Gemilerin etkili gemi trafik hizmetleri raporlamaları önünde engel teşkil eden risk faktörleri
Risk factors preventing ships from effective vessel traffic service reporting
Yazar: SELAHATTİN ALAN
Danışman: DOÇ. DR. ELİF BAL BEŞİKÇİ
İstanbul Teknik Üniversitesi / Lisansüstü Eğitim Enstitüsü / Deniz Ulaştırma Mühendisliği Ana Bilim Dalı / Deniz Ulaştırma Mühendisliği Bilim Dalı
Derece: Yüksek Lisans, 2024
Konu: Denizcilik = Marine
Dizin: Denizcilik = Maritime

Özet:
Gemi Trafik Hizmetleri (GTH), deniz trafiğinin emniyetli ve verimli bir şekilde
yönetilmesine olanak sağlayan önemli bir sistemdir. Gemilerin seyir halindeyken ve
alargada düzenli raporlama yapması, yalnızca GTH sisteminin etkili çalışmasını
sağlamakla kalmaz aynı zamanda denizde meydana gelebilecek olası tehlikelerin
önlenmesine de katkı sunar. Ancak, gemilerden ve operasyonlardan kaynaklı birçok
risk faktörü GTH raporlamalarının doğruluğunu etkileyebilir. Bu faktörler, insan
hataları, mesleki bilgi noksanlığı, durum farkındalığı, materyal eksikliği ve acil durum
yönetiminde oluşabilecek pek çok risk faktörünü içermektedir.
Hata Türü ve Etkileri Analizi (FMEA); üretim, otomotiv, havacılık, sağlık hizmetleri,
yönetim ve denizcilik gibi geniş bir yelpazede kullanılan niteliksel veya yarı niceliksel
bir risk değerlendirme yöntemidir. Bu analiz yöntemi, süreçlerde ortaya çıkabilecek
olası hata türlerini, bu hataların nedenlerini ve olası etkilerini sistematik bir şekilde
tanımlar. Her bir hata türü için risk puanlaması yapılarak olası hatalar için önleyici
tedbirler geliştirilir ve risk seviyeleri azaltılır. FMEA, operasyonel süreçlerde tüm hata
türlerini ele alarak bu hataların etkilerini belirler. Böylece ürün veya hizmet kalitesini
ve güvenilirliğini artırır. Aynı zamanda, kurumsal itibara ve güvenlik kültürüne
olumlu katkı sağlar.
Bu çalışmada, denizcilik sektörünün hızlı değişimleri ve gelişimleri göz önüne
alındığında, Türk Boğazları Raporlama Sistemleri (TÜBRAP), sektör geçiş
raporlamalarının ve acil durum raporlamalarının etkinliğini engelleyen risk faktörleri
üzerinde durulmuştur. İncelemeler, acentaların, gemi işletmelerinin ve gemilerin SP1
(Seyir Planı 1) raporlamalarında eksikler ve yanlışlar, SP2 (Seyir Planı 2)
raporlamalarındaki hatalar, sektör geçiş raporlamalarındaki dalgınlıklar, acil durum
raporlarında bilgi ve tecrübe eksikliğinden kaynaklı yapılan yanlışlıklar gibi ana
unsurlar FMEA yöntemi ile analiz edilmiştir.
Yapılan analizler, Türk Boğazları gibi yüksek yoğunluklu gemi trafiğine sahip deniz
alanlarında GTH raporlama sistemlerinin emniyetli ve etkili bir şekilde işlemesi
açısından risk yönetimine yönelik önemli bulgular ortaya koymuştur. Elde edilen
bulgulara göre, özellikle acil durum raporlamalarında yüksek oranda risk faktörleri
görülmüş olup, durum farkındalığı eksikliği, bilgi ve tecrübe yetersizliği ve ticari
baskı/kaygılar gibi sebeplerden kaynaklanan bu risklerin azaltılması hedeflenmiştir.
Ayrıca, gemi kaptanları, zabitler, acentalar ve gemi işletmecilerinin Türk Boğazları
Deniz Trafik Düzeni Yönetmeliği (TBDTDY) ve raporlama prosedürlerine dair bilgi
düzeylerinin artırılması amacıyla eğitim programlarının geliştirilmesi gerekliliği tespit
edildi. İletişim eksikliklerinin giderilmesi amacıyla Standart Denizcilik Haberleşme
Cümleleri (SMCP) iletişim kalıplarının GTH gereksinimlerine göre yeniden
düzenlenmesi öneriler arasındadır. Riskli gemilerin geçişlerinde, Denizcilik Genel
Müdürlüğü (İdare) kılavuz kaptan ve römorkör refakati zorunluluğu getirilmesi ve
raporlama süreçlerini ihlal eden gemi işletenlerine yönelik TBDTDY'de ve Limanlar
Yönetmeliği'nde caydırıcı idari yaptırımların uygulanması öngörülmektedir.
Çalışma, gemiler etkin GTH raporlaması önünde engel teşkil eden risk faktörlerinin
azaltılmasına yönelik ciddi iyileşme sağlamasının yanı sıra seyir emniyetini artırmada
önemli katkılar sunacağını ortaya koymaktadır. Araştırmanın sonuçları, mevcut
raporlama süreçlerinin optimizasyonuna katkıda bulunarak, olası risklerin önceden
tespiti ve yönetimi için karar destek mekanizmalarının geliştirilmesine ilişkin somut
öneriler sunmaktadır. Bu nedenle bu çalışma, GTH raporlama süreçlerinin deniz trafiği
yönetiminde daha emniyetli ve sürdürülebilir bir yapıya dönüştürülmesine önemli
katkılar sağlamaktadır.

Abstract:
Vessel Traffic Services (VTS) is an important system that enables safe and efficient
management of maritime traffic. Regular reporting by vessels while underway and on
alert not only ensures the effective operation of the VTS system, but also contributes
to the prevention of potential hazards at sea. However, many risk factors from ships
and operations can affect the accuracy of VTS reporting. These factors include human
error, lack of professional knowledge, situational awareness, lack of materials and
many other risk factors that may occur in emergency management.
The Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) is a qualitative or semi-quantitative
risk assessment method used in a wide range of industries such as manufacturing,
automotive, aerospace, healthcare, management and maritime. This analysis method
systematically identifies the possible types of failures that can occur in processes, the
causes and possible effects of these failures. The risk is scored for each type of failure,
preventive measures are developed for possible failures and risk levels are reduced.
FMEA identifies the effects of these errors by considering all types of errors in
operational processes. Thus, it improves product or service quality and reliability. It
also contributes positively to corporate reputation and safety culture.
This study focuses on the risk factors that hinder the effectiveness of the Turkish Straits
Reporting Systems (TSRS), sector transition reporting and emergency reporting, given
the rapid changes and developments in the maritime sector. The investigations, the
main facts such as deficiencies and inaccuracies in SP1 (Sailing Plan 1) reporting of
ship agencies, masters, watchkeeping officers, ship operators and vessels, errors in SP2
(Sailing Plan 2) reporting, distractions in sector passage reporting, mistakes made due
to lack of knowledge and experience in emergency reports were analyzed by FMEA
method.
The analyses revealed important findings on risk management for the safe and
effective operation of VTS reporting systems in maritime areas with high vessel traffic
such as the Turkish Straits. According to the findings, high risk factors were observed
especially in emergency reporting and it was aimed to reduce these risks due to reasons
such as lack of situational awareness, lack of knowledge and experience and
commercial pressure/concerns. In addition, it was realized that training programs
should be developed to increase the level of knowledge of masters, watchkeeping
officers, agents and ship operators on the Turkish Straits Maritime Traffic Regulation
(TSMTR) and reporting procedures. In order to overcome communication
deficiencies, it was suggested that Standard Maritime Communication Clauses
(SMCP) communication patterns should be revised according to the VTS
requirements. It is proposed that the General Directorate of Maritime Affairs
(Administration) should introduce the obligation of pilot and tug escort for the noncalling of risky vessels and that deterrent administrative sanctions should be applied
in TBDTDY and Ports Regulation for ship operators who violate the reporting
processes.
The study provides a significant improvement in reducing the risk factors that
constitute obstacles to effective VTS reporting, as well as making significant
contributions to increase the safety of shipping. Research results contribute to the
optimization of existing reporting processes and provide concrete recommendations
for the development of decision support mechanisms for the early detection and
management of potential risks. Therefore, this study contributes to the transformation
of VTS reporting processes into a safer and more sustainable structure in maritime
traffic management.
It has been observed that adapting the FMEA methodology to the effective VTS
reporting processes of ships contributes to a 45% improvement in methodology. The
contribution of FMEA management in terms of implementation lies in providing
guidance on how it can be applied to VTS reporting processes. Among the identified
error types, risk factors related to emergency reporting constitute the majority at
42.7%. When examining the risk factors associated with emergency reporting, the
error types identified include lack of knowledge about emergency procedures,
commercial pressures/concerns, late recognition of emergencies, and failure to notify
VTS in a timely manner. The underlying causes of these error types are factors such
as lack of situational awareness, differences in risk perception, focusing solely on the
safety of one's own ship, lack of responsibility, failure to act prudently, lack of
knowledge and experience, carelessness, and negligence. Particularly in errors
originating from shipmasters, officers, agents, and ship operators, factors such as
commercial pressures/concerns, lack of knowledge and experience, lack of situational
awareness, concerns about time and financial losses, pressure from shipowners,
carelessness, and distraction increase the likelihood of these errors occurring. When
examining the risk factors that hinder effective VTS reporting by ships, it has been
observed that agents, ship operators, shipmasters, and navigating officers are not wellversed in the Turkish Straits Maritime Traffic Regulations and Application Guidelines,
Ports Regulation, Turkish Straits VTS User Guide, COLREG 72, IALA/VTS, and
SMCP reporting rules. Additionally, difficulties stemming from the reporting system
specific to the Turkish Straits and the lack of full awareness of the associated risks
have been identified. To minimize the risk factors hindering effective VTS reporting
by ships, it is recommended to increase the knowledge and situational awareness of
agents, ship operators, shipmasters, and navigating officers. This can be achieved by
preparing an educational module that includes content on the importance of the
Turkish Straits, VTS, traffic flow and management in the Straits, TBDTD regulations
and application guidelines, Turkish Straits VTS User Guide, COLREG 72,
IALA/VTS, SMCP reporting rules, and emergency response procedures. This training
module should be provided as part of the IMO/STCW framework under the title of
Turkish Straits Familiarization Training and be certified accordingly.
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For situations that are difficult, very difficult, or nearly impossible to detect, as
identified in the error type analysis, it is crucial to continuously remind ships passing
through the Turkish Straits to strongly consider taking a pilot on board, as
recommended by IMO Resolution A.827(19). In this context, it has been clearly
demonstrated in the study that legal regulations mandating the compulsory use of a
pilot for ships making non-stop transits through the Turkish Straits would reduce
potential risks that hinder effective VTS reporting by ships and increase navigational
safety. For SP1 and SP2 reports, the importance of detecting intentional non-reporting
of defects, deficiencies, and malfunctions by agents, ship operators, and shipmasters
becomes evident. After the pilot joins the ship, carrying out necessary checks at the
earliest appropriate time and verifying the ship's information through the company
ERP system is essential.
To enhance the situational awareness of maritime traffic operators in the Turkish
Straits region, it is recommended to measure and evaluate the situational awareness of
Vessel Traffic Supervisior Operators and Vessel Traffic Operators using scientific
methods (e.g., SATEST, PMI-P). Based on the results obtained, efforts to improve
operator situational awareness should be implemented, including supportive
simulations and case study/toolbox training sessions. Additionally, vessel traffic
operators should be employed and shift schedules prepared to ensure that they work in
the sector for no more than 2 hours at a time, in accordance with IALA/V-103-1
standards. Decision-support systems that enhance situational awareness and align with
advancing technology should also be developed.
The monitoring and guidance of international commercial vessel traffic within the
Turkish Straits system are conducted via VHF communication using SMCP standard
phrases. However, it has been observed that SMCP phrases are insufficient to fully
meet the needs of VTS communication. The inadequacy of standard phrases in SMCP
necessitates deviations from the SMCP framework during ship communication,
occasionally leading to misunderstandings. To address this issue, it is recommended
that a new set of standard phrases for VTS communication be developed within the
framework of IALA or that the VTS communication section of the existing SMCP be
revised and improved. These updates should then be published as an international
guide and communicated to ships.