[Congressional Record Volume 169, Number 71 (Thursday, April 27, 2023)] [House] [Pages H2056-H2069] From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
Date: 2023-04-27
Chamber: HOUSE
Mr. GAETZ: I yield myself the balance of my time to close. In response to the argument of the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. James), who says that our withdrawals must be event based rather than time based, I would ask: What events are we waiting for in Somalia exactly? Are we waiting for a Jeffersonian democracy to emerge there? Are we waiting for the sectarian violence that has dominated to automatically just dissolve into the sands? Are we waiting for some other foreign power? I would suggest that in many of these places what we are actually waiting for is for these countries to take care of themselves and to demonstrate their own capabilities because the only way you form a nation is if your own fellow countrymen fight for and win that peace. That is how you develop national heroes, like those we see throughout this great Capitol. That is what a nation makes. A nation is not a bunch of Europeans drawing lines in Africa and then saying this is what is what. We did that after World War II, and it is why Africa has been in some degree of turmoil since. I continue to present to the body that the government in Somalia is actually on the upswing. They are gaining territory. They are unifying people, and it is not as a consequence of U.S. presence. Mr. Speaker, I include in the Record a piece from the International Crisis Group, ``Sustaining Gains in Somalia's Offensive against Al- Shabaab,'' and it is from 21 March 2023.  [From International Crisis Group, Mar. 21, 2023]  Gains in Somalia's Offensive Against Al-Shabaab  What's new? The Somali government has gained ground in its war with the Islamist insurgency Al-Shabaab, mainly in central Somalia. Most of the progress is due to Mogadishu's leveraging of local discontent with Al-Shabaab to form alliances with clan militias. Why does it matter? The joint campaign has dislodged militants from a swathe of territory in the centre of the country, reestablishing the government's presence in regions that Al-Shabaab had controlled for a decade or more. Troops are now planning to move into the insurgency's southern bastions. What should be done? Mogadishu must consolidate its gains in central Somalia as it goes on the offensive elsewhere. It should establish holding forces, work for communal reconciliation and, to the greatest degree possible, meet local expectations around service delivery.  Overview  Starting in August 2022, the Somali government launched a fresh offensive against Al-Shabaab, capitalising on mounting discontent with the Islamist insurgency, particularly among the politically dominant Hawiye clan. The operation has yielded the most comprehensive territorial gains since the mid-2010s, as soldiers fighting alongside clan militias dislodge Al-Shabaab militants from significant parts of central Somalia. Emboldened by clan backing and foreign support, Mogadishu now aims to send soldiers into Al- Shabaab's southern strongholds. As it proceeds, it should bear in mind the need to consolidate its hold on places it has recaptured from the insurgency. The government should assign holding forces to provide security in recovered areas, support local reconciliation efforts and step up service delivery, while carefully managing residents' expectations. If it does not take these measures, it may give Al-Shabaab, which has proven resilient, a chance to rebound. The government's push marks a breakthrough in a war that has raged for more than fifteen years. Historically, overstretched Somali and partner forces have hunkered down in urban locales, while Al-Shabaab secured a firm foothold in rural areas. International forces, in particular the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)--which was rebranded as the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) in 2022-- , have led the fight with Al-Shabaab. In contrast, the new offensive is spearheaded by the Somali military, in conjunction with local clans. A unique set of circumstances aided the government advance. Al-Shabaab overplayed its hand, antagonising clans in central Somalia. Demands that young male children join their ranks spurred local clans to take up arms alongside the Somali military. The insurgents' taxation of communities under their control hardly helped, as the country suffers impoverishment and food insecurity amid a record drought. Furthermore, terrorist attacks in the capital and along Somalia's borders appear to have prodded Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud to take a tougher line against the group. The government now plans to continue the offensive in southern Somalia, even though it has not fully consolidated its hold in the centre. Southern Somalia presents a different set of challenges--for one thing, clans in the south have not shown the same discontent with the Islamist movement that prevails in the centre. But even as its plans advance to meet a new set of challenges, the government should not lose sight of needs in the centre, as otherwise these areas could slip back into Al-Shabaab's hands. Before it launches major new attacks, it should make sure it has adequate holding forces in recovered areas. It should also conduct reconciliation efforts and improve basic services of which residents have long been deprived. For cash-strapped Mogadishu, that could prove difficult, and international donors will need to step in to provide support. Even if the government is successful in holding down central Somalia and reclaiming territory in the south, Al- Shabaab will probably survive. The group is playing the long game, exploiting government weaknesses wherever it can. The government should thus keep open the possibility of negotiations as a means of winding down the war for good, as Crisis Group has argued in the past. The government's recent wins on the battlefield will, if sustained, strengthen its position if it indeed decides to engage in talks.  From Local Anger to ``All-out War''  The Birth of an Offensive The Somali government's move to wrest back control from Al- Shabaab in parts of central Somalia is unusual in that the military has joined forces with clan militias. The offensive derives its strength from mounting local frustration with Al- Shabaab's persistent, onerous demands for money and recruits, as well as the group's violent measures of collective punishment for non-compliance. Several sub-clans in central Somalia have resisted the militants previously, but later cut deals with them to forge a form of coexistence, finding the cost of fighting Al-Shabaab too high. Still, overall, the government has made headway. The insurgents themselves contributed to these dynamics. In recent years, Al-Shabaab has extended its influence by taking advantage of political infighting in Mogadishu, which diverted the attention of Somali elites from the task of counter-insurgency. As politicians in the capital squabbled, sub-clans in central Somalia grew increasingly weary of Al- Shabaab's tactics. The Haber Gedir/Salebaan sub-clan is a case in point. People from this sub-clan, part of the wider Hawiye clan family, of which Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud is a member, live in and around the town of Baxdo, situated in the central region of Galgaduud (Galmudug state). They tolerated Al-Shabaab's presence in their area, for the most part, until 2019, when its commanders ordered families to provide young men to be enrolled as fighters. An influential community member told Crisis Group that this directive proved too much to stomach. Baxdo is a town with strong Sufi roots; the community perceived Al-Shabaab's demand as a ploy to inculcate the Salafi-jihadist doctrine in the younger generation. The Salebaan's refusal to comply with this de facto draft triggered a spiral of retaliation, starting with insurgents confiscating livestock and abducting elders. It culminated in Al-Shabaab assaulting Baxdo on 17 June 2022, which proved to be a tactical misstep: a militia from the sub-clan inflicted heavy casualties among the invading militants, killing an estimated 70 of them. Still, even after its defeat, Al- Shabaab carried out raids on smaller and less protected villages nearby in revenge. Around the same time, in the eastern part of Hiraan region (Hirshabelle state) west of Galgaduud, the Hawiye/Hawadle sub-clan's historically uneasy relationship with Al-Shabaab became outright hostile. The roots of the Hawadle's aggravation can be traced to 2021, when the militants took control of the road connecting Hiraan's capital Beledweyne to the Galgaduud region. Al-Shabaab had already blocked a southern route linking Beledweyne to Mogadishu, impeding the flow of vital supplies to a part of Somalia that has suffered severe drought for years. Now its checkpoint on the road headed east choked off the area, in effect. Local     anger rose, becoming even more pronounced in May 2022, when the militants killed a Hawadle elder in Beledweyne, reportedly for having participated in government elections. The community in Hiraan mobilised to push back against the group, emboldened at a crucial moment by Ethiopian military support. Al-Shabaab has long viewed Ethiopia, which invaded Somalia in 2006 to overthrow its precursor group, the Islamic Courts Union, as a major adversary; the insurgents have attempted to infiltrate the country in the past, mostly to no avail. In July 2022, however, the group launched an unprecedented incursion into Ethiopia's Somali region. Alarmed, Addis Ababa beefed up the deployment in the buffer zone it maintains between its border with Somalia and areas where Al-Shabaab is active. Ethiopia struck Al-Shabaab positions in Somalia from the air in late July and early August, while the head of the Ethiopian Army's Somali Command Post, General Tesfaye Ayalew, visited Beledweyne. Interlocutors on both sides of the Ethiopia-Somalia border confirmed to Crisis Group that Addis Ababa gave military supplies to local Hawadle at this time, coordinating with regional officials. Al-Shabaab responded to the mobilisation by unleashing a wave of repression upon the sub-clan, which generated still more resentment. In early August, Al-Shabaab torched Hawadle villages in Hiraan's Mahas district, destroying wells. Weeks later, on 2 September, militants ambushed a convoy bringing food to the area, killing numerous civilians, including women and children. More clan members joined the militias as a result. Another Al-Shabaab attack, this time in Mogadishu, provoked a strong reaction from the national government. On 20 August 2022, Al-Shabaab stormed the well-known Hayat Hotel in the Somali capital--a common meeting place for government officials--putting the premises under siege for 30 hours before security forces could dislodge them. The operation-- which led to the death of more than twenty people--may have been an attempt to intimidate President Mohamud, who had been elected to a second nonconsecutive term that May, out of taking an aggressive posture toward the group. If so, Al-Shabaab's leadership miscalculated. While Mohamud had struck a somewhat conciliatory tone when he first returned to office--repeatedly talking about the need for ``different security strategies and tough negotiations'' with Al-Shabaab--his stance changed dramatically after critics accused him of mounting a confused, ineffective response to the siege. He proceeded to declare an ``all-out war'' on Al- Shabaab that combines military pressure with efforts to rein in the group's extortion rackets in and around Mogadishu. He also committed to undercutting the group's Salafi-jihadist ideology. Previous attempts to combat Al-Shabaab had failed, he claimed, because they tried to contain rather than eradicate the group. The government deployed armed forces to Hiraan that worked in concert with Hawadle forces to flush militants out of villages and towns in August. The initial focus was on securing the main road from Mogadishu to Beledweyne and a triangular patch of territory between Beledweyne, Mahas and Bulo Burte. By October, the army and militias had freed much of Hiraan east of the Shabelle River from Al-Shabaab's physical control. Expansion in Central Somalia The government was eager to replicate the success in eastern Hiraan, based on the template the Somali army and clan militias had used there. It encouraged other clans in central Somalia to mobilise volunteer fighters, or macawisley (``those who wear the macawis'', a Somali sarong), relying on prominent personalities to rally their clansmen. Somali soldiers, particularly special forces units, still lead the fight with Al-Shabaab, but Mogadishu has provided the clan militias with logistical support such as ammunition, food and medical evacuations. The macawisley participate in joint operations, giving government forces backup from fighters who know the terrain better. They also provide a crucial link to the local population, sparing the government from going it alone or trying to mobilise community support after the fact. The clan participation also reinforces the narrative that sections of Somali society are turning against Al-Shabaab, Foreign partners have also bolstered the campaign against Al-Shabaab. U.S. airstrikes are helping the Danab, a special unit of the Somali National Army trained by the U.S. as a quick strike force, recapture territory from the insurgents in the regions of Hiraan, Middle Shabelle, Galgaduud and Mudug. The U.S. has also donated military assistance, with its ambassador for Somalia praising the war effort as ``historic''. Turkiye has carried out drone strikes in Lower and Middle Shabelle, further boosting the government's firepower. Meanwhile, ATMIS has stayed out of direct combat thus far, The combined efforts of the Somali army, clan militias and international partners have led Al-Shabaab's footprint in central Somalia to contract. The government seized the insurgency's regional centre of operations at Adan Yabaal in Middle Shabelle in December 2022. The next month, it captured the strategic towns of Ceel Dheere and Xarardheere in Galgaduud--although militants remain on the outskirts. The military is likely planning to uproot Al-Shabaab from its remaining strongholds in the southern Galgaduud districts of Ceel Buur and Galhareeri. If successful, its campaign would essentially dislodge the militants from a swathe of territory east of the Shabelle River. The playbook from eastern Hiraan has not worked smoothly everywhere, however. While clans in that region rose up spontaneously against Al-Shabaab, in other areas the government had to coax clans to join forces. Military efforts in Middle Shabelle struggled to get off the ground and were side-tracked by clashes between two sub-clans in the Adale district in November. In western Galgaduud, overly enthusiastic pro-government forces marched on the town of Wabxo in early November, only to pull out days later in the face of stiff resistance from Al-Shabaab. They could not hold the area without support from Somali special forces. Other advances have also stalled. The army had to stop south of Qaayib, in Galgaduud, amid Al-Shabaab outreach to sub-clans to counter government mobilisation. Government efforts to rally clans in Xarardheere, in the Mudug region, floundered because of sub-clan frictions and perceptions that the government had previously failed to support them in fighting the insurgents. The military ultimately moved to capture Xarardheere with limited clan militia participation. Moreover, a string of recent incidents shows that Al- Shabaab can still inflict severe damage in areas it has lost, even if it is not reoccupying them. In January alone, the insurgents deployed at least twelve suicide car bombs in central Somalia towns, in some cases causing heavy casualties. A 20 January attack in Galcad (Galmudug state) was particularly damaging, with Danab forces taking significant losses, including of a deputy commander. That incident spurred an internal reconsideration of strategy, with the offensive in central Somalia slowing in the ensuing weeks. Additionally, Al-Shabaab militants continue to cross from west of the Shabelle River to attack macawisley positions in smaller settlements in Hiraan. The infiltration raises concerns about the government's ability to hold the territory it recaptures, especially as it takes over more areas. It also demonstrates the peril of measuring success in fighting Al-Shabaab solely with the yardstick of territorial control. Still, the government has advantages in its current offensive, when compared to previous campaigns. For one thing, the military's collaboration with clan militias is strengthening ties with local communities, while allowing for greater government penetration of rural areas. Previous offensives typically focused on securing cities, inadvertently deepening the rural-urban divide that has played to Al-Shabaab's strengths as a mobile organisation reliant on local communities for recruitment and financing. Secondly, today's campaign is Somali-led, unlike those from 2011 to 2015, when the government's forces played a secondary role to what is now ATMIS. This time around, ATMIS has stayed in the background, essentially serving as the holding force for urban locales while Somali soldiers venture into less densely populated areas. There is also evidence that both the federal government and the clans are committed to sustaining their momentum. The current government in Mogadishu has arguably staked its reputation on defeating Al-Shabaab. Moreover, several of the operations to date have involved cross-clan collaboration, demonstrating an unusually high degree of consensus among those fighting the insurgents in central Somalia. Progress, however, should not be chalked up exclusively to Mogadishu or local mobilisation, but rather to the combination of the two. The campaign has been most successful where community resistance to Al-Shabaab is strongest, and the government can be a force multiplier, as in eastern Hiraan. In cases where local engagement is less apparent, the government has struggled to advance. In this sense, the offensive might be characterised as a series of wars between clans and Al-Shabaab, with the government backing the former. Al-Shabaab Adjusts to the Pressure Al-Shabaab has suffered important losses in central Somalia, but it continues to put up significant resistance, showing the value it places on the region. An intelligence source told Crisis Group that the insurgency is likely to reinforce its fighters in central Somalia with personnel now stationed in the south, likely sending the wounded south to recuperate. Somali government officials say militants have defected, but not in significant numbers. Meanwhile, Al- Shabaab has sought to increase pressure on the government with large-scale attacks in Mogadishu and other cities, in addition to making regular incursions into areas the government has seized. Al-Shabaab's flexibility suggests that the organisation is more likely to adapt to the government campaign than be defeated by it. For example, the group already appears to be changing its approach to the population in central Somalia, realising its coercive model for securing obedience has backfired. It has started offering more carrots than sticks, emphasising the need to promulgate the public good (maslaha) in its rhetoric, rather than exhorting communities to seek forgiveness (tauba) for having antagonised the group. This approach has borne fruit: in late December, in a setback for Mogadishu, a group of Salebaan elders in Galmudug reached a fresh agreement with Al-Shabaab     to avoid confrontation, withdrawing support for the government in return for the release of hostages and seized property. The federal government's collaboration with the macawisley likely prompted Al-Shabaab's shift in tone. In the past, the group has been more willing to offer concessions to clans when it feels weak, only to roll them back later when it is in a stronger position. It remains to be seen if it will renege on its commitments this time, but Al-Shabaab likely realised it needed to change tack in order to maintain community relations. Al-Shabaab has a track record of turning to guerrilla warfare when it is on the back foot and it has resorted to these tactics of late. Thus far, Somali forces have fought few major battles with the insurgents. The group prefers to preserve its strength, withdrawing from towns before the army's advance in favour of conducting hit-and-run attacks on recovered areas afterward. Sustained military pressure could certainly erode the group's capacity to act as a de facto authority in central Somalia. But Al-Shabaab's ability to exploit government weaknesses leads some observers to believe that the military cannot expect to quash the insurgency, even if it maintains a united front with the clan militias.