Case ID: 2975

Judgment:
Appeal No. 344 of 1967. Appeal from the judgment and order dated July 8	 1966 of the	 Bombay High Court in Appeal No. 17 of 1964. V. A. Seyid Muhammad and section P. Nayar	 for the appellant. section J. Sorabjee	 J. R. Gagrat and B. R. Agarwala	 for the respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Shelat	 J. This appeal	 by certificate	 arises from the res pondent 's suit in respect of fines and penalties recovered from them by the Collector of Customs	 Bombay for the alleged contravention of section 3 of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act	 1947 and. section 167(8) of the . The respondents held an import licence dated July 10	 1956 permitting them to import parts and accessories of motor cycles and scooters as per appendix XXVI of the Import Policy Book for July December 1956. Under the said licence	 the respondents	 imported certain goods which arrived in two consignments	 each containing 17 cases	 by two different ships. According to the respondents	 the goods so imported by them were motor cycle parts which their licence authorised them to import. The Customs authorities	 on the contrary. held	 on the examination of the goods	 that they constituted 51 sets of "Rixe Mopeds complete in a knocked down condition". The Deputy Collector of Customs thereupon held an enquiry in pursuance of two show cause notices issued by him. The result of the enquiry was an order under which the Deputy Collector directed confiscation of the said goods with 'an option to the respondents to pay certain sums in lieu of confiscation and also personal penalties. That order was passed on the basis that the goods imported were not parts and accessories of motor cycles and scooters permissible under entry 295 of the Schedule to the 560 Import Control Order	 but were motor cycles/scooters in completely knocked down condition	 prohibited under remark II against entry 294	 a licence in respect of goods covered by it would authorise import of motor cycles and Scooters. The order of the Deputy Collector dated November 19	 1957 reads as under: "On examination of the goods and scrutiny of the documents relating to the Bills of Entry stated above	 it was ascertained that M/s. Tarachand Gupta & Bros. had imported 51 sets of "Rixe" Mopeds complete (except tyres	 tubes and saddles) in a knocked down condition. The total number of consignments covered by the aforesaid two Bills of Entry were. sufficient to give exactly 51 sets complete	 Rixe 'Mopeds ' (except for tyres	 tubes and saddles which would in any case have required a separate licence). The packing was also such as to show that those were nothing but "Mopeds" in a disassembled condition	 since each of the cases contains components relating to three mopeds. Moreover	 it was found that major components such as the frames	 completely fitted with electrical wires and control cables and grips had been imported in equal numbers. All these went to show that the goods were not imported as spare parts but as complete vehicles in a knocked down condition. The goods were therefore	 considered to be correctly classifiable under item 75(2) of the I.C.T. corresponding to section No. 294	 IV of the I.T.O. Schedule. The licence under which clearance was sought	 could not	 therefore	 be accepted. " The Deputy Collector rejected the respondents ' contention that the two consignments which arrived in two different ships at different dates should be viewed separately	 that the machines were incomplete as they were without tyres	 tubes and saddles and therefore they could not be said to constitute motor cycles in knocked down condition. He held	 on the other hand	 that though the goods were not in completely knocked down condition it made no difference as the tyres	 tubes and saddles were easily obtainable in India and their absence did not prevent the machines being otherwise complete. He also found that there was a trade practice under which traders were supplying motor cycles without tyres	 tubes and saddles unless the purchaser specially asked for these parts. According to him	 the goods could not be regarded as spare parts but were 'Mopeds in disassembled condition". In the suit filed by the respondents in the High Court against the said order	 the Trial Judge held	 on the authority of the 561 Secretary of State vs Mask & Co.(1) that an order of a statutory tribunal	 such as the Collector of Customs under the 	 which the statute makes final	 subject	 of course	 to an appeal provided under it	 can be set aside in a suit before a civil court on two grounds only	 namely	 where the provisions of the Act have not been complied with	 or where the tribunal has failed to act in conformity with the fundamental rules of judicial procedure. He rejected the respondents ' contention that the case fell within the first ground and held that however erroneous the Collector 's decision might be since it was within his jurisdiction to decide whether the goods fell under one entry or the other	 a civil court had no jurisdiction to grant relief. He also held that the order could not be said to be without or in excess of jurisdiction and was	 therefore	 not a nullity. The order consequently required to be set aside if the respondents were to have any relief	 and therefore	 article 14 of the Limitation Act	 1908 applied. On that basis he held the respondents ' suit to be time barred and dismissed it. We may	 at this stage		 mention that in 'a similar matter involving import of spare parts and accessories under a licence relating to entry 295	 the Collector 's order	 on the basis that the goods fell under entry 294	 as the spare parts in question could	 it all the different indents were taken together	 constituted auto cycles in completely knocked down condition	 was held to be bad as "the Collector 's approach to the matter was wholly wrong by a Division Bench of the same High Court in D. P. Anand vs M/s. T. M. Thakore & Co.(2) According to that judgment	 the jurisdiction of the Collector was to ascertain whether the goods	 such as they were	 were properly imported under the licence relating to goods under entry 295	 i.e.	 whether they were spare parts and accessories	 and not to go further and find out whether they would	 when put together	 constitute auto cycles in completely knocked down condition as envisaged by entry 295	 and therefore	 the order was amenable to interference by the High Court. The Trial Judge held	 on the authority of this judgment that on merits the Collector of Customs was in error in holding the respondents guilty of importing goods not covered by the licence held by them and that the Collector would have been bound by that judgment had it been delivered before he passed the impugned order. He	 however	 was of the view that whereas the High Court in D. P. Anand 's case(2) interfered with the order in its writ jurisdiction. a suit could not lie as the impugned order was within the jurisdiction of the Collector and the mere fact that he applied a wrong entry did not invest the civil court with the jurisdiction to entertain a suit and set aside such an order. (1) (1940) 67 I.A. 222 (2)Civil appeal No. 4 of 1959	 decided on August 17	 1960 (H.C) 562 The Letters Patent Bench of the High Court	 following the judgment in Anand 's case	(1) agreed with the Trial Judge that on merits the Collector was in error. Following that judgment	 the Bench also	 held that the Collector 's jurisdiction was limited to ascertain whether or not the goods imported by the respondents were spare parts and accessories covered by entry 295 in respect of which they undoubtedly held the licence	 . and therefore	 he could not have lumped together the two consignments which	 though imported under one licence	 arrived separately and were received on different dates and could not have come to the conclusion that the plaintiffs (i.e. the respondents herein) had imported 51 "Rixe" mopeds in a completely knocked down condition. The	 Bench also held that upon the principle laid down in Anand 's case(1) it was not for the Collector to ascertain whether the goods	 if assembled together	 would constitute 51 "Rixe" Mopeds in C.K.D. condition The respondents were entitled to import the said goods	 and therefore	 section 167(8) of the did not apply and the respondents consequently could not have been held guilty of breach either of that section or section 3 of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act. The Bench also held that the decision of this Court in Girdharilal Bansidhar vs Union of India(2) did not overrule but only distinguished the judgment in Anand 's case	(1) and therefore	 the binding force of that decision remained unshaken. Regarding the jurisdiction of civil courts	 the Division Bench held that where the question is simply whether one or the other entry applies and the tribunal	 to which jurisdiction is entrusted in that behalf	 decides it erroneously	 even then its order	 made final by the statute conferring such jurisdiction	 cannot be made the subject matter of a suit. On the other hand	 where its jurisdiction is confined to see whether the importation is under a particular entry or not	 but while deciding such a question	 the tribunal 	takes into account extraneous considerations	 such as an entry which has no bearing upon the question	 the case would fall outside the ambit of the powers of th statutory authority. The question	 in other words	 would then be	 whether the tribunal has exceeded its jurisdiction and therefore acted in non compliance with the provision of the statute under which it has to decide the question. The Division Bench deprecated the attempt on the part of the Collector in considering the two consignments together and making out a case that the two	 when put together	 would make it possible to regard the goods as ' "Rixe" Mopeds in C.K.D. condition. Such 'an attempt	 the Bench observed	 was "a new classification conjured up by the authorities to rope in the imports as being illegal which according to the terms of the licence and entry No. 295 would be clearly legal". Lastly	 the Division Bench disagreed with the Trial Judge who had held that the article (1) C.A. No. 4 of 1959 decided on Aug. 17	 1960 (H.C.) (2) ; 563 in the Limitation Act applicable was article 14	 on the ground that once it was accepted that the order was in excess of jurisdiction it was a nullity	 and therefore	 there was no question of its having to be set aside. Following A. Venkata Subba Rao vs Andhra Pradesh	 (1) it held that the suit fell under article 62	 and therefore	 was within time. Counsel for the Union of India challenged the correctness of 	the judgment of the Division Bench and urged that the had clearly vested in the Collector the authority to decide whether the goods in question fell within entry 295 or not and for which the respondents had been granted the licence. His decision	 subject	 of course	 to an appeal and revision provided under the Act	 being final	 could not be challenged in a suit save under the well recognized exceptions that his decision was not in compliance with the provisions of the Act	 or that he had failed to follow the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. The present case	 according to him	 was one of importing "Rixe" Mopeds in C.K.D. condition	 not permissible either under entry 295 or entry 294	 and therefore	 was a case where the importer	misusing his licence	 had attempted to do indirectly what he could not do directly. There was	 according to him	 no question of the Collector 'acting in excess of his jurisdiction or in non compliance with the provisions of the Act	 and therefore	 the Trial Judge was right in holding that no suit lay against his action. Before we proceed to consider these contentions it is expedient first to look at the provisions of the relevant law. Under section 3 of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act	 1947	 the Central Government by an order can provide for prohibiting	 restricting or otherwise controlling inter alia the import of goods of any specified description and all goods to which any such order applies are deemed to be goods of which the import has been prohibited by the and all the provisions of that Act are to have effect accordingly. The Imports (Control) Order 1955	 passed under the power reserved under the Act	 by cl. (3) thereof	 provides that no person shall import any goods of the description specified in Sch. I thereto except under and in accordance with a licence granted by the Central Government or by an officer specified in Sch. Sub cl. (2) of cl. (3) provides that if it is found that the goods imported under a licence do not conform to the description given in such a licence under which they are claimed to have been imported	 then without prejudice to any action that may be taken against the licensee under the in respect of such importation	 the licence may be treated as having been utilised for importing the said goods. (1) ; 564 Entries ' 294 and 295 of section II of of Sch. I of the Import Trade Control Policy for the period July December 1956 are in this connection the relevant entries. Entry 294 deals with import 	of motorcycles and scooters. Remark (ii) in its column No. 6 lays down that "Licences granted under this item will not be valid for the import of motor cycles/scooters in a completely knocked down condition". Remark (iii)	 however	 provides that applications from approved manufacturers for import of motor cycles	/ scooters in C.K.D. condition will be considered ad hoc by the Chief Controller	 Imports in consultation with Development Wing. Entry 295 deals with "Articles (other than rubber tyres and tubes) adapted for use as parts and accessories of motor cycles and motor scooters	 except such articles as are adapted for use as parts and accessories of motor cars". Entry 41 in deals with import of rubber tyres and tubes and other manufactures of rubber not otherwise specified. Section 167(8) of the provides that goods shall liable to confiscation if the goods	 the importation of which is for the time being prohibited or restricted by or under Ch. IV	 are imported contrary to such prohibition or restriction and any person concerned in any such importation shall be liable to penalty prescribed therein. Section 188 of the Act makes an order. passed in appeal against the Collector 's order	 final subject only to the power of revision under section 191. The position then is	 under 'entry 294 above cited import under the requisite licence of motor cycles and scooters was permitted. However	 a licence permitting import of motor cycles and scooters could not be used for import of motor cycles and scooters in C.K.D. condition. Even then	 the prohibition was not absolute because approved manufacturers could apply and get licences to import motor cycles 'and scooters in C.K.D. condition	 albeit on an ad hoc basis. It is thus clear that entry 294 deals with the import of motor cycles and scooters and the import	 though only by approved manufacturers	 of motor cycles and scooters in C.K.D. condition. The entry is complete in itself so far as import of motor cycles 'and scooters complete and assembled and also in C.K.D. condition is concerned. The words "completely knocked down condition" in the entry are not used in any technical sense	 and therefore	 must be given their ordinary dictionary meaning	 i.e.	 "made or constructed so as to be capable of being knocked down or taken apart	 as for transportation; in parts ready to be assembled". (see Webster 's New International Dictionary	 Vol. P. 1371 and	 also Words and Phrases. Permanent Edition	% Vol. 23	 p. 560). Under entry 295	 except for rubber tyres and tubes for whose import a separate licence could be obtained under entry 41 of 565 Part V	 there are no limitations as to the number or kind of parts or accessories which can be imported under a licence obtained in respect of the goods covered thereunder. Prima facie	 an importer could import all the parts and accessories of motor cycles and scooters and it would not be a ground to say that he has committed breach of entry 295 or the licence in respect of the goods described therein	 that the parts and accessories imported	 if assembled	 would make motor cycles and scooters in C.K.D. condition. There are no remarks against entry 295	 as there are against entry 294	 that a licence in respect of goods covered by entry 295 would not be valid for import of spares and accessories which	 if assembled	 would make motor cycles and scooters in C.K.D. condition. Apart from that	 the. goods in question did not admittedly contain tyres	 tubes and saddles	 so that it was impossible to say that they constituted motor cycles and scooters in C.K.D. condition. The first two could not be imported and were in fact not imported because that could not be done under the licence in respect of goods covered by entry 295 which expressly prohibited their import and a separate licence under entry 41 of Part V would be necessary. The third	 namely	 saddles were not amongst the goods imported. No doubt	 there was	 firstly	 a finding by the Collector that a trade practice prevailed under which motor cycles and scooters without tyres	 tubes and saddles could be sold. Secondly	 the tyres and tubes could be had in the market here and so also saddles	 so that if an importer desired	 he could have sold these goods as motor cycles and scooters in C.K.D. condition. The argument was that since there was a restriction in entry 294 against imports of motor cycles and scooters in C.K.D. condition	 the importer could not be allowed to do indirectly what he could not do directly. The argument apparently looks attractive. But the question is what have the respondents done indirectly what they could not have done directly. In the absence of any restrictions in entry 295	 namely	 that a licence in respect of goods covered by entry 295 would not be valid for import of parts and accessories which	 when taken together	 would make them motor cycles and scooters in C.K.D. condition	 the respondents could import under their licence all kinds and types of parts and accessories. Therefore	 the mere fact	 that the goods imported by them were so complete that when put together would make them motor cycles and scooters in C.K.D. condition	 would not amount to a breach of the licence or of entry 295. Were that to be so	 the position would be anomalous as aptly described by the High Court. Suppose that an importer were to import equal number of various parts from different countries under different indents and at different times. and the goods were to reach here in different consignments and on different dates instead of two consignments from the same 566 country as in the present case. If the contention urged before us were to be correct	 the Collector can treat them together and say that they would constitute motor cycles and scooters in C.K.D. condition. Such an approach would mean that there is in entry 295 a limitation against importation of all parts and accessories of motor cycles and scooters. Under that contention	 even if the importer had sold away the first consignment or part of it	 it would still be possible for the Collector to say that had the importer desired it was possible for him to assemble all the parts and make motor cycles and scooters in C.K.D. condition. Surely	 such a meaning has not to be given to entry 295 unless there is in it or in the licence a condition that a licensee is not to import parts in such a fashion that his consignments	 different though they may be	 when put together would make motor cycles and scooters in C.K.D. condition. Such a condition was advisedly not placed in entry 295 but was put in entry 294 only. The reason was that import of both motor cycles and scooters as also parts and accessories thereof was permitted	 of the first under entry 294 and of the other under entry 295. A trader having a licence in respect of goods covered by entry 294 could import assembled motor cycles and scooters	 but not those vehicles in C.K.D. condition	 unless he was a manufacturer and had obtained a separate licence therefor from the Controller of Imports who	 as aforesaid	 was authorised to issue such a licence on an ad hoe basis. Thus the res triction not to import motor cycles and scooters in C.K.D. condition was against an importer holding a licence in respect of goods covered by entry 294 under which he could import complete motor cycles and scooters and not against an importer who had 'a licence to import parts and accessories under entry 295. If Dr. Syed Mohamad 's contention were to be right we would have to import remark (ii) against entry 294 into entry 295	 a thing which obviously is not permissible while construing these entries. Further	 such a condition	 if one were to be implied in entry 295	 would not fit in	 as it is a restriction against import of motor cycles and scooters in C.K.D. condition and not their parts and accessories. There is	 therefore	 no question of a licensee under entry 295 doing indirectly what he was not allowed to do directly. What he was not allowed to do directly was importing motor cycles and scooters in C.K.D. condition under a licence under which he could import complete motor cycles and scooters only. That restriction	 as already observed	 applied to a licensee in respect of goods described in entry 294 and not a licensee in respect of goods covered by entry 295. The result is that when the Collector examines goods imported under a licence in respect of goods covered by entry 295 what he has to ascertain is whether the. goods are parts and accessories	 567 and not whether the goods	 though parts and 'accessories	 are so comprehensive that if put together would constitute motor cycles and scooters in C.K.D. condition. Were he to adopt such an approach	 he would be acting contrary to and beyond entry 295 under which he had to find out whether the goods imported were of the description in that entry. Such an approach would	 in other words	 be in non compliance of entry 295. The question then is whether such a reading of the two entries is in any way contrary to the decisions of this Court. In Girdharilal Bansidhar	(1) the principle laid down was that the High Court in its writ jurisdiction does not sit in appeal over the correctness of the decision of the authorities under the on appreciation of entries in the Hand Book or in the Indian Tariff Act. In that case	 the appellant	 who had a licence to import iron and steel bolts	 nuts	 etc.	 imported nuts and bolts which were the components of 'Jackson Type Single bolt oval plate belts fasteners"	 which were described in the bill of entry as 'store bolts and nuts '. The Customs found that these were in reality the actual components of Jackson Type Single belt oval plate belts fasteners	 import whereof was totally prohibited. The Collector	 while arriving at his decision	 took into account also the fact that washers	 the third component of the prohibited article	 were imported by a firm owned by the appellant 's relations. On these facts	 this Court held (1) that importing components of a prohibited article was importing the prohibited article	 (2) that the evidence that washers imported by the relations of the appellant was considered by the Collector as evidence to confirm his conclusion that the nuts and bolts imported by him were in reality the components of the prohibited article	 and (3) that where the decision of the statutory authority is whether an item falls under one or the other entry	 the High Court could not interfere with that decision on the groun d that it is erroneous. That is because when a statute confers power on an authority to decide a particular question	 its decision	 even if it is erroneous		 is still within its jurisdiction. What needs to be observed in that decision is that the Collector 's decision was	 under which of the two competing entries the imported items fell	 that is	 whether the goods were bolts and nuts or were components of the prohibited article. And the Court there laid down the well established principle that the High Court	 under article 226	 could not interfere with the decision of the authority upon whom jurisdiction to decide the question	 whether the goods fell under one or the other entry	 was conferred on the ground that it was erroneous. Further	 the nuts and bolts imported by the appellant could only be	 used as Components of the prohibited article. In other words	 the import was of parts of the (1) ; 568 prohibited article and therefore of the prohibited article. It was	 therefore	 that the Court held (1) that the Customs ' decision was not incorrect	 and (2) that the importer could	 not be allowed to do indirectly what he could not do directly. It will be noticed that the Bombay decision in D. P. Anand 's case(1) was not dissented from but only distinguished	 and therefore	 the High Court in the present case was justified in following it. It is true	 however	 that counsel for the appellant there relied on that decision in support of his proposition that a ban on a completed article cannot be read as a ban on the importation of its constituents	 which	 when assembled	 would result in the prohibited article	 and this Court pointed out in answer that in D. P. Anand 's case	(1) the imported components could not have when assembled	 made up the completed article because of the lack of certain essential parts which admittedly were not available in India and could not be imported. The real distinction	 however	 between the two cases was that the decision of the Collector in D. P. Anand 's case(1) was not	 as was the decision in Girdharilal 's case	 (2) under which of the two competing entries the imported goods fell but that the imported goods in question	 if assembled	 together	 would not be the goods covered by the entry	 and therefore	 not the goods in respect of which the licence was granted. Further	 the articles in question	 even when assembled together	 were not prohibited articles as in Girdharilal 's case (2). Girdhari lal 's case(2) is clearly distinguishable because it is not as if motor cycles and scooters are prohibited articles as was the case there. The restriction is not against licensees importing motor cycles and scooters under entry 294 and parts and accessories under entry 295 but against the licensees under entry 294 importing motor cycles and scooters in C.K.D. condition. The question in the instant case was not under which of the two entries	 294 or 295	 the goods fell	 but whether the goods were parts and accessories covered by entry 295. In Firm Illuri Subbayya Chetty & Sons vs Andhra Pradesh	 ( 3 the suit filed by the appellants was for recovery of a sum paid by way of purchase tax under the Madras General Sales Tax Act	 1939. The cause of action was that the amount had been illegally recovered. Relying on section 18A of the Act	 this Court held that the expression "any assessment made under this Act" in that section was wide enough to cover all assessments made by the appropriate authorities under the Act and even if an assessment was incorrect	 so long as it was within the jurisdiction of the authorities	 it was not non compliance of the statute	 and therefore	 was not covered by the principle laid down in the case of Mask & Co.(4) The Court observed: (1) C.A. 4 of 1959 dt. Aug. 17	 1960(H.C.) (2) ; (3) [1964] 1.S.C.R. 752. (4) [1948] L.R. 67 I.A. 222. 569 "There is no justification for the assumption that if a decision has been made by a taxing authority under the	 provisions of a taxing statute	 its validity can be chal lenged by a suit on the ground that it is incorrect on merits and as such it can be claimed that the provisions of the said statute have not been compiled with." This principle was repeated in Dhulabliai vs Madhya Pradesh(1) where it was held that where a statute gives finality to the orders of the special tribunal the civil court 's jurisdiction must be held to be excluded if there is adequate remedy to do what the civil courts would normally do in a suit	 i.e.	 to correct an assessment which is erroneous. The Court also pointed out that in the Firm Illuri Subbayya Chetty & Sons ' case	 (2) it had been said that Mask & Co. 's case(3) was an authority for the proposition that non compliance with the provisions of the statute would render the entire proceedings before the authority illegal and without jurisdiction. The case of Panthulu vs Andhra Pradesh (4) illustrates as to when an authority can be said to have acted in non compliance with the provisions of the statute under which it derives its authority. Section 3(2) of the Madras Estates Land (Reduction of Rent) Act	 XXX of 1947 authorised the State Government to fix the rates of rent in respect of each class	 of ryoti land in each village in the State after considering the recommendations of the special officer and the remarks of the Board of Revenue. Section 8(1) provided that no order passed under section 3(2) could be challenged in a civil court. The suit filed by the appellants disputed the legality of the notification reducing the rates of land in respect of the dry delta ryoti lands in a village on the ground that the class of land had been determined to be delta ryoti lands on the basis only of the settlement register which did not contain any entry with respect to the village in question	 that the settlement register could not be treated as conclusive and that proper factual enquiry was necessary. 'Me High Court held that the suit was not main tainable by reason of section 8(1). Dua	 J.	 speaking for the Bench. held that under section 2 the special officer had to determine the average rate of cash rent per acre for each class of ryoti land such as wet	 dry or garden. 'Ibis could only be done on relevant material. The special officer	 however	 had based his determination on a report of his assistant	 who had considered the entry in the settlement register of another village. That meant that the special officer had made his determination on irrelevant evidence	 i.e.	 on the register which did not contain any data with respect to the land in the village in question. On these facts he hold that the (1) ; (3) [1948] L.R.67 I.A. 222. (2) ; (4) [1970] 2 S.C.R.714 570 .determination by the special officer was based on no evidence with the result that it was in violation of the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. A fortiori	 the order of the Government made	 under section 3(2) on the basis of the recommendations of the special officer was not in conformity with the provisions of the Act and was therefore outside the purview of section 3(2) and consequently section 8(1) was inapplicable. Thus	 sec. 8(1) was held not to apply because the Government 's determination could not be said to be one under section 3 (2). The words "a decision or order passed by an officer of Customs under this Act" used in section 188 of the must mean a real and not a purported determination. A determination	 which takes into consideration factors which the officer has no right to take into account	 is no determination. This is also the view taken by courts in England. In such cases the provision excluding jurisdiction of civil courts cannot operate so as to exclude an inquiry by them. In Anisminic Ltd. vs The Foreign Compensation Commission(1) Lord Reid at pages 213 and 214 of the Report stated as follows : "It has sometimes been said that it is only where a tribunal acts without jurisdiction that its decision 'is a nullity. But in such cases the word "jurisdiction" has been used in a very wide sense	 and I have come to the conclusion that it is better not to use the term except in the narrow and original sense of the tribunal being entitled to enter on the enquiry in question. But there are many cases where	 although the tribunal had jurisdiction to enter on the enquiry	 it has done or failed to do something in the course of the enquiry which is of such a nature that its decision is a nullity. It may have given its decision in bad faith . It may have made a decision which it had no power to make. It may have failed in the course of the enquiry to comply with the requirements of natural justice. It may in perfect good faith have misconstrued the provisions giving it power to art	 so that it failed to deal with the question remitted to it and decided some question which was not remitted to it. It may have refused to take into account something which it was required to take into account. Or it may have based its decision on some matter which	 under the provisions setting it up	 it had no right to take into account. I do not intend this list to be exhaustive. But if it decides a question remitted to it for decision without committing any of these errors it is as much entitled 	to decide that question wrongly as it is to decide it rightly." (1) [1969]1 All E.R. 208. 571 To the same effect are also the observations of Lord Pearce at page 233. R	 vs Fulham	 Hammersmith and Kensington Rent Tribunal(1) is yet another decision of a tribunal properly embarking on an enquiry	 that is	 within its jurisdiction	 but at the end of it making an order in excess of its jurisdiction which was held to be anullity though it was an order of the kind which it was entitled to make in a proper case. The principle thus is that exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil courts is not to be readily inferred. Such exclusion	 however	 is inferred where the statute gives finality to the order of the tribunal on which it confers jurisdiction and provides for adequate remedy to do what the courts would normally do in such a proceeding before it. Even where a statute gives finality	 such a provision does not exclude cases where the provisions of the particular statute have not been complied with or the tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure The word "jurisdiction" has both a narrow and a wider meaning. In the sense of the former	 it means the authority to embark upon an enquiry; in the sense of the latter it is used in several aspects	 one of such aspects being that the decision of the tribunal is in non compliance with the provisions of the Act. Accordingly	 a determination by a tribunal of a question other than the one which the statute directs it to decide would be a decision not under the provisions of the Act	 and therefore	 in excess of its jurisdiction. The respondents ' licence admittedly authorised them to import goods covered by entry 295. They could	 therefore	 legitimately import	 on the strength of that licence	 all and several kinds of parts and accessories of motor cycles and scooters. The only question	 therefore	 before the Collector was whether the respondents ' licence covered the goods imported by them	 i.e.	 whether the goods were parts and accessories. If they were	 the imports were legitimate and no question of their being nut covered by the licence or the respondents having committed breach of section 3 of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act or section 167(8) of the could possibly arise. What the Collector	 however	 did was that he put the two consignments together and held that they made up 51 'Rixe ' Mopeds in C.K.D. condition and were	 for that reason	 not the articles covered by entry 295 but articles prohibited under remark (ii) of entry 294. But entry 294 deals with the motor cycles and scooters complete and assembled. Remark (ii) against that entry prohibits an importer who held a licence to import motor cycles and scooters from importing motor cycles and scooters in C.K.D. condition. Remark (ii) containing that prohibition had nothing to do with entry 295 which did not (1) 572 contain any limitations or restrictions whatsoever against imports of parts and accessories. That being so	 if an importer has imported parts and acces sories	 his import would be of the articles covered by entry 295. The Collector could not say	 if they were so covered by entry 295	 that	 when lumped together	 they would constitute other articles	 namely	 motor cycles and scooters in C.K.D. condition. Such a process	 if adopted by the Collector	 would mean that he was inserting in entry 295 a restriction which was not there. That obviously he had no power to do. Such a restriction would mean	 that though under a licence in respect of goods covered by entry 295 an importer could import parts and accessories of all kinds .and types	 he shall not import all of them but only some	 so that when put together they would not make them motor cycles and scooters in C.K.D. condition. In the present case even that was not so because he would have to buy tyres	 tubes and saddles to convert them into motor cycles and scooters into C.K.D. condition. That would be tantamount to the Collector making a new entry in place of entry 295 which must mean non compliance of that entry and acting in excess of jurisdiction during the course of his enquiry even though he had embarked upon the enquiry with jurisdiction. 	 In our view that was precisely what the Collector did. This is	 therefore	 not one of those cases where between 	two competing entries the statutory authority applied one or the 	other	 though in error	 and where	 a civil court cannot interfere. In this view the order was in non compliance of the provisions 	of the statute	 and therefore. was covered by the exceptions laid down in Mask & Co. 's case(1). It was not an order in respect of which the Collector was invested with jurisdiction. That being so	 'the provision excluding the jurisdiction of the civil courts was not applicable. Indeed	 the order was a nullity and article 14 of the Limitation Act of 1908 could not be applied to hold the suit time barred. Even if Art	 14 applied	 it would not be time barred	 if	 as the High Court pointed out	 the date of the appellate order was taken into consideration. The judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court	 there fore	 must be upheld. Consequently	 the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. V.P.S. Appeal dismissed. (1) [1948] L.R. 67 IA.

Summary:
Under cl. 3 of the Imports (Control) Order	 1955	 passed under section 3 of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act	 1947	 no person shall import any goods of the description specified in Sch. I except in accordance with a licence	 and if it was found that the goods imported did not conform to the description in the licence	 then	 without prejudice to any action that may be taken against the licensee under the Sea Customs Act	 such goods would be treated as having been imported without a valid licence in that behalf. Under Entry 294 of section 11 of Part IV of Sch. I of the Import Trade Control Policy (July to December 1956)	 import of motor cycles and scooters was permitted under an appropriate licence	 but such a licence could not be used for their import in a completely knocked down (C.K.D.) condition except by approved manufacturers. That is	 there was no absolute phohibition for their import in C.K.D. condition. The words completely knocked down conditions are not used in any technical sense and have the dictionary meaning of "made or constructed so as to be capable of being knocked down or taken apart as for transportation; in parts ready to be assembled". Under Entry 295	 except for rubber tyres and tubes	 for whose import a separate licence could be obtained	 there are no limitations as to the number or kind of parts or accessories of motor cycles and scooters which can be imported under a license obtained in respect of the goods. There are no remarks against this entry as there are against Entry 294	 that the licence would not be valid for import of spares and accessories which	 if assembled	 would make motor cycles and scooters The respondents ' licence authorised them to import goods covered by Entry 295	 and they imported certain goods which arrived in two different consignments and on two different dates. They did not contain tyres	 tubes and saddles so that it was impossible to say that they constituted motor cycles and scooters in C.K.D. condition. The Collector of Customs and the Central Board of Revenue in appeal	 however	 put the two consignments together and held that trade practice did not require the supply of tyres and tubes and saddles while supplying motor cycles	 and that therefore they made up mopeds in C.K.D. condition and were	 for that reason	 not the articles covered by Entry 295 but articles prohibited under Entry 294. The goods were directed to be confiscated with an option to the respondents to pay certain 'sums in lieu of confiscation	 and personal penalties. The respondent filed a suit in the High Court and the trial Judge dismissed it on the authority of Secretary of State vs Mask & Co. [1948] L.R. 67 I.A. 222	 and that the suit was time barred under article 14 of the Limitation Act. In appeal	 the Divisional Bench followed Anand vs Thakore & Co.	 a decision of that High Court	 and allowed the appeal. In appeal to this Court	 558 HELD: (1) The mere fact that the goods imported by the respondents wereso complete that when put together would make motor cycles and scooters in C.K.D. condition would not amount lo a breach of the licence or of entry 295. The restriction not to import motor cycles and scooters in C.K.D. condition was against an importer holding a licence in respect of the goods covered by entry 294 under which he could import complete and assembled motor cycles and scooters	 and not against an importer who had a licence to import parts and accessories under entry 295. [565 G H; 566 E] (2)When the Collector examines goods imported under a licence in respect of goods covered by Entry 295	 what he has to ascertain is whether the goods are parts and accessories	 and not whether the goods	 though parts and accessories	 are so comprehensive that if put together would constitute motor cycles and scooters in C.K.D. condition	 because	 it would then mean that there is in the entry a limitation against importation of all parts	 and accessories of motor cycles and scooters. Such an approach	 would be acting contrary to and beyond entry 295	 and in non compliance of the entry and would lead to the anomalous result that even if the importer had sold away one consignment or part of it	 the Collector could still say that had the importer desired it was possible for him to assemble all parts and make motor cycles and scooters in C.K.D. condition. [566 A C	 H; 567 A B] (3)This Court in Girdhari Lal Bansidhar vs Union of	 India; 	 	 laid down that the High Court under article 226 of the Constitution	 could not	 on the ground that it was erroneous	 interfere with the decision of the authority upon whom jurisdiction was conferred to decide the question whether the goods fell under one or other entry	 that is	 under which of two competing entries the goods fell. This Court also held that the import of parts of a prohibited article was import of the prohibited article	 and that the importer could not be allowed to do indirectly what he could not do directly	 and distinguished the case in Anand vs Thakore & Co. In Anand 's case	 it was held that the jurisdiction of the Collector was only to ascertain whether the goods were spare parts and accessories and not to find out whether if put together they would constitute auto cycles in C.K.D. condition. [567 B C; 568 B E] (4)In the present case also the question before the Collector was whether the respondents ' licence covered the goods imported by them	 that is; whether the goods were parts and accessories. It is not	 therefore	 one of those cases where between two competing entries the statutory authority applied one or the other and where a civil court cannot interfere even if the statutory authority committed an error.	 [572 C E] (5) Exclusion of jurisdiction of Civil Courts is not to be readily inferred. Such exclusion is inferred when the statute gives finality to the order of the tribunal on which it confers jurisdiction and provides for adequate remedy to do what the courts would normally do in such a proceeding before it. Even where the statute gives finality such a provision does not exclude cases where the provisions of the particular statute have not been complied with or the tribunal has not acted in conformity with fundamental principles of judicial procedure	 and a determination by a tribunal of a question other than the one which the statute directs it to decide would be a decision not under the provisions of the Act. [571 B E] Firm illuri Subbayya Chetty & Sons vs Andhra Pradesh	 ; 	 Dhulabhai vs Madhya Pradesh	 [1968] 3 S.C.R. 662	 Panthulu vs Andhra Pradesh	 ; 	 Anisminic Ltd. vs Foreign Com 559 pensation Commissioner; 	 and R. vs Fulham	 Hammersmith and Kensington Rent Tribunal	 	 referred to. (6)Therefore	 the decision in the present case was covered by the exception laid down in Mask & Co. 's case and the provision excluding the jurisdiction of the civil court would not be applicable. Since non compliance with the provisions of the Act would be acting in excess of jurisdic tion the Collector 's order was a nullity and article 14 of the Limitation Act	 1908	 could not be applied. Even if it was applicable	 the suit would not be barred if the date of the appellate order of the customs authorities was taken into consideration. [572 E F]