gzone0111/musique_hotpotqa_graph_retriever huggingface dataset:
Question: What did Goring believe the operator of Bremse would gain with further support?
Context: Document 1: German training ship Bremse: Bremse was built as an artillery training ship (Artillerieschulschiff ) of Nazi Germany's "Kriegsmarine" with a secondary function as a testbed for new marine diesel engines later installed in German panzerschiffs. During World War II, she operated as an escort ship until her sinking in September 1941.
Document 2: The Blitz: Directive 23 was the only concession made by Göring to the Kriegsmarine over the strategic bombing strategy of the Luftwaffe against Britain. Thereafter, he would refuse to make available any air units to destroy British dockyards, ports, port facilities, or shipping in dock or at sea, lest Kriegsmarine gain control of more Luftwaffe units. Raeder's successor—Karl Dönitz—would—on the intervention of Hitler—gain control of one unit (KG 40), but Göring would soon regain it. Göring's lack of cooperation was detrimental to the one air strategy with potentially decisive strategic effect on Britain. Instead, he wasted aircraft of Fliegerführer Atlantik (Flying Command Atlantic) on bombing mainland Britain instead of attacks against convoys. For Göring, his prestige had been damaged by the defeat in the Battle of Britain, and he wanted to regain it by subduing Britain by air power alone. He was always reluctant to cooperate with Raeder.
Answer: control of more Luftwaffe units
Reasoning steps: Bremse >> operator Answer: Kriegsmarine
What did Goring believe the Kriegsmarine would gain with further support? Answer: control of more Luftwaffe units
Question: What did Goring believe the operator of U-124 would gain with further support?
Context: Document 1: The Blitz: Directive 23 was the only concession made by Göring to the Kriegsmarine over the strategic bombing strategy of the Luftwaffe against Britain. Thereafter, he would refuse to make available any air units to destroy British dockyards, ports, port facilities, or shipping in dock or at sea, lest Kriegsmarine gain control of more Luftwaffe units. Raeder's successor—Karl Dönitz—would—on the intervention of Hitler—gain control of one unit (KG 40), but Göring would soon regain it. Göring's lack of cooperation was detrimental to the one air strategy with potentially decisive strategic effect on Britain. Instead, he wasted aircraft of Fliegerführer Atlantik (Flying Command Atlantic) on bombing mainland Britain instead of attacks against convoys. For Göring, his prestige had been damaged by the defeat in the Battle of Britain, and he wanted to regain it by subduing Britain by air power alone. He was always reluctant to cooperate with Raeder.
Document 2: German submarine U-124 (1940): German submarine "U-124" (nickname "Edelweisseboot") was a Type IXB U-boat of Nazi Germany's "Kriegsmarine" during World War II. She operated in the Atlantic as part of the 2nd U-boat flotilla, both west of Scotland and east of the eastern US coast. She was also present off northern South America.
Answer: control of more Luftwaffe units
Reasoning steps: U-124 >> operator Answer: Kriegsmarine
What did Goring believe the Kriegsmarine would gain with further support? Answer: control of more Luftwaffe units
Question: What did Goring believe the operator of the U-5 would gain with further support?
Context: Document 1: The Blitz: Directive 23 was the only concession made by Göring to the Kriegsmarine over the strategic bombing strategy of the Luftwaffe against Britain. Thereafter, he would refuse to make available any air units to destroy British dockyards, ports, port facilities, or shipping in dock or at sea, lest Kriegsmarine gain control of more Luftwaffe units. Raeder's successor—Karl Dönitz—would—on the intervention of Hitler—gain control of one unit (KG 40), but Göring would soon regain it. Göring's lack of cooperation was detrimental to the one air strategy with potentially decisive strategic effect on Britain. Instead, he wasted aircraft of Fliegerführer Atlantik (Flying Command Atlantic) on bombing mainland Britain instead of attacks against convoys. For Göring, his prestige had been damaged by the defeat in the Battle of Britain, and he wanted to regain it by subduing Britain by air power alone. He was always reluctant to cooperate with Raeder.
Document 2: German submarine U-5 (1935): German submarine "U-5" was a Type IIA U-boat of Nazi Germany's "Kriegsmarine". She was laid down on 11 February 1935, launched on 14 August and commissioned 31 August that year, under Oberleutnant zur See Rolf Dau.
Answer: control of more Luftwaffe units
Reasoning steps: U-5 >> operator Answer: Kriegsmarine
What did Goring believe the Kriegsmarine would gain with further support? Answer: control of more Luftwaffe units
Question: What did Goring believe the operator of the U-4 would gain with further support?
Context: Document 1: German submarine U-4 (1935): German submarine "U-4" was a Type IIA U-boat of Nazi Germany's "Kriegsmarine" before and during World War II. She was one of the longest lasting German submarines of the period, primarily since half of her time was spent on training duties in the Baltic Sea.
Document 2: The Blitz: Directive 23 was the only concession made by Göring to the Kriegsmarine over the strategic bombing strategy of the Luftwaffe against Britain. Thereafter, he would refuse to make available any air units to destroy British dockyards, ports, port facilities, or shipping in dock or at sea, lest Kriegsmarine gain control of more Luftwaffe units. Raeder's successor—Karl Dönitz—would—on the intervention of Hitler—gain control of one unit (KG 40), but Göring would soon regain it. Göring's lack of cooperation was detrimental to the one air strategy with potentially decisive strategic effect on Britain. Instead, he wasted aircraft of Fliegerführer Atlantik (Flying Command Atlantic) on bombing mainland Britain instead of attacks against convoys. For Göring, his prestige had been damaged by the defeat in the Battle of Britain, and he wanted to regain it by subduing Britain by air power alone. He was always reluctant to cooperate with Raeder.
Answer: control of more Luftwaffe units
Reasoning steps: U-4 >> operator Answer: Kriegsmarine
What did Goring believe the Kriegsmarine would gain with further support? Answer: control of more Luftwaffe units
Question: What did Goring believe the operator of U-1105 would gain with further support?
Context: Document 1: The Blitz: Directive 23 was the only concession made by Göring to the Kriegsmarine over the strategic bombing strategy of the Luftwaffe against Britain. Thereafter, he would refuse to make available any air units to destroy British dockyards, ports, port facilities, or shipping in dock or at sea, lest Kriegsmarine gain control of more Luftwaffe units. Raeder's successor—Karl Dönitz—would—on the intervention of Hitler—gain control of one unit (KG 40), but Göring would soon regain it. Göring's lack of cooperation was detrimental to the one air strategy with potentially decisive strategic effect on Britain. Instead, he wasted aircraft of Fliegerführer Atlantik (Flying Command Atlantic) on bombing mainland Britain instead of attacks against convoys. For Göring, his prestige had been damaged by the defeat in the Battle of Britain, and he wanted to regain it by subduing Britain by air power alone. He was always reluctant to cooperate with Raeder.
Document 2: German submarine U-1105: German submarine "U-1105", a Type VII-C/41 U-boat of Nazi Germany's "Kriegsmarine", was built at the Nordseewerke Shipyard, Emden, Germany, and commissioned on 3 June 1944. "Oberleutnant zur See" Hans-Joachim Schwarz was given command. He would command "U-1105" for the remainder of the war.
Answer: control of more Luftwaffe units
Reasoning steps: U-1105 >> operator Answer: Kriegsmarine
What did Goring believe the Kriegsmarine would gain with further support? Answer: control of more Luftwaffe units
Question: What did Goring believe the operator of Kormoran would gain with further support?
Context: Document 1: German auxiliary cruiser Kormoran: The German auxiliary cruiser Kormoran" (HSK-8) was a "Kriegsmarine" (German navy) merchant raider of World War II. Originally the merchant vessel Steiermark", the ship was acquired by the navy following the outbreak of war for conversion into a raider. Administered under the designation "Schiff 41", to the Allied navies she was known as "Raider G." The largest merchant raider operated by Germany during World War II, "Kormoran" was responsible for the destruction of 10 merchant vessels and the capture of an 11th during her year-long career in the Atlantic and Indian oceans.
Document 2: The Blitz: Directive 23 was the only concession made by Göring to the Kriegsmarine over the strategic bombing strategy of the Luftwaffe against Britain. Thereafter, he would refuse to make available any air units to destroy British dockyards, ports, port facilities, or shipping in dock or at sea, lest Kriegsmarine gain control of more Luftwaffe units. Raeder's successor—Karl Dönitz—would—on the intervention of Hitler—gain control of one unit (KG 40), but Göring would soon regain it. Göring's lack of cooperation was detrimental to the one air strategy with potentially decisive strategic effect on Britain. Instead, he wasted aircraft of Fliegerführer Atlantik (Flying Command Atlantic) on bombing mainland Britain instead of attacks against convoys. For Göring, his prestige had been damaged by the defeat in the Battle of Britain, and he wanted to regain it by subduing Britain by air power alone. He was always reluctant to cooperate with Raeder.
Answer: control of more Luftwaffe units
Reasoning steps: Kormoran >> operator Answer: Kriegsmarine
What did Goring believe the Kriegsmarine would gain with further support? Answer: control of more Luftwaffe units
Question: What did Goring believe the operator of the U-96 would gain with further support?
Context: Document 1: German submarine U-96 (1940): German submarine "U-96" was a Type VIIC U-boat of Nazi Germany's "Kriegsmarine" during World War II. Her keel was laid down on 16 September 1939, by Germaniawerft, of Kiel as yard number 601. She was commissioned on 14 September 1940, with "Kapitänleutnant" Heinrich Lehmann-Willenbrock in command. Lehmann-Willenbrock was relieved in March 1942 by "Oberleutnant zur See" Hans-Jürgen Hellriegel, who was relieved in turn in March 1943 by "Oblt.z.S." Wilhelm Peters. In February 1944, "Oblt.z.S." Horst Willner took command, turning the boat over to "Oblt.z.S." Robert Rix in June of that year. Rix commanded the boat until February 1945. During 1941, war correspondent Lothar-Günther Buchheim joined "U-96" for a single patrol.
Document 2: The Blitz: Directive 23 was the only concession made by Göring to the Kriegsmarine over the strategic bombing strategy of the Luftwaffe against Britain. Thereafter, he would refuse to make available any air units to destroy British dockyards, ports, port facilities, or shipping in dock or at sea, lest Kriegsmarine gain control of more Luftwaffe units. Raeder's successor—Karl Dönitz—would—on the intervention of Hitler—gain control of one unit (KG 40), but Göring would soon regain it. Göring's lack of cooperation was detrimental to the one air strategy with potentially decisive strategic effect on Britain. Instead, he wasted aircraft of Fliegerführer Atlantik (Flying Command Atlantic) on bombing mainland Britain instead of attacks against convoys. For Göring, his prestige had been damaged by the defeat in the Battle of Britain, and he wanted to regain it by subduing Britain by air power alone. He was always reluctant to cooperate with Raeder.
Answer: control of more Luftwaffe units
Reasoning steps: U-96 >> operator Answer: Kriegsmarine
What did Goring believe the Kriegsmarine would gain with further support? Answer: control of more Luftwaffe units
Question: What did Goring believe the operator of the Bismark would gain with further support?
Context: Document 1: The Blitz: Directive 23 was the only concession made by Göring to the Kriegsmarine over the strategic bombing strategy of the Luftwaffe against Britain. Thereafter, he would refuse to make available any air units to destroy British dockyards, ports, port facilities, or shipping in dock or at sea, lest Kriegsmarine gain control of more Luftwaffe units. Raeder's successor—Karl Dönitz—would—on the intervention of Hitler—gain control of one unit (KG 40), but Göring would soon regain it. Göring's lack of cooperation was detrimental to the one air strategy with potentially decisive strategic effect on Britain. Instead, he wasted aircraft of Fliegerführer Atlantik (Flying Command Atlantic) on bombing mainland Britain instead of attacks against convoys. For Göring, his prestige had been damaged by the defeat in the Battle of Britain, and he wanted to regain it by subduing Britain by air power alone. He was always reluctant to cooperate with Raeder.
Document 2: German battleship Bismarck: Bismarck was the first of two s built for Nazi Germany's "Kriegsmarine". Named after Chancellor Otto von Bismarck, the ship was laid down at the Blohm & Voss shipyard in Hamburg in July 1936 and launched in February 1939. Work was completed in August 1940, when she was commissioned into the German fleet. "Bismarck" and her sister ship were the largest battleships ever built by Germany, and two of the largest built by any European power.
Answer: control of more Luftwaffe units
Reasoning steps: Bismarck >> operator Answer: Kriegsmarine
What did Goring believe the Kriegsmarine would gain with further support? Answer: control of more Luftwaffe units
Question: What did Goring believe the operator of U-6 would gain with further support?
Context: Document 1: German submarine U-6 (1935): The German submarine "U-6" was a long-lived but very inactive Type IIA U-boat built before World War II for service in Nazi Germany's "Kriegsmarine".
Document 2: The Blitz: Directive 23 was the only concession made by Göring to the Kriegsmarine over the strategic bombing strategy of the Luftwaffe against Britain. Thereafter, he would refuse to make available any air units to destroy British dockyards, ports, port facilities, or shipping in dock or at sea, lest Kriegsmarine gain control of more Luftwaffe units. Raeder's successor—Karl Dönitz—would—on the intervention of Hitler—gain control of one unit (KG 40), but Göring would soon regain it. Göring's lack of cooperation was detrimental to the one air strategy with potentially decisive strategic effect on Britain. Instead, he wasted aircraft of Fliegerführer Atlantik (Flying Command Atlantic) on bombing mainland Britain instead of attacks against convoys. For Göring, his prestige had been damaged by the defeat in the Battle of Britain, and he wanted to regain it by subduing Britain by air power alone. He was always reluctant to cooperate with Raeder.
Answer: control of more Luftwaffe units
Reasoning steps: U-6 >> operator Answer: Kriegsmarine
What did Goring believe the Kriegsmarine would gain with further support? Answer: control of more Luftwaffe units
Question: What did Goring believe the operator of the U-11 would gain with further support?
Context: Document 1: German submarine U-11 (1935): German submarine U-11 was a Type IIB U-boat built before World War II for service in Nazi Germany's "Kriegsmarine". She was commissioned on 21 September 1935, with "Kapitänleutnant" Hans-Rudolf Rösing in command. She served in several training flotillas in her 10-year career, but sank or damaged no ships.
Document 2: The Blitz: Directive 23 was the only concession made by Göring to the Kriegsmarine over the strategic bombing strategy of the Luftwaffe against Britain. Thereafter, he would refuse to make available any air units to destroy British dockyards, ports, port facilities, or shipping in dock or at sea, lest Kriegsmarine gain control of more Luftwaffe units. Raeder's successor—Karl Dönitz—would—on the intervention of Hitler—gain control of one unit (KG 40), but Göring would soon regain it. Göring's lack of cooperation was detrimental to the one air strategy with potentially decisive strategic effect on Britain. Instead, he wasted aircraft of Fliegerführer Atlantik (Flying Command Atlantic) on bombing mainland Britain instead of attacks against convoys. For Göring, his prestige had been damaged by the defeat in the Battle of Britain, and he wanted to regain it by subduing Britain by air power alone. He was always reluctant to cooperate with Raeder.
Answer: control of more Luftwaffe units
Reasoning steps: U-11 >> operator Answer: Kriegsmarine
What did Goring believe the Kriegsmarine would gain with further support? Answer: control of more Luftwaffe units
Question: What did Goring believe the operator of Deutschland class would gain with further support?
Context: Document 1: The Blitz: Directive 23 was the only concession made by Göring to the Kriegsmarine over the strategic bombing strategy of the Luftwaffe against Britain. Thereafter, he would refuse to make available any air units to destroy British dockyards, ports, port facilities, or shipping in dock or at sea, lest Kriegsmarine gain control of more Luftwaffe units. Raeder's successor—Karl Dönitz—would—on the intervention of Hitler—gain control of one unit (KG 40), but Göring would soon regain it. Göring's lack of cooperation was detrimental to the one air strategy with potentially decisive strategic effect on Britain. Instead, he wasted aircraft of Fliegerführer Atlantik (Flying Command Atlantic) on bombing mainland Britain instead of attacks against convoys. For Göring, his prestige had been damaged by the defeat in the Battle of Britain, and he wanted to regain it by subduing Britain by air power alone. He was always reluctant to cooperate with Raeder.
Document 2: P-class cruiser: The P class was a planned group of twelve heavy cruisers of Nazi Germany's "Kriegsmarine"; they were the successor to the s. Design work began in 1937 and continued until 1939; at least twenty designs were submitted with nine of them being considered. There were three designs that were selected as the final contenders. One design was armed with six 283mm main guns in one triple turret forward and one more turret aft. It had two 150mm double secondary gun turrets as secondary armament with one being positioned above and just fore of the aft of the main 283mm main turret, and the other being in front and lower of the front main gun turret. This design had more beam than the other 2 designs. It also mounted 2 seaplanes on its fantail instead of the mid ship area. The final design was armed with six quick-firing guns in two triple turrets, as in the preceding "Deutschland" class. The ships were designated as "Panzerschiff" (armored ship), and given the preliminary names P1–P12. They were an improved design over the preceding planned D-class cruisers, which had been canceled in 1934. Although the ships were already assigned to shipyards, construction never began on the P-class ships after the design superseded them.
Answer: control of more Luftwaffe units
Reasoning steps: Deutschland class >> operator Answer: Kriegsmarine
What did Goring believe the Kriegsmarine would gain with further support? Answer: control of more Luftwaffe units
Question: During the Blitz, what did Goring believe the operator of the F class escort ships would gain with further support?
Context: Document 1: F-class escort ship: The F-class escort ships were a class of fleet escorts () used by the "Kriegsmarine" during the Second World War. Ten ships were built in total, of a type roughly comparable to British frigates or American destroyer escorts. They were the only such type of ship built by the "Kriegsmarine". The ten ships were not given names, but were designated "F1" through "F10".
Document 2: The Blitz: Directive 23 was the only concession made by Göring to the Kriegsmarine over the strategic bombing strategy of the Luftwaffe against Britain. Thereafter, he would refuse to make available any air units to destroy British dockyards, ports, port facilities, or shipping in dock or at sea, lest Kriegsmarine gain control of more Luftwaffe units. Raeder's successor—Karl Dönitz—would—on the intervention of Hitler—gain control of one unit (KG 40), but Göring would soon regain it. Göring's lack of cooperation was detrimental to the one air strategy with potentially decisive strategic effect on Britain. Instead, he wasted aircraft of Fliegerführer Atlantik (Flying Command Atlantic) on bombing mainland Britain instead of attacks against convoys. For Göring, his prestige had been damaged by the defeat in the Battle of Britain, and he wanted to regain it by subduing Britain by air power alone. He was always reluctant to cooperate with Raeder.
Answer: control of more Luftwaffe units
Reasoning steps: F class >> operator Answer: Kriegsmarine
What did Goring believe the Kriegsmarine would gain with further support? Answer: control of more Luftwaffe units
Question: During the bombing of Britain, what did Goring believe the operator of the P class would gain with further support?
Context: Document 1: P-class cruiser: The P class was a planned group of twelve heavy cruisers of Nazi Germany's "Kriegsmarine"; they were the successor to the s. Design work began in 1937 and continued until 1939; at least twenty designs were submitted with nine of them being considered. There were three designs that were selected as the final contenders. One design was armed with six 283mm main guns in one triple turret forward and one more turret aft. It had two 150mm double secondary gun turrets as secondary armament with one being positioned above and just fore of the aft of the main 283mm main turret, and the other being in front and lower of the front main gun turret. This design had more beam than the other 2 designs. It also mounted 2 seaplanes on its fantail instead of the mid ship area. The final design was armed with six quick-firing guns in two triple turrets, as in the preceding "Deutschland" class. The ships were designated as "Panzerschiff" (armored ship), and given the preliminary names P1–P12. They were an improved design over the preceding planned D-class cruisers, which had been canceled in 1934. Although the ships were already assigned to shipyards, construction never began on the P-class ships after the design superseded them.
Document 2: The Blitz: Directive 23 was the only concession made by Göring to the Kriegsmarine over the strategic bombing strategy of the Luftwaffe against Britain. Thereafter, he would refuse to make available any air units to destroy British dockyards, ports, port facilities, or shipping in dock or at sea, lest Kriegsmarine gain control of more Luftwaffe units. Raeder's successor—Karl Dönitz—would—on the intervention of Hitler—gain control of one unit (KG 40), but Göring would soon regain it. Göring's lack of cooperation was detrimental to the one air strategy with potentially decisive strategic effect on Britain. Instead, he wasted aircraft of Fliegerführer Atlantik (Flying Command Atlantic) on bombing mainland Britain instead of attacks against convoys. For Göring, his prestige had been damaged by the defeat in the Battle of Britain, and he wanted to regain it by subduing Britain by air power alone. He was always reluctant to cooperate with Raeder.
Answer: control of more Luftwaffe units
Reasoning steps: P class >> operator Answer: Kriegsmarine
What did Goring believe the Kriegsmarine would gain with further support? Answer: control of more Luftwaffe units