Case ID: 5646

Judgment:
N: Criminal Appeal No. 742 of 1979. From the Judgment and order dated 16.1.1979 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Crl. 656 of 1976. A.S. Sohal and P.N. Puri for the Appellant. Kiran Choudhri and T. Sridharan for the Respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by 749 VENKATACHALIAH J. This appeal	 by Special Leave	 preferred against the Judgment dated April 26	 1976 of the High Court of Punjab & Haryana affirming the judgment dated 26 4 1976 of the Sessions Judge in S.C. No. S of 1976 convicting appellant for offences under Sections 302 and 120 B of the Indian Penal Code and sentencing her to imprisonment for life	 raises certain questions as to the nature and extent of corroboration of an accomplice 's evidence; and as to the procedure for the trial of offences by a "child" under the East Punjab Children 's Act 1949. Appellant Balwant Kaur was said to be 15 1/2 years of age at the time of the commission of the offence alleged against her. From 14.11.1973 the whereabouts of appellant 's husband Pritam Singh	 a police constable	 were not known. His mother Mukhtiar Kaur (P.W. 19) reported this fact and expressed her apprehensions in the matter in her complaint to the Superintendent of Police. Appellant was arrested on 8.5.1975. Nand Singh and Ram Sarup were also arrested on 8.5. 1975. Ram Sarup became an approver. Appellant 's defence was one of total denial. The judgment of the High Court under appeal is common to Criminal Appeal No. 676 of 1976 preferred by Nand Singh who was convicted under Sections 302	 364	 201 and 120 B of I.P.C. and also sentenced to imprisonment for life. Appellant 's husband	 Pritam Singh for whose murder appellant and the said Nand Singh had been arraigned	 was	 at the relevant time	 a police constable at the Police Station West	 Sector 11 Chandigarh. Nand Singh was another constable at the same Police Station. Nand Singh 's brother Bhag Singh and Pritam Singh were neighbours	 residing in adjacent Government quarters in Sector 20 A	 Chandigarh. Ram Sarup	 who later turned approver	 was another police constable on Guard duty at the Punjab Raj Bhavan	 Chandigarh. The married life of Appellant and Pritam Singh	 according to the prosecution	 lacked connubial felicity and was marked by constant bickerings and quarrels	 the cause for this discord being the addiction of Pritam Singh to liquor. It is the prosecution case that Pritam Singh was a dipsomaniac and was constantly subjecting appellant to corporeal intransigence. It was further alleged that appellant had developed illicit intimacy with Nand Singh. Ram Sarup	 in the course of his visits 750 to Bhag Singh 's house met	 and became friendly with Nand Singh and the two become accustomed to take liquor together. Ram Sarup also knew deceased Pritam Singh. It is alleged that on occasions Nand Singh	 when he lost self control under the influence of liquor	 used to confide in Ram Sarup of his illicit sexual exploits with appellant. This appears to have tempted Ram Sarup to ask Nand Singh to introduce Ram Sarup also to appellant for a similar intrigue. On November 13	 1973	 in the afternoon when Ram Sarup was off duty	 Nand Singh took Ram Sarup to his own quarters in Sector 20 A said to be at a short distance from the appellant 's residence and the two had liquor together. Thereafter	 Nand Singh is stated to have taken Ram Sarup to the residence of	 and introduced him to the appellant and persuaded her to gratify the desire of Ram Sarup also. Appellant and Ram Sarup are stated to have indulged in acts of illegal intimacy. Later	 the same afternoon	 the three met again at appellant 's home when	 it would appear	 appellant while narrating the privations and hardships endured by her at the hands of her husband broke down and implored Nand Singh and Ram Sarup to do away with Pritam Singh. She appears to have also offered that after Pritam singh 's death she would marry and live with Nand Singh	 who was then unmarried. According to the prosecution	 it was agreed amongst the three that the appellant should persuade her husband to reach Chandigarh bus stand the following day i.e. November 14	 1973 and that Nand Singh and Ram Sarup	 who would be present three	 would entice him away to Pinjore with the inducement of liquor and	 do away with him there. Pursuant to this design and conspiracy	 appellant is stated to have persuaded her husband to go to the bus stand at Chandigarh at 9.30 a.m. On 14.11.1973 where Nand Singh and Ram Sarup who were waiting for him as pre arranged took him to Pinjore by bus. There	 all the three cumsumed liquor together. Nand Singh is also stated to have purchased "Ghotna" on the pretext that his sister in law had asked for the purchase of one. Thereafter	 all the three agreed to go back Chandigarh on foot which took them along a 'dandi ' passing by the side of the Pinjore gardens. They reached the railway line near Surajpur Cement Factory and took the foot path towards Chandigarh. When the three reached a distance of almost 2 miles from Surajpur	 Nand Singh suggested that they should climb up a hill on the way side to enjoy a panoramic view of Chandigarh. Accordingly	 all the three started climbing. Ram Sarup (P.W. 2) was ahead; Pritam Singh was in 751 the middle with Nand Singh following behind him. Nand Singh is stated to have suddenly administered 2 3 Ghotna blows on the head of the unsuspecting Pritam Singh and told Ram Sarup (P.W. 2) to pin the tottering Pritam Singh down. Ram Sarup pulled Pritam Singh down whereupon Nand Singh gave 8 to 10 more blows with the Ghotna on the person of Pritam Singh. Then Nand Singh threw away the Ghotna and the two	 namely	 i.e. Nand Singh and Ram Sarup	 hastened towards Chandigarh. However	 after the two had gone 2 furlongs or so	 Nand Singh urged Ram Sarup (P.W. 2) that they both go back to find out whether Pritam Singh was really dead or not. They	 accordingly	 returned and ensured that Pritam Singh had died. They removed the pants and Bush shirt of the deceased and concealed them in a bush. Then	 the body of Pritam Singh was also concealed in the nearby hushes. The turban of the Pritam Singh had fallen down at the spot. Thereafter	 the two returned to Chandigarh by night fall. Next day	 i.e. On 15.11.1973	 Nand Singh came to Raj Bhavan where Ram Sarup was on duty and told the latter that he had	 in turn	 informed Balwant Kaur of the death of Pritam Singh. This	 in substance is the prosecution case as unfolded in the evidence of the Ram Sarup (P.W. 2) who turned approver. On 13. 12.1973	 Mukhtiar Kaur (P.W. 19)	 the mother of deceased Pritam lodged a complaint about her missing son in writing with the Senior Superintendent of Police	 Chandigarh. In that	 it was stated that she had learnt from Pandit Sita Ram that a certain Naik Singh and his two sons of the village Lahor Khuda and Dev Singh	 the Sarpanch of that village along with two other relatives of the Sarpanch had killed Pritam Singh	 the alleged motive was that deceased Pritam Singh	 when he was earlier serving in Lahorkhuda had developed illicit relations with Naik Singh 's daughter	 Prito. At the trial Mukhtiar Kaur was examined to establish that this complaint was engineered by the appellant and Nand Singh to put the investigation on a wrong scent. Apparently	 nothing was heard of the matter for along time till 3.4.1975	 when Nand Singh was arrested by ASI Gulzara Singh (P.W. 24). On his information Exg. P. 8	 a pair of shoes	 a purse	 25 pieces of bones including an incomplete human skull were recovered. Dr. Inderjit Dewan (P.W. I) examined the bones and was of the opinion that they were the remains of a well built adult	 but not old	 male of a height of about S 9. According to P.W. 1	 the person had died more than 4 months previously. The death was ascribed in all probability to the injuries to the skull administered by a blunt weapon. P.W. 1 could 752 not	 however confirm whether the injuries were ante mortem or not. Appellant was arrested by ASI Subhash Chander (P.W. 23) on 8.5.1975 and Ram Sarup was also arrested the same day. After the completion of the investigation charges were brought against them for conspiracy and murder. The trial court on the basis of the approver 's testimony as corroborated by other evidence	 held both Nand Singh 	 and the appellant guilty of the offences they were charged with and sentenced them to imprisonment for life. The High Court has dismissed their appeals and has confirmed the convictions and the sentences. Shri A.S. Sohai	 Learned counsel appearing in support of the appeal urged that the evidence of the Approver in so far as the complicity of appellant is concerned	 lacked corroboration on materials particulars and that no conviction could be sustained on such uncorroborated accomplice 's testimony. The development of the law touching the competency and credit of an accomplice as witness against others is not without its interesting antecedents. Historically	 in the background of the political trials since the time of Henry VIII where 'King 's Evidence ' was the main dependence of the crown in its prosecutions	 the question of the very admissibility of the evidence of the accomplice loomed large. In the 17th and the 18th centuries	 it was ruled repeatedly by the English courts that an accomplice was a competent witness. His 'credit ' or the sufficiency of his evidence as a quantitative conception	 however	 remained in the background. Those were days when 'form ' pre dominated over the 'substance ' and the oath had a dead weight of its own. It was for this reason that struggle was made to keep out this evidence even at the threshold. On the further development in the law which slowly began to recognise the distinction between 'competency ' and 'credit '	 Wigmore says: Wigmore on Evidence: 3rd Edition Vol. VII para 2054. G "As time went on	 and the modern conception of testimony developed	 the possibility of admitting a witness and yet discriminating as to the qualitative sufficiency of his testimony became more apparent; and the way was open for the consideration of this question. In a few instances	 as the 1700s wore on	 and even before then	 judicial suggestions are found as to feasibility of such a discrimination. But not until the end of that century does any Court seem 753 to have acted upon such a suggestion in its directions to the jury. About that time there comes into acceptance a general practice to discourage a conviction founded solely upon the testimony of an accomplice uncorroborated. But was this practice founded on a rule of law? Never	 in England	 until modern times. It was recognised constantly that the judge 's instruction upon this point was a mere exercise of his common law function of advising the jury upon the weight of the evidence	 and was not a statement of a rule of law binding upon the jury". An accomplice	 by long legal tradition	 is a notoriously infamous witness	 one who being partipes criminis	 purchases his immunity by accepting to accuse others. Section 114 Illus: (b) of the Evidence Act envisages the presumptive uncredit worthiness of an accomplice. But then	 Section 133 provides that a conviction is not illegal merely because it rests upon an accomplice 's uncorroborated testimony. In indictments	 particularly of serious crimes	 the counsel of caution and the rule of prudence enjoin that it is unsafe to rest a conviction on the evidence of a guilty partner in a crime without independent corroboration on the material particulars. Judicial experience was	 thus	 elevated to a rule of law. "It is a practice" it is said "which deserves all the reverence of law. " The nature and extent of the corroboration must necessarily vary with the nature and circumstances of each case. Enunciation of any general rule	 valid for all occasions is	 at once	 unwise and unpractical. The aspect as to the extent and content of independent corroboration is	 again	 an interesting area of study. One view was that independent evidence tending to verify any part of the testimony of the accomplice should suffice. The other view required that the corroborative evidence should not only show that part of the accomplice testimony is true; but should go further and also implicate the other accused. In R. vs Bhaskerville	 the Court of Criminal appeal in England favoured and adopted the second view. Thirtyfive years ago	 Bose J referring with approval to the principles in Bhaskerville said that this branch of the law in India is the same as in England and that the lucid exposition of it given by Lord Reading	 cannot be bettered. 754 The felicitous formulation of the law on the matter by that great master of phrase	 Bose J	 which has now become classical	 may be re called: " . But to this extent the rules are clear: (21) First	 it is not necessary that there should be independent confirmation of every material circumstance in the sense that the independent evidence in the case	 apart from the testimony of the complainant of the accomplice	 should in itself be sufficient to sustain conviction. (22) Secondly	 the independent evidence must not only make it safe to believe that the crime was committed but must in some way reasonably connect or tend to connect the accused with it by confirming in some material particular the testimony of the accomplice or complainant that the accused committed the crime. This does not mean that the corroboration as to identity must extend to all the circumstances necessary to identify the accused with the offence. (23) Thirdly	 the corroboration must come from independent source and thus ordinarily the testimony of one accomplice would not be sufficient to corroborate that of another (24) Fourthly	 the corroboration need not be direct evidence that the accused committed the crime. It is sufficient if it is merely circumstantial evidence of his connection with the crime . " (See Rameshwar Kalyan Singh vs State of Rajasthan	 ; In Rex vs Bhaskerville	 [ Lord Reading	 CJ noticed the different views as to the extent and scope of reasonable corroboration: ". The difference of opinion has arisen in the main in reference to the question whether the corroborative evidence must connect the accused with the crime. The rule of practice as to corroborative evidence has arisen in consequence of the danger of convicting a person upon the unconfirmed testimony of one who is admittedly a criminal . " 755 Resolving the difference of opinion it was held: "We hold that evidence in corroboration must be independent testimony which affects the accused by connecting or tending to connect him with the crime. In other words	 it must be evidence which implicates him	 that is	 which confirms is some material particular not only the evidence that the crime has been committed	 but also that the prisoner committed it. The test applicable to determine the nature and extent of the corroboration is thus the same whether the case falls within the rule of practice at common law or within that class of offences for which corroboration is required by statute". In Halsbury 's (IV Edition Vol. II para 454) the following passage obtains: "Corroboration of a witness 's testimony must be afforded by independent evidence which affects the defendant by connecting or tending to connect him with the offence charged. It must be evidence which implicates him	 that is which tends to confirm in some material particular not only that the offence was committed	 but also that the defendant committed it". As to independent nature of the corroboration learned Chief Justice observed in Bhaskerville case: " . Again	 the corroboration must be by some evidence other than that of an accomplice	 and therefore one accomplice 's evidence is not corroboration of the testimony of another accomplice: Rex vs Noakes . " As to the extent of the requisite reassurance by way of corroboration	 learned Chief Justice said: " . It is sufficient if there is confirmation as to a material circumstance of the crime and of the identity of the accused in relation to the crime. Parke B gave this opinion as a result of twenty five years ' practice; it was accepted by the other judges; and has been much relied upon in later cases . " 756 " . Indeed	 if it were required that the accomplice A should be confirmed in every detail of the crime	 his evidence would not be essential to the case it would be merely confirmatory of other and independent testimony . " (page 664 in Rex vs Bhaskerville) In Halsbury 's Laws of England IV Edn. Vol. II page 268 this proposition is stated thus: "The word 'corroboration ' is not a technical term of art; it means by itself no more than evidence tending to confirm	 support or strengthen	 other evidence . " " . The corroboration need not consist of direct evidence that the defendant committed the offence nor need it amount to confirmation of the whole account given by the witness	 provided that it corroborates the evidence in some respects material to the charge under consideration. It is sufficient if it is circumstantial evidence of the defendant 's connection with the offence	 but it must be independent evidence	 and must not be vague However there were some observations in Director of Public Prosecutions vs Killbourne (1973) Appeal A.C. 729 which tended towards a departure from the rule in Rex vs Bhaskerville. In Killbourne case Lord Hailsham said and this is also the statement of the law in Halsbury IV Edition "Evidence which is admissible	 relevant to the evidence requiring corroboration and (if believed) conformatory of that evidence in a material particular	 is capable of being corroborative and	 when believed	 is corroboration". The above passage was not wholly in consonance with what Lord Reading had earlier said: ". For example confirmation does not mean that there should be independent evidence of that which the accomplice relates	 or his testimony would be unnecessary Reg vs Mullins ( 1) per Maule J . " But	 in R. vs Beck.	 [ 	 it was reiterated by way of clarification that corroborating evidence need not relate to 757 the particular evidence spoken to by a suspect witness	 and that it was merely independent testimony which confirmed in some material particular not only the evidence that a crime had been committed but also that the accused person had committed it. Referring to the statement of Lord Hailsham in Killbourne case	 All England law reports 1982(1) page 815(g) it was observed: "The learned editors of Archbold para 1416	 after	 in our judgment correctly	 stating that the corroborative evidence need not relate to the particular incident or incidents spoken to by the "suspect witness"	 express the view that 'Lord Hailsham 's dictum that the corroborative evidence must be "relevant to the evidence requiring corroboration" may be misleading '. We agree. We do not think that Lord Hailsham LC was expressing any support for the proposition of counsel for the appellant. " The position of law in Rex vs Bhaskerville was	 thus restored. 13. However	 a marked tendency in England towards arresting the formalism in regard to the specific words to be used to caution the jury against the danger of accepting the testimony of the uncorroborated accomplice is now discernible. In R. vs Spencer [ ; the grievance of the convicted person was that the trial judge	 in cautioning the jury	 failed to use the word 'dangerous ' in describing the risks of injustice involved in convicting a person on the testimony of an uncorroborated accomplice. The Court of appeal and the House of Lords declined to set aside the verdict and said that the summing up did not involve some legalistic ritual to be incanted in the summing up. However	 in regard to the quality and extent of corroboration	 in R. vs Donat	 [19861 	 it was reiterated that to count as corroboration	 it is not enough that a piece of evidence merely supports the accomplice 's credibility	 however	 convincingly and independently; but it must go a little further and implicate the accused. (See All England Reports: Annual Review 1986 page 158). In Sharvana Bhavan vs State of Madras	 (AIR the corroboration was held to be of two kinds: the first belonging to the area of reassurance of the credit of the approver himself as a trustworthy witness; and the second which arises for conclusion after the court is satisfied about the credibility of the approver as to the corroboration in material particulars not only of the commission of the 758 crime but also of the complicity of other accused persons in the crime. If on the first area the court is not satisfied the second stage does not Arise. The position is attractively presented in Halsbury: (IV Edition Vol. II) Page 268. "Corroboration is required or afforded only if the witness requiring or giving it is	otherwise	 credible; if testimony falls of its own inanition	 the question of his needing or being capable of giving	 corroboration does not arise. " However	 the two areas of corroboration are not two separate	 water tight compartments. The evidence as a whole will have to be examined to reach conclusions on both aspects. In Attorney General of Hongkong vs Wong Muko Ping	 [ Lord Bridge of Harwich speaking for the Judicial Committee of the Privy council said: ". It is said that this two stage approach is implicitly indicated by passages from speeches in the House of Lords in two of the leading authorities". " . . The presence or absence of corroborated evidence may assist a jury to resolve	 one way or the other	 their doubts as to whether or not to believe the evidence of a suspect witness	 it must	 in their Lordship 's Judgment	 be wrong to direct them to approach the question of credibility in two stages as suggested in the submission made on behalf of the defendant. The controversy in the present case in the ultimate analysis	 belongs to the second area	 whether the approver 's testimony as to appellant 's complicity in the conspiracy could safely be held to have been corroborated by independent evidence on the material particulars The facts that require sequentially to be established are that appellant 's married life was in a serious disarray: that she and Nand Singh were on terms of illicit intimacy; that she also submitted herself to Ram Sarup (P.W. 2) in an ex marital relation; that on 13.11.1973 she implored Nand Singh and Ram Sarup to free her from a cruel husband by doing away with him; that she agreed that she would	 759 thereafter	 live with Nand Singh as his wife and that after coming to know of Pritam Singh 's death she deliberately missed her mother in law	 Mukhtiar Kaur (P.W. 19) into making a report to the police containing false and misleading information in an attempt to draw a red herring across the trial. The evidence of P.Ws. 17 & 18 on the first two points has been discarded by the sessions court. It is not also suggested that after the murder of Pritam Singh	 appellant began to live with Nand Singh. There was a considerable lapse of time between the death of Pritam Singh and their arrest. There is no evidence to show that	 in the interregnum	 there was any liasion between the two. 16. There is yet another impediment in accepting the evidence on an important area of the alleged conspiracy. The incriminating circumstances in the evidence of the approver appearing against the appellant had had to be put to the appellant in her examination under Section 313 Cr. The incriminating testimony of the approver pertaining to the case that on 13.11.1973 appellant wept and implored Nand Singh and Ram Sarup to do away with Pritam Singh and that appellant also agreed that she would	 thereafter	 live with Nand Singh has not been put to the appellant in the course of her examination under Section 313 Cr. P.C. Appellant was not afforded an opportunity to submit an explanation to it. That part of the evidence must for that reason	 be excluded from consideration (See Harizan Mogha: 17. On a consideration of the entire matter	 it appears to us that the approver 's evidence in regard to the complicity of the appellant in the conspiracy lacks corroboration on certain material particulars necessary to connect the appellant. A little more reassurance than is afforded by the State of evidence in the case is perhaps	 necessary to convict appellant. Appellant	 in the circumstances would be entitled to the benefit of doubt. At the time of the commission of the offence	 the appellant	 even on the basis of the observations	 made by the session court	 was about 15 xab years of age and was a "child" within the meaning of East Punjab Children 's Act 1949. The relevant date is the date of the commission of the offence. Section 27 of the Act provides: "27. Sentences that may not be passed on child Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any law	 760 no person who as a child at the date of the commission of the offence shall be sentenced to death or transported or committed to prison for any offence or in default of payment of fine	 damages or costs: Provided that a child who is fourteen years of age or upwards may be committed to prison where the court certifies that he is of so unruly or of so depraved a character that he is not fit person to be sent to a certified school and that none of the other methods in which the case may legally be dealt with is suitable". The sessions court has invoked the proviso and has held that appellant was so depraved a character that none of the other methods in which the case could legally be dealt with is suitable in her case. An examination of the legality or propriety of the procedure adopted in the case in the matter of the trial of a 'child ' under the East Punjab Children 's Act 1949 and as to the correctness of the view of the sessions court in appealing to the proviso to Section 27 and in sentencing appellant to imprisonment for life may not be necessary in this case	 in view of our finding that appellant is entitled to the benefit of doubt. In the result	 this appeal is allowed and while the conviction and sentence of the other non appealing accused is left undisturbed	 the conviction and sentence of the appellant is set aside and appellant is directed to be set at liberty forthwith. N.P.V. Appeal allowed.

Summary:
% The prosecution alleged that the married life of the appellant	 who was said to be 151/2 years of age	 was in a serious disarray	 that she and the non appealing accused were on terms of illicit intimacy	 that she also submitted herself to PW 2 in an extra marital relation	 that on 13.11.73 she implored the non appealing accused and PW 2 to free her from a cruel husband by doing away with him	 that she agreed that she would	 thereafter live with the non appealing accused as his wife	 that the three designed and conspired to do away with the deceased	 in pursuance of which the appellant persuaded her husband to go to the bus stand at Chandigarh at 9.30 a.m. On 14th November	 1973	 where the non appealing accused and PW 2 were waiting for him as pre arranged	 and took him to Pinjore by bus	 where they consumed liquor together and the non appealing accused purchased Ghotna	 that while all the three were walking back to Chandigarh and climbed the way side hill the non appealing accused gave blows on the head of the unsuspecting deceased with the Ghotna	 while PW 2 pinned him down	 that they concealed the clothes and body of the deceased in the nearby bushes	 that both of them returned to Chandigarh by night fall	 and the nonappealing accused informed PW 2 that he	 in turn	 had informed the appellant of the death of her husband	 that the mother of the deceased	 PW 19	 lodged a complaint on 13.12.73 about her missing son in writing with the Senior Superintendent of Police	 Chandigarh	 alleging that she had learnt that a certain person of the village Lahor Khoda with his two sons and the Sarpanch with his two other relatives had killed her son	 the motive being that her son had developed illicit relations with the daughter of the person	 that after coming to know of her husband 's death the appellant misled her mother in law PW 19. into making a H 746 report to the police containing false and misleading information in an attempt to draw a red herring across the trial. The non appealing accused was arrested on 3.4.75. On his information exhibit P8	 a pair of shoes	 purse	 25 pieces of bones including an incomplete human skull were recovered. The appellant and PW 2 were arrested on 8.5.75. After completing the investigation	 charges were brought against the appellants and the two accused for conspiracy and murder. PW 2	 who was one of the co accused	 turned approver. The trial court on the basis of the approver 's testimony as corroborated by other evidence held the non appealing accused and the appellant guilty of the offences under sections 302 and 120 B of the I.P.C. and sentenced them to imprisonment for life. The High Court dismissed their appeals and confirmed the convictions and sentence. In the appeal to this Court	 it was urged that the evidence of the approver insofar as the compicity of the appellant was concerned	 lacked corroboration on material particulars and that no conviction could be sustained on such uncorroborated accomplice 's testimony. On the question as to: (1) the nature and extent of corroboration of an accomplice 's evidence; and (2) the procedure for the trial of offences by a 'child ' under the East Punjab Children 's Act	 1949	 ^ HELD: 1.1 An accomplice	 by long legal tradition	 is a notoriously infamous witness	 one who being partipes criminis	 purchases his immunity by accepting to accuse others. Section 114	 illustration (b) of the Evidence Act envisages the presumptive uncreditworthiness of an accomplice. But	 then section 133 provides that a conviction is not illegal merely because it rests upon an accomplice 's uncorroborated testimony. [753C D] 1.2 In indictments	 particularly of serious crimes	 counsel of caution and the rule of prudence enjoin that it is unsafe to rest a conviction on the evidence of a guilty partner in a crime without independent corroboration on the material particulars. Judicial experience was	 thus	 elevated to a rule of law. lt is a practice which deserves all the reverence of law. [753D E] l.3 The nature and extent of the corroboration must necessarily 747 vary with the nature and circumstances of each case. Enunciation of any general rule	 valid for all occasions is	 at once	 unwise and unpractical. [753F] 1.4 The corroboration has to be of two kinds; first belonging to the area of reassurance of the credit of the approver himself as a trustworthy witness; and the second which arises for conclusion after the court is satisfied about the creditibility of the approver as to the corroboration in material particulars not only of the commission of the crime but also of the complicity of other accused person in the crime. If on the first area the court is not satisfied	 the second does not arise. However	 the two areas of corroboration are not two separate	 watertight compartments. The evidence as a whole will have to be examined to reach conclusions on both aspects. [757G H; 752C] Sharvana Bhavan vs State of Madras	 AIR 1966 SC 1273 referred 1.5 The controversy in the present case in the ultimate analysis	 belongs to the second area	 whether the approver 's testimony as to appellant 's complicity in the conspiracy could safely be held to have been corroborated by independent evidence on the material particulars. [758F G] There was a considerable lapse of time between the death of decease and the arrest of the appellant and the non appealing accused. There is no evidence to show that	 in the interregnum	 there was any liasion between the two. The incriminating circumstances in the evidence of the approver appearing against the appellant that on 13.11.1973 appellant wept and implored the non appealing accused and PW 2 to do away with the deceased and that appellant also agreed that she would	 thereafter	 live with the non appealing accused had had to be put to the appellant m the course of her examination under section 313 Cr. P.C. but this has not been done. Appellant was not afforded an opportunity to submit an explanation to it. That part of the evidence must for that reason	 be excluded from consideration. [759C E] Harijan Magha Jesha vs State of Gujarat	 	 referred to. On a consideration of the entire matter	 the approver 's evidence in regard to the complicity of the appellant in the conspiracy lacks corroboration on certain material particulars necessary to connect the 748 appellant. A little more reassurance than is afforded by the state of evidence in the case is perhaps necessary to convict appellant. The appellant in the circumstances would be entitled to the benefit of doubt. [759F] At the time of the commission of the offence	 the appellant	 even on the basis of the observations made by the sessions court	 was about 15 years of age and was a 'child ' within the meaning of East Punjab Children 's Act	 1949. The sessions court invoked the proviso to section 27 of the Act and held that the appellant was so depraved a character that none of the other methods mentioned in the section in which the case could legally be dealt with was suitable in her case. [759G; 760C] In view of the finding that the appellant is entitled to the benefit of doubt	 any examination of the legality or propriety of the procedure adopted in the case in the matter of trial of a 'child ' under the East Punjab Children 's Act	 1949 and the correctness of the view of the sessions court in appealing to the proviso to section 27	 and sentencing appellant to imprisonment for life is not necessary . [760 C D] Appeal allowed. Conviction and sentence of the appellant set aside and appellant directed to be set at liberty. However	 conviction and sentence of the other non appearing accused left undisturbed. [760E] Wigmore on Evidence: 3rd Editition Vol. VII para 2054	 Rex vs Bhaskerville	 	 Rameshwar Kalyan Singh vs State of Rajasthan ; 	 Director of Public Persecutions vs Kill bourne	 [1973] Appeal A.C. 729/All England law reports 1982(1) page 815(g)	 R. vs Beck	 	 R. vs Spencer	 ; 	 R. vs Donat	 	 Attorney General of Hongkong vs Wong Muko Ping and Halsbury 's Laws of England IV Ed. II p. 268	 para 454 referred to.