Court on the question whether the	 suit village Kadakalla is not an estate under section 3(2)(d) of the Madras Estates Land Act	 as amended upto date". As a result of this compromise	 it was held that the decision of Issues 1	 6 and 8 would follow the final decision in O.S. 47 of 1953. The remaining Issues were tried and decided on merits. On March 28	 1958	 the trial court keeping in view the joint memo filed by the parties and its findings on the other Issues	 passed a decree in these terms : "In case it is ultimately decided by the High Court or the Supreme Court	 as the case may be	 in the appeal or revision arising out of O.S. No. 47 of 1953 on the file of this Court that the suit village Kadakalla is not an estate within the meaning of section 3 (2) (d) of the Estates Land Act	 the defendants to pay to the plaintiffs the sum of Rs. 3	000/ with in terest at 5 1/2 per cent per annum from 26 3 1958 with interest thereon and for costs	 and that otherwise suit should stand dismissed with costs and that the decree should take effect from the date of the final decision of O.S. No. 47 of 1953 referred to above. " The appeal (A.S. 668 of 1954) arising out of O.S. 47 of 1953 was decided by the High Court on February 12	 1959 whereby the decree of the	 trial court declaring that village Kadakalla was not an estate	 was confirmed. The application of the State for issuance of a certificate of fitness for appeal to the Supreme Court was dismissed by the High Court. The State did not prefer any Special Leave Peti 660 tion in this Court	 with the result	 that the High Court 's decision in that case became final and the decree	 dated March 28	 1958	 of the Subordinate Judge in O.S. 101 of 1954 also became effective. After the disposal of its appeal (A.S. 668 of 1954)	 the Government issued G.O.R.T. No. 619 Rev. dated June 30	 1966	 canceling the earlier notifications in respect of this village notwithstanding the fact that prior to such renotification	 section 9 A had been inserted in the Abolition Act by the Amending Act 20 of 1960. Appellants preferred an appeal (A.S. 239 of 1961) against the said decree	 dated March 28	 1958	 of the Subordinate Judge	 to the High Court. Though in the Memorandum of Appeal	 it was said. as usual	 in general terms	 that the "decision of the lower court is against law	 weight of evidence and probabilities of the case"	 and that its decree was "worthless and did not conform to the requirements of section 2(2) of the Civil Procedure Code	 yet	 in substance	 the appeal related only to the extent of the land in the possession of the respondents and the quantum of rent or damages. The appellants ' claim was that the entire suit land	 as alleged in the plaint	 was under the cultivation of the respondents	 and consequently. the lower court was wrong in not decreeing the appellants ' claim for Rs. 15	681/19 as rent or damages	 in toto. On April 6. 1962. the respondents filed cross objections contending that the question as to whether Kadakalla village is or is not an 'estate ' as defined in section 3(2)(d) of the 1908 Act	 should have been gone into by the trial court and that the rent should have been decreed only in the sum of Rs. 551/29. The High Court posted the appeal and the cross objections for hearing in July	 1965. 	 At that stage	 on July 19	 1965. an application was made by the respondents praying that Exhts. B 196 and B 197	 being copies of the order	 dated September 2	 1950	 of the Settlement Officer and the order dated September 16	 1952	 of the Estate Abolition Tribunal	 respectively	 be read as additional evidence. It was contended that the Amending Act 20 of 1960 had added section 9A to the Abolition Act	 as a result of which	 the order of the Settlement Officer had acquired 'statutory validity '; and since the appellants did not file an appeal within two months from the commencement of the Amendment Act	 the decision of the Settlement Officer became final and binding on all the parties including the appellants. In spite of opposition by the	 appellants	 the High Court by its order	 dated August 23	 1956	 allowed this additional evidence and the setting up of the new plea. The appeal and the cross objections were heard together in August. The respondents raised a preliminary objection that the suit itself was incompetent as the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to decide whether the suit village is an estate	 or not and	 therefore	 any decision given by the High Court in appeal (A.S. 668 of 1954) would not bind the parties and the decree in the present suit (O.S. 101 of 1954) on the	 basis of the judgment and decree in A.S. 668 661 of 1954. would be without jurisdiction rendering it null and void	 .that the Settlement Officer was the competent authority to decide the tenure of the village and his decision had become final in view of the introduction of Section 9A by Act 20 of 1960. The preliminary objection of the respondents was upheld	 The contention of the appellants	 that since section 9A was inserted by an amendment which came into force on June 23	 1960	 it could not affect the compromise decree of the Court passed earlier on March 28. 1958 or the decree of the High Court whereby both the parties agreed to abide	 by the decision of the High Court or the Supreme Court in appeal or revision arising out of O.S. 47 of 1953	 was rejected in these terms "We see no force in this contention as Section 9A is designed to meet such of the decisions where it has been held that the village is not an inam estate as it stood after the 1936 Act and certainly the respondents can take advantage of change. in statute		 if it is to their benefit and there could be no estoppel against a statute and the rights accrued under a statute. It cannot reasonably be contended that the suit filed by the appellants and the decree obtained have reached any finality as an appeal is only the continuation of the proceedings instituted by the plaintiffs. " In the result. it dismissed the appeal holding that the Civil Court was not the forum for the suit as framed by the appellants and the questions raised in the suit including the claim ' for arrears of rent or damages. were outside the Jurisdiction of the Civil Court. Before dealing with the contentions canvassed	 it will be useful to have a clear idea of the relevant statutory provisions	 including the expressions "inam village"	 "inam estate" and "estate" as defined therein. section 3(2)(d) of the Madras Estates Land Act. 1908	 as it originally stood	 defined "estate" as "any village of which the land revenue alone (i.e. melwaram alone) has been granted in inam to a person not owing the kudiwaram (rights in soil) thereof	 provided the grant has been made	 confirmed or recognised by the British Government or as separated part of such village. " In this definition	 it was not clear whether the inamdar had the melwaram alone or both melwaram and kudiwaram. To remove this obscurity	 the Madras Estates Land (Third Amendment) Act	 (18 of 1936)	 substituted for the original sub clause (d) in section 3(2)	 this new clause "(d) any inam village of which the grant has been made	 confirmed or recognised by the Government 'notwithstanding that subsequent to the grant	 the village has been partitioned among the grantees or the successors in title of the grantee or grantees." ' Section 3(2)(d) was further amended by Madras Estates Land Amendment Act II of 1945 with retrospective effect from the date 662 on which the Third Amendment Act 18 of 1936 came into force. It inserted (among others) Explanation 1	 to this clause	 which reads "Where a grant as an inam is expressed to be of a named village. the area which forms the subject matter of the grant shall be deemed to be an estate notwithstanding that it did not include certain lands in the village of that name would have already been granted on service or other tenure or been reserved for communal purposes." Explanation I makes it clear that (apart from being made	 confirmed	 or recognised by the Government)	 an inam grant in order to come within the purview of "estate" under section 3(2) (d) has to be a grant expressly made of a named village or whole Village	 and not only of a part of the village or of some defined area in a village. However	 it remains and is 'deemed to be a grant of a whole village notwithstanding the exclusion of certain lands already granted on service 	or other tenure or reserved for communal purposes; nor does it cease to be a grant of an entire village merely because the village has been subsequently ' partitioned amongst the grantees or their successors. The interpretation of "estate" has behind it the authority of a bedroll of decisions	 including that of this Court in District Board	 Tanjore	 vs Noor Mohammed(1) Next	 in chronological order	 is the Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari). Act	 (XXVI of 1948). Section 1(3) thereof provided that "it applies to all estates as defined in section 3	 clause (2) of the Madras Estates Land Act. 1908 (except inam villages which became estates by virtue of the Madras Estates Land (Third Amendment) Act	 1936. The material part of section 2 of this Act says (3) "Estate" means a zamindari or an under tenure or an under tenure of an inam estate. (7) "Inam Estate" means an estate within the meaning of section 3. clause (2) (d)	 of the Estates Land Act	 but does not include an inam village which became an estate by virtue of the Madras Estates Land (Third Amendment) Act	 1936". Thus	 to begin with	 this Act did not take in its fold post 1936 inam estates. Its operation remained confined to pre 1936 inam estates till the commencement of Act 18 of 1957	 which we shall presently notice. Section 9 of the Abolition Act indicates the authorities empowered to determine Inam estate. It says "(1) As soon as may be after the passing of this Act	 the Settlement Officer may suo motu and shall	 on application enquire and determine whether an inam village in his jurisdiction is an inam estate or not. (1) (1952) 2 M. J 586 (section C.) 663 (2) Before holding the inquiry	 the Settlement Officer shall cause to be published in the village in the prescribed manner	 a notice requiring all persons claiming an in terest in any land in the village to file before	 him statements bearing on the question whether the village is an inam estate or not. (3) The Settlement Officer shall then hear the parties and afford to them a reasonable opportunity of adducing all such evidence either oral or documentary as they may desire to examine all such documents as he has reason to believe are in the possession of the Government and have a bearing on the question before him and give him decision in writing. (4) (a) Any person deeming himself aggrieved by a decision of the Settlement Officer under sub section (3) may within two months from the date of the decision or such further time as the Tribunal may in its discretion allow	 appeal to the Tribunal. (b) Where any such appeal is preferred	 the Tribunal shall cause to. be Publisher in the village in the prescribed manner a notice requiring all persons who have applied to the Settlement Officer under sub section (1) or filed before him before it	 and after giving them a reasonable opportunity of being heard	 give its decision. (c) The decision of the Tribunal under this sub section shall be final and not be liable to be questioned in any court of law. (5) No decision of the Settlement Officer under sub section (3) or of the Tribunal under sub section (4) shall be invalid by reason of any defect in the form of the notice referred to in sub section (2) or sub section (4) as the case may be	 or the manner of its publication. (6) Every decision of the Tribunal and subject to such decision	 every decision of the Settlement Officer under this section shall be binding on all persons claiming an interest in any law in the village. notwithstanding that any such person has not preferred any application or filed any statement or adduced any evidence or appeared or participated in the proceedings before the Settlement Officer or the Tribunal as the case may be. (7) In the absence of evidence to the contrary the Settlement Officer and the Tribunal may Presume that an inam village is an inam estate". Madras Amendment Act 17 of 1951	 introduced section 64 A	 which runs thus: "64 A.(1) The decision of a Tribunal or Special Tribunal in any proceeding under this Act	 or of a Judge of the 664 High Court hearing a case under Section 51 (2)	 on any matter falling within its or his Jurisdiction shall be binding on the parties thereto	 ' and persons claiming under them	 in any suit of. proceeding in a Civil Court in so far as such matter is in issue between the parties or persons aforesaid in such suit or proceeding. (2) The decision of a Civil Court (not being ;he Court of Small Causes) on any matter within its jurisdiction shall be binding on the parties thereto and persons claiming under them in any proceeding under this Act before a Tribunal or Special Tribunal	 or a Judge of the High Court under section 5 1 (2) in so far as such matter is in issue between the parties or persons aforesaid in such proceeding. " In 1957	 two Amending Acts both of which came into force on December 23	 1957	 were passed. One was Andhra Pradesh Act 17 of 1957	 which substituted the following clause for clause (a) in subsection (4) of section 9 of the Abolition Act	 1948 : (a) (i) Against a decision of the Settlement Officer under subsection (3)	 the Government may	 within one year from the date of the decision or if such decision was given before the commencement of the Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) (Andhra Pradesh Amendment) Act	 1957	 within one year from such commencement and any persons aggrieved by such decision may within two months from the date of the decision or such further time as the Tribunal may in its discretion allow	 appeal to the Tribunal. (ii) If		 before the commencement of the Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) (Andhra Pradesh Amendment) Act	 1957	 any order has been passed by the Government against a decision of the Settlement Officer on the ground that the Government were not competent to file an appeal under this clause or that such appeal was time barred	 the Tribunal shall on an application filed by the Government within one year from the commencement of the Amendment Act aforesaid	 vacate the order already passed by it and pass a fresh order on merits. " In clause (b) of s.9(4) of the Abolition Act	 after the words where such appeal is preferred"	 the words "by an aggrieved person	 the Tribunal shall give notice to the Government and in the case of all appeals whether by the ;Government or by an aggrieved person" were inserted. The second Amending Act was Andhra Pradesh Act 18 of 1957	 section 2 of which substituted the following section for sub section (3) of section 1 of the Abolition Act 665 "It applies to all estates as defined in section 3	 clause (2)	 of the Madras Estates Land Act	 1908	 (Madras Act 1 of 1908). " This Act further substituted the following clause for clause (7) of s.2 of the principal Act: "In an estate" means an estate within the meaning of section 3	 clause (2) (d) of the Madras Estates Land Act	 1908 (Madras Act 1 of 1908)". In s.9 of the principal Act	 after the words "Inam village" or "the village"	 wherever they occurred the words "or hamlet or khandriga granted as inam" were inserted. It will be seen that Act 18 of 1957	 made the Abolition Act applicable even to villages that became estates under the 1936 Amendment of the 1908 Act. For the purpose of the Abolition Act that distinction between pre 1936 and post 1936 inam grants disappeared	 and this Act became applicable to all estates falling under the definition ill section 3 (2) of the 1908 Act. Andhra Pradesh Act No. 20 of 1960	 which came into force on the 23rd of June	 1960 inserted in the Abolition Act	 s.9 A	 which	 provides : " Inquiry under section 9 not necessary in certain cases If before the commencement of the Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) (Andhra Pradesh Second Amendment) Act	 1957 (Andhra Pradesh Act XVIII of 1957) (any decision was given under section 9 in respect of any village that it was not an inam estate as it stood defined before such commencement	 and that decision was based on the finding that the inam village became an estate by virtue of the Madras Estates Land ( 'third Amendment) Act	 1936 (Madras Act XVIII of 1936) then: (a) if the decision based on the finding aforesaid was given by the Tribunal under sub section(4) of section 9	 no fresh inquiry under that section shall be necessary for taking any	 proceedings tinder this Act on the basis of that finding; and (b) if the decision based on the finding aforesaid was given by the Settlement Officer	 and no appeal was filed to the Tribunal	 the Government or any person aggrieved	 may appeal to the Tribunal against the decision and finding within two months from the com mencement of the Madras Estates (Abolition and ment). Act	 1960 and if no such appeal is filed	 the finding of the Settlement Officer shall be final and no fresh inquiry shall be necessary for taking any proceedings under this Act on the basis of that finding. " 666 The same Act 20 of 1960 introduced this section in the present Act : "12(1) No notification issued under sub section (4) of section 1 of the principal Act during the period between the 23rd December	 1957	 and the commencement of this Act	 on the basis of finding recorded in any decision given before the said date by the Settlement Officer	 or the Tribunal under section 9 of the principal Act (such finding being to the effect that the inam village become an estate by virtue of the Madras Estates Land (Third Amendment) Act	 1936 (Madras Act XVIII of 1936)	 shall be deemed to be invalid or ever .to have been invalid merely on the ground (a) that before issuing the notification no fresh inquiry was made by the Settlement Officer under the said section 9 after the said date; or (b) that the landholder or other person aggrieved had No. occasion to appeal to the Tribunal against the decision and finding of the Settlement Officer; and all such notifications issued and actions taken in pursuance thereof during the period aforesaid shall be deemed always to have been validly issued and taken in accordance with law. (2) No suit or other proceeding challenging the validity of any such notification or action or for any relief on the ground that such notification or action was not validly issued or taken shall be maintained or conti nued in any court	 and no court shall enforce any decree or other holding any such notification or action to be invalid or grant any relief to any person. " The first question that falls for decision is : To what extent and in what circumstances the Civil Court is competent in a suit to go into the question whether a particular village is an "estate"? By virtue of section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure	 the Civil Courts 'have jurisdiction to decide all suits of a civil nature excepting those of which their cognizance		 is either expressly or impliedly barred. The exclusion of the civil court 's jurisdiction	 therefore	 is not to be readily assumed unless the relevant statute expressly or by inevitable implication does so. The question thus further resolves itself into the :issue : How far s.9(1) of the Abolition Act confers exclusive jurisdiction on the Settlement Officer to determine inam estates? This matter is not res Integra. In Addenki Tiruvenkata Thata Desika Charyulu vs State of Andhra Pradesh	 (1) this Court held that there is an express bar to the jurisdiction of the civil court to adjudicate upon the question	 whether "any inam village" is an "inam 1. A.I.R. 1964 section C. 807 667 estate" or not	 and that 	to the extent of the question stated in section 9(1)	 the jurisdiction of the Settlement Officer and of the Tribunal are exclusive ". It was pertinently added that this exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil court would be subject to two limitations. First	 the civil courts have jurisdiction to examine into cases where the provisions of the Act have not been complied with or the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. The second is as regards the exact extent to which	 the	 powers of statutory tribunals are exclusive. The question as to whether any particular case falls under the first or the second of the above categories would depend on the purpose of the statute. and its general scheme	 taken in conjunction with the scope of the enquiry entrusted to the tribunal set up and other relevant factors. Applying the above principles	 the Court clarified the limits of the respective jurisdictions of the Settlement Officer/Tribunal and the civil. court	 thus : the object of the Act is to abolish only "inam estates". This determination involves two distinct matters in view of the circumstances that every "inam village" is not necessarily "an inam estate" viz.	 (1) whether a particular property is or is not an "inam village" and (2) whether such a village is "an inam estate" within the definition of section 2(7). The first of these questions whether the grant is of an "inam village" is referred to in section 9(1) itself as some extrinsic fact which must preexist before the Settlement Officer can embark on the enquiry contemplated by that provision and the Abolition Act as it stood at the date relevant to this appeal	 makes no provision for this being the subject of enquiry by the Settlement Officer . Where therefore persons appearing in opposition to the proceedings initiated before the Settlement Officer under section 9 question the character of the property as not falling within the description of an "inam village"	 he has of necessity to decide the Issue	 for until he holds that this condition is satisfied he cannot enter on the further enquiry which is the one which by section 9(1) of the Act he is directed to conduct. On the terms of section 9 (1)	 the property in question being an "inam village" is assumed as a fact on the existence of which the competency of the Settlement Officer to determine the matter within his jurisdiction rests and as there are no words in the statute empowering him to decide finally the former be cannot confer jurisdiction on himself by a wrong decision on this preliminary condition to his jurisdiction. Any determination by him of this question	 therefore	 is (subject to the result of an appeal to the Tribunal) binding on the parties only for the purposes of the proceedings under the Act	 but no further. The correctness of that finding may be questioned in any subsequent legal proceeding in the ordinary courts of the land where the question might arise for decision. " 668 Now let us approach the problem in hand in the light of the principles enunciated in Desika Charyulu 's case (supra). Mr. Natesan	 learned Counsel for the appellants	 contends that in the instant case	 the decision	 dated September 2	 1950	 of the Settlement Officer fell within the second category of cases pointed out in Desika Charyulu 's case (supra) which could be challenged in the civil court	 because	 firstly	 Kadakalla village was not an "inam village" as the	 	grant was not of the whole village	 and the Settlement Officer had grievously erred in assuming it to be so; secondly	 as soon as the Settlement Officer reached the finding that the village was not an "inam estate" within the then extant definition in section 2(7) of the Abolition Act	 he became functus officio and had no further jurisdiction under section 9(1) to proceed with the enquiry and hold that it was an estate" under section 3(2)(d) of the Estates Land Act	 1908. In reply	 Mr. P. Rameshwara Rao	 learned Counsel for the respondents	 maintains that under section 9(1)	 the Settlement Officer had the jurisdiction to determine all the three facts	 namely : (1) whether Kadakalla was an 'inam village '; (2) if so	 whether it was a pre 1936 'inam estate ' falling under the definition in section 2(7) of the Abolition Act	 or (3) a post 1936 'inam estate ' under section 3(2)(d)	 of the 1908 Act. The decision of the Settlement Officer	 according to the learned Counsel	 as to fact No. (1) was conclusive and operated as res judicata under section 64 A	 of the Abolition Act	 between the parties	 be	cause before the Settlement Officer	 it was no body 's case that Kadakalla was not an "inam village". In these circumstances	 the decision of the Settlement Officer not being in excess of his jurisdiction	 could not be questioned in a civil court. The argument	 though seemingly attractive	 does not stand a close examination and we are unable to accept it. On the other hand	 we find force in what has been contended from the appellants ' side. Under the Abolition Act	 as it stood at the material date	 the enquiry by the Settlement Officer could legitimately be confined to the ascertainment of only two issues of fact	 viz.(1) Was Kadakalla an "inam village" ? (2) if so	 was it an 'inam estate ' as defined in section 2 (7) of the Abolition Act? Once issue (2) was determined	 the enquiry would be complete and the limits of his exclusive jurisdiction 	circumscribed by section 9(1) reached; and	 if he went beyond those limits to investigate and determine further something which was unnecessary or merely incidental or remotely related to issue (2)	 then such incidental or unnecessary determination	 could be questioned in the civil court. Again	 any finding recorded by the Settlement Officer regarding the property in question being an 'inam village ' or not	 is not final or conclusive it being a finding of a jurisdictional fact	 only	 the preexistence of which is a sine qua non to the exercise of his exclusive jurisdiction by the Settlement Officer. Investigation as to the existence or otherwise of this preliminary fact is done by the Settlement Officer to ascertain whether or not he has jurisdiction to determine that the particular property is an 'inam estate '. If upon such investigation	 he 669 finds that the property is 'an 'inam village '	 the foundation for the exercise of his exclusive jurisdiction is laid	 and he can then	 and then only	 embark upon the enquiry envisaged by the statute. If such investigation reveals that the property is not an 'inam village '	 the con dition precedent to the exercise of such jurisdiction by him	 would be lacking. The Legislature must have visualised that under the cloak of an erroneous finding as to the existence or nonexistence of this prerequisite	 the Settlement Officer may illegally clutch at jurisdiction not conferred on him	 or	 refuse to exercise jurisdiction vesting in him. Perhaps	 that is why the statute does not leave the final determination of this preliminary fact to the Settlement Officer/Tribunal and his erroneous finding on that fact is liable to be question in civil court. The contention of Mr. Rao that before the Settlement Officer the fact of Kadakalla village being an "inam village" was not disputed	 does not appear to be home out by the record. A perusal of the. Settlement Officer 's order dated September 2	 1950	 would show that it was contended before him on behalf of the Inamdars "that there was no village at all at the time of grant" and "that there were more than one grant as Inam in the village". Assuming for the sake of argument that the appellants had failed to contest or adduce proof before the Settlement Officer that Kadakalla was not an 'inam village '	 then also	 we fail to appreciate how	 on Principle that would make the case any different so as to preclude the appellants from reagitating that matter in the civil court. Once it is held that determination of this fact is not a matter of the exclusive jurisdiction of the Settlement Officer	 the appellants cannot be debarred on the basis of any doctrine	 of res judicata from getting the matter fully and finally adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction. In view of the above discussion	 it is clear that under the law in force at the material time	 a suit for a declaration that the decision of the Settlement Officer/Tribunal holding certain properties to be an 'estate ' under section 3 (2) (a) of the	 1908 Act was void	 was maintainable on the ground that the suit property was not an 'inam village '. There can be no dispute that Suit No. 47 of 1953 is of that category and falls well nigh within the ratio of Gosukonda Venkata. Narasayya vs State of Madras	(1) which was approved by this Court in Desika Charyulu 's case (supra). The main contention of the appellants in this suit was that the village Kadakalla was not in 'inam village ' as the grant did not comprise the whole village and consequently	 it is not an 'estate ' within the definition in s.3 (2) (d) of the 1908 Act. The trial court accepted this contention and decreed the suit. The High Court confirmed that decision	 holding that when the grant was made (in 1774)	 it was neither of the whole village nor of a named village within the meaning of Explanation 1 to s.3 (2) (d) of the 1908 Act. In Original Suit 101 of 1954	 also	 the relief of rent or damages (1) A. I. R. 670 is conditional and dependent upon and linked up (by an agreement between the parties) with the determination of the main question involved in the former suit. We have	 therefore	 no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the common question in both these suits regarding Kadakalla being an estate or not	 on the ground that it was not an inam village	 was within the competence of the civil court. Further point to be considered is : whether the jurisdiction of the civil courts to proceed with and determine the aforesaid suits 'was	 in any way	 affected by the enactment of Amending Acts 17 and 18 of 1957. For reasons that follow	 the answer to this question	 in our opinion	 must be in the negative. It is well settled that ordinarily	 when the substantive law is altered during the pendency of an action	 rights of the parties are decided according to law	 as it existed when the action was begun unless the new statute shows a clear intention to vary such rights (Maxwell on Interpretation	 12th Edn. 220). That is to say	 in the absence of anything in the Act	 to say that it is to have retrospective operation	 it cannot be so construed as to have the effect of altering the law applicable to a claim in litigation at the time when the Act is passed. Let us	 therefore	 see whether there is anything in the Amending Acts 17 and 18 of 1957 which in clear language gives them a retrospective effect. A plain reading of these Amending Acts would show that there is nothing of this kind in them	 which	 expressly or by necessary intendment	 affects pending actions. The only major change introduced by Act 17 of 1957 was that it gave to the Government a right to file an appeal to the Tribunal	 if it felt aggrieved against the decision of Settlement Officer under sub section (3) of s.9 of the Abolition Act	 within one year from the date of the decision	 or	 if such decision was rendered before December 23	 1957 i.e. the commencement of Act 17 of 1957	 within one year from such date. It further entitled the Government to get its appeal	 if any	 dismissed	 as incompetent	 by the Tribunal restored within one year of the commencement of the Amending Act. Likewise	 the only effect of the Amending Act 18 of 1957 was that it enlarged the definition of 'inam estate ' for the purpose of Abolition Act by taking in post 1936 Inams. There is no non obstante clause in. these Amending Acts of 1957 with reference to pending or closed civil actions. Nor is there anything in the scheme	 setting or provisions of these Amending Acts which fundamentally alters the conditions on which such actions were founded. No back date or dates of their commencement have been specified in the body of these statutes as was done in Madras Estates Land Amendment Act 11 of 1945 which was expressly enforced with effect from the date of the commencement of Act 18 of 1936. These Amending Acts were published in the Government Gazette on December 23	 1957	 and will therefore be deemed to have come into force 671 from that date only. The provisions	 of these Amending Statutes are not merely Procedural but affect substantive rights		 and impose. new obligation ' and disabilities. In them	 the Legislature has not spoken in clear language that they would unsettle	 settled claims or take away or abridge rights already accrued	 or cause abatement of pending actions. These Amending Acts	 'therefore	 can be construed as having a prospective operation only. They cannot be interpreted as taking away the rights of the litigants in Suits O.S. 47 of 1953 and O.S. 101 of 1954 (which were at the commencement of these Amendments pending at the appellate or original stage) to have their respective claims determined in	 accordance with the law in force at the time of the institution of the actions. Before we come to the Amending Act 20 of 1960	 it is necessary to examine whether the decrees in O.S. 47 of 1953 and O.S. 101 of 1954 had attained finality. And	 if so	 when and to what extent ? So far as the decree of the High Court (in A.S. 668 of 1954 arising out of O.S. 47 of 1953) is concerned	 there is no dispute that it had become final and conclusive between the parti es to that action	 namely	 the State Government and the present appellants on February 12	 1954. Learned Counsel are	 however	 not agreed as to whether the decree	 dated March 28	 1958	 passed by the civil court in Suit No. 101 of 1954 had also assumed such a character. Mr. Natesan. vehemently contended that this decree in so far as it	 pursuant to the agreement between the parties	 incorporated in it	 the final determination of the High Court in A.S. 668 of 1954 that Kadakalla was not an estate was a consent decree	 and as such	 was final and non appealable in view of section 96(3) of the Code of Civil Pro cedure. On the respondents ' side Mr. Rao argued that no part of this decree was final and conclusive between the parties on the ground of estoppel or otherwise	 because (a) the appellants had in grounds 1 and 2 of the Memo of Appeal presented in the High Court	 challenged the decree in its entirety; (b) the joint memo filed by the Advocates	 concerned legal issues	 including that of jurisdiction. and as such the agreement was not lawful that would bind the parties; (c) the respondents were not a party to the proceedings in A. section 668 of 1954 and (d) the arrangement arrived at by the Advocates	 being dependent on the happening of a future event	 did not amount to a lawful adjustment of the claim	 and the decree based on it	 was inchoate. None of the points urged by Mr. Rao appears to hold water. The allegations in grounds 1 and 2 of the Memo of Appeal (which have been referred to in a foregoing part of this judgment) are too vague and general to amount to an averment. They appear to have been introduced just as a matter of form and habit by the draftsman. From the Memo of Appeal	 read as a whole	 it is clear that	 in substance and truth		 the challenge was directed only against that part of 3 L748SCI/74 672 the decree which fixed the quantum of rent and damages. In fact	 before the	 High Court it was vigorously contended on behalf of the 	appellants that 	 part of the decree	 which	 in effect	 declared that the village is not an estate ' under section 3 (2) (d)	 having been imported with the consent of the parties	 was not appealable under section 96(3)	 Code of Civil Proce dure	 and	 in reality	 had not been appealed against. In support of this contention	 reliance was placed on the	 Division Bench 	decision in Srinivasa vs Tathachariar(1). The High Court did not discuss or distinguish this decision. Nor did it say in so many words that the whole of the decree including the part based on compromise	 was under challenge in the appeal. It rejeited the contention with the remark that it had already "observed that the appeal is but a continuation of the	 suit and there could be no estoppel against a statute". Perhaps	 it was assumed that in the Memo of Appeal	 every bit of the decree was being challenged by the appellants. We think	 with all respect	 that such an assumption was contrary to the well established principle that in construing a pleading or a like petition	 in this 	country	 the court should not look merely to its form	 or pick out from it isolated words or sentences; it must read the petition as a whole	 gather the real intention of the party and reach at the substance of the matter. Thus construed	 the Memo of Appeal in this	 case could not be said to contain a challenge to that part of the decree which was in terms of the compromise agreement between the parties. Order 23	 Rule 3	 Code of Civil Procedure	 not only permits a partial compromise and adjustment of a suit by a lawful agreement	 but further gives a mandate to the court to record it and pass a decree	 in terms of such compromise or adjustment in so far as it relates to the suit. If the compromise agreement was lawful and	 as we shall presently discuss	 it was so the decree to the extent it was a consent decree	 was not appealable	because of the express bar in section 96	(3) of the Code. Next point is	 whether this agreement was lawful ? We have already discussed that the Amending Acts of 1957 did not affect pending actions in which a declaration is sought that a particular property is not an estate	 on the ground that it is not an 'inam village '. This issue which was intertwined with that of jurisdiction	 was very largely a question of fact. It follows therefrom that in any such suit	 the parties in order to avoid unnecessary expense and botheration	 could legitimately make an agreement to abide by a determination on the same point in issue in another pending action in an advanced stage. There was nothing unlawful and improper in such an arrangement particularly when the interests at the respondents were sufficiently safeguarded by the State which was hotly controverting the decree of the trial court regarding Kadakalla being an estate. By no stretch of reasoning it could be said that this agreement was collusive or was an attempt to contract out of the statute. There can be no doubt that as soon as the Court accepted the compromise agreement between the parties	 and	 acting on it	 passed a (1) A. I. R. 673 decree in terms thereof	 the compromise	 to the extent of the matter covered by it	 was complete. Nothing further remained to be done by the parties in pursuance of that agreement. The decree had become absolute and immediately executable on February 12	 1959 when the High Court in A.S. 668 of 1954 finally decided that Kadakalla was not an estate. Be that as it may		 the bar to an appeal against a consent decree	 in sub section (3) of section 96 of the Code is based on the broad principle of estoppel. It presupposes that the parties to an action can	 expressly or by implication	 waive or forego their right of appeal by any lawful 	agreement or compromise	 or even by conduct. Therefore	 as soon as the parties made the agreement to abide by the determination in the 	appeal (A.S. 668) and induced the court to pass a decree in terms of that agreement	 the principle of estoppel underlying 196(3) became operative and the decree to the extent it was in terms of that agreement	 became final and binding between the parties. And it was as effective in creating an estoppel between the parties as a judgment on 	contest. Thus	 the determination in A.S. 668 that Kadakalla was not an 'estate ' became as much binding on the respondents	 as on the parties in that appeal. In the view we take	 we can derive support from the ratio of this Court 's decision in Raja Sri Sailendra Narayan Bhanja Deo vs State of Orissa(1). In that case	 there was a compromise decree between the predecessors in title of the appellant therein on the one hand	 and the Secretary of State on the other	 that Kanika Raj was an 'estate ' as defined by Orissa Estates Abolition Act of 1951. This Court held that the appellant was estopped by the compromise decree from denying that the Raj was not such an 'estate '. In the light of the above discussion	 we would hold that part of the decree in Suit No. 101 of 1954 which was in terms of the compromise agreement had become	 final between the parties	 and	 the appeal from that decree could not be said to be a continuation of that part of the claim which had been settled by agreement. The combined effect of the two integrated decrees in Suit No. 47 and Suit No. 101	 in so far as they	 declared that Kadakalla	 not being an. 'inam village	 was not an estate under section 3(2)(d) of the 1908 Act	 was to completely vacate and render non est the decision dated September 2	 1950 of the Settlement Officer. Against the above background	 we have to consider whether the Amending Act 20 of 1960 operates retrospectively to nullify final decrees of civil courts which had before its commencement	 declared such decisions of Settlement Officer totally void and nonexistent ? Does the 'Act expressly or by necessary intendment bring into life again all such dead decisions of the Settlement Officer ? In approaching these questions	 two fundamental principles of interpretation have to be kept in view. The first is	 that if the Legislature	 (1) ; 674 acting within its legislative competence	 wants to neutralise or reopen a court 's decision	 "it is not sufficient" to use the words of Hidaytullah C.J. in Shri Prithvi Cotton Mills Ltd. vs Broach Borough Municipality(1) "to declare merely that the decision of the Court shall not bind	 for that is tantamount to reversing the decision in exercise of judicial power which the Legislature does not possess or exercise. A court 's decision must always bind unless the conditions on which it is based are so fundamentally altered that the decision could not have been given in the altered circumstances. " Thus	 the first test to be applied is	 whether the Amending Act 20 of 1960 has so radically altered the conditions on which the said decrees proceed	 that they would not have been passed in the altered circumstances ? The point is that the law which was the basis of the decision must be altered and then	 the foundation failing	 the binding value of the decision fails when the non obstante clause is superadded. As shall be presently seen	 by this test	 the answer to this question must be in the negative. The second principle to recall the words of Bowen L.J. in Reid vs Reid(2) is	 that in construing a statute or "a section in a statute which is to a certain extent retrospective	 we ought nevertheless to bear in mind the maxim (that is	 except in special cases	 the new law ought to be construed so as to interfere as little as possible with vested eights as applicable whenever we reach the line at which the words of the section cease to be plain. That is a necessary and logical corollary of the	 general proposition that you ought not to give a larger retrospective power to a section	 even in an Act which is to some extent intended to be retrospective	 than you can plainly see the Legislature meant. " With the above principle in mind	 let us now examine the provisions of the Amending Act 20 of 1960. In this Act	 also no back date for its commencement has been mentioned. It will	 therefore	 be deemed to have commenced on June 23	 1960	 which is the date on which it was published in the Govt. Gazette. It does not say (excepting in section 12 inserted by it which obviously does not apply to the facts of this case) that the amendment would have effect and would be deemed always to have had effect from the inception of the parent Act	 nor does it use any equivalent expressions or similar words which are usually found in Amending Acts intended to have retrospective operation without any limit. ' Section 9 A inserted by this Amending Act in the parent Act	 does not begin with any non obstante cause	 whatever having reference to decrees or orders of civil courts. In terms	 it concern	s itself only with a certain category of decisions given before the commencement of Act 18 of 1957 by the Settlement Officer/Tribunal	 under section 9 of the Abolition Act. Such decisions are those which were based on the finding that a particular Inam village had become estateby virtue of the. Madras Estates Land (Third Amendment) Act	 1936. The Order	 dated September 2	 1950	 of the Settlement Officer in the instant case	 was a decision of this category	 inasmuch as he held that. Kadakalla was not an 'inam estate ' because it was a post 1936 (1) L19701 1 S.C.R. 388. (2) at 408. 675 inam	 and as such	 was not covered by the definition in section 2 (7) of the Abolition Act. But	 before the commencement of the Amending Act	 1960	 this decision as a result of the High Court 's decree	 stood finally vacated. It is not at all clear from the language of this Amending Act	 that the intention was to revive even such legally non existent decisions of the Settlement Officer. On The contrary	 definite indications ire available that the section was not intended to have unlimited retrospective operation. The first of such indications is available from the marginal heading of section 9 A	 itself " which is to the effect : "Inquiry under section 9. not necessary in certain cases"	 The heading discloses the purpose as well as the extent of the new provision. it envisages only such cases in which the decision of the Settlement Officer was not successfully challenged in the civil court on the ground that the parti cular property was not an inam village; for	 it would be pointless	 only in such cases	 to hold a further inquiry into the matter. The second hint of legislative intent is available in section 64 A (2) which has not been touched by the Amending Act. Section 64 A(2) provides that the decision of the civil court on any matter within its jurisdiction shall be binding on the parties thereto and persons claiming under them in any proceeding under the Abolition Act before the Tribunal or the Special Tribunal. If the intention was to exclude the Jurisdiction of the civil court altogether	 s.64 A(2) would either have been deleted or drastically amended so as to alter the basic conditions with effect from the very inception of the parent Act	 that in the altered Conditions those decisions could not have been rendered by the civil courts. For instance	 it could say that the decision of the Settlement Officer on the question whether a particular property is an 'inam village ' or not	 would be conclusive and final and would always be deemed to have been so." In view	 of what has been said above	 we are of the opinion that s.9 A takes in its retrospective sweep only those decisions of the settlement Officer or the Tribunal which at the commencement of the Amending Act 20 of 1960 were subsisting and had not been totally vacated or rendered non est by a decree of a competent court. The decision dated September 2	 1950 of the Settlement Officer in the instant case	 was not such a decision. It had ceased to exist as 'a result of the inter linked decree in O.S. 47 of 1953 and O.S. 101 of 1954	 passed before the enactment of this Amending Act. The Amending Act of 1960	 therefore	 does not in any way	 affect the finality or the binding effect. of those decrees. Quite	 a number of authorities were cited by the learned Counsel on both sides	 but it is not necessary to notice all of them because in lost of them the facts were materially different. Only one of those cases in which the interpretation of sections 9 A and 64 A was involved reserves to be noticed. It is reported in Yeliseth Satyanarayana vs Aditha agannadharab and ors.(1) (1) [1966] I.L.R. A.P. 729. 676 The writ petitioners in that case had challenged the order of the Estates Abolition Tribunal which had held (1) that the previous order of the Civil Court holding the suit lands to be an estate	 by virtue of the Amending Act XVIII of 1936 to the Madras Estates Land Act	 1908	 was not res judicata under section 64 A of the Abolition Act and (2) that the land holder had a right of appeal under section 9 A of the said Act	 and that the inam was not of the whole village and	 conse quently	 was not an 'estate '. The first question for consideration by the High Court was	 whether the appeal filed by the land holder before the Estates Abolition Tribunal was maintainable	 notwithstanding the fact that such an appeal was not entertained earlier by the Tribunal on the ground of its being incompetent. On the construction of section 9 A(b)	 this question was answered in the affirmative. The second question before the High Court was	 whether the previous judgments of the Civil Court were res judicata under section 64 A. The Bench analysed and explained the circumstances in which the first or the second sub s of section 64 A operates. It will be useful to extract those observations here "The bar under section 64 A is applicable in two sets of circumstances; one	 where the decision was of a Tribunal or Special Tribunal or of a Judge of the High Court hearing a case under section 51; (2) the other	 where it is a decision of a Civil Court on any matter falling within its jurisdiction. The decisions mentioned in the first category are binding on the Civil Courts and the decisions mentioned in the second category are binding on the Tribunal or Special Tribunal or a Judge of the High Court when he hears a case under section 51 (2). In so far as the facts of this case are concerned	 it is sub section (2) of section 64 A that is applicable." On the second question	 the learned Judges held that the previous decisions of the Civil Court could not operate as res judicata because the issue as to whether the suit property was an estate under the Amending Act of 1957	 was not under contest. Both the parties as a matter of concession	 had conceded that fact and the Government. was not a party to the proceeding. In these peculiar circum stances	 it was held that the 'concession or assumption made in the previous proceedings	 was not a 'decision ' within the meaning of section 64 A(2). In the case before us	 as already observed	 the State had contested this issue regarding Kadakalla being an estate or not	 right upto the High Court. It would	 therefore	 operate as res judicata between the State and the land owners. The same binding effect is produced by estoppel raised by the consent decree in the suit out of which the present appeal has arisen. Thus	 this ruling does not	 advance the case of the respondents. For all the foregoing reasons	 we allow this appeal	 reverse the judgment of the High Court and send the case back to it for decision 677 on the remaining issues in accordance with law. We make no orders as to the costs of this Court. KRISHNA IYER	 J. The judgment just delivered has my concurrence. But a certain juristic thought expressed therein and consecrated in an authoritative passage which has fallen from Bowen	 L.J.	 in Reid vs Reid(1) persuades me to break my silence not so much in dissent but in explanatory divagation. The proposition there expressed and here followed relates to the presumption against vested rights being affected by subsequent legislation. Certainly this legal creed of Anglo Indian vintage has the support of learned pronouncements	 English and Indian. But when we apply it in all its sternness and sweep	 we err. Precedents should not be petrified nor judicial dicta divorced from the socioeconomic mores of the age. Judges are not prophets and only interpret laws in the light of the contemporary ethos. To regard them otherwise is unscientific. My thesis is that while applying the policy of statutory construction we should not forget the conditions and concepts which moved the judges whose rulings are cited	 nor be obsessed by respect at the expense of reason. Justice Gardozo(2) has in felicitous words made the same point : "There should be greater readiness to abandon an untenable position . when in its origin it was the product of institutions or conditions which have gained a new signifi cance or development with the progress of the years. In such circumstances	 the words of Wheeler	 J.	 in Dwy vs Connecticut Co.	 	 99	. express the tone and temper in which problems should be met : "That court best serves the law which recognizes that the rules of law which grew up in a remote generation may	 in the fullness of experience	 be found to serve another generation badly	 and which discards the old rule when it finds that another rule of law represents what should be according to the established and settled judgment of society	 Ind no considerable property rights have be come vested in reliance upon the old rule. It is thus great writers upon the common law have discovered the source and method of its growth	 and in its growth found its health and life. It is not and it should not be stationary	 Change of this character should not be left to the		 legislature. " If judges have woefully misinterpreted the mores of their day	 or if the mores of their day are no longer those of ours	 they ought not to tie 	 in helpless submission	 the hands of their successors. " The Indian Constitution	 adopting the fighting faith of equal_protection of the laws to all citizens	 necessarily contemplates a new jurisprudence where vested rights may be	 and often times are	 extensively interfered with for achieving the founding fathers ' social goals. (1) [1886] 31 Ch. D.402;408. (2) Cardozo The Nature of Judicial Process; PP. 151 52. 678 Legislative exercises directed towards distributive justice	 as in the present case	 cannot be considered in the light of a dated value system	 though sanctified by bygone decisions of Courts. However	 in the present case	 let me hasten to repeat	 the Act in question is clear about its intent and its application gives little difficulty. I have said these words only to enter a mild caveat	 on the lines indicated	 so as to obviate future misapprehensions about the	rule	of interpretation not to add a new element of judicial sub jectvism. Speaking generally	 courts have to be anchored to well known canons of statutory construction and if they are out of time with the law makers ' meaning and purpose the legitimate means of setting things right is to enact a new Interpretation Act. P.B.R. Appeal allowed.

Summary:
The Settlement Officer under the Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act	 1948 suo motu made an inquiry as to whether a particular village notified by the State Government was an estate or not within the contemplation of section 9(2) of the Act and held that it was not an "inam estate" within the meaning of section 2(7) of the Abolition Act but that the village became an estate by virtue of Madras Estates Land (3rd Amendment) Act	 1936. Ther appellants unsuccessfully appealed to the Estate Abolition Tribunal. The appellant then instituted a suit (O.S. 47 of 1953) against the State Government for a declaration that the village was not an "estate" under section 3(2)(d) of them Madras Estates Land Act	 1908 and consequently Madras Estate (Reduction of Rent) Act	 1947 and the Abolition Act were not applicable to it. The trial court decreed the suit. The State Preferred an appeal. During the pendency of the appeal the appellant filed a suit (O.S. No. 101 of 1954) against the respondents for recovery of certain amount as rent or damages in respect of lands cultivated by them in the village in dispute. The respondents contended that the village was an estate within the meaning of the Act and that it had been so held by the Settlement Officer. Ultimately both the parties filed a joint memo on 26th March	 1958 that they would abide by the decision of the High Court or the Supreme Court in the appeal or revision arising out of the suit (O.S. 47/53) on the question whether the village was or was not an "estate" under	 section 3(2)(d) of the Madras Estates Land Act. The High Court (in A.S. No. 668 of 1954 which was an appeal arising out of O.S. 47 of 1953) confirmed the decree of the trial court that the village in dispute was not an 'estate '. The State did not appeal	 with the result that the High Court 's decision became final and the decree dated 28th March	 1958 became	 effective. Against the decree of 28th March	 1958 the appellants preferred an appeal (A.S. 239 of 1961) to the High Court. The appeal related only to the extent of the land in the possession of the respondents and the quantum of rent or damages. The appellants ' claim was that the entire land was under cultivation of the respondents and so the lower court was wrong in not decreeing the appellants ' claim for rent or damages in toto. The respondents raised a preliminary objection at the time of hearing of the appeal that the suit itself was incompetent as the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to decide whether the suit village was an estate or not and	 therefore	 any (decision given by the High Court would not bind the parties and the decree in O.S. 101 of 1954 would be without Jurisdiction rendering it null and void and that the Settlement Officer was the competent authority to decide the tenure of the village and his deci sion had become final in view of the introduction of section 9A by Act 20 of 1960. The High Court upheld the preliminary objection of the respondents and rejected the contentions of the appellants that since section 9A was inserted by an amendment which came into force on 23rd June	 1960	 it could not affect the compromise decree of the court passed on March 28	 1958 or the decree of the High Court by which both the parties agreed to abide by the decision of the High Court or the Supreme Court in appeal or revision arising out of O.S. 47 of 1953. The High Court held that the Civil Court was not the forum for the suit as framed by the appellants and the questions raised in the suit L748SuP CI/74 656 including the claim for arrears of rent or damages	 were outside the jurisdiction of the Civil Court	 and so dismissed the appeal. Allowing the appeal	 HELD:1 (a) There is no doubt that the question was within the competence of the Civil Court. Under the Abolition Act	 as it stood at the material date	 the inquiry of the Settlement Officer could legitimately be confined to the ascertainment of only two disputes of fact	 viz.	 (i) Was the village an "inam village"? (ii) If so	 was it an 'Inam Estate ' as defined in section 2(7) of the Abolition Act ? Once issue (ii) was determined	 the inquiry would be complete and the limits of his exclusive jurisdiction circumscribed by section 9(1) reached; if he went beyond those limits to investigate and determine something which is unnecessary or merely incidental or remotely related to issue No. (ii)	 'then such incidental or unnecessary determination could be questioned in a Civil Court. [668FG] (b) Any finding recorded by the Settlement Officer regarding the property in question being an 'inam village ' or not	 ' is not final or conclusive it being a finding of a jurisdictional fact only	 the Preexistence of which is a sine qua non to the exercise of his exclusive jurisdiction by the Settlement Officer. [668H] (c) The legislature must have visualised that under the cloak of an erroneous finding as to the existence or nonexistence of this prerequisite	 the Settlement Officer may illegally clutch at jurisdiction not conferred on him or refuse to exercise jurisdiction vesting in him. Perhaps that is why the statute does not leave the final determination of this preliminary fact to the Settlement Officer/Tribunal and his erroneous finding on that fact is liable to be questioned in a Civil Court. Once it is held that determination of this fact is not a matter of the exclusive jurisdiction of the Settlement Officer	 the appellants cannot be debarred on the basis of any doctrine of res judicata from getting the matter fully and finally adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction. [669B C; E] Addanki Tiruvenkata Tata Desika Charyulu vs State of Andhra Pradesh A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 807 followed. District Board	 Tanjore vs Noor Mohammed	 (1952) 2 MJ. 586 (S.C.) referred to. (2) It is well settled that ordinarily when the substantive law is altered during the pendency of an action	 rights of the parties are decided according to law	 as it existed when the action was taken unless the new statute shows a clear intention to vary such rights. A plain reading of the impugned Act would show that there was nothing of this kind which expressly or by necessary intendment affects pending actions. [67OC D] (b) There is no non obstante clause in the amending Acts 17 and 18 of 1957 with reference to pending or closed civil actions. These amending Acts ' were published in the government gazette of December 23	 1957 and will therefore be deemed to have come into force from that date only. They could therefore be construed as having prospective operation only. [67OG H] (c) In the Amending Act 20 of 1960 also no back date for its commencement has been mentioned. It will	 therefore	 be deemed to have commenced on June 23	 1960 which is the date on which it was published in the Government gazette. [674E] Section 9A takes in its retrospective sweep only those decisions of the Settlement Officer or the Tribunal which at the commencement of 'the Amending Act 20 of 1960 were subsisting and had not been totally vacated or rendered non est by a decree of a competent court. [675 F] In the instant case the decision of the Settlement Officer dated September 2	 1950 was not such a decision. It had ceased to exist as a ' result of the inter linked decree in O.S. 47 of 1953 and O. section 101 of 1954 passed before the enactment of the Amending Act. The Amending Act of 1960	 therefore	 does not in any way affect the finality or the binding effect of those decrees. [675G] 657 (d) Order 23 rule 3 C.P.C. not only permits a partial compromise and adjustment of a suit by a lawful agreement	 but further gives a mandate to the court to record it and pass a decree in terms of such compromise or adjustment in so far as it relates to the suit. If the compromise agreement was lawful the decree to the extent it was a consent decree was not appealable because of the express bar in section 96(3) of the Code. [672E] Raja Sri Sailendra Narayan Bhanja Deo vs State of Orissa ; 	 Shri Prithvi Cotton Mills Ltd. vs Broach Borough Municipality and Reid vs Reid at 408	 followed. (e) In any suit the parties	 in order to avoid unnecessary expenses and botheration	 could legitimately make an agreement to abide by a determination on the same point in issue in another pending action in an advanced stage There was nothing unlawful and improper in such an arrangement particularly when the interests	of the respondents were sufficiently safeguarded by the State. By no stretch of reasoning it could be said that the agreement was collusive or was an attempt	 to contract out of the statute. In the instant case as soon as the parties made the agreement to abide by the determination in the appeal (A. section 668) and induced the court to pass a decree in terms of that agreement the principle of estoppel underlying section 96(3) C.P.C. became operative and the decree to the extent it was in terms of that agreement became final and binding between the parties. It was as effective in creating an estoppel between the Parties as a judgment on contest. [672F C & 673C] In the instant case that part of the decree in suit No. 101 of 1954 and the appeal from that decree could not be said to be a continuation of that part of the claim which had been settled by agreement. The combined effect of the two integrated decrees was to completely vacate and render non est decision dated September 2	 1950 of the Settlement Officer. [673F] Raja Sri Sailendra Narayan Bhanja Deo vs State of Orissa ; applied. Per Krishna Iyer	 J. concurring Courts have to be anchored to well known canons of statu tory construction and if they are out of tune With the law maker 's meaning and purpose the legitimate means of setting things right is to enact a new Interpretation Act. [678B] The Indian Constitution	 adopting the fighting faith of equal I protection of the laws to all citizens	 necessarily contemplates a new jurisprudence where vested rights may be	 and often times are	 extensively interfered. with for achieving the founding fathers ' social goals. Legislative exercises directed towards distributive justice as in the present case	 cannot be considered in the light of dated value system	 though sanctified by bygone decisions of Courts. [677H] In the present case the Act in question is clear about its intent and its application gives little difficulty.