Fahreddin er-Râzî’ye Göre, Tanrı’da Vücud ve Mahiyetin Aynılığı ve Ayrılığı Meselesi
According to Faḫr Al-Dīn al-Rāzī, the Issue of God's Existence and Essence
Yazar: Çiftçi, Muhammet
Dergi: Bilimname No. 47, 2021
Anahtar kelimeler: Kelam,Fahreddîn er-Râzî,Varlık,Mahiyet ; Theology,Faḫr al-Dīn al-Rāzī,Existence,Essence

Varlık-mahiyet ayrımının ilk versiyonları, her ne kadar Eflatun’a ve Aristoteles’e dayandırılsa da söz konusu ayrımın, Fârâbî ve İbn Sînâ’da felsefî bir “mesele” haline geldiği söylenebilir. Zira bu iki filozofun düşüncesinde, vücud-mahiyet ayrımı meselesi, varlığa ilişkin metafizik çalışmalarda çok önemli bir yeri haizdir ve temel iki soruya dayanmaktadır: Bir şey var mıdır ve var olan bu şey, nedir? İlk soru, daha çok dış dünyadaki şeylerin gerçekliği ile ilgili olup, o şeylerin somut bir şekilde ortaya konmasını amaç edinirken; “var olan şey nedir?” şeklinde ifade edilen ikinci soru ise sorgulanan şeyin ne olduğuyla ilgilenmektedir. Dolayısıyla ikinci soru, mahiyete ilişkin bir sorudur.  Varlık- mahiyet meselesini, Mutezile kelamında da farklı ıstılahlar üzerinden görmek mümkündür. İbn Sînâ ise bu problemi sistemleştirerek daha belirgin hale getirmiştir. Vücud-mahiyet meselesi, hususiyetle İbn Sîna sonrası yaşayan kelamcıların bîgane kalamayıp, etraflıca tartıştıkları konuların başında gelmektedir.

Although the first versions of the existence-essence distinction are based on Plato and Aristotle, it can be said that the said distinction has become a philosophical "issue" in Fârâbî and Avicenna. Because in the thoughts of these two philosophers, the issue of existence-essence distinction has a very important place in metaphysical studies of existence and is based on two basic questions: Is there something and what is this thing that exists? The first question is more about the reality of things in the outside world and aims to present those things in a concrete way; “What exists?” The second question, expressed as the following, deals with what the questioned thing is. Therefore, the second question is a question of essence. It is possible to see the existence-essence issue in Mutezile theology through different terms. Avicenna, on the other hand, systematized this problem and made it more evident. The issue of the existence-essence is one of the issues that the theologians who lived after Ibn Sîna could not remain indifferent and discussed in detail.The issue of distinction of existence-essence has been accepted by almost all philosophers. However, according to Aristotle and Ibn Rushd, this distinction is only logical. According to Fârâbî and Avicenna, this distinction is both logical and ontological.According to Avicenna, the absolute simplicity of God abolishes the existence- essence distinction in God. According to him, it is not in accordance with the principle of simplicity to attribute to God a essence that is separate from his existence. Because God is a simple. If it were unified, it would also have a quiddity, and this quiddity would be a necessary being. If it had a essence/nature, it would be the cause of necessary existence. In this case, God could not be a necessary being in terms of being a necessary being. Therefore, the necessary being has no other nature other than being a necessary being.When Ibn Sînâ says “God has no essence apart from his existence”, he wants to emphasize that His essence and existence cannot be separate things, in other words, that there cannot be a essence that precedes the existence of God.Some theologians, especially Ghazali, criticized Avicenna on this issue. For, the following questions can be asked about the conception of God put forward by Ibn Sînâ: “Can a being without an essence be thought of? Can a word be said about the existence and reality of a being that has no essence, or of something that we cannot say anything about?" In this regard, al-Ghazali claims that neither the reality nor the existence of something that has no essence can be considered.In the same way, we cannot think of a being that has no essence, and if a being does not have a certain nature, we cannot distinguish it from another being. So, it seems that if we are able to know what kind of qualifications a being must have in order to be God, what kind of being can or cannot be God, we must accept that God has a nature and what this nature does or does not contain.It is necessary to distinguish between two approaches to the existence-essence issue. According to the first approach, God has a nature; but this essence cannot exist apart from His existence. According to the second approach, it is not possible to attribute a essence to God. Existence and essence are one and the same thing.At the forefront of Râzî's criticisms of Ibn Sînâ is the issue of the distinction between existence and essence. Due to the central position of this problem in metaphysics with Avicenna, Râzî and later theologians also made various explanations about the existence-essence distinction and developed counter-objections. Râzî deals with this issue in detail in many of his books.According to Râzî, the fact that God has a different essence from his existence does not make Him causal. Indeed, God is sufficient reason for his existence. However, when it comes to possible beings, there is a need for a cause/being that brings together the essence and existence. According to Râzî, it is quite difficult to establish the relationship between God and the universe, based on Ibn Sînâ's conception of God. With this view, Râzî is not only against Avicenna, but also differs from Imam Ash'ari, the founder of his own sect.According to Râzî, the difference between necessary existence and possible existence is that in the former, its essence requires existence, and in the latter, there is no such necessity. God has a unique essence. However, this essence requires existence different from that of possible beings.