[House Hearing, 115 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
DEFEATING TERRORISM IN SYRIA:
A NEW WAY FORWARD
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 14, 2017
__________
Serial No. 115-3
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida BRAD SHERMAN, California
DANA ROHRABACHER, California GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
TED POE, Texas KAREN BASS, California
DARRELL E. ISSA, California WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina AMI BERA, California
MO BROOKS, Alabama LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
PAUL COOK, California TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
RON DeSANTIS, Florida ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania
TED S. YOHO, Florida DINA TITUS, Nevada
ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois NORMA J. TORRES, California
LEE M. ZELDIN, New York BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois
DANIEL M. DONOVAN, Jr., New York THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York
F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, Jr., ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York
Wisconsin TED LIEU, California
ANN WAGNER, Missouri
BRIAN J. MAST, Florida
FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida
BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
THOMAS A. GARRETT, Jr., Virginia
Amy Porter, Chief of Staff Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director
Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade
TED POE, Texas, Chairman
JOE WILSON, South Carolina WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts
DARRELL E. ISSA, California LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
PAUL COOK, California BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania DINA TITUS, Nevada
LEE M. ZELDIN, New York NORMA J. TORRES, California
BRIAN J. MAST, Florida BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois
THOMAS A. GARRETT, Jr., Virginia
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
Mr. Hassan Hassan, senior fellow, The Tahrir Institute for Middle
East Policy.................................................... 6
The Honorable Frederic C. Hof, director, Rafik Hariri Center for
the Middle East, Atlantic Council.............................. 13
Ms. Melissa Dalton, senior fellow, Center for Strategic and
International Studies.......................................... 19
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
Mr. Hassan Hassan: Prepared statement............................ 9
The Honorable Frederic C. Hof: Prepared statement................ 15
Ms. Melissa Dalton: Prepared statement........................... 21
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 46
Hearing minutes.................................................. 47
The Honorable Ted Poe, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Texas, and chairman, Subcommittee on Terrorism,
Nonproliferation, and Trade: Material submitted for the record. 48
DEFEATING TERRORISM IN SYRIA:
A NEW WAY FORWARD
----------
TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 14, 2017
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:01 p.m., in
room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ted Poe
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Poe. The subcommittee will come to order.
Without objection, all members may have 5 days to submit
statements, questions, extraneous materials for the record,
subject to the length limitation in the rules.
I will make my opening statement at this time.
The Syrian war has raged for nearly 6 years. Syria is in
chaos. Terrorists, foreign fighters, rebels, foreign
governments, all are engaged in battle for territory and
control of different aspects of Syria.
On the screen--let's go back to the previous screen--you
will see different areas of Syria. And the different areas that
are controlled by ISIS is in the dark section.
Let's flip to the next screen quickly. I don't know if you
can read that or not. There should be--for at least the panel
in front of you, you should have the different actors, the
state actors on one side and then the nonstate actors on the
other.
The state actors are divided into pro-Assad and actors that
are opposed to Assad, with the Middle Eastern countries at the
top of each list, and then you have non-Middle Eastern
countries at the bottom of each list. And you can see that
there are numerous countries aligned on both sides.
And then there are nonstate actors that are involved, and
those are a multitude of groups. They call themselves different
things at different times. Some are terrorist groups. Some
claim not to be terrorist groups that are terrorist groups.
One of the biggest things that I think we should know is
that we have terrorist groups on both sides. We have Hezbollah
on one side, which is obviously a terrorist group fighting for
Assad; and we have ISIS on the other side that is a terrorist
group. Al-Qaeda is a terrorist group, and they are also
somewhat aligned with the anti-Assad group.
You have a multitude of actors all seeking their own self-
interest in Syria. And this hearing is about really what do we
see happening not only now but, hopefully, what is the end game
after 6 years of war.
The losers in this have been the Syrian people, and I think
they will continue to be the losers because, as the war rages,
the war affects them more than anyone else. Half a million
Syrian people have died, at least, in this war. And I don't
call it a conflict; I call it a war. When you start dropping
bombs on people, that is not a conflict, that is a war. Fifty
thousand of those people, by all estimates, have been children.
Five million Syrians have become refugees; 6 million are
internally displaced. So that has been about 11 percent of the
Syrian population killed or injured since the start of the
violence.
The perpetrator of all of this sits directly at the regime
of Bashar Assad and his backers in Moscow and Tehran. Assad has
pursued a policy of murdering anybody that expresses criticism
of his power. He uses barrel bombs, and it doesn't make any
difference who those barrel bombs fall on as long as he thinks
they are opposed to his regime.
Russia intervened in Syria in September 2015 and began air
strikes against what it called terrorist targets. The Russians
apparently are not very good in their targeting because it
seems as though they have killed thousands of people in Syria
and they haven't all been terrorists. The Syrian Network for
Human Rights suggested last year that Russian strikes killed
more Syrians than ISIS members.
Iran's terrorist proxy, Hezbollah, has also bloodied its
hands in Syria. Since 2013, Hezbollah has operated openly in
Syria, killing on behalf of the Assad regime. It has also
created in Syria a perfect environment for out-of-towners, as I
call them, who show up with their own self-interest, including
terrorist groups. ISIS is there, and while ISIS no longer
controls as much territory as they did in 2014, they still
control major aspects of the Syrian population centers.
I have furnished each of our panelists a map, and there is
also a map on the wall. Due to time constraints, I can't go
into all of the details. But the thin black line in the middle
of Syria and in the southern part of Syria is what is
controlled by ISIS. The Kurds control the northern purple area.
The yellow area is controlled by al-Qaeda and so-called Syrian
dissidents and rebel groups. And then Assad controls the pink
area to the west.
The questions to be asked today are: What is going to
happen in the end game? What is the end game? And, also, I
would like to know from our panelists, what is the national
security interest of the United States? Should we ratchet it
up? Should we do what we are doing now, which is kind of the
Vietnam syndrome? Or should we leave it to the Middle East to
resolve this conflict themselves? I would like the opinion of
all three panelists to those three questions.
And I will turn it over to the gentleman from
Massachusetts, who has fled to Washington to get out of the
snow, for his opening statement.
Mr. Keating. Thank you, Chairman Poe. And thank you for
holding this hearing today.
The situation we have watched unfold in Syria the last 6
years has been wrought with complexities and, the chairman and
I agree, with chaos and atrocities under the Assad government.
Today, the war and the resulting humanitarian crisis is nothing
short of a global tragedy.
So I am grateful for the attendance of our witnesses--Mr.
Hassan, Ambassador Hof, Ms. Dalton--for their valuable insight
into the ongoing political strife and challenges that the
international community as well as the new administration faces
in the months and years ahead.
If we are going to be smart about terrorism and
specifically the rising role of ISIL, then we must first come
to terms with the reality that their model of terrorism is
built on a foundation of radicalization. To continue fighting
ISIL in the battlefield requires that we recognize this pattern
of recruitment and evolution in fighting tactics.
As we make progress in diminishing their territory, we must
be mindful of their shifts in strategy to prioritize covert
radicalization rather than maintain geographic strongholds. It
becomes essential that we engage in this war of ideas by
providing potential recruits with a choice of narratives. Those
choices should include a path forward other than terrorism.
But, even more importantly, we must recognize that
strengthening the resiliency and stability of communities is
necessary for eradicating terrorism. And when families live in
fear and when no one is accountable for keeping them safe and
protecting their freedom, we will never be able to eliminate
the conditions that produce these terrorists.
Countering ISIL in Syria, however, cannot be viewed as a
one-dimensional prospect. Preventing attacks and limiting
ISIL's capacity to operate within its network caliphates are
also crucial to eliminating the terrorist threat there.
The U.S. cannot do this alone, nor should we. But we should
also be wary of the compromises we are being asked to make,
allegedly in the name of securing peace and combating
terrorism.
I have grave concerns about the role of Russia and Iran and
what they intend to play in countering ISIL and preventing
future terrorists. Left without proper oversight or debate,
this same Congress may 5, 10, or 15 years from now preside over
a hearing of the same subject, examining how a Russian- and
Iranian-led resolution to this crisis allowed ISIL to survive
and become embedded in the region, like other terrorist groups
which continue to pose a threat to the U.S. today.
For the time being, I believe we still have strong allies
in Europe and the Middle East whose interests align with ours
and who can make valuable contributions, along with our own, to
tackle this threat. Our existing partnerships on intelligence-
sharing, security, military strategy are robust, and we are
united with our allies along a common goal for a peaceful
resolution to this gruesome conflict and a stable political
outcome for the people of Syria.
Even with close partnerships, there is still room for even
stronger, more effective cooperation to close some of the gaps
and inconsistencies that ISIL continues to exploit. With all
the progress in the past decades to cement effective security
partnerships among the U.S. and our allies, there is now a
sound foundation to build upon that, together, we can isolate
and destroy these terrorist threats. Neglecting these
partnerships and incredible assets in the fight against
terrorism would be a costly mistake.
Countering terrorism in Syria is a complex, multifaceted
issue. If we fail to craft a comprehensive plan to address it,
aspects of our national security will be compromised.
I look forward to the witnesses' testimony today and
hearing from you on how to balance these diverse and sometimes
seemingly divergent considerations when attempting to combat
ISIL in Syria.
I yield back.
Mr. Poe. I thank the gentleman from Massachusetts.
The Chair will recognize members for 1-minute opening
statements, and the Chair will follow the 60-minute--60-second
rule, not 60 minutes.
The gentleman from South Carolina is recognized for 1
minute.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Judge Poe.
And he and I worked together very closely on the 60-second
rule, I can assure you.
But I want to thank the chairman for having such
distinguished witnesses. And, already, this has been a helpful
hearing to me, the map showing the level of control, how narrow
it is, Damascus, west and north, but also to see the success of
the Kurdish regional efforts from Iraq.
It is very important to me that we support the people of
the Kurdish region, with the understanding that they are
working to maintain and build a stable Iraq, and by doing that,
by not indicating--expanding beyond the borders. But they are
very successful. And that was very instructive to me, so I am
very, very hopeful.
Additionally, I look forward to hearing of your efforts
regarding counterpropaganda.
Thank you. And I, within the 60 seconds, hereby yield the
balance of my time.
Mr. Poe. I thank the gentleman.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Illinois, Mr.
Schneider.
Mr. Schneider. Thank you, Chairman Poe, Ranking Member
Keating, for convening this important hearing.
And thank you to the witnesses for providing your expertise
to inform this incredibly important discussion.
I hope that we all came here today with the recognition
that Syria must be a priority for the new administration. With
5 million refugees and 6 million internally displaced people
and more than 500,000 mostly civilians killed, the 6-year civil
war is the greatest humanitarian crisis of the new century.
Syria borders key American allies, namely Israel, Jordan,
and Turkey. The civil war is putting extreme pressure on the
bordering states as well as the European nations. For 6 years,
the situation has only gotten worse.
I hope our witnesses can shed light on how to neutralize
and defeat the terrorist groups ISIS and Jabhat Fateh al-Sham,
while at the same time working toward a political solution for
the country that does not include Bashar al-Assad or cede
control of Syria to Iran and its proxy Hezbollah nor lead to
further instability and the consequent return of terrorist
groups.
As you have all shared in your testimony, there are no easy
solutions or even mostly good choices, but walking away is
clearly not an option.
Mr. Poe. I thank the gentleman.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr.
Cook.
Mr. Cook. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I think this
is a great hearing.
The problem that I have always with this is that every 6
months, a year, the players, the situation changes. And for us
to get a grasp on this, it is almost impossible. We just had a
similar hearing in the House Armed Services Committee, a
different approach.
And I did want to thank Ambassador Hof for his service in
Vietnam, where you were awarded the Purple Heart. I understand
that you were involved in the 1983 investigation of the bombing
of the Marine barracks, 1st Battalion, 8th Marines. That was
my--I was not with them. That was my former battalion. And what
happened then still lingers, and I hope we can go back to some
of the causes as they relate to today.
I yield back. Thank you.
Mr. Poe. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Rohrabacher from California.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
When we talk about \1/2\ million people who are dead and
have been killed in this, let's just admit this isn't just
Assad. We keep saying Assad killed all these people. The fact
is, if you look at our allies, whether it be Turkey, Saudi
Arabia, Qatar, even the UAE, and certainly Iran, who is not an
ally but in that region, any of those countries, any of those
governments that faced an insurgency that kept on being
financed over and over again would kill that many people. Assad
is no different than the other dictators, yet we have insisted
that he has to go. And, thus, the conflict goes on, and more
and more people are made refugees and killed.
Who is at fault? I think we should stick our nose out of
this and let them have, yes, Assad and their dictators in all
the rest of these countries, and the United States shouldn't
keep these conflicts going on and on and on.
Thank you.
Mr. Poe. I thank the gentleman.
Anybody else wish to make an opening statement?
The Chair recognizes Ms. Titus.
Ms. Titus. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Ranking
Member.
You know, throughout the campaign, we heard from candidate
Trump that he knew more than the generals and he had a secret
plan for fighting ISIS. Now, apparently, he has gone to the
Pentagon to ask for some assistance.
As we go through this hearing, I would be curious to know
what you all think about his willingness or ability to stick
with a plan if we come up with it or if our policy is just
going to jump from tweet to tweet.
Thank you.
Mr. Poe. The Chair will now introduce all three witnesses
and then----
Mr. Garrett. Mr. Chairman?
Mr. Poe. Yes.
Mr. Garrett. If I might? I had not originally not intended
to make introductory remarks.
Mr. Poe. The Chair recognizes for 1 minute.
Mr. Garrett. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member.
The comments by the gentleman from California sort of stir
where I am on this. I think that this Nation would be well-
advised never to arm any entity without having an easily
articulable plan for an end state that is preferable to the
current status quo.
And while Assad certainly has blood on his hands, I can't
find, nor could former Secretary of State John Kerry, the Free
Syrian Army. I couldn't tell you who leads it, which leaves us
with two alternative solutions to the Assad problem, that being
Jabhat al-Nusra or Jabhat Fateh al-Sham or ISIS, neither of
which, I think, are a preferable option to a dictator in Assad,
who has provided some level of stability, created a
circumstance wherein 51 percent of college graduates in Syria
are women and a safe zone for individuals of ethnic and
religious minorities.
I would yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Poe. I thank the gentleman.
The Chair will now introduce the witnesses.
Mr. Hassan is a senior fellow at the Tahrir Institute for
Middle East Policy. He is co-author of ``ISIS: Inside the Army
of Terror,'' a New York Times bestseller.
Ambassador Frederic Hof is the director of the Rafik Hariri
Center for the Middle East at the Atlantic Council. Previously,
Ambassador Hof served as Special Coordinator for the State
Department's Office of the Special Envoy for Middle East Peace.
Ms. Melissa Dalton is a senior fellow and the deputy
director of the International Security Program at CSIS. Her
research focuses on U.S. defense policy in the Middle East,
global U.S. defense strategy, and security cooperation with
U.S. allies.
Mr. Hassan, we will start with you.
Each of you have 5 minutes. When you see the red light,
stop talking.
Mr. Hassan.
STATEMENT OF MR. HASSAN HASSAN, SENIOR FELLOW, THE TAHRIR
INSTITUTE FOR MIDDLE EAST POLICY
Mr. Hassan. Thank you very much, Chairman Poe and members
of the subcommittee. It is a privilege to present today here my
views on Syria and terrorism.
I want to basically give, like, an optimistic view first.
Despite the grim situation inside Syria, I think the U.S.
Government has an opportunity to stem the challenges presented
by the two international terrorist organizations operating in
Syria, the Islamic State and al-Qaeda.
In fact, I would argue that the United States has more
options or options it didn't necessarily have 2 years ago,
including a way to prevent not only the Islamic State and al-
Qaeda from operating in Syria or weakening both of them but
also other radical groups from operating in at least 50 to 60
percent of Syria. The territory I am talking about includes
areas that the Islamic State controls or once controlled since
2014.
You know, the way ISIS does things is, when they take an
area, they act as a washing powder, I would say, which is
basically to eradicate any Islamist and jihadist cells
operating in the areas where they operate, because they want to
prevent any support system for their rivals.
So they have done that in 50 to 60 percent of Syria--or 50
percent of Syria, to be more precise. So for al-Qaeda now to go
back and fill the vacuum left by ISIS, it has to revive dormant
cells or rebuild influence almost from scratch. So there is an
opportunity there to shape the communities in which ISIS
operates today.
So the expulsion of the Islamic State offers a rare
opportunity, I would say, to implement a strategy to build an
alternative to jihadist organizations, more so than you were
able in 2014 when dozens of different armed groups operated in
these areas.
So the liberation of these areas by the U.S.-led coalition
creates a de facto American sphere of influence, which both
Russia and the regime have accepted for now, at least. This
counterterrorism strategy involves a more foresighted or
farsighted policy of establishing de facto safe zones in part
of Syria where inhabitants can be protected from jihadists and
from the regime and where the international community can also
ensure that al-Qaeda, which now operates in only 1 to 2 percent
of Syria, at least in a dominant manner, from rolling back into
areas from which the Islamic State is expelled or is being
expelled.
Those safe zones can be established in the areas where the
U.S. and allies have fought ISIS, as I said. The strategy I am
proposing is basically a baseline, meaning it requires minimal
American commitment. It builds on what the Americans are
already doing inside Syria against the Islamic State and
without which any fight against jihadism is doomed to fail. So
this is the baseline.
The war against the Islamic State has reached the point, in
my opinion, where the Americans cannot--or the U.S. forces or
the U.S.-led coalition cannot just pull out from Syria, because
of, obviously, the ongoing fight against ISIS. It can choose,
though--the U.S. can choose to continue with the current
strategy, which I consider disastrous, and allow various forces
to fill the ensuing vacuum after ISIS is defeated in some
areas.
Instead, I would propose that the U.S. must use its pre-
existing leverage to build a sound policy, a sound strategy
that breaks away from the current strategy, which overlooks the
political environment that enabled the rise of ISIS and other
jihadists in the first place.
What is lacking in the current policy is a real kind of
strategy that utilizes this leverage to ensure the removal of
jihadists, to prevent their return, to protect local
communities from indiscriminate bombardments by the Assad
regime, and minimize the conflict that is emerging among the
various allies in northern Syria, namely the Kurds on one hand
and the rebels and Turkey on the other hand.
This strategy, obviously, is not an invitation for an
American occupation of Syria or long-term nation-building that
President Donald Trump has explicitly criticized. Instead, it
is both realistic, essential, and expands on battlefield
victories already scored over the past 2\1/2\ years in
Operation Inherent Resolve against the Islamic State in
northern Syria.
The strategy, again, in my opinion, I think should
acknowledge the fractured nature of the Syrian conflict today.
To get a sense of this fracture, you have to look at kind of
the map that Chairman Poe just presented, which basically
divides Syria into four quadrants.
One is the caliphate terrain, which extends from eastern
Aleppo all the way to Iraq, Iraqi border, all the way to
Palmyra in central Syria.
And then you have the second one, the second quadrant,
which is rebel-held areas in the north and the south. This is
where the Americans and their allies--the Israelis, the
Jordanians, and others--have actually done very well in
ensuring that jihadists don't have dominance in that area and
that there is, like, a relatively reliable moderate rebel
coalition there and where al-Qaeda and Islamic State have some
presence but they don't dominate.
And the problem there, though, is that the rebel presence
there is fragile and requires a policy to ensure that they
would withstand the pressure from jihadists. And, actually,
today is a good example of that, because Jabhat al-Nusra/al-
Qaeda has started to challenge that dynamic in southern Syria.
The third quadrant, very quickly, is the more fragmented
northwest----
Mr. Poe. The gentleman's time has expired.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hassan follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
----------
Mr. Poe. And the subcommittee will be in recess for votes.
We will start 5 minutes after the last vote has ended. The
subcommittee is in recess.
[Recess.]
Mr. Poe. The subcommittee will come to order.
Ambassador Hof, we will hear your testimony.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE FREDERIC C. HOF, DIRECTOR, RAFIK
HARIRI CENTER FOR THE MIDDLE EAST, ATLANTIC COUNCIL
Ambassador Hof. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Keating, members of the
committee, I would summarize the key points of my testimony for
the record as follows: First, both the Obama and the Trump
administrations have defined defeating terror in Syria largely
in terms of neutralizing two rival descendants of al-Qaeda in
Iraq, namely the so-called Islamic State, ISIL, and the Jabhat
Fatah al-Sham, JFS, formerly known as the Nusrah Front.
ISIL has had mainly a live and let live arrangement with
the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad. JFS has fought the regime
while at the same time trying to dominate nationalist Syria
First armed rebel units.
Second, terminating the military capabilities of both of
these organizations is critically important. But if our goal in
Syria is to kill terror and keep it dead, ultimately, a
political system reflecting legitimacy has to take hold. Absent
a political system that virtually all Syrians see as
satisfactory with no superior alternative, absent that,
extremists will seek to rise again to fill the vacuum created
by gross corruption, incompetence, and brutality.
Third, the main obstacle to political legitimacy in Syria
is the survival of a regime headed by Bashar al-Assad and
supported by Iran and Russia. The collective punishment and
mass homicide survival strategy of this regime has been the
main factor behind a humanitarian abomination and a political
catastrophe.
Yesterday, the Atlantic Council released a report entitled,
``Breaking Aleppo.'' This report details and documents the
campaign of terror inflicted by the Assad regime and Russia on
the civilians of Aleppo. It adds to the enormous body of
evidence of war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in
Syria over the past 6 years, the overwhelming majority of which
have been committed by the regime and its allies. These crimes
have helped ISIL and JFS enormously in their recruiting.
Fourth, even if the diplomatic pursuit of political
legitimacy in Syria is a long-term project, neutralizing ISIL
and JFS militarily are urgent priorities. Two successive
Presidents have defined both organizations as threats to
American national security. ISIL in Syria, which has planned
and executed major atrocities in Europe, is currently under
attack by a U.S.-led air coalition and a U.S.-advise ground
force, largely Kurdish in composition.
I understand the administration is reviewing this military
approach in light of Turkish objections to the Kurdish role and
the objective desirability of liberating densely populated
areas with highly skilled military professionals.
JFS is under attack by U.S. and Russian air assets
independently with Syrian nationalist rebel forces seeking ways
and means to defeat it. These nationalists will need a tight
Russian leash on Assad and on Iranian-led foreign militias in
order to move effectively against JFS. It is not yet clear that
they will get Russian cooperation.
Fifth and finally, thanks to Russian and Iranian military
intervention, Assad seems secure in at least part of Syria.
Iran, in particular, needs Assad to bind Syria to Lebanon's
Hezbollah, another important Islamist terrorist group. But
Assad's political well-being means the indefinite continuation
of state terror in Syria.
As the United States and its partners move ideally with
dispatch against ISIL and JFS, any temptation to make common
cause with or improve the political prospects of Syria's
premier practitioner of terror, Bashar al-Assad, must be
resisted. Reports of Russian disaffection with Assad and with
Iranian-led militias should be explored.
Killing terror in Syria and keeping it dead will, I am
afraid, be a long-term endeavor for the United States and its
partners, one extending far beyond the defeats of ISIL and JFS.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Hof follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
----------
Mr. Poe. Thank you, Ambassador Hof.
Ms. Dalton.
STATEMENT OF MS. MELISSA DALTON, SENIOR FELLOW, CENTER FOR
STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
Ms. Dalton. Chairman Poe, Ranking Member Keating, and
distinguished members of the subcommittee, it is an honor to
testify before you today with my excellent colleagues
Ambassador Frederic Hof and Hassan Hassan.
Syria stands today at the epicenter of a regional conflict
with global consequences for U.S. interests. Countering
terrorism is one aspect of a deeper problem set. The Trump
administration and the Congress have the opportunity to change
the course of U.S. policy toward Syria by nesting short-term
operations into a strategy.
Americans have no interest in perennial military
interventions in the Middle East. We have demands for resources
at home and competing geostrategic objectives in Europe and
Asia. However, the United States has compelling reasons to
counter terrorism and to address the broader factors that have
enabled the rise of the so-called Islamic State and al-Qaeda's
affiliate in Syria, Jabhat Fatah al-Sham. The growth of Iranian
proxy groups and a battle-hardened Lebanese Hezbollah in Syria
also pose counterterrorism challenges.
Additionally, the United States has to contend with
intertwined realities that could challenge its ability to
influence outcomes to its advantage. Among these reasons are:
Countering terrorists and the roots of terrorism, which
threaten the U.S. homeland and our allies and partners;
preventing military confrontation with Russia and Iran while
limiting the long-term subversive influence they could have in
the region; and stemming conflict emanating from Syria from
further destabilizing neighboring states in Europe.
Achieving U.S. objectives in Syria will require inherent
tradeoffs in the policy choices the Trump administration could
pursue. Complicating matters, 6 years of war have torn Syria
apart. It no longer exists a unitary whole, requiring different
approaches in the north, south, east, and west. Woven
throughout the options in Syria are geopolitical choices with
which the United States will have to grapple, including how to
manage tensions with Russia in a way that secures U.S.
interests and contests Russian aggression globally while
cooperating where it is advantageous and feasible; how to
calibrate pressure on Iran's destabilizing activities without
provoking blowback to U.S. Forces operating in the area and
while attaining an enduring political outcome in Syria; and how
to manage deeply fraught relations with NATO ally Turkey while
leveraging the highly capable YPG to fight ISIS in northern
Syria.
The Trump administration and Congress should work together
to forge a coordinated U.S. strategy for Syria with allies and
partners. The goals of this strategy should be to degrade ISIS
and JFS, achieve a nationwide cessation of hostilities and a
negotiated transition of power in Damascus, and consolidate
counterterrorism gains by knitting together local security and
governance in the four segments of Syria.
Such an approach will require leveraging multiple tools of
U.S. statecraft, including: Registering strong concerns with
Russia and Iran about their support for Assad's brutal tactics
and their long-term ambitions in Syria and being prepared to
back up those concerns with sanctions and coercion; rebuilding
communication and trust with Turkey. While pressing on human
rights concerns, we should emphasize the criticality of working
through differences as NATO allies. Bolstering support to Iraqi
Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi and his efforts to restore
security and stability in Iraq. If Iraq falters, ISIS and other
terrorist groups will regrow in western Iraq and push back into
Syria. Working with the U.N. to leverage and integrate the
Astana process into a U.N.-mediated negotiations, calibrating
sanctions pressure on Putin to convince Assad to accede to the
negotiating table, requiring Russian action before alleviating
sanctions. Ukraine should not be a quid pro quo for Syria.
Synchronizing operations for Raqqa and Mosul to squeeze ISIS,
and aligning covert and noncovert approaches versus ISIS and
JFS.
Letting operational conditions on the ground inform
strategic adjustments and withdrawal timelines. Countering ISIS
and JFS will be a multiyear effort. Increasing both special
operations forces and conventional ground forces in Syria and
Iraq, based on commanders' assessed requirements, conducting
training and combat operations with local partners.
Consolidating gains from operations, knitting connections among
local security forces and governance structures so that
terrorist groups cannot grow back. Being strategic about
deploying the local partner forces that will be the most
credible, accounting for ethno-sectarian differences, even if
it requires a slower pace for operations.
If the United States commits resources to establishing a
safe zone, I recommend constructing one in southern Syria where
operational dynamics are clearer than in the north and to
ensure that it ties to political negotiations to end the civil
war so as to avoid an open-ended commitment.
We should also enhance intelligence sharing and improved
coordination among military intelligence and law enforcement
entities and continue to provide humanitarian assistance to
besieged civilian areas with clear and immediate repercussions
in the case of outside interference.
Finally, we should seek a new authorization for the use of
force for the U.S. intervention in Syria and Iraq providing for
operational flexibility to U.S. commanders. The presence of
ISIS and al-Qaeda in Syria demands our immediate attention.
However, the United States must anchor its counterterrorism
approach in a broader strategy if it is to prevail.
Thank you. I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Dalton follows:]
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----------
Mr. Poe. I thank all of you all for your testimony. I will
recognize myself for 5 minutes.
First of all, I gave each of you a list of the participants
as I know them as of today. Ambassador Hof, I will just ask you
quickly, is this a fair statement of the lineup of the players?
Ambassador Hof. I think, broadly speaking, Mr. Chairman, it
is a fair lineup. The only--the only thing off the top of my
head I might take issue with here is listing ISIS under the
roster of anti-Assad forces. There has been, for the past 3
years, a live and let live relationship between the regime and
ISIS. The regime's military effort, the military effort of
Russia has been directed at elements other than ISIS with rare
exception.
Mr. Poe. Okay. Thank you. And it is a fair statement that
there is an ebb and flow of the anti-Assad forces as to who
they are today, whether they are anti-Assad or whether they are
just working for their own self-interest in particular areas of
the country. Is that a fair statement?
Ambassador Hof. Yes, it is, Mr. Chairman. There is probably
an example of just about everything in Syria today.
Mr. Poe. You have the bona fide rebel forces who want to
overthrow Assad; you have out-of-towners who are criminals that
are looking to loot, pillage the area; you have people coming
in to take over territory. You just have everybody there in the
anti-Assad group. Is that a fair statement?
Ambassador Hof. You have got local elements that, for
criminal purposes, have taken full advantage of local
situations. You also--you also have an ebb and flow of people
depending on resource availability.
One of the great successes of the al-Qaeda elements in
Syria is that they have been pretty well resourced and have
been able to pull away young Syrian men who are anti-Assad,
originally lined up with the Free Syrian Army and so forth, but
who have gone to work for an organization where they know--
where breakfast is going to come from, they know they have got
a serviceable weapon, they know they have got plenty of
ammunition, so that has been a factor as well.
Mr. Poe. Are any of the Middle Eastern countries, Saudi
Arabia, Qatar, UAE, are they funding any of these groups like
al-Qaeda, quasi-terrorist groups?
Ambassador Hof. I think, Mr. Chairman, the bulk of the
evidence suggests that at an official level, no. These
governments are not funding al-Qaeda or ISIS or any of those.
Mr. Poe. But it would be a fair statement that money is
coming from those countries?
Ambassador Hof. You bet, you bet. It would be a totally
fair statement. There is money coming, I think in recent
reports, Qatar and Kuwait have earned honorable or dishonorable
mentions in this regard.
Mr. Poe. Dishonorable mentions. So you have at least three
terrorist groups. You have ISIS, you have al-Qaeda, and you
have Hezbollah, three terrorist groups, questionable whose side
they are on on any given day.
Let me ask you this. The U.S.--let's talk about the United
States' role. In the past, we decided we would fund 5,000 so-
called moderate rebels. That turned out to be a disaster. It
cost us $\1/2\ billion. Armed 60 of them and they surrendered
after the first day. I say that to say it is difficult to know
who we are dealing with as a country when we turn over American
equipment and American money.
What should the United States do? Should we just stay the
course, give a little money, a little weapon here and there?
Should we go all in with the, you know, with the B-52s? So I
say that, not facetiously, but all in all should we just say
this is not our battle? Which of those three options, and I am
going to ask each of you to give me which option the United
States should take from this point on.
Mr. Hassan, which position should the U.S. take?
Mr. Hassan. I think what the U.S. should be doing and what
should----
Mr. Poe. Which of those three options?
Mr. Hassan. I think they have to be more--they have to go
all--politically all in, and I think that is where the U.S. has
been lagging behind. They haven't pegged a political track to
the military track as necessary.
Mr. Poe. All right. Ambassador Hof.
Ambassador Hof. I would say all in using a whole-of-
government approach to this. It is not entirely a military
issue. Against ISIL it is, for sure, but there are--you know,
the security of Americans is what is at stake and what is----
Mr. Poe. Sure, political solution.
Ambassador Hof [continuing]. Bubbling up out of Syria.
Mr. Poe. And Ms. Dalton.
Ms. Dalton. I think we have to go in with a multifaceted
approach that pushes hard politically, that creates leverage
with Russia and Iran to pressure Assad to come to the
negotiating table, and to change the military balance on the
ground by continuing to support the groups that we have been
working with.
Mr. Poe. I thank all three of you.
And I recognize the gentleman from Massachusetts, ranking
member, Mr. Keating.
Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Dalton, you mentioned in your opening remarks,
``Ukraine should not be a quid pro quo for Syria.'' What
prompted those statements from you?
Ms. Dalton. Thank you, Ranking Member Keating. There have
been reports of late that as the new administration is
examining the policy options before it, which are, of course,
global in scale given where the United States sits in the
world, that they might take a different approach to Russia and
that perhaps there is some transactional trade space to be had
in areas where Russia and the United States are conflicting or
have been conflicting. And there is a notion that perhaps an
agreement could be reached with the Russians such that the
United States would turn a blind eye to Russia's activities in
Ukraine in Crimea in exchange for Russian cooperation against
ISIS in Syria and working with Assad.
The reality is that that would be strategically foolhardy
for the United States, in my opinion, to go down that pathway.
Russia responds to strength, and rewarding Russia for bad
behavior by encouraging more bad behavior doesn't seem to be a
recipe for success.
Mr. Keating. Let me follow that up, if I could.
Ms. Dalton. Yeah.
Mr. Keating. The Trump administration has repeatedly
embraced the idea that the U.S. should cooperate with Russia on
counter-ISIS or ISIL operations in Syria. How possible is that
engagement in security in cooperating with Russia without
working with Iran and its affiliates? Any of you.
Ms. Dalton. Yes. I think--before turning to the Iran bit of
that question, I think it is important to note that the vast
majority, up to 80 percent of Russia's air strikes in Syria
have not been on ISIS targets. They have been on other Syrian
opposition groups, some of which have been supported by the
United States and our partners, and against civilian targets in
Syria. So the idea--in a very sort of objective way of looking
at this, our objectives are not aligned with Russia in terms
of----
Mr. Keating. Professor Hof, same question.
Ambassador Hof. Yes, sir. I would certainly not begrudge
the administration the ability to conduct its due diligence
about the possibility of some kind of diplomatic and even,
eventually, military cooperation with Russia. I have--I have my
doubts as to whether there is any there there, but doing the
diplomatic due diligence, look, there is no doubt whatsoever
that the leadership in Russia has no affection, much less
respect for Bashar al-Assad. Bashar al-Assad has served a
political purpose, to date, for President Putin. For our
Government to explore whether there is a possibility of Russia
using some leverage to push Assad into meaningful negotiations,
I think it is worth a try.
Mr. Keating. Yeah. Mr. Hassan, how--could you--Mr. Hassan,
I mean, could you follow up, but also talk about the ability of
the U.S. and Russia sharing information, vital information in
that quest.
Mr. Hassan. Absolutely. I think it is possible to cleave
away Russia from Iran but only under one condition, which is
that the U.S. pursues the right policy inside Syria, regardless
of how Russia perceives that, which is basically a change in
Syria that has seen legitimate--like as a legitimate change
inside Syria, and the defeat--and focus on the political
environment inside Syria as much as the military challenge that
ISIS and al-Qaeda pose.
Only then would Russia start to maybe work with Americans
in the right way against the interest of Iran. We know that the
priorities of the two countries are different. They are long-
term priorities at least.
Mr. Keating. Perhaps, if I could interrupt just to put this
on the table, we are running out of time, but I think other
people will follow up. I haven't heard you talk about safe
zones. If you could comment on some of the drawbacks of safe--
and dangers of safe zones, what we should be looking out for,
what is possible.
Ambassador Hof. I think the main--the main thing to try to
understand about safe zones is that it requires very strong
protection not only from 30,000 feet, not just a no-fly zone,
it requires decisive military power on the ground. This is what
distinguishes a safe zone from a killing zone where people are
inadvertently drawn in to a situation where they are not
protected on the ground and as a result, slaughter takes place.
Mr. Keating. Yeah. And infiltration from terrorists.
I yield back.
Mr. Poe. I thank the gentleman.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr.
Cook.
Mr. Cook. Thank you very much.
One of the countries that is not listed right on this list
or your list is Israel, and a lot of the foreign policy that we
have in the United States is very sensitive to Israel's
position.
Do you have any comments in regards to how Israel views
this situation? I know the relations with Russia isn't bad, but
their position against Hezbollah and Iran, I think, is well
known, and they consider them a, you know, a major threat to
the country. Anyone?
Ms. Dalton. Thank you, Congressman. I believe that, from a
security perspective, Israel is very concerned about the growth
and development of IRGC-backed groups, not just Lebanese
Hezbollah but the up to 115,000 Iranian-backed groups that are
present in Syria and bolstering the Assad regime, and what that
portends for the long-term presence of those groups in Syria
and how that could potentially serve as a beachhead for IRGC
activities that could threaten Israel and its interest.
On top of that, the fact that Lebanese Hezbollah has
acquired further operational refinement and capability
development through its activities in Syria that could then be
taken back to Lebanon and threaten Israel, I think is also
something that the Israelis are very concerned about from a
security perspective.
Mr. Cook. I noticed Hamas was not listed on there. Do you
have any comments about Hamas? Anybody? No? They are a
nonplayer?
Ambassador Hof. I think, Congressman, Hamas has been
essentially a nonplayer in Syria for--there used to be an
office in Damascus. It left, and I believe it has been a
nonplayer for awhile in the Syrian context.
Mr. Cook. Okay. Going back to Assad. I still--being a
history major, and the history of Hezbollah and in Iran and
their conduct there, it is very hard for me to accept the
Russian position in Syria and some of the other countries
there. The pro-Assad forces, I think they are very accurate
there. Pro-Assad, obviously Iran, North Korea, China, and
Hezbollah. And so I am still very, very nervous about any
Russian affiliation with Assad and because of his conduct, both
the present ruler and his father, which has been going on for
years, and the number of people that have been killed in that
country.
I yield back. Thank you.
Mr. Poe. The Chair recognizes the gentlelady from Nevada,
Ms. Titus.
Ms. Titus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would just like to ask you about the perception of the
United States in the region within Syria. You know, with the
travel ban, with our unwillingness to do our part to help
refugees, the recent announcement, perhaps, that they are going
to continue to go down this path, what kind of perception will
we have to overcome to be successful in the area? And is this
working in the hands of some of the terrorist groups to use as
propaganda against us in making the situation worse? Anybody,
or all of you?
Mr. Hassan. Sure. I think many people, especially people
who are in charge of the campaign against ISIS and al-Qaeda,
recognize that the framing of the fight against these
organizations is as important as the military challenge. So if
your--if you have like 60 countries fighting ISIS and ISIS is
telling everyone that these are crusaders, these are not
fighting us because we are terrorists but fighting the Sunnis,
look at the devastation in Mosul but also look at the
devastation at Aleppo. These are two separate powers doing work
in two countries against Sunnis.
So I think the framing of the fight against ISIS is as
crucial as the military challenge. The ban itself is not as
much discussed in the region as here, obviously, but I think
there is a--perception matters a lot in Syria and Iraq. And
that is why there is a danger in working with the Russians
without really working out the political formula in the two
countries.
Ms. Titus. Ms. Dalton, or Ambassador?
Ambassador Hof. I would say, Congresswoman, there is--the
United States does have a--definitely an image and a perception
problem in Syria. It was not born with the executive order.
Okay? It goes back. It goes back a few years. Expectations that
the Obama administration, for example, would do something short
of invading and occupying the country to protect Syrian
civilians from mass murder. The fact that that never happened,
unintended consequence for sure, but it does bear on our
reputation in the country.
My organization, the Atlantic Council, recently published
what I consider to be a very, very important nonpartisan
bipartisan effort. Steve Hadley and former secretary Madeleine
Albright have published a Middle East Strategy Task Force
report. And what comes through clearly in this report is the
absolute need we and our transatlantic partners have for
partnerships within the region.
Ultimately, if terror is going to be killed and kept dead
in the Middle East, it is going to be Muslims in the lead. All
right? And again, nobody begrudges the President of the United
States, his authorities, his views about the national security
of the United States, but when we do these things, I think--I
think we have to keep in mind the imperative of partnership in
the region, who our partners need to be. And I suspect the
administration will be doing a better job in that respect.
Ms. Titus. Thank you. Ms. Dalton.
Ms. Dalton. I would completely align myself with Ambassador
Hof's remarks in terms of the necessity of reaching out, not
only to our traditional partners, but also civil society
organizations on the ground. The best messenger of countering
violent extremism is local actors, local religious leaders,
community activists. They are credible in the eyes of the
people that we are trying to reach. And I think bolstering
resourcings for those efforts through third-party means is
exceptionally important. And really creating a coalition of not
just government to government but also public-private
partnerships also must be part of the equation.
Ms. Titus. Thank you.
I yield back.
Mr. Poe. I thank the gentlelady.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr.
Perry.
Mr. Perry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ambassador Hof, thanks for your service. In 2015, ICE,
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, reported through their
intelligence sources that ISIS had been able to co-opt or to
obtain passport information data, biometric data, facilities,
equipment, et cetera, in Syria, and they were able to falsify
or manufacture passports in that regard with that information.
I am just wondering, since that time, this is the end of
2015, as I understand it and as I recall it, did we ever verify
that? And does ISIS or al-Qaeda, for that matter, currently
maintain access to Syrian Government facilities, equipment,
biometric data, passport information, et cetera, that would
allow either one of those groups to forge passports and/or
falsify identities? Anybody?
Mr. Hassan. Sure. Just quickly. I think the only place
that, you know, people inside Syria talked about with little
evidence was Aleppo, but ISIS did not go to Aleppo. So if there
was another--if there was one group that took the--you know,
seized these ones, it wouldn't be ISIS. It would be Free Syrian
Army groups.
Mr. Perry. But involved in the Free Syrian Army--I mean, we
have a hard time, I think, distinguishing who's who, and it
changes, in some respects, seems to be month to month or if you
want to say year to year. Could those--that information have
fallen into the hands of al-Qaeda or al-Qaeda operatives, even
if they weren't particularly ISIS operatives?
Mr. Hassan. I can't say, to be honest.
Mr. Perry. Based on that, I mean, and maybe in conjunction
with that, I mean, what confidence should the United States
Government have in the Government of Syria and the actors in
Syria to accurately confirm the identities of immigrants or
refugees from Syria?
Ambassador Hof. Congressman, my sense, and I am certainly
not an expert in consular affairs, my sense is that there is a
very intensive and very long vetting process for Syrian
refugees to come to the United States. My suspicion is that the
administration will probably find some tweaks, if you will, to
improve that on the margins, but my--again, not being a
consular specialist, you know, my sense from people who are in
this business is that Syrian refugees considered to come to the
United States get a pretty thorough scrubbing.
Mr. Perry. I am not doubting at all the capabilities, the
diligence, et cetera, of the people in the United States doing
the vetting. What I am questioning or trying to determine is
the validity of the information that they compare against, who
is giving it to them, what their interests may be, those who
are giving the information, and the validity and the competence
in the validity of that information coming from--does all that
information come from the Assad Government or is there anybody
else providing information? If you don't know, you don't know,
but I am just--you know, looking at the map, I mean, obviously
there is a lot of different players, right?
So when a refugee comes from here, are they getting the
information from Damascus, they being the United States, to vet
this person, or is somebody in this region or any of these
other regions providing some form of governance or tyranny or
whatever you want to call it--where is that information coming
from? Do we know? Do you know?
Ambassador Hof. Congressman, speaking for myself, I don't
know. Syrian refugees in Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, elsewhere in
Europe who apply to come to the United States have, in most
cases, documentation from the Syrian Government: Passport,
I.D., and so forth. That, I think, is where the investigation
starts.
There are numerous, numerous agencies of the United States
Government involved in this, numerous international
organizations as well. And I, although I don't know, I strongly
suspect that the kinds of questions that you are putting your
finger on as to the validity of basic identity documents
probably rates high in these investigations.
Mr. Perry. Thank you, Ambassador.
Mr. Chairman, I yield.
Mr. Poe. I thank the gentleman.
Ms. Dalton, I understand that you need to leave. There may
be questions that members of the committee have not been able
to ask you and they may turn those in in writing, which will be
forwarded to you, and we would expect you to answer those
questions within a week of when you received them. With that
understanding, then you can leave.
Ms. Dalton. Thank you so much, Chairman. And I beg the
subcommittee's forgiveness. I have a flight to catch today, but
thank you so much for the opportunity to testify, and I would
be glad to answer any followup questions. Thank you.
Mr. Poe. Thank you, Ms. Dalton.
Mrs. Torres, you probably had all your questions for Ms.
Dalton, but you are recognized.
Mrs. Torres. Absolutely, but that is okay. Thank you so
much, Mr. Chairman.
Terrorism, in many ways, is fueled by poverty and poor
governance. In the long run, if Syria doesn't see better
governance and prosperity, then even if ISIS is defeated,
something else will take its place.
Getting back, Ambassador Hof, to, you know, what you were
trying to get at earlier when you said, you know, who should
our partners in the region be, who should we be working with
there, I wonder if you can sort of look at your crystal ball, 5
years from now, down the road, you know, what are the prospects
for the Syrian economy and Government? Will the Syrian economy
and Government be better off if Russia and Iran are in the main
outside powers shaping events in Syria, or should--what would
that look like if the U.S. and Europe are the main outside
powers shaping events in Syria?
Ambassador Hof. Thank you for your--thank you for your
question, Congresswoman. I would say off the top of my head
that if Iran, in particular, is playing a decisive role 5 years
from now in Syria, Syria will be basically a smoking pit, and
it will be hemorrhaging human beings in all directions.
Iran--Iran needs Bashar al-Assad for one thing and one
thing only. He is--he and his entourage are the only people in
a very nationalistic country willing to subordinate Syria 100
percent to Iran on the issue of Hezbollah. Iran knows there is
nobody else in the country willing to go that far. So from
Iran's point of view, it is Bashar or nothing.
Now, there are estimates out there that the rebuilding of
Syria is going to take something on the order of $350 billion
worth of investment, in some cases aid, grants. We are not even
talking about humanitarian assistance here. Reconstruction.
Okay? And there is a practical problem here, and I think the
Russians get this, okay, because the Russians know the Assad
regime probably better than any of us.
Mrs. Torres. But do they understand the rule of law?
Ambassador Hof. I don't think that is a--I don't think that
is a high priority. I think--I think what the Russians do
understand is it is going to be very difficult for
international financial institutions, for the United States,
for Japan, for Western Europe to make the kinds of investment,
make the kinds of grants and loans if you have got Bashar al-
Assad and his entourage sitting there with their hands cupped
ready to take a piece of this.
Now, you know, as an American, like everybody else here, I
am--I guess I am basically an optimist. Yes, 5 years from now I
do see Syria in a much better place, but that--that is going to
require very, very, very strong efforts for all of us. There is
a formula out there for moving toward a national unity
governing scheme. It was agreed in June 2012 by Russia, China,
the United States, Great Britain, and France. Our diplomatic
challenge right now, I think, is to try to convince the
Russians to get that back on track.
Mrs. Torres. But meanwhile, you know, we have thousands of
people that are--continue to be slaughtered in the region and
with very little control. You, yourself, stated that there is
very little protection in some of these camps for folks. What
more can be done to get our regional partners involved, if not
Russia?
Ambassador Hof. I think--I think for all of our regional
partners there is a--there is an obligation that needs to be
met in terms of providing sufficient funds for the humanitarian
assistance that needs to take place. Thanks to you ladies and
gentlemen and your colleagues in the appropriations process,
the American taxpayer has been very generous in this respect.
Mrs. Torres. Thank you.
And I yield back.
Mr. Poe. I thank the gentlelady.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Virginia, Mr.
Garrett.
Mr. Garrett. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Hassan, I want to clear up the record based on some
questions asked by my colleague from Pennsylvania, Mr. Perry.
He queried you whether or not there might have been access to
equipment in Aleppo that might allow individuals to forge
Syrian passports, official documents, and your response, as I
recall, was that ISIS was not in Aleppo, that that was the Free
Syrian Army. Is it not also true, however, that a significant
faction in Aleppo was Jabhat al-Nusrah or Jabhat Fatah al-Sham?
Mr. Hassan. Inside Aleppo, Jabhat al-Nusrah Arpar was never
dominant. That was true until it was expelled--until the
Russians and the regime expelled the rebels from Aleppo.
Mr. Garrett. Okay. But there were factions of Jabhat al-
Nusrah and Jabhat Fatah al-Sham in Aleppo, correct?
Mr. Hassan. Absolutely.
Mr. Garrett. And Aleppo was, prior to this upheaval, the
largest city in the nation and a seat for a significant amount
of government activity, correct?
Mr. Hassan. Yes. Remember, this was in 2012, and the
jihadists were not yet there in that sense.
Mr. Garrett. Well, Mr. Hassan, the people who I have spoken
with who were there on the ground indicated that when the Arab
Spring occurred, the uprising was of individuals who had
dissatisfaction with the regime but not necessarily an intent
to overthrow. Ultimately, that leadership was co-opted or even
killed and replaced by elements affiliated with al-Qaeda,
originally known as al-Nusrah, right, and then an evolution of
names.
I guess what I am driving at is, the answer to Mr. Perry's
question was, if they controlled the proper parts of Aleppo,
al-Qaeda-affiliated elements may have had access to equipment
that could be used to forge government documents. And they were
in Aleppo, were they not?
Mr. Hassan. In all honesty, I can't tell, because I have
no--I have not--I have no evidence to that or the contrary. But
it is all possible. The regime still had presence inside
Aleppo, so the equipment would have been taken very quickly to
the west side of Aleppo where the regime was there. There was
rumors that--there were rumors that some biometrics machines
were still there.
Mr. Garrett. And we know that there were elements of what
was originally al-Nusrah, which is morphed into an al-Qaeda
affiliate, that were in control of portions of Aleppo over
periods of time.
Mr. Hassan. Yes, lately.
Mr. Garrett. Okay. I wished that Ms. Dalton didn't have to
leave. We have talked a lot, and her comment was, ``our
objectives are not aligned with those of Russia.'' What would
either of you gentlemen or both articulate as our objectives?
Ambassador Hof. I would say, Congressman, our principal
objective is to defeat terror in Syria and keep it dead. This
is--this is a national security objective, okay. Part of that
involves going after ISIL directly militarily as quickly as
possible. This organization has been sitting in its Syrian
capital of Raqqa for a few years now. It has planned and
executed some major atrocities in Europe. I mean, I have been
asking myself, you know, for quite some time now how lucky do
we think we are, okay. But killing that organization is one
thing. Ultimately, there has to be something resembling decent,
responsive, legitimate governance in Syria to keep it dead, and
this is going to be the work of several years.
Mr. Garrett. So I don't want to be disrespectful, and I
appreciate your time, but I have limited time. So our objective
is decent, responsible government in Syria that will protect
Syrians. Okay. And right now, there--you can see that the vast
bulk of, quote, anti-Assad military power on the ground is
Kurdish in nature if you extract ISIS and al-Qaeda-affiliated
elements. Combat power on the ground, we both served, that
aside from ISIS and al-Qaeda-affiliated elements, the most
powerful player that is quote, deg.``anti-Assad is
the Kurds.''
Ambassador Hof. I would say, Congressman, the Kurdish
military power on the ground in Syria, the YPG, this is
predominantly our ground combat component against ISIL. They
are not--they are not fighting--they are not fighting the
regime.
Mr. Garrett. I agree, and that is why I used quotes when I
said anti-Assad, because they are included on this form as
anti-Assad. They are really pro-protecting themselves. And we
have had wonderful success working with Kurdish minorities, but
one thing we have learned is the Kurdish minorities protect
Kurdish regions and then say why are we going this direction,
right. And so the question becomes, and I know I am almost out
of time, who is the viable entity to replace the Assad regime,
because it is not ISIS or al-Qaeda? So who is there that can do
it?
Ambassador Hof. Congressman, there is--there is--there is a
process, again, that was agreed to by the permanent five
members of the Security Council on June 30, 2012. I was there
as part of the American delegation when this agreement was
reached.
If we can somehow get back to that process in forming a
national unity entity that will include, inevitably, members of
the Syrian Government, you know, who are not--who are not
covered in blood over the past few years, if we can get that
way, that is--that is the beginning of the end for terrorism in
Syria.
Mr. Garrett. Mr. Chairman, I respect that my time is up.
Mr. Poe. All right. The gentleman's time is expired.
The Chair recognizes the gentlelady from Florida, Ms.
Frankel.
Ms. Frankel. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be quick. I
have to go to another meeting.
Thank you both for your testimony, and I just wanted to
make two points. I think it was Ms. Dalton, but maybe somebody
else, that talking about the necessity, perhaps, of making some
type of deal or cooperative arrangement or using sanctions
against Russia in order to influence Assad. And I think this
paper we were given just shows there is such a complicated web
of players, andunraveling it is a phenomenal exercise.
But I want to say that if we are going to have any hope of
working with Russia, then I want to respectfully suggest that
this Congress needs to know the relationship of Russia to the
folks currently in the White House. And the resignation today
of General Flynn, I think, calls in serious question as to what
exactly who knew what, what did they know, when did they know
it, and what is the real relationship between the White House
and Russia. That is number one.
Number two, I think it was the Ambassador that said--called
what was going on in Syria a humanitarian abomination. And was
that you, sir? Yes. I agree with you. I think everybody here
agrees with you. I think our chairman laid out initially in his
remarks the horrors of what is going on. And I can just say
this, I heard the sadness in your heart of what is going on.
What is it, \1/2\ million people probably killed, 50,000
children, the President bombing his own people.
And so I wanted to say what I think is another abomination,
and that is the position of the United States of America that
we do not want to take any of these Syrian refugees into this
country. I think that is an abomination. And I yield back.
Mr. Poe. I thank the gentlelady.
And the Chair recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr.
Rohrabacher.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Let me get to the nitty-gritty. First of all, this is a
hearing that is represented by think tanks. One of the think
tanks, she had to leave, but let me ask this: Do either of your
think tanks receive contributions from Gulf State countries?
Ambassador Hof. Sir, the case of the Hariri Center for the
Middle East, we receive no government funding at all.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Or from private sector people from the
Middle East?
Ambassador Hof. Our principal donor is of Lebanese
citizenship residing in Europe.
Mr. Rohrabacher. A Lebanese citizen?
Ambassador Hof. Yes.
Mr. Rohrabacher. And what about from your think tank?
Mr. Hassan. No government money.
Mr. Rohrabacher. No Arab money comes from----
Mr. Hassan. Not that I am aware of, no.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Okay. And where does your money come from?
Mr. Hassan. Oh, Arab, sorry, and Egypt, yes.
Mr. Rohrabacher. But Arab money, yes.
Mr. Hassan. Egyptian businessman, the principal----
Mr. Rohrabacher. And what Arab money goes into your----
Mr. Hassan. Just Egypt.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Who?
Mr. Hassan. Egypt.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Oh, Egypt. I didn't know Egypt had enough
money to send over here. We just got back from there.
Mr. Hassan. Not the government.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Not the government. All right.
Well, thank you. Let me just note that I have just got some
specific questions for you. If Assad--if we are going to
compare Assad, this brutal horrible man, to the other countries
in the Gulf, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, even UAE, or now we are
finding maybe Erdogan in Turkey. We know the Iranians are very
brutal. But if, let's say, with Qatar, let's use that as an
example, if there was an uprising against the royal family in
Qatar and it was financed by people from the outside trying to
overthrow, basically, an insurgency to overthrow the royal
family and replace it with, of course, let's say you have all
of those nine out of ten people in Qatar are guest workers,
let's say they are declaring themselves for ISIL, and they get
some support from the outside like that, basically, do you
think that the Government of Qatar or these other governments
would be less bloody than Assad when Assad was faced with an
insurgency movement in his country? Either one of you. These
are more benevolent than Assad?
Ambassador Hof. I would say--I would say, Congressman, that
I would find it very, very hard to imagine anyone else in the
region adopting a political survival strategy that focuses
almost exclusively on civilians----
Mr. Rohrabacher. On what?
Ambassador Hof. On civilians and on civilian terror.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Uh-huh.
Ambassador Hof. Okay. I think, you know, whether we look at
the Independent International Commission of Inquiry and its
work, if we--if we--if we look at the work of major American
NGOs----
Mr. Rohrabacher. I cut what you--reclaiming my time.
Ambassador Hof [continuing]. I think the record is clear.
Mr. Rohrabacher. I have got 5 minutes. How about you? Do
you think these other countries are more benevolent than Assad?
Mr. Hassan. To be honest, I don't think they would do the
same.
Mr. Rohrabacher. They wouldn't do the same.
Mr. Hassan. What happened in Syria never happened.
Mr. Rohrabacher. I am sorry, but I have got a limited
number of time. You both think that these powerful forces that
have--that are armed to the teeth would permit an insurrection
to succeed in their countries and not utilize their weapons to
destroy and obliterate anyone who is supporting the insurgency.
I think you are wrong. We will leave that to whoever is
listening to this and reading the transcript.
We have \1/2\ million people who have been dead. Many of
them are refugees, there is no doubt about that. There are, of
course, a lot of people who are dead who became refugees and
survived who are leaving and fleeing ISIL, wasn't it? I mean,
didn't we have the ISIL people at the same time murdering
Christians by lining them up, and in the grossest fashion,
cutting off their heads and engaged in--yes, bombing people
from the air is brutal and kills children, et cetera. Cutting
people's heads off is a way to frighten large numbers of people
and turn them into refugees. We know that happened.
I don't have to tell you, I do not see--I do not believe
that this regime and Assad's regime is any different than the
rest of the regimes that I have seen for the last 28 years. And
there is no reason why--you stated when we asked what our
objective is. Our objective is to eliminate these terrorists?
No, terrorism and the terrorist forces there. What we have done
is our major focus is getting rid of Assad when, in fact, it
should be eliminating the ability of the terrorist forces in
that region to commit acts that threaten our security, and we
have not done that.
Instead, by focusing instead on one dictatorial regime as
compared to all the rest of those authoritarian and brutal
regimes that exist in that area of the woods, one regime has to
go, and our focus is on getting rid of that regime. That makes
no sense to me. It is not in our interest any more than it
would be in our interest if another regime was under attack by
an insurgency from its own people.
And in this case, let us not forget this insurgency has
gone on and on and on. The amount of death that has happened
has happened because we and others have given the Assad--
insurgents against Assad the idea that we are going to give
them the means to succeed. And I will have to say that you are
repeating. We have to go back to agreement made by outsiders,
outside powers way back in 2012. I am sure that gives all of
those people who are fighting Assad a reason to keep on going
rather than ending this struggle. And if it ends with Assad
still in power, I don't think it is going to be any different
than having the royal family in Qatar or UAE or Iran or Saudi
Arabia or now even Erdogan in Turkey remain in power.
So with that said, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Poe. I thank the gentleman.
And the subcommittee is adjourned. I thank the witnesses
for being here.
[Whereupon, at 4:07 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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Material Submitted for the Record
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Material submitted for the record by the Honorable Ted Poe, a
Representative in Congress from the State of Texas, and chairman,
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade
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