Tasarımda bilgi ve değer sorunsalının tarih öncesi taş alet teknolojisi üzerinden incelenmesi
Investigation of the information and value problem in design on the prehistorical stone tool technology
Yazar: MURAD BABADAĞ
Danışman: DOÇ. DR. OĞUZ HAŞLAKOĞLU
İstanbul Teknik Üniversitesi / Lisansüstü Eğitim Enstitüsü / Sanat Tarihi Ana Bilim Dalı / Sanat Tarihi Bilim Dalı
Derece: Doktora, 2021
Konu: Antropoloji = Anthropology ; Endüstri Ürünleri Tasarımı = Industrial Design ; Felsefe = Philosophy
Dizin: Bilgi = Information ; Bilgi felsefesi = Information philosopy ; Değerler = Values ; Endüstriyel tasarım = Industrial design ; Etik = Ethics ; Tasarım = Design ; Taş aletler = Stone tools

Özet:
Tezin esas meselesi olarak, 'iyi tasarım' kavramı önce değer bağlamında, Platoncu bir kavram olan poiesis (eski Yunanca yapma/ortaya çıkarma) ilişkisi üzerinden, bilginin değere dönüşmesi ve 'iyi' çerçevesinden, sonra da, çağdaş tasarım yaklaşımlarıyla kıyaslanarak irdelenecektir. İnsanın tasarım yoluyla bilgi ve değer bağlamı üzerinden kendisini bir tür olarak nasıl doğayı araçsallaştırarak ayrıcalıklı bir konuma getirdiği, ilk taş alet teknolojisi örneğinde incelenerek ortaya konulmaya çalışılacaktır. Alet yapmak sayesinde bir yandan, yapma bilgisini elde etmek, korumak ve aktarmak yollarını öğrenir ve deneyimlerken, diğer yandan da yaptığı aletin işlevini doğrudan ve tam olarak yerine getirmesi sayesinde de, değer kavramına ulaşması araştırılacaktır.  Böylece 'yapma' eylemi üzerinden bilgi ve değer bağlamının nasıl bizatihi insanın 'olma' esasında kendisini ürettiği araştırılacaktır.
Tez konusu esastan üç farklı kavramla analiz edilmiş, dolayısıyla bu üç kavram sayesinde kendisini destekleyecek açılardan ele alınmıştır. Bu üç farklı kavramın birincisi faaliyetin aktif olarak katılımcısı olarak fail'in, failleşme süreci olan evrimle ilgilidir ve tezin konusu olması itibariyle birlikte çalışan nörolojik yetiler olarak hafıza ve hayal gücünün aktif hale geçme sürecini içerir. Diğerleri ise "değer" bağlamında Etik ve bir yapma pratiği olarak Tasarım kavramıdır.
Sonuç ürünü olan bir eylem biçimi olarak tasarım yapma pratiği, hafıza ve hayal gücü vasıtasıyla geçmiş ve gelecek zaman kiplerinin içinde eylemek ve bu yüzden kaybettiği şimdiki zamanın hem içinde hem de dışında olabilmektir. Doğası gereği yapıcı-yıkıcı bir eylem olan tasarım faaliyeti sırasında hafıza ve hayal gücü eşzamanlı olarak çalışırken, faaliyet anında kendini dışardan izleyen zihin/göz, fiiliyatın an be an şahidi olur. Poietik faaliyet sayesinde üç zaman kipi, geniş bir şimdinin içinde buluşurlar.
Metin boyunca, ilk taş alet teknolojisi örneği ele alınarak, bir tür olarak Homo Sapiens'in Platoncu mahiyette yapma-olma/auto-poiesis bağlamı üzerinden nasıl kendine bir Dünya sahnesini açtığı konusu ele alınmıştır.  Aletin nicelik ve nitelik analizlerini yaparak, onun 'iyi' olup olmadığına karar vermek ancak ideolojik ve ekonomik fayda amaçlıdır. Doğadan özgürleşmeyi sağlayan pragmatik değerler, bu araçsallaştırmadan da kurtularak hürleşme bağlamında özellikle aşılması gereken değerlerdir. Bu anlamda 'iyi' yapılmaktan öte, olunan bir şeydir. Yapma-olma vasıtasıyla sahip olduğumuz değerler, bizi aynı şekilde, bugüne kadar kullandığımız pragma değerlerinden de hürleştirmelidir. İnsanoğlunun örtük olan esas amacı, kendi doğası gibi görünen bu araçsallaşmadan da hürleşme olmalıdır. Tez boyunca bu iddialar, farklı disiplinler ve bakış açıları ışığında gerekçelendirilecektir.

Abstract:
This thesis first examines the concept of "good design" in the context of virtue, with respect to the making/becoming relation, as part of knowledge turning into virtue and the concept of 'good', then compares it to the contemporary approaches of design - again with respect to the Platonic concept Poiesis (making/becoming) relation. An explanation of how humans privilege themselves as a species by using nature as an instrument by means of design based on the contexts of knowledge and virtue will be attempted. The fact that humans learn and experience the ways of acquiring the knowledge of making, of protecting and transferring that knowledge on one hand, on the other hand, they attain the concept of virtue through the tool they have made that functions properly and completely will be discussed. In this way, how the context of knowledge and virtue produces itself in the principle of 'being' that is actually of humans will be investigated through the action of 'making'.
Throughout the thesis, the issue of how Homo Sapiens as a species walk into the world scene via the context of making-becoming/auto-poiesis in a Platonic manner is examined in terms of the first stone tool technology. The pragmatic virtues that enable the liberation from nature are virtues that should be overcome by getting rid of this instrumentalization in the context of liberation. In this respect, 'good' is not something to be made, it is rather something to be. The virtues we achieved by means of making-becoming should liberate us from the pragma virtues that we have used to date in the same way. The implicit and main goal of humanity should be the liberation from this instrumentalization that looks as though it is human nature.

Introduction

Approximately three and a half million years ago, somewhere in the middle of Africa, a primate  species, turns a physical force that they experienced in nature into something visible, tangible and usable by confining it to some material. It is observed that other species also take  advantage of nature by directly using it as a means (leverage), however, it is not observed that this kind of behavior ever turns into the actual production of tools in any species other than humankind. 
Transforming some natural material into a useful tool requires a cognitive process that is prolonged and presumably complex. There is, of course, a biological process that brought hominids to a milestone prior to this cognitive process. This milestone is to come to the realization of their lack of the organons that fall out from their body and their lack of the organons that serve to cut off/tear-off/dismember, the skills that they themselves have to develop. That is, they compensate what they have become lacking in the course of evolution by a neurological procurement. Once they are able to use their "cutting" power as a proto-concept to shape the material, a production activity emerges. They use the power that they experienced in nature on a material in a mimetic way and by shaping it so that they get to manage this power, hence, its effect. Thanks to the process operating this way, the concept (cutting) is embodied in the stone tool. The concept manifests itself in the purpose of the use of the tool, as its function. The memory operability increases due to the fact that hominids store this experience of the cutting power as the doer of the action as well as their self-consciousness in their mind. This experience of the maker of the stone tool is actually experiencing the self. Since anticipating/imagining a useful tool in processing time when looking at a raw material can be regarded as anticipating/planning/imagining the future, it can be said that hominids' tense markers were revealed in the long term. Hominids as a doer or maker tamed nature by appropriating it via the proto-concept of 'cutting'. Learning by making brings in the knowledge of making. 

Knowledge transforming into Virtue

The human mind evaluates the process in the context of causality (action-reaction) based on the result. The classifications/taxonomy made in order to understand and interpret something are generally done based on the result and sometimes through reverse engineering starting from the result. The essence of a 'thing'/tool as a collection of qualities is generally understood by segmenting its elements. 
What we should keep in mind is that hominids' survival instinct is the reason why hominids as the maker made the tool, in other words, hominids are 'pushed' by nature to make the tool. Therefore, hominids took the first steps of independence and autonomy as the doer/maker. Hominids' liberation from nature is actually liberation from instincts. However, this liberation should not be considered as the elimination of instincts. It is only the liberation from the pressure and unidirectionality of instincts as a species.
Nature is contingent because possibilities of nature are infinitely many. That is, anything can happen anytime, yet nature's contingency is not alone, it is intertwined with 'obligation'. These two concepts are the essential principles of causality. It does not seem possible to decide which one comes first because there is again the dialectic of two concepts that are intertwined. As a result, living beings that have the ability to react (it does not matter if it is an animal or a plant) feel the obligation to react to the natural force that they have been exposed to, that seems contingent to them, and they do something about it. Hominids converted natural stone into an obligation over which they could have power. The action of 'cutting' performed on the stone tool can be regarded as the internalization of this natural force by performing it on the material, hence, mimicking it. Therefore, if the reason for cutting is taken to be the force, causality can be considered to have been mimicked. As a result, the mimetic repetition (hence, appropriation) of the natural force reforms as knowledge (knowledge of making / tekhné). Once hominids are able to transfer this knowledge to the next generation, they start forming their own culture as a species. As soon as they claimed one of the many forces that they were exposed to in nature, they realized that they could claim others, as well. Consequently, they managed to appropriate other forces (especially fire) over the course of both biological and cultural evolution. Hominids, in fact, instrumentalized as soon as they started using a force originating from the natural environment they were in. It can even be said that they instrumentalized their own body in order to copy and use it. At the heart of the nature of humankind lies instrumentalization. Yet humankind that got liberated through the instrumentalization now has a responsibility for the world they got liberated from. As hominids have control over causality, this effect affects the cause (the instincts nature gave the doer/maker) and alters the way the system operates. From then on, hominids actively take part in the operation of the system as the doer/maker. As soon as they have the knowledge, they become dependent on themselves. The virtue of pragma that comes about via tool making is only possible when what is common to the species is put into use. Hominids establish their own nature with the virtue context that knowledge has brought to them by recognizing their own potential. As virtue originates from knowledge (the knowledge of making/tekhné), knowledge turns into the norm through cultural evolution. This transformation implies the establishment of belonging/ethnos, knowledge is transferred only in this way. Virtue keeps the commonness of belonging in the context of purpose/telos. Independent of the pragma function of the tool, this is exactly what its main/implicit purpose is. If we focus only on the pragma function, the human nature will seem accidental due to humankind's ability to instrumentalize anything as explained before. The only way for this to be no more an issue is that humans take responsibility for their 'actions' and they know/understand they should use their virtues, which they have acquired via the pragmatic outcomes they obtained, to establish and protect humanity as a species. 

The Essence of the Concept of Design

In order to discuss the effects of 'good' in the context of virtues that hominids as doer/maker established on the concept of 'design', one should first examine this concept. It seems that the action of making and design are two inseparable concepts because the unrealized design that lingers in mind is not able to create its own world yet. As a matter of fact, the word project that means 'a represented idea' in today's design terminology derives from the Italian word 'pro-getto' meaning 'to throw forth' and the word product derives from the Italian word 'pro-duttivo' meaning 'to bring forth', which makes sense. 
When we approach the issue in the context of Ancient Greek philosophy, these etymological definitions will be even more meaningful. According to Aristotle, knowing something is knowing its causes. As for the topic of the present study, we can think of 'cutting' as the force itself and the potential of a sharp material to cut.
The thinker suggests that there are four causes that enable anything and the entire universe to exist:
● Causa materialis (the material): the implicit material that constitutes something as part of it
● Causa formalis (the form that contains the material): the essence (model) according to Aristotle
● Causa finalis (the purpose, teological cause): the purpose that something is for (telos)
● Causa efficiens (doer/maker): the first principle that the change originates from, the decision-maker
Given these, there needs to be a doer/maker as a decision-maker and a purpose/telos for a tool to exist. Then comes the appropriate material/hyle (here, in this article, stone) and the final form/morphé of this material. It should be noted that these four causes are the relatively reduced versions of the concept of 'eidos/substance' that Aristotle took from his master Platon. Hence, in the coming sections, the discussion will continue with the 'model' that both thinkers assume. As mentioned before, the form as we know it today is contingent, it is infinite. However, the model does not change, in other words, it is not subject to change. As a result, the model could also be called the form of the forms. The work/ergon is done for the purpose/telos of existence. That is, the essence/eidos of ergon is seen in its purpose/telos. Therefore, the purpose/telos is the substance/arche of the work/ergon. The natural force/dynamis generates the work/ergon thanks to know-how[completion?]/entelekheia and the productive action/energia. What is remarkable here is the following: tele in the word entelekheia that means completion in the Ancient Greek refers to telos while erge in energeia refers to ergon. As Heidegger emphasizes, 'causa finalis', or the purpose/telos is the determiner of the entire cause as a criterion. Heidegger describes what the tool owes its existence to as first the purpose/telos and then the agent (as its maker). When the purpose/telos that is the original cause appears, the other causes follow it obligatorily. Although the tool must manifest itself in the mind of its maker for it to come into existence, this manifestation as the maker's need results from the purpose/telos. The Ancient Greek correspondent of the Latin word 'causa' is aition and when Heidegger looks at the etymology of this word, he sees that it does not only mean 'cause' but actually it also means 'responsibility, to be responsible' ('to lead' derived from the same root). The existence purpose/telos of the tool is in fact its maker's cause/aitia. As a matter of fact, as soon as the production process finishes, the maker of the tool sees his/her purpose/telos in the tool, which means he/she sees himself/herself in it. As soon as the making of the tool is over, the tool creates its own stage, yet the agent is on the stage as its maker until the process is over. In fact, the history of humanity starts at the moment when the maker/agent conceives the idea of making the tool, not when the process over and the tool has been made. Hence, the purpose/telos of the tool makes its maker/agent exist, not after the process ends but once the idea of making it appears in the mind of the agent/maker. 
The only thing the maker can do is to establish his/her own existence and world mimetically and reflectively thanks to that 'thing'. The agent sees his/her uniqueness in the tool. As mentioned at the beginning, the agent shapes himself/herself as a tool through the tool he/she has made. Once the making of the tool is over, the tool is particular. However, with its virtue context, it becomes universal. Its virtue is in fact this universality. It should be noted here that 'obligation' and the first act of 'making' in history give way to all these in the first place. The word 'de-signum' in Latin where the first words appeared in written history defines a designation. This definition is the designation of the maker based on the work/ergon done.
Knowledge of doing/making is subject to choice due to knowledge's nature. A decision/judgment is made this way. Making establishes the norm, by which it makes choices every moment. While knowledge includes certain things in making, it excludes opponents. This exclusion is only possible by means of the boundaries/peras of the ergon that have been determined by choice. What is interesting is that the 'cutting' force as a proto-concept is achieved by actively defining the boundaries of the stone. While the essence is determined by the purpose/telos and the model/eidos, its objecthood is determined by the material/hyle and the form/morphe.
Consequently, what is to be created -before it comes into being as ergon- is seen as an eidetik model because its purpose of being/telos is represented as a need in mind, meaning it is designed. The agent/maker starts making choices by talking to himself/herself. This is the very definition of design. Talking to oneself and making a decision during the choice phase of the design process is an act of choosing and deciding to begin with, which is necessary in order for making to be becoming.

The First Tool as the Beginning of the Virtue Establishment

If Lomekwian the first stone tool is examined in the context of pragma, it may be weak/deficient as compared to other stone tool technologies. Nonetheless, what makes the tool 'good' is not one of its properties (such as its function). What makes it 'good' is the fact that the person who made it got liberated from his/her belonging to nature, after which that person built his/her own belonging and identity. As for Acheulean, the situation is more complicated because of the fact that since the concept of 'cutting' integrated into the entire body of the tool, it becomes unusable and it loses its primary function. Although the tool that exists because of its function has lost this function, it continued being produced in large quantities, which may be an indicator of the fact that 'beauty/beautiful' as a concept had emerged by that time. Hominids as a species transfer the concept of 'beauty' as an autonomous virtue that has its own purpose to the stone together with the concept of 'good' whose existence is focused on its function to establish both their belonging as a species and their identity as individuals.
The essence-cognition is identical to its object in Lomekwian, nevertheless, it provokes an awareness of self/entity to some extent as an agent despite them being identical. The object is not yet ergonomic. It is not anthropometric either since there is still a long time for H. Sapiens to appear in the evolution circle. Things change with Oldowan: Hominid has gotten closer to H. Sapiens now. This is why the tool is both portable and easy to grasp. It can be said that the concept of design takes form in Oldowan for the first time because it went through a mental process first, consequently, and an operational process. Besides, because there is no definite form/model in Oldowan, the form can diverge from the function. To avoid misunderstanding, the following clarification should be made: it is not that Oldowan does not have a form, it is just that the form is not adjacent or belonging to the function that gives us an idea about telos yet. It can be stated that although the function is obligatory, the form is still contingent. Based on the result of this analysis, the concept of design is seeing this process, the purpose/telos, and the function in mind. In other words, the concept of design is the ability to see and experience this cognitive process between the agent and the tool. 

Conclusion

Throughout the article, the issue of how Homo Sapiens as a species walk into the world scene via the context of making-becoming/auto-poiesis in a Platonic manner is examined in terms of the first stone tool technology. Making a decision as to whether or not a tool is 'good' by doing quantitative and qualitative analyses is solely for ideological purposes and economic interests. The pragmatic virtues that enable the liberation from nature are virtues that should be overcome by getting rid of this instrumentalization in the context of liberation. In this respect, 'good' is not something to be made, it is rather something to be. The virtues we achieved by means of making-becoming should liberate us from the pragma virtues that we have used to date in the same way. The implicit and main goal of humanity should be the liberation from this instrumentalization that looks as though it is human nature.