Date: 2023-04-26
Danny Kruger: I am very pleased to have listened to this interesting and useful debate. I rise to speak to new clauses 22 and 17, which clarify the means by which a suspensive claim may be made to stop a removal from this country. In that context, I will reply briefly to my hon. Friend the Member for Newbury (Laura Farris), who made a good speech in Committee opposing the amendment that I had tabled to disapply the operation of the European convention on human rights as a means to prevent removals. Her point was that English law already includes protections that could be used in the same way as the ECHR. Of course, she is quite right: the jurisprudence of the UK has a set of remedies against unfair treatment, and they still apply. Indeed, they are clarified in the Bill. In contradiction to what the hon. Member for Sheffield, Hallam (Olivia Blake) was saying, the remedies for a suspensive claim against a removal are clarified in the Bill, particularly the principle of non-refoulement, which is in our common law--we would have it even without European rights law. So this policy does not contradict that principle. Indeed, it strengthens it with a clear protection for people who would suffer harm by being returned to their own country or any country. Now that that relief is clarified in the Bill, we need to block the spurious use of other domestic remedies that are no longer necessary. I thank the Minister and the team for their constructive engagement. I am very happy about where we have got to in the Bill. I will quickly explore the issue at the heart of the debate, which is not migration but the sovereignty of Parliament in making law, including laws about this essential issue. It has been established in recent times--particularly by the judgment in the case of Thoburn in 2002--that some laws in this country have more weight than others and, indeed, are not subject to implied repeal. They essentially have the status of constitutional documents. Of course, the European Communities Act 1972 had that status until Brexit. The other Act that has that constitutional status is the Human Rights Act 1998, which requires and enables the British courts to apply the ECHR. The doctrine of implied repeal does not apply to the 1998 Act either, and that Act requires the courts to follow the judgments made in Strasbourg. I can live with anomalies. We do not want a hasty, destructive, ideological or populist rejection of the status quo in the legal arrangements of this country--that is not the British way; it is not the Conservative way. We can live with an eccentric inheritance from the post-war era. The problem is not when it is eccentric, but when it is deeply problematic, as it was in June last year, when the European Court put a stop on our removals policy. To respond to my hon. Friend the Member for Newbury, that was an occasion on which the European Court exercised an interference in our immigration policy. I accept that that was just a rule of the court, which, in my view, we could have ignored, but the Government seemed to accept the legal advice that they were obliged to give immediate effect to that ruling. I am very pleased that new clause 26 will give the Home Secretary the power to disregard rule 39 interim orders from Strasbourg, but we remain subject to article 46 of the convention, which obliges us to comply with final judgments. For me, there are two profound problems in our membership of the ECHR. First, we have an in-built ratchet with Strasbourg rulings and the treatment of the ECHR as a living instrument to be interpreted in the light of whichever cultural ideas are prevalent or appealing to the judges. Thanks to the Human Rights Act, those rulings form part of English law. At the same time, there is a willingness among lawyers in the UK to employ the ECHR to frustrate the will of Parliament and to refer the laws that we make to some higher authority--to an abstract morality rooted not in custom or the habitual allegiances that we have to each other as citizens of the same country, but in their own liberal fantasies. I also believe in a higher authority that respects the dignity and value of every human being. Let us call it the natural law. I believe that that higher authority is the source of all our liberties and rights, and indeed of the ECHR and every other noble-sounding document in the west. It is the source of our morality, but the way in which that morality works in practice is not through abstract theorising from on high but through the accumulation of case law and the statutes passed in this place. I do not propose that we come out of the ECHR now. I am suggesting that, if there is a further challenge to British sovereignty and the supremacy of Parliament--be it in Strasbourg or through the British courts applying the convention--we have no superior obligation to remain in the ECHR. The superior obligation is to our own sovereignty and the supremacy of this place. This debate  has exposed a difference between those of us who believe in nation states and the customary laws of nations, and those who believe in abstractions to be interpreted by unaccountable judges--whether or not they are in their pyjamas. I am content with where we have got to with the Bill, which I support unreservedly.