Question: During the Blitz, what did Goring believe the operator of the Leipzig-class cruiser would gain with further support?

full_context: Document 1: The Blitz: Although it had equipment capable of doing serious damage, the problem for the Luftwaffe was its unclear strategy and poor intelligence. OKL had not been informed that Britain was to be considered a potential opponent until early 1938. It had no time to gather reliable intelligence on Britain's industries. Moreover, OKL could not settle on an appropriate strategy. German planners had to decide whether the Luftwaffe should deliver the weight of its attacks against a specific segment of British industry such as aircraft factories, or against a system of interrelated industries such as Britain's import and distribution network, or even in a blow aimed at breaking the morale of the British population. The Luftwaffe's strategy became increasingly aimless over the winter of 1940–1941. Disputes among the OKL staff revolved more around tactics than strategy. This method condemned the offensive over Britain to failure before it began.
Document 2: P-class cruiser: The P class was a planned group of twelve heavy cruisers of Nazi Germany's "Kriegsmarine"; they were the successor to the s. Design work began in 1937 and continued until 1939; at least twenty designs were submitted with nine of them being considered. There were three designs that were selected as the final contenders. One design was armed with six 283mm main guns in one triple turret forward and one more turret aft. It had two 150mm double secondary gun turrets as secondary armament with one being positioned above and just fore of the aft of the main 283mm main turret, and the other being in front and lower of the front main gun turret. This design had more beam than the other 2 designs. It also mounted 2 seaplanes on its fantail instead of the mid ship area. The final design was armed with six quick-firing guns in two triple turrets, as in the preceding "Deutschland" class. The ships were designated as "Panzerschiff" (armored ship), and given the preliminary names P1–P12. They were an improved design over the preceding planned D-class cruisers, which had been canceled in 1934. Although the ships were already assigned to shipyards, construction never began on the P-class ships after the design superseded them.
Document 3: Leipzig-class cruiser: The "Leipzig" class was a class of two light cruisers of the German "Reichsmarine" and later "Kriegsmarine"; the class comprised "Leipzig", the lead ship, and "Nürnberg", which was built to a slightly modified design. The ships were improvements over the preceding "Königsberg"-class cruisers, being slightly larger, with a more efficient arrangement of the main battery and improved armor protection. "Leipzig" was built between 1928 and 1931, and "Nürnberg" followed between 1934 and 1935.
Document 4: The Blitz: Regardless of the ability of the Luftwaffe to win air superiority, Adolf Hitler was frustrated that it was not happening quickly enough. With no sign of the RAF weakening, and Luftwaffe air fleets (Luftflotten) taking punishing losses, the OKL was keen for a change in strategy. To reduce losses further, a change in strategy was also favoured to take place at night, to give the bombers greater protection under cover of darkness.[b] On 4 September 1940, in a long address at the Sportspalast, Hitler declared: "And should the Royal Air Force drop two thousand, or three thousand [kilograms ...] then we will now drop [...] 300,000, 400,000, yes one million kilograms in a single night. And should they declare they will greatly increase their attacks on our cities, then we will erase their cities."
Document 5: List of battleships of Germany: The German navies—specifically the Kaiserliche Marine and Kriegsmarine of Imperial and Nazi Germany, respectively—built a series of battleships between the 1890s and 1940s. To defend its North and Baltic Sea coasts in wartime, Germany had previously built a series of smaller ironclad warships, including coastal defense ships, and armored frigates. With the accession to the throne of Kaiser Wilhelm II in 1888, the Kaiserliche Marine began a program of naval expansion befitting a Great Power. The navy immediately pushed for the construction of the four s, after which soon followed five ships. The appointment of Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz to the post of State Secretary of the Navy in 1897 accelerated naval construction. Tirpitz's "risk theory" planned a fleet that would be sufficiently powerful so that Great Britain, then the world's preeminent naval power, would avoid risking war with Germany in order to preserve its superiority.
Document 6: The Blitz: The decision to change strategy is sometimes claimed as a major mistake by the Oberkommando der Luftwaffe (OKL). It is argued that persisting with attacks on RAF airfields might have won air superiority for the Luftwaffe. Others argue that the Luftwaffe made little impression on Fighter Command in the last week of August and first week of September and that the shift in strategy was not decisive. It has also been argued that it was doubtful the Luftwaffe could have won air superiority before the "weather window" began to deteriorate in October. It was also possible, if RAF losses became severe, that they could pull out to the north, wait for the German invasion, then redeploy southward again. Other historians argue that the outcome of the air battle was irrelevant; the massive numerical superiority of British naval forces and the inherent weakness of the Kriegsmarine would have made the projected German invasion, Unternehmen Seelöwe (Operation Sea Lion), a disaster with or without German air superiority.
Document 7: H-class battleship proposals: The H class was a series of battleship designs for Nazi Germany's "Kriegsmarine", which were intended to fulfill the requirements of Plan Z in the late 1930s and early 1940s. The first variation, "H-39," called for six ships to be built, essentially as enlarged s with guns. The "H-41" design improved the "H-39" ship with still larger main guns, with eight weapons. Two subsequent plans, "H-42" and "H-43", increased the main battery yet again, with pieces, and the enormous "H-44" design ultimately resulted with guns. The ships ranged in size from the "H-39", which was long on a displacement of , to the "H-44", at on a displacement of . Most of the designs had a proposed top speed in excess of .
Document 8: The Blitz: Directive 23 was the only concession made by Göring to the Kriegsmarine over the strategic bombing strategy of the Luftwaffe against Britain. Thereafter, he would refuse to make available any air units to destroy British dockyards, ports, port facilities, or shipping in dock or at sea, lest Kriegsmarine gain control of more Luftwaffe units. Raeder's successor—Karl Dönitz—would—on the intervention of Hitler—gain control of one unit (KG 40), but Göring would soon regain it. Göring's lack of cooperation was detrimental to the one air strategy with potentially decisive strategic effect on Britain. Instead, he wasted aircraft of Fliegerführer Atlantik (Flying Command Atlantic) on bombing mainland Britain instead of attacks against convoys. For Göring, his prestige had been damaged by the defeat in the Battle of Britain, and he wanted to regain it by subduing Britain by air power alone. He was always reluctant to cooperate with Raeder.
Document 9: SMS Derfflinger: SMS "Derfflinger" was a battlecruiser of the German Kaiserliche Marine built just before the outbreak of World War I. She was the lead vessel of her class of three ships; her sister ships were and . The s were larger and featured significant improvements over the previous German battlecruisers, in terms of armament, armor protection, and cruising range. The ship was named after Field Marshal Georg von Derfflinger who fought in the Thirty Years' War.
Document 10: Scharnhorst-class battleship: The "Scharnhorst" class were the first capital ships, referred to as either battleships or battlecruisers, built for Nazi Germany's "Kriegsmarine" after World War I. The class comprised two vessels: and . "Scharnhorst" was launched first, and is considered to be the lead ship by some sources; they are also referred to as the "Gneisenau" class in some other sources, as "Gneisenau" was the first to be laid down and commissioned. They marked the beginning of German naval rearmament after the Treaty of Versailles. The ships were armed with nine 28 cm (11 in) SK C/34 guns in three triple turrets; plans to replace these with six 38 cm (15 in) SK C/34 guns in twin turrets were never realized.
Document 11: The Blitz: The deliberate separation of the Luftwaffe from the rest of the military structure encouraged the emergence of a major "communications gap" between Hitler and the Luftwaffe, which other factors helped to exacerbate. For one thing, Göring's fear of Hitler led him to falsify or misrepresent what information was available in the direction of an uncritical and over-optimistic interpretation of air strength. When Göring decided against continuing Wever's original heavy bomber programme in 1937, the Reichsmarschall's own explanation was that Hitler wanted to know only how many bombers there were, not how many engines each had. In July 1939, Göring arranged a display of the Luftwaffe's most advanced equipment at Rechlin, to give the impression the air force was more prepared for a strategic air war than was actually the case.
Document 12: The Blitz: A major problem in the managing of the Luftwaffe was Hermann Göring. Hitler believed the Luftwaffe was "the most effective strategic weapon", and in reply to repeated requests from the Kriegsmarine for control over aircraft insisted, "We should never have been able to hold our own in this war if we had not had an undivided Luftwaffe". Such principles made it much harder to integrate the air force into the overall strategy and produced in Göring a jealous and damaging defence of his "empire" while removing Hitler voluntarily from the systematic direction of the Luftwaffe at either the strategic or operational level. When Hitler tried to intervene more in the running of the air force later in the war, he was faced with a political conflict of his own making between himself and Göring, which was not fully resolved until the war was almost over. In 1940 and 1941, Göring's refusal to cooperate with the Kriegsmarine denied the entire Wehrmacht military forces of the Reich the chance to strangle British sea communications, which might have had strategic or decisive effect in the war against the British Empire.
Document 13: SMS Augsburg: SMS "Augsburg" was a light cruiser of the German "Kaiserliche Marine" (Imperial Navy) during the First World War. She had three sister ships, , , and . The ship was built by the "Kaiserliche Werft" in Kiel; her hull was laid down in 1908 and she was launched in July 1909. "Augsburg" was commissioned into the High Seas Fleet in October 1910. She was armed with a main battery of twelve 10.5 cm SK L/45 guns and had a top speed of .
Document 14: The Blitz: In 1941, the Luftwaffe shifted strategy again. Erich Raeder—commander-in-chief of the Kriegsmarine—had long argued the Luftwaffe should support the German submarine force (U-Bootwaffe) in the Battle of the Atlantic by attacking shipping in the Atlantic Ocean and attacking British ports. Eventually, he convinced Hitler of the need to attack British port facilities. Hitler had been convinced by Raeder that this was the right course of action due to the high success rates of the U-Boat force during this period of the war. Hitler correctly noted that the greatest damage to the British war economy had been done through submarines and air attacks by small numbers of Focke-Wulf Fw 200 naval aircraft. He ordered attacks to be carried out on those targets which were also the target of the Kriegsmarine. This meant that British coastal centres and shipping at sea west of Ireland were the prime targets.
Document 15: York-class cruiser: The "York" class was the second and final class of –gunned heavy cruisers built for the Royal Navy under the terms of the 1922 Washington Naval Treaty. They were essentially a reduced version of the preceding , scaled down to enable more cruisers to be built from the limited defence budgets of the late 1920s.
ground_truth: control of more Luftwaffe units
sub_queries: Leipzig-class cruiser >> operator Answer: Kriegsmarine
What did Goring believe the Kriegsmarine would gain with further support? Answer: control of more Luftwaffe units