Question: When was the son of John Rossell, 4th Earl Russell born?

full_context: Document 1: Duff Cooper: Duff Cooper (he was always known as “Duff” rather than “Alfred”) was born at Cavendish Square on 22 February 1890. He was the only son of fashionable society doctor Sir Alfred Cooper (1843–1908), a surgeon and specialist in the sexual problems of the upper classes, and Lady Agnes Duff, daughter of James Duff, 5th Earl Fife. She had already eloped with two husbands, the first of whom she deserted and the second of whom died, before marrying Cooper in 1882. Duff Cooper had three older sisters. He had royal connections: his maternal uncle, the first Duke of Fife, was married to Louise, Princess Royal. Cooper enjoyed a typical gentleman's upbringing of country estates and London society. He attended two prep schools, including Wixenford School. He was unhappy at prep school, but was then very happy at Eton College. One of his maternal great-grandmothers was Lady Elizabeth FitzClarence, an illegitimate daughter of King William IV who fathered eight children with Dorothea Jordan.
Document 2: Georgiana Burne-Jones: Georgiana Burne-Jones, Lady Burne-Jones (Birmingham, 21 July 1840 – 2 February 1920), the second oldest of the Macdonald sisters, was the wife of Pre-Raphaelite Brotherhood artist Edward Burne-Jones, mother of painter Philip Burne-Jones, aunt of novelist Rudyard Kipling, confidante and friend of George Eliot, William Morris, and John Ruskin something of a painter and engraver in her own right. She was a Trustee of the South London Gallery and was elected to the parish Council of Rottingdean, near Brighton in Sussex.
Document 3: John Russell, 4th Earl Russell: John Conrad Russell, 4th Earl Russell (16 November 1921 – 16 December 1987) was the eldest son of the philosopher and mathematician Bertrand Russell (the 3rd Earl) and his second wife, Dora Black. His middle name was a tribute to the writer Joseph Conrad, whom his father had long admired. He was the great-grandson of the 19th century British Whig Prime Minister Lord John Russell. He succeeded to the earldom on the death of his father on 2 February 1970.
Document 4: Context principle: The context principle is one of Gottlob Frege's ``three fundamental principles ''for philosophical analysis, first discussed in his Introduction to The Foundations of Arithmetic (Grundlagen der Arithmetik, 1884). Frege argued that many philosophical errors, especially those related to psychologism in the philosophy of logic and philosophy of mathematics, could be avoided by adhering carefully to the context principle. The view of meaning expressed by the context principle is sometimes called contextualism, but should not be confused with the common contemporary use of the term contextualism in epistemology or ethics. This view need not be contrasted with the view that the meanings of words or expressions can (or must) be determined prior to, and independently of, the meanings of the propositions in which they occur, which is often referred to as compositionalism.
Document 5: Prince John of the United Kingdom: Prince John of the United Kingdom (John Charles Francis; 12 July 1905 – 18 January 1919) was the fifth son and youngest of the six children born to King George V and his wife, Queen Mary. At the time of John's birth, his father was the Prince of Wales and heir apparent to the reigning monarch of the United Kingdom, King Edward VII. In 1910, George succeeded to the throne upon Edward's death and John became fifth in the line of succession to the British throne.
Document 6: Sir Robert Frankland-Russell, 7th Baronet: Sir Robert Frankland-Russell, 7th Baronet (1784–1849) was an English politician, known also as an artist. In early life he was called Robert Frankland.
Document 7: Empiricism: The neopositivists subscribed to a notion of philosophy as the conceptual clarification of the methods, insights and discoveries of the sciences. They saw in the logical symbolism elaborated by Frege (1848–1925) and Bertrand Russell (1872–1970) a powerful instrument that could rationally reconstruct all scientific discourse into an ideal, logically perfect, language that would be free of the ambiguities and deformations of natural language. This gave rise to what they saw as metaphysical pseudoproblems and other conceptual confusions. By combining Frege's thesis that all mathematical truths are logical with the early Wittgenstein's idea that all logical truths are mere linguistic tautologies, they arrived at a twofold classification of all propositions: the analytic (a priori) and the synthetic (a posteriori). On this basis, they formulated a strong principle of demarcation between sentences that have sense and those that do not: the so-called verification principle. Any sentence that is not purely logical, or is unverifiable is devoid of meaning. As a result, most metaphysical, ethical, aesthetic and other traditional philosophical problems came to be considered pseudoproblems.
Document 8: Idealism: Bradley was the apparent target of G. E. Moore's radical rejection of idealism. Moore claimed that Bradley did not understand the statement that something is real. We know for certain, through common sense and prephilosophical beliefs, that some things are real, whether they are objects of thought or not, according to Moore. The 1903 article The Refutation of Idealism is one of the first demonstrations of Moore's commitment to analysis. He examines each of the three terms in the Berkeleian aphorism esse est percipi, "to be is to be perceived", finding that it must mean that the object and the subject are necessarily connected so that "yellow" and "the sensation of yellow" are identical - "to be yellow" is "to be experienced as yellow". But it also seems there is a difference between "yellow" and "the sensation of yellow" and "that esse is held to be percipi, solely because what is experienced is held to be identical with the experience of it". Though far from a complete refutation, this was the first strong statement by analytic philosophy against its idealist predecessors, or at any rate against the type of idealism represented by Berkeley. This argument did not show that the GEM (in post–Stove vernacular, see below) is logically invalid.
Document 9: Edith Finch Russell: Finch was Bertrand Russell's fourth and last wife. She first met Russell in the 1930s through her close friend and housemate Lucy Martin Donnelly, who was a friend of Russell's first wife, Alys. Finch moved to England in 1950 and married Russell in December 1952. By all accounts it was a very happy marriage. The couple settled in Wales, where Bertrand died in 1970. Edith died in 1978.
Document 10: Cyril Holland: Cyril Holland (born Cyril Wilde, 5 June 1885 – 9 May 1915) was the older of the two sons of Oscar Wilde and Constance Lloyd and brother to Vyvyan Holland.
Document 11: Empiricism: The phenomenalist phase of post-Humean empiricism ended by the 1940s, for by that time it had become obvious that statements about physical things could not be translated into statements about actual and possible sense data. If a physical object statement is to be translatable into a sense-data statement, the former must be at least deducible from the latter. But it came to be realized that there is no finite set of statements about actual and possible sense-data from which we can deduce even a single physical-object statement. Remember that the translating or paraphrasing statement must be couched in terms of normal observers in normal conditions of observation. There is, however, no finite set of statements that are couched in purely sensory terms and can express the satisfaction of the condition of the presence of a normal observer. According to phenomenalism, to say that a normal observer is present is to make the hypothetical statement that were a doctor to inspect the observer, the observer would appear to the doctor to be normal. But, of course, the doctor himself must be a normal observer. If we are to specify this doctor's normality in sensory terms, we must make reference to a second doctor who, when inspecting the sense organs of the first doctor, would himself have to have the sense data a normal observer has when inspecting the sense organs of a subject who is a normal observer. And if we are to specify in sensory terms that the second doctor is a normal observer, we must refer to a third doctor, and so on (also see the third man).
Document 12: Coningsby Disraeli: Born in Kensington, London, Disraeli was the son of Ralph Disraeli (1809–1898, the younger son of the writer Isaac D'Israeli). He was educated at Charterhouse School and New College, Oxford. The Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli was his uncle. He inherited the Hughenden Manor estate acquired by his uncle on his father's death in 1898.
Document 13: Karl Popper: As early as 1934, Popper wrote of the search for truth as "one of the strongest motives for scientific discovery." Still, he describes in Objective Knowledge (1972) early concerns about the much-criticised notion of truth as correspondence. Then came the semantic theory of truth formulated by the logician Alfred Tarski and published in 1933. Popper writes of learning in 1935 of the consequences of Tarski's theory, to his intense joy. The theory met critical objections to truth as correspondence and thereby rehabilitated it. The theory also seemed, in Popper's eyes, to support metaphysical realism and the regulative idea of a search for truth.
Document 14: Philosophiæ Naturalis Principia Mathematica: The French mathematical physicist Alexis Clairaut assessed it in 1747: "The famous book of Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy marked the epoch of a great revolution in physics. The method followed by its illustrious author Sir Newton ... spread the light of mathematics on a science which up to then had remained in the darkness of conjectures and hypotheses."A more recent assessment has been that while acceptance of Newton's theories was not immediate, by the end of a century after publication in 1687, "no one could deny that" (out of the Principia) "a science had emerged that, at least in certain respects, so far exceeded anything that had ever gone before that it stood alone as the ultimate exemplar of science generally."In formulating his physical theories, Newton developed and used mathematical methods now included in the field of calculus. But the language of calculus as we know it was largely absent from the Principia; Newton gave many of his proofs in a geometric form of infinitesimal calculus, based on limits of ratios of vanishing small geometric quantities. In a revised conclusion to the Principia (see General Scholium), Newton used his expression that became famous, Hypotheses non fingo ("I feign no hypotheses").
Document 15: Idealism: and proliferation of hyphenated entities such as "thing-in-itself" (Immanuel Kant), "things-as-interacted-by-us" (Arthur Fine), "table-of-commonsense" and "table-of-physics" (Sir Arthur Eddington) which are "warning signs" for conceptual idealism according to Musgrave because they allegedly do not exist but only highlight the numerous ways in which people come to know the world. This argument does not take into account the issues pertaining to hermeneutics, especially at the backdrop of analytic philosophy. Musgrave criticized Richard Rorty and Postmodernist philosophy in general for confusion of use and mention.
ground_truth: 1872
sub_queries: John Russell, 4th Earl Russell >> father Answer: Bertrand Russell
When was Bertrand Russell born? Answer: 1872