I was, of course, for Gore. In the beginning I was a Bradley man. But as soon as he dropped out of the race, I rallied - like the good Democrat I briefly was - to the party's chosen candidate. Memories of snowy days campaigning with Edmund Sextus Muskie in the New Hampshire primary combined with the distaste I feel for George W Bush and my regret that the Great Republic should be led by such an obviously cornball president. However, after four weeks of waiting for a miracle to happen, I realised that there is at least one benefit to be gained from the vice-president's defeat. The Labour leadership may now take a more grown-up view of America and its politics. The years of girlish infatuation are over. The notion that the US provides the pattern of modern progressive government will not survive an administration that is isolationist abroad and fiscally neolithic at home.  Although I have always been part of Labour's pro-America tendency - star-struck by JF Kennedy when I was young, properly impressed by Lyndon Johnson's civil-rights crusade after the assassination, and devoted to Hubert Humphrey to the point at which admiration and idolatry are difficult to distinguish - I find it hard to understand why, apart from the president's success in winning two consecutive elections, Tony Blair feels such an affection for William Clinton.  The second victory was won at the expense of welfare and medicare - which he was elected to improve. Both are more difficult to obtain now than eight years ago. That is not an example that Tony Blair should wish to follow. Let us hope that, in four years' time, the Clinton inheritance will not prejudice the policies, as well as the prospects, of the Democratic candidate.  In the meantime, President Bush - detached by irresistible ignorance from the needs of Europe - may help us all to take a more rational view of the rapid reaction force. I have argued for our continued commitment to Nato in every Labour forum from local party to national conference. But the alliance is now outdated. It was created to meet a danger that, although real and present at that time, has disappeared.   Without the nuclear sword and shield, an imperialistic Soviet Union might have moved west. But nobody believes that Russia has territorial ambitions that are held back only by the deterrent. Nor will the threat of massive retaliation make the pirate nuclear states think twice before firing off their missiles. Deterrence is a sophisticated business in which the potential adversaries calculate each other's reactions with mordant scientific care. Only superpowers behave in that way.   Nato was necessary but it was, and remains, an instrument of US policy. Successive administrations realised that if Berlin fell, Boston and Baltimore would not be safe. That is why they made (and still make) so massive a contribution to the cost of security. The size of their commitment makes it hard to complain about their determination to control how the money is spent. But we ought to be frank about the result of that determination. It goes further than insisting that the supreme allied commander is always American. They want Europe to pay more. But they still expect Nato to reflect US strategic interests.  President Clinton was hard to persuade that those interests included imposing a reluctant peace on the Balkans. It is easy enough to argue about the propriety, as well as the long-term success, of the Kosovo and Bosnia operations. But it is absolutely certain that President Bush would not become involved in anything that remotely resembled them. If Europe believes that fire-fighting may be necessary in Europe or   Africa, it has to create a fire brigade of its own. If future flames are outside the American continent, Uncle Sam will stay at home and watch the far-off countries burn - confident that they will not even scorch the US.  We cannot expect Tony Blair - or any other European leader with the exception of President Chirac - to say such things publicly. The prime minister is absolutely right to pretend that the election of President Bush makes no difference to what he called the "special friendship". But he must know it does. And, if he has any judgment at all, he must also realise that it argues for an even closer relationship with Europe.  That greater integration is demanded by realism not by anti-American sentiment. The US presidents whom I admired most all argued for Britain to become a major force within the fast-track of the union. They used to talk about Europe and America as "twin pillars" joined together by what I suppose was architrave-Britain.  It may be too late for that. Being a reluctant European we have lost much of our influence with America. Ironically, the election of a president who is careless of our interests may help to achieve a proper, if not special, relationship.