Bilgi ve Gerçeklik: Nasîrüddin Tûsî Açısından Nefsü’l-Emrin Epistemolojik Boyutu
Knowledge and Reality: The Epistemological Dimension of Nafs al-Amr according to Nasir al-Din al-Tusi
Yazar: Yurtkuran, Muhammet
Dergi: Bilimname No. 53, 2024
Anahtar kelimeler: Islamic Philosophy ; İslam Felsefesi ; Logic ; Mantık ; Kalam ; Kelam ; Kalam,Nasir al-Din al-Tûsî,Nafs al-amr,Truth,Theory of Consensus ; Kelam,Nasîrüddin Tûsî,Nefsü’l-emr,Gerçeklik,Mutabakat Teorisi

Bu çalışmada, İslam düşünce geleneğinin önemli kavramlarından biri olan nefsü’l-emr kavramı epistemolojik açıdan ve Nasirüddin Tûsî merkezinde incelenmektedir. Tûsî, nefsü’l-emre dair kaleme aldığı “İsbâtu’l-‘akli’l-mücerred” adlı risalesinde ve “Tecrîd” adlı kitabındaki bir pasajda nefsü’l-emr konusunu ele almış ve onu “faal akılda bulunan akledilirler” olarak tanımlamıştır. Tûsî’nin zikredilen eserlerine yazılan şerh ve haşiyeler başta olmak üzere birçok eserde nefsü’l-emr meselesi tartışılmış ve Tûsî’nin nefsü’l-emr tanımına yönelik eleştiriler yöneltilmiştir. Tûsî’yi eleştiren düşünürler kendi nefsü’l-emr anlayışlarını ortaya koymuş ve bunun neticesinde birçok nefsü’l-emr tanımı ortaya çıkmıştır. Nefsü’l-emr meselesiyle ilgilenen düşünürler dış dünyada (haricî) ya da zihinde (zihnî) bir gerçekliğe sahip nesnelerle ilgili bilgilerin nefsü’l-emre mutabık olarak doğruluk değeri kazandığı konusunda genel bir kanaate sahip olmuşlardır. Fakat Tûsî nefsü’l-emri daha çok zihnî önermelerin doğruluk ölçütü olarak görmüş, haricî önermelerin doğruluğu için dışa (hariç) mutabakatın gerektiğini belirtmiştir. Böylece önermelerin nefsü’l-emre mutabakatı, önermelerin özne ve yükleminin varlık tarzına göre farklı şekillerde değerlendirilmiştir. Buna göre önermeler; “özne ve yüklemi haricî”, “öznesi haricî, yüklemi zihnî” ve “özne ve yüklemi zihnî” olan önermeler olarak farklı şekillerde ele alınmıştır. Yine önermenin öznesinin tikel ya da tümel olması önermenin nefsü’l-emre mutabakatının keyfiyetini etkilediği görülmüştür. Ayrıca dış dünyada ya da zihinde bir gerçekliği bulunmayan mümteni nesnelerle ilgili önermelerin nefsü’l-emre mutabakatı da tartışılmıştır. Sonuç olarak, Meşşâî felsefe geleneğinden etkilenen kelamcı bir alim olan Tûsî’nin nefsü’l-emr yorumunun, İslam düşüncesinde bilgi ve gerçeklik ilişkisini nasıl etkilediğini göstermek hedeflenmiştir. Bu bağlamda, nefsü’l-emrin bilgi teorisine katkısı, düşünsel bir zenginlik sunmakta ve epistemolojik tartışmalar için yeni bir zemin hazırlamaktadır.

This study investigates the concept of nafs al-amr, a pivotal notion in Islamic thought, through an epistemological lens, focusing on Nasir al-Din al-Tusi’s interpretation. Tusi discusses the concept of nafs al-amr in his treatise “İsbâtu’l-‘akli’l-mücerred” and a passage from his book “Tecrîd” defining it as “the intelligibles found in the active intellect”. The issues surrounding nafs al-amr have been debated in many works, including commentaries and glosses written on Tusi’s mentioned works, where several critiques have been directed at Tusi’s definition of nafs al-amr. Thinkers who critique Tusi have put forth alternative conceptions. Scholars interested in the nafs al-amr issue generally agree that knowledge of objects, whether external (haricî) or mental (zihnî), gains its truth value in accordance with nafs al-amr. However, Tusi primarily views nafs al-amr as a criterion for the truth of mental propositions, indicating that external agreement is necessary for the truth of external propositions. Thus, the agreement of propositions with nefsü’l-emr is evaluated in different ways according to the mode of existence of the subject and predicate. Accordingly, propositions are categorized as those with (1) both subject and predicate external, (2) an external subject and mental predicate, or (3) both subject and predicate mental. It has also been observed that whether the subject of a proposition is particular or universal affects the quality of its agreement with nafs al-amr. Additionally, propositions about impossible objects -entities lacking reality in both the external world and the mind- are analyzed in terms of their alignment with nafs al-amr.  Accordingly, for Tūsī, the criterion for the truth of particular propositions concerning sensibles is the sensory external world. Such propositions do not attain truth value by conforming to nafs al-amr, as sensory particulars are subject to change, whereas nafs al-amr comprises immutable intelligibles. For true conformity to occur, the conforming entity and the entity it conforms to must possess the same characteristics. In universal propositions about sensibles, however, the situation differs. According to Tūsī, these propositions gain truth value through conformity to both the external world and nafs al-amr, as universals are unchanging truths and thus can conform to nafs al-amr without issue. Moreover, since universal external objects have instances in the external world, these propositions can also gain truth value through conformity to the external world. For propositions about intellectual entities that exist externally but are non-sensory, the truth criterion must be considered in two contexts. When viewed in terms of the conformity of judgments within the human mind, since the human mind cannot directly observe external intellectual entities, such judgments acquire truth value by conforming to nafs al-amr. However, when judgments are considered independently of the human mind, the truth of judgments about external intellectual entities also depends on their alignment with the external world. Regarding propositions with both a mental subject and a mental predicate, Tūsī asserts that their truth depends on their conformity to nafs al-amr, as mental entities do not exist in the external world; their reality lies within nafs al-amr. For propositions with an external subject and a mental predicate, if the predicate is not a concept of non-existence, these propositions attain value through conformity to nafs al-amr. If the predicate is a non-existent concept, then for propositions with a particular subject, the criterion of truth is the external world, while for those with a universal subject, the criterion of truth is both the external world and nafs al-amr. In the alignment of propositions with nafs al-amr, propositions concerning objects with an actual reality are taken into account. According to Tusi, imaginary objects lack any reality; hence, propositions about them fall outside the scope of this discussion. However, the case of impossible objects, which lack existence in both the external and mental realms, is different. This is because it is possible for propositions concerning such objects to convey a certain truth. Our ability to speak of truth or conformity to nafs al-amr in judgments about impossible entities becomes feasible by interpreting these judgments as a form of negation. From this perspective, the truth of judgments about impossible entities should be considered in terms of their impossibility in either the external world or the mind and should be understood within a similar framework to the negative propositions discussed above regarding external and mental entities.