Case ID: 118

Judgment:
399 of 1952. Petition under article 32 of the Constitution of India for a writ in the nature of habeas corpus	 Godavari Parutekar	 the petitioner	 in person. M. C. Setalvad	 Attorney General for India	 (G.N. Joshi and P. A. Mehta	 with him) for the respondent. December 5. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by BosE J. This is a habeas corpus petition under article 32 of the Constitution. The petitioner was detained the	 16th of October	 1951	 under the of 1950 as amended in 1951. Her detention was actually longer than this but the earlier detentions were under a different set of orders which are not relevant to the present matter. The present detention is based an order of the District Magistrate	 Thana	 and merely says that the petitioner be detained	 without specifying any period. The order of confirmation was passed the 4th of January	 1952	 and there again no period was specified. The petitioner 's case is that as no period was specified in the order her period of detention expired the 31st of March	 1952	 because of the amending Act of 1951 ; or at the outside the 30th of September	 1952	 because of Act XXXIV of 1952 which effected a further amendment. The reply behalf of the State of Bombay is that the of 1950 was again amended by Act LXI of 1952 and that the effect of this amendment was to carry the petitioner 's detention to the 31st of March	 1953	 because of section 11 A which was added to the original Act of 1950. The petitioner counters by saying that the new Act does not apply to cases in which the order of detention is not silent about its duration and so section 11 A does not serve to extend the period of her detention. She relies the following portion of section II A (2) ". every detention order which has been confirmed under section 11 before the commencement of the Preventive Detention (Second Amendment) Act 1952	 shall	 unless a shorter priod is specified in the order	 continue to remain in force until the Ist day of April	 1953. " The petitioner concedes that no shorter period is specified in her order of detention but contends that as her detention would have expired either the 31st of March	 1952	 or the 30th of September	 1952	 one of those two dates must now be read into the order and when that is done we have an order which specifies as shorter period	 therefore section 11 A (2) does not serve to extend her detention. We are unable to accept this contention. The section is clear and unless a shorter period is specified in the order	 section I 1 A(2) applies. We cannot add the words "or must be deemed to have been specified by reason of the expiry of the earlier Act" into the section. We hold therefore that section 11 A(2) validly extended the period of detention till the Ist of April	 1953. 1 The petitioner 's next point is based articles 14 and 22(i)(b) of the Constitution. ' It arises in this way. Section 3 (1) (a) of the of 1950 classifies grounds of permissible detention into three categories. Article 22 (7) (b) empowers Parliament to prescribe the maximum period for which any person may "in any class or classes of cases" be detained. The petitioner argues that this permits only one maximum for each class and that if different maxima are provided for "equals" within a class it offends not only article 22 (7) (b) but also article 14 as interpreted by the decisions of this Court	 She next argues that section 11 A	 now introduced by the second amending Act of 1952 (Act LXI of 1952)	 does just that and so is ultra vires. Her point is put as follows. Sub section (1) of section 11 A states that the maximum period for which any person may be detained in pursuance of any detention order which has been confirmed under section 1 1 shall be twelve months from the date of detention. But sub section (2) qualifies this by dividing detentions into two classes; 213 (a) those in which the detention order was confirmed before 30th of September	 1952	 and (b) those in which the confirmation was after that date	 and it provides that. in the former case	 unless a shorter period is specified in the order	 the detention shall continue either till the 1st of April	 1953	 or for twelve months from the date of detention	 whichever expires later. This	 she says	 introduces a fresh classification which divides detentions into those before the Act and those after. That	 she says	 is ultra vires	 first	 because it introduces a discriminatory classification in the class to which she belongs under section 3 of the Act and	 second	 because it entails discrimination even in the fresh class into which she has been thrown by the new sub division	 made by the second amending Act of 1952. As regards the first point	 the ratio decidendi in Shamrao V. Parulekar vs The District Magistrate	 Thana	 and Others(1) applies here. In that case	 detentions were divided into those which had already been considered by an Advisory Board and those which had not. This was upheld. The dividing line here is different	 namely a certain date	 but the principle is the same and its reasonableness is apparent from a consideration of the various amendments which have been made from time to time. The life of the Act of 1950	 which was the principal Act	 was extended till the 1st of October	 1952	 by section 2 of the amending Act (Act XXXIV of 1952)	 and the effect of section 3 was to prolong the ' life of all detentions in force on 14th of March 1952	 (provided they had been confirmed before that date) for so long as the principal Act was in force. At that date this meant till the 1st of October	 1952. But the second amending Act of 1952 extended the life of the principal Act till the 31st of December	1954. Therefore	 in the absence of section 11 A all those detentions would have been extended till that date. But section 11 A modified that and put 1st of April	1953	 as the latest date for these old detentions	 (1) ; at 691 and 693. 214 It therefore conferred a benefit and cannot be deemed unreasonable. Sub section (3) of 'section 11 A shows that that was the object. But the petitioner attacked the provisions on the ground of discrimination. She said that even assuming the new classification of detentions into those before and after the 30th of September	 1952	 to be good	 section 11 A is nevertheless discriminatory because it discriminates amongst those in her class		 namely those whose detentions were made and confirmed before the 30th of September. She put it in this way. Taking the case of her own detention	 she pointed	 out that if section II A is good	 it will continue till the 1st of April	 1953	 that is to say	 her detention will have been for a period of 17 1/2 months from the 16th of October	 1951	 till the 1st of April	 1953. 'On the other hand	 a person detained after her on	 say	 the last of September	 1952	 would also be due for release on the 1st of April	 1953	 and so would have had only six months ' detention. This	 in our opinion	 is not discrimination within the meaning of article 14. A maximum can be fixed	 either by specifying a particular period	 such as twelve months	 or by setting an outside limit	 land it is inevitable in such a case that the length of detention will vary in each individual case. Those taken into detention at a later date are bound to be detained for a shorter time. Government is not bound to detain everybody for the same length of time. 	 It has a discretion. Moreover	 the appropriate Government has boon left power to revoke or modify the detention order at any earlier time. This point was considered in Shamrao V. Parulekar vs The District Magistrate	 Thana	 & Others (1) and was decided against the detenu. The petitioner endeavoured to have her application reopened on the merits contending again that the grounds of detention are vague. She relies on Shamrao V. Parulekar vs The State	 of Bombay (2) where (1) ; at 691 at 693. (2) Petition No. 86 of 1952. 215 another detenu was released by another Bench of this Court in circumstances which.	 according to her	 are very similar. We are unable to allow this as her petition has already been rejected on the merits. She was only allowed to appear on constitutional points. We understand that in the other petition this fact was not brought to the notice of the Court. The application is dismissed. Application dismissed.

Summary:
Section 11 A which was inserted in the of 1950 by the Preventive Detention (Second Amendment) Act	 1952	 provided that the maximum period for which any person may be detained in pursuance of any detention order which has been confirmed under section 11 shall be twelve months from the date of detention. But subs. (2) qualified this by dividing do tentions into two classes: (a) those in which the detention order was confirmed before the 30th September	 1952	 and (b) those in which the confirmation was after that date	 and it provided that in the former case	 unless a shorter period was specified in the order	 the detention shall continue either till the 1st of April	 1953	 or for twelve months from the date of detention	 whichever expires later: I Held	 (i) that the section did not contravene article 14 or article 22 (7) (b) of the Constitution merely because it introduced a fresh classification which divided detentions into those before the Act and those thereafter	 as the classification was a reasonable one. The section did not involve any discrimination between persons whose detentions were confirmed before the 30th September	 1952	 Merely because	 as a result o f the section	 in the case of some persons the period of detention may be longer and in the case of others it may be shorter; Shamrao Parulekar vs The District Magistrate	 Thana and Others ( ; followed. (ii)that a detention order made the 16th October	 1951	 which did not specify any period of detention was not a case where " a shorter period was specified in the order " within the meaning of section 11 A (2) merely because the detention would have expired either ' the 31st March	 1952	 or 30th September	 1952	 but for the Amendment Act.