[House Hearing, 116 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
THE HUMANITARIAN CRISIS IN YEMEN: ADDRESSING CURRENT
POLITICAL AND HUMANITARIAN CHALLENGES
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
THE MIDDLE EAST, NORTH AFRICA, AND INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MARCH 6, 2019
__________
Serial No. 116-9
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/, http://docs.house.gov,
or http://www.govinfo.gov
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
35-368PDF WASHINGTON : 2019
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York, Chairman
BRAD SHERMAN, California MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas, Ranking
GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York Member
ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia STEVE CHABOT, Ohio
THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida JOE WILSON, South Carolina
KAREN BASS, California SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania
WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts TED S. YOHO, Florida
DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois
AMI BERA, California LEE ZELDIN, New York
JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas JIM SENSENBRENNER, Wisconsin
DINA TITUS, Nevada ANN WAGNER, Missouri
ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York BRIAN MAST, Florida
TED LIEU, California FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida
SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania BRIAN FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
DEAN PHILLIPS, Minnesota JOHN CURTIS, Utah
ILHAN OMAR, Minnesota KEN BUCK, Colorado
COLIN ALLRED, Texas RON WRIGHT, Texas
ANDY LEVIN, Michigan GUY RESCHENTHALER, Pennsylvania
ABIGAIL SPANBERGER, Virginia TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee
CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania GREG PENCE, Indiana
TOM MALINOWSKI, New Jersey STEVE WATKINS, Kansas
DAVID TRONE, Maryland MIKE GUEST, Mississippi
JIM COSTA, California
JUAN VARGAS, California
VICENTE GONZALEZ, Texas
Jason Steinbaum, Staff Director
Brendon Shields, Republican Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on the Middle East, North Africa, and International
Terrorism
THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida, Chairman
GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia JOE WILSON, South Carolina,
DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island Ranking Member
TED LIEU, California STEVE CHABOT, Ohio
COLIN ALLRED, Texas ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois
TOM MALINOWSKI, New Jersey LEE ZELDIN, New York
DAVID TRONE, Maryland BRIAN MAST, Florida
BRAD SHERMAN, California BRIAN FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts GUY RESCHENTHALER, Pennsylvania
JUAN VARGAS, California STEVE WATKINS, Kansas
Casey Kustin, Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
Rand, Dr. Dafna, Vice President for Policy and Research, Mercy
Corps.......................................................... 7
Almutawakel. Ms. Radhya, Co-Founder and Chairperson, Mwatana for
Human Rights................................................... 14
Konyndyk, Mr. Jeremy, Senior Policy Fellow, Center for Global
Development.................................................... 20
Zimmerman, Ms. Katherine, Research Fellow, American Enterprise
Institute...................................................... 34
APPENDIX
Hearing Notice................................................... 61
Hearing Minutes.................................................. 62
Hearing Attendance............................................... 63
STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD
Statement for the record submitted from Representative Gerald
Connolly....................................................... 64
RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
Responses to questions submitted from Representative Steve
Watkins........................................................ 65
THE HUMANITARIAN CRISIS IN YEMEN:
ADDRESSING CURRENT POLITICAL AND HUMANITARIAN CHALLENGES
Wednesday, March 6, 2019
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on the Middle East,
North Africa, and International Terrorism,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:40 p.m., in
Room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Theodore E.
Deutch (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Deutch. This hearing, titled ``The Humanitarian Crisis
in Yemen,'' will examine current political and humanitarian
challenges in Yemen and how the U.S. Congress can address them.
Without objection, all members may have 5 days to submit
statements, questions, extraneous materials for the record,
subject to the length limitation of the rules. I will now make
an opening statement and then turn it over to the ranking
member for his opening statement.
I want to thank our esteemed panel for being here today. I
would like to particularly thank Ms. Radhya Almutawakel for
joining us today. She and her organization, Mwatana for Human
Rights, bravely advocate for justice, accountability, and human
rights in Yemen. We are so honored by your presence today.
Thank you very much. Having your voice on this panel to help us
better understand both the situation on the ground and the
plight of the people of Yemen will help us make better and more
informed, well-informed decisions. We really are grateful.
In September 2014, Houthi rebels attacked the Yemeni
capital of Sana'a and forced the internationally recognized
government of President Hadi to flee. In March 2015, in
response, the military coalition led by Saudi Arabia and the
United Arab Emirates launched devastating airstrikes in Yemen
and partnered with local forces to reclaim territory from the
Houthis. The Saudis and Emiratis remain preoccupied with their
military campaign in Yemen, which they view as directly related
to their national security, and I share their concern that Iran
is providing training as well as military and logistical
support to the Houthis. This assistance has allowed the Houthis
to attack international shipping, including an American naval
vessel, in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. It also prepared
the Houthis to launch attacks on territory in both Saudi Arabia
and the UAE, where approximately 130,000 Americans live.
U.S. relationships with these States are enduring and date
to the end of the Second World War. I believe these
partnerships are vital to stability in the Middle East. The
United States is correct to support these countries' legitimate
right to self-defense. However, we cannot avoid the fact that
the war has directly caused tens of thousands of civilian
deaths in Yemen. The United Nations has verified more than
18,000 civilian casualties since March 2015, although the
actual number is likely much higher. The total does not include
the tens of thousands of additional Yemenis who have died from
nonmilitary causes, such as disease and hunger, that are
worsened by the conflict.
Last year's National Defense Authorization Act, the NDAA,
required the Trump administration to certify to Congress that
Saudi Arabia and the UAE are taking demonstrable actions to
reduce harm to civilians and damage to civilian infrastructure
in Yemen. However, the administration brazenly ignored the
February 9th certification deadline. The administration
continues to refuse to certify, ignoring a law supported by
both Republicans and Democrats.
Even worse, the military conflict has exacerbated a
devastating humanitarian crisis in Yemen that began in 2011.
According to the United Nations, the crisis in Yemen is the
worst humanitarian situation in the world. Approximately 3.3
million people remain displaced, and an estimated 24 million
people, nearly 80 percent of the population, require assistance
and protection. More than 20 million people in Yemen are food
insecure with 5 million--5 million--people on the brink of
famine. More than 17.8 million lack access to safe water and
sanitation, and 19.7 million lack access to adequate
healthcare. Because of the conflict, poor sanitation and
waterborne diseases, like cholera, are widespread. The World
Health Organization estimates that more than 1.1 million people
in Yemen have cholera and that thousands have already died from
the disease.
A lack of humanitarian access in Yemen aggravates these
extreme conditions, putting millions at risk of starvation,
disease, and death. In response, the United Nations has
contributed nearly $700 million in humanitarian aid since
Fiscal Year 2018. In late November, another $131 million in
food assistance was announced. The Saudis and Emiratis have
provided billions of dollars in assistance, but billions of
dollars are meaningless if the goods cannot reach those in
need, if there is no cold storage for food, if there is no cash
available to buy food in places where there might actually be
food. Money is not going to solve the crisis. Only a political
solution will end the war in Yemen and begin to relieve the
suffering of its people.
Like most Americans, I am deeply troubled by this crisis.
That is why I cosponsored and voted for H.J. Res. 37, a
resolution that requires the removal of U.S. Forces from the
Saudi-led military campaign in Yemen. I supported the
resolution because I believe there is no military solution to
this situation. We cannot allow American resources to
contribute to or, worse, be complicit in the suffering created
by this conflict.
Furthermore, with this resolution, Congress is finally
engaging in a thoughtful and nuanced debate on our role in
foreign policy decisions and the constitutional limits of
Presidential authority to participate in military action abroad
without congressional consent. Congress has an important
oversight responsibility when it comes to the use of military
force, and we are appropriately reasserting ourselves in these
decisions. This afternoon, I hope our witnesses can provide
insight into the political situation and humanitarian
challenges in Yemen. I also look forward to hearing how the
U.S. Government, specifically Congress, can take steps to
increase humanitarian access and stem the spread of disease,
displacement, and famine. And, finally, I hope the witnesses
will outline how the United States can support diplomatic
efforts to reach a lasting political solution, which is the
best way to secure U.S. national interests, end the suffering
of Yemen's people, and provide the country with a brighter
future. I now turn for the first time in the subcommittee
proudly to the ranking member for his opening statement.
Mr. Wilson. Chairman, thank you.
Mr. Chairman and Chairman Deutch, first of all, I want to
congratulate you on assuming the chairmanship of this important
subcommittee. Your leadership on U.S. policy issues in the
Middle East is well known, and I look forward to working
closely with you and your staff in moving forward.
Second, I would like to thank you for calling this
important hearing. Now, ongoing conflict in Yemen has produced
the most devastating humanitarian catastrophe in the world. To
reaffirm the chairman's statistics, our concerns are
bipartisan. Close to 80 percent of Yemen's population of nearly
30 million people are currently in need of some form of
assistance. That is a staggering 22 million people. Sixteen
million Yemenis lack access to drinking water and sanitation.
Another 16 million are classified as severely food insecure.
Unfortunately, children have borne the brunt of this
humanitarian nightmare. The regional director of the United
Nations International Children's Emergency Fund, UNICEF,
remarked just last week that, quote, ``today Yemen is the worst
place on Earth for a child'', end of quote. Nearly 85,000
children have died from severe acute malnutrition between 2015
and the end of last year. About 360,000 children are suffering
from acute malnutrition with life-threatening consequences.
Cholera has resurfaced in Yemen with roughly 10,000 suspected
cases now reported per week, according to the World Health
Organization. Tragically, children account for 30 percent of
the infections.
Amid the conflict and humanitarian crisis, Yemen's economy
continues to unravel. The exchange rate is around 600 Yemeni
rials to the U.S. dollar. As the economy's situation gets
increasingly worse, the price of food for Yemenis rises,
exacerbating the situation on the ground. We are optimistic
that the U.N.-brokered Stockholm agreement signed in December
2018 could alleviate some of the humanitarian concerns, but
little progress has been achieved since the parties met in
Sweden, and violations of the agreement and resulting cease-
fire continue unabated. I am saddened by reports that the
Iranian-backed Houthi rebels have been targeting and detaining
humanitarian workers in the country. International aid is a
lifeline to millions of Yemenis, and humanitarian workers
should have unhindered and unimpeded access to civilians in war
zones. Everyone should condemn harassment and intimidation of
these good people risking their lives to help others. But
fundamentally, I agree with the U.N. Secretary General
Guterres' comments last week when he said that we cannot have a
humanitarian solution to a humanitarian problem. Only a
comprehensive political solution to the conflict can begin to
address Yemen's immense problems. Throwing money at the many
problems Yemen faces will not fix the country.
I appreciate Chairman Deutch calling this hearing and
shedding some light on the tragic humanitarian conditions on
the ground currently in Yemen. Too often we focus exclusively
on our Nation's more direct security concerns, whether it be
al-Qaeda's local branch or the increasing influence of Iran.
The truth, however, is that the humanitarian crisis in Yemen is
laying the groundwork for future decades of instability in the
country that will be inevitably a breeding ground for
terrorists to attack the United States. This is a long-term
threat to our national security interest and must be addressed.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I look forward to hearing from our
esteemed witnesses. I yield back my time.
Mr. Deutch. I thank the ranking member, Mr. Wilson. And I
would ask if any other members, Mr. Malinowski, would like to
make a 1 minute opening statement. No. Seeing none, I would
like to introduce the witnesses.
Dr. Dafna Rand is vice president for policy and research at
Mercy Corps. Prior to joining Mercy Corps, Dr. Rand held a
number of leadership positions in government and academia, most
recently as the Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor at U.S. Department of State.
Mr. Malinowski, do you have anything to add to that
introduction?
Mr. Malinowski. And served ably as my Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State for Middle East Affairs when I had the honor
to work with her at the State Department.
And this will not protect you from tough questions today.
Mr. Deutch. Thanks.
Also joining us is Radhya Almutawakel. She is chair of
Mwatana for Human Rights, a Yemeni human rights organization.
Again, we are so grateful for your presence here on the panel
with us today.
Jeremy Konyndyk is a senior policy fellow at the Center for
Global Development. He previously served in the Obama
Administration from 2013 to 2017 as the Director of USAID's
Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance where he led the
U.S. Government's response to international disasters.
And Katherine Zimmerman is a research fellow at the
American Enterprise Institute.
To all of our distinguished witnesses, I ask that you limit
your testimony to 5 minutes.
And, without objection, your prepared written statements
will be made a part of the record.
I thank you again so much for being here with us today.
And, Dr. Rand, I will turn it over to you.
STATEMENT OF DAFNA RAND, PH.D., VICE PRESIDENT FOR POLICY AND
RESEARCH, MERCY CORPS
Dr. Rand. Thank you. Thank you, Chairman Deutch, Ranking
Member Wilson, members of this committee. I am really honored
to testify, especially with this expert group of witnesses. In
addition to my written statement, I would like to make four
additional points quickly.
First, I would like to analyze a bit the humanitarian
tragedy that you have both described so ably. It is clear that
institutional and governance solutions are the longer term
complement to the current humanitarian relief operations. There
is food in the marketplace but no money in the household to buy
it. Forty percent of the hospitals are closed or shuttered in
Yemen or have been targeted by airstrikes while 1.2 million
people have contracted cholera. Both the public and private
sectors have been politicized and, in some cases, weaponized
with no social safety net, massive inflation, and no regulation
on the remaining formal private sector.
The second nuance to the humanitarian situation: We have
heard about the predominant strikes on weddings, funerals, and
school buses, but there also have been strike upon strike on
potato chip factories, agricultural infrastructure, water
treatment centers, and electric grids. No party to the conflict
is innocent. And the bottom line is this: In Yemen, the
military conduct of State and non-State actors has downgraded
international norms of warfare, expectations for how security
actors treat civilians, expectations that have held for
decades, and I worry that the damage to these international
norms will extend far beyond the Arabian Peninsula.
The second point is that we are at an inflection moment.
There have been recent agreements regarding de-escalation led
by the U.N. special envoy. They have focused rightly on
Hudaydah Port and City, through which so much of the
humanitarian operations transit. And the United States
congressional action of last year, your oversight, your
legislative activity, your floor statements, these were
instrumental in 2018 in creating this diplomatic opportunity.
Congressional pressure on this administration dragged the
parties to Stockholm, I believe. And although they are limited
agreements, negotiated by the United Nations, they have the
potential to shift the dynamic. For the first time, Congress
has questioned the assumption and the assumed logic that only
escalation will achieve the end goals of the coalition, the
Government of Yemen, or the Houthis.
The third point is that, buoyed by recent evidence that
your voice matters, Congress should continue signaling
privately and publicly that there will be consequences for
failing to follow through on the Stockholm agreements. In
Yemen, like in so many other places, when Congress speaks
united with one voice, you are echoing the conscience as well
as the common sense of the global community. So Congress must
continue to publicly and privately support the U.N. Special
Envoy process, pushing through to follow through on the current
commitments and demand additional de-escalation; call on the
parties directly to empower and improve the functioning of the
Central Bank of Yemen in order to control the currency crisis;
tell the Government of Yemen and the Houthis to pay the public
sector employees, the doctors and the teachers, before the
militias; tell the Government of Yemen and the UAE to finally
cut through that backlog at the Aden Port so that humanitarian
shipments can offload there; tell the Saudis to allow flights
out of the Sana'a airport at least for medical treatment and
other basic needs; and, finally and perhaps most fundamentally,
call out publicly when U.S. partners and all parties commit
human rights abuses in their military operations, whether these
abuses are through interrogation or torture, through unlawful
airstrikes, or through any other means.
And, finally, the United States must definitively and
completely end its support for the coalition. This is a 4-year
policy that has failed. It has incurred significant cost to the
United States, generating greater instability and potential new
rounds of terrorism in the Arabian Peninsula, offering Iran a
broad and chaotic civil conflict to exploit and manipulate.
U.S. support for this coalition has had significant moral costs
for the United States and for U.S. global leadership worldwide.
Congress must ensure that the Trump administration extricates
itself from this war. This means legislating a formal end to
DOD operations, including the refueling. This means signaling
through oversight that the new focus of U.S. power will be on
diplomatic opportunities that have arisen, and this means
blocking all future offensive arms sales that could be used in
the war in Yemen.
Finally and in conclusion, I urge this committee and
Members of Congress to learn from this failed policy approach
of 4 years. There is a dangerous trap lurking when the United
States offers a blank check in the form of a security
assistance to partners who whose values and interests can
diverge from ours. Thank you very much, and I look forward to
your questions.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Rand follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Deutch. Thank you very much, Dr. Rand.
Ms. Almutawakel, thank you again for being with us.
STATEMENT OF RADHYA ALMUTAWAKEL, CO-FOUNDER AND CHAIRPERSON,
MWATANA FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Ms. Almutawakel. Thank you. Chairman Deutch, Ranking Member
Wilson, subcommittee members, thank you for the opportunity to
speak to you today. I will summarize my written statement,
which I submit for the record.
Mwatana for Human Rights documents violations by all sides
in Yemen. It is a dangerous job, but our 70 staff, men and
women, know that for humanity to be preserved, the brave must
stand up in the face of abuses.
Today I urge Congress to do the same. Congress has the
power to change the face of millions of Yemeni civilians but
must choose to do so. Twenty-four million Yemenis need
humanitarian aid, more people than live in Florida. Ten million
are on the brink of famine, twice South Carolina's population.
It is a manmade crisis. Yemenis are not starving. They are
being starved. The humanitarian crisis cannot be addressed
without addressing the human rights situation.
The war in Yemen is not some distant tragedy with no
connection to America. Since 2015, the U.S. has supported Saudi
and Emirati attacks on Yemeni civilians by selling billions in
bombs and other weapons and providing military and political
support. After 4 years of war, Yemenis are losing hope for a
country based on rule of law. Most now live under de facto
control of extremist groups. On the one hand, the Houthis, who
are supported by Iran and commit terrible abuses, such as
indiscriminate attacks, disappearances, and land mines; on the
other hand, armed groups loyal to the Hadi government and
Saudi-Emirati coalition who also commit horrible violations.
All these armed groups act with impunity because they think no
one will stand up in the face of their abuses, but neither does
Saudi-Emirati coalition.
When CNN recently showed U.S. weapons sold to Saudi Arabia
and United Arab Emirates in the hands of extremist armed
groups, Congress was right to be angry at this business, but
you should not have been surprised because, since 2015, the
Saudi-Emirati coalition have used U.S. weapons recklessly to
kill and maim Yemeni civilians. Mwatana has documented hundreds
of attacks, killing and maiming thousands of civilians, and
destroying key infrastructure. We found U.S. bomb remnants at
dozens of these airstrikes. Many are likely war crimes. Every
single one destroyed innocent lives.
The 2016 Saudi bombing of a Sana'a funeral using U.S.
Munitions, killing and maiming hundreds, should have been a
turning point. Congress should have stopped arms sales until
unlawful attacks ended and war criminals were held accountable.
And instead, the U.S. accepted Saudi and Emirati promises to
end violations and investigate. Two years later, there has been
no accountability, and airstrikes on Yemeni civilians continue.
Yemen cannot survive another 4 years. In the short time I
have been talking to you, another child has died because of
war-inflicted wounds, starvation, or disease. Congress has the
power to change this, to stop this.
Attention to Yemen increased after the outrageous Khashoggi
murder. The Stockholm talks showed that the international
community can push to end the war, but this tentative progress
needs sustained global pressure including from Congress. Your
recent votes on Yemen drew the parties to take small steps
toward peace. By ending U.S. arms sales and military support to
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, Congress can stop
American allies from using American weapons to kill Yemeni
civilians with impunity. This would be a significant step
toward accountability and an end to the war.
This month, America pledged millions in humanitarian aid
for Yemen, but if U.S. arms sales to Saudi Arabia and United
Arab Emirates continue, American bombs might reach Yemeni
civilians before American aid will. Peace in Yemen is very
possible, but to achieve it, Congress must act. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Almutawakel follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Deutch. Thank you very much.
Mr. Konyndyk.
STATEMENT OF JEREMY KONYNDYK, SENIOR POLICY FELLOW, CENTER FOR
GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT
Mr. Konyndyk. Thank you, Chairman Deutch, Ranking Member
Wilson, and distinguished members of the panel. Thank you for
the opportunity to testify before you today. When this crisis
began in 2015, I served as the Director for Foreign Disaster
Assistance at USAID, and in that capacity, I oversaw U.S.
Government humanitarian aid to Yemen for several years, and I
also participated actively in U.S. policymaking on the crisis.
Since leaving government, I have tracked the crisis closely in
my new position at the Center for Global Development.
Yemen is the world's worst humanitarian catastrophe, and it
is worsening rapidly. Humanitarian relief operations there are
robust, and they are growing, but aid alone cannot offset State
collapse. As you mentioned in your own opening remarks, 20
million people are hungry; 7.4 million are malnourished. At
least 238,000 live in areas affected by famine-level
conditions. Health and water systems have imploded. Twenty
million people lack access to adequate healthcare. Cholera is
present. Diphtheria is present. Millions have been forced to
flee their homes.
All parties to this conflict are culpable, but that
culpability is not evenly distributed. Any fair assessment must
assign predominant responsibility to the Saudi and Emirati-led
coalition. To be clear, the Houthis are a part of the problem
and bear special responsibility for having instigated the
conflict. They have blocked and sought to manipulate relief
operations. They have harassed humanitarian personnel and
committed a litany of other human rights violations. The
Houthis are not angels or good guys by any stretch of the
imagination. But while both sides have impeded humanitarian
response to the emergency, it is Saudi and Emirati behavior
that has been the engine of the emergency. This is because the
crisis flows from the collapse of Yemen's economy and its
infrastructure, and that has been a direct and seemingly
intentional consequence of the coalition's political and
military strategy. Their airstrikes have repeatedly and
intentionally targeted Yemen's critical infrastructure,
directly fostering both Yemen's massive cholera outbreak and
its creeping famine. Examples of this include strikes on major
ports and roads vital to humanitarian relief and movements,
including roads and other facilities that the U.S. Government
has specifically asked them not to strike, more than 100
attacks on water and electrical facilities, more than 70
attacks on medical facilities, and concerted targeting of food
production and commerce, including nearly 600 attacks on farms
and 200 attacks on marketplaces. They have also struck
weddings, funerals, a packed school bus, and countless other
targets with no plausible military purpose. This is not the
behavior of a campaign that is seeking to minimize civilian
harm. The Saudis and Emiratis have simultaneously pursued a
policy of economic punishment. Their naval blockade and flight
restrictions have disrupted supplies of food, fuel, and other
essential goods. The shift of the Yemeni Central Bank out of
Houthi-controlled territory has been a fiasco, depriving huge
numbers of Yemenis of their wages and dramatically weakening
the currency.
For 4 years, the U.S. has treated this kind of reckless
behavior as a problem of weak systems rather than maligned
intent. U.S. officials argue to this day that U.S. military
cooperation is a moderating factor. It is time to end this
delusion. Saudi Arabia and the UAE have continued to drop U.S.-
supplied bombs out of U.S.-refueled planes flown by U.S.-
trained pilots onto innocent civilians. If this is due to
coalition military incompetence, then years of U.S. Engagement
and support have delivered no improvement whereas if this
targeting is intentional, then these same U.S. efforts are
arguably enabling war crimes. Either way, the Saudis and
Emiratis have shown willful disregard for the laws of war and
have manifestly failed to demonstrably reduce civilian harm as
Congress demanded rightly last year. U.S. involvement in this
confers on us a degree of culpability, but it also gives us
unique leverage to change coalition behavior.
And one clear takeaway from the last 4 years is that when
it comes to moderating Saudi and Emirati behavior, pressure
delivers while quiet engagement does not. To that end, I make
three recommendations: First, the U.S. should halt all military
assistance, including ongoing arm sales and maintenance that
supports offensive military operations in Yemen. This is
important leverage, and we should use it.
Second, the U.S. should put this leverage toward a
concerted diplomatic surge. Recent U.S. actions shielding the
coalition from Security Council criticism or giving them a pass
on Congress' civilian targeting concerns have undermined U.S.
goals of halting the fighting and bringing the parties to the
table. The U.S. should instead make clear that sustaining the
conflict will deal long-term damage to U.S.-Saudi and U.S.-
Emirati bilateral relationships. Two immediate confidence-
building measures would be to negotiate humanitarian access to
besieged Taiz and to restore neutrality and functionality to
the Central Bank and restart salary payments.
Finally, the U.S. should pull out all the stops to protect
the Hudaydah cease-fire. A major battle for Hudaydah would
devastate the food import lifelines on which most of Yemen
depends. The U.S. should make clear to the Saudis and Emirates
that this is a red line.
There is much that Congress can do to shape policy in these
areas, and I look forward to your questions. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Konyndyk follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Mr. Konyndyk.
Ms. Zimmerman.
STATEMENT OF KATHERINE ZIMMERMAN, RESEARCH FELLOW, AMERICAN
ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE
Ms. Zimmerman. Chairman Deutch, Ranking Member Wilson,
members of the subcommittee, thank you for your attention to
this issue and the opportunity to participate in this hearing.
America has vital national security interests in Yemen,
defeating al-Qaeda and the Islamic state, reducing Iran's
ability to threaten allies in the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, and
addressing the deepening humanitarian catastrophe. The U.S.
must develop a policy that pursues all of these interests.
Above all, America must lead in securing itself and shaping
allies and actions to support American interests in accord with
international laws and norms. The U.S. must help our partners
develop strategies to resolve the underlying conflicts that
permit both al-Qaeda and Iran to operate in Yemen rather than
partial and limited approaches that exacerbate those conflicts.
The U.S. must also engage diplomatically not only with the
recognized Yemeni Government and the United Nations-led peace
process but also with sub-State actors whose views will
ultimately determine the durability of any settlement.
The U.S. bears some responsibility for the conditions in
Yemen. The Obama Administration subcontracted Yemen to Gulf
partners while pursuing the Iranian nuclear deal. The Trump
administration has continued this approach for fear of becoming
entangled in Yemen's complexities. American efforts to stay out
of the Yemeni mire have helped make the situation worse and
reduced the likelihood that our vital national security
interests will be secured.
Yemen's complexities make finding a solution seem
impossible. Trying to simplify it by focusing on one of
America's interests to avoid dealing with local conflicts will
lead to failure across the board. A U.S. strategy to secure its
interests requires dealing with the problem in all of its
complexity and abandoning the search for simplistic, short-
term, feel-good solutions. If relying on Gulf partners has been
counterproductive, abandoning them would be disastrous. They
are unlikely to find their way out of this war on their own and
will continue it without us.
Although limited, American influence has shaped both Saudi
and Emirati actions for the better. The U.S. could do even more
to shape their behavior if engaged more seriously in the
effort. War in Yemen has acquired a momentum that will not
easily be stopped. The U.S. must recognize the importance and
interest of sub-State actors who benefit from continued
conflict and engage them directly and through partners to shape
conditions for enduring peace. U.S. policy must recognize that
the U.N.-led effort to resolve the current political crisis may
not succeed and will not address the conditions that drove
Yemenis to war in the first place. Any elite settlement does
not resolve the sub-State actor conflicts which allow al-Qaeda
and Iran to persist, and there is also a gap between what the
Houthis and the Saudis will accept in terms of the Houthi
representation in the final government.
Persuading the Houthis that they will ultimately lose
requires a more skillful and nuanced strategy than the
coalition has been pursuing along with much more serious and
energetic diplomatic engagements with the United States and
extra regional partners.
The Salafi jihadi movement in Yemen has transformed in the
context of the war. It has decentralized in such a way that
defeating al-Qaeda and the Islamic state will not eliminate the
threat. Additional Salafi jihadi groups have established
themselves and exist independent of al-Qaeda support. The
current U.S. counterterrorism strategy does not address this
transformation. The UAE has been a critical enabler for
counterterrorism successes in Yemen, but its efforts are
unlikely to yield permanent success. The risk that
counterterrorism gains will be reversed is high unless the U.S.
helps shape Emirati operations and nests the counterterrorism
effort into a larger effort to resolve the underlying drivers.
The U.S. should leverage its continued support to this end.
The threat from the al Houthi movement is unacceptable, and
it has grown largely through Iranian support. Iran and Lebanese
Hezbollah have transferred asymmetrical attack capabilities
that threaten maritime security and U.S. Gulf partners. No
clear incentives exist for Iran to stop supporting the Houthis
and for the al Houthis to stop receiving Iranian support, but
the Houthis are not Iranian proxies. They are not in the same
category as Lebanese Hezbollah, and Yemen is a defensive front
for the U.S. in the struggle against Iranian regional maligned
behavior. Pressure on the Houthis does not harm Iran enough.
The humanitarian situation in Yemen has sharply declined
over the course of the war, but any emergency humanitarian
situation solution without a political settlement will not be
enduring. Long-term international engagement to improve Yemen's
weak State institutions and economy will be required for any
lasting effect, and low-level conflict will be disruptive. The
Trump administration and Congress must prioritize securing a
political resolution in Yemen.
A first step is for the U.S. to rebuild trust with Yemeni
power brokers not close to Riyadh. We might consider moving our
embassy to into a country other than Saudi Arabia. We must also
persuade our partners away from practices that exacerbate the
humanitarian crisis, but neither should we defend their
practices. We should chastise them publicly when they do wrong
and make it clear that our support is conditional. The time to
end it has not yet come because we have not yet put enough
energy into shaping their actions and giving them a strategy
and a way out. America must regain a position of leadership in
shaping the coalition's strategies and our own interests inside
of Yemen. Real success might not be possible, but it is vital.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Zimmerman follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Deutch. Thank you very much, Ms. Zimmerman.
I will begin the questioning.
There is consensus on the panel that political settlement
is what we must be striving for. In December, Martin Griffiths
brokered a cease-fire and the Stockholm agreement between the
warring parties. What role should the United States play in
diplomacy? How can Congress support those diplomatic efforts
springing out of there?
Dr. Rand, I will start with you.
Dr. Rand. Thanks. The U.S. diplomatic efforts have been
behind the scenes, and they have been a bit timid. It is
important at this stage that the U.S. State Department step up
and both publicly and privately show U.S. leadership and
resolve, elevating this issue. It has been great the U.S.
Special Envoy has taken the lead and has been quite successful,
but there has been too little effort from Washington to show
how important this is to the U.S. Government. So I would urge
greater public and private diplomacy from the U.S. side.
Mr. Deutch. Ms. Almutawakel, how do the Yemeni people view
American involvement in the war?
Ms. Almutawakel. When we say ``parties to the conflict,''
Yemenis consider America as one of the parties to the conflict
in a very negative way.
Mr. Deutch. Were they aware of the House's recent passage
of the War Powers Resolution?
Ms. Almutawakel. Whatever happens, although they--Yemenis,
they have a lot of anger toward America for many reasons. But
whenever there is something happening in America, they follow
it with a lot of interest because they know what is happening
here has a lot of influence in Yemen.
And for your first question, let me tell you that the peace
talk in Sweden, why have it happened? It happened only because
of the pressure that happened because of the Khashoggi murder.
So the international community pressure, especially from the
U.S., in 2 months succeeded to send parties to the conflict to
the table. So, if the pressure continues, it should be a
balanced pressure on all parties to the conflict. If this
pressure continues, then the peace talks will just continue,
and Martin should be supported to be successful in this.
Mr. Deutch. Can I just ask? The work that you do at Mwatana
for Human Rights, we have heard a lot of--there a lot of
harrowing statistics that have been thrown around. The numbers
are so staggering, but given the data that you collect, can you
personalize it for us? Make this, the humanitarian crisis, the
abuses that you have seen, can you give it some context from
the work that you do through your organization?
Ms. Almutawakel. So, in our work, we work on the details,
not in the numbers. So we go deep--we just try to move the
numbers to details of the suffering of people with just
documentation that can be even a legal paper for the future. We
build a human rights memory. So it is a lot, yes. We are
documenting a lot of incidents daily. But I will just mention
one of the incidents that was in our late report regarding
using U.S. and U.K. Weapons in some of the airstrikes. There
was an airstrike in 2018, in April 2018. It was a wedding in
Hajjah, in a very poor area. Most of the people who died in
this wedding were the drummers and dancers, and people, they
said it was just a very happy day that ended like a judgment
day. And those people are marginalized.
This picture is not even unique. It is happening. So the
bus incident is famous, but it is not the only one. The funeral
incident in Sana'a is famous, but it is not the only one. It is
not new in Yemen. It is not even strange to sleep as a whole
family and then to get up in the morning, one person, and all
your family is dead. This is only because of the airstrikes,
but airstrike is not the only attacks in Yemen, the only
violation in Yemen. It is just only one.
What has really broke the back of Yemenis is the
starvation. It is not having their salaries. And many Yemenis
will not go to ask for humanitarian aid because the middle
class, they are now very poor. And they are dying behind the
closed doors. That is why humanitarian aid is just an emergency
that helps a lot but will never solve the situation in Yemen.
We miss the feeling safe. We are safe in Yemen by accident, not
because we are protected by anything. We miss the feel of being
safe and sleeping while we are sure that, in the morning, all
the people we love is going to be safe. Whatever I say, there
is just more.
Mr. Deutch. I appreciate that very much. Thank you. Thank
you so much.
Mr. Wilson.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank all of you
for being here today.
Ms. Zimmerman, given that Iran has not been a party to any
of the negotiations or diplomatic initiatives surrounding the
conflict, do you assess that Iran has had any incentive to
encourage the Houthi rebels to meaningfully come to the
negotiating table? If not, how do we incentivize Iran as the
major outside supporter of the Houthis to support a peaceful
solution to the conflict, including stopping the missile
attacks from Yemen on Saudi Arabia?
Ms. Zimmerman. The issue of whether Iran supports the
Houthis going to the negotiating table or not is a little bit
moot because Iran does not pull the strings in Yemen. It does
not make the decisions for the Houthi family. There are
instances where Foreign Minister Javad Zarif has met with
Houthis during negotiations, so there are clearly conversations
happening back door and Iranian advice going forward with the
Houthi delegation and negotiating team, but it is not going to
be Iranian pressure on the Houthis that changes their actions.
They have actually ignored it before, and so I think that is
not the vector for changing the Houthi behavior. This is where
the nuance in what I put forward is actually putting forward a
strategy that would convince the Houthis that ultimately they
will lose the majority position they hold in Sana'a. That will
bring them to the table, and they are there. They just disagree
with the Saudis over how much of a share in the government they
should hold.
Mr. Wilson. Well, thank you very much.
Ms. Almutawakel, thank you for your courage to be here, and
a question for you, but Mr. Konyndyk can add, too, because I am
a big fan of USAID, and so it relates to aid. And that is
multiple reports earlier this year indicated the Houthi rebels
were engaging in wholesale food aid diversion to key areas they
control. How big a problem is this, the Houthi aid diversion?
Have the Houthis used the aid diversion to finance their
operations in the past? What is the international aid community
doing to mitigate this type of phenomenon?
Ms. Almutawakel. So it is me, yes?
Mr. Wilson. Yes.
Ms. Almutawakel. Yes. OK. It is big. It is very big. We
documented many cases where Houthis just obstructed
humanitarian access for food and medicine, and also they are
bothering humanitarian NGO's on the ground, and humanitarian
NGO's cannot talk because Houthis might just do anything. They
just might close the humanitarian NGO's and they do not care.
So it is very big. But how to solve it? It is only how to stop
the war because Houthis is just one issue regarding the
humanitarian access, and the Saudi-led coalition is another
issue. The other avenues are the third issue. So it is a huge
problem for all parties to the conflict. But, again,
humanitarian aid is not the solution in Yemen. It is just a
lifeline emergency. So, whether we solve it or not, it is not
going to solve the problem.
Mr. Konyndyk. Thanks for that question, Congressman, and
thank you for your support for USAID. I know when I worked
there, we really felt the support from the Hill, and we really
appreciated it. I know that they still do.
It is a problem. The Houthi diversion is a problem. I think
obstruction by both sides is a problem, and that is important
to understand, you know. Neither side has their hand clean when
it comes to obstructing humanitarian aid. They have different
tactics of it. Obviously, you know, it is the more on kind of
the entry side with the coalition and then the ground side with
the Houthis, but both sides have been playing games with and
obstructing humanitarian aid really from the get-go. My
understanding of what has happened since that report on the
concerns about food aid diversion by the World Food Program is
that, as you all have seen in the news reports, the World Food
Program put out an ultimatum to the Houthis that this behavior
needed to change. The Houthis have begun engaging with WFP in
dialog and have begun changing some of their practices that had
caused so much concern. I would not say it is completely
resolved or perfect, but there is at least, as I understand it,
a constructive dialog going on to address the underlying
problem.
Mr. Wilson. Well, you make a difference, and we want to
continue that.
And Dr. Rand, what is the current status of the Stockholm
agreement and cease-fire?
Dr. Rand. Unfortunately, Congressman, as of this morning or
yesterday, Martin Griffiths, the esteemed and excellent U.N.
Special Envoy, has said it is on life support. He is really
trying, and he is disappointed, as we all are, there has not
been greater commitment by the parties. There has been some
redeployment. There has been a diminution in the airstrikes in
the Hudaydah city and port, and that was one of the goals was
to decrease the fighting in and around the port, so that has
been sort of the best part of the progress, but there has not
been so far the full redeployment of the forces out of
Hudaydah. So there needs to be pressure right now in the next
week or two to ensure that the parties commit to the agreements
made in Stockholm.
Mr. Wilson. Well, thank you for your extraordinarily
current information. Thank you very much.
Mr. Deutch. The gentleman yields back.
Mr. Malinowski will be recognized.
Mr. Malinowski. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Rand, excuse me. You and I were both involved in the
effort to advise the Saudis early in the conflict on how to
avoid hitting civilians, on how to conduct their operations in
a way that was more consistent with the laws of war and more
effective. Could you describe that effort and the lessons that
you think we should learn from it?
Dr. Rand. Sure. Thanks. To Katie Zimmerman's point, to your
great point, that, at the beginning of the war, we at the State
Department thought that the best approach was to work with our
partners, work with our allies behind closed doors, to build on
the strong partnership that the U.S. had with Saudi Arabia. So,
in 2015, when it was clear that there was these mass casualty
civilian targets and we assumed that they were mistakes in the
fog of war that U.S. State Department sent a trainer to Riyadh,
you know, someone who had worked with CENCOM on trying to limit
civilian casualties for U.S. coalition operations in
Afghanistan, thinking that we could train and support the
coalition using the same models that had successfully reduced
U.S. civilian casualties in Afghanistan. We approached this
very technically behind closed doors, very quietly sent our
trainer in, and he was well received by the Saudi Ministry of
Defense. We kept on trying this, and we were hopeful in the
beginning, and we kept on sending him. And then there was a
cease-fire in 2016, so we remained hopeful that maybe our
efforts to train the Saudis to limit civilian casualties were
working.
But then, in August 2016 when the cease-fire broke down,
there was a series of mass casualty civilian targets that were
hit in a span of 2 weeks in that deadly August 2016, and it
gave us pause to recalibrate the strategy and wonder what had
happened to our training. Where had been the lessons learned
that had been taken so receptively by the Saudi Ministry of
Defense, and so we continued. We continued. We very quietly re-
sent him. We really, really tried. And we came to the
conclusion by late 2016 that, although there were very many
well-meaning and good and professional generals in the Saudi
Ministry of Defense, there was a lack of political will at the
top, senior levels, to reduce the number of civilian
casualties. There were many technicians and tacticians who
wanted to learn the software and the approaches that the U.S.
military had tried in Afghanistan, but at the end of the day,
the shots were called from up high, from up above, and there
was no political will to change the status quo.
Mr. Malinowski. So was it a problem of imprecise targeting
or that they were precisely targeting the wrong things?
Dr. Rand. Right. It was very clear that precision was not
the issue and that guidedness was not the issue. It was the
type of target selection that became the clear issue. And even
when, as Jeremy has mentioned, the U.S. Government told them
which targets not to hit, we saw instances where the coalition
was targeting the wrong things.
Mr. Malinowski. So they deliberately struck targets like
water treatment facilities, food distribution centers that were
on a no-fly list, a no-strike list that was handed to them. Is
that correct?
Mr. Konyndyk, if you want to chime in as well, or either of
you, yes.
Mr. Konyndyk. Yes. So the basic progression was this:
Initially we provided--USAID compiled the list of initially
just strictly humanitarian sites, NGO offices, warehouses,
things that if you, you know, you looked at them from the air,
you might not be aware it is a humanitarian facility whereas we
would assume you would know what a school looks like, what a
hospital looks like, and so on, and not hit those things.
What we found was that the Saudis tended to treat anything
not on the no-strike list we gave them as fair game. So then we
expanded the list, and we began naming categories of sites
including specific road routes that were critical to the
humanitarian effort. And in an instance in, I believe it was
2018, they struck the bridges along the main road from Hudaydah
Port to Sana'a, which was the principal artery for bringing
food, aid, and commercial food into the country. They struck
that despite us having specifically told them through that
process not to.
Mr. Malinowski. Thank you.
And, Ms. Almutawakel, first of all, thank you so much for
being here and for speaking for people in Yemen whose voices
are not normally heard in our debate here in the Congress.
When American bombs reach Yemeni civilians before American
aid does, as you aptly described the situation, what impact
does that have on the Houthis and on other extremist groups
like al-Qaeda? Does it hurt them, or does it help them? Do they
take advantage of this?
Ms. Almutawakel. Well, in the war in Yemen in general, the
war in Yemen is empowering two groups in Yemen: al-Qaeda and
Iran. The war is a very perfect environment for all armed
groups and their allies, whoever they are. So only rebuilding
the State in Yemen can just defeat different groups. For
Yemenis, many of the Yemenis, they have never been to America,
but they received America through the weapons--not through
technology, not through education, not through civilization. It
is just through weapons.
And in many instances, we documented 300 incidents since
the beginning of the war until today, but not in all incidents
we could find evidence of weapons. We could find this in 25
incidents, but it might be even much more. So people, they know
America through these weapons, and they feel very angry about
it, and it is propaganda for the Houthis and for al-Qaeda, but
the situation in general does not depend on the propaganda
itself.
The war--because the war is--all parties to the conflict,
they do not have a war plan; they do not have a peace plan. And
even in the areas that are controlled by Hadi government and
the coalition, they did not try to rebuild the State, the
judicial system, the national army. They decided to empower
fanatic religious armed groups in the ground. So this is also
empowering Houthis and other armed groups in the areas. If the
80 percent that was controlled by the coalition and Hadi
government was administrated in a good way, then this would
defeat also Houthis easily, much easily than the war itself.
Mr. Malinowski. Thank you.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you.
And I will recognize Mr. Chabot for 5 minutes.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. As a former
chair of this subcommittee and a long-time member of it, it is
really heartbreaking to have the need for this hearing today
because this is clearly one of the most significant, if not the
most significant, humanitarian crisis on Earth. And,
unfortunately, it has been extremely frustrating for those of
us that are really trying to help and trying to get aid to
those people who need it and try to get a cease-fire on the
targeting of civilians or even if it is collateral damage, so
to speak. That is where you really want to have some impact to
be able to not have people who are completely innocent
targeted, or it is always hard, but particularly in this type
of situation where you do have the fighters oftentimes in
civilian populations. And then another challenge, of course,
and I apologize for being in and out. I have had meetings here
on and off, and so I have I missed and I probably am repeating
some of the things my colleagues have said. And I know speaking
for probably folks on both sides of the aisle, the inability to
get the aid to those who need it, the access, is a big problem,
so I guess my first question would be how can we improve that?
What could actually work to get the aid to the people who
really need it? Is there anything we can do? And I know your
organization is USAID. I know that is what you all do, but I
would be happy to just go down the line.
Doctor?
Dr. Rand. I would highlight three things. One is the Sana'a
airport is a very important center because of the number of
people who cannot leave the country seeking medical help and
other treatments, so urging the coalition to open the Sana'a
airport. That would be one.
Second, continuing to monitor the verification mechanisms
in the Red Sea Port. Part of the challenge is there are
legitimate concerns about Iranian and other nefarious missile
activity in the region, and so the U.N. has tried very hard to
broker a compromise with the coalition to check ships to see,
you know, to make sure there are not bad things on some of
these vessels, but that has really slowed down the humanitarian
access into the port. So there has to be more that can be done
to ensure that these ships that are coming in with the
humanitarian relief are not stopped and blocked because it is
deterring the commercial shipping industry from coming in at
all. So there can be more work that can be done with the U.N.
and the coalition to ensure that this verification mechanism is
not delaying and stopping humanitarian relief access.
And then, finally, calling attention to parts of the
Stockholm agreements that were intended to enable the recovery
of the Hudaydah and Red Sea Ports along that area. Because of
the backlogs at the Aden Port, there is no substitute for
Hudaydah Port, despite the parties' wish that there could be
run-arounds. It is still true that 70 or 80 percent of all
humanitarian relief must get into the country through that
region and that part of Yemen. And so, therefore, ensuring port
capacity, ensuring the management, the administration, and the
free flow of goods into that port remains critical.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you. You know, I am actually--I have only
got a minute and 30 seconds to go, so I am going to hold your
thought, if I can, because I had one other point that I wanted
to make. If I go down the line, I am going to be infringing on
other people's times. I was in Yemeni some years ago--in Yemen
a number of years ago, and I remember at the time because we
got a call. There were only a couple of us on the codel. We got
there the day after they blew up the graduation of the police,
or it was about 100 people I think killed on the parade
grounds. We went in anyway and met with an awful lot of
goodwilled people, but it was--I remember the date specifically
because of that.
Let me ask this question, Ms. Zimmerman. Let me go to you
on this one. I know Mr. Wilson was interested in this as well.
The business about human shields, you know. We have heard
reports that there are examples where that has happened, where
Houthis have embedded, you know, militant fighters or military
equipment in civilian areas. Could you address that issue?
Ms. Zimmerman. Yes. Thank you, Congressman. The Houthis and
many other of the actors on the ground have used civilian
positions including the offices of international NGO's as a
shield against airstrikes or other artillery fire, and there
are multiple instances where you can map the no-strike list
against a Houthi military position, and the Houthi military
position is right adjacent to a civilian position which places
the coalition in a lot of stress.
I think the challenge with civilian casualties in Yemen is
not just limited to targeting from the air, however, and what
is missed is the mortar fire that is somewhat indiscriminate in
certain places, some in Taiz City, which gets lost in the
discussion about Hudaydah because it is not stuck on
humanitarian issues. All sides are committing egregious
targeting cases, and I think we need to be holding all actors
accountable.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much.
My time has expired.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Mr. Chabot.
Mr. Trone.
Mr. Trone. Thank you, Ms. Almutawakel, for your courage and
efforts in this unmitigated tragedy. Food insecurity, lack of
sanitation, relocation to the IDP camps, real negative impacts
on all the citizens of Yemen. My question is: The women and
girls are specifically disadvantaged in this humanitarian
crisis and subject to even greater risk, gender-based violence
during the conflict. Could you make any comments on protections
that we should be taking?
Ms. Almutawakel. You know, the state in Yemen has collapsed
100 percent. Before the war, we used to have a stable state.
Now we do not. So you can imagine how much the situation is
horrible. Before the war, we started to discuss to have a law
to stop the early marriage. You can now just imagine how much
we are away far from this. It is just like a dream; it never
happened. And the war is very masculine, yes. So women were
just fighting for many years to be in the front in many jobs in
Yemen, and they succeed to have a lot of success in this. And
now all of this has destroyed as we are just starting from the
scratch. And it is scary how much children, girls and boys, are
not going to school now. So I am just worried about the future
of Yemen. Many, many, I mean, thousands of schools have been
destroyed, and millions of children are not going to school. So
we are just going very steps--very huge steps to the back.
Yemen was not that bad before.
Mr. Trone. Ms. Zimmerman, your thoughts on that?
Ms. Zimmerman. The challenge that I see is that we are
focused on the very serious humanitarian catastrophe right now,
which is revolving around the civilian casualties and the
distribution of food and fuel, frankly. The challenge that
Yemen will face is that it has now gone through 4 years of war,
and it is not just coming out of this war, but even from the
Arab Spring, children were not going to school. And so, when
you look at the Yemeni population, about half of it is under 15
years of age at this moment, and most of them have not had a
regular education. Yemenis already suffered from a high level
of illiteracy. It is driving them and setting up their
opportunities such that when they come out of this, there will
be a significant investment required from the international
community to rebuild the institutions to allow Yemenis to start
succeeding.
Mr. Trone. Mr. Konyndyk, denial of humanitarian assistance
is a violation of international humanitarian law. Under the
U.S. Foreign Assistance Act, a government that prohibits or
restricts the transport or delivery of U.S. foreign assistance
faces penalties, including withholding of foreign assistance
and withholding that under the Arms Export Control Act. Based
on your observations over the past 4 years, is it your opinion
the Government of Saudi Arabia and/or UAE have prohibited or
otherwise restricted foreign assistance?
Mr. Konyndyk. So, on the strict legal question, I am not a
lawyer, and I would defer to the lawyers, but I can tell you,
on the broader policy question, which I engaged with very
closely during my several years in the administration,
absolutely the Saudis and the Emiratis, principally the Saudis
in that case, were obstructing humanitarian--legitimate
humanitarian assistance from entering the country.
And, you know, I think they have given large amounts to the
United Nations, and they deserve some recognition for that, but
no amount of aid that they give can keep pace with the damage
they are doing.
We saw repeatedly that it was very difficult for
humanitarian groups to get aid into the country, and there were
instances, for example, in 2015, when ships of World Food
Program food were being prevented for weeks on end from being
allowed to enter the country. I think what we typically saw was
that eventually, in that sort of an instance where there was a
specific item that they were blocking, they would eventually
relent but only after pretty extensive pressure from the U.S.
And that to me is a microcosm of I think a key takeaway from
this entire process over the last 4 years, which is that when
the Saudis are doing something we do not want them to do or the
Emiratis are doing something we do not want them to do, asking
them nicely while continuing to sell them arms has not yielded
much progress. And the only times we have seen progress has
been when, at a very high level, up to and including at times
the President himself, when they put that request forward and
make clear that it will have consequences for the U.S.
bilateral relationship if it is ignored, then we see movement.
Mr. Trone. Thank you.
Mr. Deutch. Mr. Reschenthaler.
Mr. Reschenthaler. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Violence and human rights atrocities, as you know,
devastate Yemen. Iran, the world's largest State sponsor of
terror, illegally supplies Houthi rebels with missiles,
training, and support. These Houthi rebels terrorize civilians
and American allies by attacking cities in Saudi Arabia, the
UAE, and even civilian aircraft. Yemen also remains a focal
point of U.S. counterterrorism. AQAP, al-Qaeda of the Arabian
Peninsula, is one of the largest and most capable terror groups
in the region. This is why I voted against the decision to try
to remove U.S. Forces from the conflict. Frankly, it was
dangerous and misguided, and abandoning this region will not
end the humanitarian crisis. In fact, it will just make it
worse. Without the United States, bad actors will continue to
become more reckless and the tens of millions of Yemenis will
continue to suffer without us. If Syria has shown us anything,
it is that rogue countries like Russia and China, who have very
little regard for peace, prosperity, or even human life, will
fill the power vacuum that we create.
So, Ms. Zimmerman, can you please elaborate on how the U.S.
can better provide security assistance in the Arabian Peninsula
while also holding our counterparts accountable for actions
that we as Americans would not adhere to?
Ms. Zimmerman. Thank you, Congressman.
I think you have heard today that the U.S. has provided
significant tactical training in how to limit civilian
casualties and how to improve operations on the battlefield,
and you can see that we have done it with Saudi Arabia, and
then we have also done that through counterterrorism training
and with cooperation with the United Arab Emirates. What has
been missing from this piece is the actual strategic guidance
and a nuanced approach that will lead our coalition partners to
some sort of victory. And so they have applied the tactics that
they have learned not perfectly against the strategy that is
fundamentally flawed, and this is one of the reasons why I
think that the U.S. should lean further in and provide what
only America can provide, which is the expertise that we have
in order to coalesce something that will deliver a better
negotiated settlement than, frankly, what I can see on the
table. I still do not see the path from Hudaydah to a national
settlement, and, you know, that is the key piece that we need
to start delivering.
Mr. Reschenthaler. And what are your thoughts on if we
continue to withdraw, with Russia and China filling that power
vacuum? Do you want to elaborate on that?
Ms. Zimmerman. Saudi Arabia and the UAE are one of the few
partners we have that do not need our money, and if we were to
stop selling munitions and weapons, the question is then, will
they keep buying it? And I think the answer is yes. And when we
provide it, we also provide it with significant support in
terms of military training. It has not been completed in terms
of our military training and the professional development,
especially of the Saudi military, and withdrawing the provision
of weapons will probably lead to the end of that sort of
training, which means that we have gotten halfway there and
then we lose that investment.
Russia and China do not have that sort of predilection in
terms of who they sell their weapons to and the end use of the
weapon. And so we have seen cases where our partners have not
used our weapons as we have desired. We should publicly hold
them accountable, but we also need to recognize that, at the
end of the day, there are other actors out there with weapons
that are high end, and they are willing to sell, as well.
Mr. Reschenthaler. Thanks, Ms. Zimmerman.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back the balance of my
time.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Mr. Reschenthaler.
Mr. Vargas, you are recognized.
Mr. Vargas. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you again, the witnesses, for being here today.
Obviously, it is a hugely tragic humanitarian crisis. I
have also had the opportunity to talk to David Beasley,
Governor--former Governor from South Carolina, who tells me of
the issues they have had at the port, and so I want to talk a
little bit about that. Has the issues of the food coming in--I
mean, I understood you saying that there could be some
contraband on the ships, and because of that, they have stopped
them, and maybe there is a lot more hassle, if you will, to get
in. Has that been corrected, or how can that be corrected? I
know that that is not the whole issue because there is just so
many people that are on the point of starvation, but it does
seem that so much of--you said 80, 90 percent--of the food goes
through there. How is that being corrected? Who would like to
handle that? Go ahead.
Mr. Konyndyk. I can take a first crack at that, and I am
sure others have thoughts.
Mr. Vargas. Sure.
Mr. Konyndyk. So when I was at AID, that was one of our
major preoccupations, protecting that lifeline through Hudaydah
because it is where most of the country's food comes from. And,
you know, we saw two important dynamics that were concerning.
One was obviously the Saudi naval blockade, which was
preventing a lot of legitimate material from getting in out of
fear, as you said, that there may be contraband upon some of
the ships.
We also saw Iran playing games. And Iran at one point sent
a what they called an aid ship, and I think that ship probably
did only have aid on it, but there was no way to know that, and
they were doing that to test the Saudi blockade, and they were
in effect misusing using aid, as well.
So we did two things. First, we worked with the U.N. to set
up an arrangement where all aid from Iran and other States
would go through the U.N. and be validated by them and
delivered by them rather than directly by the State. So that
ensured that the contents of the aid were legitimate and not
being, you know, no contraband was on board.
And then we set up something called the U.N. Verification
and Inspection Mechanism for all commercial shipping, so kind
of a counterpart for commercial to what existed for the aid.
And that was a U.N. process for similarly verifying and
validating what was on board ships to avoid contraband.
The concern has been that the Saudis have not--Saudis and
Emiratis have not been great about respecting and working
through on them. And I think that gets to the underlying issue,
which is that the purpose of the blockade is not merely to
prevent contraband; it is also to economically hurt the country
with cover of this contraband argument.
Mr. Vargas. So that was going to be my question because it
seems that there is the whole issue of, you know, the
contraband, but more than that, they were using it almost as a
way to starve the country.
Mr. Konyndyk. It was an excuse.
Mr. Vargas. It was an excuse. OK. Has that been corrected
at all? What can we do to change that reality again?
Mr. Konyndyk. It has not--it is a problem that requires
constant management. Others may want to weigh in.
Dr. Rand. I would just add that I think these two questions
actually relate to each other. Congressman, your question
assumed a bit of a binary between either withdrawing completely
from our relationship with Saudi Arabia and stopping to limit
U.S. support for the coalition for the war in Yemen.
The United States is actively engaged to support the
defense of Saudi Arabia day in and day out, aside from
operational DOD and arms sales support for the war in Yemen,
and this is a great example, right? The United States will
continue to defend Saudi Arabia from contraband material going
through the Red Sea Port through the activities that my
colleague just described and many, many other naval and
maritime activities.
Mr. Vargas. I am going to reclaim my time because you are
actually not focusing on my question. My question was not about
Saudi Arabia. They are doing quite fine. My question was more
about Yemen and how are we going to help the Yemeni people.
So, again, I want to focus how can we get more food in
there. I know one of the things that we can do also is try to
figure out how to help their currency. I mean, their currency
in free fall creates a real problem when there is, in fact,
imported food that people would be able to buy if it was not
for the depreciation of their currency.
Ms. Almutawakel. This is not only your question. I have
heard this question from more than one: How can we just help
the humanitarian access? We are in the Congress, and just it is
so weird for me to ask this question rather than asking how can
we stop the war in Yemen. Humanitarian access is a very small
issue in Yemen, and it is not even the only thing that
causesstarvation in Yemen. For example, millions of Yemenis are
not receiving their salaries for years now. Those who are
living under the control of Houthis, which is most of the
population of Yemen, Houthis they do not consider themselves
responsible to obey salaries, and the Hadi government, the
coalition, are not paying salaries for people just because they
are living in the areas that is controlled by Houthis. That is
one of the main reasons that causes starvation in Yemen, more
than the access of humanitarian aid.
So the issue in Yemen is not an issue of how to flow the
humanitarian access. It is much more than this, and if there is
a humanitarian crisis here and you have a very big influence to
just to stop the crisis, just like the symbol, then to stop it
by we have to stop it by to stop the war, not to just solve the
problem of how to get the food in.
Humanitarian NGO's can get--can solve this problem, and
they are trying to, and it is not your question. It is an----
Mr. Vargas. No, I know. My time is the expired, but thank
you for your answer. I appreciate it. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Mr. Vargas.
Mr. Sherman, you are recognized.
Mr. Sherman. If our goal was just to feel better and more
moral, we would get ourselves completely out of Yemen in all
respects. It is unlikely that Yemen will be a place that anyone
says: That is where great things are happening, and America is
a great country to be a part of that.
But the fact is that washing our hands of the issue is not
necessarily the best thing we could do for the Yemeni people.
I know that air power has been criticized here. I point out
as the country that has the leading air power in the world, we
should defend the rules of engagement and the laws of war,
which make it plain that if you are hitting strategic targets
for strategic reasons and, in that context, that you are trying
to avoid civilian casualties, then that is legal. If we then
take the position that you cannot use air power if you have any
adverse effect on the civilians, then air power is illegal, and
it puts us in a much worse strategic position.
One way this war could end is we could change sides or
whatever and join the Houthi. And how bad would the Houthi be
if they just took over the country? They have a record of
enforced disappearances, you know, children soldiers. The U.N.
has said they have committed war crimes, but if they, Dr. Rand,
if the Houthis just swept their opponents from the battlefield,
would they engage in reprisals? Would they kill civilians? Or I
do not expect them to provide good governance, but would the
people of Yemen be better if, 6 months from now, the Houthis
just controlled the whole country?
Dr. Rand. Thanks, Congressman. The Houthis do control
around 75, 80 percent of the population. So this is not a
hypothetical.
Mr. Sherman. Right. Well, it is in some ways. They may be
holding themselves back saying: We want to restrain ourselves
and not kill 50,000, 100,000 civilians until we win the war.
Then, once we win the war, then we do not have to worry as much
about our world image, and then we can kill our enemies.
You know, Lenin did not kill all his enemies in 1917. He
waited until more like 1920, 1925. So, if the Houthis really
had freedom of action, what would they do?
Ms. Almutawakel. I want to invite you to visit Mwatana's
website just to see how much Houthis are already killing
civilians. They are not holding their thumbs back. They are
engaged in many serious violations, indiscriminate shelling,
child soldiers, torture, enforced disappearance, a lot. They
are doing whatever they can do in the areas that they are
controlling, but who said that the scenario of stopping the war
that the Houthis control the areas? How this idea came up?
So the idea for the political agreement is to just end, to
just replace all armed groups to a state, the state of rule of
law----
Mr. Sherman. Well, obviously, if we can create peace and
compromise, that is the best possible outcome. But we have been
trying to do that for a long time.
I will ask the panel: How optimistic are you that a
peaceful solution will be reached among the parties?
Dr. Rand. Congressman, you know, in 2015 and in 2016, the
U.S. Government was focused very, very directly on reaching a
cease-fire----
Mr. Sherman. Right.
Ms. Rand [continuing]. In Yemen, and to be honest, in the
past 2 years, that has not been a focus of U.S. foreign policy.
So what we are advocating here is elevating this issue as a
diplomatic priority given the momentum in Sweden and pushing
the Trump administration to really make compromise and
political negotiation the end goal as opposed to some of the
parties maybe preferred strategy of escalation. So that is the
recommendation here.
Mr. Konyndyk. And, Congressman, I think, to hit on a couple
of your other points, I do not think anyone is advocating for
the U.S. pulling out or for the Houthis winning or just----
Mr. Sherman. Well, when you say ``pulling out,'' nobody is
advocating for us to pull out diplomatically. And, in fact,
there is a consensus on the panel that we should have a higher
level diplomat involved in these issues, but there are a lot of
folks urging us to pull out militarily.
Mr. Konyndyk. Yes, including me. And the reason for that
is, you know, in your comment, you said: Would this have
implications for U.S. use of air power?
I think if the Saudis were anywhere close to the quality of
targeting and the quality of respect for international law of
armed conflict that the U.S. military has, there would be far
less of a problem.
Mr. Sherman. We are doing a much better job now if you
compare what the Saudis are doing to our approach in World War
II. I do not know how historians would rate us, but I yield
back.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you.
Mr. Lieu, you are recognized.
Mr. Lieu. Thank you.
Thank you, Chairman Deutch, for calling this hearing on
Yemen, and I appreciate your doing so, and the message we are
sending is that we are not going to let this issue go.
So, if you are a Saudi Arabia or UAE or the Trump
administration, we are going to keep highlighting it. We are
going to keep exposing your war crimes and the famine that you
are causing in Yemen. I do note that, as the witnesses had
testified, a new report recently came out with nearly a
thousand people killed by U.S. munitions and over 120 children
killed. I do have a question about that report. So, Ms.
Almutawakel, was that from airstrikes from a Saudi-led
coalition that did not also include airstrikes from, let's say,
civilian drones and others with U.S. intel? What was the nature
of that casualty count?
Ms. Almutawakel. No, these ones, we have reports about
drones, and there are incidents regarding the drones. And there
are civilians who have been killed and injured because of
drones in 2017 and 2018.
Mr. Lieu. Is that in your report or a separate report?
Ms. Almutawakel. No, separate. This one, in this report, it
is only the Saudi and Emirati airstrikes.
Mr. Lieu. Thank you. And are you aware of any Saudi or UAE
officials being held accountable for the killing of civilians
through these airstrikes?
Ms. Almutawakel. This is a dream.
Mr. Lieu. So the answer is no. And as you had testified
earlier, as Congressman Malinowski noted, it appears that many
of these airstrikes are not because they are trying to hit a
moving Houthi target and missed; it is that they are
deliberately trying to target the actual places to hit that
have lots of civilians. Is that correct?
Ms. Almutawakel. What is really strange about the incidents
that killed and injured civilians in Yemen is it is very
preventable. Many of the cases that we have documented, there
is not even a military target. People themselves were asking,
why we were targeted? It is even strange. It is just--that is
why it is not a matter of training. It is a matter of
accountability. They do not care. If they cared, they can just
make it much better, at least not to embarrass their allies.
Mr. Lieu. Thank you.
I actually think it is worse than that they do not care. It
does appear to me that they are intentionally hitting
civilians. So, as you know, during the Obama Administration,
Saudi jets flew and hit a funeral that had a lot of civilians,
injuring and killing hundreds, and then they came back around
and struck the very same precise location again. So my view is
they are deliberately targeting civilians. I think these are
war crimes.
And my question to Dr. Rand is, when you have civilians in
Yemen watching a U.S.-supported coalition killing a lot of
civilians, would not that fuel what terrorists are trying to do
in recruiting members and causing more people to hate the
United States as well as the British, who are also providing
these munitions?
Dr. Rand. Yes. As my colleague said earlier today----
Mr. Deutch. Turn on your mike, please.
Dr. Rand. Thank you, Congressman. As my colleague had said
earlier in the hearing, I think if you are sitting in Yemen,
none of the outside powers look particularly appealing at this
point, and I think there is a lot of blaming that is going on.
But yes, this is so directly and obviously a recruiting vehicle
for radicalism, extremism, and the next generation of AQAP in
Yemen. And behind every sortie is clearly the image of a U.S.-
sold weapon, a U.S.-sold airplane, and the maintenance, and the
other support services. So there is no doubt there is a real,
real risk here of generating greater terrorist threat in Yemen
of the like AQAP or a future generation of radicalization.
Mr. Lieu. And then just as a question for anyone on the
panel: It was reported today that the Trump administration is
reversing an executive order that would essentially now hide
the number of civilian deaths being caused from drone strikes
from our intelligence agencies. How many of you think that is a
good idea? OK. No one does.
So what is your view of what the harm would be if we hide
that information from Congress and the American people?
Dr. Rand. I am sure my colleagues have ideas and have
responses as well, but just in brief, the idea of the 2016
executive order was in keeping with democratic principles of
transparency and clear communication to be open about the
civilian casualties in line with current operational procedure
at DOD. That was the goal of the 2016 policy, and revoking it
sends a signal to the American public and to, more importantly
probably, allies, friends, and enemies around the world that
the United States will be hiding its civilian casualties.
I would also say this is a global executive order. It is
not related to Yemen, but it is related to today's hearing
because one of the original purposes of the 2016 executive
order was to send the signal to U.S. allies of how America
handles its own civilian casualties and wartime operation, to
send the signal that the U.S. is open, the U.S. is transparent,
the U.S. is willing to investigate ourselves, which was what we
were urging the coalition to do and continue to urge it. So
there was a diplomatic value to this executive order in 2016,
and revoking it is stepping back and saying that we are not
going to expect allies and partners of the United States to
adhere to the same standards of accountability of the U.S.
military.
Mr. Lieu. Thank you.
I yield back.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you very much, Mr. Lieu. This was an
excellent hearing. I am really grateful to all of the
witnesses.
Yemen is a humanitarian crisis, and American leadership is
necessary to ensure food is delivered and that we stop the
spread of the disease, but ultimately a political solution is
necessary to end the war, and American leverage is what can be
used to accomplish that.
Again, I thank the witnesses.
Ms. Almutawakel, your voice here with us today is so
critically important to our decisionmaking going forward. I
would just ask that, as you return to Yemen, that you make sure
that you take with you the commitment by this committee and by
this Congress to continue to focus on the crisis in Yemen and
the war and work to see that it ends.
And, with that, this committee is adjourned.
[The information referred to follows:]
[Whereupon, at 4:06 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
APPENDIX
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STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD
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RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
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