Case ID: 2606

Judgment:
Appeal No. 808 of 1966. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated September 3	 1965 of the Gujarat High Court in Civil Revision Application No. 244 of 1965. 82 Arun H. Mehta and I. N. Shroff	 for the appellant. S.T. Desai	 P. C. Bhartari	 J. B. Dadachanji and O. C. Mathur	 for the respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Shah	 J. The respondent is the owner of a house in the town of Ahmedabad. The appellants are the tenants of that house at a monthly rental of Rs. 2	171/ . Under the agreement of lease the appellants were to pay out of the agreed rent Rs. 810/ per month	 and the balance was to be appropriated towards a loan advanced by them to the respondent for constructing the house. The appellants had also agreed to pay municipal taxes and electricity charges. The appellants filed suit No. 1308 of 1963 in the Court of the Small Causes	 Ahammadabad	 for an order	 inter alia	 determining the standard rent of the premises in exercise of the power under section 11 of the Bombay Rents	 Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act 57 of 1947. The Court of Small Causes	 Ahamadabad	 on an application filed by the appellants fixed the contractual rent as "interim standard rent" and directed the appellants to pay the rent and municipal taxes. Pursuant to this order	 the appellants deposited Rs. 2	403/ as rent and Rs. 8	921.25 due as municipal taxes for the year 1964 65. An application by the respondent to withdraw the amount deposited in Court was resisted by the appellants. The Court permitted the respondent to withdraw Rs. 2	403/ but not the municipal taxes. The respondent then obtained an order for the issue of a distress warrant under section 53 of the 15 of 1882 read with r. 5 of the Rules framed under the Bombay Rents	 Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act	 1947	 for recovery of the amount due as municipal taxes. Distress was levied	 and the order was confirmed. A revision application moved in the High Court of Gujarat against that order was rejected. In support of this appeal counsel for the appellants urges that r. 5 of the Rules framed under section 49 of the Bombay Rents	 Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act 57 of 1947	 is ultra vires the State Government; that the Court of Small Causes Ahmedabad has in any event no jurisdiction to pass an order issuing a distress warrant when trying a suit or proceeding under Bombay Act 57 of 1947 especially when an application for determination of standard rent under section 1 1 of the Act is pending; and that the municipal taxes and electricity charges do not constitute rent which may be recovered by the issue of a distress warrant. By the express terms of the tenancy the appellants had undertaken to pay the municipal taxes and electricity charges as part of 83 the rent it is not open to them to contend that they are not rent recoverable by the issue of a distress warrant. The last branch of the argument has	 therefore	 no force. The relevant provisions of the Bombay Rents	 Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act 57 of 1947 and other statutes which have a bearing may first be noticed. Bombay Act 57 of 1947 was intended to control rents and to confer protection against eviction upon tenants of premises in certain urban areas in the Province of Bombay. By section 28 of the Act certain courts were designated as courts of exclusive jurisdiction to entertain and try suits and proceedings between a landlord and tenant	 relating to recovery of rent or possession to which the provisions of the Act applied	 and also to decide claims or questions arising under the Act. Section 28 as originally enacted and later amended by Bombay Acts 58 of 1949 and 15 of 1952	 insofar as it is material reads : "(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law and notwithstanding that by reason of the amount of the claim or for any other reason	 the suit or "proceeding would not	 but for this provision	 be within its jurisdiction	 (a) in Greater Bombay	 the Court of Small Causes	 Bombay; (aa) in any area for which	 a Court of Small Causes is established under the Provincial Small Cause Courts	 Act	 1887	 such Court and (b). shall have jurisdiction to entertain and try any suit or proceeding between a landlord and a tenant relating to the recovery of rent or possession of any premises to which any of the provisions of this Part apply and to decide any application made under this Act and to deal with any claim or question arising out of this Act or any of its provisions and subject to the provisions of subsection (2)	 no other court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any such suit	 proceeding or application or to deal with such claim or question. Section 28 did not set up new Courts to try suits or proceedings between landlords and tenants : it invested existing courts with exclusive jurisdiction to try suits and proceedings of the nature set out and claims or questions arising under the Act. Section 31 of the Act provides	 inter alia	 that the courts specified in section 28 shall follow the prescribed procedure in trying and hearing suits	 proceedings	 applications and appeals and in executing orders 84 made by them. Section 49 authorises the State Government to make rules for the purpose of giving effect to the provisions of the Act and in particular to make rules	 among other subjects	 for the procedure to be followed in trying or hearing suits	 proceedings (including proceedings for execution of decrees and distress warrants)	 applications	 appeals and execution of orders. Pursuant to the authority conferred	 rules were framed by the Government of Bombay and r. 5 which deal with the procedure to be followed by the Court of Small Causes	 Bombay	 for suits	 proceedings	 appeals	 etc. provided insofar as it is material : "In such of the following suits and proceedings as are cognizable by the Court of Small Causes	 Bombay	 on the date of the coming into force of these Rules	 namely (2) proceedings under Chapter VII and VIII of the 	 and (3) proceedings for execution of any decree or order passed in any such suit or proceedings	 the Court of Small Causes	 Bombay	 shall follow the practice and procedure provided for the time being (a) in the said Act	 except Chapter VI thereof	 and (b) in the rules made under section 9 of the said Act. " By the enactment of the Bombay Reorganization Act 11 of 1960 a separate State of Gujarat was constituted out of the territory which formed the State of Bombay	 and the area within the city limits of Ahmedabad formed part of the State of Gujarat. By the Gujarat Adaptation of Laws (State and Concurrent Subjects) Order	 1960	 cl. (a) of sub section (1) of section 28 of Bombay Act 57 of 1947 as it was originally enacted was deleted. The Legislature of the State of Gujarat enacted the Ahmedabad City Courts Act 19 of 1961 which by section 17 provided that the (XV of 1882)	 shall extend to and come into force in the City of Ahmedabad on and from the appointed day. By section 18 it was provided : "The (XV) of 1882)	 and the Bombay Rents	 Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act	 1947 (Bom. LVII of 1947)	 shall in their application to the City of Ahmedabad stand amended in the manner and to the extent specified in the Schedule. " By section 19 it was provided : "With effect on and from the appointed day. the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act	 1887 (IX of 85 1887)	 and all rules	 notifications and orders made thereunder shall cease to apply to	 or be in force	 in the City of Ahmedabad	 By the Schedule certain amendments were made in the 	 in its application to the City of Ahmedabad By cl. 13 of the Schedule	 section 50 of the was to apply to every place within the City of Ahmedabad. Certain amendments were also made in section 28 of the Bombay Rents	 Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act	 1947	 and in sub section (1) of section 28	 before cl. (aa) the following clause was inserted : "(a) in the City of Ahmedabad	 the Court of Small Causes of Ahmedabad	 By the enactment of the Ahmedabad City Courts Act, 1961, the proceedings before the Court of Small Causes at Ahmedabad were governed by that Act and by virtue of the amendment made in section 28 of Bombay Act 57 of 1947 it became a Court of exclusive jurisdiction to try suits, proceedings, claims and questions arising under that Act. Being a Court governed by the , the Ahmedabad Court of Small Causes was competent to exercise, subject to the Ahmedabad City Courts Act, all the powers which a Presidency Small Causes Court may exercise. Power to issue a distress warrant being expressly conferred by section 53 of the upon the Courts governed by it, the Court of Small Causes, Ahmedabad, was competent to exercise that power. Rule 5 was framed under the Bombay Act 57 of 1947 in exercise of the authority conferred by section 49 (2) (iii). After the enactment of the Ahmedabad City Courts Act, 1961, r. 5 as originally framed by the Government of Bombay continued in force by virtue of section 87 of the Bombay Reorganization Act 11 of 1960, and applied to the Ahmedabad Small Causes Court. When r. 5 was framed under Bombay Act 57 of 1947 it was not ultra vires, and it is not shown to have become ultra vires after the enactment of the Ahmedabad City Courts Act in its application to the City of Ahmedabad. The argument that section 28 sets up a new set of Courts, with special powers and jurisdiction is without substance. Section 28 merely confers upon the existing Courts exclusive jurisdiction in respect of matters relating to possession of premises and recovery of rent and to determine claims and questions arising under that Act. On that account it does not become a Special Court : it is a court which is competent to exercise all the powers which are conferred upon it by virtue of its constitution under the statute which governs it. The Court of Small Causes at Ahmedabad had, 86 therefore, power to issue distress warrant and that power could be exercised even in respect of suits and proceedings which were exclusively triable by it by virtue of the Bombay Act 57 of 1947. We are also unable to hold that so long as an application for fixation of standard rent is pending, the Court 's jurisdiction to issue a distress warrant remains suspended. Until standard rent is determined, or an interim order is made, rent at the contractual rate is payable and process for recovery by distress warrant may always be adopted. Section II of Bombay Act 57 of 1947 confers upon the Court power to fix standard rent and permitted increases in certain cases. The Court is also competent to determine interim standard rent, and direct payment pending final determination of standard rent. The appellants applied for fixation of standard rent and invited the Court to pass an order fixing interim standard rent and the Court of Small Causes proceeded to pass the order for payment of rent and municipal taxes. In the present case there was an express order of the Court requiring the appellants to deposit in Court Rs. 810/ per month and also to deposit municipal taxes. The Court of Small Causes ordered that the amount deposited by the appellants towards municipal taxes shall not be paid over to the landlord. The amount was on that account not available to the respondent. The respondent was unable to pay the taxes and the Municipality threatened to attach the property. The amount of municipal taxes was due and it was payable by the appellants. Though deposited in Court, it could not be withdrawn by the respondent. The municipal taxes were, therefore, in arrears and a distress warrant could be applied for under section 53 of the by the respondent. It was urged that the appellants had to pay the amount of interim standard rent twice over : once when they deposited it in the Court and again when they satisfied the demand to avoid execution of the distress warrant. The landlord undoubtedly cannot obtain the amount twice over. But that does not mean that when the tenant has not made the amount available to the landlord the application for distress was not maintainable. The argument that the erroneous order passed by the Court of Small Causes preventing the landlord from recovering the amount of municipal taxes could have been got corrected by approaching the superior courts and so long as that order stood, no distress could be levied, ignores the fact that the appellants had persuaded the Court of Small Causes to pass that order. In our judgment, there was no bar to the respondent maintaining the application for distress. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. G.C. Appeal dismissed. 
3518	Civil Appeal No. 2574 of 1972. Appeal from the Judgment and Order dated the 2nd June, 1965 of the Calcutta High Court in Appeal from Original Order No. 287 of 1964. Naunit Lal and (Miss) Lalita Kohli for the Appellant. B. Sen, M. Mookherjee, Sardar Bahadur Saharya and Vishnu Bahadur Saharya for Respondent No. 1. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by GOSWAMI, J. This is an appeal at the instance of the workman on certificate of the Calcutta High Court from the decision of the Division Bench reversing the earlier judgment and order of the learned single Judge in an application under article 226 of the Constitution directed against the award of the First Industrial Tribunal, West Bengal, made under section 33A of the Industrial Disputes Act. The appellant (hereinafter to be described as the workman) was employed by M/s Hindustan Motors Ltd. (hereinafter to be described as the company) since August 3, 1949. On August 3, 1956, the workman entered into an agreement of service with the company wherein the first clause reads as follows: The Employer agrees to and does hereby engage the services of the employee for a period of 5 years beginning with 1 6 56 and thereafter until this agreement shall be determined by either party hereto giving to the other 3 months ' notice in writing of such intended termination. 637 Provided that in case Employer finds the employee 's work satisfactory	 Employer shall have the option to extend the period of service by a further term of 3 years". The workman went on two months ' leave to Banaras for a change some time in 1960. He requested for extension of leave for one month on medical grounds. He actually sent an application on August 8	 1960	 along with a medical certificate praying for extension of his leave. The company asked the workman to get himself examined by the company 's medical officer within ten days. As the workman was lying ill at Banaras	 he could not comply with the directions of the company. On September 5	 1960	 he sent another telegram followed by a formal application enclosing a medical certificate for extension of his leave. On September 15	 1960	 the company sent a letter to him terminating his services on the ground of habitual absence which is a misconduct under the company 's standing orders. At the time of this termination there was an industrial dispute pending between the company and its workmen. Since the company did not ask for approval of its order from the Industrial Tribunal the workman made a complaint to the Tribunal under section 33A of the Industrial Disputes Act (briefly the Act). The company contested the application. The Tribunal made its award on September 27	 1962	 ordering reinstatement of the workman with 50% of his back wages for the period of his forced unemployment as compensation. The Tribunal directed that the award should be given effect to not later than one month of the publication of the award which was on October 26	 1962. After a little over two months of the publication of the award	 to be precise	 on February 4	 1963	 the company intimated to the workman to rejoin his service. The workman reported for duty the following day on February 5	 1963. On February 16	 1963	 the company invoked clause (1) of the agreement which we have set out earlier and terminated the services of the workman by paying three months ' salary in lieu of notice. This is the second round of litigation with which we are concerned in this appeal. Since an industrial dispute was pending even on this date of termination of his service and the company did not apply to the Tribunal for approval of the order	 the workman made a complaint to the Tribunal	 as on the previous occasion	 under section 33A of the Act. The Tribunal accepted the complaint and held as follows: "In my opinion	 the company has really dismissed the petitioner for a piece of conduct which must have appeared as misconduct in the eye of the company". The Tribunal observed that the company in substance dismissed the workman for misconduct since the workman became "odious to the company" on account of his earlier success before the Tribunal in his application under section 33A of the Act. The Tribunal	 therefore	 ordered his reinstatement with full back wages for the period of his forced unemployment as compensation. This time the company did 638 not accept the award although on the earlier occasion the company did not choose to litigate and reinstated him as ordered by the Tribunal. The company moved the Calcutta High Court under article 226 of the Constitution to quash the award. The learned single Judge refused to interfere with the award holding that "the reason might have been the old reason of dismissal. ". The learned Judge further observed that "the circumstances relied on by the Tribunal are not wholly irrelevant and the inference drawn by the Tribunal cannot be characterised as unreasonable". The company appealed to the Division Bench of the High Court and the appeal was accepted. The Division Bench held as follows: "It may be that having regard to the sequence of events that took place in this case the termination of service of the respondent No. 1 by the letter of 16th February 1963 may be regarded as a colourable exercise of the power under the contract of employment or may even be regarded as one of unfair labour practice or mala fide	 but the discharge cannot be said to be for any misconduct. There is no evidence for discharge on any specific misconduct. The definite case of the respondent No.1 has been that it was by way of retaliatory measure that his services were terminated. This may be true and may show that the action on the part of the appellant company was mala fide. But until it is established that there has been a contravention of section 33 of the Act which would create jurisdiction in the Industrial Tribunal to entertain an application under section 33A	 or in other words	 unless it is established that there has been dischrge for misconduct	 the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to set aside the order of termination in an application under section 33A". On the application of the workman the High Court granted a certificate to him under article 133(1)(c) of the Constitution. That is how this matter has come before us for a decision. We should at the outset observe that this is not an appeal against the award of the Industrial Tribunal but is only directed against the judgment of the High Court under article 226 of the Constitution. In an application under article 226 of the Constitution the High Court was concerned only with the question of jurisdiction of the Tribunal in entertaining the application under section 33A of the Act. The question of jurisdiction again was intimately connected with the question whether the termination of service was for misconduct of the workmen. The learned single Judge accepted the finding of the Tribunal when it held that the discharge was nothing but dismissal for misconduct and in that view of the matter did not find any justification for interfering with the award. According to the learned Judge	 therefore	 no question of lack of jurisdiction of the Tribunal arose to merit interference with the award under article 226 of the Constitution. 639 The Division Bench	 however	 looked at the matter from a different viewpoint. It assumed that the action of the management was even mala fide and so it could be wrongful and in an appropriate reference under section 10 of the Act the workman might be able to get proper relief. The High Court	 however	 came to the conclusion that since clause (1) of the agreement was invoked by the employer it was not a case of discharge for misconduct and that being the position the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to entertain the complaint under section 33A even though the action of the company might be as a result of unfair labour practice. Mr. Naunit Lal on behalf of the workman has assailed the conclusion of the Division Bench while Mr. Sen submits that the decision is legally unquestionable. The question that arises for consideration in this appeal relates to the applicability of the proviso to section 33(2) (b) of the Act as amended in 1956. Section 33(2)(b) at the material time reads as follows: "33(2): During the pendency of any such proceeding in respect of an industrial dispute	 the employer may	 in accordance with the standing orders applicable to a workman concerned in such dispute. (b) for any misconduct not connected with the dispute	 discharge or punish	 whether by dismissal or otherwise	 that workman: Provided that no such workman shall be discharged or dismissed	 unless he has been paid wages for one month and an application has been made by the employer to the authority before which the proceeding is pending for approval of the action taken by the employer". We may also read section 33A of the Act as that is the section under which the complaint was originally made by the workman to the Industrial Tribunal. 33A: "Where an employer contravenes the provisions of section 33 during the pendency of proceedings before a Labour Court	 Tribunal or National Tribunal	 any employee aggrieved by such contravention	 may make a complaint in writing	 in the prescribed manner to such Labour Court	 Tribunal or National Tribunal and on receipt of such complaint that Labour Court	 Tribunal or National Tribunal shall adjudicate upon the complaint as if it were a dispute referred to or pending before it	 in accordance with the provisions of this Act and shall submit its award to the appropriate Government and the provisions of this Act shall apply accordingly". 640 It is clear that the foundation of jurisdiction of the Tribunal to entertain a complaint under section 33A is the contravention of section 33 of the Act. Section 33 may be contravened in a variety of ways. We are concerned in this appeal only with one type of contravention	 namely	 that the employer did not make any application to the Tribunal for approval of the order of termination of service of the workman. There is no dispute between the parties in this appeal that there was an industrial dispute pending before the Tribunal in which the workman was concerned and that the particular termination had nothing to do with that dispute. The only point on which the parties differ is as to the nature of the order of termination of service. The employer claims it to be a termination simpliciter in exercise of its right under a written contract of service entered between the parties in August 1956. The workman on the other hand contends that termination of his service was meted out as a punishment for avenging the defeat of the employer in an earlier litigation under section 33A at the instance of the workmen. In other words the workman contends that the order although purported	 ex facie	 to be a termination under the terms of the agreement	 is in truth and reality an order of dismissal for misconduct. Originally when the Act was passed in 1947 (Act 14 of 1947) section 33 imposed a ban on the employer against discharge	 dismissal or punishment of a workman during the pendency of proceedings before the Tribunal and other specified authorities "except for misconduct not connected with the dispute. " The section underwent a vital change for the employer when the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act 1950 (Act 48 of 1950) was passed and section 33 was substituted and a total ban imposed against discharge	 dismissal or any punishment of a workman during the pendency of proceedings before the Tribunal and other specified authorities. The reservation of the right to the employer to take action even in case of misconduct	 which was there in the original Act	 was withdrawn. As time passed	 in view of representations from employers	 the Parliament became alive to the question of discipline in the industry and reintroduced in an altered form the said right of the employer to take action during the pendency of proceedings before the Tribunal when the Act was amended by the Industrial Disputes (Amendment and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1956 (Act 36 of 1956). We have already set out the material provision of section 33(2) (b) at the out set which has since restored to the employer the right to take punitive action under specified conditions. To complete the picture we may note in passing that the section was further amended by the Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act (Act 36 of 1964) with effect from December 19	 1964	 whereby some words were inserted in sub section (2) of section 33 with which we are not concerned in this appeal. From the provisions of section 33 it is manifest that punitive action by the employer in whatever form it may be passed is permissible against an ordinary workman	 as distinguished from a protected workman even during the pendency of proceedings before the Tribunal 641 provided that the employer pays one month 's wages and also applies to the concerned Tribunal for approval of his action. Since the action is punitive	 namely	 dismissal or discharge for misconduct	 the Tribunal has to oversee the action to guarantee that no unfair labour practice or victimisation has been practised thereby. If the procedure of fair hearing has been observed the Tribunal has to find in an application under section 33 that a prima facie case is made out for dismissal. If	 on the other hand	 there is violation of the principles of natural justice in the enquiry	 the Tribunal can go into the whole question relating to the misconduct and come to its own conclusion whether the same is established. The submission of the employer is that since the termination of the workman is in exercise of the right under the written agreement it was not a case of discharge or dismissal for misconduct and there was	 therefore	 no obligation on the employer to make an application under section 33 of the Act and hence section 33 has not been contravened and the application under section 33A is not maintainable. The question that arises for decision in this appeal is whether if a particular order of termination of service is not on account of misconduct and is merely a termination simpliciter the employer is still required to make an application under section 33 of the Act. We have no doubt in our mind that section 33(2)(b) makes it obligatory upon the employer to make an application to the Tribunal under the proviso only when he discharges or dismisses a workman for misconduct. It is submitted by Mr. Sen that misconduct contemplated in section 33(2)(b) must be a misconduct enumerated in the standing orders of the company. We are unable to accept this submission. Standing orders of a company only describe certain cases of misconduct and the same cannot be exhaustive of all the species of misconduct which a workman may commit. Even though a given conduct may not come within the specific terms of misconduct described in the standing orders	 it may still be a misconduct	 in the special facts of a case	 which it may not be possible to condone and for which the employer may take appropriate action. Ordinarily	 the standing orders may limit the concept but not invariably so. When	 therefore	 the Tribunal has found as a fact after taking note of the history and the entire circumstances of the case that the termination was on account of misconduct of the employee it is difficult to hold that there is any manifest error of law committed by the Tribunal in reaching that conclusion only because the misconduct	 as found	 is not within the four corners of the description of the various misconducts mentioned in the company 's standing orders. It is not possible	 therefore	 to accept the submission that the Tribunal committed an error of law or of jurisdiction in entertaining the application under section 33A. 642 Termination simpliciter or automatic termination of service under the conditions of service or under the standing orders is outside the scope of section 33 of the Act. This does not mean that the employer has the last word about the termination of service of an employee and can get away with it by describing it to be a simple termination in his letter of discharge addressed to the employee. It is also not a correct proposition of law that in case of a complaint under section 33A the Tribunal would be debarred from going into the question whether	 notwithstanding the form of the order in sub stance	 it is an action of dismissal for misconduct and not termination simpliciter. The possibility that in an appeal against the award of the Tribunal this Court may have taken a different view about the termination does not affect the present issue. Mr. Naunit Lal relies upon a decision of this Court in the Management of Murugan Mills Ltd. vs Industrial Tribunal Madras and Another in support of his contention that even termination simpliciter is within the sweep of section 33. That was a case where the workman 's services were terminated "because he deliberately adopted go slow and was negligent in the discharge of his duty". The Supreme Court in that case observed thus: "His services were therefore terminated for dereliction of duty and go slow in his work. This clearly amounted to punishment for misconduct and therefore to pass an order under cl. 17(a) of the Standing Orders in such circumstances was clearly a colourable exercise of the power to terminate the services of a workman under the provision of the Standing Orders". The Supreme Court further observed: "In these circumstances the case was clearly covered by cl.(b) of section 33(3) of the Act as the services of the respondent were dispensed with during the pendency of a dispute by meeting out the punishment of discharge to him for misconduct". The decision is	 therefore	 not an authority for the extreme proposition advanced by Mr. Naunit Lal. Mr. Naunit Lal also drew our attention to two decisions of the Madras High Court in Shyamala Studios vs Kannu Devar (S.S.) and others and Sri Rama Machinery Corporation (Private) Limited	 Madras vs Murthi (N.R.) and others in support of the above submission. Although the decision of the Supreme Court in Murugan Mills ' case (supra) was noticed by the Madras High Court it does not appear to have correctly appreciated the ratio decidedi of that judgment. We are unable to hold that the Supreme Court in 643 Murugan Mills ' case (supra) went to the extent of re writing section 33 by completely obliterating the concept of misconduct of a workman for which alone in a limited way the right of action for the employer is preserved during the span of pendency of proceedings before the Tribunal in the interest of discipline. To the extent the Madras decisions state that termination of services need not be for misconduct of the workman in order to attract section 33(2)(b)	 we cannot agree. If the Tribunal finds that a particular termination of service of a workman is in truth and substance innocuous or in exercise of a bona fide right under the contract	 section 33(2)(b) will not be applicable and necessarily there will be no contravention of section 33A of the Act. In Air India Corporation	 Bombay vs V. A. Rebellow & Anr.(1) this Court had to deal with the validity of an award made under section 33A although the Labour Court in that case had held that the workman was guilty of misconduct and that his services were terminated for that reason. This Court did not agree with the aforesaid conclusion and dismissed the workman 's petition under section 33A of the Act. In doing so this Court observed as follows: "It is noteworthy that the ban is imposed only in regard to action taken for misconduct whether connected or unconnected with the dispute. The employer is	 therefore free to take action against his workmen if it is not based on any misconduct on their part". We are	 therefore	 clearly of opinion that the single Judge is right in not interfering with the award under article 226 of the Constitution and the Division Bench is wrong in doing so. It is true that on the face of the order of termination the company invoked clause (1) of the agreement and even so it was open to the Tribunal to pierce the veil of the order and have a close look at all the circumstances and come to a decision whether the order was passed on account of certain misconduct. This is a finding of fact which could not be interfered with under article 226 of the Constitution unless the conclusion is perverse	 that is to say	 based on no evidence whatsoever. We are	 however	 unable to say so having regard to the facts and circumstances described by the Tribunal in its order. It is	 however	 unexceptionable that if an employer passes an order of termination of service in exercise of his right under a contract or in accordance with the provision of the standing orders and the Tribunal finds that the order is not on account of any misconduct	 the question of violation of section 33 would not arise. There remains	 however another aspect to which the Tribunal did not properly address. The workman in this case had a contract of employment only for 8 years at the most. The reinstatement in his 644 case	 therefore	 cannot extend beyond a period of eight years from June 1	 1956 and the contract of employment would have automatically terminated on May 31	 1964. The Tribunal awarded reinstatement on March 24	 1964	 when even the employer did not bring it to its notice that the contract of employment would terminate in May 1964. Mr. Sen	 however	 during the course of the argument" hinted at another round of litigation under section 33C of the Act to contest the claim to reinstatement ordered by the Tribunal. We cannot be oblivious to the plight of this workman in his unequal fight with a big company. He was serving the company since 1949 for about eleven years when he was first dismissed in 1960. He has been involved in litigation since 1960 uptill today except for a lull for eleven days on his reinstatement after the first award. Eleven years in actual service and sixteen years in litigation is a doleful tale by itself. We	 therefore	 feel that	 in the interest of industrial peace and above all to draw a final curtain to this unhappy litigation	 we would be justified in quantifying the compensation payable to the workman in this case to a sum of Rs. 20	000/ only in lieu of reinstatement with full back wages as ordered by the Tribunal	 which we accordingly order. We may also observe that Mr. Sen	 fairly enough had made it clear before us in the course of hearing that even if the company succeeded in this Court it would be prepared to pay to the workman a sum of Rs. 10	000/ on compassionate grounds. In the result the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court is set aside. The award of the Tribunal is varied as stated above. The appeal is allowed accordingly with no order as to costs. No. 6664 of 1976 on behalf of the company for urging additional grounds is dismissed as not pressed. P.B.R. Appeal Allowed.

Summary:
Jurisdiction to try suits and proceedings between landlords and tenants under the Bombay Rents	 Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act 57 of 1947 was by virtue of section 28 of the Act given to Small Cause Courts. Under section 49 of the Act the State Government was authorised to make rules for the purpose of giving effect to the provisions of the Act and in particular to make rules among other subjects	 for the procedure to be followed in trying or hearing suits and proceedings including proceedings for execution of decrees and distress warrants. For these purposes the Government of Bombay under r. 5 framed by it provided that the procedure under the would be followed. By the enactment of the Bombay Reorganization Act 11 of 1960 a separate State of Gujarat was constituted out of the territory which formed the State of Bombay	 and the area within the city limits of Ahmedabad formed part of the State of Gujarat. The Legislature of the State of Gujarat enacted the Ahmedabad City Courts Act 19 of 1961 which by 17 extended the (15 of 1882) as well as the Bombay Rents Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act 57 of 1947 to the City of Ahmedabad with suitable modifications and amendments. Jurisdiction to try suits under the Bombay Act was by amendment of section 28 thereof given to the Court of Small Causes Ahmedabad. The appellants were tenants of a house owned by the respondent in Ahmedabad. Apart 'from the rent the appellants had also agreed to pay municipal taxes and electricity charges. In 1963 the appellants filed a suit in the Court of Small Causes Ahmedabad for an order inter alia determining the standard rent of the premises in exercise of the power under section 11 of Bombay Act 57 of 1947. The said court on an application filed by the appellants fixed the contractual rent as the 'interim standard rent ' and directed the appellants to pay rent and municipal taxes	 which the appellants accordingly deposited in Court. The Court permitted the respondent to withdraw the rent so deposited but not the municipal taxes. The respondent then obtained an order for the issues of a distress warrant under section 53 of the Presidency Small Cause Court 	 Act 15 of 1882 read with r. 5 of the Rules framed under Bombay Act 57 of 1947 for recovery of the amount due as municipal taxes. Distress was levied and the order was confirmed. A revision application in the High Court of Gujarat was rejected. In their appeal against the High Court 's order the appellants urged : (i) that r. 5 of the Rules 'framed under section 49 of the Bombay Act 57 of 1947 was ultra vires the State Government; (ii) that the Court of Small Causes Ahmedabad had no jurisdiction to pass an order issuing a distress warrant in a proceeding under Bombay Act 57 of 1947 especially 81 when an application under section 11 was pending; (iii) that the municipal taxes and electricity charges did not constitute rent which could be recovered by the issue of a distress warrant. HELD: (i) Rule 5 was framed under Bombay Act 57 of 1947 in exercise of the authority conferred by section 49(2)(iii). After the enactment of the Ahmedabad City Courts Act	 1961	 r. 5 as originally 'framed by the Government continued in force by virtue of section 87 of the Bombay Reorganization Act 11 of 1960	 and applied to the Ahmedabad Small Causes Court. When r. 5 was framed under Bombay Act 57 of 1947 it was not ultra vires and it was not shown to have become ultra vires after the enactment of the Ahmedabad City Courts Act in its application to the City of Ahmedabad. [85 F G] (ii) The distress warrant issued by the Court of Small Causes Ahmedabad against the appellant was within its powers. By the enactment of the Ahmedabad City Courts Act	 1961	 the proceedings before the Court of Small Causes at Ahmedabad were governed by that Act and by virtue of the amendment made in section 28 of Bombay Act 57 of 1947 it became a court of exclusive jurisdiction to try suits	 proceedings	 claims and questions arising under that Act. Being a court governed by the Presidency Small Causes Courts Act	 the Ahmedabad Court of Small Causes was competent to exercise	 subject to the Ahmedabad City Courts Act	 all the powers which a Presidency Small Cause Court could exercise. Power to issue a distress warrant being expressly conferred by section 53 of the upon the Courts governed by it	 the Court of Small Causes Ahmedabad	 was competent to exercise that power. [85 D E] Section 28 does not make the Court of Small Causes trying suit under the Bombay Act a special Court : it is a court which is comptent to exercise all the powers conferred on it under the statute which governs it. Its power to issue distress warrant could therefore be exercised even in respect of suits and proceedings which were exclusively triable by it by virtue of the Bombay Act 57 of 1947. [85 H] Pendency of an application for fixation of standard rent does not suspend the court 's power to issue distress warrant	 for until standard rent is determined or an interim order is made	 rent at the contractual rate is payable and process for recovery by distress warrant may always be adopted. In the present case the amount of municipal taxes was due and it was payable by the appellants. Though deposited in Court it could not be withdrawn by the respondent. The municipal taxes were therefore ill arrears and a distress warrant could be applied for under section 53 of the Presidency Small Cause Court by the respondent. It was not necessary for the respondent to approach a higher court against the erroneous order of the Small Cause Court preventing him from recovering the amount of municipal taxes. [86 B G] (iii) By the express terms of the tenancy the appellants had undertaken to pay the municipal taxes and electricity charges as part of the rent : it was not open to them to contend that these taxes and charger were not rent recoverable by the issue of a distress warrant. [83 H 84 A]