Case ID: 79

Judgment:
N: Criminal Appeal No. 15 of 1951. Appeal under articles 132(1) and 134(1)(c) of the Constitu tion of India against the Judgment and Order dated 28th February	 1951	 of the High Court of Saurashtra at Rajkot (Shah C.J. and Chhatpar J.) in Criminal Appeal No. 162 of 1950	 The material facts appear in the Judgment. S.L. Chibber (amicus curia )	 for the appellant	 B. Sen	 for the respondent. 439 1952. February 27. The following Judgments were delivered. PATANJALI SASTRI C.J. This appeal raises questions under article 14 of the Constitution more or less similar to those dealt with by this Court in Criminal Appeal No. 297 of 1951	 The State of West Bengal vs Anwar Ali Sarkar(1)	 and it was heard in part along with that appeal but was adjourned to enable the respondent State to file an affidavit explaining the circumstances which led to the enactment of the Saurashtra State Public Safety Measures (Third Amendment) Ordinance	 1949 (No. XLVI of 1949)	 hereinafter referred to as the impugned Ordinance. As in the West Bengal case	 the jurisdiction of the Special Court of Criminal Jurisdiction	 which tried and convicted the appellant	 was challenged on the ground that the impugned Ordinance	 under which the Court was constitut ed	 was discriminatory and void. The Objection was overruled by the Special Judge as well as by the High Court of Sau rashtra on appeal and the appellant now seeks a decision of this Court on the point. The impugned Ordinance purports to amend the Saurashtra State Public Safety Measures Ordinance (No. IX of 1948) which had been passed "to provide for public safety	 mainte nance of public order and preservation of peace and tran quillity in the State of Saurashtra"	 by the insertion of sections 7 to 18 which deal with the establishment of Spe cial Courts of criminal jurisdiction in certain areas to try certain classes of offences in accordance with a simplified and shortened procedure. Section 9 empowers the State by notification to constitute Special Courts for such 'areas as may be specified in the notification and section 10 provides for appointment of Special Judges to preside over such courts. Section 11 enacts that the Special Judge shall try "such offences or classes of offences or such cases or classes of cases as the Government may	 by general or special order in writing; direct"	 (1) Since reported as ; 57 57 440 Then follow provisions prescribing the procedure applicable to the trial of such offences. The only variations in such procedure from the normal procedure in criminal trials in the State consist of the abolition of trial by jury or with the aid of assessors and the elimination of the inquiry before commitment in sessions cases. Even under the normal procedure trial by jury is not compulsory unless the Govern ment so directs (sections 268 and 269 (1)). while assessors are not really members of the court and their opinion is not binding on the judge with whom the responsibility for the decision rests. Nor can the commitment proceeding in a sessions case be said to be an essential requirement of a fair and impartial	 trial	 though its dispensation may involve the deprivation of certain advantages which an accused person may otherwise enjoy. Thus the variations from the normal procedure are by no means calculated to imperil the chances of a fair and impartial trial. In exercise of the power conferred by sections 9	 10 and 11	 the Government issued the notification No. H/35 5 C dated 9/11 February	 1950	 directing that a Special Court shall be constituted for certain special areas and that it shall try certain specified offences which included offences under sections 302	 307 and 392 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (as adapted and applied to the State of Saurashtra) for which the appellant was convicted and sen tenced. It is contended on behalf of the appellant that section 11 and the notification referred to above are discriminatory in that the offences alleged to have been committed by the appellant within the specified areas are required to be tried by the Special Judge under the special procedure	 while any person committing the same offences outside those areas would be tried by the ordinary courts under the ordi nary procedure. It is also urged that sections 9 and 11 by empowering the State Government to establish a Special Court and to direct it to try under a special procedure such offences as may be notified by the Government	 in effect	 authorise the Government to 441 amend section 5 of the Criminal Procedure Code read with the Second Schedule (as adapted and applied to the State of Saurashtra)	 which provides that "all offences under the Indian Penal Code shall be investigated	 enquired into	 tried and otherwise dealt with according to the provisions hereinafter contained"	 and that delegation of such power to the executive Government was beyond the competence of a legislature and was	 therefore	 void. On the first point	 many of the considerations which weighed with me in upholding the constitutionality of sec tion 5 (1) of the West Bengal Special Courts Act	 which is in identical terms with section 11 of the impugned Act	 apply a fortiori to the present case. The West Bengal case (1) arose out of a reference by the State Government of certain individual cases to the Special Court for trial and 1 there expressed the view that it was wrong to think that classification was something that must somehow be discovera ble in every piece of legislation or it would not be legis lation. That way of regarding classification	 I pointed out	 tended only to obscure the real nature of the problems for which we have to find solution. In the present case	 howev er	 the State Government referred not certain individual cases but offences of certain kinds committed in certain areas and so the objection as to discriminatory treatment is more easily answered on the line of reasoning indicated in my judgment in the West Bengal case (1). Again	 the varia tions from the normal procedure authorised by the impugned Ordinance are less disadvantageous to the persons tried before the Special Court than under the West Bengal Act. It was	 however	 said that any variation in procedure which operates materially to the disadvantage of such persons was discriminatory and violative of article 14. On the other hand	 it was contended on behalf of the respondent State that	 in the field of personal liberty	 the only constitu tional safeguards were those specifically. provided in articles 20 to 22	 and 'this Court having held in (1) [1952] S.C.R.284. 442 Gopalan 's case (1) that any procedure prescribed by law satisfies the requirements of article 21 (the only article relevant here) the impugned Ordinance which prescribes a special procedure for trial of offences falling within its ambit could not be held to be unconstitutional. Reliance was placed on a decision of a Full Bench of the Hyderabad High Court (Abdur Rahim and others vs Joseph A. 'Pinto and others (2) which seems to lend some support to this view. I am	 however	 of opinion that neither of these extreme con tentions is sound. All legislative differentiation is not necessarily dis criminatory. In fact	 the word "discrimination" does not occur in article 14. The expression "discriminate against" is used in article 15 (1) and article. 16(2)	 and it means	 according to the Oxford Dictionary	 "to make an adverse distinction with regard to; to distinguish unfavourably from others". Discrimination thus involves an element of unfa vourable bias and it is in that sense that the expression has to be understood in this context. If such bias is disclosed and is based on any of the grounds mentioned in articles 15 and 16	 it may well be that the statute will	 without more	 incur condemnation as violating a specific constitutional prohibition unless it is saved by one or other of the provisos to those articles. But the position under article 14 is different. Equal protection claims under that article are examined with the presumption that the State action is reasonable and justified. This pre sumption of constitutionality stems from the wide power of classification which the legislature must	 of necessity	 possess in making laws operating differently as regards different groups of persons in order to give effect to its policies. The power of the State to regulate criminal trials by constituting different courts with different procedures according to the needs of different parts of its territory is an essential part of its police power (cf. Missouri vs Lewis)(3). Though the differing (1) ; (3) 101 U.S.22 (2) A.I.R. 1951 Hyderabad ll. 443 procedures might involve disparity in the treatment of the persons tried under them	 such disparity is not by itself sufficient	 in my opinion	 to outweigh the presumption and establish discrimination unless the degree of disparity goes beyond what the reason for its existence demands as	 for instance	 when it amounts to a denial of a fair and impar tial trial. It is	 therefore	 not correct to say that arti cle 14 provides no further constitutional protection to personal liberty than what is afforded by article 21. Notwithstanding that its wide general language is greatly qualified in its practical application by a due recognition of the State 's necessarily wide powers of legislative clas sification	 article 14 remains an important bulwark against discriminatory procedural laws. In the present case	 the affidavit filed on behalf of the respondent State by one of its responsible officers states facts and figures relating to an increasing number of incidents of looting	 robbery	 dacoity	 nosecutting and murder by marauding gangs of dacoits in certain areas of the State	 and these details support the claim that "the securi ty of the State and public peace were jeopardised and that it became impossible to deal with the offences that were committed in different places in separate courts of law expeditiously. " The statement concludes by pointing out that the areas specified in the notification were the "main zones of the activities of the dacoits as mentioned above. " The impugned Ordinance having thus been passed to combat the increasing tempo of certain types of regional crime	 the two fold classification on the lines of type and territory adopted in the impugned Ordinance	 read with the notifi cation issued thereunder	 is	 in my view	 reasonable and valid	 and the degree of disparity of treatment involved is in no way in excess of what the situation demanded. On the second point	 the appellant 's learned counsel claimed that the majority view in In re The 	 etc.(1) supported his contention. He attempted to make this out by piecing together certain dicta (1) ; 444 found in the several judgments delivered in that case. While undoubtedly certain definite conclusions were reached by the majority of the Judges who took part in the decision in regard to the constitutionality of certain specified enact ments	 the reasoning in each case was different and it is difficult to say that any particular principle has been laid down by the majority which can be of assistance in the determination of other cases. I have there expressed my view that legislatures in this country have plenary authori ty to delegate their power to make laws to subordinate agencies of their choice and such delegation	 however inex pedient or undesirable politically	 is constitutionally competent. I accordingly reject this contention. It follows that the Special Judge had jurisdiction to try the appellant and the persons accused along with him. As the majority concur in overruling the preliminary objection the appeal will be heard on the merits. FAZL ALI J. This is an appeal by one Kathi Raning Rawat	 who has been convicted under sections 302	 307 and 392. read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to death and to seven years ' rigorous imprison ment. The appellant was tried by a Special Court constitut ed under the Saurashtra State Public Safety Measures(Third Amendment) Ordinance	 1949 (Ordinance No. LXVI of 1949)	 which was issued by the Rajpramukh of Saurashtra on the 2nd November	 1949	 and his conviction and sentence were upheld on appeal by the State High Court. He has preferred an appeal to this Court against the decision of the High Court. The principal question which arises in this appeal is whether the Ordinance to which reference has been made is void under article 13(1) of the Constitution on the ground that it violates the provisions of article 14. It appears that on the 5th April	 1948	 the Rajpramukh of Saurashtra State promulgated an Ordinance called the Criminal Proce dure Code	 1898 (Adaptation) Ordinance	 1948 (Ordinance No. XII of 445 1948)	 by which "the Criminal Procedure Code of the Dominion of India as in force in that Dominion on the 1st day of April	 1948" was made applicable to the State of Saurashtra with certain modifications. In the same month	 another Ordinance called the Saurashtra State Public Safety Measures Ordinance (Ordinance No. IX of 1948) was promulgated	 which provided among other things for the detention of persons acting in a manner prejudicial to public safety	 maintenance of public order and peace and tranquillity in the State. Subsequently	 on the 5th November	 1949	 the Ordinance with which we are concerned	 namely	 the Saurashtra State Public Safety Measures (Third Amendment) Ordinance	 1949	 was promulgated	 which purported to amend the previous Ordinance by inserting in it certain provisions which may be summa rised as follows : Section 9 of the Ordinance empowers the State Government by notification in the Official Gazette to constitute Spe cial Courts of criminal jurisdiction for such area as may be specified in the notification. Section 11 provides that a Special Judge shall try such offences or classes of offences or such cases or classes of cases as the State Government may	 by general or special order in writing	 direct. Sec tions 12 to 18 lay down the procedure for the trial of cases by the Special Judge	 the special features of which are as follows : (1) The Special Judge may take cognizance offences without the accused being committed to his court for trial; (2) There is to be no trial by jury or with the aid of assessors; (3) The Special Judge should 'ordinarily record a memo randum only of the substance of the evidence of each wit ness; and (4) The person convicted has to appeal to the High Court within 15 days from the date of the sentence. 446 The Ordinance further provides that the provisions of sections 491 and 526 of the Code of Criminal Procedure shall not apply to any person or case triable by the Special Judge	 and the High Court may call for the record of the proceedings of any case tried by a Special Judge and may exercise any of the powers conferred on an appellate court by sections 423	 426	 427 and 428 of the Code. From the foregoing summary of the provisions of the Ordinance	 it will appear that the difference between the procedure laid down in the Criminal Procedure Code and the procedure to be followed by the Special Judge consists mainly in the following matters: (1) Where a case is triable by a court of session	 no commitment proceeding is necessary	 and the Special Judge may take cognizance without any commitment; (2) The trial shall not be by jury or with the aid of assessors; (3) Only a memorandum of the substance of the evidence of. each witness is ordinarily to be recorded; (4) The period of limitation for appeal to the High Court is curtailed; and (5) No court has jurisdiction to transfer any case from any Special Judge	 or to make an order under section 491 of the Criminal Procedure Code. It appears that pursuant to the provisions contained in sections 9	 10 and 11 of the Ordinance	 the State Government issued a Notification No. H/35 5 C	 dated the 9/11th Febru ary	 1951	 directing the constitution of a Special Court for certain areas mentioned in a schedule attached to the Noti fication and empowering such court to try the following offences	 namely	 offences under sections 183	 189	 190	 212	 216	 224	 302	 304	 307	 323 335	 341 344	 379 382	 384 389 and 392 402 of the Indian Penal Code	 1860	 as adapted and applied to the State of Saurashtra	 and most of t	 be offences under the. Ordinance of 1948. 447 In the course of the hearing	 an affidavit was filed by the Assistant Secretary in the Home Department of the Sau rashtra Government	 stating that since the integration of different States in Kathiawar in the beginning of 1948 there had been a series of crimes against public peace and that had led to the promulgation of Ordinance No. IX of 1948	 which provided among other things for detention of persons acting in a manner prejudicial to public safety and mainte nance of public order in the State. Notwithstanding this Ordinance	 the crimes went on increasing and there occurred numerous cases of dacoity	 murder	 nosecutting	 ear cutting	 etc. for some of which certain notorious gangs were respon sible	 and hence Ordinance No. LXVI of 1949 was promulgated to amend the earlier Ordinance and to constitute Special Courts for the speedy trial of cases arising out of the activities of the dacoits and other criminals guilty of violent crimes. As has been already indicated	 the main contention advanced before us on behalf of the appellant is that the Ordinance of 1949 violates the provisions of article 14 of the Constitution	 by laying down a procedure which is dif ferent from and less advantageous to the accused than the ordinary procedure laid down in the Criminal Procedure Code	 and thereby discriminating between persons who are to be tried under the special procedure and those tried under the normal procedure. In support of this argument	 reliance is placed on the decision of this court in The Slate of West Bengal vs Anwar Ali Sarkar and Gajen Mali (Cases Nos. 297 and 298 of 1951) (1)	 in which certain provisions of the West Bengal Special Courts Act	 1949	 have been held to be unconstitutional on grounds similar to those urged on behalf of the appellant in the present ease. A comparison of the provisions of the Ordinance in question with those of the West Bengal Act will show that several of the objectionable features in the latter enactment do not appear in the Ordi nance	 (1) ; 58 448 but	 on the whole	 I am inclined to think that that circum stance by itself will not afford justification for upholding the Ordinance. There is however one very important differ ence between the West Bengal Act and the present Ordinance which	 in my opinion	 does afford such justification	 and I shall try to refer to it as briefly as possible. I think that a distinction should be drawn between"dis crimination without reason" and ' 'discrimination with rea son". The whole doctrine of classification is based on this distinction and on the well known fact that the circum stances which govern one set of persons or objects may not necessarily be the same as those governing another set of persons or objects	 so that the question of unequal treat ment does not really arise as between persons governed by different conditions and different sets of circum stances. The main objection to the West Bengal Act was that it permitted discrimination "without reason" or with out any rational basis. Having laid down a procedure which was materially different from and less advantageous to the accused than the ordinary procedure	 that Act gave uncon trolled and unguided authority to the State Government to put that procedure into operation in the trial of any case or class of cases or any offence or class of offences. There was no principle to be found in that Act to control the application of the discriminatory provisions or to correlate those provisions to some tangible and rational objective	 in such a way as to enable anyone reading the Act to say : If that is the objective	 the provisions as to special treatment of the offences seem to be quite suitable and there can be no objection to dealing with a particular type of offences on a special footing. The mere mention of speedier trial as the object of the Act did not cure the defect	 because the expression "speedier trial" standing by itself provided no rational basis of classification. It was merely a description of the result sought to be achieved by the application of the special procedure laid down in the Act ' and afforded no help in determining what cases required speedier trial. 449 As regards the present Ordinance	 we can discover a guiding principle within its four corners	 which cannot but have the effect of limiting the application of the special procedure to a particular category of offences only and establish such a nexus (which was missing in the West Bengal Act) between offences of a particular category and the object with which the Ordinance was promulgated	 as should suffice to repel the charge of discrimination and furnish some justification for the special treatment of those of fences. The Ordinance	 as I have already stated	 purported to amend another Ordinance	 the object of which was to provide for public safety	 maintenance of public order and preservation of peace and tranquillity in the State. It was not disputed before us that the preamble of the original Ordinance would govern the amending Ordinance also	 and the object of promulgating the subsequent Ordinance was the same as the object of promulgating the original Ordinance. Once this is appreciated	 It is easy to see that there is something in the Ordinance itself to guide the State Govern ment to apply the special procedure not to any and every case but only to those cases or offences which have a ra tional relation to	 or connection with	 the main object and purpose of the Ordinance and which for that reason become a class by themselves requiring to be dealt with on a special footing. The clear recital of a definite objective furnishes a tangible and rational basis of classification to the State Government for the purpose of applying the provi sions of the Ordinance and for choosing only such offences or cases as affect public safety	 maintenance of public order and preservation of peace and tranquillity. Thus	 under section 11	 the State Government is expected to select only such offences or class of offences or class of cases for being tried by the special court in accordance with the special procedure	 as are calculated to affect public safety	 maintenance of public order	 etc.	 and under section 9	 the use of the special procedure must necessarily be confined to only disturbed areas or those areas where adoption of 450 public safety measures is necessary. That this is how the Ordinance was intended to be understood and was in fact understood	 is confirmed by the Notification issued on the 9/11th February by the State Government in pursuance of the Ordinance. That Notification sets out 49 offences under the Indian Penal Code as adapted and applied to the State and certain other offences punishable under the Ordinance	 and one can see at once that all these offences directly affect the maintenance of public order and peace and tran quillity. The Notification also specifies certain areas in the State over which only the special court is to exercise jurisdiction. There can be no dispute that if the State Legislature finds that lawlessness and crime are rampant and there is a direct threat to peace and tranquil lity in certain areas within the State	 it is competent to deal with offences which affect the maintenance of public order and preservation of peace and tranquillity in those areas as a class by themselves and to provide that such offences shall be tried as expeditiously as possible in accordance with a special procedure devised for the purpose. This	 in my opinion	 is in plain language the rationale of the Ordinance	 and it will be going too far to say that in no case and under no circumstances can a legislature lay down a special procedure for the trial of a particular class of offences	 and that recourse to a simplified and less cumbrous procedure for the trial of those offences	 even when abnormal conditions prevail	 will amount to a violation of article 14 of the Constitution. I am satisfied that this case is distinguishable from the case relating to the West Bengal Act	 but I also feel that the legislatures should have recourse to legislation such as the present only in very special circumstances. The question of referring individual cases to the special court does not arise in this appeal	 and I do not wish to express any opinion on it. Certain other points were urged on behalf of the appel lant	 namely	 that the Ordinance suffers from excessive delegation of legislative authority	 and that 451 the Rajpramukh had exceeded his powers in amending the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code. These contentions were found to be devoid of all force and have to be reject ed. In the result	 I would hold that the Saurashtra State Public Safety Measures (Third Amendment) Ordinance is not unconstitutional	 and accordingly overrule the objection as to the jurisdiction of the special court to try the appel lant. MAHAJAN J. The principal point for decision in the appeal is whether section 11 of the Saurashtra State Public Safety Measures (Third Amendment) Ordinance (No. LXVI)	 1949. which came into force on 2nd November	 1949	 is hit by article 14 of the Constitution inasmuch as it mentions no basis for the differential treatment prescribed in the Ordinance for trial of criminals in certain cases and for certain offences. Section 11 of the Ordinance is in these terms : "A Special Judge shall try such offences or classes of offences or such cases or classes of cases as the Government of the United State of Saurashtra may	 by general or special order in writing	 direct. " This section is in identical terms with section 5(1) of the West Bengal Special Courts Act (Act X of 1950). Section 5(1) of that Act provided as follows : "A Special Court shall try such offences or classes of offences or cases or classes of cases	 as the State Govern ment may	 by general or special order in writing	 direct. " The question whether section 5(1) of the Bengal Act (X of 1950) was hit by article 14 of the Constitution was an swered in the affirmative by this court in The State of West Bengal vs Anwar Ali Sarkar etc.(1) In that case I was of the opinion that even if the statute on the face of it was not discriminatory	 it was so in its effect and opera tion inasmuch as it vested in the executive government unregulated official discretion and therefore had to be adjudged unconstitutional. Section 11 of the Ordinance	 like section 5(1) (1) ; 452 of the West Bengal Act	 suggests no reasonable basis or classification either in respect of offences or in respect of cases. It has laid down no measure for the grouping either of persons or of cases or of offences by which meas ure these groups could be distinguished from those outside the purview of the special Act. The State Government can choose a case of a person similarly situate and hand it over to the special tribunal and leave the case of another person in the same circumstances to be tried by the procedure laid down in the Criminal Procedure Code. It can direct that the offence of simple hurt be tried by the special tribunal while a more serious offence be tried in the ordinary way. The notification in this case fully illustrates the point. Offence of simple hurt punishable with two years ' rigorous imprisonment is included in the list of offences to be tried by the Special Judge	 while a more serious offence of the same kind punishable with heavier punishment under section 308 is excluded from the list. It is the mischief of section 11 of the Ordinance that makes such discrimination possible. To my mind	 offences falling in the group of sections 302 to 308	 Indian Penal Code. possess common characteristics and the appellant can reasonably complain of hostile dis crimination. I am therefore of the opinion that section 11 of the Ordinance is unconstitutional and the conviction of the appellant under the Ordinance by the special judge is bad and must be quashed. There will be a retrial of the appellant under the procedure prescribed by the Code of Criminal Procedure. The contention of the learned counsel for the State that the provisions of the Ordinance are in some respects distinguishable from the provisions of the West Bengal Special Courts Act cannot be sustained. Reference was made to section 9 of the Ordinance which is in these terms : "The Government of the United State of Saurashtra may by notification in the official gazette constitute Special Courts of criminal jurisdiction for such area as may be specified in the notification. " 453 This section is in the same terms as section 3 of the West Bengal Special Courts Act. It only empowers the State Government to constitute Special Courts for any area or for the whole of the State of Saurashtra in the like manner in which section 3 empowered the West Bengal Government to constitute special courts for the whole of the State or any particular area	 It does not in any way limit or curtail the power conferred on the State Government by the provi sions of section 11. Reference was also made to the pream ble of the original Ordinance which uses the familiar con ventional phraseology: "An Ordinance to provide for public safety	 maintenance of public order and preservation of peace and tranquillity in the State of Saurashtra. " These words cannot limit the plain and unambiguous language of section 11 of the Ordinance which authorises the State Government to send any case or commit persons guilty of any offence to the special judge for trial by the procedure prescribed in the Ordinance. MUKHERJEA J. The appellant before us was tried	along with two other persons	 by the Special Judge	 Court of Criminal Jurisdiction	 Saurashtra State	 on charges of murder	 at tempted murder and robbery under sections 302	 307 and 392 of the Indian Penal Code read with section 34. By his judgment dated 20th December	 1950	 the Special Judge con victed the appellant on all the three charges and sentenced him to death under section 302 and to seven years ' rigorous imprisonment both under sections 307 and 392 of the Indian Penal Code. The conviction and sentences were upheld by the High Court of Saurashtra on appeal. The appellant has now come to this court on the strength of a certificate granted by the High Court under articles 132(1) and 134(1)(c) of the Constitution. The appeal has not been heard on its merits as yet. It was set down for hearing on certain preliminary points of law raised by the learned counsel for the appellant attacking the legality of the entire trial on the ground that section 11 of the Saurashtra Public 454 Safety Measures Ordinance No. XLVI of 1949 passed by the Rajpramukh of Saurashtra as well as the Notification issued by the State Government on 9/11th February	 1951	 under which the Special Court was constituted and the trial held	 were void and inoperative. The first and the main ground upon which the constitutional validity of the section and the notification has been assailed is that they are in conflict with the provision of article 14 of the Constitu tion. The other point raised is that the provision of section 11 the Ordinance is illegal as it amounts to delegation of essential legislative powers by the State Legislature to the Executive. So far as the first point is concerned	 the learned counsel for the appellant has placed great reliance upon the majority decision of this court in two analogous appeals from the Calcutta High Court (being cases Nos. 297 and 298 of 1951)(1)	 where a similar question arose in regard to the validity of section 5 (1) of the West Bengal Special Courts Act	 1950. In fact	 it was because of our pronouncement in the Calcutta appeals that it was considered desirable to have the present case heard on the preliminary points of law. It is not disputed that the language of section 11 of the Saurashtra Ordinance	 with which we are now concerned	 is identically the same as that of section 5 (1) of the West Bengal Special Courts Act. The wording of the section is as follows: "11. Jurisdiction of Special Judges A Special Judge shall try such offences or classes of offences or such cases or classes of cases as the Government of the United State of Saurashtra may	 by general or special order in writing	 direct. " In the West Bengal Act there is a further provision em bodied in clause (2) of section 5 which lays down that no such direction as is contemplated by clause (1) could be given in respect of cases pending before ordinary criminal courts at the date when the Act came into force. No such exception has been made in the Saurashtra Ordinance. In the Calcutta cases referred (1) Since reported as ; 455 to above	 the notification under section 5(1) of the West Bengal Act directed certain individual cases in which speci fied persons were involved to be tried by the Special Court and it was held by the High Court of Calcutta that section 5 (1) of the West Bengal Special Courts Act to the extent that it empowers the State Government to direct any case to be tried by Special Courts was void as offending against the provision of the equal protection clause in article 14 of the Constitution; and this view was affirmed in appeal by a majority of this court	 With regard to the remaining part of section 5(1)	 which authorises the State Government to direct	 "offences	 classes of offences. or classes of cases" for trial by Special Courts	 the majority of the Judges of the Calcutta High Court were of opinion that it was not obnoxious to article 14 of the Constitution. In the present case the notification	 that was issued by the Sau rashtra State Government on 9/11th February	 1951	 did not relate to individual cases. The notification constituted in the first place a Special Court in the areas specified in the schedule. It appointed in the next place a judge to preside over the Special Court and finally gave a list of offences with reference to appropriate sections of the Indian Penal Code which were to be tried by the Special Judge. If the view taken by the Chief Justice of the Cal cutta High Court and the majority of his colleagues is right	 such notification and that part of section 11 of the Ordinance	 under which it was issued	 could not be chal lenged as being in conflict with article 14 of the Constitu tion. This point did come up for consideration before us in the appeals against the Calcutta decision with reference to the corresponding part of section 5 (1) of the West Bengal Act	 but although a majority of this court concurred in dismissing the appeals	 there was no such majority in the pronouncement of any final opinion on this particular point. In my judgment in the Calcutta appeals I was sceptical about the correctness of the view taken upon this point by the learned Chief Justice of the Calcutta High Court and the majority of his colleagues. The 59 456 consideration that weighed with me was that as the learned Judges were definitely of opinion that the necessity of speedier trial. 	 as set out in the preamble	 was too elusive and uncertain a criterion to form the basis of a proper classification	 the authority given by section 5 (1) of the Special Courts Act to the State Government to direct any class of cases or offences ' to be tried by the Special Court would be an unguided authority and the propriety of the classification made by the State Government that is said to be implied in the direction could not be tested with refer ence to any definite legislative policy or standard. Mr. Sen appearing for the State of Saurashtra	 has argued be: fore us that in this respect the Saurashtra Ordinance stands on a different footing and he has referred in this connec tion to the preamble to the original ordinance as well as the circumstances which necessitated the present one. As the question is an important one and is not concluded by our previous decision	 it merits	 in my opinion	 a careful consideration. It may be stated at the outset that the Criminal Procedure Code of India as such has no application to the State of Saurashtra. After the State acceded to the Indian Union	 there was an Ordinance promulgated by the Rajpramukh on 5th of April	 1948	 which introduced the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code of India (Act V of 1898) with certain modifications into the Saurashtra State. Another ordinance	 known as the Public Safety Measures Ordinance	 was passed on the 2nd of April	 1948	 and this ordinance	 like similar other public safety measures obtaining in other States	 provided for preventive detention	 imposition of collective fines	 control of essential supplies and similar other matters. On 11th of November	 1949	 the present ordinance was passed by way of amendment of the Public Safety Measures Ordinance and inter alia it made provisions for the establishment of special courts. Section 9 of this Ordinance empowers the State Government to constitute spe cial courts of criminal.jurisdiction for such areas as may be specified in the notification. Section 10 relates to appointment. 457 of Special Judges who are to preside over such courts and section 11 lays down that the Special Judge shall try "such offences or classes of offences. . or classes of cases as the Government of United State of Saurashtra may	 by general or special order in writing	 direct. " The proce dure to be followed by the Special Judges is set out in sections 12 to 18 of the Ordinance. In substance the Spe cial Court is given the status of a sessions court	 although committal proceeding is eliminated and so also is trial by jury or with the aid of assessors. The Special Judge has only to make a memorandum of the evidence and he can refuse to summon any witness if he is satisfied after examination of the accused that the evidence of such witness would not be material. Section 16 (1) curtails the period of limita tion within which an accused convicted by the Special Judge has to file his appeal before the High Court and clause (3) of the section provides that no court shall have jurisdic tion to transfer any case from any Special Judge or make any order under section 491 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The ordinance certainly lacks some of the most objectionable features of the West Bengal Act. Thus it has not taken away the High Court 's power of revision	 nor does it expose the accused to the chance of being convicted of a major offence though he stood charged with a minor one. There is also no provision in the ordinance similar to that in the West Bengal Act which enables the court to proceed with the trial in the absence of the accused. But although the ordinance in certain respects compares favourably with the West Bengal Act	 the procedure which it lays down for the Special Judge to follow does differ on material points from the normal procedure prescribed in the Criminal Procedure Code; and as these differences abridge the rights of the accused who are to be tried by the Special Court	 and deprive them of cer tain benefits to which they would otherwise have been enti tled under the general law	 the ordinance prima facie makes discrimination and the question has got to be answered whether such discrimination brings it in conflict with article 14 of the Constitution. 458 The nature and scope of the guarantee that is implied in the equal protection clause of our Constitution have been explained and discussed in more than one decision of this court and do not require repetition. It is well settled that a legislature for the purpose of dealing with the complex problems that arise out of an infinite variety of human relations	 cannot but proceed upon some sort of selection or classification of persons upon whom the legislation is to operate. The consequence of such classification would un doubtedly be to differentiate the persons belonging to that class from others	 but that by itself would not make the legislation obnoxious to the equal protection clause. Equal ity prescribed by the Constitution would not be violated if the statute operates equally on all persons who are included in the group	 and the classification is not arbitrary or capricious	 but bears a reasonable relation to the objective which the legislation has in view. The legislature is given the utmost latitude in making the classification and it is only when there is a palpable abuse of power and the differ ences made have no rational relation to the objectives of the legislation	 that necessity of judicial interference arises. Section 11 of the Saurashtra Ordinance so far as it is material for our present purpose lays down that a Special Court shall try such offences or classes of offences. or classes of cases as the State Government may. direct". This part of the section undoubtedly contemplates a classi fication to be made of offences and cases but no classifica tion appears on the terms of the statute itself which merely gives an authority to the State Government to determine what classes of cases or offences are to be tried by the special tribunal. The question arises at the outset as to whether such statute is not on the face of it discriminatory as it commits to the discretion of an administrative body or officials the duty of making selection or classification for purposes of the legislation; and there is a still further question	 namely	 by what tests	 if any	 is the propriety of the administrative action to be adjudged and what would be the remedy of the aggrieved person if the 459 classification made by the administrative body is arbitrary or capricious ? It is a doctrine of the American courts which seems to me to be well founded on principle that the equal protection clause can be invoked not merely where discrimination ap pears on the express terms of the statute itself	 but also when it is the result of improper or prejudiced execution of the law (1). But a statute will not necessarily be condem ned as discriminatory	 because it does not make the classi fication itself but	 as an effective way of carrying out its policy	 vests the authority to do it in certain officers or administrative bodies. Illustrations of one class of such cases are to be found in various regulations in the U.S.A. which are passed by States in exercise of police powers for the purposes of protecting public health or welfare or to regulate trades	 business and occupations which may become unsafe or dangerous when unrestrained. Thus there are regu lations where discretion is lodged by law in public officers or boards to grant or withhold licence to keep taverns or sell spirituous liquors(2)	 or other commodities like milk(3) or cigarettes(4). Similarly	 there are regulations relating to appointment of river pilots(5) and other trained men necessary for particularly difficult jobs and in such cases	 ordinarily	 conditions are laid down by the statute	 on compliance with which a candidate is consid ered qualified. But even then the appointment board has got a discretion to exercise and the fact of the candidate for a particular post is submitted to the judgment of the officer or the board as the case may be. It is true that these cases are of a somewhat different nature than the one we are dealing with; but it seems to me that the principle underly ing all these cases is the same. The whole problem is one of choosing the method by which the legislative policy is to be effectuated. As has been observed by Frankfurter J. in (1) Vide Weaver on Constitutional Law	 p. 404. (2)Crowley vs Uhristensen; 	 (3) People of the State of New York vs Job. E	 Van De Carr	 199 U.S.552. (4) Gundling vs Chicago	 ; (5) Kotch vs Board of River Port Pilot Commissioners	 330 U.S.552. 460 Tinger vs Texas(1)	 "laws are not abstract propositions. but are expressions of policy arising out of specific difficulties addressed to the attainment of specif ic ends by the use of specific remedies. " In my opinion	 if the legislative policy is clear and definite and as an effective method of carrying out that policy a discretion is vested by the statute upon a body of administrators or officers to make selective application of the law to certain classes or groups of persons	 the statute itself cannot be condemned as a piece of discriminatory legislation. After all "the law does all that is needed when it does all that it can	 indicates a policy. and seeks to bring within the lines all similarly situated so far as its means allow(2) ' '. In such eases	 the power given to the executive body would import a duty on it to classify the subject matter of legislation in accordance with the objective indicated in the statute. The discretion that is conferred on official agencies in such circumstances is not an un guided discretion; it has to be exercised in conformity with the policy to effectuate which the direction is given and it is in relation to that objective that the propriety of the classification would have to be tested. If the administra tive body proceeds to classify persons or things on a basis which has no rational relation to the objective of the legislature	 its action can certainly be annulled as offend ing against the equal protection clause. On the other hand	 if the statute itself does not disclose a definite policy or objective and it confers authority on another to make selec tion at its pleasure	 the statute would be held on the face of it to be discriminatory irrespective of the way in which it is applied. This	 it seems to me	 is the true principle underlying the decision of the Supreme Court of America in Yick Wo vs Hopkins(3). The object of the ordinance of the City and County of San Francisco	 which came up for consid eration in that case	 was	 as found by the court	 not to regulate laundry business in that locality in the interests of the general public(4). The business was (1) ; at 147. (2) Vide Buck vs Belt	 ; 	 208. (3) (4) Vide the observations of Field J. in Crowley vs Chris tensen; 	 	94. 461 harmless in itself and useful to the community. No policy was indicated or object declared by the legislature	 but an uncontrolled discretion was given to the Board of Supervi sors who could refuse license at their pleasure to anybody carrying on laundry business in wooden buildings. The classification contemplated by the statute was an arbitrary classification depending on the caprice of the Board	 and consequently it was condemned as discriminatory on the face of it;its application against the Chinese was a confirmation of the discriminatory character and the really hostile intention of the legislation. I would be inclined to think that the West Bengal case	 which we have decided already	 comes within the purview of this principle	 as the desira bility of "speedier trial"	 which is hinted at in the pream ble to the West Bengal Act	 is too vague	 elusive and uncer tain a thing to amount to an enunciation of a definite policy or objective on the basis of which any proper classi fication could be made. the matter has been left to the unfettered discretion of the State Government which can classify offences or cases in any way they like without regard to any objective and as such the statute is open to the challenge of making arbitrary discrimination. The point that requires consideration is	 whether the Saurashtra Ordinance presents any distinguishing features or occupies the same position as the West Bengal Act ? As has been stated already	 section 11 of the Saurash tra Ordinance is worded in exactly the same manner as sec tion 5(1) of the West Bengal Special Courts Act; and that part of it	 with which we are here concerned	 authorises the State Government to direct any classes of offences or cases to be tried by the special tribunal. The State Government	 therefore	 has got to make a classification of cases or offences before it issues its directions to the Special Court. The question is	 on what basis is the classification to be made ? If it depends entirely upon the pleasure of the State Government to make any classification it likes	 with out any guiding principle at all. it cannot certainly be a proper classification	 Which requires that a reasonable relation must exist 462 between the classification and the objective that the legis lation has in view. On the other hand	 if the legislature indicates a definite objective and the discretion has been vested in the State Government as a means of achieving that object	 the law itself	 as I have said above	 cannot be held to be discriminatory	 though the action of the State Govern ment may be condemned if it offends against the equal pro tection clause	 by making an arbitrary selection. Now	 the earlier ordinance	 to which the present one is a subsequent addition by way of amendment	 was passed by the Rajpramukh of Saurashtra on 2nd April	 1948. It is described as an ordinance to provide for the security of the State	 mainte nance of public order and maintenance of supplies and serv ices essential to the community in the State of Saurashtra. The preamble to the ordinance sets out the objective of the ordinance in identical terms. It is to be noted that the integration of several States in Kathiawar which now form the State of Saurashtra	 was completed some time in Febru ary	 1948. It appears from the affidavit of an officer of the Home Government of the Saurashtra State that soon after the integration took place	 an alarming state of lawlessness prevailed in some of the districts within the State. There were gangs of dacoits operating at different places and their number began to increase gradually. As ordinary law was deemed insufficient to cope with the nefarious activi ties of those criminal gangs	 the Saurashtra Public Safety Measures Ordinance was promulgated by the Rajpramukh on 2nd April	 1948. The ordinance	 as stated already	 provided principally for preventive detention and imposition of collective fines '; and it was hoped that armed with these extraordinary powers the State Government would be able to bring the situation under control. These hopes	 however	 were belied	 and the affidavit gives a long list of offences in which murder and nose cutting figure conspicuously in addition to looting and dacoity	 which were committed by the dacoits during the years 1948 and 1949. In view of this ugly situation in the Star	 the new Ordinance was 463 passed on 11th of November	 1949	 and this ordinance pro vides inter alia for the establishment of Special Courts which are to try offenders under a special procedure. Acting under section 11 of the Ordinance	 the Government issued a notification on 9/11th February	 1950	 which Con stituted a Special Court for areas specified in the sched ule. and here again the affidavit shows that all these areas are included in the districts of Gohilwad	 Madhya Saurashtra and Sorath	 where the tribe of marauders principally flour ished. The object of passing this new ordinance is identi cally the same for which the earlier ordinance was passed	 and the preamble to the latter	 taken along with the sur rounding circumstances. discloses a definite legislative policy which has been sought to be effectuated by the dif ferent provisions contained in the enactment. If Special Courts were considered necessary to cope with an abnormal situation. it cannot be said that the vesting of authority in the State Government to select offences for trial by such courts is in any way unreasonable. In the light of the principles stated already	 I am unable to hold that section 11 of the Ordinance in so far as it authorises the State Government to direct classes of offences or cases to be tried by the Special Court offends against the provision of the equal protection clause in our Constitution. If the notification that has been issued by the State Government proceeds on any arbitrary or unreasona ble basis	 obviously that could be challenged as unconstitu tional. It is necessary	 therefore	 to examine the terms of the notification and the list of offences it has prescribed. The notification	 as said above	 constitutes a Special Court for the areas mentioned in the Schedule and appoints Mr. P.P. Anand as a Special Judge to preside over the Spe cial Court. The offences triable by the Special Court are then set out with reference to the specific sections of the Indian Penal Code. Mr. Chibber attacks the classification of offences made in this list primarily on the ground that while it mentions offences of a particular character	 it excludes at the same time other offences of a cognate char acter in reference to 60 464 which no difference in treatment is justifiable. It is pointed out that while section 183 of the Indian Penal Code is mentioned in the list	 sections 184	 186 and 188 which deal with similar offences are excluded. Similarly the list does not mention section 308	 Indian Penal Code	 though it mentions section 307. The learned counsel relies in this connection upon the decision of the Supreme Court of America in Skinner vs Oklahoma(1). In that case the question for consideration related to the constitutionality of a certain statute of Oklahoma which provided for sterilization of certain habitual criminals who were convicted two or more times in any State of felony involving moral turpitude. The statute applied to persons guilty of larceny	 which was a felony	 but not to embezzlement	 and it was held that the legislation violated the equal protection clause. It is undoubtedly a sound and reasonable proposition that when the nature of two offences is intrinsically the same and they are punishable in the same manner	 a person accused of one should not be treated differently from a person accused of the other	 because it is an essential principle underlying the equal protection clause that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike both in privileges conferred and liabilities imposed. At the same time it is to be noted as Douglas J. observed in the very case that in determining the reach and scope of particular legislation it is not necessary for the legislature to provide abstract symmetry. "It may mark and set apart the classes and types of problems according to the needs and as dictated or sug gested by experience. " A too rigid insistance therefore on a thing like scientific classification is neither practica ble nor desirable. It is true that the notification men tions section 183 of the Indian Penal Code	 though it omits section 184; but I am unable to hold that the two are iden tically of the same nature. Section 183 deals with resist ance to the taking of property by the lawful authority of public servant; while section 184 relates to obstructing sale of property offered for sale (1) ; 465 by authority of public servant. Section 186 on the other hand does not relate to the taking of property at all	 but is concerned with obstructing a public servant in the dis charge of his public duties. Then again I am not sure that it was incumbent upon the State Government to include section 308	 Indian Penal Code	 in the list simply because they included section 307. It is true that culpable homicide as well as attempt to murder are specified in the list; but an attempt to commit culpable homicide is certain ly a less heinous offence and the State Government might think it proper	 having regard to all the facts known to them	 that an offence of attempt to commit culpable homicide does not require a special treatment. Be that as it may	 I do not think that a meticulous examination of the various offences specified in the list with regard to their nature and punishment is necessary for purposes of this case. The appellant before us was accused of murder punishable under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. There is no other offence	 I believe	 described in the Indian Penal Code	 which can be placed on an identical footing as murder. Even culpable homicide not amounting to murder is something less heinous than murder	 although it finds a place in the list. In my opinion	 the appellant can have no right to complain if he has not been aggrieved in any way by any unjust or arbitrary classification. As he is accused of murder and dacoity and no offences of a similar nature are excluded from the list	 I do not think that it is open to him to complain of any violation of equal protection clause in the notification. There are quite a number of offences specified in the notification and they are capable of being grouped under various heads. Simply because cer tain offences which could have been mentioned along with similar others in a particular group have been omitted therefrom	 it cannot be said that the whole list is bad. The question of inequality on the ground of such omission can be raised only by the person who is directed to be tried under the special 466 procedure for a certain offence	 whereas for commission of a similar offence not mentioned in the list another person has still the advantages of the ordinary procedure open to him. In my opinion	 therefore	 the first point raised on behalf of the appellant cannot succeed. The other point urged by the learned counsel for the appellant which relates to the question of delegation of legislative authority by the Rajpramukh to the State Govern ment admits	 I think	 of a short answer. It is conceded by the learned counsel that the facts of this case are identi cal with those of King Emperor vs Benoarilal Sarma (1) which was decided by the Privy Council. In fact	 the language of section 5 of the Special Criminal Courts Ordinance (No. II of 1942) which came up for consideration in that case is almost the same as that of section 11 of the Saurashtra Ordinance. It was held by the Privy Council that it was not a ease of delegated legislation at all	 but merely an exam ple of the not uncommon legislative arrangement by which the local application of the provision of a statute is deter mined by the judgment of a local administrative body as to its necessity. In other words	 it was a case of conditional legislation coming within the rule of Queen vs Burah (2). The pronouncement of the Judicial Committee in Benoarilal 's case (2) has been accepted and acted upon by this court in more than one case and it is too late now to question its correctness. My conclusion	 therefore	 is that both the preliminary points must be disallowed and the appeal should be heard on its merits. DAS J. The appellant before us was tried by a Special Court constituted under the Saurashtra Public Safety Meas ures (Third Amendment) Ordinance No. LXVI of 1949 for of fences alleged to have been committed by him under sections 302	 307 and 392 of the Indian Penal Code. On December 20	 1950	 he was found guilty of the offences charged against him and was convicted and sentenced to death under section 302	 (1) 72 I.A. 57. (2) 3 App. 889. 467 Indian Penal Code	 and to seven years rigorous imprisonment under each of the charges under sections 307 and 392	 Indian Penal Code	 the sentences of imprisonment running concur rently He appealed to the High Court of Saurashtra but the High Court	 by its judgment pronounced on February 28	 1951	 rejected his appeal and confirmed his conviction and the sentences passed by the Special Court. By its order made on March 21	 1951	 however	 the High Court granted him a cer tificate for appeal to this Court both under article 132 and article 134 (1) (c) of the Constitution. This appeal has accordingly been filed in this Court. A preliminary point has been raised by learned counsel for the appellant	 namely	 that the Special Court had no jurisdiction to try this case and the whole trial and con viction have been illegal and void ab initio and should be quashed in limine. It is necessary	 for the disposal of the preliminary objection	 to refer to the provisions of the Ordinance and the circumstances in which the Special Court came to be constituted. In the beginning of 1948 the different States in Kathia war were integrated into what is now the State of Saurash tra. About that time different dacoits indulged in lawless activities in Kathiawar and in particular in the area now known as the districts of Gohilwad and Madhya Saurashtra and on the outskirts of Sorath that was formerly a district in Junagadh State. Their activities gathered such strength and virulence that the security of the State and the maintenance of public peace became seriously endangered. In order to check their nefarious activities the Rajpramukh of the State of Saurashtra on April 2	 1948	 promulgated Ordinance No. IX of 1948. The preamble of the Ordinance recited that 'it was "expedient to provide for public safety	 maintenance of public order and preservation of peace and tranquillity in the State of Saurashtra. " that Ordinance gave power to the State Government to make orders	 amongst other things	 for detaining or restricting the movements or 468 actions of persons and impose collective fines. The Rajpra mukh on April 5	 1948	 promulgated another Ordinance No. XII of 1948 which extended to the State of Saurashtra the provi sions of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Act V of 1898) subject to certain adaptations and modifications mentioned in the Schedule thereto. It appears from the affidavit of Ramnikrai Bhagwandas Vesavada	 Assistant Secretary in the Home Department	 Government of Saurashtra	 that the Ordi nance was not sufficient to cope with the activities of the gangs of dacoits and that cases of looting	 dacoity	 rob bery	 nose cutting and murder continued as before and indeed increased in number	 frequency and vehemence and it became impossible to deal with the offences at different places in separate Courts of law expeditiously. In view of the seri ous situation prevailing in those districts the State of Saurashtra considered it necessary to constitute Special Courts and to provide for a special procedure of trials so as to expedite the disposal of cases in which offences of certain specified kinds had been committed. The Rajpramukh of Saurashtra accordingly	 on November 2	 1949	 promulgat ed Ordinance No. LXVI of 1949 called "The Saurashtra State Public Safety Measures (Third Amendment) Ordinance	 1949"	 whereby it amended the Saurashtra State Public Safety Meas ures Ordinance (No. IX of 1948). By section 4 of the Ordi nance No. LXVI of 1949 several sections were added to Ordi nance No. IX of 1948. Three of the sections thus added	 which are material for our present purposes	 were sections 9	 10 and 11 which run as follows : "9. Special Courts. The Government of the United State of the Saurashtra may by notification in the Official Ga zette constitute Special Courts of Criminal Jurisdiction for such area as may be specified in the notification. Special Judges. The Government of the United State of Saurashtra may appoint a Special Judge to preside over a Special Court constituted under section 9 for any area any person who has been 469 a Sessions Judge for a period of not less than 2 years under the Code of Criminal Procedure	 1898	 as applied to the United State of Saurashtra. Jurisdiction of Special Judges. A Special Judge shall try such offences or classes of offences or such cases or classes of cases as the Government of the United State of Saurashtra may	 by general or special order in writing	 direct. " Pursuant to the provisions of the Ordinance as amended the State of Saurashtra issued a notification	 the material part of which is as follows : "No. H/35 5 C In exercise of the powers conferred by sections 9	 10 and 11 of the Saurashtra State Public Safety Measures Ordinance	 1948	 (Ordinance No. IX of 1948)	 here inafter referred to as the said Ordinance)	 Government is pleased to direct (i) that a Special Court of a Criminal Jurisdiction	 (hereinafter referred to as the said Court) shall be consti tuted for the areas	 mentioned in the schedule hereto an nexed	 and that the headquarters of the said Court shall be at Rajkot	 (ii) that Mr. P.P. Anand shall be appointed as a Spe cial Judge to preside over the said Court and (iii) that the Special Judge hereby appointed shall try the following offences	 viz. . (a) offences under sections 183	 189	 190	 212	 216 224	 302	 304. 307	323 to 335	 341 to 344	 379 to 382 384 to 389 and 392 to 402 of the Indian Penal Code 1860 (XLV of 1860)	 as adapted and applied to the United State of Saurashtra	 and (b) all offences under the said Ordinance	 except an offence punishable under sub section (6) of section 2 of the said Ordinance	 in so far as it relates to the contravention of an order made under clause (a) of subsection (1) of the said section. " The appellant having been charged with offences included in the Notification he was tried by the Special Court with the result I have mentioned. The preliminary objection raised on his behalf is that section 470 11 of the Ordinance is invalid in that (a) it offends against article 14 of our Constitution	 and (b) it autho rises illegal delegation of legislative power to the State Government. In support of the first ground on which the preliminary objection is rounded reliance is placed by learned coun sel for the appellant on the judgment of this Court in Case No. 297 of 1951 (The State of West Bengal vs Anwar Ali Sarkar). That case was concerned with the validity of the trial of the respondent therein by a Special Court consti tuted under the provisions of the West Bengal Special Courts Act	 1950 (West Bengal Act X of 1950). The preamble to that Act recited that it was "expedient to provide for the speedier trial of certain offences". Sections 3	 4 and 5 (1) of the West Bengal Special Courts Act	 1950	 reproduced substantially	 if not verbatim	 the provisions of sections 9	 10 and 11 of the Saurashtra Ordinance of 1948 as subse quently amended. The notification issued by the State of West Bengal under that Act was	 however	 different from the notification issued by the State of Saurashtra in that the West Bengal notification directed certain specific "cases" to be tried by the Special Court constituted under the West Bengal Special Courts Act. That notification had obviously been issued under that part of section 5 (1) of the West Bengal Special Courts Act which authorised the State Govern ment to direct particular "cases" to be tried by the Special Court. A majority of this court held that at any rate section 5 (1) of the West Bengal Special Courts Act in so far as it authorised the State to direct "cases" to be tried by the Special Court and the notification issued thereunder offended against the provisions of article 14 of the Consti tution and as such were void under article 13. The Saurash tra notification	 however	 has been issued quite obviously under that part of section 11 which authorises the State Government to direct "offences ' '	 "classes of offences" or "classes of cases" to be tried by the Special Court and the question before us on the present appeal is whether that part of section 11 under 471 which the present notification has been issued offends against the equal protection clause of our Constitution. It is contended that the opinion expressed by the majority of this Court in ' the West Bengal case on the corresponding part of section S (1) of the West Bengal Special Courts Act was not necessary for the purposes of that appeal and re quires reconsideration. After referring to our previous decisions in Chiranjit Lal Choudhury vs The Union of India and Others (1) and The State of Bombay vs F.N. Balsara (2)	 I summarised the meaning	 scope and effect of article 14 of our Constitu tion	 as I understand it	 in my judgment in the West Bengal case which I need not repeat but to which I fully adhere. It is now well established that while article 14 forbids class legislation it does not forbid reasonable classification for the purposes of legislation. In order	 however	 to pass the test of permissible classification	 two conditions must be fulfilled	 namely	 (i) that the classifi cation must be rounded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from others left out of the group	 and (ii)that that differ entia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the Act. What is necessary is that there must be a nexus between the basis of classification and the object of the Act. It will be noticed that section 11 of the Saurashtra Ordinance	 like section 5 (1) of the West Bengal Special Courts Act	 refers to four distinct categories	 namely	 "offences"	 "classes of offences"	 "cases" and "classes of cases" and empowers the State Government to direct any one or more of these categories to be tried by the Special Court constituted under the Act. The expressions "offences"	 "classes of offences" and "classes of cases" clearly indi cate and obviously imply a process of classification of offences or cases. (1) ; (2) ; at p. 326 ; ; 61 472 Prima facie those words do not contemplate any particular offender or any particular accused in any particular case. The emphasis is on "offences"	 "classes of offences" or "classes of cases. " The classification of "offences" by itself is not calculated to touch any individual as such	 although it may	 after the classification is made	 affect all individuals who may commit the particular offence. In short	 the classification implied in this part of the sub section has no reference to	 and is not directed towards	 the singling out of any particular person as an object of hostile State action but is concerned only with the grouping of "offences"	 "classes of offences" and "classes of cases" for the purposes of the particular legislation as recited in its preamble. An argument was raised	 as in the West Bengal ease	 that even this part of the section gave an uncontrolled and unguided power of classification which might well be exer cised by the State Government capriciously or "with an evil eye and an unequal hand" so as to deliberately bring about invidious discrimination between man and man although both of them were situated in exactly the same or similar circumstances. I do not accept this argument as sound	 for	 the reasons I adopted in my judgment in the West Bengal case in repelling this argument apply with equal	 if not with greater	 force to the argument directed against the validity of the Saurashtra Ordinance. It is obvious that this part of section 11 of the Ordinance which	 like the corresponding part of section 5 (1) of the West Bengal Special Courts Act	 confers a power on the State Government to make a classifi cation of "offences"	 "classes of offences" or "classes of cases"	 makes it the duty of the State government to make a proper classification	 that is to say	 a classification which must fulfil both conditions	 namely	 that it must be based on some intelligible differentia distinguishing the offences grouped together from other offences and that that differentia must have a reasonable relation to the object of the Act as recited in the preamble. A 473 classification on a basis which does not distinguish one offence from another offence or which has no relation to the object of the Act will be wholly arbitrary and may well be hit by the principles laid down by the Supreme Court of the United States in Jack Skinner vs Oklahoma(1). On the other hand	 as I observed in the West Bengal case	 it is easy to visualise a situation when certain offences	 by reason of the frequency of their perpetration or other attending circumstances	 may legitimately call for a special treatment in order to check the commission of such offences. Are we not familiar with gruesome crimes of murder	 arson	 loot and rape committed on a large scale during communal riots in particular localities and are they not really different from a case of a stray murder	 arson	 loot or rape in another district which may not be affected by any communal upheaval ? Does not the existence of the gangs of dacoits and the concomitant crimes committed on a large scale as mentioned in the affidavit filed on behalf of the State call for prompt and speedier trial for the maintenance of public order and the preservation of peace and tranquillity in the State and indeed of the very safety of the community ? Do not those special circumstances add a peculiar quality to the offences or classes of offences specified in the notifi cation so as to distinguish them from stray cases of similar crimes and is it not reasonable and even necessary to the State with power to classify them into a separate group and deal with them promptly ? I have no doubt to ' my mind that the surrounding circumstances and the special features mentioned in the affidavit referred to above furnish a very cogent and reasonable basis of classification	 for they do clearly distinguish these offences from similar or even same species of offences committed elsewhere and under ordinary circumstanceS. This differentia quite clearly has a reason able relation to the object sought to be achieved by the Act	 namely	 the maintenance of public order	 the preserva tion of public safety	 the peace and tranquillity of the State. Such a classification (1) 216 U.S. 535; L. Ed. 1655. 474 will not be repugnant to the equal protection clause of our Constitution	 for there will be no discrimination	 for whoever may commit the specified offence in the specified area in the specified circumstances will be treated alike and sent up before a Special. Court for trial under the special procedure. Persons thus sent up for trial by a Special Court cording to the special procedure cannot point their fingers to the other persons who may be charged before an ordinary Court with similar offences alleged to have been committed by them in a different place and in different circumstances and complain of unequal treatment	 for those other persons are of a different category and are not their equals. In my judgment	 this part of the section	 properly construed and understood	 does not confer an uncontrolled and unguided power on the State Government. On the con trary	 this power is controlled by the necessity for making a proper classification which is to be guided by the pream ble in the sense that the classification must have a ration al relation to the object of the Act as recited in the preamble. It is	 therefore	 not an arbitrary power. The Legislature has left it to the State Government to classify offences or classes of offences or classes of cases for the purpose of the Ordinance	 for the State Government is in a better position to judge the needs and exigencies of the State and the Court will not lightly interfere with the decision of the State Government. If at any time	 however	 the State Government classifies offences arbitrarily and not on any reasonable basis having a relation to the object of the Act	 its action will be either an abuse of its power if it is purposeful	 or in excess of its powers even if it is done in good faith	 and in either case the resulting discrimination will encounter the challenge of the Constitu tion and the Court will strike down	 not the law which is good	 but the abuse or misuse or the unconstitutional admin istration of the law creating or resulting in unconstitu tional discrimination. In this case	 however	 the facts stated in the affidavit filed on behalf of the State make it abundantly 475 clear that the situation in certain parts of the State was sufficient to add a particularly sinister quality to certain specified offences committed within those parts and the State Government legitimately grouped them together in the notification. The criticism that the State Government in cluded certain offences but excluded certain cognate of fences has been dealt with by my learned brother Mukherjea and I have nothing more to add thereto. In my opinion	 lot reasons given in my judgment in the West Bengal case and referred to above	 section 11 of the Saurashtra Ordinance in so far as it authorises the State Government to direct offences or classes of offences or classes of cases to be tried by the Special Court does not offend against the equal protection clause of our Constitu tion and the notification which has been issued under that part of the section cannot be held to be invalid or ultra vires. On the question of delegation of legislative power the matter appears to be concluded by the decision of the Privy Council in Benoarilal 's case(1) and the section may well be regarded as an instance of conditional legislation. Fur ther	 I would be prepared to say	 for reasons stated in my judgment in the President 's Reference(2) that there has been no illegal delegation of legislative power. For reasons stated above	 I agree that the preliminary point should be rejected and the appeal should be heard on its merits. CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR J. Mr. Sen tried his best to distinguish this case from our decision on the West Bengal Special Courts Act	 1950	 The State of West Bengal vs Anwari Ali Sarkar and Gajan Mali (3). But in my view he has not succeeded in his attempt. Sections 9 and 11 of the Ordinance in question do not lay down any classification in themselves. The preamble to the earlier Ordinance of 1948	 which is still intact as the later one is only an amending (1) L.R. 72 I.A. 57. (3) Cases Nos. 297 & 298 of 1951. Since (2) ; reported as ; 476 measure	 merely refers to the need to provide for public safety	 maintenance of public order	 and the preservation of peace and tranquillity in the State of Saurashtra. This by itself indicates no classification	 as the object is a general one	 which has to be kept in view by every enlight ened government or system of administration. Every law dealing with the commission and the punishment of offences is based on this need. The notification under which the Special Court was established no doubt deals with "offences" as distinguished from "cases" or "groups of cases	 but here also, there is no rational classification. Offences present ing the same characteristic features, and cognate in this sense, have been separately dealt with; some of them are to go before the Special Court, while others are left to be tried by the ordinary courts. The circumstance that the deviations from normal procedure prescribed in the Ordinance are not so many or vital, as in the Bengal case, does not in nay humble opinion, affect the result, as the defect of the absence of a reasonable or rational classification is still there. The negation of committal proceedings is a matter of much moment to the accused, as it deprives him of the un doubted advantage of knowing the evidence for the prosecu tion and discrediting it by cross examination, leading possibly to his discharge even at that early stage. The argument for the respondent that there has been no discrimination as against the appellant visa vis other persons charged with the same offences is unacceptable. Cognate offences have been left over for trial by the ordi nary courts. It is no answer to the charge by A of discrim inatory legislation to say that B & C have also been placed in the same category as himself, when he finds that D, E & F also liable for the same or kindred offences have been left untouched and are to be tried by ordinary courts under the normal procedure. Much importance cannot be attached to the affidavit of the Assistant Secretary to the Government. It may be that all the facts stated by him as regards the frequency and locale of the particular 477 offences are true. But no such grounds for the classifica tion are indicated, much less stated, either in the impugned Ordinance or notification. This is certainly not a legal requirement; but a wise prudence suggests the need for such incorporation, as otherwise the ascertainment of the reasons for the classification from extraneous sources may involve the consideration of what may be regarded as after thoughts by way of explanation or justification. In my. view, the West Bengal Special Courts Act deci sion governs this case also, and section 11 is bad. It is unnecessary to deal with the other point raised by the learned counsel for the appellants as regards the dele gation of legislative powers involved in the pro tanto repeal of some of the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code, viz., sections 5 and 28 and the Schedule, especially as it seems concluded against him by the decision in King Emperor vs Benoari Lal Sarma and Others(1). The convictions of the appellant and the sentences imposed on him are set aside, and there will be a retrial under the ordinary procedure. Boss J. I agree with my brothers Mahajan and Chandra sekhara Aiyar that the Saurashtra State Public Safety Meas ures (Third Amendment) Ordinance, offends article 14. As I explained in my judgment in The State of West Bengal vs Artwar Ali Sarkar(2), I prefer not to base my decision on the classification test. For the reasons given there I am of opinion that the differentiation here travels beyond. bounds which are legitimate. It is true the points of differentiation are not as numerous here as in the other case but the ones which remain are, in my judgment, of a substantial character and cut deep enough to attract the equality clauses in article 14. I would hold the Ordinance invalid. Preliminary objection overruled. (1) (1945) 72 I.A. 57. 
839	Civil Appeal No. 34 of 1956. Appeal from the judgment and order dated February 19, 1954 of the former Nagpur High Court, in Misc. Appeal No. 164 of 1949, arising out of the judgment and decree dated November 22, 1949, of the First Additional District Judge, Akola, in Civil Suit No. 12 A of 1948. C. B. Agarwala and Ganpat Rai, for the appellant. section K. Kapur and B. P. Maheshwari, for the respondent. January, 21. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by KAPUR J. KAPUR J. This is an appeal against the judgment and order of the Nagpur High Court and arises out of proceedings under the Indian . The appellant in this case is Champalal and the respondent is Samarath Bai, the widow of Lal Chand. The parties who are Jains belong to Balapur in the district of Akola in the previous State of Madhya Pradesh. The relationship of the parties is shown by the following pedigree table: 813 Phool Chand | | | | | | Nanak Chand Khushal Chand Sundarlal | | | Bulakhidas= Lalchand= Deolal jivanbai Samarathbai | | | | | | | | Babibai= Ratanbai= | Rasiklal Vijay Kumar | | | | | | | | Ishwardas Baglal Digamber Das | | Champalal | | | | | | | | Sakarchand Vinaychand Vimalchand On September 14, 1944, Lal Chand made a will by which he authorized his wife Samarath Bai to adopt Champalal and made certain disposition of his property. Lal Chand died on September 26, 1944. On October 20, 1944, the appellant made an application under section 192 of the Succession Act to the First Additional District Judge of Akola for the appointment of a Curator. This was Misc. No. 3 of 1944. Notices were issued to the respondent, Samarath Bai and her daughters, The will was registered on December 29, 1944. On January 10, 1945, an arbitration agreement was entered into between the appellant and the respondent and on January 16, 1945, both parties applied for stay of proceedings in the case (Misc. No. 3 of 1944) and the case was adjourned to March 28, 1945, and then was adjourned to June 18, 1945. On that date the arbitrators made an application to the First Additional District Judge for extension of time for four months for making the award. This application was opposed by the appellant but the court gave three months ' time on July 26, 1946. The award was made on October 18, 1946. On October 21, it was filed by the arbitrators in the court of the First Additional District Judge who on October 30, gave to the parties ten days ' time for objections. On November 15, 814 1946, the appellant filed objections to the award and on January 31, 1947, the respondent applied for a judgment in terms of the award and for a decree. The award was unregistered and therefore at the request of the respondent it was handed over for getting it registered to Mithulal who was an attorney of two of the arbitrators Magandas and Sakarchand. On February 7, 1947, he presented it for registration to the Sub Registrar but the Sub Registrar returned it as it was not accompanied by a list and particulars of the property covered by the award. On February 15, 1947, the list and particulars signed by Mithulal were supplied and the award was represented for registration by Mithulal. As he was an attorney of only two of the three arbitrators the Sub Registrar registered the document on March 26, 1947, in regard to said arbitrators and refused it qua the third arbitrator, Bhogilal. But under the orders of the Registrar the document was registered in regard to Bhogilal also and it was refiled on July 21, 1948, in the Court of the First Additional District Judge. He ordered the two proceedings one under section 192 of the Succession Act and the other under the to be separated and the proceedings under the were ordered to be registered as a suit on August 14, 1948, and on August 30, the court ordered a proper application as required under the High Court Rules to be filed. On September 15, 1948, an application under section 14(2) of the was filed. On October 14,1948, the appellant filed an application for setting aside the award and therein raised various objections which were rejected and on November 22, 1949, a judgment was passed in accordance with the terms of the award followed by a decree. Against this order the appellant took an appeal to the High Court which was dismissed on February 19, 1954. The High Court held that the application filed. by the respondent dated September 15, '1948, under section 14(2) of the was not within time but the original application filed by the arbitrators on October 21. , 1946, was within time; that no objection could be taken to the award on the ground that 815 there were two awards one by the arbitrators and the other by Mithulal who had added to the award by giving the list and particulars; that the First Additional District Judge was authorised to extend time for making an award an the application of the arbitrators and he was properly seized of the case; that no misconduct had been proved and that no illegality had been established and that the appellant did not get anything under the will except on adoption nor was he until then constituted an executor. Against this judgment this appeal has been filed on a certificate by the High Court. In appeal before us counsel for the appellant raised six points: (1) the filing of the award was not within time as no application was made under section 14 within the time allowed by the Limitation Act; (2) that the award required registration and was not registered in accordance with law and the mere fact that it was registered does not clothe it with legality ; (3) the First Additional District. Judge had no jurisdiction to grant three months ' extension of time to the arbitrators for making the award which was granted on July 26, 1946 ; (4) that the arbitrators were guilty of mis conduct; (5) that the award is in excess of the power given to the arbitrators under the agreement of arbitration and (6) even if the award was proper and legal the respondent had refused to adopt the appelant and therefore the decree should have been as provided by the award on the happening of that contingency and in the alternative the First Addi tional District Judge who passed the decree had no jurisdiction to take subsequent events into consideration. In our opinion points nos. 1, 2 and 3 are wholly without substance. The award was made on October 18, 1946, and the arbitrators filed it in the court of the First Additional District Judge and they also gave notice to the parties by registered post informing them of the making of the award. It has not been shown as to how the filing of the award is barred by Iimitation. Article 178 of the Limitation Act which was 104 816 relied upon by the appellant applies to application,made by the parties and not to the filing of the award by the arbitrators. The second question that the award required registration and could not be filed by the arbitrators before it was registered is equally without substance. The filing of an unregistered award under section 49 of the Registration Act is not prohibited; what is prohibited is that it cannot be taken into evidence so as to affect immoveable property falling under section 17 of that Act. That the award required registration was rightly admitted by both parties. It was contended by counsel for the appellant that under section 21 of the Registration Act and the rules made tinder section 22 a description of the property was necessary and as that was supplied through Mithulal who, according to counsel, did not have the necessary authority to do so, the award must be taken to be an incomplete document which could not be registered. The High Court has found that in the circumstances of this case lists were not necessary and therefore anything done by Mithulal whether authorised or not will not affect the legality of the registration. The third point that the First Additional District Judge before whom the application was made for extending the time for making the award had no jurisdiction is also not sustainable. It so happened that the court which had jurisdiction to entertain applications for the filing of awards was the same before whom the application under section 192 of the Succession Act had been filed. If that court was the proper court in which such applications were to be made then no defect can be found in the application being made to that court or that court giving such extension. The ground on which the charge of misconduct of the arbitrators was founded was that the arbitrators had before hearing the parties decided amongst themselves that they would give a particular award. The High Court has found that this charge has not been proved. It was based on a statement of the appellant that one of the arbitrators, Magandas, had suggested to him that he, the appellant, should agree to give to 817 the respondent an absolute estate in a portion of the property and if that was done the dispute would be settled, but he was agreeable only to giving a life estate and the arbitrators then told him that in that case they would give an absolute estate to the respondent. As the High Court has pointed out this fact was not pleaded in the first application of objections filed by the appellant and it was in its opinion an after thought. Reliance was also placed on the following statement of Magandas in cross examination as P.W. 3:  We had decided as to how the award was to be made by us	 but as these two persons did not come we made the application to the Court for extension of time ". But the explanation of the other arbitrators was that they wanted to bring about an amicable settlement and had gone to Balapur and then to Akola. The appellant and his brother had promised to follow them there but as they did not turn up an application was made for extension of time. There is nothing wrong in what the arbitrators did and it cannot be said that	 any inference of misconduct can be drawn from this evidence. It was then submitted that the award was in excess of the powers given to the arbitrators and was therefore invalid. This point was divided into three points: (i) that the reference itself was invalid and therefore the award was a nullity; (ii) that the award was in excess of the powers given to the arbitrators and (iii) the award was contrary to law on the face of it. In support of point No. (1) it was submitted that the appellant having accepted the office of an executor could not enter into an arbitration concerning the execution	 authority to adopt or the property covered by the will. It is unnecessary to decide the vitality of this point because according to the true construction of the will the appellant was not to become the executor till he had been adopted. Paragraph 10 of the will was as follows: " I have this day	 made as above the wilt of my estate. Under this will	 I am authorising the said 818 Champalal Ishwardas to execute the same. I have appointed him the executor of this will. Under the said will	 the said Champalal alone shall be the full owner of my entire movable and immoveable property and the executor of the will after my death if I adopt him during my lifetime or even if my wife adopts him (after my death). " The words " under the said will the said Champalal shall be the executor of the will after my death if I adopt him during my lifetime or even if my wife adopts him after my death " show that the appellant was to become executor after his adoption and as he was not adopted he cannot be the executor and therefore the argument that an executor cannot enter into arbitration does not arise and we do not think it necessary to decide this matter beyond saying that the appellant was not constituted an executor eo nominiee but was to be an executor if he was adopted. Similarly the question whether the appellant after accepting the office of an executor had renounced it or a discharge was necessary under section 301 of the Succession Act does not arise. Points (ii) and (iii) may be taken up together. lt was argued that the award is in excess of the power given to the arbitrators because it determined the rights of the appellant as an executor and because it was in excess of para. No. 1 of the arbitration agreement which provided that the arbitrators should maintain the gifts to charities and the gift in favour of the testator 's daughters and others. lt is difficult to see how the award has lost sight of this paragraph. As a matter of fact the arbitrators have maintained the gifts to charities and other gifts made by the testator in the will and they have clearly stated that the person becoming the owner of the deceased 's property	 will have to provide for the maintenance of the persons named in the will and pay the charities therein enumerated. Another objection raised was that according to the arbitration agreement the arbitrators had to enforce the will and	 not to act outside it and also they could not impose a limit of time for adoption. How they 819 have acted dehors the will has not been shown. The contention raised was that according to the arbitration agreement the arbitrators had to decide in what proportion the parties to the dispute were to " enjoy " the estate of the testator and not that one of them will get nothing at all. As we read paragraph 10 of the will	 and the High Court also so construed it	 the appellant could get the property of the testator only if he was adopted by the testator or his widow	 the respondent. It is not correct	 therefore	 to read the term of the arbitration agreement as meaning that the appellant was to get at least some portion of the property irrespective of his being adopted. Paragraph 2 of the arbitration agreement shows that they had also to decide that in case the respondent adopted the appellant what should be the respective rights of the parties in the estate. The arbitrators decided that the respondent should adopt the appellant according to Hindu Law within four months before February	 1947	 and if the respondent failed so to do within the time above specified the appellant would be the heir and executor of the deceased 's entire property and the respondent would he entitled to Rs. 200 per mensem as maintenance. But if in spite of the respondent 's readiness to adopt the appellant refused to be adopted within four months	 he would not get any rights in the property of the deceased nor would he be the executor. As it was specifically stated in the arbitration agreement that the consequences of the adoption or non adoption were to be decided by the arbitrators	 they rightly laid down what was to happen if the adoption did not take place and also provided that if it was due(		 to the default of the appellant one consequence will follow and if it was the default of the respondent another consequence would follow. The words of the agreement "In the same way the arbitrators may also decide that in case it is decided that the party No. 2 should adopt the party No. 1 and if that thing is accepted by the party No. 1 and in case the adoption takes place	 what shall be the rights of both the parties and how they will stand in respect of the property . . . 820 mean that the power to limit the time was implicit because the happening of these events could not be left for a limitless period. The courts below have found on the evidence that the appellant was not prepared to be adopted. We have been taken through the evidence and we find no reason to differ from the opinion of the High Court that the appellant was not prepared to be adopted. His attitude in regard to that matter is clear from ground No. 37 of the Grounds of Appeal taken by him in the High Court which was: " The lower Court erred in holding that Champalal was not within his rights in consenting to get adopted by Mt. Samarathbai within the time fixed by the arbitrators without prejudice to his objections against the award " and the courts have rightly come to that conclusion. In this view of the matter the alternative argument of taking subsequent events into consideration does not arise. It was also argued that by making the award the arbitrators had perverted the line of succession. All that the award has stated is that in case the adoption takes place the respondent would receive I share of the property of the testator and it would form her stridhana. How that has perverted the line of succession is difficult to understand. There is no force in this appeal and it must there. fore be dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.

Summary:
The Saurashtra State Public Safety Measures Ordinance	 1948	 was passed "to provide for public safety	 maintenance of public order and preservation of peace and tranquillity in the State of Saurashtra. " As crimes involving violence such as dacoity and murder were increasing	 this Ordinance was amended by the Saurashtra State Public Safety Measures (Third Amendment) Ordinance	 1949	 which	 by secs. 9	 10 and 11	 empowered the State Government by notification in the official gazette to constitute Special Courts of criminal Jurisdiction for such area as may be specified in the noti fication	 to appoint Special Judges to preside over such Courts and to invest them with jurisdiction to try such offences or classes of offences or such eases or classes of cases as the Government may	 by general or special order in writing	 direct. The procedure laid down by 436 the Ordinance for trial before such Courts varied from the normal procedure prescribed by the Criminal Procedure Code in two material respects	 viz.	 there was no provision for trial by jury or with the aid of assessors	 or for enquiry before commitment to sessions. In exercise of the powers conferred by this Ordinance the Government	 by a notifica tion	 constituted a Special Court for certain areas and empowered that Court to try offences under sees. 183	 189	 302	 304	 307	 392 and certain other sections of the Indian Penal Code which were specified in the notification. It was contended on behalf of the appellant who had been convicted by the Special Court under secs. 302	 307 and 392 of the Indian Penal Code read with sec. 34	 that the Ordi nance of 1949 and the notification above mentioned contra vened article 14 of the Constitution and were therefore ultra vires and void: Held	 per PATANJALI SASTRI C.J	 FAZL ALI	 MUKHERJEA and DAS JJ. (MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN	 CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR and Bose JJ. dissenting) That the impugned Ordinance in so far as it authorised the State Government to direct offences or class es of offences or classes of cases to be tried by the Spe cial Court did not contravene the provisions of article 14 and was not ultra vires or void. The notification issued under the Ordinance was also not void. PATANJALI SASTRI C.J. All legislative differentation is not necessarily discriminatory. Discrimination involves an element of unfavourable bias	 and it is in that sense that the expression has to be understood in the context. Equal protection claims under article 14 are examined with the presumption that the State action is reasonable and. justi fied. Though differing procedures might involve disparity in treatment of persons tried under them	 such disparity is not. in itself sufficient to outweigh this presumption and establish discrimation unless the degree of disparity goes beyond what the reason for its existence demands	 e.g.	 when it amounts to a denial of a fair and impartial trial. The impugned Ordinance having been passed to combat the increas ing tempo of certain types of regional crime	 the two fold classification on the lines of type and territory adopted by the said Ordinance read with the notification issued there under was reasonable	 and the degree of disparity of treat ment involved was in no way in excess of what the situation demanded. While on the one hand it cannot be said that any variation of procedure which operates materially to the disadvantage of the accused is discriminatory and violates article 14	 the other extreme view that article 14 provides no further constitutional protection to personal liberty than what is afforded by article 21 is also wrong	 FAZL ALI J. A distinction must be drawn between "dis crimination without reason" and "discrimination with reason" 437 The whole doctrine of classification is based on this dis tinction and on the well known fact that the circumstances which govern one set of persons or objects may not neces sarily be the same as those governing another set of persons or objects so that the question of unequal treatment does not really arise as between persons governed by different conditions and different sets of circumstances. The clear recital of a definite objective in the earlier Ordinance and the impugned Ordinance which amended it	 furnished a tangi ble and rational basis of classification and the Ordinance and the notification did not violate article 14. [The Legisla ture should however have recourse to legislation like this only in very special circumstances.] MUKHERJEA J. Where the legislative policy is clear and definite and as an effective method of carrying out that policy a discretion is vested by the statute upon a body of administrators or officers to make selective application of the law to certain classes or groups of persons	 the statute itself cannot be condemned as a piece of discriminatory legislation. In such cases	 the power given to the execu tive body would import a duty on it to classify the subject matter of legislation in accordance with the objective indicated in the statute. If the administrative body pro ceeds to classify persons or things on a basis which has no rational relation to the objective of the legislature	 its action can certainly be annulled as offending against the equal protection clause. The preamble of the main Ordinance (IX of 1948) taken along with the surrounding circumstances disclosed a defi nite legislative policy and objective	 and the impugned Ordinance cannot therefore be held to be unconstitutional merely because it vested in the Government the authority to constitute Special Courts and to specify the classes of	offences to be tried by such courts with a view to achieve that objective. The notification issued by the Government was also not void as it did not proceed on any unreasonable or arbitrary basis but on the other hand there was a reasonable relation between the classification made b.y the notification and the objective that the legislation had in view. Though it is a sound and reasonable proposition that when the nature of two offences is intrinsically the same and they are punishable in the same manner	 a person accused of one should not be treated differently from a person accused of the other	 yet in determining the reach and scope of a particular legislation it is not necessary for the legislature to provide abstract symmetry. A too rigid insistence on anything like scientific classification is neither practicable nor desirable. DAS J. The relevant part of sec. 11 properly construed and understood does not confer an uncontrolled and unguided power on the State Government; on the contrary	 the power is controlled by the necessity of making a proper classifi cation 438 which is to be guided by the preamble in the sense that the classification must have a rational relation to the object of the Ordinance as recited in the preamble. The classifica tion effected by the impugned Ordinance and the notification thus satisfied the two conditions necessary for a valid classification	 viz.	 that it must not be arbitrary but must be rounded on an intelligible differentia	 and that differ entia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the Act. The Ordinance and the notification did not therefore contravene article 14 of the Constitution. MAHAJAN J. Section 11 of the Ordinance suggests no reasonable basis for classification either in respect of offences or in respect of cases	 nor has it laid down any measure for the grouping either of persons or of cases or of offences	 by which measure these groups could be distin guished from those outside the purview of the Ordinance. The words used in the preamble to the main Ordinance and the fact that sec. 9 of the impugned Ordinance provides that the power can be exercised for any particular area cannot limit the plain and unambiguous language of sec. 11	 and the said section is therefore unconstitutional. CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR J. Sections 9 and 11 do not lay down any classification. The preamble to the earlier Ordi nance also indicates no classification as the object stated there is a general one which has to be kept in view by every enlightened Government or system of administration. The classification adopted in the notification also is not a rational one. BOSE J. The differentiation effected by the impugned Ordinance and the notification issued thereunder travels beyond bounds which are legitimate and the Ordinance there fore offends article 14 and is invalid. Held also	 per curiam	 that the Ordinance was not in valid on the ground that it involved delegation of legisla tive powers. The State of West Bengal vs Anwar Ali Sarkar ([1952] S.C.R. 284)	 In re 	 etc. ([1951] S.C.R. 7471 and King Emperor vs Benoarilal Sarma [72 I.A. 57] referred to.