Question: What did Goring believe the operator of battleships from the country where Marie Elisabeth of Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel lived when she died would gain with further support?

full_context: Document 1: Marie Elisabeth of Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel: Marie Elisabeth of Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel (7 January 1638 - 15 February 1687), was a German noblewoman member of the House of Welf and by her two marriages Duchess of Saxe-Eisenach and Saxe-Coburg.
Document 2: Railway stations in Coburg: There are six railway stations in the town of Coburg in Bavaria, southern Germany. These include: two passenger stations, three halts and one goods station.
Document 3: German battleship Bismarck: Bismarck was the first of two s built for Nazi Germany's "Kriegsmarine". Named after Chancellor Otto von Bismarck, the ship was laid down at the Blohm & Voss shipyard in Hamburg in July 1936 and launched in February 1939. Work was completed in August 1940, when she was commissioned into the German fleet. "Bismarck" and her sister ship were the largest battleships ever built by Germany, and two of the largest built by any European power.
Document 4: Princess Sophie Antoinette of Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel: Sophie Antoinette of Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel (13/23 January 1724, Wolfenbüttel – 17 May 1802, Coburg) was the tenth of 17 children of Ferdinand Albert II, Duke of Brunswick-Lüneburg.
Document 5: Scharnhorst-class battleship: The "Scharnhorst" class were the first capital ships, referred to as either battleships or battlecruisers, built for Nazi Germany's "Kriegsmarine" after World War I. The class comprised two vessels: and . "Scharnhorst" was launched first, and is considered to be the lead ship by some sources; they are also referred to as the "Gneisenau" class in some other sources, as "Gneisenau" was the first to be laid down and commissioned. They marked the beginning of German naval rearmament after the Treaty of Versailles. The ships were armed with nine 28 cm (11 in) SK C/34 guns in three triple turrets; plans to replace these with six 38 cm (15 in) SK C/34 guns in twin turrets were never realized.
Document 6: Hannover Hauptbahnhof: In the timetable of summer 1939, Hanover station had a total of 144 scheduled long-distance arrivals and departures. It was the most important junctions on Deutsche Reichsbahn’s long-distance network after the terminal stations of Berlin, Cologne, Frankfurt am Main and the main stations of Leipzig and Duisburg.
Document 7: The Blitz: In 1941, the Luftwaffe shifted strategy again. Erich Raeder—commander-in-chief of the Kriegsmarine—had long argued the Luftwaffe should support the German submarine force (U-Bootwaffe) in the Battle of the Atlantic by attacking shipping in the Atlantic Ocean and attacking British ports. Eventually, he convinced Hitler of the need to attack British port facilities. Hitler had been convinced by Raeder that this was the right course of action due to the high success rates of the U-Boat force during this period of the war. Hitler correctly noted that the greatest damage to the British war economy had been done through submarines and air attacks by small numbers of Focke-Wulf Fw 200 naval aircraft. He ordered attacks to be carried out on those targets which were also the target of the Kriegsmarine. This meant that British coastal centres and shipping at sea west of Ireland were the prime targets.
Document 8: Hannover Hauptbahnhof: A wooden platform area was built next to the entrance building and on each side of the two tracks. That was enough for the first traffic because the still short trains running to the east and the west stopped at the same platform. There were no through trains initially. The first through train ran from 1 May 1851 between Berlin and Cologne. The first railway workshop was built opposite the station building. In 1853, the opening of the first section of the Southern Railway to Alfeld, Göttingen and Kassel made the through station into a railway junction. A marshalling yard was established in Hainholz to relieve the station in 1868.
Document 9: The Blitz: The deliberate separation of the Luftwaffe from the rest of the military structure encouraged the emergence of a major "communications gap" between Hitler and the Luftwaffe, which other factors helped to exacerbate. For one thing, Göring's fear of Hitler led him to falsify or misrepresent what information was available in the direction of an uncritical and over-optimistic interpretation of air strength. When Göring decided against continuing Wever's original heavy bomber programme in 1937, the Reichsmarschall's own explanation was that Hitler wanted to know only how many bombers there were, not how many engines each had. In July 1939, Göring arranged a display of the Luftwaffe's most advanced equipment at Rechlin, to give the impression the air force was more prepared for a strategic air war than was actually the case.
Document 10: Kornwestheim station: Kornwestheim station is located in the Ludwigsburg district of Kornwestheim in the German state of Baden-Württemberg. It is located on the Franconia Railway () and is a station on the network of the Stuttgart S-Bahn. It is near the junction of the Untertürkheim–Kornwestheim line ("Schusterbahn") freight bypass. Kornwestheim passenger station was the site of a Deutsche Bahn car train loading facility until December 2007.
Document 11: Sophie Marie of Hesse-Darmstadt: Sophie Marie of Hesse-Darmstadt (7 May 1661, Darmstadt – 22 August 1712, Gotha) was a member of the House of Hesse and by marriage Duchess of Saxe-Eisenberg.
Document 12: The Blitz: Directive 23 was the only concession made by Göring to the Kriegsmarine over the strategic bombing strategy of the Luftwaffe against Britain. Thereafter, he would refuse to make available any air units to destroy British dockyards, ports, port facilities, or shipping in dock or at sea, lest Kriegsmarine gain control of more Luftwaffe units. Raeder's successor—Karl Dönitz—would—on the intervention of Hitler—gain control of one unit (KG 40), but Göring would soon regain it. Göring's lack of cooperation was detrimental to the one air strategy with potentially decisive strategic effect on Britain. Instead, he wasted aircraft of Fliegerführer Atlantik (Flying Command Atlantic) on bombing mainland Britain instead of attacks against convoys. For Göring, his prestige had been damaged by the defeat in the Battle of Britain, and he wanted to regain it by subduing Britain by air power alone. He was always reluctant to cooperate with Raeder.
Document 13: Elisabeth of Brunswick-Lüneburg, Duchess of Guelders: Elisabeth of Brunswick-Lüneburg (11 September 1494 in Celle – 2 April 1572 in Geldern) was a Duchess of Brunswick-Lüneburg by birth and by marriage Duchess of Guelders.
Document 14: List of battleships of Germany: The German navies—specifically the Kaiserliche Marine and Kriegsmarine of Imperial and Nazi Germany, respectively—built a series of battleships between the 1890s and 1940s. To defend its North and Baltic Sea coasts in wartime, Germany had previously built a series of smaller ironclad warships, including coastal defense ships, and armored frigates. With the accession to the throne of Kaiser Wilhelm II in 1888, the Kaiserliche Marine began a program of naval expansion befitting a Great Power. The navy immediately pushed for the construction of the four s, after which soon followed five ships. The appointment of Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz to the post of State Secretary of the Navy in 1897 accelerated naval construction. Tirpitz's "risk theory" planned a fleet that would be sufficiently powerful so that Great Britain, then the world's preeminent naval power, would avoid risking war with Germany in order to preserve its superiority.
Document 15: The Blitz: A major problem in the managing of the Luftwaffe was Hermann Göring. Hitler believed the Luftwaffe was "the most effective strategic weapon", and in reply to repeated requests from the Kriegsmarine for control over aircraft insisted, "We should never have been able to hold our own in this war if we had not had an undivided Luftwaffe". Such principles made it much harder to integrate the air force into the overall strategy and produced in Göring a jealous and damaging defence of his "empire" while removing Hitler voluntarily from the systematic direction of the Luftwaffe at either the strategic or operational level. When Hitler tried to intervene more in the running of the air force later in the war, he was faced with a political conflict of his own making between himself and Göring, which was not fully resolved until the war was almost over. In 1940 and 1941, Göring's refusal to cooperate with the Kriegsmarine denied the entire Wehrmacht military forces of the Reich the chance to strangle British sea communications, which might have had strategic or decisive effect in the war against the British Empire.
ground_truth: control of more Luftwaffe units
sub_queries: What city did Marie Elisabeth of Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel live when he died? Answer: Coburg
Railway stations in Coburg >> country Answer: Germany
list of battleships of Germany >> operator Answer: Kriegsmarine
What did Goring believe the Kriegsmarine would gain with further support? Answer: control of more Luftwaffe units