Question: What did Goring believe the operator of U-6 would gain with further support?

full_context: Document 1: German submarine U-11 (1935): German submarine U-11 was a Type IIB U-boat built before World War II for service in Nazi Germany's "Kriegsmarine". She was commissioned on 21 September 1935, with "Kapitänleutnant" Hans-Rudolf Rösing in command. She served in several training flotillas in her 10-year career, but sank or damaged no ships.
Document 2: The Blitz: In 1941, the Luftwaffe shifted strategy again. Erich Raeder—commander-in-chief of the Kriegsmarine—had long argued the Luftwaffe should support the German submarine force (U-Bootwaffe) in the Battle of the Atlantic by attacking shipping in the Atlantic Ocean and attacking British ports. Eventually, he convinced Hitler of the need to attack British port facilities. Hitler had been convinced by Raeder that this was the right course of action due to the high success rates of the U-Boat force during this period of the war. Hitler correctly noted that the greatest damage to the British war economy had been done through submarines and air attacks by small numbers of Focke-Wulf Fw 200 naval aircraft. He ordered attacks to be carried out on those targets which were also the target of the Kriegsmarine. This meant that British coastal centres and shipping at sea west of Ireland were the prime targets.
Document 3: German submarine U-4 (1935): German submarine "U-4" was a Type IIA U-boat of Nazi Germany's "Kriegsmarine" before and during World War II. She was one of the longest lasting German submarines of the period, primarily since half of her time was spent on training duties in the Baltic Sea.
Document 4: German submarine U-546: German submarine "U-546" was a Type IXC/40 U-boat operated by Nazi Germany's "Kriegsmarine" during World War II. She was laid down at the Deutsche Werft in Hamburg as yard number 367 on 6 August 1942, launched on 17 March 1943 and commissioned on 2 June 1943 under "Oberleutnant zur See" Paul Just. The U-boat was a member of three wolfpacks.
Document 5: German submarine U-6 (1935): The German submarine "U-6" was a long-lived but very inactive Type IIA U-boat built before World War II for service in Nazi Germany's "Kriegsmarine".
Document 6: German submarine U-5 (1935): German submarine "U-5" was a Type IIA U-boat of Nazi Germany's "Kriegsmarine". She was laid down on 11 February 1935, launched on 14 August and commissioned 31 August that year, under Oberleutnant zur See Rolf Dau.
Document 7: German submarine U-626: The German submarine "U-626" was a Type VIIC U-boat of Nazi Germany's "Kriegsmarine" during World War II. The ship was built by Blohm & Voss of Hamburg, and commissioned in May 1942. After six months of basic training she was assigned to the 6th U-boat Flotilla. "U-626" sailed from Bergen in December 1942 on her first operational voyage. She was sunk seven days later by a single depth charge from USCGC "Ingham". The crew of the cutter were unaware of their kill, which was not credited until the war was over.
Document 8: The Blitz: Regardless of the ability of the Luftwaffe to win air superiority, Adolf Hitler was frustrated that it was not happening quickly enough. With no sign of the RAF weakening, and Luftwaffe air fleets (Luftflotten) taking punishing losses, the OKL was keen for a change in strategy. To reduce losses further, a change in strategy was also favoured to take place at night, to give the bombers greater protection under cover of darkness.[b] On 4 September 1940, in a long address at the Sportspalast, Hitler declared: "And should the Royal Air Force drop two thousand, or three thousand [kilograms ...] then we will now drop [...] 300,000, 400,000, yes one million kilograms in a single night. And should they declare they will greatly increase their attacks on our cities, then we will erase their cities."
Document 9: The Blitz: In the inter-war years and after 1940, Hugh Dowding, Air Officer Commanding Fighter Command has received credit for the defence of British air space and the failure of the Luftwaffe to achieve air superiority. However, Dowding had spent so much effort preparing day fighter defences, there was little to prevent the Germans carrying out an alternative strategy by bombing at night. When the Luftwaffe struck at British cities for the first time on 7 September 1940, a number of civic and political leaders were worried by Dowding's apparent lack of reaction to the new crisis.
Document 10: German submarine U-26 (1936): German submarine "U-26" was one of the two Type IA ocean-going U-boats produced by Nazi Germany's "Kriegsmarine". Constructed in Bremen, "U-26" was commissioned in May 1936. She experienced a short, but successful combat career, sinking eleven ships.
Document 11: The Blitz: A major problem in the managing of the Luftwaffe was Hermann Göring. Hitler believed the Luftwaffe was "the most effective strategic weapon", and in reply to repeated requests from the Kriegsmarine for control over aircraft insisted, "We should never have been able to hold our own in this war if we had not had an undivided Luftwaffe". Such principles made it much harder to integrate the air force into the overall strategy and produced in Göring a jealous and damaging defence of his "empire" while removing Hitler voluntarily from the systematic direction of the Luftwaffe at either the strategic or operational level. When Hitler tried to intervene more in the running of the air force later in the war, he was faced with a political conflict of his own making between himself and Göring, which was not fully resolved until the war was almost over. In 1940 and 1941, Göring's refusal to cooperate with the Kriegsmarine denied the entire Wehrmacht military forces of the Reich the chance to strangle British sea communications, which might have had strategic or decisive effect in the war against the British Empire.
Document 12: The Blitz: The decision to change strategy is sometimes claimed as a major mistake by the Oberkommando der Luftwaffe (OKL). It is argued that persisting with attacks on RAF airfields might have won air superiority for the Luftwaffe. Others argue that the Luftwaffe made little impression on Fighter Command in the last week of August and first week of September and that the shift in strategy was not decisive. It has also been argued that it was doubtful the Luftwaffe could have won air superiority before the "weather window" began to deteriorate in October. It was also possible, if RAF losses became severe, that they could pull out to the north, wait for the German invasion, then redeploy southward again. Other historians argue that the outcome of the air battle was irrelevant; the massive numerical superiority of British naval forces and the inherent weakness of the Kriegsmarine would have made the projected German invasion, Unternehmen Seelöwe (Operation Sea Lion), a disaster with or without German air superiority.
Document 13: The Blitz: Although it had equipment capable of doing serious damage, the problem for the Luftwaffe was its unclear strategy and poor intelligence. OKL had not been informed that Britain was to be considered a potential opponent until early 1938. It had no time to gather reliable intelligence on Britain's industries. Moreover, OKL could not settle on an appropriate strategy. German planners had to decide whether the Luftwaffe should deliver the weight of its attacks against a specific segment of British industry such as aircraft factories, or against a system of interrelated industries such as Britain's import and distribution network, or even in a blow aimed at breaking the morale of the British population. The Luftwaffe's strategy became increasingly aimless over the winter of 1940–1941. Disputes among the OKL staff revolved more around tactics than strategy. This method condemned the offensive over Britain to failure before it began.
Document 14: The Blitz: The deliberate separation of the Luftwaffe from the rest of the military structure encouraged the emergence of a major "communications gap" between Hitler and the Luftwaffe, which other factors helped to exacerbate. For one thing, Göring's fear of Hitler led him to falsify or misrepresent what information was available in the direction of an uncritical and over-optimistic interpretation of air strength. When Göring decided against continuing Wever's original heavy bomber programme in 1937, the Reichsmarschall's own explanation was that Hitler wanted to know only how many bombers there were, not how many engines each had. In July 1939, Göring arranged a display of the Luftwaffe's most advanced equipment at Rechlin, to give the impression the air force was more prepared for a strategic air war than was actually the case.
Document 15: The Blitz: Directive 23 was the only concession made by Göring to the Kriegsmarine over the strategic bombing strategy of the Luftwaffe against Britain. Thereafter, he would refuse to make available any air units to destroy British dockyards, ports, port facilities, or shipping in dock or at sea, lest Kriegsmarine gain control of more Luftwaffe units. Raeder's successor—Karl Dönitz—would—on the intervention of Hitler—gain control of one unit (KG 40), but Göring would soon regain it. Göring's lack of cooperation was detrimental to the one air strategy with potentially decisive strategic effect on Britain. Instead, he wasted aircraft of Fliegerführer Atlantik (Flying Command Atlantic) on bombing mainland Britain instead of attacks against convoys. For Göring, his prestige had been damaged by the defeat in the Battle of Britain, and he wanted to regain it by subduing Britain by air power alone. He was always reluctant to cooperate with Raeder.
ground_truth: control of more Luftwaffe units
sub_queries: U-6 >> operator Answer: Kriegsmarine
What did Goring believe the Kriegsmarine would gain with further support? Answer: control of more Luftwaffe units