Case ID: 668

Judgment:
section 176	 177 and 253 of 1956; 34	 35	 51 53	 69	 70	 75	 94 & 137 of 1957 ; 34	 58	 72	 90	 92	 106	 109 & 115 of 1958. Petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution of India for. enforcement of Fundamental rights. C.B. Aggarwal and Naunit Lal	 for the petitioner (In Petition No. 176 of 1956). Achhru Ram and Naunit Lal	 for the petitioner (In Petition No. 177 of 56). Naunit Lal	 for the petitioner (In Petitions Nos. 253/ 56; 34	 35	 51 53	 69	 70	 75	 94 and 137/57; 34	 58	 92	 106	 109 & 115/58). 750 Radhey Lal Aggarwal and A. G. Ratnaparkhi	 for the petitioner (In Petition No. 90/58). H. N. Sanyal	 Additional Solicitor General of India	 S.M. Sikri	 Advocate General for the State of Punjab	 Gopal Singh and T. M. Sen	 for respondent No. 1 (In Petition No. 176/56). S.M. Sikri	 Advocate General for the State of Punjab	 and T. M. Sen	 for respondent No. 1 (In Petitions Nos. 177 & 253/56; 34	 35	 51 53	 69	 70	 75	 94 & 137/57; 34	 58	 72	 90	 92	 106	 109 & 115/58). R.S. Gheba	 for respondent No. 3 (In Petition No. 90/58). Dipak Dutta Chowdhury	 for respondent No. 3 (In Petition No. 176/56). Udai Bhan Chowdhury	 for respondent No. 7 (In Petition No. 59/57) and respondent No. 3 (In Petition No. 70/57). Harnam Singh and Sadhu Singh	 for the Interveners (In Petition No. 176/56). December 8. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SINHA	 J. These petitions under article 32 of the Constitution impugn the constitutionality of the Punjab Security of Land Tenure Act (Punj. X of 1953) (which will be referred to hereinafter as the Act)	 as amended by Act XI of 1955. The petitioners are land owners of the lands affected by the provisions of the impugned Act. The State of Punjab and its officers	 besides persons claiming benefits under the Act	 are the respondents in these several petitions. The impugned Act has a history which may shortly be set out. With a view to providing for the security of tenure to tenants	 the Punjab Tenants (Security of Tenure) Ordinance IV of 1950	 was promulgated with effect from May 13	 1950. That Ordinance was replaced by the Punjab Tenants (Security of Tenure) Act XII of 1950	 which came into force on November 6	 1950	 on the date on which it was first published in the Punjab Government Gazette. The Act prescribed a limit of one hundred standard acres of land (equivalent to two hundred ordinary acres) which could be 751 held by a land owner for his " self cultivation "; and it was termed" permissible limit " (section 2(3) ). Any landowner having land in excess of the " permissible limit was authorized by section 3 to select for " self cultivation land out of the entire area held by him in the State of. Punjab	 as land owner	 and reserve it for his own use to the extent of the " permissible limit ". This " right of reservation " had to be exercised	 first	 in respect of land in his self cultivation; and if the extent of such land fell short of the " permissible limit "	 he could	 under section 4	 make up the deficiency by ejecting tenants under him in respect of such lands as fell within his reserved area. Section 5 fixed the minimum period of tenancy as four years	 subject to certain exceptions set out in section 6. These were some of the salient features of the Act of 1950	 which itself was amended by the Punjab Tenants (Security of Tenure) Act (Punj. V of 1951)	 which came into force on December 24	 1951. By the amending Act	 the " permissible limit " was reduced to 50 standard acres equivalent to 100 ordinary acres	 and the minimum period of tenancy was raised to five years. It also made provisions for preferential right of pre emption (section 12A)	 and conferred a right of purchase on the tenant in respect of land in his possession (section 12B)	 subject to certain exceptions(s. 12C). Another legislation in this series was the Prevention of Ejectment (Temporary Powers) Ordinance No. 1 of 1952	 which came into force on June 11	 1952. Then	 came the Punjab Security of Land Tenure Act (Punj. X of 1953)	 now impugned	 which repealed the aforesaid Acts XII of 1950 and V of 1951. It came into force on April 15	 1953. This Act itself was amended by Act LVII of 1953 and Act XI of 1955. Though. this Act has undergone subsequent amendments in 1957 and 1958	 we are not concerned with those amendments	 because they came into existence after this Court was moved under article 32 of the Constitution. We are concerned with the state of the law as it stood after the amendment of 1955	 aforesaid. Before dealing with the grounds of attack urged against the impugned Act	 it is convenient to set out	 752 in a nut shell	 the salient provisions of the Act	 which have given rise to the present controversy	 and which give an idea of the scope and nature of the legislation now under examination. The Act has a short Preamble	 namely	 " to provide for the security of land tenure and other incidental matters ". The Act further reduces the " permissible area " (section 2(3) ) in relation to a landlord or a tenant	 to 30 standard acres equivalent to 60 ordinary acres	 thus	 releasing a larger area for re settlement of tenants ejected or to be ejected under the provisions of the Act. So to say	 it creates a pool of "surplus area" (section 2(5 a))	 meaning thereby the area other than the"reserved area"in excess of the "permissible area" as aforesaid. "Reserved area" means the area lawfully reserved by the landlord under the provisions of the two Acts aforesaid	 which were repealed by the Act (section 2(4)). The definition of a tenant under the Act	 includes a sub tenant and a self cultivating lessee (section 2(6)). As already indicated	 a tenant also may be liable to be ejected from any area which he holds in any capacity whatever in excess of the " permissible area ". Section 10 A authorizes the State Government or any officer empowered by it in this behalf	 to utilize any " surplus area " for re settlement of tenants ejected or to be ejected under the provisions of section 9(1). But a tenant inducted on to such " surplus area "	 holds the land under the land owner	 who	 thus	 becomes entitled to receipt of rent from the tenant. Section 12 lays down the maximum rent payable by a tenant. Section 17 recognizes the rights of certain tenants to pre empt sales or fore closure of land. Section 18	 which formed the subject matter of the most vehement attack on behalf of the petitioners	 confers upon the tenants of the description given in the several clauses of the Act	 the right to purchase from the land owner the land held by them	 subject to certain exceptions	 and subject to the payment in a lump sum or in six monthly instalments not exceeding ten	 of the purchase price to be determined in accordance with cls. (2) and (3) of section 18. Section 23 invalidates any decree or order of any. court or authority	 or a notice 753 of ejectment	 which is not consistent with the provisions of the Act. Thus	 the Act seeks to limit the area which may be held by a land owner for the purpose of self cultivation	 thereby	 releasing " surplus area " which may be utilized for the purpose of resettling ejected tenants	 and affording an opportunity to the tenant to become the land owner himself on payment of the purchase price which	 if anything	 would be less than the market value. It	 thus	 aims at creating what it calls a class of " small land owners " meaning thereby	 holders of land not exceeding the " permis sible area " (section 2(2)). The utmost emphasis has been laid on self cultivation which means " cultivation by a land owner either personally or through his wife or children	 or through such of his relations as may be prescribed	 or under his supervision " (section 2(9) ). The arguments at the Bar	 on behalf of the petitioners may be put under three main heads	 namely	 (1) that the Legislature had no legislative competence to enact the Act	 (2) that the provisions of the Act contravene the petitioners ' fundamental rights enshrined in articles 14	 19(1)(f) and 31 of the Constitution	 and (3) that certain specified provisions of the Act amount to unreasonable restrictions on the petitioners ' rights to hold and dispose of property. At the outset	 it is necessary to deal with the question of legislative competence	 which was raised on behalf of some of the petitioners	 though not on behalf of all of them. This argument of want of legislative competence goes to the root of the impugned Act	 and if it is well founded	 no other question need be gone into. It has been argued that Entry 18 in List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution	 should not be read as authorizing the State Legislature to enact a law limiting the extent of the land to be held by a proprietor or a landowner. Entry 18 is in these words: " 18. Land	 that is to say	 rights in or over land tenures including the relation of landlord and tenant	 and the collection of rents; transfer and alienation of agricultural land improvement and agricultural loans; colonization. " 754 It will be noticed that the Entry read along with article 246(3) of the Constitution	 has vested exclusive power in the State to make laws with respect to " rights in or over land tenures including the relation of landlord and tenant. . The provisions of the Act set out above	 deal with the landlord 's rights in land in relation to his tenant	 so as to modify the landlord 's rights in land	 and correspondingly	 to expand the tenant 's rights therein. Each of the expressions " rights in or over land " and " land tenures "	 is comprehensive enough to take in measures of reforms of land tenures	 limiting the extent of land in cultivating possession of the land owner	 and thus	 releasing larger areas of land to be made available for cultivation by tenants. Counsel for some of the petitioners who challenged the legislative competence of the State Legislature	 were hard put to it to enunciate any easily appreciable grounds of attack against Entry 18 in List II of the Seventh Schedule. It was baldly argued that Entry 18 aforesaid	 was not intended to authorize legislation which had the effect of limiting the area of land which could be directly held by a proprietor or a land owner. It is difficult to see why the amplitude of the words " rights in or over land " should be cut down in the way suggested in this argument. A similar argument was advanced in the case of The United Provinces vs Mst. Atiqa Begum (1). In that case	 the United Provinces Regularization of Remissions Act	 1938 (U. P. XIV of 1938)	 was challenged. One of the main provisions of that Act had validated remission of rent. It had been argued that the United Provinces Legislature was not competent to legislate about the remission of rent	 when the relevant words in Entry 21	 relating to land in the Provincial List of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution Act of 1935	 were " collection of rents ". Entry 21 relating to " land " bad added certain words by way of explanation and illustration of the intention of the Constitution makers	 	so as to indicate that the word " land " was meant to be used in its widest connotation. A member of the (1)[1940] F.C.R. 110. 755 Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court	 in his judgment which was the subject matter of the appeal to the Federal Court	 had come to the conclusion that Item No. 21 aforesaid	 including the words " collection of rents "	 had not authorized the Provincial Legislature to validate remission of rent. That conclusion was not upheld by the Federal Court which held that remission of rent was a matter covered by Item No. 21	 and it was	 therefore	 within the competence of the Provincial Legislature to enact the impugned Act; and Gwyer	 C. J.	 in the course of his judgment observed that the Items in the several lists of the Seventh Schedule	 should not be read in a narrow or restricted sense	 and that each general word should be held to extend to all ancillary and subsidiary matters which could fairly ' and reasonably be said to be comprehended in it. The same Item 21 in List II (Provincial List) of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution Act of 1935	 came up for consideration before the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council on appeal from the Federal Court of India in Megh Raj vs Allah Rakhi (1)	 affirming the judgment of the Lahore High Court. In that case	 the Punjab Restitution of Mortgaged Lands Act (Punj. IV of 1938) had been challenged as ultra vires. By that Act	 the Legislature had provided for redemption of mortgages on terms much less onerous than the terms of the mortgage deeds. Their Lordships of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council repelled the contention raised on behalf of the appellants that the words of Item No. 21	 were not wide enough to comprehend the relationship of mortgagor and mortgagee in respect of agricultural land. Their Lordships observed that Item 21 aforesaid	 forming a part	 as it did	 of the Constitution	 should	 on ordinary principles	 receive the widest construction	 unless	 for some reasons	 it is cut down either by the terms of that item itself	 or by other parts of the Constitution	 which have	 naturally	 to be read as a whole; and then proceeded to make the following very significant observations : (1) (1946) L.R. 74 I.A. 12. 756 " As to item 21	 " land "	 the governing word	 is followed by the rest of the item	 which goes on to say	 'that is to say '. These words introduce the most general concept ' rights in or over land '. Rights in land ' must include general rights like full ownership or leasehold or all such rights. Rights over land ' would include easements or other collateral rights	 whatever form they might take. Then follow words which are not words of limitation but of expla nation or illustration	 giving instances which may furnish a clue for particular matters: thus there are the words relation of landlord and tenant	 and collection ' of rents ". Thus	 their Lordships concluded that the Item 21 relating to land	 would include mortgages as an incidental and ancillary subject. Another branch of the same argument was that Entry 18 could not cover the determination of the relation of landlord and tenant	 which is envisaged by some of the provisions of the Act	 particularly section 18	 which has the effect of converting the tenant into a land owner himself	 by virtue of the purchase. This argument is also disposed of by the judgment of the Federal Court in United Provinces vs Atiqa Begum (1). It was next contended that Entry 18 has got to be read with article 19(5)	 in order to determine the legislative competence in enacting the impugned statute. In other words	 it was contended that cl. (5) of article 19 of the Constitution	 is in the nature of a proviso to the Entry ; and that the Entry so read along with article 19(5)	 lays down the test of the legislative competence. This argument is easily disposed. of with reference to the provisions of article 31 A of the Constitution. If it is held that the provisions of the impugned statute lay down the law for the modification of rights in estates	 as defined in sub article (2) of article 31A	 none of the grounds of attack founded on any of the provi sions of articles 14	 19 or 31	 can avail the petitioners. As will presently appear	 the Act lays down provisions which are in the nature of modifications of rights in estates within the meaning of article 31A(1). That being (1) 757 so	 article 19(5) is wholly out of the way in this case. In view of all these considerations	 it must be held that there is no legal foundation for the contention that the impugned Act is beyond the legislative competence of the State Legislature. Having dealt with the question of legislative competence	 we have to deal with the several contentions raised on behalf of the petitioners	 with reference to the provisions of articles 14	 19 and 31 of the Constitution. On this part of the case	 it has rightly been conceded on behalf of the petitioners that if the impugned Act comes within the purview of any of the clauses of article 31A	 the law will be immune from attack on any of the grounds based on the provisions of articles 14	 19 and 31. But it has been argued that the provisions of article 31A(1)(a)	 which are admittedly the only portions of the Article	 which are relevant to the present inquiry	 are not attracted to the impugned Act. It has been conceded on behalf of the respondents that the Act does not provide for the acquisition by the State of any estate or of any rights in any estate. Hence	 the crucial words which must govern this part of the controversy	 are the words " the extinguishment or modification of any such rights "; that is to say	 we have to determine whether or not the impugned Act provides for the extinguishment or modification of any rights in " estates ". article 31A(2) defines what the expression II estate " used in article 3 1 A means. According to that definition	 " the expression " estate " shall	 in relation to any local area	 have the same meaning as that expression or its local equivalent has in the existing law relating to land tenures in force in that area	 and shall also include any jagir	 inam or Muafi or other similar grant and in the States of Madras and Kerala	 any janmam right". It is common ground that we have to turn to the definition of an estate	 as contained in the Punjab Land Revenue Act XVII of 1887. Section 3(1) of that Act has the following definition: (1) " estate " means any area (a) for which a separate record of rights has been made; or 758 (b)which has been separately assessed to land revenue	 or would have been so assessed if the land revenue had not been released	 compounded for or redeemed ; or (c)which the (State) Government may	 by general rule or special order	 declare to be an estate ". Clause (c) of the definition is out of the way	 because it has not been claimed that the State Government has made any declaration within the meaning of that clause. Estate	 therefore	 for the purposes of the present controversy	 means any area or which a separate record of rights has been made	 or which has been separately assessed to land revenue (omitting the unnecessary words). In this connection	 it is also necessary to refer to the definition of a holding in section 3(3) in the following terms: "(3) 'holding" means a share or portion of an estate held by one landowner or jointly by two or more landowners ". It was not controverted at the Bar that in Punjab	 there are very few estates as defined in section 3(1)	 quoted above	 in the sense that one single land owner is seized and possessed of an entire estate which is equated with a whole village. In other words	 in Punjab	 an estate and a village are inter changeable terms	 and almost all villages are owned in parcels	 as holdings by co sharers	 most likely	 descendants of the holder of a whole village which came to be divided amongst the co sharers	 as a result of devolution of interest. The parties were also agreed that the impugned Act deals with holdings	 as defined in the Land Revenue Act	 or shares or portions thereof. The argument on behalf of the petitioners to get over the provisions of article 31A	 is that the Act does not deal with any estate or any rights therein	 but only with holdings or shares or portions thereof. This argument proceeds on the assumption that holdings are not any rights in an estate. If the petitioners are right in their contention that the immunity granted by article 31A of the Constitution	 is available only in respect of entire estates and not portions of estates	 then the argument on behalf of the respondents that the Act is saved by the 759 provisions of that Article fails in limine. If	 on the other hand	 it is held that article 31A applies not only to entire estates or any rights therein	 but also to shares or portions of an estate or rights therein	 then all the arguments advanced on behalf of the petitioners	 founded on the provisions of Arts 14	 19 and 31	 are thrown overboard. Therefore	 it becomes necessary to consider the amplitude of the expression " any estate or of any rights therein " in article 31A(1)(a). Rights in an estate may be either quantitative or qualitative. That is to say	 rights in an estate may be held by persons having different qualities of rights in lands constituting an estate	 as a result of sub infeudation. Generally speaking and omitting all references to different kinds of land tenures prevailing in different parts of India	 it may be said that at the apex of the pyramid	 stands the State. Under the State	 a large number of persons variously called proprietors	 zamindars	 malguzars	 inamdars and jagirdars	 etc.	 hold parcels of land	 subject to the payment of land revenue designated as peshkash	 quit rent or malguzari	 etc.	 representing the Government demands by way of land tax out of the usufruct of the land constituting an estate	 except where Government demands had been excused in whole or in part by way of reward for service rendered to the State in the past	 or to be rendered in the future. An estate	 thus	 is an area of land which is a unit of revenue assessment	 and which is separately entered in the Land Revenue Collector 's register of revenue paying or revenue free estates. A single estate	 unless governed by the Rule of Primogeniture	 would	 in course of time	 be hold by a number of persons in the same rights as co sharers in the estate. Those several co sharers are all jointly and severally liable for the payment of the Government demands	 if any	 though	 by an arrangement with the Revenue Department	 they may have had a distribution made of the total Government demands as payable in respect of aliquot portions of the estate. Generally speaking	 in the first instance	 each sharer in an estate is liable to pay his portion of the landrevenue	 but if	 for any reasons	 the Government 760 demands cannot be realized from any defaulting share primarily liable for them	 the entire estate	 including the shares of those who may not be the defaulting proprietors	 is liable to be sold or otherwise dealt with for the realization of those demands. Thus	 the unity of assessment of land revenue in respect of the entire estate remains intact. In actual practice	 the holder of each specified portion or share of an estate	 holds his portion for his own exclusive use and occupation. Such a sharer in an estate in Punjab is known as the land owner of a " holding ". But such a holding still continues to be a portion or a share of the estate out of which it has been carved. Such a division of an estate is quantitative or a vertical division of an estate. But there may also be a horizontal or qualitative division of the lands in an estate	 effected by the process of sub infeudation. Continuing the illustration of the pyramid	 generally speaking	 the lands in an estate may in their entirety or in portions	 be let out to what	 in Eastern India	 are known as tenure holders	 for example	 patnidars	 in areas covered by the Permanent Settlement. Tenure holders were persons who took lands of an estate not necessarily for the purpose of self cultivation	 but also for settling tenants on the land	 and realizing rents from them. These patnidars may have darpatnidars under them	 and darpatnidars sepatnidars	 and in this way	 the sub infeudation went on. All these classes are included within the terms " tenure holders "	 " sub proprietors " or " under proprietors ". The persons who are inducted on to the land for bringing it under their direct cultivation	 are generally known in Eastern India as raiyats with rights of occupancy in the land held by them. But raiyats	 in their turn	 may have inducted tenants under them in respect of the whole or a portion of their holding. The tenant holding under a raiyat is known as an under raiyat	 and an under raiyat may induct a tenant under himself	 and he will be an under raiyat of the second degree. Thus	 in each grade of holders of land	 in the process of subinfeudation described above. the holder is a tenant under his superior holder	 the landlord	 and also the 761 landlord of the holder directly holding under him. Thus	 in Eastern India	 the interest of intermediaries between the proprietor of an " estate " at the top and the actual tiller of the soil at the bottom	 is known as that of a " tenure holder "	 and the interest of tenants other than tenure holders	 is given the generic name of a " holding ". A holding in Eastern India	 thus	 indicates the interest of the actual tiller of the soilraiyat or under raiyat unlike the " holding " in Punjab where	 as indicated above	 its signifies the interest of the holder of a share in an estate. Thus	 holdings in Punjab are vertical divisions of an estate; whereas in Eastern India	 they represent a horizontal division	 connoting a lesser quality of an estate in land than the interest of a tenure holder in his tenure	 or of a land owner in his estate or portion of an estate. It is not necessarily true that there should be intermedia ries in every estate or a portion of an estate. Very often	 the holder of an estate may be holding his entire estate directly in his possession by way of khudkasht	 zeerat	 kamath or neezjote	 or it may be that the proprietor has only raiyats under him without the intermediation of tenure holders	 and the raiyats may not have any under raiyats under them. The process of sub infeudation described above	 naturally	 varies with the size of the estate. It appears to be common ground in this case that in Punjab	 an estate means the whole village	 whereas in Eastern India	 an estate may comprise a whole district or only a cluster of villages	 or a single village	 or even a part of a village. The larger the size of an estate	 the greater the process of sub infeudation and vice versa. In Punjab	 as there was no permanent settlement of Revenue as in Bengal	 Bihar	 Orissa and other parts of Eastern India	 the unit of revenue assessment has been the village. Thus	 a holding in Punjab means a portion of a village either big or small. That portion may be in the direct possession of the landowner himself	 or he may have inducted tenants on a portion or the whole of his holding. The interest of the tenant in Punjab	 appears to have been a precarious tenure	 even more precari ous than that of an under raiyat in Eastern India. The 96 762 Punjab Legislature	 realising that the interest of a tenant was much too precarious for him to invest his available labour and capital to the fullest extent so as to raise the maximum quality and quantity of money crops or other crops	 naturally	 in the interest of the community as a whole	 and in implementation of the Directive Principles of State Policy	 thought of granting longer tenures	 and as we have seen above	 the period has been progressively increased until we arrive at the stage of the legislation now impugned	 which proposes to create a large body of small land owners who have a comparatively larger stake in the land	 and consequently	 have greater impetus to invest their labour and capital with a view to raising the maximum usufruct out of the land in their possession. Keeping in view the background of the summary of land tenures in Punjab and elsewhere	 we have to construe the amplitude of the crucial words " any estate or of any rights therein " in article 31A (1) (a). Soon after the coming into effect of the Constitution	 the different States in India embarked upon a scheme of legislation for reforming the system of land holding	 so as (1) to eliminate the intermediaries	 that is to say	 those who hold interest in land in between the State at the apex and the actual tillers of the soil in other words	 to abolish the class of rent receivers	 and (2) to create a large body of small landholders who have a permanent stake in the land	 and who are	 therefore	 interested in making the best use of it. As the connotation of the term " estate " was different in different parts of the country	 the expression " estate " described in el. (2) of article 31 A	 has been so broadly defined as to cover all estates in the country	 and to cover all possible kinds of rights in estates	 as shown by sub cl. (b) of cl. (2) of article 31A	 which is in these terms: shall include any rights vesting in a proprietor	 sub proprietor	 under proprietor	 tenure holder (raiyat	 under raiyat) or other intermediary and any rights or privileges in respect of land revenue. " The expression " rights " in relation to an estate has been given an all inclusive meaning	 comprising both 763 what we have called	 for the sake of brevity	 the " horizontal " and " vertical " divisions of an estate. A proprietor in an estate may be the proprietor holding the entire interest in a single estate	 or only a co sharer proprietor. The provisions aforesaid of article 31A	 bearing on the construction of the expression " estate " or "rights" in an estate	 have been deliberately made as wide as they could be	 in order to take in all kinds of rights quantitative and qualitative in an area co extensive with an estate or only a portion thereof. But it has been suggested that the several interests indicated in sub cl. (b)	 quoted above	 have been used with reference to the area of an entire estate	 but knowing as we do	 that a raiyat 's or an under raiyat 's holding generally is not co extensive with the area of an entire estate but only small portions thereof	 it would	 in our opinion	 be unreasonable to hold that the makers of the Constitution were using the expression " estate " or " rights " in an estate	 in such a restricted sense. Keeping in view the fact that article 31A was enacted by two successive amendments one in 1951 (First Amendment)	 and the second in 1955 (Fourth Amendment) with retrospective effect	 in order to save legislation effecting agrarian reforms	 we have every reason hold that those expressions have been used in their widest amplitude	 consistent with the purpose behind those amendments. A piece of validating enactment purposely introduced into the Constitution with a view to saving that kind of legislation from attacks on the ground of constitutional invalidity	 based on articles 14	 19 and 31	 should not be construed in a narrow sense. On the other hand	 such a constitutional enactment should be given its fullest and widest effect	 consistently with the purpose behind the enactment	 provided	 however	 that such a construction does not involve any violence to the language actually used. Another branch of the same argument was that if the makers of the Constitution intended to include within the purview of article 31A	 not only entire estates but also portions thereof	 nothing would have been easier than to say so in terms	 and that in the absence of any specific mention of " portions of an estate 764 we should not read that article as covering " portions of an estate " also. In our opinion	 there is no substance in this contention	 because they must be attributed full knowledge of the legal maxim that " the greater contains the less " Omne Majus continet in se minus. In this connection	 our attention was invited to the decision of a Full Bench of the Punjab High Court in the case of State of Punjab vs section Kehar Singh (1)	 to the effect that a holding being a part of an estate	 was not within the purview of article 31A of the Constitution. In this connection	 it is necessary to state the conflict of views in that High Court itself. In the case of Bhagirath Ram Chand vs State of Punjab (2)	 the validity of the very Act impugned before us	 was challenged on grounds based upon Articles 14	 19 and 31 of the Constitution. The learned Judges constituting the Full Bench	 unanimously held that the impugned Act did not infringe those provisions of the Constitution	 and the restrictions on the right of land holding	 imposed by the Act	 were reasonable	 and that the classification did not exceed the permissible limit. But they also held that the Act was saved by article 31A of the Constitution	 which applied equally to an entire estate or to a portion thereof. Besides giving other reasons	 which may not bear close scrutiny	 they made specific reference to the doctrine that the whole includes the part. Thus	 the Full Bench specifically held that article 31A of the Constitution applied equally to portions of estates also. This decision of the Full Bench was followed by a Division Bench of the same High Court	 consisting of Bhandari	 C. J.	 and Dulat	 J.	 in the case of Hukam Singh vs The State of Punjab (3). That Bench was concerned with the provisions of another Act Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act	 1954. In that case	 the Division Bench	 naturally	 followed the decision of the Full Bench in so far as it had ruled that the I whole ' includes the part	 and that where an Act provides for rights in an estate	 it provides for rights in a part of an estate also. The later Full (1) (1958) 60 P.L.R 461. (2) A.I.R. 1954 Pun. (3) 765 Bench case referred to above	 was decided by three Judges	 including Bhandari	 C. J.	 who agreed with the judgment of the Court delivered by Grover	 J. Perhaps	 the better course would have been to constitute a larger Bench	 when it was found that a Full Bench of three Judges	 was inclined to take a view contrary to that of another Full Bench of equal strength. Such a course becomes necessary in view of the fact that otherwise the subordinate courts are placed under the embarrassment of preferring one view to another	 both equally binding upon them. In our opinion	 the view taken by the earlier Full Bench is the correct one. The learned Chief Justice who was a party to both the conflicting views on the same question	 has not indicated his own reasons for changing his view. The Full Bench has accepted the force of the legal maxim that the greater contains the less	 referred to above	 but has not	 it must be said with all respect	 given any good reasons for departing from that well established maxim. The judgment of the Full Bench on this part of the case is based entirely upon the definition of an estate	 as contained in the Punjab Land Revenue Act	 set out above. It has not stopped to consider the further question why a holding	 which is a share or a portion of an estate	 as defined in the Punjab Act	 should not partake of the characteristics of an estate. Keeping in view the background of the legislative history and the objective of the legislation	 is there any rational reason for holding that the makers of the Constitution thought of abolishing only intermediaries in respect of an area constituting one entire estate but not of a portion thereof ? On the other hand	 as indicated above	 they have used the expression " estate" in an all inclusive sense. They have not stopped at that; they have also added the words " or any rights therein ". The expression " rights " in relation to an estate again has been used in a very comprehensive sense of including not only the interests of proprietors or sub proprietors but also of lower grade tenants	 like raiyats or under raiyats	 and then they added	 by way of further emphasizing their intention	 the expression " other intermediary "	 thus	 clearly showing that 766 the enumeration of intermediaries was only illustrative and not exhaustive. If the makers of the Constitution have	 thus	 shown their intention of saving all laws of agrarian reform	 dealing with the rights of intermediaries	 whatever their denomination may be	 in our opinion	 no good reasons have been adduced in support of the view that portions or shares in an estate are not within the sweep of the expression " or any rights therein ". A recent decision of this Court in the case of Ram Narain Nedhi vs The State of Bombay (1) dealt with the constitutionality of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Amendment) Act	 1956	 which contains similar provisions with a view to doing away with intermediaries	 and establishing direct relationship between the State and tillers of the soil. In that case also	 the contention had been raised that the expression " estate " had reference to only alienated lands and not to unalienated lands	 and this Court was invited to limit the meaning of the expression in the narrower sense. This Court repelled that contention in these words: the context of the Code is thus clear and unambiguous as comprising both the types of lands	 there is no reason why a narrower construction as suggested by the petitioners should be put upon the expression " estate. . . . Even if there was any ambiguity in the expression	 the wider significance should be adopted in the context of the objectives of the Act as stated above. " These observations apply with full force to the contention raised on behalf of the petitioners in the present cases also. Another branch of the same argument as to why the provisions of article 31A do not apply to the Act	 is that the Act did not have the effect of either extinguishing or modifying any rights in any estate	 assuming that the expression " estate " includes reference also to parts of an estate. In this connection	 it is contended that the provisions of the Act impugned in these cases	 did not amount to the extinguishment of (1) [1959] SUPP. (1) S.C.R. 489. 767 the interest of the land owners in estates or portions thereof	 and that what the Act did was to transfer some of the rights of the land owners to their tenants. In this connection	 reliance was placed on the observations of this Court in the case of Thakur Raghubir Singh vs Court of Wards	 Ajmer (1)	 where Mahajan	 J. (as he then was	 speaking for the Court	 observed that the expressions " extinguishment " and " modification " used in article 31A of the Constitution	 meant extinguishment or modification respectively of a proprietary right in an estate	 and should not include	 within their ambit	 a mere suspension of the right of management of an estate for a time definite or indefinite. Those observations must be strictly limited to the facts of that case	 and cannot possibly be extended to the provisions of Acts wholly dissimilar to those of the Ajmer Tenancy and Land Records Act	 XLII of 1950	 which was the subject matter of the challenge in the case then before this Court. This Court held	 on a construction of the provisions of that Act	 that they only suspended the right of management but did not amount to any extinguishment or modification of any proprietary rights in an estate. The provisions of the Act then under consideration of this Court	 have absolutely no resemblance to those of the Act now before us	 and it is impossible to put a similar interpretation on these provisions. In the recent decision of this Court (not yet reported*)	 this Court had been invited to apply the observations of this Court referred to above	 to the provisions of the Bombay Act. It was pointed out in that case that those observations of Mahajan	 J. (as he then was)	 must be read as limited to an Act which only brings about a suspension of the right of management of an estate	 and could not be extended to the provisions of an Act which either extinguishes or modifies certain rights of a proprietor in an estate or a portion thereof. In this connection	 it was further argued that extin guishment of a right	 does not mean substitution of (1) ; 	 1055	 1056. Since reported as Sri Ram Narain Modhi vs The State of Bombay	 [1959] SUPP (1) S.C.R. 489. 768 another person in that right	 but total annihilation of that right. In our opinion	 it is not necessary to discuss this rather metaphysical argument	 because	 in our opinion	 it is enough for the purpose of this case to bold that the provisions of the Act	 amount to modification of the landowner 's rights in the lands comprised in his " estate " or " holding ". The Act modifies the land owner 's substantive rights	 particularly	 in three respects	 as indicated above	 namely	 (1) it modifies his right of settling his lands on any terms and to anyone he chooses; (2) it modifies	 if it does not altogether extinguish	 his right to cultivate the " surplus area" as understood under the Act; and (3) it modifies his right of transfer in so far as it obliges him to sell lands not at his own price but at a price fixed under the statute	 and not to any one but to specified persons	 in accordance with the provisions of the Act	 set out above. Thus	 there cannot be the least doubt that the provisions of the Act	 very substantially modi the land owner 's rights to hold and dispose of his property estate or a portion thereof. It is	 therefore clear that the provisions of article 31A save the impugned Act from any attack based on the provisions of articles 14	 19 and 31 of the Constitution. That being so	 it is not necessary to consider the specific provisions of the Act	 which	 it was contended	 were unreasonable restrictions on the land owner 's rights to enjoy his property	 or whether he had been unduly discriminated against		 or whether the compensation	if any	 provided for under the Act	 was illusory or	 at any rate	 inadequate. Those grounds of attack are not available to the petitioners. In the result	 all these petitions are dismissed with costs	 the State of Punjab and its officers being entitled to only one set of hearing fees in all the petitions. Petitions dismissed.

Summary:
The point in controversy in these petitions was the con stitutional validity of the Punjab Security of Land Tenure Act (Punj. X Of 1953)	 as amended by Act XI of 1955	 which sought to "provide for the security of land tenure and other incidental matters ". The impugned Act which admittedly dealt with holdings as defined by the Punjab Land Revenue Act	 1887	 limited the area which might be held by a land owner for the purpose of self cultivation and thereby released surplus area to be utilised for resettling ejected tenants ; and by section 18 conferred upon the tenants the right to purchase from the land owners the lands held by them and thus themselves to become the landowners on prices which would be below the market value. It was contended on behalf of the petitioners	 who were	landowners affected by the impugned Act	 that under Entry 18 in List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution	 the State Legislature was incompetent to enact a law limiting the extent of the land to be held by a land owner and that the provisions of the impugned Act contravened the petitioners ' fundamental rights under articles 14	 19(1)(f)and 31 of the Constitution. Held	 that the contentions must fail. The words " rights in or over land " and " land tenures occurring in Entry 18 in List 11 of Seventh Schedule to the Constitution were sufficiently comprehensive to include measures of land tenure reforms	 such as the impugned Act	 that sought to limit the extent of land in cultivating possession of the landowner in order to release larger areas of land to be made available for cultivation by tenants and that Entry read with article 246(3) of the Constitution gave the State Legislature exclusive power to enact such measures. Such determination of the relation of landlord and tenant as was contemplated by section 18 and other provisions of the impugned Act	 which sought to convert a tenant into a land owner	 was well within the ambit of Entry 18. 749 The United Provinces vs Mst. Atiqa Begum	 and Megh Raj vs Allah Rakhi	 (1946) L.R. 74 I.A. 12	 referred to. It was beyond doubt that the impugned Act substantially modified the land owner 's rights to hold and dispose of his property in any estate or portion thereof and thus fell within the purview of article 31A(1)(a) of the Constitution and was immune from any attack on the ground that it contravened articles 14	 19and 31 of the Constitution. The observations made by this Court in Thakur Raghubir Singh vs Court of Wards	 Ajmer	 ; 	 in connection with another Act	 with absolutely different provisions	 must be limited to the facts of that case and were wholly inapplicable. Thakur	 Raghubir Singh vs Court of Wards	 Ajmer	 ; 	 distinguished and held inapplicable. The words " any estate or of any rights therein " occurring in article 31A(1)(a) read in the light of article 31A(2) included any kinds of rights either quantitative or qualitative in the area encompassed by an estate or any portion of it and thus included holdings as defined by the Punjab Land Revenue Act	 1887	 and any shares or portions thereof. Regard being had to the legal maxim that the greater must include the less	 it was	 inappropriate to suggest that the Constitution should have specifically mentioned "portion of an estate" in article 31A if it intended to give that Article such a comprehensive construction. Bhagirath Ram Chand vs State of Punjab	 A.I.R. 1954 Pun. 167	 approved. State of Punjab vs section Kehar Singh	 (1958) 60P.L.R. 461	 dis approved. Ram Narain Medhi vs The State of Bombay	 [1959] SUPP. (1) S.C.R. 489	 applied. Hukam Singh vs The State of Punjab	 	 referred to.