Case ID: 4888

Judgment:
Civil Appeal No. 621 of 1975 Appeal by Special leave from the Judgment and order dated the 13th March	 1973 of the Allahabad High Court in Special Appeal No.9 of 1973. R.K Garg and M. Qamaruddin for the Appellant. Prithvi Raj and Mrs. Shobha Dikshit for the Respondent. The Judgment of the Court WCIS delivered by PATHAK	 J This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment and order of the Allahabad High Court dismissing the appellant 's writ petition against an order terminating his services. The appellant	 Nepal Singh	 was employed in a temporary capacity as Sub Inspector of Police. He was serving at Shahjahanpur in 1968 when the Superintendent of Police	 Shahjahanpur initiated disciplinary proceedings under S.7 of the Police Act against him on the charge that while posted at Pithoragarh he had	 in November	 1964	 contracted a second marriage while his first wife was alive	 and as this was done without obtaining the prior permission of the Government the appellant had violated Rule 29 of the U.P. Government Servants ' Conduct Rules	 1956. The appellant filed a reply and denied the charge. The oral testimony of about twelve witnesses for the prosecution and an almost equal number for the defence was recorded. But in January	 1970 the Superintendent 4 of Police	 Shahjahanpur wrote to the Deputy Inspector General of Police	 Bareilly Range that as the act alleged against the appellant related to the district of Pithoragarh the disciplinary proceedings taken by him would be without jurisdiction unless there was an existing order transferring the proceedings from Pithoragarh to Shahjahanpur. Accordingly	 on March 12	1 970	 the Deputy Inspector General of Police	 Bareilly Range ordered the quashing of the disciplinary proceedings. It appears that no further action was taken and the proceedings were dropped. About this time the Inspector General of Police	 Uttar Pradesh issued a circular letter to the Superintendents of Police throughout the State requiring them to submit a list of Sub Inspector who fell in any of the following three categories: "1. Whose reputation and integrity is very low and/or 2. Who are generally involved in scandals	 like drinking	 immorality etc. which blackens the face of the U.P. Police ' and/or. 3. Everywhere they are a big problem because they encourage gambling	 excise offences	 brothels	 criminals	 etc. The Superintendent of Police	 Shahjahanpur drew up a list of such Sub Inspectors on February S	 1970 and directed them to appear before the Deputy Inspector General of Police	 Bareilly Range on February 10	 1970 during his inspection of the district. The list included the name of the appellant with the note; "A corrupt officer	 who is not straight forward. Married two wives against Government Servants Conduct Rules. ' Does not do his duty sincerely. Wherever he goes creates problem. " Thereupon	 on April 27	1970 the Deputy Inspector General of Police	 Bareilly Range	 made an order purporting to be under the rules published by Notification No. 230/II B 1953 dated January 30	 1953 that the appellant 's services were not required any more and were terminated with one month 's pay in lieu of notice. The appellant filed a writ petition in the High Court against 5 the order terminating his services and on November 17	1972 a learned A Single Judge of the Allahabad High Court dismissed the writ petition holding that the order of termination was passed bonafide that it was an order of termination simpliciter	 and that it did not constitute the removal of the appellant from service. That view was endorsed	 on appeal filed by the appellant	 by a Division Bench of the High Court by its judgment and order dated March 13	1973. The learned judges have taken the view that the case in respect of the appellant was covered by the first and third of the three categories enumerated earlier	 that is to say	 his integrity was low and he was a problem officer ' who encouraged gambling	 excise offences	 brothels	 criminals	 etc. " The allegation that he had married two wives against the Government Servants Conduct Rules	 1956	 the learned Judges said	 did not bring him within any of the three categories as	 in their view	 the second marriage without prior permission of the Government gave rise merely to a tinkle charge. In view of the opinion that the impugned order was ex facie innocuous and could not be said to cast any stigma or be regarded as imposing the punishment of dismissal or removal	 the learned Judges dismissed the appeal. It seems to us that the High Court has failed to consider the true content of the case set up by the appellant. The entire thrust of the appellant 's case is that in terminating the appellant 's Services the competent authority treated him unfairly and arbitrarily. It is well settled that in dealing with a Government servant the state must conform to the constitutional requirements of articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. An arbitrary exercise of power by the State violates those constitutional guarantees	 for a fundamental implication in the guarantee of equality and of protection against discrimination is that fair and just treatment will be accorded to all	 whether individually or jointly as a class. When a Government servant satisfies the Court prima facie that an order terminating his services violates articles 14 and 16	 the competent authority must discharge the burden of showing that the power to terminate the services was exercised honestly and in good faith	 on valid considerations fairly and without discrimination. The High Court has observed that within the framework of the three categories defined in the Inspector General 's circular the allegation of a second marriage by the appellant was of no significance	 and that the principal intent in terminating the appellant 'section 6 services was to rid the State of an unsuitable officer. The Superintendent of Police has noted that the appellant created problems wherever he went	 but it is not disclosed in the affidavits what were those "problems". It is not shown that the problems were of the nature specifically indicated by the circular issued by the Inspector General of Police We are unable to conclude from the material before us that the Superintendent of Police applied his mind to the requirements of the case. The Superintendent of Police has also commented that the appellant was a corrupt officer who was not straightforward (whatever that might mean). On that we have this to say. Where the a services of a Government servant on temporary appointment are terminated on the ground that his reputation for corruption makes him unsuitable for retention in the service	 the reputation for corrupt behavior must be based on something more than a mere allegation. The other grounds mentioned in the report of the Superintendent of Police	 which impressed the High Court	 appear to us to be equally vague and unspecific. The State	 and for that matter any statutory employer	 must take great care when proceeding to terminate a career on the ground of unsuitability	 to ensure that its order is founded in definable material	 objectively assessed and relevant to the ground on which the termination is effected. Proceeding from there	 we may advert to a further aspect of the case. It would seem that the dominating factor which influenced the mind of the Deputy Inspector General of Police was the allegation that the appellant had married a second wife against the Government Servants ' Conduct Rules it is clear that a full fledged enquiry was instituted into the matter	 evidence was recorded but before any findings could be rendered the enquiry was dropped for want of jurisdiction. No attempt was made thereafter to institute proper enquiry by the appropriate authority. In the circumstances	 it was not open to the Superintendent of Police to mention in his report	 as a statement of fact	 that the appellant had married a second time against the Government Servants ' Conduct Rules. With the dropping of the enquiry the allegation remained unverified. We may observe that where allegations of misconduct are levelled against a Government servant	 and it is a case where the provisions of article 311(2) of the Constitution should be applied	 it is not open to the competent authority to take the view that holding the enquiry contemplated by that clause would be a bother or a nuisance and 7 that therefore it is entitled to avoid the mandate of that provision and resort to the guise of an ex facie innocuous termination order. A The Court will view with great disfavor any attempt to circumvent the constitutional provision of Art.311 (2)in a case where that provision comes into play. For all the aforesaid reasons	 we are unable to uphold the judgment and order of the High Court	 and in the result the appeal must he allowed. The appeal is allowed and the order dated April 27	 1970 of the Deputy Inspector General of Police	 U.P. Bareilly Circle is quashed. The appellant is entitled to be treated as continuing in service without interruption. It will be open to the authorities to take fresh proceedings against the appellant in accordance with law. It will also be open to them to determine whether the appellant was gainfully employed for the purpose of considering the extent of relief	 if any	 to which he may be entitled pursuant to our present order quashing the impugned order. In the circumstances	 there is no order as to costs. section R Appeal allowed.

Summary:
On an allegation that the appellant	 a temporary Sub inspector of Police	 while posted at Pithoragarh had contracted in November 1964 a second marriage	 while his first wife was alive	 without obtaining the prior permission of the Government and in violation of Rule 29 of the U. P. Government Servants ' Conduct Rules	 1956 the Superintendent of Police	 Shahjahanpur initiated in 1968 disciplinary proceedings under section 7 of the Police Act against him. 1 However	 after the evidence was closed in January 1970	 the Superintendent noticed that his action was without jurisdiction and pointed out the same lo the Deputy Inspector General of Police	 Bareilly Range	 who ordered the quashing of the disciplinary proceedings on March 12	 1970. About this time the Inspector General of Police	 Uttar Pradesh issued a circular letter to the Superintendent of Police throughout the State requiring them to submit a list of Sub Inspectors who fell in any of the following three categories: 1. Whose reputation and integrity is very low and/or 2. Who are generally involved in scandals	 like drinking	 immorality	 etc. which blackens the face of the U. P. Police and/or 3. Everywhere they are a big problem because they encourage gambling	 excise offences	 brothels	 criminals	 etc. The Superintendent of Police	 Shahjahanpur drew up a list of such Sub Inspectors on February S	 1970 and directed them to appear before the Deputy Inspector General of Police	 Bareilly Range on February 10	 1970 during his 2 inspection of the district. The list included the name of the appellant with the note: "A corrupt officer	 who is not straight forward. Married two wives against Government Servants Conduct Rules. Does not do his duty sincerely. Wherever he goes creates problem". Thereupon	 on April 27	 1970	 the Deputy Inspector General of Police	 Bareilly Range	 made an order purporting to be under the rules published by Notification No. 230/ 1953 dated January 30	 1953 that the appellant 's services were not required any more and were terminated with one month 's pay in lieu of notice. The appellant thereupon filed a Writ Petition in the High Court against the order terminating his services and on November 17	 1972 a learned Single Judge of the Allahabad High Court dismissed the Writ Petition holding that the order of termination was passed bonafide	 that it was an order of termination simpliciter and that it did not constitute the removal of the appellant from service. On appeal filed by the appellant that vice was endorsed by a Division Bench of the High Court by its judgment and order dated March 13	 1973 and the appeal was dismissed holding that the impugned order was ex facie innocuous and could not be said to cast any stigma or be regarded as imposing the punishment of dismissal or removal. Hence the appeal by Special Leave of the Court. Allowing the appeal	 the Court ^ HELD; 1. It is well settled that in dealing with a government servant the State must conform to the constitutional requirements of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. An arbitrary exercise of power by the State violates these constitutional guarantees	 for a fundamental implication in the guarantee of equality and of protection against discrimination is that fair and just treatment will be accorded to all	 whether individually or jointly as a class. When a government servant satisfies the Court prima facie that an order terminating his services violates Articles 14 and 16 the competent authority must discharge the burden of showing that the power to terminate the services was exercised honestly and in good faith	 on valid considerations fairly and without discrimination. [S E G] 2. Where the services of a government servant on temporary appointment arc terminated on the ground that his reputation for corruption makes him unsuitable for retention in the service	 the reputation for corrupt behavior must be based on something more than a mere allegation. The State	 and for that matter any statutory employer must take great care when proceeding to terminate a career on the ground of unsuitability	 to ensure that its order is found in definable material	 objectively assessed and relevant to the ground on which the termination is effected. [6 C E] In the instant case	 the Superintendent of Police did not apply his mind to the requirements of the case. The Superintendent of Police has noted that the 3 appellant created problems wherever he went	 but it is not disclosed in the affidavits what those problems were and that the problems were of the nature specifically indicated by the circular issued by the Inspector General of Police. The other grounds mentioned in the report of the Superintendent of Police are equally vague and unspecific. [ 6A B] 3. Where allegations of misconduct are leveled against a Government Servant	 and it is : case where the provisions of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution should be applied(l	 it is not open to the competent authority to take the view that holding the enquiry contemplated by the clause would be a bother or a nuisance and that therefore it is entitled to avoid the mandate of that provision and resort to the guise of an ex facie innocuous termination order. The Court will view with great disfavour any attempt to circumvent the constitutional provision of Article 311 (2) in a case where that provision comes into play. [6 G H	 7A B]