Some people here think war with Iraq is close. They range beyond the civilians at the top of the Pentagon. They want a war, and they have a case. Saddam Hussein is already in breach of numerous UN demands, and is certain, they believe, to multiply his breaches, starting on December 8, when he is required to produce a full declaration of his mass-destruction assets and will certainly not do so. At the next stage, when inspections get fully under way, there will be more breaches. The war party envisages an early hearing at the White House, at which President Bush is persuaded, over the head of Secretary of State Powell, that the US cannot afford to be jerked around for further weeks by Russians, French and Mexicans at the UN, and must not wait to attack. There's a precedent for the precipitate action that would follow. In December 1998, Bill Clinton launched bombing raids on Iraq at the very moment the UN security council was meeting to discuss what to do about Saddam. Mr Bush, the case goes, has stronger unilateralist instincts than Clinton, and is surrounded by officials who nurture them. An attack will happen soon, early 2003 at the latest, without UN support if necessary.  I think this quite unlikely. Conversations inside the Bush administration and at the UN begin to produce the shape of the more probable scenario. Among other things this will force European (and indeed American) anti-warriors to think more seriously about their position than Bush has given them the luxury of doing so far.  It's always possible Saddam will be very stupid, and orchestrate provocations nobody can ignore, but what most American officials are preparing for is a long game. For example, the December 8 declaration could declare several hundred thousand documents purporting to be the history of chemical-agent production in Iraq. They wouldn't be what the UN wants, but the inspectors would need to study them. Many possible Iraqi responses, evasive but not blatantly in breach, have been thought about and docketed. The pattern of obstruction will need to be conclusive before war starts.  This is because Bush has become, in effect, an internationalist. His own inner demons used, of course, to be different. Their message was, and implicitly still is, voiced by Vice-President Cheney, a rigid opponent of any UN involvement. But from the moment in September when Bush opted for the UN route, the need for international support became rooted deep in his strategy. His election victory, touted as a hawkish moment, gives him more strength to wait for it to build.  The main reason he wants it is to be found not in the war so much as the victory that follows. A senior UN official contrasted for me a victory gained by America alone, leaving the US to carry the entire burden of Arab hatred as it struggled alone to hold Iraq together, with a victory under the collective UN banner, in which many states share the material and moral   responsibility for what the world decided to do. "Bush will go a long way to build that alliance," the official said.  His chances of doing so via the UN are better than they were. The US spent eight weeks fending off the demand, from France and Russia mainly, that there must be a second resolution before further Iraqi infractions are formally converted into a casus belli. They won that one. But Washington agreed to return for a security council discussion, in terms so clear that a Clinton-style pre-emptive strike would be seen, by faithful Britain as much as anyone, as an intolerable betrayal.  However, the chances of a second resolution being voluntarily proposed by the US or Britain are quite high, since the chances of it being passed are improving. France, having righteously defended the UN process for eight weeks, now sees its Iraqi contracts being broken and is losing interest in blocking further action. China, distant from the scene, is more interested in bilateral relations with the US than defending Saddam. An isolated Russia would be reluctant to cast a veto. With the permanent five on side, a simple security council majority would be enough for war. Ensuring it is a task on which the diplomats are now embarked.  This doesn't alter the difficulties of agreeing when Iraq should be deemed conclusively in violation. As the inspectors go in, the speculative nits are being interminably picked on the 24-hour TV news programmes here. That could go on for months, and the war party will get more contemptuously rowdy. My impression, though, is that for both military and diplomatic reasons Washington will be patient. The armaments need to be in place. Most of all, the allies need to agree. An official at the national security council startled me by volunteering that six months could pass before anything happened. I now see why he may be right.  I draw three conclusions from this trip. The first is that, in the delicate matter of deciding when enough has been enough, Prime Minister Blair will have a crucial, perhaps decisive, voice. Bush desperately needs Blair, and Blair desperately needs the UN. If Blair cannot agree that Saddam has yet insulted the world order enough to justify war, Bush's hand may be temporarily stayed.  Second, the probability of war at some stage is high, verging on certain. The inspection process may yield its own peace dividends. Saddam is already less secure than he was, as witness his referendum and the prisoner releases. Perhaps Mr Blix will destabilise him further, simply by being there, and with the power to take willing witnesses out of Iraq to a new life in exchange for testimony. But don't bet on it. The US/UN demands will be unrelenting. Short of the assassin's bullet - regarded longingly in Washington - war will be the only way to meet them.  But thirdly, this does look more like being a UN war. Saddam's chances of splitting the security council are receding. France, having insured the system against US unilateralism, is now as keen as anyone to see the back of the monster. There may not be many more forces than American, British and French in the field and the air, but time and palpably serious intent are producing deals with Iraq's neighbours - Turkey, perhaps even Iran - that begin to close the trap.  A UN war doesn't destroy the arguments against any war at all. The hazards of bio-chemical retaliation will remain. The death of innocent civilian Iraqis will be a brutal certainty. What kind of post-war Iraq, a subject of Polyanna-ish optimism in the Bush administration, is a question that should dog all regime-changers. Al-Qaida will feed. But the issue now, if I'm right, is not the simple one of American superpowerdom and whether Blair should be tailgating in its wake. It is whether, by internationalising the Iraqi conflict, Bush and Blair, with Chirac and Putin in acquiescence, will make the world a safer place. Unless one is to say the UN, from being anathema to the US, has become her tool, the case has strengthened, and needs more than ranting to defeat it.