POV  I removed  Many fewer would have been shot down if not for poor planning and inflexibility by the mission planners of Strategic Air Command Specifically SAC ordered Bs to attack from highly predictable preciselytimed repetitive positions and altitudes This eliminated the element of surprise The NVA were able to aim their Sovietbuilt SA Guideline SurfacetoAir Missiles SAMs by simple timing and azimuth prediction Further complicating the situation for the Bs was the fact that SAC had used the same jamming electronic countermeasures techniques for years thus enabling the NVA to develop countercountermeasures  SAC ordered the Bs to make a steep turn after dropping the bombs This resulted in an interruption in the electronic jamming of NVA radars because the Bs jamming antennas which were located on the bottom of the aircraft were then pointed away from the radars To make matters worse the turn made the Bs face into a mph headwind which slowed their escape The NVA were surprised at first but after a few nights of these repetitive tactics they figured it out The NVA blasted several Bs with direct hits Two were damaged severely and crashed near UTapao Royal Thai Air Force Base The situation would have been even worse for the Bs if not for the inaccuracy of the SA system and the inexperience and errors of its NVA operators  SAC refused to change its tactics even when shown that the existing tactics were ineffective and highly dangerous to the aircraft and crews In part this was due to indecision on the part of SACs commander Also because of a topdown culture which had been originally established for nuclear war by General LeMay refused to listen to the suggestions of its aircrews The LeMay culture had discouraged open and frank discussion to the point that only yes men made it to the top of the SAC organization where potentially they might have been able to prod the SAC commander into a change of tactics Surprisingly NVA records and interviews with former SAM operators show exactly the opposite culture Realistic discussion and innovation were encouraged among the batteries commanders  Ironically although the NVA had run out of missiles by Day Four of the campaign and the Bs could have bombed an undefended Hanoi SAC was so rattled by its losses that it directed the Bs to targets outside Hanoi thus giving the NVA time to reload After that B losses mounted again  SAC commanders did their best to suppress revelations about their incompetence even going so far as to suggest that one of their critics was mentally unstable SAC has rewritten history in its official account of Linebacker II This semifiction is still taught at the USAFs Air University at Maxwell Air Force Base Alabama  It lacks NPOV or sources