[House Hearing, 115 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
STRENGTHENING U.S.
CYBERSECURITY CAPABILITIES
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 14, 2017
__________
Serial No. 115-02
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology
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Available via the World Wide Web: http://science.house.gov
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COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY
HON. LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas, Chair
FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
DANA ROHRABACHER, California ZOE LOFGREN, California
MO BROOKS, Alabama DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois
RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois SUZANNE BONAMICI, Oregon
BILL POSEY, Florida ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky AMI BERA, California
JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma ELIZABETH H. ESTY, Connecticut
RANDY K. WEBER, Texas MARC A. VEASEY, Texas
STEPHEN KNIGHT, California DONALD S. BEYER, JR., Virginia
BRIAN BABIN, Texas JACKY ROSEN, Nevada
BARBARA COMSTOCK, Virginia JERRY MCNERNEY, California
GARY PALMER, Alabama ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado
BARRY LOUDERMILK, Georgia PAUL TONKO, New York
RALPH LEE ABRAHAM, Louisiana BILL FOSTER, Illinois
DRAIN LaHOOD, Illinois MARK TAKANO, California
DANIEL WEBSTER, Florida COLLEEN HANABUSA, Hawaii
JIM BANKS, Indiana CHARLIE CRIST, Florida
ANDY BIGGS, Arizona
ROGER W. MARSHALL, Kansas
NEAL P. DUNN, Florida
CLAY HIGGINS, Louisiana
------
Subcommittee on Research and Technology
HON. BARBARA COMSTOCK, Virginia, Chair
FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois
RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois ELIZABETH H. ESTY, Connecticut
STEPHEN KNIGHT, California JACKY ROSEN, Nevada
DARIN LaHOOD, Illinois SUZANNE BONAMICI, Oregon
RALPH LEE ABRAHAM, Louisiana AMI BERA, California
DANIEL WEBSTER, Florida DONALD S. BEYER, JR., Virginia
JIM BANKS, Indiana EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
ROGER W. MARSHALL, Kansas
LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas
C O N T E N T S
February 14, 2017
Page
Witness List..................................................... 2
Hearing Charter.................................................. 3
Opening Statements
Statement by Representative Barbara Comstock, Chairwoman,
Subcommittee on Research and Technology, Committee on Science,
Space, and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives........... 4
Written Statement............................................ 6
Statement by Representative Daniel Lipinski, Ranking Member,
Subcommittee on Research and Technology, Committee on Science,
Space, and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives........... 8
Written Statement............................................ 10
Statement by Representative Eddie Bernice Johnson, Ranking
Member, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House
of Representatives............................................. 12
Written Statement............................................ 14
Witnesses:
Dr. Charles H. Romine, Director, Information Technology Lab,
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
Oral Statement............................................... 16
Written Statement............................................ 19
Mr. Iain Mulholland, Industry Member, CSIS Cyber Policy Task
Force; Chief Technology Officer, Security, VMware, Inc.
Oral Statement............................................... 28
Written Statement............................................ 31
Dr. Diana Burley, Executive Director and Chair, Institute for
Information Infrastructure Protection (I3P); Professor, Human
and Organizational Learning, The George Washington University
Oral Statement............................................... 39
Written Statement............................................ 41
Mr. Gregory Wilshusen, Director, Information Security Issues, GAO
Oral Statement............................................... 53
Written Statement............................................ 55
Discussion....................................................... 81
Appendix I: Additional Material for the Record
Documents submitted by Representative Barbara Comstock,
Chairwoman, Subcommittee on Research and Technology, Committee
on Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of
Representatives................................................ 99
Documents submitted by Representative Daniel Lipinski, Ranking
Member, Subcommittee on Research and Technology, Committee on
Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives.. 146
Documents submitted by Representative Eddie Bernice Johnson,
Ranking Member, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology,
U.S. House of Representatives.................................. 150
STRENGTHENING U.S.
CYBERSECURITY CAPABILITIES
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TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 14, 2017
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Research and Technology,
Committee on Science, Space, and Technology,
Washington, D.C.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:08 a.m., in
Room 2318 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Barbara
Comstock [Chairwoman of the Subcommittee] presiding.
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Chairwoman Comstock. The Committee on Science, Space, and
Technology will come to order.
Without objection, the Chair is authorized to declare
recesses of the Committee at any time.
Good morning, and welcome to today's hearing titled
''Strengthening U.S. Cybersecurity Capabilities.'' I recognize
myself for five minutes for an opening statement.
I want to begin by thanking everyone for attending this
first hearing of the Research and Technology Subcommittee in
the 115th Congress. I look forward to working with the members
of the Subcommittee, some of whom are new to the Committee,
while others are new to Congress, and working together on many
of the issues under our jurisdiction.
The topic of cybersecurity is a familiar one for this
Committee, and this Subcommittee in particular. It is also a
topic of continuously growing international attention and real
concern.
During the 114th Congress, the Science Committee held a
dozen hearings related to cybersecurity. Some of these were
triggered by notable events such as the Office of Personnel
Management and Internal Revenue Service data breaches. I still
remember receiving my OPM letter, and I also got one of those
IRS letters, which informed me that my personal information may
have been compromised or stolen by the cyber criminals behind
this attack. I also chaired a hearing last year during which
the IRS Commissioner testified about the breaches under his
watch. It's certainly frustrating to hear that criminals used
information from other cyber-attacks to accurately answer
questions on the IRS website to access what should have been
secured information. Those criminals should not have been able
to access such information, and may not have been able to
access it, had the agency fully followed security guidelines
provided by the National Institute of Standards and Technology.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today about
cybersecurity recommendations to help protect U.S. information
systems. These recommendations were highlighted in recent
documents, which include the report published by the Commission
on Enhancing National Cybersecurity and one published by the
Center for Strategic and International Studies. The Government
Accountability Office (GAO), which has issued countless
recommendations in the area of cybersecurity for decades, is
also represented at today's hearing. I am interested in hearing
how the suggestions from the reports being profiled today align
with GAO's body of work.
I also look forward to hearing more about what can be done
to proactively address cyber workforce gaps. This Committee has
been very much involved in STEM education and making sure we
have that cybersecurity generation for dealing with this, and
that is an important role that we need to play here in
Congress, continuing to get that cyber workforce up and
running, I, particularly in my district, am pleased that we
have so much going on in that area and want to continue in this
Subcommittee to focus on that also. You know, when I travel
around my district and visit with constituents who work in this
sector, a repeated concern is the increasing need for
individuals with appropriate education, training, and knowledge
of cybersecurity matters and being able to tackle what we know
are going to be increasing problems and that we need to be on
the offense on this front.
Before I yield to the Ranking Member, let me just note that
I appreciate everyone's presence here today given that this is
the week of the RSA Conference in San Francisco. So sorry you
aren't able to be there and are here, but we truly appreciate
you being able to join us here today.
[The prepared statement of Chairwoman Comstock follows:]
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Chairwoman Comstock. And I now yield to our distinguished
Ranking Member, Mr. Lipinski.
Mr. Lipinski. Thank you, Chairwoman Comstock. Too bad we
couldn't all go out to San Francisco to have a field hearing
there.
But I want to thank Chairwoman Comstock and I look forward
to working with you. It's good to have some continuity in the
Chair of the Subcommittee. I think that will be helpful as we
move forward and work together on getting some things done here
on the Subcommittee, and I also look forward to working with
all our returning and new members of this Research and
Technology Subcommittee. I also want to thank our distinguished
panel for being here today. I know some of you have been here a
number of times, and we always appreciate your expertise.
Cybersecurity has long been a priority of mine in Congress.
The Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2014, which was signed
into law, began as a bill that Representative McCaul and I
introduced in 2009. As pointed out in the CSIS report,
cybersecurity is a topic on which nearly every Committee in
Congress has something to contribute. This is a good thing and
a bad thing. What we need to do is to do our best at making
sure that there is collaboration and coordination across all
these different committees.
Our committee is uniquely positioned to contribute
meaningfully to oversight and policy development for
cybersecurity because of our jurisdiction over NIST, and our
oversight responsibility for STEM education and workforce
training activities across the Federal government. I understand
that today's hearing is likely just the first of several
hearings on cybersecurity we will hold in this Congress. I
understand that today's hearing is likely--well, this hearing--
I got lost in my script here--this is one of several. This one
is going to be a more broad overview of what we're looking at
in cybersecurity.
However, sitting before us are a few of our nation's top
experts on NIST's role in cybersecurity and on cybersecurity
education and workforce issues, so I look forward to hearing
those specific areas from our witnesses.
NIST plays a central role in the security of federal
information systems. The experts at NIST develop the security
standards and guidelines that all other civilian federal
agencies are required to implement through the Federal
Information Security Modernization Act, or FISMA. Those experts
also provide technical assistance to other agencies.
Furthermore, NIST led the development of the Cybersecurity
Framework for Critical Infrastructure, a widely adopted set of
voluntary guidelines and standards for industry, and works
closely with industry to help develop tools for businesses of
all sizes and from all sectors to effectively implement the
Framework.
There have been some calls for an expanded role for NIST,
including an expanded oversight role under FISMA. These
suggestions warrant careful examination. NIST is successful in
its current role in large part because of its independence as a
standards and technology agency, and not a regulatory or
enforcement agency. Any discussion about an expanded role must
be accompanied by a discussion about increasing resources and
other issues that would come up.
On the topic of education and workforce, NIST leads federal
efforts through coordination of the National Initiative for
Cybersecurity Education, or NICE. Another agency in our
jurisdiction, the National Science Foundation, supports
important programs such as the CyberCorps Scholarship for
Service.
However, the gap between supply and demand for
cybersecurity training in both the government and the private
sector remains a challenge. All of the best policies are
meaningless without the skilled workforce to implement these
policies. Increasing the recruitment and retention of
cybersecurity talent in our federal agencies is going to
require new and creative thinking, as well as increased
resources.
It is also going to require stepping back from the
disparaging rhetoric aimed lately at the civil service. Federal
agencies already struggle to recruit and retain top talent from
the limited pool of qualified cybersecurity professionals,
especially when private sector salaries are much higher.
Negative remarks, combined with a federal hiring freeze, can do
real damage to agencies' recruitment and retention efforts.
Before I conclude, I want to ask unanimous consent to add
to the record two letters to the Committee, one from the
Electronic Privacy Information Center, and the other from the
National Association of Federally Insured Credit Unions.
Chairwoman Comstock. Thank you. Without objection.
[The information appears in Appendix I]
Mr. Lipinski. Thank you, and I want to again thank the
Chairwoman for holding this hearing, and the witnesses for
being here, and I look forward to your testimony.
I yield back.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Lipinski follows:]
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Chairwoman Comstock. I thank the Ranking Member, and I also
thank him for his comments on the importance of our
cybersecurity workforce and I'll second those sentiments.
Our first witness today is Dr. Charles Romine, Director of
the--oh, I'm sorry. The Ranking Member is present. I'm sorry.
Ms. Johnson. Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman.
I'd like to ask for unanimous consent to enter some
material in the record prior to making a statement.
Chairwoman Comstock. Without objection.
Ms. Johnson. Thank you.
Chairwoman Comstock, I have been in Congress and on this
Committee for a long time. As a matter of fact, this is the
beginning of my 25th year. There are many times I have
disagreed with my Republican colleagues. Sometimes we've had
harsh criticisms of each other's political positions. That
comes with the job description of being a Member of Congress,
and I accept that. But what I will not accept is when Members
or staff provide clearly misleading information about me or my
colleagues to the press, the public, or anyone else.
Yesterday, a story in The Hill newspaper regarding a letter
that I sent along with Mr. Lipinski and Mr. Beyer to you,
Chairman Smith and Chairman LaHood about President Trump's
cybersecurity practices quoted an unnamed GOP Committee aide
that suggested that last Congress, Committee Democrats opposed
cybersecurity hearings that were held on this Committee
regarding the Office of Personnel Management, the Internal
Revenue Service and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
because we believed that they were political and illegitimate.
I want to speak--I will not speak for my colleagues but I will
speak for myself. I did believe many of the hearings that were
held on this Committee were politically motivated but none of
them included any of the hearings mentioned by the Committee
aide. If this aide had attended any of these hearings or read
any of the statements by me or the Ranking Members Beyer or
Lipinski, they would have understood that. Since I believe in
ensuring there is an honest record of events, I would like
unanimous consent to enter into the record all of the Ranking
Member's statements and press releases issued by the Democrats
for each of the hearings referenced by this Republican staffer
just in order to set the record straight.
Chairwoman Comstock. Without objection.
[The information appears in Appendix I]
Ms. Johnson. Thank you.
Let me thank you again and also Ranking Member Lipinski for
holding the hearing today on cybersecurity, and thank you to
all the witnesses for being here this morning. We have several
new members on the Committee, so it is valuable to start off
the year with a Cybersecurity 101 hearing.
Today's panel includes four very distinguished experts from
government, the private sector, and academia, and I know it
will be an interesting and informative discussion. I'm pleased
that Dr. Romine is able to join us this morning. Testifying
before Congress so early during a transition in administrations
can be challenging for any agency official.
This is not a hearing specifically about NIST's role in
cybersecurity, but I'm going to set some context with a few
words about this very important but little-known agency. NIST
plays a crucial role in both public and private sector
cybersecurity, as we will hear about today. In fact,
cybersecurity accounts for a significant fraction of NIST's
total budget. However, it is but one of dozens of topics to
which the hundreds of extraordinary scientists and engineers
working at the NIST labs in Gaithersburg, Maryland, and
Boulder, Colorado, devote their careers. NIST hosts the world
leading measurement scientists, and uses that science to lead
the development of technical standards for the nation. NIST
scientists work closely with industry across all sectors, big
and small, to advance U.S. innovation and competitiveness.
And they do all of this on what amounts to a shoestring
budget. Because NIST usually exceeds expectations, there is a
tendency by policymakers to ask them to do more with less. That
has surely been true in the realm of cybersecurity. But I
caution this Committee and the Administration not to push NIST
to the breaking point. Every agency must set priorities, and
there may be room even at NIST to put aside some of its work to
make room for higher priority topics, including cybersecurity.
I will be watching closely to ensure that that none of NIST's
important work is compromised in our zeal to save a dollar here
and dollar there. The costs to the nation will be much greater
than the few dollars saved.
And finally, I want to bring up a troubling incident from
2013, in which the National Security Agency (NSA) secretly
inserted a ``back door'' into a cryptographic standard being
developed by NIST. There was an immediate outcry, as this sneak
attack was widely recognized as a potentially slippery slope to
a surveillance state. It undermined the stellar reputation and
credibility of NIST in international circles and it had a
negative impact on the global operations of U.S. corporations.
In the aftermath of that incident, NIST implemented new
procedures to reinforce transparency and integrity in their
standards development process. I want NIST to be able to
consult with the intelligence agencies. Such collaboration is
necessary and appropriate in the realm of cybersecurity. Both
NIST and the U.S. intelligence community share special
cybersecurity expertise and skills that should be shared to
help defend our nation against the many cybersecurity threats
that confront us. However, I will be watching out for the
slightest hint that such collaborations in any way compromise
NIST's independence or the integrity of their work.
With that, I want to thank the witnesses again for your
time and contributions to this Committee's discussion about
cybersecurity, and I yield back.
I thank you, Madam Chair.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Johnson follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairwoman Comstock. Thank you.
Our first witness today is Dr. Charles Romine, Director of
the Information Technology Lab at the National Institutes of
Standards and Technology. This program develops and
disseminates standards for security and reliability of
information systems including cybersecurity standards and
guidelines for federal agencies. Dr. Romine has previously
served as a Senior Policy Analyst at the White House Office of
Science and Technology Policy and as a Program Manager at the
Department of Energy's Advanced Scientific Computing Research
Office. Dr. Romine received his bachelor's degree in
mathematics and his Ph.D. in applied mathematics from the
University of Virginia.
Our second witness today is Mr. Iain Mulholland, Industry
Member of the Center for Strategic and International Studies
Cybersecurity Task Force and Chief Technology Officer of
Security for VMware, Inc. A 20-year veteran of the software
security space, Mr. Mulholland was an early member of the
Microsoft Trustworthy Computing Group where he led the
Microsoft Security Response Center. Mr. Mulholland is also a
member of the U.S. Delegation to the Wassenaar Plenary in
Austria in charge of negotiating international cybersecurity
protocols. Mr. Mulholland has received degrees from the Royal
Military Academy in the United Kingdom as well as from Stanford
University Graduate School of Business' Executive Leadership
Program.
Our third witness today is Dr. Diana Burley, Executive
Director and Chair of the Institute for Information
Infrastructure Protection, and Professor of Human and
Organizational Learning at the George Washington University.
Prior to joining GW, Dr. Burley managed a multimillion-dollar
computer science education and research portfolio and led the
CyberCorps Program for the National Science Foundation. Dr.
Burley holds a B.A. in economics from the Catholic University
of America, M.S. in public management and policy, M.S. in
organization science, and Ph.D. in organization science and
information technology from Carnegie Mellon University, where
she studied as a Woodrow Wilson Foundation fellow.
Our final witness today is Mr. Gregory Wilshusen, Director
of Information Security Issues at the U.S. Government
Accountability Office. Prior to joining GAO in 1997, he was a
Senior Systems Analyst at the Department of Education. He
received his bachelor's degree in business administration from
the University of Missouri and his master of science and
information management from George Washington University.
Thank you all for joining us this morning, and now I'll
hear five minutes from Dr. Romine.
TESTIMONY OF DR. CHARLES H. ROMINE, DIRECTOR,
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY LAB,
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY (NIST)
Dr. Romine. Chairwoman Comstock, Ranking Member Lipinski,
and Mrs. Johnson, and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you
for the opportunity to discuss NIST's activities that help
strengthen the nation's cybersecurity capabilities.
In the area of cybersecurity, NIST has worked with federal
agencies, industry and academia since 1972. Our role to
research, develop and deploy information security standards and
technology to protect the federal government's information
systems against the threats to the confidentiality, integrity
and availability of information and services, was strengthened
through the Computer Security Act of 1987, broadened through
the Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002, and
reaffirmed in the Federal Information Security Modernization
Act of 2014, or FISMA.
In addition, the Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2014
authorizes NIST to facilitate and support the development of
voluntary, industry-led cybersecurity standards and best
practices for critical infrastructure.
Recently, the independent bipartisan Commission on
Enhancing National Cybersecurity released its report, which
provides detailed recommendations to strengthen cybersecurity
in both the public and the private sectors. NIST is active in
many areas addressed by the Commission report.
Three years ago, NIST issued the Framework for Improving
Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity, or the ``Framework,''
which was created through collaboration between industry and
government, and consists of standards, guidelines, and
practices to promote the protection of critical infrastructure.
The prioritized, flexible, repeatable, and cost-effective
approach of the Framework helps owners and operators of
critical infrastructure to manage cybersecurity-related risk.
Last month, NIST released a draft update to the Framework
for public comment. The Framework continues to be voluntarily
implemented by industry and adopted by infrastructure sectors,
and this is contributing to reducing cyber-risks to our
nation's critical infrastructure.
NIST works with stakeholders to cultivate trust in the
Internet of Things, or IoT. NIST performs fundamental research,
contributes to the development of consensus standards, and
issues guidance that addresses security of IoT.
NIST's applied research for IoT security addresses market-
focused applications such as healthcare, vehicles and
transportation, smart home, and manufacturing. NIST carries out
its responsibilities under FISMA through Federal Information
Processing Standards and associated guidelines and practices.
NIST provides management, operational, and technical security
guidelines for federal agencies covering a broad range of
topics. NIST stresses that the authorization of a system by a
management official is an important quality control under
FISMA. By authorizing operation of a system, the manager
accepts the associated risk, formally assuming responsibility
for operating an information system at an acceptable level of
risk to agency operations, agency assets, or individuals.
NIST is considering additional steps to assist federal
agencies, including how best to align the Cybersecurity
Framework with our FISMA suite of standards and guidelines.
Applying the Cybersecurity Framework across the federal
government complements and enhances rather than duplicates or
conflicts with the existing statute, executive direction,
policy and standards.
NIST is active in other areas identified in the Commission
report, such as authentication and identity management,
privacy, and cybersecurity education, training and workforce
development. NIST recognizes that it has an essential role to
play in helping industry, consumers and government to counter
cyber threats and strengthen the nation's cybersecurity
capabilities.
NIST is extremely proud of its role in establishing and
improving the comprehensive set of cybersecurity technical
solutions, standards, guidelines, and best practices and the
robust collaborations with its federal government partners,
private sector collaborators, and international colleagues.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify today on NIST's
work in cybersecurity, and I'd be delighted to answer any
questions that you may have.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Romine follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairwoman Comstock. Thank you, Doctor.
And now we'll hear from Mr. Mulholland.
TESTIMONY OF MR. IAIN MULHOLLAND,
INDUSTRY MEMBER, CSIS CYBER POLICY TASK FORCE;
CHIEF TECHNOLOGY OFFICER, SECURITY,
VMWARE, INC.
Mr. Mulholland. Chairwoman Comstock, Ranking Member
Lipinski, Mrs. Johnson, other Members of the Committee, thank
you for the opportunity to testify today.
I'm Iain Mulholland, a member of the Center for Strategic
and International Studies Cyber Policy Task Force and the Chief
Technology Officer for Security at VMware.
VMware is the fourth largest software company in the world
with 2016 revenues of over $7 billion and over 19,000 employees
globally.
The U.S. Government is dependent on a vast cyber world of
interconnected networks, data centers, cloud, mobile platforms,
and other assets. Because we require cyber infrastructure to
perform the modern-day functions of government, sophisticated
and aggressive cyber-attacks perpetuated by criminal entities
and foreign government agencies represent a clear and present
national security threat to the U.S. Government.
We are also experiencing an unprecedented level of cyber-
attacks and sophistication in the private sector. The reality
is that global technology companies like VMware not only
receive an unprecedented amount of information in regards to
cyber threats from inside the U.S. but we also receive a large
number from overseas as well. The fact is, with data moving
across borders instantly, the digital devices and technologies
associated with this ecosystem and therefore with cybersecurity
are not confined to physical borders.
In order to continue to provide world-class secure
services, we must be able to act on a moment's notice whether
that information is coming from the U.S. or from abroad. We
must have the tools and resources on hand to act immediately.
Building on the 2009 Commission on Cybersecurity, the
Center for Strategic and International Studies established the
Cyber Policy Task Force to lay out practical steps for policy,
resources and organization that the new Administration can use
to build better cybersecurity. In the eight years since that
report was published, there has been much activity and an
exponential increase in attention to cybersecurity. However, we
are still at risk and there's still much that this new
Administration can do.
Specifically, CSIS believes that there are five core areas
that require renewed focus. Firstly, the development of a new
international strategy based on partnerships with like-minded
nations to improve the ability of deterring attackers.
Secondly, there must be a serious effort to reduce
cybercrime to build international cooperation to fight botnets
and sophisticated financial crime. Part of this effort must be
to penalize countries that won't cooperate in the effort to
reduce and control cybercrime.
Thirdly, we must prepare our critical infrastructures and
services for attack and improve cyber hygiene. Greater use of
shared, managed and cloud services can make government agencies
more secure.
Further, we must identify where federal action and resource
issues such as research or workforce development is necessary.
And finally, we must streamline White House bureaucracy,
increase oversight of federal cybersecurity, and clarify the
rules of DOD and other agencies. A stronger DHS is crucial, and
the new Administration must strengthen DHS's role in
cybersecurity.
Promoting good cyber hygiene should also be a key standard
that helps agencies, consumers, and businesses better protect
their information and networks from hackers. One of the best
ways for the federal government to be proactive is by deploying
microsegmentation technology that offers the ability to segment
their networks in the event of a breach. Let's use the example
of the cybersecurity breach at OPM. The nature of the security
breach at OPM was not particularly unique. Hackers were able to
penetrate perimeter network security systems and gain access to
OPM and Department of Interior systems where they were free to
roam around the internal networks and steal sensitive data over
a period of months. In order to effectively prevent an attacker
from moving freely around the network, agencies must
compartmentalize their network perimeters by adding zero trust
or microsegmented networks within the data center. A zero-trust
environment prevents unauthorized lateral movement within a
data center by establishing automated governance rules that
manage the movement of users and data between systems and
applications.
Lastly, I'd like to touch on another topic that is
important to securing the cyber ecosystem, the internet of
things. As we saw from the distributed denial-of-service
attacks in October, there are security vulnerabilities that
must be addressed to advance the IOT economy. A way to better
secure the IOT ecosystem is by ensuring flexible and isolated
connection points through secure managed infrastructure such as
edge systems, which include but are not limited to IOT
gateways.
As Congress and the Administration continue to work on
policies to promote the IOT economy, we believe that some
consideration should be given to developing some rules of the
road, standards for IOT moving forward. Among others, we would
agree with the CSIS recommendation calling on NIST and other
federal agencies to cooperate with industry stakeholders to
develop a set of standards and principles for IOT security.
Lastly, another security issue looming that could have
significant impact on the cyber ecosystem is the 2013 Wassenaar
Arrangement. I've included more on this topic in my written
testimony. My hope is that the new Administration will continue
to view this as a leadership opportunity for the U.S. to ship
international cyber norms and support ongoing renegotiations at
the Wassenaar Arrangement. The continued U.S. renegotiation
efforts in partnership with the U.S. technology industry and
bipartisan support from Congress can ensure a signed Wassenaar
cyber agreement that enhances our nation's cyber posture and
ultimately strengthens our defense against attacks.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify today, and I look
forward to answering the Committee's questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Mulholland follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairwoman Comstock. Thank you.
And now we will hear from Dr. Burley.
TESTIMONY OF DR. DIANA BURLEY,
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR AND CHAIR,
INSTITUTE FOR INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION (I3P);
PROFESSOR, HUMAN AND ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING,
THE GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY
Dr. Burley. Good morning. Chairwoman Comstock, Ranking
Member Lipinski, and Mrs. Johnson, Members of the Committee, I
am honored to appear before you today to discuss strategies for
strengthening U.S. cybersecurity capabilities.
Recommendations from the recent reports serving as the
foundation of this Committee hearing highlight the critical
importance of developing a cybersecurity workforce of
sufficient quality and quantity to meet the global threat
environment. The workforce need is acute and immediate with a
projected shortfall of nearly 1.5 million professionals by the
year 2020.
Yet despite significant effort and steady progress, the gap
between supply and demand is widening. Of the recommendations
offered in the recent reports, I will briefly address two.
The first, to develop a comprehensive cybersecurity
education and workforce development model that standardizes
interdisciplinary curricula, that serves as a foundation for
accreditation, and integrates with existing programs and
taxonomies. To implement this recommendation, I suggest that
the federal government leverage the work of the Association for
Computing Machinery, the ACM Joint Task Force on Cybersecurity
Education. I serve as Co-Chair of this task force, and our
work, which is developing the first set of global curricular
guidelines in cybersecurity education, structuring the
cybersecurity discipline and providing comprehensive and
flexible curricular guidance, will be complete late this year.
Several points drive my recommendation. First, with over
100,000 members, the ACM is the largest computing society in
the world, and the framework is being developed by global
subject-matter experts across academia, government and
industry. The ACM has nearly 50 years of experience developing
curricular guidance, and the document will be endorsed by major
computing societies, the ACM, the IEEE Computer Society, the
Association for Information Systems, and the International
Federation for Information Processing.
The framework is grounded in both the interdisciplinary
nature of cybersecurity and the inherently technical foundation
of the field. It facilitates the alignment between curricular
content and workforce frameworks including the National
Cybersecurity Workforce Framework developed through the U.S.
National Initiative for Cybersecurity Education, and it forms
the foundation for emerging accreditation standards currently
under development by ABET.
The second recommendation from the reports is to add new
credentialing requirements and to develop a network of
credentialing associations. The call for additional
credentialing requirements is not new. I support the need to
ensure cybersecurity professionals maintain the highest level
of competency but caution against blanket professionalization
requirements that do not consider differences in occupational
needs. Cybersecurity is a broad field with many occupations and
the needs of those occupations must be considered separately. I
co-chaired the 2013 National Research Council Committee on
Professionalizing the nation's Cybersecurity Workforce that
addressed this issue. As we state in our report, before new
credentialing requirements are added, workforce developers
should review specific occupational characteristics, identify
the associated workforce deficiencies, and consider the
tradeoffs associated with implementing additional requirements.
I urge the federal government to continue to catalyze
activities and to leverage existing multisector stakeholder
groups like the Institute for Information Infrastructure
Protection (The I3P) to integrate, accelerate and guide
existing cybersecurity workforce development initiatives. These
initiatives should leverage existing and scalable models,
emphasize both evidence-based short-term interventions that
address immediate needs, and strategic long-term initiatives
that address the entire ecosystem; expand the pipeline by
engaging a broad cross-section of society to include women,
ethnic groups typically underrepresented in this workforce,
veterans, and even special-needs populations who possess
targeted skill sets, to lengthen the pipeline by engaging
students early in their education, and including K-12 teachers
who will largely influence those students' choices.
A coordinated and comprehensive cybersecurity workforce
development strategy that supports our ability to scale is a
critical success factor for strengthening U.S. cybersecurity
capabilities.
Again, I am honored to appear before the Committee, and I
look forward to your questions. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Burley follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairwoman Comstock. Thank you, Doctor.
And now we'll hear from Mr. Wilshusen.
TESTIMONY OF MR. GREGORY WILSHUSEN, DIRECTOR,
INFORMATION SECURITY ISSUES, GAO
Mr. Wilshusen. Chairwoman Comstock, Ranking Member
Lipinski, Mrs. Johnson, and Members of the Subcommittee, thank
you for the opportunity to discuss ways to strengthen U.S.
cybersecurity.
As recent cybersecurity attacks have illustrated, the need
for robust and effective cybersecurity has never been greater.
Today I will provide an overview of our work related to
cybersecurity posture of the federal government and the
nation's critical infrastructure.
At your request, I will also identify areas of consistency
between our recommendations and those made in recent reports by
the Commission on Enhancing National Cybersecurity and CSIS.
Before I do, if I may, I'd like to recognize for the record
Mike Gilmore, Kush Malhotra, Nancy Glover, and Scott Pettis for
their significant contributions to helping develop my written
statement.
Madam Chairwoman, GAO has consistently identified
shortcomings in the federal government's approach to protecting
its computer systems. This year marks the 20th anniversary of
GAO designating federal information security as a government-
wide high-risk area. We expanded this area to include the
protection of cyber critical infrastructure in 2003 and
protecting the privacy of personally identifiable information,
or PII, in 2015. Federal agencies in our nation's critical
infrastructures are dependent upon computerized systems,
networks and electronic data to carry out operations yet these
systems and networks are inherently at risk and cyber threats
continue to evolve and become more sophisticated. While
agencies in previous Administrations have acted to improve the
protections over systems supporting federal operations of
critical infrastructure, the government needs to take
additional actions to bolster U.S. cybersecurity. These include
effectively implementing risk-based entity-wide information
security programs consistently and over time improving its
cyber incident detection, response and mitigation capabilities,
enhancing its cybersecurity workforce planning and training
efforts, expanding efforts to fortify cybersecurity of the
nation's critical infrastructures, and better overseeing
protection of personally identifiable information.
Over the last several years, GAO has made about 2,500
recommendations aimed at improving the security of federal
systems and information. We have identified how agencies can
tighten technical security controls, fully implement
information security programs, and better protect the privacy
of PII held on their systems. Many agencies continue to be
challenged in safeguarding their computer systems and
information, in part because many of these recommendations have
not yet been implemented. As of January 2017, about 1,000 of
our recommendations had not been implemented.
Regarding recommendations made by the Cybersecurity
Commission and CSIS, several are generally consistent with or
similar to previous GAO recommendations. In particular, certain
recommendations pertaining to the establishing of an
international cybersecurity strategy, protecting critical cyber
infrastructure, promoting use of the NIST Cybersecurity
Framework, prioritizing cyber research and expanding
cybersecurity workforces share common traits.
In summary, the dependence upon the federal government and
the national critical infrastructure on information and
communications technologies makes them potentially vulnerable
to a wide and evolving array of cyber-based threats. Securing
these technologies is vital to the nation's security,
prosperity and well-being. Nevertheless, the security over
these systems is inconsistent and additional actions are needed
to address ongoing cybersecurity and privacy challenges. We at
GAO will continue to work with the Congress and federal
agencies to address these challenges and strengthen our
nation's cybersecurity capabilities.
Chairwoman Comstock, Ranking Member Lipinski, members of
the Subcommittee, this concludes my statement, and I'd be happy
to answer your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Wilshusen follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairwoman Comstock. Thank you.
I'll now yield myself five minutes, and I appreciate the
witnesses' testimony.
Mr. Wilshusen, as you noted, 1,000 of the recommendations
have not been implemented. That's about 40 percent. What are
some of the most common reasons for that lack of
implementation, and what steps might Congress take to help
encourage agencies to implement these recommendations?
Mr. Wilshusen. Well, I think the recommendations in some
instances require a longer period of time to actually implement
consistently throughout the organization, and that may be one
factor. Another factor is that agencies often will close a
recommendation as implemented when they may have a plan to
implement the recommendations and not when they take the action
needed to implement the recommendation across the enterprise.
We often find that when we go back to an agency that has
indicated that it has implemented the recs. We go out and re-
test the systems across the organization, the conditions still
exist. They may have implemented it on a couple of the systems
but not throughout the organization. So that's another factor.
Chairwoman Comstock. Should there be some self-testing then
on that so you have your plan and then you have tests that each
agency is doing on their own, or do you have recommended
policies on that front?
Mr. Wilshusen. Right, most definitely. In fact, FISMA
requires agencies to test and evaluate the security of their
systems frequently, at least once a year, to assure that their
controls are adequately implemented, but----
Chairwoman Comstock. But that is not being done?
Mr. Wilshusen. Well, it may be done but we have also found
that agencies' security tests and evaluation processes may not
be that comprehensive. In some cases, they may rely on
interviews or document reviews but not dig down to look to see
how systems and their settings are actually configured. That's
vital with information security because so many controls,
particularly the technical security controls, are implemented
in the systems that have to be configured in a certain way. So
that's one of the key areas that we consistently find as a
reason for these outstanding recommendations.
Chairwoman Comstock. Thank you.
And Dr. Burley, I really appreciate your focus on the need
for education, and 1.5 million jobs you said are needed?
Dr. Burley. Yes.
Chairwoman Comstock. And so that certainly is a good growth
area that people should be focused on, appreciate GW's focus on
that and many of our universities in the region.
What type of practices even earlier on can get people into
the pipeline? To get young students in this can we be focusing
on really in earlier grades to make this really be kind of a
lifestyle and understanding that this is something that
everybody needs to be engaged in?
Dr. Burley. I think that there are two different approaches
that we can take. One is certainly getting students into the
technology areas earlier - so teaching them how to code and to
understand what that means. Moving computer science down into
the K-12 classrooms is critical. But we also need to focus on
more general skills like analytical ability, critical thinking,
communication, those types of skills, teamwork, team building.
All of those different skill sets are critical for
cybersecurity professionals and so we need to consider those as
well.
Chairwoman Comstock. And even for people who aren't going
into that field, I mean, obviously, with 1.5 million jobs
needed, that is a good field for them to go into, but what type
of--should there be classes maybe in grades for qualification
for just basic understanding for people even who aren't in the
field?
Dr. Burley. Absolutely. So you're talking about awareness
programs?
Chairwoman Comstock. Yes.
Dr. Burley. We certainly need to make sure that everyone
understands what cybersecurity is, and what role they play as
individuals in that workforce. Not all of the cybersecurity
careers are solely focused on only doing cybersecurity. There
are a lot of what we consider to be hybrid roles so that if
someone is going into healthcare, they may have an opportunity
to work with electronic medical records or need to understand
privacy considerations and so it is very important that the
awareness programs aren't just general blanket broad awareness
programs but that they also contain elements that specifically
link cybersecurity concepts and ideas to all of the disciplines
across the curriculum as early as we possibly can do it.
Chairwoman Comstock. So it sounds like we need something
akin to a continuing education program for everybody in various
fields on the need to be aware of this, and Mr. Mulholland, I
noticed you're nodding too. If you wanted to----
Mr. Mulholland. Yeah, if I could just add to that, you
know, as someone who hires and over the last 20 years has hired
many, many security engineers, certainly I would support, you
know, enhancement of skills. We find it incredibly difficult to
hire well-qualified security engineers, but also more broadly
in some of the software security programs that we run, I end up
spending a lot of time just teaching known security software
developers about security. I would love to see basic security
skills to be part of every computer science degree, you know,
in the curriculum moving forward so I can invest my time in
being proactive and defending rather than having to teach all
of my known security colleagues about the basics of security.
Chairwoman Comstock. Excellent. Thank you all, and I now
yield to Mr. Lipinski for five minutes.
Mr. Lipinski. I want to thank you all for your testimony,
and just very briefly, education, workforce. Dr. Burley, you
were speaking about that. I just want to say that as Co-Chair
of the STEM Ed Caucus, I think there's more that we need to be
doing to encourage STEM education. Next week is National
Engineers Week. I know one of those days is Introduce a Girl to
Engineering Day and there's a lunch up here tomorrow about
that. We need to get as many people as we can into the
pipeline. And also, we need to have general education on things
like cyber hygiene.
I wanted to--there's so many things we could talk about. I
have some questions for the record. But I wanted to ask Mr.
Mulholland, you had spoken a little bit about the internet of
things and what needs to--you started touching on what needs to
be done. Both the Commission and the CSIS focused on security
of IOT devices, and in his testimony, Dr. Romine discussed the
steps NIST is already taking to address security for IOT in
different sectors.
Now, I assume that the CSIS task force took into account
the efforts already underway at NIST to develop security
standards. Would you have any thoughts on how NIST should
prioritize their IOT work in the next couple years given
limited resources?
Mr. Mulholland. You know, I think all of us in the CSIS
cyber task force felt that IOT is really critical in terms of
priorities. The speed and acceleration of things is quite
phenomenal, and the spectrum that they cover is quite
considerable. If you look at, you know, IOT as a concept, it is
not necessarily new. We've had industrial control systems for a
very long time in the power and the energy sectors but if you
look at--you know, I'm wearing a watch today that's probably as
powerful as my iPhone was ten years ago--the proliferation of
these devices is critical, and I think NIST's involvement in
setting some basic rules of the road are going to be critical,
particularly actually in the consumer segment around how these
devices are actually manufactured and supported over the
lifecycle of those.
Mr. Lipinski. Anything--nothing more specific on where you
would direct NIST to go?
Mr. Mulholland. I think that there are a couple of specific
areas. I think first of all, you need to look at it from a
sector-specific point of view. If you look at industrial
control systems, for example, or healthcare advices or
manufacturing, certainly I think some of the work NIST has
already done should be accelerated around how do we actually
connect these systems through things like internet gateways and
edge-type devices, what are, you know, appropriate
architectures and controls for those.
But I think the other area that can't be forgotten is the
consumer side. If we look at the attacks in October last year,
that was predominantly consumer devices where there really
aren't any standards or any recommendations around how a
consumer device should be developed or, you know, some basic
kind of frameworks for how it should be supported over its
lifecycle. If we don't look at that full spectrum, you know,
much more prescriptive around, you know, more kind of
manufacturing, industrial, but also a consumer, then we're
going to continue to see attacks like that.
Mr. Lipinski. Thank you. And since we're going down that
road, let me finish with a question about privacy.
Last week, Vizeo agreed to pay $2.2 million settlement for
charges that TVs collected owners' information without their
knowledge. We have devices like Amazon Echo, Google Home, all
these listening devices that are proliferating. We have facial
recognition technologies that are getting better and better. So
the issue of privacy, cybersecurity, privacy is also very
important. Are there any recommendations that any of you have
for how the Science Committee or Congress in general should
thoughtfully address both the cybersecurity and privacy issues
and balancing them?
Mr. Mulholland. So certainly at CSIS, we made a set of
recommendations again specifically around the definition of PII
and some recommendations that NIST should revisit the
definition both on kind of reestablishing a baseline but also
on an ongoing basis. I think what is considered PII
historically is rapidly, rapidly evolving. One of the things
that we discussed quite a lot about was that five years ago,
none of us would have considered that we'd have a device in our
pocket that is tracking every move or we might have a
television that's listening to our every conversation, and you
know, the data that those devices create does not necessarily
fit under the traditional definition of PII. So we had a
recommendation that NIST should specifically look at what the
definition of PII is but see that as a moving target that needs
to be so that we can set some acceptable norms around, you
know, privacy and private information.
Mr. Lipinski. All right. Thank you.
I yield back.
Chairwoman Comstock. Thank you.
I recognize Mr. Webster for five minutes.
Mr. Webster. Thank you, Madam Chair.
I have a question, I believe, for Dr. Romine. So we have
this--if we looked at the negative side of cybersecurity and
all the things that are happening, the attacks from other
governments and even in the private sector and things that are
all going on, it seems like just from what I've heard today
that that's an issue that's moving at light speed, and yet
we're not here in this body known for moving at snail speed,
and I guess my question is, you had testified that there have
been three modifications in 30 years of the document that
pretty much tells you what you should be doing and how you
should be doing it, and so we're walking along and yet we have
something moving three times ten to the eighth meters per
second. And so my question, I believe, is there an
infrastructure that you're a part of and others that are part
of who have testified--we've got this whole list of acronyms of
organizations that are working on this. Is that infrastructure
that's there combined fast enough and good enough to catch it?
Dr. Romine. Thank you for the question. Let me address it
in this way. One of the reasons that NIST is as effective as it
is in this space is our deep and longstanding partnerships with
the private sector, the folks who are moving at light speed,
and so I think the idea that we maintain that connection with
them, that we provide input to them on priorities that the
federal government has, that they provide us with a partnership
working collaboratively on solving some of these really
challenging technical problems in security, frankly I think is
the only way that we can maintain the kind of pace and to
anticipate some of the challenges that we have down the road to
remain relevant.
We have deep technical expertise ourselves but we rely
entirely on that connection that we have with industry and with
academia to maintain our awareness and engagement at the speed
that's necessary.
Mr. Webster. Do you think that there is too many or too few
kingdoms that are addressing this issue, or do they--maybe if
there are too many, are they bleeding over into each other and
maybe doing things that the other might be doing?
Dr. Romine. Well, I'm not exactly sure how to interpret
your question but----
Mr. Webster. I'm only looking at the structure to see if
this is the right structure or there should be something else.
Dr. Romine. Oh, I see.
Mr. Webster. That's what I'm thinking about.
Dr. Romine. Right. Yes, I can really address only NIST's
role with regard to how we provide guidance and standards in
this space, and I think the statutory role that we have is
essential for us. It's--you alluded to the fact that there----
Mr. Webster. Is it more defensive in that the agency--let's
say the federal agencies, do they have to come to you before
you give them or are you aggressive in----
Dr. Romine. No, we have partnerships. I alluded to the
partnerships with the private sector but we also have strong
engagement in the public sector as well with other federal
agencies and even with state and local governments in some
cases.
From my perspective, you alluded to the fact that there are
only three updates to the governing legislation of FISMA in the
last 30 years. I view that in many ways as a strength because
the legislation actually sets the structure, the very high-
level components, and if that were to change rapidly, I think
it would be much more difficult for us. Whereas putting the
structures in place and providing roles and responsibilities
clearly in legislation gives us the opportunity to then operate
effectively in that structure.
Mr. Webster. Thank you very much. That was helpful.
I yield back.
Chairwoman Comstock. Thank you, and I now recognize Mr.
Bera for five minutes.
Mr. Bera. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman, and the Ranking
Member.
You know, just listening to the testimony, Mr. Mulholland,
in your opening statement, you talked about how cyber-attacks
represent a clear and present security threat, and I think each
of you, you know, alluded to the sense that the federal
government is pretty vulnerable to cyber-attacks. Would any of
you dispute that statement? So we've got vulnerabilities there.
I think, Dr. Burley, in your opening statement, you talked
about the workforce need being acute and immediate, and I think
you mentioned over a million jobs, maybe 1.5 million vacancies.
Now, that's not just federal government, that's the need that
exists in the private sector, and so there's this acute need,
and unfortunately, I would bet that it's going to get worse
before it gets better because we're not training that
workforce.
If we look at the federal government, maybe Mr. Wilshusen,
I would imagine we've got critical hiring needs in the federal
government that we can't fill. Would that be correct? In the
thousands?
Mr. Wilshusen. I hesitate to give a specific number but
with the work we've done and the surveys where we've gone out
to the agencies, it was pretty much across the board that they
all felt they were very challenged to attract and retain the
cyber skill sets that they needed.
Mr. Bera. So we recognize we're vulnerable as the federal
government. We've got critical vacancies and needs that we need
to hire for. We understand that our salaries, you know,
compared to just looking at simple rules of supply and demand
cannot compete with what folks in the private sector may be
paying so we have difficulty retaining and recruiting those
individuals. Would that be an accurate statement? So that, you
know, obviously is a critical need, and a critical security
need. Recently a few weeks ago, the President signed a broad,
sweeping federal Executive Order freezing the hiring of federal
employees. Do we know if these critical IT, critical
cybersecurity jobs are exempt from that federal order, Dr.
Romine?
Dr. Romine. We're seeking clarification on that now just to
make certain because we do want to know whether we're going to
be able to continue to recruit in this space.
Mr. Bera. I mean, I guess I would go on the record along
with my colleagues in a bipartisan way that, you know, we ought
to send a strong message to the Administration that these are
clearly critical jobs that need to be filled that are in our
national security interest and we would provide you with
whatever support you need might in that clarification, but my
sense is, if it's already hard enough to recruit these
individuals and hard enough to retain these individuals, let's
not make it any more difficult, and, you know, that broad order
in my mind is making us less secure and certainly it's
worrisome.
You know, maybe, Mr. Wilshusen, if we were thinking about
strategies to recruit and retain some of these individuals,
we've introduced a couple bills. One was the Tech Corps Act in
the last Congress which would try to work with universities to
help offset the cost of tuition. I'm a physician by training.
Much as doctors can go back and fill critical needs and serve
their country and community, perhaps that's one idea. You know,
we've also considered prioritizing hiring of veterans and
getting them into quick technical training skills--we know
they're already patriotic--in order to fill some of these
needs. What would be some other ideas that could help us fill
these needs?
Mr. Wilshusen. Well, I think the one you mentioned too
about reimbursement of student--well, one of the things would
be reimbursement of student loans. That's one that we use at
GAO, and it's a very useful and effective way of helping to
recruit staff, particularly in the IT security realm where we
perform these IT audits. So that has been very helpful in being
able to reimburse and help those individuals to pay off their
student loans would be one thing.
Another, of course, is just the focus on the civic
responsibility and I would say the satisfaction of doing
federal work. That's been very effective for us as well because
of the type of work that we do.
Mr. Bera. Dr. Romine, do you have any suggestions?
Dr. Romine. I agree with Mr. Wilshusen that one of the
secret weapons we have in recruiting top-notch staff is the
fact that our mission is so compelling and interesting and we
work in a really terrific place. I'm guessing GAO would make
that same claim.
So people who do feel a sense that they want to contribute
through public service, we're able to be competitive with that
segment of the population.
I also want to point out one of the things that really
needs to be understood well is that cybersecurity as it's
currently constituted is interdisciplinary, and by that I mean
people from economists, sociologists, psychologists, electrical
engineers, computer scientists, across the board, these folks
have roles to play in cybersecurity that are really compelling,
and so we find that we're able to attract those folks.
Mr. Bera. I realize I'm out of time so I'll yield back.
Chairwoman Comstock. And I now recognize Mr. Abraham for
five minutes, the new Vice Chair of the Subcommittee. Welcome.
Mr. Abraham. Thank you, Mrs. Chair.
Mr. Wilshusen, as far as--give me the advantages and
disadvantages from your perspective as an auditor, when the
federal government and the private sector, they take the same
approach, in this case using NIST Cybersecurity Framework for
securing their information and information systems, the good,
the bad, the uglies?
Mr. Wilshusen. Well, one of the benefits of the NIST
Cybersecurity Framework is its flexibility. The way that it can
be used by different organizations, whether they're federal
government organizations or private sector organizations who
apply the techniques. The guidance in that document is very
useful. Certainly, over the years NIST has issued a complete
and comprehensive set of cybersecurity guidelines and standards
that could be used by the private sector and indeed many do.
They certainly are required for the federal agencies. We use
that criteria in our audits, and we think that NIST does a very
good job of identifying those.
Mr. Abraham. Mr. Mulholland, your take on the advantages
and disadvantages of taking that same approach?
Mr. Mulholland. Well, I would actually second that the NIST
Framework, even within the private sector is still seen as
being a very compelling standard. There are many standards out
there, and NIST is certainly one of the most compelling.
I'll add a different spin to my answer, though, which is
that because it is a compelling framework, it actually means
it's software manufacturers like ourselves who actually build
our software so that it can conform to the standard and make
implementing the standard a little easier for people who are
using our software. So by having that kind of standard somehow
float to the top actually, you know, a rising tide lifts all
boats, so to speak.
Mr. Abraham. Let me stay with you, Mr. Mulholland. In your
testimony, you said that there may be a need to increase
federal oversight or increase oversight of the federal
cybersecurity by creating a special GAO office, would you
elaborate on that? What does that entail?
Mr. Mulholland. That's certainly one of the CSIS
recommendations that I'm less familiar with so I'll defer to my
written testimony if that's okay.
Mr. Abraham. Mr. Wilshusen, give me your take on that. I'll
ping pong between you guys.
Mr. Wilshusen. Okay. Well, with respect to GAO assessing
agencies' implementation of cybersecurity, that's something we
do already. One of our roles is to provide and help Congress
provide the oversight over federal agencies' implementations of
cybersecurity. So that recommendation in terms of having GAO
conduct reviews is something that we do and we'll continue to
do.
Mr. Abraham. Mrs. Chairman, I yield back.
Chairwoman Comstock. Thank you, and I now recognize Mr.
Beyer for five minutes.
Mr. Beyer. Thank you, Chairman Comstock.
Last week, Ranking Members Lipinski and Johnson and I sent
a letter to Chairmen Smith, LaHood and Comstock calling on them
to investigate President Trump's cybersecurity practices, and
my friend, Chairman Smith, was quoted in the press as saying
that this is hypocritical since we didn't support the
Committee's investigation of Hillary Clinton's email server. I
just want to highlight a few facts.
Number one is that by the time Science Committee launched
its investigation of former Secretary Hillary Clinton's emails,
three government agencies--the FBI, the State, Inspector
General, et cetera--had already completed investigations of
Clinton's emails and five other Congressional committees were
investigating the same issue, and the Committee essentially
dropped all interest in Hillary Clinton's emails right after
the presidential election.
There's also a quote in The Hill yesterday from an
anonymous Science Committee staffer claiming Science Committee
Democrats refused to support past investigations into cyber
hacks, specifically mentioning the OPM hack and breaches at the
FDIC, and I'd like to submit two documents for the record that
dispute these alternative facts. The first is my letter to
Chairman Smith, which requested the hearing into the OPM hack,
and the second was any opening statement--my opening statement
from the FDIC hearing in which I voiced explicit support for
the inquiry into the FDIC breaches. I also don't remember any
of the Democrats defending Secretary Clinton's email server.
And I believe really that members of both parties are
deeply concerned about cybersecurity, and I look forward to
continuing to work together with my Republican friends on this.
This past week, the Trump Administration revised and then
delayed the release of a new Executive Order on cybersecurity.
It was reported that the Chief Information Security Officer in
charge of cybersecurity for the White House and the President
was fired. As I pointed out in the letter with Ranking Members
Johnson and Lipinski, in the few short weeks in office,
President Trump and some of his senior staff appear to be
struggling with implementing proper and appropriate
cybersecurity practices. The President still apparently uses
his easily hackable personal cell phone, his Android, not an
iPhone, which of course opens it up to the foreigners who could
use foreign intelligence services who can tracking location,
can log keystrokes, could use the camera.
The official Twitter account has been linked to unsecure
private Gmail account, and just this weekend it was widely
reported that the President held conversations and reviewed
documents about the North Korean missile launch in the middle
of Mar-a-Lago's restaurant, potentially within earshot of
waiters and fellow diners, and according to eyewitnesses and
pictures we've all seen, aides used their phones as flashlights
to illuminate the documents, which could let hackers if they
had compromised these phones to read the materials because the
phones' cameras were pointed right at them.
So these actions give the appearance that the Trump
Administration's cybersecurity policies are in disarray and
that the personal cybersecurity practices of the President and
senior staff are both unwise and insecure. And by the way, if
we're concerned--you know, the security of the President's
Twitter account is not trivial. I mean, his tweets have given
rise to a drop in Toyota stock, the Mexican peso to devalue,
the best subscription day ever on Vanity Fair, the scuttling of
the Mexican president's trip to the United States.
So Dr. Burley, could you speak to this issue, particularly
about how effective cybersecurity policy requires buy-in from
the top of the organizational chart, whether it's from a CEO or
agency head or even the President of the United States?
Dr. Burley. Thank you for that question. I would say two
things. One, certainly when we're dealing with cybersecurity
culture within any organization, it is important that all
levels of the organization buy in and employees are certainly
driven by what the top of the organization pushes forward.
With regard to awareness and understanding how our
individual behavior impacts the security of our enterprise and
our personal security, I would say that this is something we
need to address in the redevelopment of cybersecurity awareness
programs. We need to move beyond simply trying to make people
aware of the issues and move toward helping them understand
what their particular behavior does in terms of making a
situation more or less secure, and that's something that needs
to happen across all levels of organizations and even starting
with some of the programs that we were talking about earlier in
terms of going down into the K-12 range because awareness is
one thing but understanding the implications of your behavior
that then lead to behavioral changes is another matter.
Mr. Beyer. Thank you very much.
And Dr. Romine, we know how powerful the President's
Twitter account is. It's an important way for him to
communicate. What should the Administration do to secure his
important Twitter account?
Dr. Romine. Well, that verges on a certain oversight
function in a specific case like this, and NIST is a non-
regulatory agency with no oversight role or capabilities. I
think the oversight typically for federal cybersecurity rests
with the Inspectors General, with the GAO and with OMB who has
the policy lever for ensuring cybersecurity of systems. So
beyond that, I don't think I can really comment.
Mr. Beyer. Madam Chair, I yield back.
Chairwoman Comstock. Thank you, and I'd also like to enter
into the record Chairman Smith's letter responding to Mr.
Beyer's letter, and I'm sure he welcomes your newfound interest
in oversight, and you obviously have a role on the Oversight
Subcommittee and this Committee, but I would like to also enter
into the record Mr. Beyer's August 22nd, 2016, press release
that was critical of the full Committee and the email
investigation and your quote here, ``The House Science
Committee must focus on its role promoting science and ensuring
that America is the global leader in research and development
rather than scoring cheap political points.'' And I'd also
enter into the record an October 2016 interview that was on a
local TV show which was critical of the FBI Director in that
regard also.
[The information appears in Appendix I]
Chairwoman Comstock. I will now yield five minutes to Mr.
LaHood, the Chairman of the Oversight Subcommittee.
Mr. LaHood. Thank you, Madam Chair, and I want to thank the
witnesses for being here today and for your valuable testimony.
I do want to make a couple observations in response to my
friend Mr. Beyer. I would first say that there's no evidence
that President Trump is using his personal phone. In contrast
to what was said, the New York Times has reported that he
traded in his Android phone for a secure encrypted device
authorized by the Secret Service, which is protocol for all
Presidents, and he is abiding by that protocol by having an
authorized phone.
I would also dispute the assertion that somehow the
allegations of what occurred with former Secretary of State
Hillary Clinton which was brought up, you know, in that case, I
think it is really apples and oranges in terms of the activity
that went on there and the allegations there. You know, the FBI
in that case found multiple violations of federal law on
national security, cybersecurity and criminal statutes. The FBI
Director said in his press conference that there were
violations of federal law there. There's currently an active
Department of Justice investigation and a grand jury looking
into that, and I think the underlying circumstances and facts
there are completely different than a Twitter account. And
let's remember, Twitter is by its nature a service meant to
provide information to the public, and there is again no
information that somehow the tweets that are being put out by
the President are done by a private phone. They can clearly be
done by a secure, authorized phone, and I think we live in a
unique age with technology. The fact that the President
communicates every day with 20 to 25 million people by Twitter
in an unfiltered, raw manner I think is unique, but that's the
age that we live in now. But to make the comparison to what
happened with Hillary Clinton I think is really disingenuous to
this discussion, and I think the facts bear that out.
I guess in looking at our hearing here today and how we can
improve on cybersecurity at the federal level, I'm very
interested, and I've talked about this in previous hearings,
looking at the private sector and what has been beneficial in
the private sector, what has worked there, and public-private
partnerships specifically, and I guess I would start with Mr.
Mulholland.
In looking at the private sector, how do we look at metrics
or effective strategies that have worked, Mr. Mulholland, that
we can implement, learn from, and then how do we--how do we in
an effective way put together a framework or metrics to judge
that moving forward?
Mr. Mulholland. Thank you for the question. I think in
terms of metrics, we can have metrics for metrics sake, or we
can have metrics that are actually measuring outcomes. I think
in the private sector, actually to refer back to something that
Dr. Burley mentioned earlier, we've moved from basic awareness
to understanding. So sometimes metrics can be the kind of
outcome of a checklist of items that people can complete
without necessarily actually understanding what they're doing
or why they're doing it. So certainly in the private sector,
we've moved from, you know, predominantly checklists to really
focusing on what outcomes are on how do you measure and use
metrics to measure those outcomes. So specific examples might
be actually looking at what are our threat models so what is
the actual threat that we are subject to and then focusing and
prioritizing around that. So for example, we're a Silicon
Valley-based technology company. A big threat to us is the
theft of intellectual property so a lot of the metrics and a
lot of the outcomes we're looking at is, how do we protect our
intellectual property. Perhaps some other pieces of data are
less important to us than, you know, the lifeblood of our
company. So we focus our metrics on outcomes and not so much on
checklists for checklists' sake.
Mr. LaHood. Thank you for that.
The Cybersecurity Commission report recommends that the
President issue a national cybersecurity strategy within the
first six months of the Administration. I guess, Mr. Wilshusen,
what might you--I guess what might you wish to see reflected in
that strategy and what advice would you give?
Mr. Wilshusen. Well, I think a couple things. One would be
just to come to an agreement on what the norms of behavior
should be within the cybersecurity realm across the various
different nations. As you know, norms differ in many different
ways across nations. Coming to some sort of understanding of
what's acceptable behavior, what is not when using the internet
and cyberspace would be one of those areas that should be
discussed.
And also how to go about raising that discussion with the
different nations who have different values and mores would be
another key area as part of that strategy.
Mr. LaHood. Thank you.
Those are all my questions. Thank you.
Chairwoman Comstock. And I now yield five minutes to Ms.
Rosen, a new member of the Committee.
Ms. Rosen. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
I have to tell you that I started my career as a computer
programmer in the 1970s with a card deck and a mainframe, and
oh, how I long for those days when no one could break into the
system. It was very difficult. We had a phone with a modem.
Remember that was the only way in? And there weren't the
possibility for attacks in those kinds of ways.
So I couldn't agree more that we need to have the
analytical and teach the analytical and critical thinking
skills that are needed of course to move us forward in all jobs
across all platforms for this sector and that as you so
eloquently said, the computer industry, engineering sciences,
we have to take a multifactorial approach to be able to
dynamically respond across all platforms to the challenges that
we're facing, and nobody knows this better than you, and like I
said, as I wrote software trying to keep that secure and safe,
so I have a different perspective maybe than some people on
this panel. I could talk to you all all day.
But what I find most important, as I started as a woman in
technology in the 1970s, it's still not so popular but more
popular. How do we teach and train--how do we promote the
education? First of all, I think it starts with our teachers
and our educators. How do we get them trained to inspire the
students that understand that computers and all these things
are very creative? It's not dull and boring. It's extremely
creative and innovative. And then teachers can take those to
our schools K-12 and above.
And then also my second part of the question is the general
public when you begin to talk about computer things, our eyes
roll back. They don't want to hear about cyber hygiene. They
don't get it. They just want to use their social media, Twitter
or Facebook or whatever. How do we educate the public about how
easy it is for them to be used as a target into things with
phishing and all those? How do we make them--give them the buy-
in to do something?
Dr. Burley. Well, with your first question, thank you. I
would say that we have to target all of the K-12 teachers
instead of just focusing on those who have self-identified as
being interested in computer science or in cybersecurity. So I
would say that we need to start to work with the schools and
colleges of education so that when the teachers are in their
developmental process that they begin to understand
cybersecurity concepts and that they understand how to
integrate those concepts into what they're doing in their
fifth-grade English classroom or what they're doing in ninth
grade biology because there is an aspect of cybersecurity that
pervades across the curriculum. But in order for the teachers
to be able to do that, we have to educate them as such, so I
would say that that's a part of what we need to do and focusing
on them.
The other thing with regard to getting more women and young
girls into STEM in general and certainly cybersecurity is in
role models, understanding that there are people who look like
them and who do this job and what that really means. We talk
about cybersecurity as if it is one thing when it's really not,
and so--but we do ourselves a disservice because we don't
really help people to understand what it means and what it can
mean to be a cybersecurity professional. So we need to do a
better job of that. And I would say that that also adds into
this notion of the general public and awareness and
understanding. That we're not talking about something that only
people down in the corner are doing or that those guys over
there will keep us safe but that we really understand as
individuals what our role is, how we interact with things, that
we understand the tradeoffs that come along with convenience so
that we understand what we're giving up when we're getting
something, and as a society we don't really have that
understanding and so we need to do more to educate the public
on what those tradeoffs are and what their role is in making
sure that they are safe and that collectively the society is
safe.
Ms. Rosen. Thank you. I appreciate that.
I yield back.
Chairwoman Comstock. Thank you, and I now recognize Mr.
Marshall for five minutes, and welcome to the Committee, our
new member from Kansas.
Mr. Marshall. Thank you so much, Chairman.
I'm a physician and had the pleasure of leading a hospital
and a group of physicians through meaningful stages 1 and 2,
been using an electronic medical record now for a couple years.
I'm intrigued with the value. Someone here in the review
mentioned that medical record is worth ten times more than some
other records you would hack. What brings the value to people?
What's in there that brings value to start with? And I'm not
sure who could answer that question the best.
Mr. Mulholland. If I can clarify, do you mean in terms of
the value of a medical record versus, say, a tax record or a
credit card?
Mr. Marshall. I guess so. In one of the testimonies,
someone said that the--on the black market, it would be worth
ten times than other type of record.
Mr. Wilshusen. What I would say is that one of the benefits
with electronic health records and information is the fact that
the accessibility of that information not only to patients if
they're able to access it but to other healthcare providers can
help to assure that the treatments, the drugs prescribed to
particular patients, you know, if they have a full view of the
individual's overall health records that that can be very
positive and beneficial to the healthcare of that individual.
But at the same time, what we have found in our audits of
reviewing the security and the privacy controls over that
information is that while the Centers for Medicaid and Medicare
Services have come up with guidelines for that through HIPAA
and the security and privacy rules, the actual use and
implementation of controls on certain health information
technology has not been adequately reviewed in some respects to
assure that those capabilities have been designed into the
technology and that in fact at some of the healthcare providers
that that information and those controls are effectively
implemented.
Mr. Marshall. Yeah, I guess----
Mr. Wilshusen. I'm not sure if----
Mr. Marshall. --I'm not explaining my question very well. I
certainly understand about physician-to-physician transfer of
records and that we used to go from one page of information,
now it's 40 pages and it's almost a worthless piece of
document. My question is on the black market. When people are
hacking medical records, what makes it ten times more valuable
than a credit card or other things they hack into? What do they
do with it?
Mr. Mulholland. I think I'll take an attempt at that.
Something like a medical record, to your point about, you know,
the 40 pages of information, that's going to contain a lot of
effective metadata that perhaps would not be available in, you
know, just a credit card-type hack or whatever, so, you know,
you're going to be able to get a person-- probably be able to
get a person's Social Security number, their date of birth,
their address, so that can be used for other attacks. You might
then be able to use that to hack a person's credit card details
or their tax return, but also you're going to have a list of
medical conditions that can be used for, you know, extortion
purposes in the most extreme case but also basic things like
prescription fraud. You can see who is the--you know, does the
patient have any controlled substances prescribed to them,
where their pharmacy is, and you've also got all the
information to be able to impersonate that person and
potentially go and steal their records. So it's a little bit of
a goldmine. You've got a lot of information in the same place
that can be very valuable used----
Mr. Marshall. I mean, my big--one of my bigger concerns
would be Medicare fraud, Medicaid fraud, people pretending like
they're a physician. They've got this person's health record
and they bill Medicare and Medicaid for procedures never done.
Are we seeing much of that now or how big of an issue do you
think it actually is today?
Mr. Mulholland. I can't personally speak to that but it's
certainly very feasible with the information available.
Mr. Marshall. Okay. When someone made the statement that it
was ten times more valuable to have that record than other,
say, a credit card record, is it ten times 10 cents? Is it ten
times a dollar? Give me a--what's a black-market value of
something like this?
Mr. Mulholland. Well, I can't tell you the exact value of a
Medicare record--or sorry, a medical record but I will tell you
to calibrate that credit card information goes for cents. It is
that much of a commodity. So your credit card details are
probably, you know, worth 10 or 20 cents.
Mr. Marshall. And this might be theoretically then worth
$10 or $20. If you could hack into my physician's office and I
have 5,000 records there that it might be worth 5,000 times $10
to somebody?
Mr. Mulholland. Conceivably. I couldn't give you an exact
figure, but yes.
Mr. Marshall. Thank you. I yield back.
Chairwoman Comstock. Thank you. I now recognize Ms.
Bonamici for five minutes.
Ms. Bonamici. Thank you very much, Chair Comstock and
Ranking Member Lipinski, and thank you to our witnesses for
testifying today. I've been in a hearing in the Education and
Workforce Committee, which explains my absence for the
beginning of this, but I did read your testimony and really am
particularly concerned that we are falling short when it comes
to developing adequate cybersecurity personnel both in quantity
and quality, and I know that the NIST report recommends that
federal programs supporting education at all levels should
incorporate cybersecurity awareness for students as they're
introduced to and provided with internet-based devices, and I
know this has been discussed already here this morning but I
really want to emphasize that especially with my concerns about
education and workforce issues as well that these programs be
developed as the report says and focused on children as early
as preschool and throughout elementary school, and we also need
programs to better prepare our teachers, and I know that that's
been discussed.
So I wanted to talk a little bit about the tremendous
potential for community and technical colleges, community
colleges to have an increased role in preparing the workforce.
What more can we be doing to create an environment that
supports this? And then also if you'll address public-private
partnerships as well. My State of Oregon has been working on a
Center for Cyber Excellence, which is a collaboration with
private sector as well as our universities and community
colleges. So can you talk about what sorts of roles community
and technical colleges can play as well as public-private
partnership?
Dr. Burley, I'll start with you.
Dr. Burley. Community and technical colleges play an
incredibly important role in developing the cybersecurity
workforce. They are often more flexible than four-year
institutions and so they're able to integrate curriculum a
little bit faster. They are often where we turn to for more of
the hands-on technical training that we are not necessarily as
equipped to provide as rapidly in the four-year space but it
really is a collaboration across all of the different levels of
the academy because while the community and technical colleges
are possibly able to help us develop technical skill sets a
little bit faster, there are other aspects that perhaps they
are not as well versed in doing and so we really have to
continue to enable and push partnerships across all the levels
of academia, and that also gets to your second question about
the public-private partnership. Because we're dealing with an
environment where the needs are very broad and very rapidly
evolving, it is critical that all of the different sectors play
a role and collaborate to make sure that the programs that
we're developing have all of the different components that are
necessary and that we are really getting at holistically
looking at the development of the workforce, and it's not a
situation where we can simply focus on one part of the
ecosystem at the expense of another because we'll only grow a
portion of the workforce.
Ms. Bonamici. I'm going to ask the others to respond as
well, but before I do, would you please talk a little bit about
how we can get more girls, young women and minorities involved?
Dr. Burley. A couple of things. I mean, first we have to
begin to really push forward role models so that people
understand that there are people in the workforce that look
like them and that are doing these jobs. That's very important,
and evidence has shown that across all of the STEM disciplines,
that that's an important consideration.
Ms. Bonamici. And I'll put in a little plug for Hidden
Figures if nobody else has done that.
Dr. Burley. Absolutely. We also need to unbundle what it
means to be a cybersecurity professional. It really is a very
broad field with many, many different occupations and different
roles that people can play, and while you may not see yourself
in one type of role, there are a thousand other roles that you
could see yourself in and so we really have to do a better job
at explaining what it means to be a part of the cybersecurity
workforce.
Ms. Bonamici. And you say ``we.'' Who would that be?
Teachers----
Dr. Burley. All of us, the government, academia, anybody
who is developing or working on developing the cybersecurity
workforce. This is part of what awareness programs ought to do
but it's all of those who are involved in the development, the
education of future professionals.
Ms. Bonamici. Terrific. I have a little bit more time left
if somebody wants to jump in. Dr. Romine?
Dr. Romine. I'd like to just make two very quick points.
NIST, specifically my laboratory's, privileged to house the
Program Office for the National Initiative for Cybersecurity
Education, which is an interagency program with a lot of
agencies committed to working together to help solve this
problem, workforce problem and awareness problem, and certainly
community colleges are one area where we have touch points and
are engaged.
With regard to your public-private partnership, we're also
privileged in my laboratory to house the National Cybersecurity
Center of Excellence, the NCCOE. I'm delighted to learn that
your State of Oregon is doing an analogous thing. I'd love to
learn more about it.
Ms. Bonamici. Terrific. Thank you very much.
Mr. Wilshusen. And if I may just add one comment real quick
from a personal note? I took a community college course at PG
Community--Prince Georges County Community College on network
defense about a year and a half ago. It was very rigorous and
it was very informative for me, and I used that as part of my
continuing professional education. So there's definitely a very
useful place for community college to provide technical skill
sets to the federal workforce.
Ms. Bonamici. Thank you very much. I see my time is
expired. I yield back. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Chairwoman Comstock. Thank you, Ms. Bonamici, and I believe
we will continue on that education front and have future
hearings, and I agree very much with you on the role of
community colleges, you know, online classes, and a lot of
these approaches, and we are very pleased that the Hidden
Figures are not as hidden anymore, and it's a fabulous movie,
and I'll just take the--since I have a young women's leadership
program, I hope Dr. Burley can come and join us in highlighting
the importance of this because STEM education and STEM careers
are something that we very much try and promote with young
people, and since I have a daughter in that field, I always
appreciate getting mentors out there in front of young women,
and it's exactly what you say. They need to see other people in
that role so that they can relate and understand the job, so it
is very apropos.
So I thank all of the members of the panel this morning for
their testimony and their insight and their passion on this
very important issue, and I know we will continue to have a
number of hearings on this front.
The record will remain open for two weeks for additional
written comments and written questions from members.
And this hearing is now adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:40 a.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
Appendix I
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