[Congressional Record Volume 169, Number 71 (Thursday, April 27, 2023)] [House] [Pages H2056-H2069] From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
Date: 2023-04-27
Chamber: HOUSE
Mr. GAETZ: I yield myself such time as I may consume. It is a great honor to participate in this debate with my esteemed colleague, Mr. Meeks, of the Foreign Affairs Committee, and with a great patriot such as Mr. James of Michigan. I welcome the American people to the second part in a legislative series we are conducting about all of the places on the planet Earth where Congress still believes that 9/11 justifies current U.S. troop presence in 2023. The first in that series was Syria. I came to this floor, only got about 103 votes, but I made the argument that our troops were essentially sitting ducks, guarding oil extraction operations where their presence was known and where their location was easily identifiable. I called for a withdrawal. That withdrawal was defeated. Then what happened is precisely what I predicted, more U.S. casualties from Iranian drones, exactly what I said would occur. It is with no joy I say that. I know all of us would take any policy decision we could to reduce U.S. casualties, and I think this debate will present an excellent opportunity to reflect on Somalia in that light. There are currently 900 U.S. troops in Somalia, give or take, and this resolution would bring them home. Somalia is a country of 17 million who have been tortured at times by Al-Shabaab, a group of roughly 7,000 hardened fighters and even more sympathizers. But to logically believe any of the arguments that my colleagues are making, you have to believe that 900 U.S. troops is what is going to save a country of 17 million from a hardened group of 7,000. I think that strains not only logic but understanding of the history of Somalia, a country that has oscillated between failed state and just absolute coup revolution over and over again, civil war, and sectarian violence. The future of Somalia must be determined by Somalia. To the extent that foreign influences could be helpful, I would argue that the African Union is far better positioned to build a stronger sense of national identity and national unity among clans that have been warring in Somalia for generations than U.S. troops. I have yet to see the evidence that U.S. troops are the essential element to fusing relationships among warring African warlords, clans, and tribes. Now, the British controlled Somalia, and in nearly half a century since, we have seen a constant state of despair. So what is the end state for our military presence in Somalia? Are we going to be the block captain of Mogadishu, presumably forever, until we beat the last sympathy for Al-Shabaab out of the last heart of the last Somali? That was the argument with Syria and ISIS; we have to stay in Syria because there are still people who believe the ISIS ideology. Mr. Speaker, I would argue that the U.S. military is not an effective capability to deploy to defeat an ideology. We are not able to permanently stabilize countries by having a presence that can at times be the very basis for the terrorism recruitment that we seem to work against. There is also an opportunity cost to being in Somalia that I would like to share with the body. I represent constituents who are part of these missions, these train, equip, and advise missions throughout Africa. Increasingly, they are having to enter the INDOPACOM to get analysis and research on the best communication skills, tactical skills and strategic skills that would be necessary if conflict were to erupt in the INDOPACOM theater. What I have observed firsthand is that at times, some of our best and brightest are having to go split squad, where some are wandering about Africa on train-and-equip missions. Then there is less of a focused capability in places where I think America must hold the high ground to ensure the enduring success of our Nation. My colleague from the other side of the aisle made mention of the training that America does in Africa and how critical it is. The problem is, far too often, we are training the next generation of coup leaders. We haven't figured that out yet. I got to ask the question of the leader of AFRICOM: Why so many people who are leading coups in Africa were trained by Americans? He was unable to identity even current leaders of African countries, that they were trained by Americans or that they participated in coups.  Mr. Speaker, I include in the Record a piece from The Intercept: ``AFRICOM Chief to Congress: We share `core values' with coup leaders.''  [From The Intercept, April 10, 2023]  Africom Chief to Congress: We Share ``Core Values'' With Coup Leaders  (By Nick Turse)  In Ghana and Cote d'Ivoire last month, 1,300 U.S., NATO, and African troops met for tactical and mock raids as part of Flintlock 2023, an annual exercise sponsored by U.S. Special Operations Command Africa, or SOCAFRICA. Among the countries participating was Burkina Faso, which has been restricted from receiving substantial U.S. security aid since an officer trained by Americans at previous Flintlock exercises overthrew his democratically elected government in a coup last year. U.S. military officials have spent the last month trying to explain this curious state of affairs to Congress and the press. Flintlock provides a ``critical training opportunity'' for special operations forces from the U.S. and Africa and a chance to ``exchange best practices,'' Rear Adm. Milton ``Jamie'' Sands, the chief of SOCAFRICA, told The Intercept and other reporters on a conference call last month. He didn't mention that, by the Pentagon's own assessments, militant Islamist attacks in the Sahel have spiked and security has plummeted across West Africa since SOCAFRICA began Flintlock trainings in 2005. ``The Sahel now accounts for 40 percent of all violent activity by militant Islamist groups in Africa, more than any other region in Africa,'' reads a recent report: by the Defense Department's Africa Center for Strategic Studies. The four-star general in charge of U.S. Africa Command, or AFRICOM, meanwhile, told the House Armed Services Committee that only a small percentage of U.S.-trained officers overthrow their governments--while admitting he didn't know the exact number. This prompted farright Rep. Matt Gaetz, R- Fla., to ask, ``Why should U.S. taxpayers be paying to train people who then lead coups in Africa?'' Flintlock attendees have conducted at least five coups in the last eight years. Since 2008, in fact, U.S.-trained officers have attempted at least nine coups (and succeeded in at least eight) across five West African countries, including Burkina Faso (three times), Guinea, Mali (three times), Mauritania, and the Gambia. Before he toppled Burkina Faso's democratically elected president in 2022, for example, Lt. Col. Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba attended Flintlock exercises in 2010 and 2020, according to AFRICOM. A fellow Flintlock 2010 attendee, Gen. Gilbert Diendere, overthrew the government of Burkina Faso in 2015. Just a year after he attended Flintlock 2019, Col. Assimi Goita headed the junta that overthrew Mali's government. After staging that coup, Goita stepped down and took the job of vice president in a transitional government tasked with returning Mali to civilian rule. But nine months later, he seized power for a second time. Another alum of Flintlock 2019, Col. Mamady Doumbouya, served as a Guinean unit commander during the exercise, according to AFRICOM. In 2021, members of Doumbouya's unit took time out from being trained in small unit tactics and the law of armed conflict by Green Berets to storm the presidential palace and depose their country's 83-year-old president, Alpha Conde. Doumbouya soon declared himself Guinea's new leader. The U.S. ended the training and distanced itself from the coup. ``Core values is what we start off with,'' Gen. Michael Langley, the AFRICOM chief, told the House Armed Services Committee last month. ``Do we share those values with Col. Doumbouya?'' asked Gaetz.