Question: Radical translation is a thought experiment in "Word and Object", a major philosophical work from American philosopher Willard Van Orman Quine, in which year was the work made, in which Quine expands upon the line of thought of his earlier writings in "From a Logical Point of View" (1953), and reformulates some of his earlier arguments, such as his attack in "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" on the analytic-synthetic distinction?

full_context: Document 1: The Logic of Scientific Discovery: The Logic of Scientific Discovery is a 1959 book about the philosophy of science by Karl Popper. Popper rewrote his book in English from the 1934 German original, titled Logik der Forschung. Zur Erkenntnistheorie der modernen Naturwissenschaft, which literally translates as, Logic of Research: On the Epistemology of Modern Natural Science. The work is famous.
Document 2: Confirmation holism: It is attributed to Willard van Orman Quine who motivated his holism through extending Pierre Duhem's problem of underdetermination in physical theory to all knowledge claims. Duhem's idea was, roughly, that no theory of any type can be tested in isolation but only when embedded in a background of other hypotheses, e.g. hypotheses about initial conditions. Quine thought that this background involved not only such hypotheses but also our whole web-of-belief, which, among other things, includes our mathematical and logical theories and our scientific theories. This last claim is sometimes known as the Duhem–Quine thesis. A related claim made by Quine, though contested by some (see Adolf Grünbaum 1962), is that one can always protect one's theory against refutation by attributing failure to some other part of our web-of-belief. In his own words, "Any statement can be held true come what may, if we make drastic enough adjustments elsewhere in the system.".
Document 3: Two Dogmas of Empiricism: "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" is a paper by analytic philosopher Willard Van Orman Quine published in 1951. According to City University of New York professor of philosophy Peter Godfrey-Smith, this "paper [is] sometimes regarded as the most important in all of twentieth-century philosophy". The paper is an attack on two central aspects of the logical positivists' philosophy. One is the analytic-synthetic distinction between analytic truths and synthetic truths, explained by Quine as truths grounded only in meanings and independent of facts, and truths grounded in facts. The other is reductionism, the theory that each meaningful statement gets its meaning from some logical construction of terms that refers exclusively to immediate experience.
Document 4: Word and Object: Word and Object is a 1960 work by philosopher Willard Van Orman Quine, in which Quine expands upon the line of thought of his earlier writings in "From a Logical Point of View" (1953), and reformulates some of his earlier arguments, such as his attack in "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" on the analytic-synthetic distinction. The thought experiment of radical translation and the accompanying notion of indeterminacy of translation are original to "Word and Object", which is Quine's most famous book.
Document 5: Proper name (philosophy): In the philosophy of language a proper name, for example the names of persons or places, is a name which is ordinarily taken to uniquely identify its referent in the world. As such it presents particular challenges for theories of meaning and it has become a central problem in analytical philosophy. The common sense view was originally formulated by John Stuart Mill in "A System of Logic" where he defines it as "a word that answers the purpose of showing what thing it is that we are talking about but not of telling anything about it". This view was criticized when philosophers applied principles of formal logic to linguistic propositions. Gottlob Frege pointed out that proper names may apply to imaginary and inexistent entities without becoming meaningless, and he showed that sometimes more than one proper name may identify the same entity without having the same "sense", so that the phrase "Homer believed the morning star was the evening star" could be meaningful and not tautological in spite of the fact that the morning star and the evening star identifies the same referent. This example became known as Frege's Puzzle and is a central issue in the theory of proper names.
Document 6: Internal–external distinction: The internal–external distinction is a distinction used in philosophy to divide an ontology into two parts: an internal part consisting of a linguistic framework and observations related to that framework, and an external part concerning practical questions about the utility of that framework. This division was introduced by Rudolf Carnap in his work "Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology". It was subsequently criticized at length by Willard Van Orman Quine in a number of works, and was considered for some time to have been discredited. However, recently a number of authors have come to the support of some or another version of Carnap's approach.
Document 7: Quasi-quotation: Quasi-quotation or Quine quotation is a linguistic device in formal languages that facilitates rigorous and terse formulation of general rules about linguistic expressions while properly observing the use–mention distinction. It was introduced by the philosopher and logician Willard van Orman Quine in his book "Mathematical Logic", originally published in 1940. Put simply, quasi-quotation enables one to introduce symbols that "stand for" a linguistic expression in a given instance and are "used as" that linguistic expression in a different instance.
Document 8: Radical translation: Radical translation is a thought experiment in "Word and Object", a major philosophical work from American philosopher Willard Van Orman Quine. It is used as an introduction to his theory of the indeterminacy of translation, and specifically to prove the point of inscrutability of reference. Using this concept of radical translation, Quine paints a setting where a linguist discovers a native linguistic community whose linguistic system is completely unrelated to any language familiar to the linguist. Quine then describes the steps taken by the linguist in his attempt to fully translate this unfamiliar language based on the only data he has; the events happening around him combined with the verbal and non-verbal behaviour of natives.
Document 9: A. J. Ayer: Sir Alfred Jules "Freddie" Ayer, FBA ( ; 29 October 1910 – 27 June 1989), usually cited as A. J. Ayer, was a British philosopher known for his promotion of logical positivism, particularly in his books "Language, Truth, and Logic" (1936) and "The Problem of Knowledge" (1956).
Document 10: The Philosophical Lexicon: The Philosophical Lexicon is a humorous dictionary founded by philosopher Daniel Dennett and now edited by Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen. It lists neologisms that have been humorously coined from the names of (mostly) contemporary philosophers. For example, the following definition refers to the philosopher Willard Van Orman Quine:quine, v. (1) To deny resolutely the existence or importance of something real or significant. "Some philosophers have quined classes, and some have even quined physical objects." Occasionally used intr., e.g., "You think I quine, sir. I assure you I do not!" (2) n. The total aggregate sensory surface of the world; hence quinitis, irritation of the quine.
Document 11: The Roots of Reference: The Roots of Reference is a 1974 book by philosopher Willard Van Orman Quine, in which Quine expands on his earlier concepts about the inscrutability of reference and examines problems with traditional empiricism, arguing for a naturalized epistemology based on holism.
Document 12: Referential indeterminacy: In linguistics, referential indeterminacy is a situation in which different people vary in naming objects. For example, William Labov studied this effect using illustrations of different drinking vessels to see what people would label as "cups" and what people would label as "mugs".
Document 13: Willard Van Orman Quine: Willard Van Orman Quine ( ; June 25, 1908 – December 25, 2000) (known to intimates as "Van") was an American philosopher and logician in the analytic tradition, recognized as "one of the most influential philosophers of the twentieth century." From 1930 until his death 70 years later, Quine was continually affiliated with Harvard University in one way or another, first as a student, then as a professor of philosophy and a teacher of logic and set theory, and finally as a professor emeritus who published or revised several books in retirement. He filled the Edgar Pierce Chair of Philosophy at Harvard from 1956 to 1978. A 2009 poll conducted among analytic philosophers named Quine as the fifth most important philosopher of the past two centuries. He won the first Schock Prize in Logic and Philosophy in 1993 for "his systematical and penetrating discussions of how learning of language and communication are based on socially available evidence and of the consequences of this for theories on knowledge and linguistic meaning." In 1996 he was awarded the Kyoto Prize in Arts and Philosophy for his "outstanding contributions to the progress of philosophy in the 20th century by proposing numerous theories based on keen insights in logic, epistemology, philosophy of science and philosophy of language."
Document 14: Inscrutability of reference: The inscrutability or indeterminacy of reference (also indeterminacy of reference, or referential inscrutability) is a thesis propounded by 20th century analytic philosopher Willard Van Orman Quine in his book "Word and Object". The main claim of this theory is that any given sentence can be changed into a variety of other sentences where the parts of the sentence will change in what they reference, but they will nonetheless maintain the meaning of the sentence as a whole. The , because it is subject to the and of the speaker.
Document 15: Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language: Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language is a 1982 book by philosopher of language Saul Kripke, in which Kripke contends that the central argument of Ludwig Wittgenstein's "Philosophical Investigations" centers on a devastating rule-following paradox that undermines the possibility of our ever following rules in our use of language. Kripke writes that this paradox is "the most radical and original skeptical problem that philosophy has seen to date" (p. 60). He argues that Wittgenstein does not reject the argument that leads to the rule-following paradox, but accepts it and offers a 'skeptical solution' to alleviate the paradox's destructive effects.
ground_truth: 1960