Case ID: 1652

Judgment:
minal Appeal No. 152 of 1962. 710 Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated April 4	 1962 of the Rajasthan High Court in D. D. Criminal Appeal No. 505 of 1961. section K. Kapur	 section Murthy	 B. N. Kirpal and K. K. lain	 for the appellant. H. R. Khanna and B. R. G. K. Achar for P. D. Menon	 for the respondent. August 29	 1963. The judgment of the Court was delivered by DAS GUPTA J. This appeal by special leave is against a conviction and sentence under section 167(81) of the . The appellant was acquitted by the trial court	 but on appeal by the State of Rajasthan	 the Rajasthan High Court set aside the order of acquittal and convicted the appellant under section 167(81) of the 	 and sentenced him to rigorous unprisonment for one year. The prosecution case was that on receipt of some information that gold smuggled from Pakistan was being carried	 Lal Singh	 Sub Inspector of the Check post of Barmer	 followed the appellant into a railway train at Luni railway station	 and in the running train between the stations of Kerla and Pali	 searched appellant 's person and found that he was carrying 286 tolas of gold in a pouli under his trousers. In the reasonable belief that these were smuggled goods	 Lal Singh seized the gold. The gold that was seized consisted of six blocks bearing marks "999"	 N. M. Rothschild & Sons	 22 bars bearing marks '999 '	 3 small pieces of gold and one pair of murkies. Lal Singh seized the gold after preparing a seizure list in the presence of witnesses and later produced the appellant along with the gold before the Superintendent	 Land Customs	 Barmer. By an order of the Collector of Customs	 New Delhi	 dated July 19	1957	 this gold was confiscated and a fine of Rs. 10	000 was imposed on the appellant. Criminal proceedings were afterwards instituted against the appellant on the allegation that he had committed an offence under section 167(81) of the . The prosecution claimed that under section 178 A of the 	 the burden of proving that gold was not smuggled lay on the accused. Even apart from that	 the prosecution claimed	 it was clear that the gold had been smuggled. It was alleged that the appellant had carried 711 the gold knowingly with intent to evade the regulations prohibiting the import of gold Into India. The main defence of the accused	 who pleaded not guilty	 was that no gold was recovered from him. The trial court held that the prosecution had failed to establish the recovery of gold from the accused. It further accepted the defence contention that Lai Singh had no authority to search the appellant and seize the gold at the place where the seizure was alleged to have been made. According to the learned Magistrate	 the seizure	 if any	 had not been made under the and so had not been made under "the Act" within the meaning of section 178 A	 and there was no question of the accused having to prove that the gold was not smuggled. On the evidence adduced by the prosecution	 he was not convinced that it was smuggled gold. Accordingly	 he acquitted the accused. The High Court came to contrary findings on all these points. It held that the evidence of Lal Singh as regards the seizure should be believed and that the seizure of the gold from the accused had been proved satisfactorily. It was also of the opinion that Lal Singh had authority to seize the gold at the place where the seizure was made	 and that section 178 A of the applied. In the opinion of the High Court	 the accused had failed to prove that the gold was not smuggled and that under the provisions of section 178 A as also on the evidence in the case	 the gold had been established to be smuggled gold. All the ingredients of the offence	 according to the High Court	 had been proved	 and therefore	 the accused was convicted and sentenced as mentioned above. Three points were raised before us by Mr. section K. Kapur in support of the appeal. The first was that the High Court was not justified in disturbing the trial court 's finding that the seizure of the gold from the accused had not been proved. The second point urged was that the High Court had fallen into an error in thinking that Lal Singh had authority to seize the gold at the place where the seizure was made. The third contention was that in any case even if section 178 A applied and it was found that the gold was smuggled	 the prosecution had failed to prove the necessary mens rea in the accused that was necessary to constitute the offence. 712 On the question of seizure of gold from the accused	 the prosecution relied on the testimony of Lal Singh himself. Lal Singh gave a detailed account as to how he followed the accused into the train at Luni station and in the running train conducted the search of his person in the presence of witnesses and recovered from his possession from a pouli tied beneath his trousers the gold identified in court as exhibit P.M. 1 32. The seizure Memo. which he claimed to have prepared at the time of the seizure was marked Exh. This document mentions the names of three persons as search witnesses. None of these was examined by the prosecution. The third name mentioned in Exh. P. 3 is Pukh Raj son of Awasthi Mal	 aged about 22 years	 resident of Ajit. The defence examined a Pukh Raj who gave his father 's name as Basti Mal and who was resident of Ajit	 and stated that he was the only Pukh Raj in that village. The High Court seems to have doubted the indentity of Pukh Raj examined as defence witness as the Pukh Raj mentioned in the seizure list. This finding has been attacked by Mr. Kapur as un justified. Whether or not the Pukh Raj examined as defence witness is the same as the person whose name is mentioned in the seizure list	 is not	 however	 of much consequence; for the fact remains that the prosecution has not got the evidence of any of the witnesses in whose presence the search and seizure are said to have been made	 to support Lal Singh 's evidence. The learned Magistrate gave this failure of the prosecution to examine the witnesses as the main reason for his inability to accept Lal Singh 's testimony. The High Court has accepted Lal Singh 's testimony	 but unfortunately the judgment does not indicate that the learned judges of the High Court took into consideration this fact that the search witnesses had not been examined. We have	 therefore	 thought it necessary to examine the evidence for ourselves to see whether the seizure as alleged by the prosecution has been proved. Lal Singh 's evidence on the point has already been mentioned. It has to be noticed that the defence witness No. 2	 Poonam Chand	 has also spoken about the search. His evidence is that police conducted search in the compartment when the train was enroute from Luni to Pali	 and that "the police took search of the 713 accused Hukma present before the court and of two or three more persons named Kesrimal and Tarachand". The witness added no gold was recovered from: the possession of the accused Hukma Ram	 but admitted that in the same compartment a purse was recovered. It has to be noticed that when Lal Singh was examined	 no suggestion was made to him in cross examination that any other person had been searched in the compartment. It is not unreasonable to think	 therefore	 that when Poonam Chand is speaking of search in the com partment of Hukma and the find of a purse there though stopping short of saying what was recovered from it	 his evidence unwittingly supports the story given by Lal Singh about the search and the recovery of the gold. It does not stand to reason that if two other persons bad been searched and gold had been found within one of them	 this appellant	 a pointsman in the Railway	 should be falsely implicated and the person from whom the recovery of gold was made	 should have been allowed; to	 escape. The accused suggested in his statement that Lal Singh was inimically disposed towards him because on one occasion Lai Singh had asked him to serve water and he had not done it at once. There was no suggestion about this incident to Lai Singh in his cross examination	 and we are convinced that this is: entirely false. On a consideration of Lal Singh 's evidence along with the evidence of appellant 's own witness	 Poonam Chand we are convinced that the story of recovery of gold from the accused is true. The reason why the three witnesses mentioned in the seizure list have not come forward to support the prosecution case is	 in	 our poinion	 not that the story of search and seizure as given by Lal Singh is not true	 but that these witnesses have been gained over. This brings us to Mr. Kapur 's main contention	 namely	 that Lal Singh was not a Customs Officer for the place where the seizure was made	 and so the seizure was not under the 	 taken with the provisions of the . The answer to this contention depends on the construction of the notification appointing Customs Officers for the areas adjoning the frontier between West Pakistan and India. The notification as it stands after an amendment in 1956	 runs 46 2 section C. India/64 714 as follows: "1. In exercise of the powers conferred by Sub section (1) of section 3 of the (19 of 1924) read with the notification of the Government of India in the late Finance Deptt. (Central Revenues) No. 5444	 dated 1st December 1924	 the Central Board of Revenue hereby appoints for the areas adjoining the Land Customs Frontiers separating West Pakistan from India	 the officers of the Government of Rajasthan specified in the schedule hereto annexed	 to be Land Customs Officers within the jurisdiction of the Collector of Land Customs Delhi." "The Schedule." "All officers of the Rajasthan Civil Police and the Rajasthan Armed Constabulary of and above the rank of Head Constable posted in the Districts of Barmer	 Bikaner	 Ganganagar	 Jaisalmer and Jalore in the State of Rajasthan." Asking us to give a restricted meaning to the word "adjoining" in the notification	 Mr. Kapur has suggested that this notification gave authority to the Customs Officers only for the areas within a few miles from the border	 He contended next that even if this be not accepted	 the notification on a reasonable interpretation gave authority only to the officers of the Districts mentioned in the Schedule to function as Customs Officers in those Districts and nowhere else. The trial court appears to have accepted this construction	 and as admittedly the place of seizure was not in any of the District mentioned in the Schedule	 it held that Lal Singh was not authorized to search the accused or to seize the gold. The High Court	 on the contrary	 has taken the view that each of the officers mentioned in the Schedule has been appointed a Customs Officer for the entire area which has "jurisdiction of the Collector of Land Customs	 Delhi". In our opinion	 this is the correct and only possible construction. Section 3 of the authorizes the Central Government to appoint by notification in the official gazette one person to be the Collector of Land Customs for any area adjoining a foreign frontier and specified in the notification. The section also authorizes 715 the Central Government to appoint by a similar notification such other persons as it thinks fit to be Customs Officers for the same area. "Foreign frontier" has been defined in section 2	 cl. (e) of the Act as the frontier separating any foreign territory from any part of India. "Land Customs area" has been defined in cl. (g) of the same section as any area adjoining a foreign frontier for which a Collector of Land Customs has been appointed under section 3. From the definition of foreign frontier in cl. (e)	 it is clear that an area adjoining the frontiers separating any foreign territory from any part of India	 is within these words. What	 then is meant by the word 'adjoining '? According to Mr. Kapur	 only a few miles near the frontier can be considered to be adjoining the frontier. We can see no justification for such a restricted construction of the word " adjoining". It is true that the village next to the frontier adjoins the frontier. It is equally correct	 however	 to describe the entire District nearest the frontier as adjoining the frontier ; and we can see nothing wrong in the entire State of Rajasthan adjoining the West Pakistan Frontier. It appears to us that the Central Government treated the whole compact block consisting of the State of Punjab	 State of Jammu & Kashmir and State of Rajasthan and Himachal Pradesh and Delhi as one area ad joining the West Pakistan frontier	 and for this one area it appointed a Collector of Land Customs. This appears clear from the order appointing the Collector of Central Excise	 Delhi	 to be the Collector of Land Customs (Notification No. 2L Customs	 dated 25th January	 1958)	 taken with Rule 2(ii) A (i) of the Central Excise Rules	 according to which Collector means "in the State of Punjab	 Jammu and Kashmir and Rajasthan and in the Union Territories of Himachal Pradesh and Delhi	 the Collector of Central Excise	 Delhi". In other words	 the jurisdiction of the Collector of Central Excise	 Delhi	 is not only over Delhi	 but also it extends to the States of Punjab	 Jammu & Kashmir and Rajasthan and the Union Territories of Himachal Pradesh and Delhi. It was for this entire area that the collector of Central Excise	 Delhi was appointed Collector of Land Customs. The resultant position	 therefore	 is that for this entire area of Punjab	 Jammu and Kashmir	 Rajasthan	 Himachal and Delhi	 one person has been ap 716 pointed Collector of Customs. When	 therefore	 the Central Government proceeded next to appoint Land Customs Officers and stated that certain officers as specified in the schedule were appointed Land Customs Officers "for the areas adjoining the land customs frontiers separating West Pakistan from India"	 and added the words that they were to be Land Customs Officers "within the jurisdiction of the Collector of Land Customs	 Delhi	 it appears to us to be quite clear that every officer mentioned in the Schedule would be a Customs Officer not for any particular District mentioned in the Schedule but for the whole areas which forms the Jurisdiction of the Collector of Land Customs, Delhi and is the area adjoining the West Pakistan frontier for which a Collector of Land Customs has already been ap pointed under section 3. We find no justification for reading into the Schedule any indication of the area where the officers will operate. The Schedule purports to mention the different officers of different districts who arc appointed Land Customs Officers not for those particular Districts but for the entire area. Any other reading of the words used in the main body of the notification would be not only against the plain meaning of the words used but is likely to defeat the object for which Land Customs Officers are appointed. We have, therefore, come to the conclusion that the construction put by the High Court on the notification is right, and Lai Singh, being an officer in the District of Barmer which is mentioned in the Schedule, was an officer for the entire area which formed the jurisdiction of the Collector of Land Customs, Delhi, including the place where the seizure was made, and was therefore competent to make the seizure. There remains for consideration the last point raised by the learned counsel, namely, that even if Lal Singh had authority to seize at the place where the seizure was made and section 178 A of the applied, the prosecution had still to prove by further evidence that the accused had the mens rea necessary to constitute the offence. Learned counsel rightly pointed that while section 178 A has the result of placing the burden of proof that the gold was not smug gled on the accused, it is of no assistance to the prose cution to prove that the accused was carrying the gold 717 knowingly to evade the prohibition which was for the time being in force with respect to the import of gold into India. Once, however, it is found, as it must be found in this case, in consequence of the provisions of section 178 A (the accused has not tried to discharge the burden that lay on him that the gold was not smuggled) that he was carrying smuggled gold, the circumstances under which the gold was discovered, the manner in which he was carrying the gold, the considerable quantity of the gold that was being carried and the form in which gold was being carried, namely, blocks and bars in which the major portion of the gold was found, all these circumstances establish beyond a shadow of doubt that accused was carrying the gold knowingly and with the intention of evading the prohibition that was in force with respect to the import of gold into the country. Mr. Kapur tried to argue that when gold is carried by persons, they often carry it in this manner in a pouli concealed under trousers. That may well be so. Here, however, there is an additional circumstance that a pointsman of the Railway, not expected to have so much gold in his possession, was carrying the gold which was, as already mentioned in six bloks and 22 bars apart from some small pieces and one pair of murkees. The total quantity was as much as 286 tolas and 11 annas, that is, about three kilograms. When all these circumstances are taken together, it is not possible to accept learned counsel 's suggestion that he might be carrying the gold innocently having purchased it from somebody. In our opinion, the High Court has rightly held that all the ingredients of the offence under section 167(81) of the have been established. It may be mentioned that it has not been disputed before us that if we believe the story of the recovery of the gold from the appellant, the circumstances are sufficient to establish that Lal Singh seized the gold in the reasonable belief that these were smuggled goods. In the view we have taken in this matter, it is unnecesary to consider the further argument raised by Mr. H. R. Khanna, who apperaed for the State that even apart from section 178 A, the guilt of accused could be held to be proved by the confession made by him before the Deputy Superintendent, Land Customs, corroborated as it 718 is by the recovery of the gold from him. All the points raised in the appeal on behalf of the appellant fail, and the appeal is, accordingly, dismissed. Appeal dismissed. 
5434	vil Appeal No. 4115 and 4116 of 1985. From the Judgment and Order dated 12.4.1985 of the Allahabad High Court in Civil Misc. Writ Petn. No. 3441 of 1984. J.P. Goyal, Rajesh for the Appellants in C.A. No. 41 15 of 1985. Anil Dev Singh, Mrs. section Dikshit and Sudhir Kulshreshta for the Appellants in C.A. No. 4116 of 1985. R. Ramachandran for the Respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by DUTT, J. These two appeals by special leave, one pre ferred by the State of U.P. and the other by the Cane Super visors of the Cane Development Department, U.P., are direct ed against the judgment of 975 the Allahabad High Court directing the State Government to merge the posts of Ganna Gram Sewaks and Ganna Supervisors into the cadre of Ganna Sahayak in the pay scale of Rs.400 615 with effect from 1 7 1979. In the hierarchy of field officers in the Cane Develop ment Department, U.P., the post of Ganna Gram Sewak is at the bottom. The next higher post is the post of Cane Super visor. Under the Cane Development (Fourth Class) Service Rules, 1972 framed under Article 309 of the Constitution of India, the posts of Ganna Gram Sewaks are filled by direct recruitment and the minimum qualification prescribed there for by Rule 9(3) of the said Rules is that a candidate for recruitment in the post of Ganna Gram Sewak must have passed the High School Examination from the Board of High Schools and Intermediate Education, U.P. or an equivalent examina tion and he must know Hindi in Devnagri script. Under the Uttar Pradesh Ganna Paryavekshak (III) Service Rules, 1978, also framed under Article 309 of the Constitution of India, 50 per cent of the posts of Cane Supervisors are to be filled by direct recruitment and the remaining 50 per cent by promotion on the basis of seniority from amongst perma nent Ganna Gram Sewaks of the concerned region. The basic qualification for the post of Cane Supervisor is Intermedi ate (Agriculture) or equivalent or High School with two years Diploma in Agriculture. The duties that are to be performed by the Ganna Gram Sewaks are preparation of progress report, survey of the cane areas and development programmes. The Cane Supervisors are responsible for plant protection, inputs godown and nurseries in the areas of Ganna Gram Sewaks. The State of U.P. appointed a Second Pay Commission in the year 1979. The Ganna Gram Sewaks submitted a representa tion to the Commission demanding that since their qualifica tions were similar to those of Cane Supervisors and they performed the same kind of duties, they should get the same pay scale as that of the Cane Supervisors. It appears that on the suggestion of the Pay Commission, the State Govern ment appointed a Task Force Committee. The Task Force Com mittee in its report recommended the merger of the posts of Ganna Gram Sewaks and Cane Supervisors into one group to be designated as Ganna Sahayaks and allotted an equal field of operation. It was observed that the merger being effected would satisfy the demand of the Ganna Gram Sewaks for the equalisation of their pay scale with that of the Cane Super visors. The said recommendation was made by the Task Force Committee on the ground that there was no special difference between these two categories of posts in regard to 976 the duties performed by the members of each category. The Second Pay Commission, however, did not accept the recommen dation made by the Task Force Committee for the merger of these two categories of posts .into one category, namely, Ganna Sahayak. After taking into consideration the minimum academic qualification and the nature of duties for each category, the Second Pay Commission, inter alia, recommended the revision of the pay scales as follows: CANE DEVELOPMENT DEPARTMENT section No. Name of Post Pay Scale Existing Proposed 46. Cane Supervisor/ 230 385 400 615 Seed Asstt. Ordinary Ordinary Grade Grade 250 425 510 675 (Selection After Grade) After 10 years of service Selection Grade ( 15% Selection Grade on the post of Supervisor) 47. Ganna Gram Sewak 185 265 325 495 Ordinary Ordinary Grade Grade 200 320 400 540 Selection After 15 years Grade of service Selection Grade on 15% posts. The recommendation of the Second Pay Commission was considered by the Review Committee and, thereafter, by the Cabinet Sub Committee. There is a dispute between the par ties as to whether the Cabinet Sub Committee had accepted the recommendation made by the Task Force Committee. Be that as it may, the State Govern 977 ment accepted the recommendations of the Second Pay Commis sion only with a slight modification that instead of a pay scale of Rs.325 495 for Ganna Gram Sewaks, it would be Rs.330 495. One of the Ganna Gram Sewaks, Shri Vyas Muni Mishra, the respondent No. 1, filed a writ petition before the Allahabad High Court praying for a writ of mandamus directing the State Government to merge the posts of Ganna Gram Sewaks and Cane Supervisors into one cadre of 'Ganna Sahayak '. The High Court took the view that although the minimum educational qualifications required were High School for Ganna Gram Sewaks and Intermediate in Agriculture for Cane Supervisors, since 1975 the minimum qualification for both Ganna Gram Sewaks and Cane Supervisors became Intermediate in Agricul ture. Further, the High Court was of the view that the nature of duties performed by the members of these two categories of posts was the same. Accordingly, relying upon the principle of equal pay for equal work, as contained in Article 39(d) of the Constitution, the High Court allowed the writ petition and directed the State Government to merge the posts of Ganna Gram Sewak and that of Cane Supervisor into one post as Ganna Sahayak in the pay scale of Rs.400 615 with effect from July 1, 1979. The State of U.P. and the Cane Supervisors being aggrieved by the judgment of the High Court have preferred the above appeals. At the outset it may be said that the High Court exceed ed its jurisdiction in directing the merger of the two posts. It may be that the Task Force Committee and the Review Committee had recommended for the merger, but it was for the State Government to consider whether such merger should be made or not. The State Government after considera tion of the relevant reports and recommendations accepted the recommendation of the Second Pay Commission only with regard to the revision of the pay scale of the Ganna Gram Sewaks with the slight modification by an increase of Rs. 5 at the initial stage of the recommended pay scale. The question whether two posts should be merged into one or not is absolutely within the jurisdiction and authority of the Executive Government. However much the High Court was influ enced by the principle of equal pay for equal work for both men and women as contained in Article 39(d) of the Constitu tion, the High Court was not justified in exceeding its jurisdiction for giving effect to the said doctrine. The principle of equal pay for equal work requires on the face of it that the work to be performed by two groups of persons must be 978 equal. It has been already noticed that the duties that had to be performed by the Ganna Gram Sewaks are preparation of progress report, survey of the cane areas and development programmes. On the other hand, the Cane Supervisors are responsible for plant protection, inputs godown and nurser ies in the areas of Ganna Gram Sewaks. Thus the nature of duties that are performed by the members of these two cate gories of posts is different. It has been observed by the Second Pay Commission that the Department has so fixed the duties of the two functionaries that both of them now func tion more or less independently. The High Court did not discuss in detail as to whether the Ganna Gram Sewaks and the Cane Supervisors perform the same duties. The High Court has only referred to an observation in the report of the Task Force Committee that there were not much differences in the duties performed by these two categories of officers. As has been stated already, the Second Pay Commission did not accept the recommendation of the Task Force Committee for the merger of the two posts into one. It is true that the Cane Supervisors are not doing any supervision of the work of the Ganna Gram Sewaks, but in view of the nature of duties performed by both, as mentioned above, it is diffi cult to hold that both perform the same kind of duties. We have also looked into the reports of the Task Force Commit tee and the Review Committee. In our opinion, these two Committees have not properly dealt with the nature of duties performed by the Ganna Gram Sewaks and Cane Supervisors, although both these Committees have recommended the merger of the two posts. As soon as, therefore, it is held that the two groups of persons do not perform the same kind of du ties, the question of equal pay for equal work does not arise. In directing merger of the two posts, the High Court has greatly relied upon the fact that although the minimum educational qualification for Ganna Gram Sewaks was High School, since 1975 the minimum educational qualification for the Ganna Gram Sewaks has been Intermediate in Agriculture. In other words, according to the High Court the minimum educational qualification required for both these posts is Intermediate in Agriculture. We have already referred to the Rules framed under Article 309 of the Constitution under which the minimum qualification for the posts of Ganna Gram Sewaks has been prescribed as High School or equivalent examination and for the Cane Supervisors as Intermediate (Agriculture) or equivalent or High School with two years ' Diploma in Agriculture. The minimum qualifications, as prescribed, have not yet been changed by the amendment of the said Rules. In entertaining the view that the minimum qualification for the Ganna Gram Sewaks has been since 1975 Intermediate in 979 Agriculture, the High Court has placed reliance upon a letter dated March 10, 1975 addressed by the Cane Commis sioner, U.P,, to the Deputy Secretary, Cane Development Department, Government of U.P. In that letter, it was recom mended that the minimum educational qualification for the Ganna Gram Sewaks should be Intermediate in accordance with the proposal of the Ganna Gram Sewaks ' Union, U.P. It was, accordingly, requested by the Cane Commissioner in the said letter that the Government might consider the minimum quali fication as recommended. It is the case of the State of U.P. that the said letter was issued in connection with 600 new posts of Ganna Gram Sewaks to be created under non statutory bodies, namely, Sakkar Nidhi and Ganna Board. It is contend ed that these 600 posts have nothing to do with the posts of Ganna Gram Sewaks under the Cane Development Department of the State of U.P. In our opinion, the High Court should not have placed any reliance upon any such recommendation made by the Cane Commissioner, when, under the Rules framed under Article 309 of the Constitution, the minimum qualification required for the Ganna Gram Sewaks is High School or equiva lent. So long as the Rules are amended and the minimum qualification is not enhanced to Intermediate in Agricul ture, the Cane Development Department of the Government cannot prescribe or insist on a minimum qualification of Intermediate in Agriculture. The Second Pay Commission could not also equate the posts of Ganna Gram Sewaks with that of Cane Supervisors on the ground that the minimum qualifica tion for the two posts are different. The High Court was, therefore. not justified in relying upon the said letter of the Cane Commissioner in preference to the Rules framed under Article 309 of the Constitution. In our view, there fore, not only the nature of duties attached to each post is different, but also the minimum qualification required for each post is also different. As stated earlier, the posts of Ganna Gram Sewaks are filled by direct recruitment. So far as .the posts of Cane Supervisors are concerned, 50 per cent of the same are filled by promotion from the posts of Ganna Gram Sewaks and the remaining 50 per cent are filled by direct recruitment. Thus, the post of Cane Supervisor is a promotional post vis a vis the post of Ganna Gram Sewak. In our view where, as in the instant case, of the two posts, one being the promotional post and the other being the feeder post, it will be beyond the jurisdiction of the Court to implement the principle of equal pay for equal work inasmuch as such implementation will practically result in the amalgmation of the two posts leading to great administrative difficulties. Article 39(d) of the Constitution lays down the Directive Principle of 980 equal pay for equal work for both men and women. The direc tive principles contained in Part IV of the Constitution are not enforceable in any court of law. It is a constitutional goal that has to be achieved at the instance of the State. Merger or bifurcation of a cadre is an executive act and normally the Court does not deal with it. It is for the State to consider whether two groups of persons working under two distinct posts perform the same kind of duties or not and whether in implementing the directive principle, as contained in Article 39(d) of the Constitution, it is neces sary to merge these two posts into one cadre or post. If the State Government is of the view that it is necessary that there should be a merger of the two posts into one post, the State Government has to take steps in that regard by framing proper rules with regard to seniority, promotions, etc. But, when two groups of persons are in the same or similar posts performing same kind of work, either in the same or in the different Government departments, the Court may in suitable cases direct equal pay by way of removing unreasonable discrimination and treating the two groups, similarly situ ated, equally. In the facts and circumstances of the instant case, we are of the view that the High Court was not justi fied in directing a merger of the two posts, namely, the posts of Ganna Gram Sewaks and Cane Supervisors. For the reasons aforesaid, the impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside and the writ petition is dismissed. Both these appeals are allowed. There is, however, no order as to costs. This judgment, however, will not prevent the State of U.P. from considering the merger of these two posts and the consequent equalisation of pay. P.S.S, Appeals allowed. 
3045	iminal Appeal No 64 of 1969. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated December 10, 1968 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in. Criminal Revision No. 1200 of 1967. R. L. Kohli, for the appellant. V. C. Mahajan and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Khanna, J. Ishar Das appellant was convicted by the judicial magistrate 1st class Patiala for an offence under section 7(1) of the (Act No. 37 of 1954) read with section 16(1) (a) (i) of that Act and was ordered to furnish bond under section 4 of the . Bedi, J. of the Punjab and Haryana High Court during the course of the inspection of the Court of trial magistrate, took the view that an improper order had been made in the above case by the magistrate. The High Court thereupon of its own motion directed that a notice be issued to the appellant. The case was thereafter posted before Bedi, J. The learned judge referred to the fact that a minimum sentence of imprisonment for a period of six months and a fine of Rs. 1,000 had been prescribed by section 16 of the . It was also observed that offenses under the were against the public and called for deterrent punishment. Order was consequently made that the appellant instead of being released on his furnishing a bond, should be sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of six months and to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000. In default of payment of fine. the appellant was ordered to undergo simple imprisonment for a further period of one and a half month. The appellant thereafter filed this appeal by special leave to this Court. At the time the leave was granted. it was ordered that the appeal would be limited to the question of sentence only. The prosecution case is that on August 1, 1966 the Food Inspector Patiala took a sample of two cups of ice cream from the appellant from Phul Cinema canteen on payment of three rupees. Part of the ice cream was sent for analysis to Public Analyst Chandigarh. The Analyst reported that the ice cream was adulterated, being deficient in milk fat contents to the extent of 77 per cent and total solid contents to the, extent of 7 per cent. The appellant was thereafter prosecuted on the allegation that he had committed an offence under section 7(1) of the read with section 16 (1 ) (a) (i) of that 314 Act. Charge was framed on that count against the appellant and he pleaded guilty to the same. The trial magistrate took the view that the appellant, who was aged about 20 years, was in a repentant mood. The appellant was, in the circumstances, directed to furnish bond under section 4 of the . The bond was thereafter furnished by the appellant. On revision, the sentence was altered by the High Court as mentioned above. In appeal Mr. Kohli on behalf of the appellant has referred to the matriculation certificate which was produced on behalf of the appellant and according to which the date of birth of the appellant was May 8, 1947. It is argued that as the age of the appellant on the date of his conviction by the trial magistrate was less than 20 years, the appellant was rightly given the benefit of the provisions of the . The High Court, according to the learned counsel, was in error in awarding the sentence of imprisonment and fine to the appellant. As against that Mr. Mahajan on behalf of the respondent has contended that the provisions of the cannot be invoked by an accused convicted of an offence under section 7 read with section 16 of the Prevention of Food Adultera tion Act. Mr. Mahajan has not disputed that the age of the accused was less than 20 years on the date of his conviction by the trial magistrate, but, according to the learned counsel, that fact could make no difference. There is, in our opinion, considerable force in the stand taken on behalf of the appellant by his learned counsel and we find ourselves unable to accede to the submission made on behalf of the respondent State. The received ,the assent of the President on May 16, 1958 and was published in the Gazette of India dated May 19, 1958. According to subsection (3) of section 1 of that Act, it shall come into force in a State on such date as the State Government may, by notification in the Official. Gazette, appoint, and different dates may be appointed for different parts of the State. The fact that the Act was in force in the State of Punjab before the sample of ice cream was taken from the appellant has not been disputed before us. 'Section 3 of the Act gives power to the court to release certain offenders after admonition. According to that section, where any person is found guilty of having committed an offence punishable under section 379 or section 380 or section 381 or section 404 or section 420 of the Indian Penal Code or any offence punishable with imprisonment for not more than two years, or with fine, or with both under the Indian Penal Code or any other law, and no previous conviction is proved against him and the Court by which the person is found guilty is of opinion that, .having regard to the circumstances of the case including the nature 315 of the offence and the character of the offender, it is expedient so to do, then, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the Court may, instead of sentencing him to any punishment or releasing him on probation of good conduct under section 4, release him after due admonition. The relevant part of sub section (1) of section 4 and sub section (1) of section 6 of the Act read as under : 4(1) When any person is found guilty of having committed on offence not punishable with death or imprisonment for life and the Court by which the person is found guilty is of opinion that	 having regard to the circumstances of the case including the nature of the offence and the character of the offender	 it is expedient to release him on probation of good conduct	 then	 notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force	 the Court may	 instead of sentencing him at once to any punishment	 direct that he be released on his entering into a bond	 with or without sureties	 to appear and receive sentence when called upon during such period	 not exceeding three years	 as the Court may direct	 and in the meantime to keep the peace and be of good behavior." "6(1) When any person under twenty one years of age is found guilty of having committed an	 offence punishable with imprisonment (but not with imprisonment for life)	 the Court by which the person is found guilty shall not sentence him to imprisonment unless it is satisfied that	 having regard to the circumstances of the case including the nature of the offence and the character of the offender	 it would not be desirable to deal with him under section 3 or section 4	 and if the Court passes any sentence of imprisonment on the offender	 it shall record its reasons for doing so. " The 	 as observed by Subba Rao	 J. (as he then was) speaking for the majority in the case of Rattan Lal vs State of Punjab(1)	 is a milestone in the progress of the modem liberal trend of reform in the field of penology. It is the result of the recognition of the doctrine that the object of criminal law is more to reform the individual offender than to punish him. Broadly stated	 the Act distinguishes offenders below 21 years of age and those above that age	 and offenders who are guilty of having committed an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life and those who are guilty of a lesser offence. While in the case of offenders who are above the (1) ; 316 age of 21 years absolute discretion is given to the court to release 	them after admonition or on probation of good conduct	 subject to the conditions laid down in the appropriate provisions of the Act	 in the case of offenders below the age of 21 years	 an injunction is issued to the court not to sentence them to imprisonment unless it is satisfied that	 having regard to the circumstances of the case	 including the nature of the offence and the character of the offenders	 it is not desirable to deal with them under sections 3 and 4 of the Act. It is Manifest from plain reading of sub section (1 ) of section 4 of the Act that it makes no distinction between persons of the age of more than 21 years and those of the age of less than 21 years. On the contrary	 the said sub section is applicable to persons of all ages subject to certain conditions which have been specified therein. Once those conditions are fulfilled and the 	other formalities which are mentioned in section 4 are complied with	 power is given to the court to release the accused on probation of good conduct. Section 6 of the Act deals specifically with persons under twenty one years of age convicted by a court for an offence punishable with imprisonment other than imprisonment for life. In such a case an injunction is issued to the court not to sentence the young offender to imprisonment	 unless the court is of the view that having regard to the circumstances of the case including the nature of the offence and the character of the offender (it would not be desirable to release him after admonition under section 3 or on probation of good conduct under section 4 of the Act. Sub section (1) of section 16 of the provides the punishment which may be awarded to a person found guilty of the various offenses under that Act. According to the above sub section	 such a person	 in addition to a penalty to which he may be liable under section 6	 with which we are not concerned	 be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than six months but which may extend to six years and with fine which shall not be less than one thousand rupees. There follows a proviso	 according to which the court May	 in case of some of the offenses under the Act	 for adequate and special reasons to be mentioned in the judgment	 impose a sentence of imprisonment for a term of less than six months or of fine of less than one thousand rupees or of both imprisonment for a term of less than six months and fine of less than one thousand rupees. The question which arises for determination is whether despite the fact that a minimum sentence of imprisonment for a term of six months and a fine of rupees one thousand has been prescribed .by the legislature for a person found guilty of the offence under 317 the 	 the court can resort to the provisions of the . In this respect we find that sub section (1) of section 4 of the contains the words "notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force". The above non obstante clause points to the conclusion that the provisions of section 4 of the would have overriding effect and shall prevail if the other conditions prescribed are fulfilled. Those conditions are (1) the accused is found guilty of having committed an offence not punishable with death or imprisonment for life	 (2) the court finding him guilty is of the opinion that having regard to the circumstances of the case	 including the nature of the offence and the character of the offender	 it is expedient to release him on probation of good conduct	 and (3) the accused in such an event enters into a bond with or without sureties to appear and receive sentence when called upon during such period not exceeding three years as the court may direct and	 in the meantime	 to keep the peace and be of good behavior. Sub section (1) of section 6 of the above mentioned Act	 as stated earlier	 imposes a duty upon the court when it finds a person under 21 years of age	 guilty of an offence punishable with imprisonment other than imprisonment for life	 not to sentence him to imprisonment unless the court is satisfied that	 having regard to the circumstances of the case	 including the nature of the offence and the character of the offender	 it would not be desirable to deal with him under sections 3 or 4 of the Act but to award a sentence of imprisonment to him. The under lying object of the above provisions obviously is that an accused person should be given a chance of reformation which he would lose in case he is incarcerated in prison and associates with hardened criminals. So far as persons who are less than 21 years of age are concerned	 special provisions have been enacted to prevent their confinement in jail at young age with a view to obviate the possibility of their being subjected to the pernicious influence of hardened criminals. It has accordingly been enacted that in the case of a person who is less than 21 years of age and is convicted for an offence not punishable with imprisonment for life	 he shall not be sentenced to imprisonment unless there exist reasons which justify such a course. Such reasons have to be recorded in writing. According to section 18 of the 	 the aforesaid Act shall not affect the provision of sub section (2) of section 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act	 1947 (Act 2 of 1947). The last mentioned provision	 namely	 sub section (2) of section 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act	 prescribes	 in the absence of special reasons	 a minimum sentence of imprisonment for a term of not less than one year for those convicted 318 under section 5 of that Act. If the object of the legislature was that the provisions of the should not apply to all cases where a minimum sentence of imprisonment is prescribed by the statute	 there was no reason to specify subsection (2) of section 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act in section 18 of the . The fact that out of the various offenses for which the minimum sentence is prescribed	 only the offence under sub section (2) of section 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act has been mentioned in section 18 of the and not the other offenses for which the minimum sentence is prescribed	 shows that in case of such other offenses the provisions of can be invoked. The provisions of 	 in our opinion	 point to the conclusion that their operation is not excluded in the case of persons found guilty of offenses under the . Assuming that there was reasonable doubt or ambiguity	 the principle to be applied in Construing a penal act is that such doubt or ambiguity should be resolved in favour of the person who would be liable to the penalty (see Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes	 p. 239	 12th Edition). It ha		; also to be borne in mind that the was enacted in 1958 subsequent to the enactment in 1954 of the . As the legislature enacted the despite the existence on the statute book of the 	 the operation of the provisions of cannot be whittled down or circumscribed because of the provisions of the earlier enactment	 viz. Indeed	 as mentioned earlier	 the non obstante clause in section 4 of the is a clear manifestation of the intention of the legislature that the provisions of the would have effect notwithstanding any other law for the time being in force. We may also in this context refer to the decision of this Court in the case of Ramji Missir vs State of Bihar(1) wherein this Court while dealing with the observed that its beneficial provision		 should receive wide interpretation and should not be read in a restricted sense. Adulteration of food is a menace to public health. The has been enacted with the aim of eradicating that anti social evil and for ensuring purity in the articles of food. In view of the above object of the Act and the intention of the legislature as revealed by the fact that a minimum sentence of imprisonment for a period of six months (1) [1962] Suppl. 2 S.C.	R. 745. 319 and a fine of rupees one thousand has been prescribed	 the courts should not lightly resort to the provisions of the in the case of persons above	 21 years of age found guilty of offenses under the . As regards persons under 21 years of age	 however	 the policy of the law appears to be that such a person in spite of his conviction under the 	 should not be deprived of the advantage of which is a beneficent measure and reflects and incorporates the modern approach and latest trend in penology. Mr. Mahajan has argued that if the trial magistrate took the view that the accused appellant in view of Ms age	 should not be sentenced to undergo imprisonment	 the learned magistrate should still have imposed the sentence of fine as prescribed by subsection (1) of section 16 of the Act. In this respect we are of the opinion that a sentence of fine also carries with it the consequence of imprisonment in case the accused fails to pay the fine. As the object of is to avoid imprisonment of the person covered by the provisions of that Act	 the said object cannot be set at naught by imposing a sentence of fine which would necessarily entail imprisonment in case there is a default in payment of fine. The High Court in the present case did not consider the pro visions of the and its attention does not appear to	 have been invited to the mandatory provisions of section 6 of that Act. In view of the fact that the accused was less than 20 years of age and appeared to be in a repentant mood	 the trial court took action under section 4 of the . The High Court	 in our view	 was in error in interfering with the above order of the trial magistrate. We	 therefore	 accept the appeal	 set aside the order of the High Court and restore that of the trial magistrate. V.P.S. Appeal allowed.

Summary:
The appellant was found carrying 286 tolas of gold in running train between Kerla and Pali stations by the Sub Inspector of Barmer District. After the gold was seized	 criminal proceedings were instituted against the appellant. The trial court acquitted the appellant but the High Court convicted him. The appellant 's case in this Court was that the seizure of the gold from him had not been proved; that the Sub Inspector was not a Customs Officer for the place where the seizure was made	 and so the 709 seizure was not under the Land Customs Act; and that	 in any view of the case	 the prosecution had failed to prove the necessary mens rea in the appellant. Section 3 of the Land Customs Act authorises the Central Government to appoint by notification one person to be the Collector of Land Customs for any area adjoining a foreign frontier and specified in the notification. The section also authorises the Central Government to appoint such other persons as it thinks fit to be customs officer for the same area by a similar notification. The relevant notification issued was as follows: "1. In exercise of the powers conferred by sub section (1) of section 3 of the (19 of 1924) read with the notification of the Government of India in the late Finance Deptt. (Central Revenues) No. 5444	 dated 1st December 1924	 the Central Board of Revenue hereby appoints for the areas adjoining the Land Customs Frontier separating West Pakistan from India	 the officers of the Government of Rajasthan specified in the Schedule hereto annexed	 to be land Customs Officers within the jurisdiction of the Collector of Land Customs Delhi. ""The Schedule." "All officers of the Rajasthan Civil Police and the Rajasthan Armed Constabulary of and above the rank of Head Constable posted in the Districts of Barmer	 Bikaner	 Ganganagar	 Jaisalmer and Jalore in the State of Rajasthan. " Held	 that the word "adjoining" in the above notification means the whole compact block consisting of the State of Punjab	 Jammu and Kashmir and Rajasthan and the Union territories of Himachal Pradesh and Delhi as one area adjoining the West Pakistan Frontier	 and that for this entire area one person was appointed the Collector of Land Customs. Every officer	 therefore	 mentioned in the Schedule would be a Customs Officer not for any particular District mentioned in the Schedule but for the whole area which forms the jurisdiction of the Collector of Land Customs Delhi. Since in the instant case	 the Sub Inspector was an officer mentioned in the Schedule	 he would be an officer for the entire area which formed the jurisdiction of the Collector of Land Customs	 Delhi	 including the place where the seizure was made	 and was therefore	 competent to make the seizure. Held	 further	 that on the evidence the story of the re covery of gold from the appellant was true	 and that the circumstances	 manner	 quantity and the form in which gold was carried	 clearly showed that the appellant was smuggling gold knowingly and with the intention of evading the prohibition in force with respect to the import of gold into the country.