Akıl Din Kurabilir Mi? Matthew Tindal’in Doğal Din Anlayışı Üzerine Eleştirel Bir Okuma
Can Reason Establish Religion? A Critical Reading of Matthew Tindal's Understanding of Natural Religion
Yazar: Kar, Sait
Dergi: Dinbilimleri Akademik Araştırma Dergisi, Vol. 26 No. 1, 2025
Anahtar kelimeler: Philosophy of Religion ; Din Felsefesi ; Din Felsefesi,Aydınlanma,Hakiki Din,İçsel Vahiy,İlahi Adalet ; Philosophy of Religion,Enlightenment,True Religion,Inner Revelation,Divine Justice

Bu çalışma, İngiliz deizmi içinde Matthew Tindal’in doğal din projesini din felsefesi açısından eleştirel-analitik bir okuma ile yeniden değerlendirerek “Dinin temeli akıl olabilir mi?” sorusunu tartışmaktadır. Çalışma dört adımda ilerler: (i) Aydınlanma ve İngiliz deizmi bağlamında Tindal’in konumu belirlenir; (ii) aklı vahyin ölçütü sayan epistemolojisi analiz edilir; (iii) Tanrı’yı değişmez rasyonalite ve ilahi adalet ilkesi etrafında temellendiren tasavvuru incelenir; (iv) din-ahlak özdeşliği ve vahiy/mucize eleştirisi, aklın din için kurucu olup olamayacağı açısından sınanır. Makalenin temel iddiası, Tindal’in yaklaşımının teolojik keyfiliğe karşı güçlü bir rasyonel denetim sunduğu; ancak insan aklını yeknesak ve tarih-dışı varsaydığı ölçüde dinin tarihsel, sembolik ve topluluk kurucu boyutlarını açıklamakta zorlandığıdır. Sonuç olarak çalışma, aklın din için vazgeçilmez bir ölçüt olmakla birlikte tek başına kurucu ilke kılındığında din olgusunu daraltma riski taşıdığını savunur.

This article offers a critical assessment of Matthew Tindal’s natural-religion project and his interpretation of reason from the standpoint of philosophy of religion. Situating Tindal within the English Enlightenment and the deist movement, the study examines his claim that genuine religion is identical with a universal moral law accessible to every rational agent. On this basis, Tindal argues that revelation can be meaningful only insofar as it reiterates what reason already knows; miracles and doctrinal mysteries therefore lack independent epistemic authority.The paper proceeds in four steps. First, it reconstructs Tindal’s historical and intellectual context, noting why Christianity as Old as the Creation was received as a central deist text. Second, it analyzes his account of reason and revelation. Reason is portrayed not merely as a human faculty but as an “inner revelation” implanted by God; hence there is no middle position between being governed by one’s own reason or by external authority. Consequently, any alleged revelation that contradicts reason must be rejected as non-divine. Third, the article explores Tindal’s concept of God and divine justice. God is identified with the “eternal reason of things”; divine will is necessarily rational and just, not arbitrary. This commitment places Tindal on the second horn of the Euthyphro dilemma: God commands the good because it is good, and moral norms are grounded in the rational nature of reality. Finally, the paper discusses Tindal’s ethics and his thesis of the universality of natural morality, together with his critique of historical revelation and miracles.The evaluation highlights both the strengths and the limits of Tindal’s program. Positively, his model offers a strong antidote to theological voluntarism and to religious practices that demand assent to unintelligible propositions. By tying religion to universally shareable moral reasons, Tindal safeguards the intelligibility of faith, defends the autonomy of ethics, and insists that divine justice must accord with human moral conscience. His insistence that Scripture is given for understanding anticipates later Enlightenment critiques of priestcraft and provides a template for rational theism.Yet the paper argues that Tindal overextends the competence of reason. He treats human rationality as uniform, ahistorical, and largely free from cultural and psychological conditioning. In light of persistent moral and religious pluralism, the idea of a single natural religion that every “sound mind” will acknowledge becomes difficult to sustain. Equally important, reducing religion to morality risks eclipsing the experiential, ritual, symbolic, and communal dimensions through which historical religions shape meaning and identity. His contention that any new revelation would imply divine imperfection also presupposes a static model of revelation; alternative accounts—such as pedagogical or progressive revelation—interpret historical disclosure as deepening rather than correcting natural knowledge.In conclusion, Tindal’s emphasis on reason and natural religion remains a vital reminder that faith cannot be divorced from rational and moral accountability. However, the article maintains that reason is a necessary but not sufficient foundation for religion: when revelation, historical experience, and community are excluded, religion survives only in a reduced and incomplete form.