Case ID: 2062

Judgment:
Appeal No. 975 of 1964. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order December 12	 1962	 of the Mysore High Court in W.P. No. 531 of 1961. Bishan Narain	 Naunit Lal and B.R.G.K. Achar	 for the appellant. section K. Venkataranga Iyengar and R. Gopalakrishnan	 for the respondent. The judgment of the Court was delivered by Satyanarayana Raju	 J. This appeal	 by special leave	 raises a somewhat important question of all	 which is whether the reversion of a Government servant from an officiating post to his substantive post	 while his junior is officiating in the higher post	 does not	 by itself	 constitute a reduction in rank within the meaning of article 311(2) of the Constitution. For the purpose of deciding the point raised in the appeal	 it would be necessary to state the material facts. The Southern Railway has two grades of Train Examiners	 one in the scale of Rs. 100 5 125 6 185 and the other in the scale of Rs. 150 225. The respondent was employed in the lower scale as a Train Examiner. By an order dated April 7	 1959	 the respondent was promoted to officiate in the higher scale with a starting salary of Rs. 150 per month. That order read as follows : "2. Sri section Raghavendrachar	 TXR YPR in scale Rs. 100 185 is promoted to officiate as TXR in scale Rs. 150 225 on Rs. 150 per month and retained YPR as TXR IC. 185 is promoted to officiate as TXR in scale Rs. 150 225 on Rs. 150 per month and transferred to SBC BG vide item above. Sanction endorsed by D.S. for promotion of items 2 and 3. " 108 There is a note appended to the order which is important "Note: 1. The promotion of items 2 and 3 are purely provisional subject to revision when Divisional Seniority lists are drawn up. " By an order dated November 27	 1959	 the respondent was reverted. ]Mat order was as follows : "Sri section Raghavendrachar	 TXR/YPR (officiating) in scale Rs. 150 225 is reverted to scale Rs. 100 185 on Rs. 130 per month and transferred to SBC/MG. " On receipt of this order	 the respondent made representations to the appellant. The appellant sent to the respondent communication dated May 25	 1960 : "As per the existing instructions an officiating employee with less than 18 months of service in the higher grade may be reverted to lower scale without assigning any reason for such reversion by a competent authority. Since the period of your officiating in scale Rs. 150225 was less than 18 months and since your reversion from scale Rs. 150 225 to Rs. 100 185 has been ordered by a competent authority	 no reasons need be assigned as requested in your representation dated 8th/9th December 1959. As regards the confirmation of TXRs in scale Rs. 150 225	 who were your juniors while you were officiating in scale Rs. 150 225	 1 have to advise you that consequent on your reversion to scale Rs. 100 185	 all your juniors	 in scale Rs. 150 225	 have become your seniors and their confirmations in preference to you are in order. Regarding your re promotion to scale Rs. 150 225	 it will be considered in the normal course according to your	 seniority and suitability to hold the post in scale Rs. 150 225." The respondent made a further appeal to the Divisional Superintendent	 Mysore	 on July 2	 1960 and sent him two reminders. Not having got any response	 he filed an appeal on January 31	 1961	 to the General Manager	 Southern Railway. The respondent sent a reminder to the latter on March 31	 1961. In reply	 109 the Divisional Personnel Officer wrote to the respondent as follows by letter dated April 30	 1961 : Rs. 150 225 (PS) was not a penalty as presumed by you	 in your above representations. The vacancy thus released by you in scale Rs. 150 225 (PS) and the vacancies which existed on the date of your reversion were filled up on 14th February 1960. You are therefore eligible to be considered for promotion against a vacancy which occurred after the date of your reversion and not against the vacancies which existed on the date of your reversion and also the vacancy caused by your reversion. No regular vacancy (other than short term leave vacancy) in scale Rs. 150 225 has occurred from the date of your reversion till date. You will therefore be considered for promotion against the next vacancy	 subject to the condition of seniority cum suitability	 on the basis of which only promotions to non selection posts are to be ordered. As regards seniority	 all those hitherto promoted to scale Rs. 150 225 (PS) will automatically rank seniors to you and your seniority if promoted will be reckoned only from the date of your promotion in future vacancy. Your contention that	 when you were promoted to officiate for 2 months against the leave vacancy of Shri Venkataraman	 as per this office order No. M. 542/PI of 14th November 1960	 you should have been continued even after the expiry of the leave vacancy	 and that Shri Varghese should have been reverted	 is not correct	 for the reasons stated in paragraph 2 above. Your representation of 30th January 1961 to GM(P) Madras is therefore withheld. " Aggrieved by the order dated November 27	 1959	 the res pondent moved the Mysore High Court	 on the failure of his representations to the hierarchy of Departmental Heads	 for a writ of certiorari to quash the impugned order made by the appellant. By judgment dated December 12	 1962	 a Division Bench of the High Court quashed the order of reversion. The High Court observed that it was not necessary to express any opinion on the question whether the reversion of the respondent on the ground that his work was unsatisfactory amounted to a reduction 110 in rank within the meaning of that expression occurring in article 311(2) of the Constitution. But the High Court held that the reversion of the respondent amounted to a reduction in rank because he was reverted from the higher post to the lower post notwithstanding the fact that his juniors were still retained in the higher posts. In reaching this conclusion the High Court purported to follow the decision of this Court in Madhav Laxman Vaikunthe vs State of Mysore(.). The Divisional Personnel Officer	 Southern Railway	 Mysore	obtained special leave from this Court against the order of the High Court. It is contended by Mr. Bishan Narain	 learned counsel for the appellant	 that the High Court misunderstood the ratio of the judgment of this Court in Vaikunthe 's case(1)	 that there is no right in a Government servant to promotion as of right	 that the mere reversion of a Government servant from an officiating post to his substantive post	 notwithstanding that his juniors are retained in the higher posts	 does not amount to a reduction in rank and the provisions of article 311(2) are not attracted. On the other hand	 it is contended by Mr. section K. Venkataranga lyengar	 learned counsel for the respondent	 that the circumstances of the case clearly indicated that the reversion of the respondent amounted to a reduction in rank and since the procedure prescribed by article 311(2) was not complied with	 the order of reversion was bad in law. It may be taken to be settled by the decisions of this Court that since article 311 makes no distinction between permanent and temporary posts	 its protection must be held to extend to all government servants holding permanent or temporary posts or officiating in any of them	 but that protection is limited to the imposition of three major penalties contemplated by the Service Rules	 viz.	 dismissal or removal or reduction in rank. The first of the cases which may be considered is the decision in Parshotam Lal Dhingra vs Union of India(2)	 Commonly known as Dhingra 's case. In this case	 Das C.J.	 who spoke for the majority	 considered comprehensively the scope and effect of the relevant constitutional provisions	 service rules and their impact on the question as to whether reversion of Dhingra offended against the provisions of article 311(2). Dhingra was appointed as a Signaller in 1924 and promoted to the post of Chief Controller in 1950. Both these posts were in Class III Service. In (1) ; (2) ; 111 1951	 he was appointed to officiate in Class II Service as Assistant Superintendent	 Railway Telegraphs. On certain adverse remarks having been made against him	 he was reverted as a subordinate till he made good his 'short comings. Then	 Dhingra made a representation. Subsequently	 the General Manager gave him notice reverting him to Class III appointment. It was this order which was challenged by Dhingra by a writ petition	 in the High Court and	 eventually	 in this Court. The question for decision was whether the order of the General Manager amounted to reduction in rank within the meaning of article 311(2) of the Constitution	 and Dhingra was entitled to a reasonable opportunity to show cause against the order. This Court held that the reversion of an officiating officer to his substantive post did not attract the provisions of article 311(2) and that Dhingra was not entitled to the protection of that article. It is however true that even an officiating government servant may be reverted to his original rank by way of punishment. It was therefore observed in Dhingra 's case(") at p. 863 : "Thus if the order entails or provides for the forfeiture of his pay or allowances or the loss of his seniority in his substantive rank or the stoppage or postponement of his future chances of promotion	 then that circumstance may indicate that although in form the Gov ernment had purported to exercise its right to terminate the employment or to reduce the servant to a lower rank under the terms of the contract of employment or under the rules	 in truth and reality the Government has terminated the employment as and by way of penalty. " One test for determining whether the termination of service was by way of punishment or otherwise is to ascertain whether under the Service Rules	 but for such termination	 the servant has the right to hold the post. It was held in Dhingrads case(1) that he was holding an officiating post and had no right under the rules of the Railway Code to continue in it	 that under the general law such appointment was terminable at any time on reasonable notice and the reduction could not operate as a forfeiture of any right	 that the order of the General Manager visited him with no evil consequences and that the order therefore did no"	 amount to a reduction in rank. (1) (1958] S.C.R. 828. 112 Vaikunthe 's case(1) was relied upon by the High Court in support of its conclusion that the reversion of the respondent amounted to a reduction in rank. It is therefore necessary to scrutinize the facts of that case. The appellant Vaikunthe	 who held the rank of a Mamlatdar in the first grade	 and was officiating as District Deputy Collector	 was alleged to have wrongly charged travelling allowance for 59 miles instead of 51 and was	 as the result of a Departmental enquiry	 reverted to his substantive rank for three years and directed to refund the excess he had charged. He made a representation to the Government which was of no avail although the Accountant General was of the opinion that the appellant had not over charged and committed no fraud. Ultimately	 the appellant was promoted to the Selection Grade but the order of reversion remained effective and affected his position in the Selection Grade. After retirement he brought a suit for a declaration that the order of reversion was void and for recovery of a certain sum as arrears of salary and allowances. The trial Court held that there was no compliance with the provisions of section 240(3) of the Government of India Act	 1935	 granted the declaration but refused the arrears claimed. Vaikunthe filed an appeal and the State a cross objection. The High Court dismissed the appeal and allowed the cross objection	 holding that the order of reversion was not a punishment within the meaning of section 240(3) of the 1935 Act. This Court held that the matter was covered by the observations in Dhingra 's case(1) and the tests of punishment laid down by this Court viz.	 (1) whether the servant had a right to the rank or (2) whether he had been visited with evil consequences of the kind specified therein	 and that the second test certainly applied. This Court concluded that Vaikunthe might or might not have the right to hold the higher post	 but there could be no doubt that he was visited with evil consequences as a result of the order of reversion. It was there held : "Mere deprivation of higher emoluments	 however	 in consequence of an order of	 reversion could not by itself satisfy that test which must include such other consequences as forfeiture of substantive pay and loss of seniority." Since the requirement of section 240(3) of the 1935 Act	 which corresponds to article 311(2) of the Constitution	 had not been found to have been fully complied with	 the order of reversion was held to be void. (1) ; (2) ; 113 There was an important aspect of this decision which was lost sight of by the High Court. The impugned order there ran as follows : "After careful consideration Government have decided to revert you to Mamlatdar for a period of three years. . It was pointed out in Dhingra 's case( ) that if the order of reversion entailed or provided for the forfeiture of the pay or allowances of the Government servant or loss of his seniority in his substantive rank or the stoppage or postponement of his future chances of promotion	 then that circumstance might 'Indicate that although in form the Government had purported to exercise its right to terminate the employment or to reduce the servant to a lower rank under the terms of the contract of employment or under the rules	 in truth and reality the Government had terminated the employment as and by way of penalty. At p. 891	 Sinha	 C.J.	 who spoke for the Court	 pointed out: he would have continued as a Deputy Collector but for the Order of the Government	 dated August 11	 1948	 impugned in this case	 as a result of the enquiry held against him	 and that his reversion was not as a matter of course or for administrative convenience. The Order	 in terms	 held him back for three years. (Italics ours). Thus his emoluments	 present as well as future	 were adversely affected by the Order aforesaid of the Government. In the ordinary course	 he would have continued as a Deputy Collector with all the emoluments of the post and would have been entitled to further promotion but for the set back in his service as a result of the adverse finding against him which finding was ultimately declared by the Accountant General to have been under a misapprehension of the true facts. It is true that he was promoted as a result of the Government Order dated March 26	 1951	 with effect from August 1	 1950. But that promotion did not entirely cover the ground lost by him as a result of the Government Order impugned in this case. " Again	 at p. 893	 the learned Chief Justice pointed out"If the loss of the emoluments attaching to the higher rank in which he was officiating was the only consequence of his reversion as a result of the enquiry against him	 the appellant would have no cause of (1) 114 action. But it is clear that as a result of the Order dated August 11	 1948 (exhibit 35)	 the appellant lost his seniority as a Mamlatdar	 which was his substantive post. That being so	 it was not a simple case of reversion with no evil consequences; it had such consequences as would come within the test of punishment as laid down in Dhingra 's case. " Finally	 it was pointed out : "If the reversion had not been for a period of three years	 it could not be Said that the appellant had been punished within the meaning of the rule laid down in Dhingra 's Case. It cannot be asserted that his reversion to a substantive post for a period of three years was not by way of punishment. From the facts of this case it is clear that the appellant was on the upward move in the cadre of his service and but for this aberration in his progress to a higher post	 he would have	 in ordinary course	 been promoted as he actually was some time later when the authorities realised perhaps that he had not been justly treated. The real ground on which Vaikunthe 's reversion to his original post of Mamlatdar was held to be a violation of his Constitutional grantee was that his chances of promotion were irrevocably barred for a period of three years. If this aspect of Vaikunthe 's case(1) is borne in mind	 it will be found that there is no basic inconsistency between the decisions which have a bearing on the question as to in what cases reversion would amount to a reduction in rank. Even so	 it is contended by learned counsel for the respon dent that the real reason which operated on the mind of the appellant was that the respondent 's work in his officiating capacity was unsatisfactory. Assuming that to be so	 the question is whether his reversion to his original post	 because he was found unsuitable for the higher rank to which he had been given the officiating chance	 is valid. In State of Bombay vs F. A. Abraham(2) the respondent held the substantive post of Inspector of Police and had been officiating as Deputy Superintendent of Police. He was reverted to his original rank without being given an opportunity of being heard in respect of the reversion. His request to furnish him with reasons for his reversion was refused. Later	 a departmental (1)[1962]1 S.C.R.886. (2) [1962] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 92. 115 enquiry was held behind his back in regard to certain allegations of misconduct made against him in a confidential communication from the District Superintendent of Police to the Deputy Inspector General of Police	 but these allegations were not proved at the enquiry. The Inspector General of Police	 however	 thereafter wrote to the Government that the respondent 's previous record was not satisfactory and that he had been promoted to officiate as Deputy Superintendent of Police in the expectation that he would turn a new leaf. The High Court held	 following its earlier decision in M. A. I. Waheed vs State of Madhya Pradesh(1) that if a person officiating in a higher post is reverted to his original post in the normal course	 that is	 on account of cessation of the vacancy or his failure to acquire the required qualification	 the reversion did not amount to a reduction in rank but if he is reverted for unsatisfactory work	 then the reversion would amount to a reduction in rank. This Court did not agree with the ob servations in Waheed 's case(1) that when a person officiating in a post s reverted for unsatisfactory work	 that reversion would amount to a reduction in rank. This Court took the view that the Government had a right to consider the suitability of the respondent to hold the position to which he had been appointed to officiate and that it was entitled for that purpose to make inquiries about his suitability and that was all what the Government had done in that case. Two more cases cited at the Bar now require to be consider ed. In The High Court	 Calcutta vs Amal Kumar Roy (2) this Court held that the word 'rank ' in article 311(2) referred to classification and not to a particular place in the same cadre in the hierarchy of service. The facts of the case were as follows. The respondent was a Munsif in the West Bengal Civil Service (Judicial). When the cases of several Munsifs came up for consideration before the High Court for inclusion in the panel of officers to officiate as Subordinate Judges	 the respondent 's name was excluded. On a representation made by him	 the respondent was told by the Registrar of the High Court that the Court had decided to consider his case after a year. As a result of such exclu sion	 the respondent	 who was then the senior most in the list of Munsifs	 lost eight places in the cadre of Subordinate Judges before he was actually appointed to act as an Additional Subordinate Judge. His case mainly was that this exclusion by the High Court amounted in law to the penalty of 'withholding of promotion ' without giving him an opportunity to show cause. He pray (1) (2) ; 116 ed that a declaration might be made that he occupied the same position in respect of seniority in the cadre of Subordinate Judges as he would have done if no supersession had taken place and claimed arrears of salary	 in a suit filed by him. The trial Court decreed the suit. On behalf of the appellants a preliminary objection was taken in this Court that the controversy raised was not justiciable. This Court held that there was no cause of action for the suit and the appeal must succeed. It was there contended on behalf of the respondent that even though there	 might not have been any disciplinary proceed ings taken against him	 the effect of the High Court 's order was that he was reduced by eight places in the list of Subordinate Judges and that in law amounted to a reduction in rank within the meaning of article 311 (2) of the Constitution. At p. 453 it was pointed out as follows : "In our opinion	 there is no substance in this contention because losing places in the same cadre	 namely	 of Subordinate Judges does not amount to a reduction in rank within the meaning of article 311(2). The plaintiff sought to argue that 'rank '	 in accordance with dictionary meaning	 signifies 'relative position or status or place	 according to Oxford English Dictionary. The word 'rank ' can be and has been used in different senses in different contexts. The expression 'rank ' in article 3 1 1 (2) has reference to a person 's classification and not his particular place in the same cadre in the hierarchy of the service to which be belongs. Hence	 in the context of the Judicial Service of West Bengal	 'reduc tion in rank ' would imply that a person who is already holding the post of a Subordinate Judge has been reduced to the position of a Munsif	 the rank of a Subordinate Judge being higher than that of a Munsif. But Subordinate Judges in the same cadre hold the same rank though they have to be listed in order of seniority in the Civil List. Therefore	 losing some places in the seniority list is not tantamount to reduction in rank. Hence	 it must be held that the	 provision 	 of article 311 (2) of the Constitution are not attracted to this case. " This decision therefore is authority for the position that losing some places in the seniority list is not tantamount to reduction in rank 117 The respondent relied upon the decision of this Court in P. C. Wadhwa vs Union of India(1). There	 the appellant	 a member of the Indian Police Service and holding the substantive rank of Assistant Superintendent of Police (a post in the junior time scale of pay) in the State of Punjab	 was promoted to officiate as Superintendent of Police	 which was a post carrying a higher salary in the senior time scale	 and posted as Additional Superintendent of Police. After he had earned one increment in that post	 he was served with a charge sheet and before the enquiry	 which had been ordered	 had started	 he was reverted to his substantive rank of Assistant Superintendent of Police	 the ground suggested for reversion being unsatisfactory conduct. No details of the unsatisfactory conduct were specified and the appellant was not asked for any explanation. At the time when the appellant was reverted officers junior to him in the I.P.S. Cadre of the State were officiating in the senior scale. The order entailed loss of pay as well as loss of seniority and postponement of future chances of promotion. It was held that the order of reversion made against the appellant was in effect a 'reduction in rank ' within the meaning of article 311(2) of the Constitution and inasmuch as he was given no opportunity of showing cause against the said order of reversion	 there was violation of article 311. On a consideration of the circumstances of the case	 this Court reached the conclusion that the action of the Government reverting the appellant was mala fide. But that was not the sole ground on which the order of reversion was held to be bad. After an examination of the legal position from the large body of rules to which reference was made	 it was held that in so far as the Indian Police Service is concerned there was only one cadre	 that appointment to posts borne on that cadre were to be made by direct recruitment except to the extent of 25 per cent of the senior posts which may be filled by promotion from the State Police Service. A special feature of the All India Services like the Indian Police Service and the Indian Civil Service is that pro motion is a matter of right. It was for this reason that this Court	 by a majority pointed out at p. 622 that in the case of ' those services there was no rule which	 specifically provided that an officer had to be freshly appointed to a post carrying a salary in the senior scale of pay. (1) 118 At p. 627 it was said "In our opinion	 the whole scheme of the rules indicates that a person borne on the junior scale of pay has a right to hold a post on the senior scale of pay depending upon the availability of	 a post and his seniority in the junior scale of pay. If a person hold ing a post in the senior scale	 though in an officiating capacity	 is found to be unfit to hold that post	 action will have to be taken against him as required by r. 5 of Discipline and Appeal Rules because his reversion to a post in the lower scale would amount to reduction in rank within the meaning of article 311 of the Constitution. " On a consideration of the circumstances of that case	 it is clear that the decision itself proceeded on the basic fact that for members of All India Services like the Indian Police Service	 promotion was a matter of right and special considerations would have to be applied to them. Now	 in the light of the principles established by the above decisions	 we may consider the respondent 's case. The Southern Railway has two grades of Train Examiners. The respondent and one James Blazey were promoted from the lower grade to officiate in the higher grade. The respondent was shown at item No. 2 and James Blazey at item No. 3 in the promotion list. A note was appended to the order that the promotion of the respondent and Blazey were 'purely provisional subject to revision when seniority lists were drawn up for the Division '. By reason of the order dated November 27	 1959	 the respondent was reverted to the lower grade while Blazey was retained in the higher grade. The case of the respondent is that Blazey was junior to him and that since he was reverted while Blazey was not	 it would amount to a reduction in rank so far as he was concerned. It is plain that what he complains of is that he lost his seniority by reason of the retention of Blazey in the officiating higher post. The respondent 's rank in the substantive post i.e.	 in the lower grade	 was in no way affected by this. In the substantive grade	 the respondent retained his rank. It may also be added that he was visited with no penal consequences. It is no doubt true that it is not the form but the substance that matters	 but once it is accepted that the respondent has no right to the post to which he was provisionally promoted	 there can be no doubt that his reversion does not amount to a reduction in rank. 119 None of the decisions considered above lends support to the contention for the respondent. It was finally argued that the procedure prescribed by rr. 1609 to 1619 of the rules contained 'in the Indian Railway Establishment Code	 Vol. I.	 were contravened. Rule 1609 reads "As a general rule	 in no circumstances	 should a gazetted railway servant be kept in ignorance for any length of time that his superiors	 after sufficient experience of his work	 are dissatisfied with him; where a warning might eradicate a particular fault	 the advantages of prompt communication are obvious. On the other hand	 the communication of any adverse remarks removed from their context is likely to give a misleading impression to the gazetted railway servant concerned. The procedure detailed in rule 1610 should therefore be followed. " Rules 1609 to 1618 apply only to gazetted railway servants. 'Me respondent is not a gazetted railway servant and there is no question of his claiming that he is entitled to the right given under the above rules. Rule 1619 refers to non gazetted railway servants. That rule Provides that in general conformity with the principles laid down in the preceding rules applicable to Gazetted Railway Servants	 a General Manager may frame detailed rules for the preparation	 submission and disposal of confidential reports on non gazetted railway servants. Learned counsel for the respondent could not place before us those rules	 if any. The contentions raised by the respondent having been nega tived	 this appeal must succeed	 and it is accordingly allowed	 but	 in the circumstances of the case	 there will be no order as to costs. Appeal allowed.

Summary:
The respondent was employed in the Southern Railway as Train Examiner in the scale of Rs. 100 5 125 6 185. He was promoted to officiate in the next higher scale of Rs. 150 225. Subsequently he was reverted to the lower scale	 and his departmental representations and appeals having failed	 he filed a writ petition under article 226 of the Constitution. The High Court held that the reversion of the respondent amounted to a reduction in rank because he was reverted from the higher post to the lower post notwithstanding the fact that his juniors were still retained in the higher posts. As this reduction of rank was in violation of article 311(2) the High Court granted the writ prayed for. The Divisional Personnel Officer	 Southern Railway appealed to this Court by special leave. It was contended on behalf of the appellant that the High Court had misunderstood the ratio of the judgment of this Court in Vaikunthe 's case and that the respondent had not suffered any reduction in rank within the meaning of article 311(2). HELD : (i) The reversion of a Government servant from an officiating post to his substantive post	 while his junior is officiating in higher post	 does not	 by itself	 constitute a reduction in rank within the meaning of article 311(2) of the Constitution. [110 D] (ii) An important aspect of the decision in Vaikunthe 's case was lost sight of by the High Court. The real ground on which Vaikunthe 's reversion to his original post of mamlatdar was held to be a violation of his constitutional guarantee was that his chances of promotion were irrevocably barred for a period of three years. There was no such bar on promotion in the present case. [114 E] Madhav Laxman Vaikunthe vs State of Mysore	 [1962] 1 S.C.R. 886	 distinguished. (iii) The respondent 's complaint was that he had lost his seniority by reason of the retention of his juniors in the officiating higher post. But his rank in the substantive post i.e. in the lower grade	 was in no way affected by this. In the substantive grade the respondent retained his rank and was not visited with any penal consequences. The respondent had no right to the post to which he was provisionally promoted. His reversion in these circumstances did not amount to reduction in rank. [118 G 119 A] 107 Parshotam Lal Dhingra vs Union of India	 ; 	 State of Bombay vs F. A. Abraham	 [1962] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 92 and The High Court	 Calcutta vs Amal Kumar Roy	 ; 	 'relied on. P. C. Wadhwa vs Union of India	 	 distinguished. M. A. Waheed vs State of Madhya Pradesh	 [1954] Nag. L. J. 305	 referred to.