[House Hearing, 116 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 116-3]
_________________________________________________________________________
EVALUATION OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE'S COUNTERTERRORISM APPROACH
__________
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
FEBRUARY 6, 2019
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
35-336 WASHINGTON : 2019
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
One Hundred Sixteenth Congress
ADAM SMITH, Washington, Chairman
SUSAN A. DAVIS, California WILLIAM M. ``MAC'' THORNBERRY,
JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island Texas
RICK LARSEN, Washington JOE WILSON, South Carolina
JIM COOPER, Tennessee ROB BISHOP, Utah
JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio
JOHN GARAMENDI, California MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
JACKIE SPEIER, California K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas
TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado
DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia
RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri
SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia
SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California MO BROOKS, Alabama
ANTHONY G. BROWN, Maryland, Vice PAUL COOK, California
Chair BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama
RO KHANNA, California SAM GRAVES, Missouri
WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York
FILEMON VELA, Texas SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee
ANDY KIM, New Jersey RALPH LEE ABRAHAM, Louisiana
KENDRA S. HORN, Oklahoma TRENT KELLY, Mississippi
GILBERT RAY CISNEROS, Jr., MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin
California MATT GAETZ, Florida
CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania DON BACON, Nebraska
JASON CROW, Colorado JIM BANKS, Indiana
XOCHITL TORRES SMALL, New Mexico LIZ CHENEY, Wyoming
ELISSA SLOTKIN, Michigan PAUL MITCHELL, Michigan
MIKIE SHERRILL, New Jersey JACK BERGMAN, Michigan
KATIE HILL, California MICHAEL WALTZ, Florida
VERONICA ESCOBAR, Texas
DEBRA A. HAALAND, New Mexico
JARED F. GOLDEN, Maine
LORI TRAHAN, Massachusetts
ELAINE G. LURIA, Virginia
Paul Arcangeli, Staff Director
Jonathan Lord, Professional Staff Member
Peter Villano, Professional Staff Member
Rory Coleman, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
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Page
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Chairman,
Committee on Armed Services.................................... 1
Thornberry, Hon. William M. ``Mac,'' a Representative from Texas,
Ranking Member, Committee on Armed Services.................... 3
WITNESSES
Hecker, Maj Gen James B., USAF, Vice Director of Operations, J3,
Joint Staff.................................................... 5
West, Hon. Owen, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special
Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict, Office of the Secretary of
Defense........................................................ 4
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Smith, Hon. Adam............................................. 41
West, Hon. Owen, joint with Maj Gen James B. Hecker.......... 43
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
[The information is for official use only.]
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Brown.................................................... 53
Ms. Escober.................................................. 55
Mr. Gaetz.................................................... 54
Mr. Gallego.................................................. 51
Ms. Horn..................................................... 55
Ms. Stefanik................................................. 53
Mr. Waltz.................................................... 54
EVALUATION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE'S COUNTERTERRORISM APPROACH
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, February 6, 2019.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in room
2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Adam Smith (chairman
of the committee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
WASHINGTON, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
The Chairman. I call the meeting--I call the hearing to
order. Welcome, everybody. As a starting point, we are going
to, after this, move into a classified setting. It is my goal,
objective, hope, that we can start that at noon, which means we
may not have enough time to do everybody for 5 minutes. But we
will have another opportunity to ask more questions in the
classified setting. If it drifts a little past noon, that is
fine. But as we move from one to the next, don't want to keep
these gentlemen for 3 or 4 hours. So just for everyone's
information, we will do this, and then we will go into a
classified setting and there will be an opportunity to ask
further questions at that point.
With that, I welcome everybody to the hearing. We have two
witnesses this morning: the Honorable Owen West, who is the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Policy, Special Operations
and Low-Intensity Conflict; and Major General James Hecker, who
is on the Joint Staff, and Vice Director for Operations, J3.
Welcome gentlemen. I look forward to your testimony.
We are looking to get a greater idea of where we are at in
combating international and transnational terrorist groups. And
on this committee and at the Pentagon, I know we have a pretty
good idea when we look out at the threat environment. And
obviously, there are a lot of issues, but there are five that
we are all focused on: Russia, China, Iran, North Korea, and
the subject of today's discussion, which is transnational
terrorists. And this has been, obviously, going on for some
time, even before 9/11. But after 9/11, we reorganized
significant portions of our national security apparatus to try
to combat that threat. So that effort has been going on over 17
years now. What we want to learn today is where is it at? What
are our priorities? What is working? What is not working? And
what do you see the future of this effort?
To begin with, I think our response was fairly effective.
And I remember General McChrystal talking about it, that
basically when we had a full understanding of what al-Qaida
was, he said, ``It takes a network to beat a network.''
So we systemically did a whole-of-government approach
building up our network to counter that terrorist threat. Now
it has morphed and metastasized in the years since then.
Originally, obviously, the focus was in Afghanistan and then
shifted to Pakistan, and then we faced threats out of Yemen.
And now you have a very extensive list of transnational
terrorist groups. We are all familiar with al-Qaida and ISIS
[Islamic State of Iraq and Syria] as the two at the top. But
there are dozens of others in different places throughout the
world, primarily in Africa and the Middle East and South Asia.
So when we are combating those threats, how do we
prioritize? Obviously, the number one biggest concern is when
these organizations threaten the U.S. directly, or our Western
allies. We want to try to stop those groups first. That is what
took us to Yemen a long time ago when AQAP [al-Qaida in the
Arabian Peninsula] started planning attacks against the U.S.
and was behind the attempted bombing in Detroit, and also the
attempted bombing using the package airlines. That shifted our
focus there, so that is part of it.
But also, if we are ultimately going to be able to defeat
transnational terrorist groups, we need to stop them from being
able to have safe havens where they can grow. Now, a lot of
these groups aren't necessarily focused initially on targeting
Western interests. They are sort of like criminal
organizations. They are involved in drugs and human
trafficking, and all manner of different crimes to fund their
operations. But as we look at how we deal with the scarce
resources that we have, I really want to learn more today about
how we prioritize. What are the groups that we are most
concerned about? What is our effort now to contain them?
And then there is just two other points that I want to
raise in my opening statement before turning it over to the
ranking member. Number one, since the Trump administration,
there has been a significant increase in kinetic strikes,
bombings, but also raids against targets in a variety of
places. Certainly in Afghanistan, there has been a significant
increase in the tempo, but also in Somalia, and even in places
like Libya and West Africa. Why? And what has it accomplished?
And also what is the downside? I've seen various reports,
primarily from nongovernment organizations, talking about an
increase in civilian casualties. What impact does that have on
our broader effort to defeat the ideology? Because again, to go
back to General McChrystal and some of the things I heard him
say, he said when you are combating a terrorist group, it is
not a simple numbers game. It is not a matter of there is 100
terrorists, and if you kill 50, you only have 50 left. If you
kill 50, but you wind up upsetting 20 of their relatives, then
you actually wind up with an increase. So how are we dealing
with the backlash from those increased civilian casualties and
unintended consequences? And what is being accomplished by that
increase in tempo?
And lastly, I know a report is due shortly, one of the most
dominant aspects of this effort to combat transnational
terrorist groups has been the significant increase in the use
of our special operations forces. Their numbers, I believe,
have more than doubled since 9/11. Certainly their OPTEMPO
[operating tempo] is high. They have been doing very dangerous
missions for a very long time. A question that this committee
has asked, and I know Mr. Langevin's Subcommittee on Emerging
Threats has asked as well: Are we asking too much of them? Has
it strained the force to the point where it is causing
problems? Are there things that we can do to mitigate that? How
do we handle the fact that so much is now being asked of our
special operations forces in light of the post-9/11 world?
I look forward to your testimony, and I yield to the
ranking member for his opening statement.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the
Appendix on page 41.]
STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM M. ``MAC'' THORNBERRY, A
REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED
SERVICES
Mr. Thornberry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and let me join in
thanking our witnesses for being here today. It seems to me it
is absolutely appropriate for us to take a global look at
terrorism today. It was true with bin Laden and Zawahiri that
they moved around from different places before 9/11. It is more
true than ever today.
I note that Bruce Hoffman and Seth Jones, two witnesses who
have testified a number of times before our committee over the
years, have pointed out of the more than roughly 40,000 foreign
fighters who arrived in Iraq and Syria, most of them are still
on the loose. Today, there are nearly four times as many Sunni
extremists around the world as on 9/11.
So we have challenges, not only with a greater number than
before, but it is harder to define them in a particular
locality than it was before. And that is part of the reason
that in the fiscal year 2014 NDAA [National Defense
Authorization Act], we set up additional mechanisms for this
committee to have oversight of special operations and other
forces so that we could monitor, under our constitutional
responsibility, what our military was doing in a variety of
locations around the world, not just in Iraq and Afghanistan.
I also think it is appropriate to sit back and see where we
have been, to have things in perspective. As one of the few
members left on this committee who was here on 9/11, I never
would have expected us to go, let's see, 18 years nearly, and
not have a repeat of that sort of incident. We have definitely
had terrorist attacks here and abroad. But I also think it is
important that we pay tribute to our military, intelligence
community, and law enforcement for the remarkable success that
they have had in the years since 9/11, because the enemy
continues to be motivated to attack us without question.
I am concerned that with these terrorists who are freer to
roam about than ever before, that it is more important than
ever before to keep the pressure on them. And it is my view, as
others have written, that the number one lesson of the last 18
years, if you let up the pressure they are going to spring back
and they will spring back quickly. And that is true whether we
are talking Syria, Afghanistan, Somalia, or Yemen.
Mr. Chairman, I want to finish with just one other thing.
On Saturday, my wife and I had the opportunity to attend a
memorial service for the most recent member of our military who
was a casualty in this war against terrorists. Army Ranger
Sergeant Cameron Meddock was killed a couple of weeks ago in
Afghanistan on a very important mission. And I bring that up
for two reasons. Number one, we can never forget the human
sacrifice, the human cost that goes into keeping us safe and
free, and some members of this committee have participated in
that effort. Sergeant Meddock was one who gave everything he
had.
And secondly, it is important because we can't really talk
about the mission he was on and so forth, but it was very
important, not for Afghanistan, but for us. Because that
mission was designed to make sure that known terrorists were
not able to enter the battlefield against our troops and
against our homeland. And so, I think a lot of the questions
you outline, Mr. Chairman, are exactly the appropriate
questions we should always ask. I also think it is very
important that we never do anything to diminish the importance
of the mission that Sergeant Meddock and others have given
their life for over the last 18 years, because what they have
achieved is remarkable, and what they are doing today is
remarkable as well.
Thank you. I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. West.
STATEMENT OF HON. OWEN WEST, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR
SPECIAL OPERATIONS/LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT, OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Secretary West. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
Thornberry, and members of the committee so dedicated to this
issue over the years, for the privilege of testifying before
you today. The counterterrorism fight continues to evolve. I
want to take this opportunity to highlight where we have been
and where I think we are headed.
I will start with our counter-ISIS campaign. Our coalition
has almost destroyed the so-called the physical caliphate. By
this, I mean ISIS no longer governs a pseudo-state in Syria
that at its height attracted tens of thousands of recruits from
around the world who easily slipped across the border, took up
arms, and lived off of ISIS illicit revenue streams that at one
time topped $250 million per month. The human toll was, of
course, much higher.
The so-called physical caliphate has been systemically
destroyed in one of the most lethal, offensive surrogate
operations in history. In Syria, U.S. special forces partnered
with and mentored the Syrian Democratic Forces [SDF], which
grew from a few hundred to tens of thousands of Kurds and
Arabs, all supported by the U.S. Marines, Army, Air Force, and
international partners. The SDF, fighting for its homeland,
suffered thousands of casualties. ISIS has suffered the most.
This achievement should not be discounted and its model should
remain an enduring lesson in this long war. I say ``long war''
because the end of the so-called physical caliphate ushers in a
new phase of fighting. ISIS has morphed into a global
ideological network as deadly and evil as al-Qaida at its
height.
Stepping back, terrorism remains a persistent condition
driven by political, religious, and socioeconomic trends. So we
must simultaneously acknowledge that while we are close to a
tremendous battlefield victory, we still face a resilient
threat. In the last 2 weeks, individual ISIS terrorists bombed
a church in the Philippines, while its West African affiliate
overran military bases in Nigeria.
To defeat the global terror networks requires a coalition
of allies applying relentless pressure at the local level. This
means we must make cost-informed decisions on the future CT, or
counterterror, operations. A disciplined approach to this long
fight will also enable our Department's pivot toward great
power competition with near-peer adversaries in line with the
National Defense Strategy, and the renewed importance of
irregular warfare in this space.
To be clear, this does not mean raising the risk for every
resource optimized. Rather, it means we must be deliberate in
operations against prioritized threats for the long haul,
remaining agile as the enemy.
Operation Inherent Resolve provides an excellent template
for such future operations, because it stressed local and
international partnerships with a modest U.S. footprint. The
Department of Defense will continue to execute counterterror
operations globally to prevent attack on America and our
interests. Congress has been a stalwart partner in helping to
ensure we have the necessary resources and authorities to
achieve this overriding goal. I value our relationship. I look
forward to continuing dialogue. And I look forward to your
questions today.
Thank you.
The Chairman. General Hecker.
STATEMENT OF MAJ GEN JAMES B. HECKER, USAF, VICE DIRECTOR OF
OPERATIONS, J3, JOINT STAFF
General Hecker. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Thornberry,
first of all, thank you for honoring Sergeant Meddock with your
presence at his funeral, as well as here at the House. I am
sure his family members certainly appreciate that, so thank
you.
Members of the House Armed Services Committee, thanks for
the opportunity to speak to you today concerning DOD's global
counterterrorism campaign.
In our current operational environment, we assess that ISIS
and al-Qaida are degraded, but still viable global network
organizations that is well-positioned to generate capability if
the pressure is reduced. Over the past year, there have been
two strategic inflections related to the defeat of ISIS fight,
and to a broader campaign against violent extremist
organizations [VEOs]. First, ISIS lost its physical caliphate
in Iraq and Syria, and evolved into a trans-regional networked
insurgency, making it vulnerable to kinetic attack.
Second, our Nation shifted priority focus from countering
VEOs to great power competition as reflected in the National
Defense Strategy and evolving strategic guidance on Syria and
Afghanistan. Going forward, these inflection points will
fundamentally change the way that we conduct our CT operations.
We must continue to evolve our way of doing business in the
counterterrorism space, placing more focus on enabling our
coalition partners and interagencies, increasing nonmilitary
and non-kinetic effects, and enhancing local partner capacity
and capability to contain this threat.
This evolving counterterrorism operation construct will
place even greater emphasis on successful programs, such as the
127 Echo [127e] program, which provides us viable surrogate
forces designed to achieve U.S. CT objectives at relatively low
costs in terms of resources and especially risks to our
personnel.
The small footprint approach inherent in 127 Echo, in
addition to lessening the need for large-scale U.S. troop
deployments, fosters an environment where local forces take
ownership of the problem. Greater reliance on our coalition
partners will also be a key facet of our sustainable and global
CT construct. We are already seeing this in places like Mali
and Niger, where French forces have taken the lead in
conducting counterterrorism operations against JNIM [Jama'a
Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin] and ISIS Greater Sahara, with
us providing key enabling support in such areas of intelligence
and logistics. This willingness by our partners to shoulder
more of the load, offers our formations the opportunity to
rebuild a more sustainable level of readiness after 17 years of
continuous operations.
Hard-won experience over the last decade and a half has
taught us that sharing information with our partners is
absolutely critical in staying ahead of the global network
VEOs. We must build on our current information and
intelligence-sharing constructs, and also encourage our
partners to undertake similar yet more regionally focused
ventures on their own.
Once again, thank you for the opportunity to speak today
and we look forward to your questions.
[The joint prepared statement of Secretary West and General
Hecker can be found in the Appendix on page 43.]
The Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen.
The starting point, when we look at where the transnational
threat is at right now, and we know there are disrupted
terrorist groups in a number of different of countries
throughout Africa, Middle East, South Asia. What are the areas
that you are most concerned about in terms of groups that are
able right now to plot and plan attacks that could be carried
out against Western targets either in Europe or in the United
States? And how do you assess that threat level at this point?
General Hecker. I think first and foremost, when we
prioritize what we are looking at and who we are most concerned
about, I think we would all agree what we are most concerned
about is a repeat of 9/11. So we look at terrorist
organizations that want to harm of U.S. For the most part, you
know, in their stated reasoning, and what they are all about,
al-Qaida still has the intent to harm the United States and
other countries in the West and Europe. So al-Qaida is one that
we really look for.
The Chairman. I am thinking more geographically, where in
the world? Because obviously, al-Qaida is spread out in a bunch
of different places as well as is ISIS. Where in the world are
we most vulnerable to them being able to organize that type of
attack?
General Hecker. Well, there is a couple of different
places. I think, right now, we sit in a decent spot because we
have maintained the pressure on a lot of the folks, al-Qaida,
ISIS in particular. And we have been able to make sure that
they don't have the capabilities to attack the U.S. So those
are the areas that we look at. And as we now adjust with our
National Defense Strategy to taking some resources that used to
be in those areas and now using those resources for global
competition against China and Russia, we need to make sure that
we find a way to keep the pressure on these other areas in the
world that contains these terrorists.
The Chairman. Okay. Doesn't quite answer the question. We
can talk about it in a classified setting, if that is more
comfortable.
The only other question I have is you talk about
partnerships, and I think that is incredibly important, because
part of being able to defeat these terrorist groups is to have
as low a U.S. presence as possible and to make it more about
developing domestically. So whether you are talking about
Somalia, West Africa, Afghanistan, you know, if the countries
themselves and the countries in their region can be partners to
stop terrorism and build a more sustainable government,
obviously, I know the limitations of that, but that is where we
want to go. In Syria and Afghanistan, as we discuss drawing
down in both of those places, and I am not unsympathetic to the
idea. I just want the idea that there is a plan behind it.
Who are our partners in Syria, if we pull out completely,
as the President has suggested? We have been working with the
Syrian Democratic Forces, we have been working with the Kurds.
If we pull out, how are we going to be able to work with people
in that region to continue to contain the ISIS threat? And same
question for Afghanistan.
Secretary West. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
In Syria specifically, the SDF remains our best partner.
What they have done in this fight is astonishing. We will
continue to support them. We should remember that the D-ISIS
[Defeat ISIS] coalition makes up 79 different countries.
The Chairman. If I could be more pointed to the question
and quickly, so I can move on to other people. Are these forces
we are talking about going to have sufficient support to
continue doing what you just described, or I think we all
acknowledge, if we pull our forces out? What is the strategic
rationale for looking at Syria right now and saying, we can
pull our troops out and yes, the other part, they will be fine.
What was the strategic thinking that went into that decision
that said that we can do that?
Secretary West. Sir, I do not know the strategic thinking
that went into it. I know that we have been issued an order to
deliberately withdraw. But I do believe that if we look at the
outset of ISIS, we were doing remote advise [and] assist. We do
not need to be co-located to keep the pressure on the enemy.
The Chairman. Okay. Mr. Thornberry.
Mr. Thornberry. Gentlemen, in response to the chairman, you
said that we are in a pretty decent place because of the
pressure that we have applied. Be specific. What kind of
pressure are you talking about?
General Hecker. It is really what this whole committee is
all about, or this hearing is all about, the counterterrorism
pressure that we have been able to apply. If you look at the
area in Afghanistan and Syria back in 2014, there was a large
area that was controlled by ISIS. We were able to apply
pressure primarily through partner nations, as well as
partners. So we weren't doing a lot of the fighting ourselves,
we are teaching and training, and working by, with, and through
our partners in Iraq and our partners in Syria.
Mr. Thornberry. But the chairman noticed that there has
been an increase of air strikes in recent years. Is that part
of the pressure too?
General Hecker. Yes. There has been a significant increase
in air strikes in both Syria, Iraq, and in Afghanistan. So we
have increased the efforts to decrease the physical caliphate.
And I think we have been relatively successful. As you have
seen, there is roughly only about 1 percent of the physical
caliphate left and that is in Syria in the Middle Euphrates
Valley. We are rapidly working to try to finish that off and we
think we will be there quite soon.
Mr. Thornberry. You agree with my earlier statement that
one of the lessons, primary lessons, of the last 18 years is if
we let up that pressure, then terrorist groups have a way of
springing back to life in a rather rapid fashion?
General Hecker. Yes, sir. I agree with that.
Mr. Thornberry. Let me ask one other question right quick.
As you know, Yemen has been a controversial location, because
it is a complicated, difficult situation. You said that one of
our primary objectives is to prevent another 9/11. At one
point, the primary terrorist or threat to our homeland emanated
from Yemen and the al-Qaida branch there, print cartridge plot,
as well as a bomb maker who was burying bombs inside human
bodies and a whole variety of things. Are there still al-Qaida
remnants in Yemen today, or have they been extinguished?
General Hecker. No, they are still there today. And there
is a significant number that are there as well. And we can get
into the specific numbers in the closed session. But there is
also ISIS there as well, not quite as many as al-Qaida. But
that is one of our CT efforts that we have is going against
both of those entities that are in southern Yemen.
Mr. Thornberry. Thank you. I yield back.
The Chairman. Mrs. Davis.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and to both of you, we
appreciate you being here. I want to follow up a little bit on
what has just been said.
We would love to be able to rely on our partners, and also
the men and women of the country that were in Afghanistan,
obviously, is a good example of that. We have been hoping that
they would be in a better place today than they are. But where
then--if these partners are not there, where do we go? How do
we work within our own intelligence agencies, within the State
Department? What is it that has to be different if we are to
remove our troops, at least in numbers that are very different
from today?
Secretary West. Thank you, Congresswoman.
First of all, I would say that local partnerships are
absolutely key to our long-term counterterror strategy. Over
the last 15 years, though, we have developed capabilities in
terms of fusing intelligence with operations. And that
intelligence can come from a variety of sources. Although it is
excellent to get human intelligence at the local level, I can
explain in a closed session just how we operate in countries
like Yemen and are able to differentiate between AQAP and ISIS,
and the current civil war.
Mrs. Davis. And the State Department?
Secretary West. The State Department--and by the way, many
other agencies are key components. And I think this is another
enduring lesson of this war, in terms of having a whole-of-
government approach. There is--in most of these countries, if
not all, there is a diplomatic effort that is simultaneous with
our military counterterror effort.
Mrs. Davis. General Hecker, you mentioned sharing of
information sort of as in talking about this. And one of the
things that I think we all were setback a little bit with our
forces in Niger in 2017, a sense that we didn't know where our
forces were. How do we balance the secrecy important to the
mission, and at the same time, providing information to the
public and to our partners in the area?
General Hecker. Yes, Congresswoman. A very important
question, because, you know, we don't want to give information
up that may put our folks at risk. But at the same time, we
need to make sure that our civilian leadership knows what is
going on and has a say in what we are doing. And quite
honestly, I think Niger was a good lesson for us in the
military. And I know we have had several discussions, with your
committee and others, to make sure that we continue to share
information with one another, so you can exercise the
appropriate oversight that you deserve.
Secretary West. Congresswoman, if I can follow up. This
committee was the driving force behind our counterterror
monthly briefings, which will give you an absolutely accurate
laydown each month of precisely where our special operations
forces and other counterterror troops are.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you. And I think the public is still
questioning whether or not having unlimited authorization is
the best way to go to try and make certain that we are as open
and transparent as possible, given the circumstances that our
troops are in. Can you speak to that? Where do we go from here?
Secretary West. Congresswoman, we are absolutely committed
to transparency with our oversight committees. Right now, we
are working with your staffers, and we are very close to
distributing our ex [execute] orders. This is new policy for
us, but I think that will help the transparency. Further, over
the last year, we have also improved our reporting requirements
to make sure that you are armed after a strike, for example,
with information within the 48-hour requirement that this body
helped impart a few years ago, and then a follow-up that makes
clear the action within 7 days.
Mrs. Davis. General, any comments--did you want to make?
General Hecker. We are in sync on that one, ma'am.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
The Chairman. Mr. Wilson.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank both of you for
being here today.
I recently received a brief at Joint Base Anacostia-Bolling
on the materiel, weapons, and technology which the Iranian
regime supplies to the Houthis in Yemen. It was really shocking
to see how clear it was, the relationship of providing weapons
to the Houthis by the Iranians. It made it pretty simple,
because some of the materiel there, the weapons were very
clear, in English, made in Iran. And with this, the Iranian
regime is the world's largest state sponsor for terrorism, and
use Houthis as a proxy.
And for Secretary West, how does our counterterrorism
strategy and CENTCOM [U.S. Central Command] area of
responsibility address the Iranian influence and sponsorship of
terror?
Secretary West. Sir, our national strategy in both Yemen
and Syria is stable areas, free of Iranian and terror
influence.
Mr. Wilson. And additionally, I appreciate that you have
had multiple deployments to Iraq. And you had firsthand
experience working with Iraqis. Can you speak on the importance
of maintaining a counterterrorism strategy in the region if the
United States and partner forces withdraw forces as has been
proposed in Syria? How would the terrorist organizations
proliferate or increase in the region?
Secretary West. Congressman, the President has stated that
we will have a long-term military presence in Iraq. This
partnership still evolves, but the Iraqis are our partners. I
believe it is critical to have a regional counterterror
footprint that spans the globe. And I think this is, again, one
of lessons that we learned over the 15-odd years of this war.
Mr. Wilson. And I appreciate very much your response to
that.
Additionally, while ISIS has lost significant territory
recently, social media still serves to accelerate the group's
ideology and network of influence. Again, Mr. Secretary, what
are the counterterrorism efforts to combat the proliferation of
ISIS ideology through social media?
Secretary West. Congressman, that is an excellent question,
because the ideology is very much alive and their will to fight
is very much alive through different media. I would like to get
to the specifics of that in the closed session. I think I can
answer that question with much more fidelity. Suffice it to say
that that has our utmost attention, but this is not just a DOD
problem. I think stepping back when we look at information
warfare and messaging against the ideology, we have got work to
do.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much.
And General Hecker, I am concerned about the reductions of
military personnel in Afghanistan, and the potential of
terrorists to regain safe havens as they did prior to 9/11.
Recently, in December of 2018, the administration announced a
reduction of forces. How does this policy impact our
counterterrorism activities?
General Hecker. Well, as you know, there is a lot of
ongoing diplomatic conversations that is going on between
Khalilzad, Ambassador Khalilzad and the Taliban as we go
forward here.
As the President mentioned last night in the State of the
Union address, it is going to depend on the success of those
negotiations on when and if, and how many U.S. forces are
pulled out of Afghanistan. So as we move forward, we will watch
closely with what our diplomatic efforts are, and then, we will
adjust accordingly based on how those efforts end up.
Mr. Wilson. And General also, recently, the Pentagon
announced a reduction in counterterrorism troops in Africa over
the next 3 years as part of a force optimization. What is being
done to maintain counterterrorism capability in the region? How
can we mitigate adverse impacts and prioritize the constrained
resources?
General Hecker. So because of the National Defense
Strategy, which is going to concentrate on peer power
competition, we have to get the assets from somewhere. So what
we started with is we started with Africa. And we went with
this Africa optimization model. Where can we pull troops where
we don't think the U.S. interest of an attack may come from,
and where we can do that? So we have done that with Africa. Now
we are going to do that throughout the rest of the world and
realize as we pull troops, we are going to use partner forces,
as well as the 127 Echo programs that we talked about to try to
maintain pressure on the enemy. My hunch is we will miss some
of these. We will pull some and we will go, hey, we are not
getting the pressure that we desire to make sure that our
country stays safe. So this is something, this optimization,
that we will continue to revisit monthly, basically, to make
sure that we have the pressure needed to keep the U.S. and
Western interests safe.
Mr. Wilson. I thank both of you for your testimony today.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Larsen.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. So thanks for coming,
gentlemen. Mr. Secretary and General, thanks for your comments
on 127e. That is, as I understand it, I guess the grandchild of
the 1206 and the 1208 programs that we created in the mid
2000s. I think I got that right. And then we codified those
into 127e. So these programs have been around for at least--the
authorities have been around for at least 10 years. And with
this focus on great power competition, have you at all
considered how using the 127e authorities, or other authorities
for partnership capacity, are going to be any less or more
successful than they were in the mid 2000s, given the fact that
we are going to be focused more on the great power competition
and less on CT? What is going to be different?
Secretary West. Congressman, you are right, the 127e
started as a modest fiscal authority of $10 million. It has
grown to $100 million per annum, thereabouts. There is a new
authority called 1202, which is purpose-built to get after the
problem you are talking about, it's irregular warfare. You are
going to start to see some of the CONOPS [concept of
operations] and proposals coming up to you soon, if you haven't
already. And I think this new authority going forward should be
grown in a similar way where we have to demonstrate its value
proposition to you, our board. But ultimately, I think this
should be as large as 127e.
Mr. Larsen. Well, it is going to have to be a little
different because if we were asking these questions in the mid
2000s, and we are asking them 10 to 12 years later and not
getting--and getting the same answers, it seems to me that
maybe we ought to be doing something different. Or it might not
be totally our fault. It might be the challenges that our
partners present as well. And because it may just be harder to
get them to change--some of the countries that we work with
maybe don't have our history, our culture, our commitment to
civil rights, human rights. And that causes a big problem for
us when we are trying to create these partners.
But on 127e, I want to go back to your answer from--to Mrs.
Davis, because despite repeated requests by this committee and
by the Senate Armed Services Committee, these execute orders
relating to operations haven't been provided on a consistent
basis. And to my understanding, we have been asking for at
least a year. So you said it was kind of new for us to ask. I
don't think a year makes it new. It gives us the impression
that you are holding back, and that you only provide these ex
orders when it is necessary to provide them because we are
putting holds on programs. So I guess I would really want to
push on you and get a commitment from you that you are going to
be sharing with this committee the ex orders that are governing
the Department's counterterrorism operations, and doing it
before we threaten you withholding money from other programs,
and rather just doing it in the interest of transparency. Can
we get that commitment today?
Secretary West. Sir, we are committed to agreeing to an MOU
[memorandum of understanding] to get the ex orders delivered to
you on a read-and-return basis.
Mr. Larsen. It sounds like a lot of process. I would just
like a ``yes'' answer.
Secretary West. Sir, it has been a long process. And I
understand your frustration. We are committed to working this
as quickly as possible.
Mr. Larsen. The title 10, section 130(f) also requires----
The Chairman. I am sorry. I will give you more time. But
what does ``as quickly as possible'' mean? Can you ballpark it
for us? It has been a year, so weeks?
That looks like a no.
Secretary West. We have had to run this, because it is a
new DOD policy, through review after review, but we are very
close in this negotiation.
The Chairman. That doesn't mean anything. Nothing you have
said in response to Mr. Larsen's question means anything. Okay?
So I would almost rather have you say, I have no idea, we are
working on it, who the hell knows? I mean, days, weeks, months?
Secretary West. Sir, if you will permit me, I will get you
that, an answer with granularity in the coming days.
The Chairman. We will anxiously await that. I apologize,
Mr. Larsen, go ahead.
Mr. Larsen. Yeah, thank you.
Mr. Secretary, would you say you are doing more aggressive
review of this decision than the Syria withdrawal decision?
Secretary West. I am sorry, sir. Could you repeat the
question.
Mr. Larsen. I think I made my point with it. I think you
are probably giving this more review than the review about
withdrawing from Syria from the Department's perspective. On
title 10 section 130(f), it requires notification within 48
hours. You mentioned that in response to Mrs. Davis' question.
And although notification, timing, and information is slowly
improving, it seems the administration hasn't complied
consistently with that requirement. So again, will you commit
to continuing to improve this process and these procedures for
the notification of these sensitive military operations to
Congress, as required by law?
Secretary West. Yes, sir.
Mr. Larsen. That wasn't so hard. Thank you. I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Lamborn.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for having
this hearing. Thank you both for what you do for our country.
I would like to ask a little bit about the forces in Iraq
that possibly have connections to Iran. We have seen evidence
that in the past Iranian-linked militias were able to access
resources, including even advanced defense weapon systems
through our train-and-equip mission that we provide the Iraqis.
And Iran is now lobbying hard for the Iraqi leader of the
Popular Mobilization Forces to become the next Minister of the
Interior. And then the Minister of the Interior oversees those
forces and all of Iraq's internal security, and we give them
$1.6 billion a year for their 20,000-person security forces. So
what are we doing to make sure that we are not ultimately
bankrolling Iranian-backed militias or politicians in Iraq? Mr.
West.
Secretary West. Sir, thank you. I am here in a
counterterror capacity, but I will say that we are absolutely
committed to the Iraqis as our partners, but this ultimately--
part of your question is ultimately up to the Iraqis. We
partner with them to protect and defend their sovereignty, but
I think this partnership, over the years, has continued to grow
and we will have a long-term presence in Iraq, which gets to
the heart of your questions.
Mr. Lamborn. General Hecker, do you have anything to add to
that?
General Hecker. I think the big thing for us, when we look
at this from a military perspective, is to make sure our
military members are able to be--the force protection is there
for them. We saw this with--we had to close the consul in
Mosul, because we had some what we thought were Shia kind of
militia groups that were throwing some IDFs [indirect fires]
that way. We have looked at the construction around the bases
that we are at to make sure that our troops will be safe from
any of these groups. But this is an Iraqi issue that we, with
State, need to work with them to make sure that they look at
this issue and take it seriously, because we need to make sure
that Iran doesn't have the influence. And we have a lot of
forces in the area to try to deter Iranian malign influence in
the area.
Mr. Lamborn. Ok, thank you both.
Changing gears, we know that title 10 military forces have
been deployed to bolster Homeland Security on the southern
border. In fact, we had a hearing about that here in this
committee recently.
So Mr. West, one of the six strategic objectives of the
national counterterrorism strategy is, quote, ``Americans are
prepared and protected from terrorist attacks in the homeland,
including through more exacting border security and law
enforcement actions,'' unquote.
So what kind of resources are we going to be able to give
to Homeland Security from title 10 forces or other assets that
will help accomplish that particular strategic objective,
especially as it pertains to southern border? I know there is
all kinds of Homeland Security ways of accessing--terrorists
can access our country. But I want to concentrate on the
southern border right now in particular.
Secretary West. Congressman, I will let General Hecker talk
about the details of the border deployment, which he has. But I
will say that in my judgment over the last 15 years, the
interagency partnership, and at the heart of your question, it
is, how do we work together to fuse intelligence with
operations to prevent penetration of the homeland, is really,
really good.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you.
General Hecker. And so far as upcoming deployments, we have
roughly 3,750 title 10 forces that will be coming to the
southern border over the next 30 days. We have 2,500 that will
go along the southern border and they will all be laying in the
167.5 miles of concertina wire. In addition to that, we have
roughly 1,100 forces that will be deploying to man the--to do
basically a surveillance kind of mission we call it the MSC
mission, mobile surveillance cameras, and they'll be looking at
that.
In addition, and this is new as of basically yesterday,
there is 20--or 49 buses that are coming up to the southern
border, just to the south of Del Rio in Texas. Based on that
threat, CBP [U.S. Customs and Border Protection] requested us
to help them at one specific point of--port of entry where
these roughly 2,000 people are on their way to. So over the--2
days ago, I think is--no, it was actually yesterday morning is
when we made the decision to call what we call a ``crisis
reaction force.'' So this is a force that can come and help out
at that one specific----
The Chairman. I am sorry. The gentleman's time has expired.
I should have explained that at the front to the witnesses,
when we get down to 5 minutes, we do try to move on.
We will just note for the record that as we talked and the
chairman noted we had the attack on 9/11. We have not had an
attack like that since. We have had other attacks, groups
affiliated with ISIS and other terrorist groups hit us in the
U.S. and exactly none of those people have come across our
southern border. So while we are talking about counterterrorism
here and throughout today's hearing, it is very difficult to
see any link between the southern border and the terrorism
attacks that we are talking about here, that is not where they
are coming in from. I just want to make sure the record
reflects that. And I yield to Mr. Garamendi.
Mr. Garamendi. It would be very useful to have a full
report immediately on the deployment of these troops to the
border, and a clear understanding of not only what they intend
to do there, but what they were doing before they were deployed
to the border. In other words, what ongoing task has been
degraded as a result of the deployment of the troops to the
border. Could you please develop that and get that to us
immediately?
And I would remind you that at the last hearing last week,
I asked for some specific information along that line. It has
just not yet been delivered. So thank you.
General Hecker. Congressman----
Mr. Garamendi. Going back to the issue of Syria, and the
pullout of Syria, and the reality that there really was no
strategic strategy behind the pullout tweet, we do know that
the major cities along the river valley have been destroyed,
literally leveled, beginning with Raqqa, Iraq, and then moving
on into Syria. I think your testimony, if I recall it
correctly, indicated that there is a significant potential for
a resurgence of ISIS in that area. Is that a result of the
destruction of the communities, the economy and the societies,
or is there some other reason that you anticipate a resurgence
of ISIS in those areas?
General Hecker. Congressman, are you addressing that
question to me?
Mr. Garamendi. I am sorry?
General Hecker. Is that question for me, sir?
Mr. Garamendi. Well, for both of you. You seem to want to
take a shot at it, go for it.
General Hecker. Sure, I will give it a shot, sir. I don't
remember saying that there is going to be a significant
resurgence of ISIS in the area. But I think there is a serious
risk if we do not keep the pressure on in both Syria and Iraq.
And I realize the concern is if we move our forces out of
Syria, that that may take some pressure off of the ISIS forces
in Syria. So our mission is to try to figure out how we can
continue to keep the pressure on in Syria without any boots on
the ground.
Mr. Garamendi. And how are you doing in that effort trying
to figure out?
General Hecker. So what we are doing is detailed military
planning, and our objectives are to safely remove our troops.
We have an objective to make sure that we finish up the last
little bit of the fight that is left there in the Middle
Euphrates Valley. And then we need to also make sure that the
security concerns of both the Turks and the security concerns
of the people that we just fought with, the SDF, are taken care
of.
Now I realize that is a very difficult task and it can't be
done just militarily. It also needs to have high diplomatic
levels of effort which Ambassador Jeffrey is working with the
SDF, with Turkey, and with coalition to see if we can have
coalition forces, SDF, in coming up with a plan to see what we
can do to try to keep the pressure on.
Mr. Garamendi. Jeffrey has replaced McCabe in this task of
working with the----
General Hecker. Ambassador Jeffrey is the one that is
currently working with both Turkey and the SDF on agreements.
Mr. Garamendi. How about the reconstruction of the cities,
and the economy, and the societies that have been pretty much
smashed? Mr. West.
Secretary West. Sir, the heart of your question is
stability operations, and is there going to be a vacuum now
that the U.S. has withdrawn. And we are doing our very best in
terms of what we can do as a military to prevent that vacuum
from being filled by malign actors.
Mr. Garamendi. Is there any reconstruction plan for the
communities and cities, or are you going to leave the fertile
ground of the destruction for ISIS to then flourish?
Secretary West. Sir, our orders are deliberate withdrawal.
But there is a coalition in place. So we certainly are not the
only actor there, and we certainly can support from afar.
Mr. Garamendi. My question isn't on the military side, it
is on the humanitarian side. Is there any plan?
The Chairman. I am sorry, we will have to take that one for
later. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you.
The Chairman. Mr. Wittman.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Major General Hecker
and Mr. West, thanks so much for joining us today.
I wanted to begin with Major General Hecker. This past
November, I traveled with my colleagues to Afghanistan to
really get a laydown of what is happening there. I had a chance
to meet with General Miller, President Ghani, to talk about
them--to them about what is happening with negotiations with
insurgent groups, specifically, the Taliban, and what is
happening in the reconciliation effort. And what we found out
was that from their perspective, it is going to take more than
political force and posturing to bring substantive change to
the dynamic that is happening between those insurgent groups
and U.S. forces and the Afghan Government.
I want to go to what Chairman Dunford said in early
December, I want to say his words. He said ``Reconciliation
between the Afghan Government and Taliban can only be achieved
by bringing sufficient political, social, and military pressure
on the insurgents to accept a negotiated settlement. And this
strategy would not work if the U.S. did not retain its
capability to bring military pressure on the insurgents to
accept the deal.''
And Major General Hecker, I know your experience there with
the 9th Air and Space Expeditionary Task Force in Afghanistan
as past commander and past commander of the NATO [North
Atlantic Treaty Organization] Air Command in Afghanistan. I
wanted to get your perspective about how you feel the drawdown
puts us in a position as far as being able to bring the
necessary military force to make sure that there is a
substantive and lasting opportunity for reconciliation between
the Taliban, and not just the United States forces, but most
specifically, the Afghan Government?
General Hecker. Yes, Congressman. Thanks for that question.
And I just don't want to presuppose that there is going to be a
drawdown. It is in relation to how the negotiations go. But
those different types of pressure that you talked about, it is
really the whole-of-government efforts that are going to be
required to make this happen. We see the ongoing efforts, you
know, socially, you know, with some of religious leaders and
how they have spoken up against some of the things that the
Taliban leaders are doing. So they are getting some social
pressure there. We are working the political pressure, albeit
it is early in its state with Ambassador Khalilzad and the
negotiations that he is working.
On the military side of the house, our desire is to keep
the pressure on the Taliban. We know that some of the Taliban
are in part of these negotiations, so we have kind of made a
distinction between Talibans. There is unreconcilable Taliban,
which we don't think will ever reconcile. And then there is
others that they are thinking about it. When I was in
Afghanistan, when I first showed up about a year and a half
ago, reconciliation wasn't in anyone's vocabulary. Since then,
we have had a ceasefire. So we have made progress, but we still
have a long ways to go. So what we need to do is keep pressure
on the nonreconcilable Taliban to help the negotiations that
the State Department and we are doing diplomatically to keep
the pressure on.
Mr. Wittman. Very good. Thank you, Major General Hecker.
Mr. West, I wanted to get your reflection on an article
that you wrote back in 2012 for a news outlet, better known as
Slate. And you wrote a series of pieces titled, ``Can the
United States Build a Foreign Army?'' And you wrote ``One
belief was constant, adviser teams work. I only wish some of
our predecessors had seen the eventual turnaround.'' So my
question for you is this: Do you believe that the Afghan
National Army [ANA] will have sufficient military advisers and
support to effectively combat the threat going into the future,
whether it is Taliban or al-Qaida? And are they ready for what
they will have to deal with, more of a U.S. hands-off approach,
and less U.S. presence, and maybe less U.S. support in the
train and advise and assist mission?
Secretary West. Sir, I am not well-versed enough in the ANA
to answer that specifically. I do believe that combat advisers
provide us--or combat multipliers, they provide us real
leverage, and the train, advise, assist mission is crucial.
Mr. Wittman. Let me ask another element too. The Army's
Security Force Assistance Brigades continue to bring a new Army
presence there, more permanent and more continuing ability to
help the Afghan National Army build capability and be effective
in the future. Do you believe that structure has long-lasting
opportunity there? And do you think that that should be a
continual presence there in helping the Afghan National Army
not only attain but to maintain capability to defeat insurgent
forces in that country?
Secretary West. Yes, sir.
Mr. Wittman. Okay. Very good.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Norcross.
Mr. Norcross. Thank you, Chairman. Thank the two of you for
coming before us today.
I want to focus a little bit more on the evaluation of the
Department's counterterrorism approach, the very focus of the
committee hearing today. And General, you mentioned something
that when you are assessing the threats across the Middle East,
but particularly focused in that area, that you need to take
troops from somewhere where the threat is not as great. Let's
take those words and we think about the threat assessment that
is going across Syria, Iraq, Iran, through that Middle East
area. You are suggesting that the threat on our southern border
is greater than the threat coming from the Middle East, and
that is why the troops would be going south?
General Hecker. No, Congressman. I am sorry. I was just
addressing the southern border with the question. I didn't mean
to impose that there are terrorists coming across the southern
border at all.
Mr. Norcross. Let me drill down. You said you make the
threat assessments and you take the troops from where the
threat is less and put them where there is more. And we just
talked about an additional 2,500 troops going to the southern
border, which would suggest by your own words that that is the
greatest threat taking place, because that is where you are
sending troops. Is that the case?
General Hecker. Uh-huh. So we--we were given, you know--we
were requested for assistance from Department of Homeland
Security on if we could put troops and help them out on some
gaps that they had on the southern border. We looked throughout
the forces, and we determined that we had some forces that we
could take and move down there. And we obviously sourced them
very carefully to make sure that they weren't about to go to
one of the areas that you were talking about, where they would
be supporting counterterrorism. And we have them go down there
for a short amount of time, and then come back in plenty of
time to get their readiness back up to speed before they go to
do counterterrorism type actions.
Mr. Norcross. So there is no impact to the force readiness
for counterterrorism by sending those 2,500 troops?
General Hecker. I won't go as far to say there is no
impact, but I will say that we have minimized that impact where
it is not that great.
Mr. Norcross. There have been times that you had been
requested for help that you haven't been able or you chose not
to answer the call for Homeland Security in the past.
General Hecker. Yes, sir, that is the case. As a matter of
fact, I mean, even in the recent past, they have asked for
things that we have not provided them.
Mr. Norcross. And we understand that. You make a threat
assessment throughout our world and put the troops where they
are needed. So is this one of the times that the threat has
diminished that we can send the troops there?
General Hecker. Where the----
Mr. Norcross. Send the troops to the southern border versus
elsewhere in the world.
General Hecker. I think we can send some troops down to the
southern border, if requested, to fill a gap. And we can do
that, but what we do before we do that is assess to make sure
that the readiness will not decrease to an extent where we
can't fulfill our other missions. And in this case, what we are
talking about is counterterrorist missions.
Mr. Norcross. Certainly appreciate that.
Just to follow up on the recruitment techniques because, A,
we are trying to stop the attacks now, but we are also trying
to stop the attacks from future--through recruitment. And that
brings me to my question. The government-as-a-whole approach,
there is a lot of rhetoric going on that talks about Muslim
bans, withdrawal from Syria.
Is this a positive thing that cuts down on the recruitment
in social media by our enemies? Mr. West, you certainly could
address that.
Secretary West. Sorry, sir, could you repeat the first part
of that question?
Mr. Norcross. We are talking about recruitment for the
future by terrorism groups across the board. Their use of
social media is quite high. It enables them to have a
tremendous reach. So, when we look at some of the things that
are taking place immediately, we are pulling out of Syria. Do
you see an uptick in their recruitment saying, ``The Americans
are leaving, we have a chance''? Is this a positive statement
when we say we are leaving?
Secretary West. We have not, to my knowledge, sir, seen an
uptick in recruitment as a result of the announcement to
withdraw from Syria.
Mr. Norcross. Thank you. I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Scott.
Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, I have a couple of questions about AFRICOM [U.S.
Africa Command]. And I was at Camp Lemonnier not too long ago
with a couple of other members. And questions then about AMISOM
[African Union Mission in Somalia] and whether or not it was
going to stay together. But the thing that struck me about Camp
Lemonnier was the lack of assets that it was General Furness at
the time had at his disposal.
And as we talk about the National Defense Strategy, I
recognize that China and Russia are the focus in that. But when
we start talking about pulling assets out of a region, that has
got to have an impact on how our partners feel about our
commitment to that region.
And so, with regard to Somalia in particular, there is
discussion in here about the terrorists that are in the south.
There are also terrorists that have moved into the north part
of Somalia as well. And as we talk about the assets, General,
what assets are being pulled out of Africa? Can that be
disclosed in here? I mean, it seemed to me that Camp Lemonnier,
quite honestly, needed significantly more assets, especially
with the Chinese and the activities that they are engaged in in
Djibouti.
General Hecker. I think it is hard to ever pull out any
assets. And I do think, as we go a little bit deeper on this
subject, I think it would be a little bit better if we did that
in a closed session and we will be happy to discuss that.
Mr. Scott. I know that Camp Lemonnier is in Djibouti, but
that is where the Somalia--those are the assets that we use for
the fight in Somalia.
A couple of other questions. As foreign fighters in Syria
and Iraq that are currently fighting for ISIS or other
terrorist groups, as we have seen the collapse of the
territory, as these fighters migrate into other regions, how is
that going to impact our National Security Strategy, and do we
expect these fighters to return to their homeland, or do we
expect these fighters to migrate to other areas, like the Horn
of Africa, where some of the others have set up camp?
Secretary West. Congressman, it is a good question. There
are a large number of foreign fighters that the SDF has
currently detained that we and our partners view as very high
threat. And then, as you mentioned, there are the 40,000-odd
fighters that infiltrated and those that remain who may go back
to their territories or may stay in the fight in Iraq and
Syria.
I think the broad assessment from the intelligence
community is both. That number one, we have got to stay very
connected with our international partnerships and begin to
track these folks; there is a biometric effort underway which
we can discuss in a closed session, to make sure that we are
connected and follow these folks. And then there is an
insurgency, where many of these people will simply go
underground in this same locale and stay in the fight until
they are captured or killed.
Mr. Scott. I would just, you know, again remind people that
Africa is larger than China, the U.S., India, and the majority
of Europe geographically. There are over a billion people on
the continent of Africa, better than 50 different states--or
countries, I should say, in Africa. A lot of challenges there.
Not possible to resolve it without the partnerships.
And I just want to make sure that as we talk about the
moving of any assets, that that is coordinated with our
partners in such a manner that they recognize that we are
committed to stamping out these terrorists, regardless of where
they are.
I yield the remainder of my time.
Gentlemen, thank you for your service.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Moulton.
Mr. Moulton. Gentlemen, thank you both for your service to
the country.
I just wanted to start, General Hecker, with you and the
withdrawal from Syria. We have talked a lot about how it is
important to keep up the pressure on ISIS, and that is one of
the most important lessons that we have learned overall from
the global war on terror. How does our precipitous withdrawal
from Syria, at the request of the Turkish President, keep up
the pressure on ISIS in Syria?
General Hecker. It is going to be a very difficult
situation. What we need to do is work with our allies, work
with the SDF, work with the surrounding countries, whether that
be Iraq, Jordan, or Turkey, on how we can keep the pressure on,
enabling some of our partnered forces outside of Syria without
having boots on the ground.
Mr. Moulton. So, General, what you are saying is it does
not keep up the pressure and so, therefore, it is going to be
difficult to do so.
General Hecker. No, I said it is going to be difficult to
keep up the pressure, but that is what we are doing. A detailed
plan----
Mr. Moulton. So you agree with my statement that it does
not keep up the pressure to withdraw from Syria?
General Hecker. I will say that there will be a decrease in
the amount of pressure that we will be able to apply, but we
will still be able to apply pressure.
Mr. Moulton. We are playing a game of semantics here, but
it is pretty clear it decreases the pressure.
Mr. West, your former boss, Secretary Mattis, disagreed
with the President's plan to withdraw from Syria. Do you think
he was wrong?
Secretary West. No, sir.
Mr. Moulton. Thank you very much. Mr. West, when Secretary
Carter came before the committee in 2017, he talked about a
mission statement for the war against ISIS, the fight against
ISIS. And he said, the mission statement is ``a victory over
ISIL [Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant] that sticks.'' Is
that still the mission statement from the Department?
Secretary West. Congressman, I am not sure what the
specific mission statement is, but I would say that, since that
time, ISIS has morphed, and so we will likely need a new
mission statement. What I mean by that is there is a physical
component to this fight. The physical caliphate is very nearly
defeated. And then there is a massive ideological and
underground network. They have globalized. We can talk in a
closed session about the number of countries they were in in
2014-2015 and the number of countries that have ISIS affiliates
today. So it is a different fight altogether.
Mr. Moulton. Mr. West, at the time General Dunford was
holding a meeting every 3 weeks with the Department of State.
And he stated that even so, he was not satisfied with the level
of coordination. I would offer that another critical lesson we
have learned from the global war on terror is that a military
solution alone doesn't defeat the terrorists. You need to have
a whole of government. You need to have a political plan.
General Dunford certainly recognized this, and he said that
even meeting every 3 weeks was not enough to do the
coordination that was required.
How has that improved over the last 8 months, that
coordination?
Secretary West. Sir, I can answer that, over the last
month, there has been a meeting that includes the State
Department and many agencies that occurs two or three times a
week.
Mr. Moulton. Mr. West, you spent a lot of time in Iraq, and
I am grateful for your service there. What is the current
purpose of U.S. troops in Iraq, and what is the counterterror
mission there?
Secretary West. Sir, I think the purpose is twofold. Number
one, we support the Iraqi Government; we still do some advising
and assisting of their security forces. And, number two, this
gives us regional reach.
Mr. Moulton. Mr. West, I would agree with those. You did
not mention countering Iran, which the President has stated is
a new mission for the troops in Iraq. Are you aware that
Congress has not given authorization to counter Iran?
Secretary West. Yes, sir.
Mr. Moulton. And are you aware that our troops are in Iraq
at the request of the Iraqi Government?
Secretary West. I am fully aware of that, sir.
Mr. Moulton. Mr. West, how do we deal with the fact that
Iraq has indicated that it is unwilling to continue hosting
American troops?
Secretary West. Sir, I think that is mixed, and we are
extremely hopeful that they will continue this relationship.
Mr. Moulton. Thank you.
One last question, General Hecker. We talked a lot about
the success of the war on terror and preventing terror attacks
at home, and there is some real truth to that. We also heard
that there are four times as many Sunni extremists now than
versus 9/11. How does the amount of territory compare? Do Sunni
extremists control more territory now than on 9/11 or less?
The Chairman. And if you could be fairly quick in that
answer, that would be helpful. The gentleman's time has
expired.
General Hecker. I will have to get back to get the exact
numbers on that.
[The information referred to is for official use only and
retained in the committee files.]
Mr. Moulton. Thank you, General. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Cook.
Mr. Cook. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank the witnesses for being here.
And, Mr. West, I appreciate your candid response to the
comment. General Mattis is going to be certainly missed. And in
the line of questioning, I am also one of those ones; I was a
product of the military. And for years, you had the State
Department over here and you had the Defense Department over
here and never the two shall mix. Maybe that is an
oversimplification of it, but that was a huge, huge problem.
And I want to go off script just a little bit, in light of
the fact that very, very concerned about some of our allies,
and I put that in quotes, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, the Emirates,
Qatar, maybe Egypt, and the issue of the Muslim Brotherhood,
which may have contributed, obviously, to the situation in
Turkey and the strain on our relations on many of these host
nations that we need so desperately if we are going to continue
the fight in the future and, of course, be a key ally to
Israel.
In your calculus, when you make that up, and I know we
talked about ISIS and we can talk about al-Qaida and Hamas and
Hezbollah and what have you, but the Muslim Brotherhood, at
least in regards to Turkey and Egypt and Saudi Arabia,
depending upon what side of the fence, it influences a lot of
these actions or decisions. Can you comment on that, please?
Mr. West. I will keep you in the hot seat for a while.
Secretary West. The Muslim Brotherhood is not a named
terrorist group, to my knowledge, by the State Department, nor
do we target them in counterterror operations.
Mr. Cook. No. The reason, I am looking at it more, and I am
going into foreign affairs. And, obviously, if they are going
to meddle in Egypt or they are going to create situations in
Qatar, which might strain relationships with Saudi Arabia or
the Emirates, and, of course, the bases that we have,
particularly in the UAE [United Arab Emirates] and Qatar, this
is going to be--and Turkey is a key NATO member.
And I am just saying that is not a variable or, in general,
maybe I am just worried about that situation and maybe I
shouldn't be.
Secretary West. Sir, I don't know enough about it to answer
your question.
Mr. Cook. General, from a military standpoint? NATO is
huge.
General Hecker. From a military standpoint, we have no
orders, you know, to go after the Brotherhood right now. So,
obviously, they have effects around the world. I am not as well
versed, as well, on this, but it is something that we can both
look at and give you some comments back on.
Mr. Cook. Okay. Thank you. I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Carbajal.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Violent ideologies can serve as a vehicle for legitimate
local grievances, ranging from the lack of economic opportunity
to political disenfranchisement and human rights abuses. How is
our current counterterrorism approach addressing these
underlying drivers of recruitment? To both of you.
Secretary West. Thank you, Congressman. The national
counterterror strategy does address this. This is a very, very
difficult problem, and we have not done well with this in the
past. I think broadly, from a DOD perspective, one of the
lessons we learned is that this is where we try to empower our
local partners. When we have tried to message, especially from
a military, to do counter, say, radicalization efforts, it has
been challenging, but we are seeing inroads at the local
grassroots level.
Mr. Carbajal. General.
General Hecker. I think a lot of this, you know, you have
to get to the nonkinetic effects. What can we do nonkinetically
to influence the amount of recruits that these radical
extremists are getting. And I think we are tackling that
problem, but I think we can put some more pressure there as
well.
Mr. Carbajal. The administration considers both Syria and
the Palestinian territories vulnerable to radicalization yet
pulled back nearly $200 million of reconstruction funds for
Syria as well as aid to the Palestinian civilians.
Do you agree that the administration's policy of slashing
reconstruction and stabilization funds is counterproductive and
actually makes it more difficult to effectively implement a
counterterrorism strategy, and especially when we talk about
the three points of pressure that we have heard, at least I
heard when I was in Afghanistan in December of 2017. The best
way to address many of these issues are diplomatic, social, and
militarily.
So what would you say to the slashing of those
reconstruction funds?
General Hecker. Unfortunately, I don't have the details of
why those funds were slashed, but I will agree with you that
reconstruction efforts do help prevent recruiting and further
radicalization, as long as you have security forces in place
that can make sure that the area stays relatively safe.
Mr. Carbajal. When do you think we might be able to get an
update on the progress of these three approaches, not just the
military approach that we oftentimes hear about, but the
diplomatic and the social combined as a cohesive
counterterrorism strategy?
General Hecker. It might be good, you know, instead of just
having military up here is maybe we have a hearing with our
State brethren, and we can talk some of the diplomatic
questions that come up at the same time. Because, you know, as
much as we try to get together, just like General Dunford said,
you know, three times a week isn't enough. Now, we do have the
Global Engagement Center, which is a State Department kind of
run thing, that we go over there pretty much weekly, and we try
to engage on things. We have different meetings on the Joint
Staff where we have Ambassador Khalilzad. We have Ambassador
Jeffrey. And that used to be a daily meeting when we were
talking Syria kind of things.
I think the more that we can work together with the other
interagencies, I think we have seen a military solution isn't
working, and we need to make sure that we include our
diplomatic efforts and the whole of government.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you. And, moreover, the environment
here at home affects the counterterrorism operations we carry
out globally. The fearmongering approach this administration
has pursued while alienating the Muslim population here at home
has only made it easier for terrorists to operate, especially
in terms of recruitment. A successful counterterrorism strategy
requires a whole-of-government approach, which means our
messaging and actions need to be consistent and aligned.
I would assume you agree with that.
General Hecker. Yes, Congressman.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you. I yield back.
The Chairman. Mr. Bacon.
Mr. Bacon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And Mr. West, thank you for being here.
And General Hecker, I should point out that I used to work
with a Colonel Hecker, a Brigadier General Hecker, and I got to
visit him in Afghanistan. And you have my utmost respect, you
both do. So thanks for being here.
I think a holistic strategy is required to defeat ISIS and
al-Qaida. Kinetic targeting, going after their finances, the
internet and how they do their recruiting, their ideology.
Is there an area that you think that we are a little light
on that we need to put more emphasis in a holistic strategy?
Secretary West. Yes, sir, the ability of terrorists to use
cyberspace as their stage.
Mr. Bacon. So more focus on going after the cyber arena.
How do we do a better job with the ideology portion? It
seems to me that is their center of gravity. I know we may talk
about this in the next forum, but this is what they use to
recruit through the cyber, and I don't know how we do a good
job in trying to counter that ideology.
Can you expand on that at all? How do we go about doing
that? Can we do that on our own, or do we have to use our
moderate allies, for example?
Secretary West. Sir, for specific tactics, in a closed
session, we can go over exactly what we are trying to do in
cyberspace, and I think it has been very effective. But
stepping back more broadly, in terms of the ideology, it
absolutely must run through our local partners.
Mr. Bacon. Okay. Do we have any evidence of state
sponsorship of ISIS or al-Qaida at this point? I know we did
the previous decade.
Secretary West. Sir, that is a question for the
intelligence community. Not to my knowledge.
Mr. Bacon. Let me just maybe do one follow-on. About a
decade ago, we knew that Iran was harboring or sheltering some
al-Qaida leadership. Do we have any evidence that we can talk
about in this forum if that is continuing?
Secretary West. We cannot talk about that in this forum,
sir.
Mr. Bacon. I appreciate the word ``deliberate'' when we
talk about the pullout out of Syria. I think it requires a very
deliberate process. I think you have bipartisan concern here
that if we don't do this right, we will allow ISIS to
reconstitute, and that would be a tragic mistake.
One last question: In regards to the talks with the
Taliban, is the Afghanistan Government involved in these talks?
General Hecker. I think so. What you have seen so far is
the initial, you know, diplomatic efforts, but I think, to get
a closure to this, it can't just be between the U.S. and the
Taliban. It needs to have President Ghani. It needs to have the
Afghan Government and the Taliban that will sit down together
and come up with an agreed-upon reconciliation. And I know that
the diplomatic efforts that we are doing right now are going
towards that goal.
Mr. Bacon. I was a little concerned with the reporting
yesterday that show that the government has not been involved.
It seems to me that they need to be an integral part of this.
So, gentlemen, thank you for being here, appreciate both of
you and your leadership.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Brown.
Mr. Brown. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I didn't think I would necessarily be asking about
terrorism at the southwest border in today's hearing, and I
didn't think I would because, as I went through the 25-page
National Strategy for Counterterrorism, the Western Hemisphere,
other than passing reference to the homeland, there is no
mention of the Western Hemisphere. There is mention of Africa
and Asia, Europe, and the Middle East. There are 25 references
to specific countries in the Middle East, and no references to
any nation in South, Central America.
But, General Hecker, you made a comment that adds to the
confusion that I have about the administration's analysis or
assessment of the terrorist threat at the southern border. So
let me ask this question, maybe you can clarify.
Early January, the press office in the White House said
4,000 known or suspected terrorists come into our country. The
most vulnerable points of entry are at our southern border.
Days later, the DHS Secretary says 3,000 special interest
aliens, which she defined as those terrorist travel patterns
and/or known or suspected ties to terrorism. She says 3,000 and
that we have seen a twofold or an increase at the southwest
border.
Now, the State Department has downplayed that. But your
comment in response to a question and your reference to 49
buses from the southern border, I just need you to clarify. Do
we have a terrorist threat in the Western Hemisphere that is
based in Central America and that is moving northward,
northerly, to our southwest border?
General Hecker. I am not aware of any terrorist threat on
those 49 buses. And I didn't mean to imply that there are any
terrorists on those 49 buses. We were just asked to help
because we were getting a massing of a caravan of roughly 2,000
people, of which I am not aware that there is a single
terrorist in there, and I didn't mean to imply that.
Mr. Brown. Okay, and I appreciate that. You also mentioned
but you couldn't complete a crisis reaction force. You
mentioned that in the context of Active Duty, you know, new
Active Duty deployments to the southwest border. Are those
deployments to the southwest border, the most recent Active
Duty deployments, the types of forces that we typically deploy
in a counterterrorist operation?
General Hecker. No. Okay. I think I see where the--what we
had is we have Reserve forces that we call crisis reaction
forces that were just going to be used against the southern
border in case there was a mass at one of the points of entry.
Mr. Brown. Okay, I got that. We had a briefing last week. I
just want a clarification that we are not deploying special
operators----
General Hecker. No, no.
Mr. Brown [continuing]. Special forces, SOCOM [U.S. Special
Operations Command] forces, to the southwest border because of
some perceived or fabricated concern of a terrorist threat.
General Hecker. These are engineers and cops is basically
what it is, and it is the most recent, and it is roughly 240
people that left yesterday.
Mr. Brown. Okay, thank you. Let me shift my question. It
sort of picks up where Representative Carbajal and Moulton
were. Beginning with the Bush administration--this may be more
for Mr. West--the United States made a concerted effort to use
foreign aid as an instrument in countering terrorism. During
the Obama Presidency and under Republican majority Congresses,
foreign aid was funded at a fairly constant level of
approximately $50 billion annually.
The National Strategy for Counterterrorism, which was
released in October, as you know, declares that we will, quote,
``use all available instruments of United States power to
counter terrorism,'' unquote. Yet President Trump's budget, his
budgets in each of the last 2 years has reduced foreign aid by
25 percent each year, only to have it restored by Congress.
Do you believe that reducing foreign aid by this amount
supports our strategy of using all instruments available to the
United States?
Secretary West. No, Congressman, I don't.
Mr. Brown. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Gallagher.
Mr. Gallagher. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. West, what is the goal of Ansar Allah in Yemen?
Secretary West. I think we should take that into a closed
session, Congressman, if we may.
Mr. Gallagher. I would submit that the organization's
formal slogan--death to America, death to Israel, curse upon
the Jews, victory to Islam--gives us a sense of the general
direction. If the U.S. withdrew its forces from Yemen, would it
negatively impact the Saudi-led coalition's ability to defeat
Ansar Allah?
Secretary West. So I want to make clear that our
counterterror operations in Yemen are absolutely distinct from
the Houthi-Saudi war.
Mr. Gallagher. So what are our goals with respect to the
Houthi movement and any Iranian presence in Yemen?
Secretary West. Sir, our counterterror goals are distinct
from the two actors you mentioned. Again, we in Yemen
specifically and with limits target AQAP and the ISIS Yemen
factions.
Mr. Gallagher. In 2015, Houthi rebels obtained as many as 6
operational launchers and 33 Scud-B short-range ballistic
missiles. Do you assess that the Houthis are working to acquire
additional weapons, such as antiship missiles, from Iran?
Secretary West. I don't have any information to indicate
that, Congressman.
Mr. Gallagher. If we were to withdraw any support to our
regional partners from Yemen, would it, in your opinion, ease
the ability of the Houthis to acquire additional advanced
weapons in Yemen?
Secretary West. It depends which troops, but broadly, yes,
Congressman.
Mr. Gallagher. In 2016, the Houthis fired at the USS Mason.
Do you assess that the Houthis still have a desire to attack
U.S. Navy or civilian ships in the area?
Secretary West. That is an intelligence question, sir, and
I don't have the answer to it.
Mr. Gallagher. If provided an opportunity, what kind of
threat might Houthi or Iranian military power in Yemen pose to
the free flow of commerce through the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait?
Secretary West. Sir, I believe that roughly 10 to 20
percent of global oil flows go through the strait, perhaps a
little more. So it is a key strategic choke point.
Mr. Gallagher. So I guess more broadly, I understand that
our mission there, as you put it, is narrowly focused on al-
Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, other Sunni terrorist groups
that might threaten our interest. Should we consider
designating a group like Ansar Allah as a foreign terrorist
organization?
Secretary West. Sir, I think that is more appropriately
taken on by the intelligence community, just because I lack the
underlying information to make that decision.
Mr. Gallagher. And looking more broadly across the region,
as you pursue your counterterrorism goals, would it be fair to
say that ISIS is sort of your number one priority in the Middle
East, or ISIS combined with al-Qaida and its adherents? How
then do you assess Iranian terrorist proxies in the region? In
other words, let me put it differently. If our goal--and I
think it is the administration's regional policy to roll back
Iranian influence; correct me if I am wrong on that point--but
if that is the goal, then what is our posture with respect to
Lebanese Hezbollah and other Iranian proxies in the region?
Secretary West. Sir, this is an authorities question
largely, but to what the basic goals are and when we talked
about prioritization, our first priority as laid out in the
National Counterterrorist Strategy is to hit those groups that
are directly threatening the homeland. The Iranians are not
doing that.
Mr. Gallagher. Thank you. I yield the balance of my time.
The Chairman. Thank you. If I could, just a couple quick
followups there because I think that is a real issue in Yemen.
Long before the current Houthi uprising, we had an interest in
Yemen because, well, al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula was
present there--and this was mentioned in opening statements--
tried to conduct attacks against the U.S.
But would you consider the Houthis to be an aspiring
transnational terrorist group, or are they more interested in
what is going on in Yemen specifically and in their interests
there? I mean, when you are looking at all these different
threats, personally, it doesn't seem to me that that is what
the Houthis are trying to do. Now, there is still an al-Qaida
in there. And I will emphasize that those of us who are
concerned about the Saudi Arabia and UAE campaign against the
Houthis have always been clear: we do not want to withdraw our
effort to contain the terrorism threat coming out of Yemen.
But the terrorism threat is not the same thing as what the
Houthis are doing. Is that not correct? Not to say that there
isn't a problem there, but the Houthis are not actually an
aspiring transnational terrorist group, are they, in your
estimation? Is that part of your planning is considering that
they might be planning those sorts of attacks?
Secretary West. Sir, they are not.
The Chairman. Okay.
Mr. Keating.
Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. West, your office has been tasked with the oversight of
U.S. Special Operations and Command, and you have policy
oversight over strategic capabilities and force transformation.
One of our strongest tools I think that we have in
combating terrorism is our civilian workforce, and could you
share with us how involved they are with the Pentagon and the
various combatant command J2s [intelligence directorates], and
how mission critical these civilians are, and how often they
are deployed in the zones, in war zones?
Secretary West. Sir, the civilian-military partnership is
crucial. And U.S. SOCOM, as you mentioned--and thank you for
bringing it up--our special operations forces around the globe
represent about 2 to 3 percent of the force, but have taken
about 40 percent of the overall casualties in the last 2 years.
But from what I have witnessed sitting in this seat for
about 14 months, the partnership with civilians is excellent
and there is a lot of intellectual firepower that comes in
those ranks as well.
Mr. Keating. Thank you. And your responsibility too, our
office would really look forward to working with you to
incentivize, you know, the civilian-military people too and
make sure that some of the treatment they get, for instance, if
they are deployed in a combat zone that the same creditor kind
of relief might be applied. So we would like to work with your
office on that in the future, and thank you for your comments
in that regard.
Quickly, this week the lead inspector general put out a
report that gave a status update on OIR [Operation Inherent
Resolve], the military campaign against ISIS in Iraq and Syria.
There are a couple of quotes I would like to share from that.
``If Sunni socioeconomic, political, and sectarian grievances
are not adequately addressed by the national and local
governments of Iraq and Syria, it is likely''--``very likely,''
I think they said--``that ISIS will have the opportunity to set
conditions for future resurgence and territorial control.''
They also went on to say that ``absent sustained
counterterrorism pressure, ISIS could likely resurge in Syria
within 6 to 12 months.''
So do you believe that and have any confidence that the
Sunni grievances will be addressed so that the conditions are
not in place for a resurgence of ISIS that way, those
underlying Sunni grievances that were quoted in this report?
Secretary West. Sir, that question might be more
appropriately answered by my regional counterpart, but I will
say that I read the report that many of the conditions that
gave rise to ISIS still exist, with one major exception, and
that is the SDF and the international coalition that is there
right now.
And, in my judgment and as General Votel said yesterday, he
has supreme confidence that our special operations forces and
conventional forces, along with our allies, can continue to
keep up the pressure to prevent a resurgence.
Mr. Keating. Thank you. I think the other questions I have
will be dealt with in a different setting, so I yield back, Mr.
Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Waltz.
Mr. Waltz. Thanks so much for coming today. I appreciate
your time.
I am struck by your title here of the handout: Conditions
favor expanded ISIS network insurgency in 2019, showing the
growth from 2013 to 2018 worldwide. Would you agree that the
statement that ISIS may be defeated as a caliphate in Iraq and
Syria but is not defeated as a movement?
Secretary West. Yes, sir, I do agree with that.
Mr. Waltz. Okay. And I think I have heard you say--and I am
a Green Beret by background so I certainly buy into this--that
by, with, and through is kind of the operative strategy for
defeating ISIS, particularly in Syria.
Secretary West. Yes, sir.
Mr. Waltz. Okay. So ``with'' is a key term there. And, as I
understand the pullout strategy, we will no longer be with our
allies on the ground. Is that correct?
Secretary West. We will not be co-located, sir.
Mr. Waltz. So I heard you mention remote advise and assist,
and I think referenced that was successful in the past. I don't
know that I would agree with that statement, that it was
successful under the Obama administration; hence, why we had
such a burgeoning caliphate in the first place.
So can you explain to me how we plan to conduct remote
advise and assist? And if we need to take this in the other
setting, that is fine.
Secretary West. Sir, I would prefer we take this in the
other setting. And both General Hecker and I can directly
address this question.
Mr. Waltz. Okay. Would you just agree then that it is more
effective to be with on the ground, from an air strike
capability, from understanding who is who and the human
terrain, and just generally being more effective, is it more
effective to be with than to not be with?
Secretary West. Congressman, it is much more effective to
be co-located with your partners.
Mr. Waltz. Okay. So is the objective now, as you understand
the strategy, to withdraw or to win and stabilize that region
so that we no longer suffer attacks in the United States and
with our allies? Which is the strategic objective, to get out
or to be successful?
Secretary West. The strategic objective is to prevent an
attack on the homeland, even from this region and from Syria.
The order we have been given is a deliberate withdrawal while
continuing the fight in the MERV [Middle Euphrates River
Valley].
Mr. Waltz. Even though we are more effective, though, with
and on the ground. So we now have a less effective means to
achieve that objective. Do you agree with that statement? We
will not be as effective remotely as we will on the ground with
a small force presence?
Secretary West. Sir, militarily, we would be less
effective.
Mr. Waltz. Separately, related to Syria but separately, the
Idlib pocket where al-Qaida still has a presence, what is our
counterterrorism strategy for affecting al-Qaida and degrading
and continue the destruction of al-Qaida in that pocket?
Secretary West. Congressman, that is a very important
question that we need to take to a closed setting.
Mr. Waltz. Would you say that Turkey has the same
counterterrorism, counterinsurgency military capability as the
United States?
General Hecker. No, Congressman.
Mr. Waltz. Okay. So we have two questions here. We have
Turkey's will to take on ISIS, which I would submit Turkey is
much more concerned with the Kurds than with ISIS. But then we
also have the capability. And if you look at the geography down
in the MERV, the Euphrates River Valley where ISIS remains, all
the way in the southern part of Syria and then Turkey in the
north, would you say, in your military opinion, that Turkey has
the ability, the capability to destroy and to keep ISIS
suppressed in that pocket?
General Hecker. Not without help.
Mr. Waltz. With whose help?
General Hecker. Either our help or other allies' help.
Mr. Waltz. Okay. Separately, just my time remaining, to
Afghanistan, the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, spent a little
bit of time there. Half the world's terrorist organizations
still exist there.
Do you think the Taliban has the capability--assuming that
we buy into the fact that they have the will, do they have the
capability to keep ISIS and al-Qaida out of Afghanistan?
General Hecker. When you say ``out,'' you know, zero, no.
Mr. Waltz. Well, training camps, the ability to then stage
attacks on the United States and West. Does the Taliban,
setting will aside, which I think is highly debatable, do they
have the capability, the military capability if they renounce
those groups to then keep them suppressed?
General Hecker. I think assuming the government has come
together and you now have Taliban as well as the ANASOF [Afghan
National Army Special Operations Forces] and ANA, and they are
all working together----
Mr. Waltz. Working together, big assumption.
General Hecker [continuing]. Which is a huge----
The Chairman. Sorry. We are going to have to cut this off,
and you can continue in closed. I want to get to other members.
Mr. Kim.
Mr. Kim. Yes. Thank you so much.
I appreciate everything that you said so far. I just wanted
to delve into a few things. Certainly, with the loss of
physical space that ISIS has had in Iraq and Syria, that is one
measure of progress, but we know never to underestimate the
threat that is faced.
I remember in the early days of Operation Inherent Resolve,
General Dempsey at the time often always talked about an
enduring security, that that was the goal this time. That,
during my lifetime, we have had three wars in Iraq, every 12
years of my life. How do we make sure that this is one that is
going to be an enduring security going forward, that we measure
this only by whether or not it is our last war in Iraq as the
benchmark for success?
On that front, you talked about in your written statement
that Operation Inherent Resolve provides an excellent template
for future operations. While I agree that certainly that could
be the case for when we face a crisis situation as we did in
2013-2014, we hope that we are not in that kind of situation
again where it requires that level of terrorist threat before
we take some actions of that magnitude.
Now, what got us in that situation in the first place was
the failure to prevent these types of crises. Now, what I saw
was both the rapid rise of ISIS, but also the rapid attrition
and degradation of the skills and capabilities of the Iraqi
security forces from all levels, including some of the most
high-performing elements like the Counterterrorism Services,
CTS. So while I certainly think the train, advise, assist
mission that we have engaged in has been successful in
bolstering up those capabilities, what I still don't understand
is, what is the long-term goal and what are we trying to get
towards so that we can ensure that there is going to be an
enduring security that doesn't require a constant train,
advise, assist physical presence on the ground?
So I wanted to ask, what are we doing differently this
time? What does success look like for us when it comes to the
train, advise, assist to make sure that those skills don't
degrade and degradate?
General Hecker. Well, what I can tell you is, you know, the
CTS took a pretty hard hit when they cleared out ISIS over the
last 2 or 3 years. Their numbers decreased. The Iraqi National
Army took a lot of casualties as we went through. So we are
building back up, but they are a little bit tired, and we have
got to get their readiness going.
It is going to take kind of like what we have, you know, in
our forces. It is going to take the CTS doing special ops
stuff, and it is going to take the Iraqi National Army to build
up and work together cohesively along with an air force. Now,
we have elements that are training all three of those in Iraq.
So we just stood up a Canadian two-star command, the NATO, it
is called NATO Mission in Iraq, just stood up here a couple
months ago, and they are going to be concentrating on the
conventional forces. We have an Air Force wing that is out
there, U.S. Air Force, that is teaching them how to fly F-16s
and other sorts of aircraft. And then we have the CT force.
And what we are trying to do is put that all together and
make sure that they know how to interact well with one another.
But that is going to be an ongoing mission before they can
interact and be able to take care of these terrorists
themselves.
Mr. Kim. That is helpful. I think for me, where I am having
trouble understanding the full totality is there will always be
a use for train, advise, and assist. They will always be useful
to helping the Iraqi security forces, but what is the actual
metric by which we are measuring when we no longer need a
physical presence of American soldiers on the ground to be able
to help them do that?
General Hecker. I think the metric is going to be when, you
know, you have train, advise, assist, accompany. If you can get
rid of the accompany and just do train, advise, assist. And
then if you can get rid of the assist, i.e., the enablers,
right, some of our ISR [intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance] assets stuff. And then you are just training.
And then the obviously big metric is when you don't have to do
any of it, and they can take care of this all by themselves.
So I think you just kind of peel back the level of effort
that we are participating in the CT mission, and as you peel
that back, those are your metrics.
Mr. Kim. That is helpful. I think just to conclude here, my
concern here is that we have invested a significant amount in
helping the Iraqi security forces and CTS. When I see that
these metrics weren't engaged in the way that you would just
talk to me about on the Syria side, I worry about how we are
going to be engaging on the Iraq side of the equation here.
Just with my last second, I did want to just point out
something, which is with the Global Engagement Center that you
talked about before, we still, after 2 years, don't have a
director appointed to that center. So these are the types of
efforts that we need to move forward on so the administration
is strong on that civilian-military partnership. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
I will point out we are going to stop at noon because I
want to get to the classified setting. So we will get to as
many people as we can, but that is just the way it is going to
have to happen.
Mr. Banks.
Mr. Banks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, in your opening statement, you say, you write,
quote, ``We assess that both ISIS and al-Qaida are degraded.''
Is it not true that ISIS-K [Islamic State of Iraq and
Syria-Khorasan Province] is growing in Afghanistan?
General Hecker. I don't have indications they are growing.
In the classified session, I can give you the current numbers
that we have in Afghanistan, but I will tell you that the al-
Qaida numbers in Afghanistan are extremely low.
Mr. Banks. But ISIS-K, you can't say for the record whether
ISIS-K is growing in Afghanistan?
General Hecker. I have not seen that.
Mr. Banks. It is well reported that ISIS-K is growing in
Afghanistan. You don't agree with that?
General Hecker. I would agree that it has been state----
Mr. Banks. Mr. West, would you agree that ISIS-K is growing
in Afghanistan today?
Secretary West. Sir, on balance, if we subtract their
casualties, our estimated casualties that we have inflicted on
them from their numbers a couple years ago, I think the answer
is yes.
Mr. Banks. Okay. Do we believe that ISIS-K potentially
poses a threat to the homeland?
Secretary West. The intelligence community believes that,
yes, sir.
Mr. Banks. General Votel was quoted recently saying, quote,
``We have no illusions about reconciliation with ISIS-K. Our
mission is to destroy this organization,'' end quote.
How do we destroy ISIS-K if we pull out of Afghanistan, Mr.
West?
Secretary West. Sir, first, we have received no orders to
pull out of Afghanistan and our CT mission there remains
exactly the same, which is focus, and ruthless focus, on ISIS-K
and al-Qaida.
Mr. Banks. General, can you describe the threat that ISIS-K
poses that makes them different from the Taliban?
General Hecker. Their tactics are pretty ruthless. We see
some of the things that they do. They like high-profile
attacks. They like to go to downtown Kabul and take a suicide
bomber and get as many civilians around them as they can and
blow themselves up.
Mr. Banks. Is it easy to speculate that if we did draw down
substantially or pull out of Afghanistan, that ISIS-K would
pose a greater threat to the stability of Afghanistan than the
Taliban?
General Hecker. I think it depends under, you know, what
metric we withdraw and what reconciliation efforts Ambassador
Khalilzad was able to make. I think if we have a united Taliban
with the forces that we have been building up along and they
choose--big if, right--but if they choose to take on ISIS, I
think there is a time in the future where we could see them,
you know, keeping ISIS at bay.
Mr. Banks. Mr. West, would you agree with that?
Secretary West. I think that is a question for intelligence
community as well, sir. And I am not as well informed on the
issues or implications, and I think that requires some
speculation to answer that well.
Mr. Banks. I understand you haven't received orders to
withdraw from Afghanistan or to substantially draw down, but
there has been a lot--you would agree that that appears to be
the way forward that this administration is forecasting.
Could you not agree, though, that that would be a dangerous
path forward if ISIS-K is growing, with the nature of the
threat that they pose, to not just the stability of Afghanistan
but as a threat to the homeland?
Secretary West. The way I would articulate it is, is that a
significant or sudden drawdown of our counterterror ability or
footprint would be a risk.
Mr. Banks. Thank you.
I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Cisneros.
Mr. Cisneros. Thank you, gentlemen, for being here this
morning.
I just want to follow up on our earlier question about the
radicalization. We know these terrorist groups have done very
well at using technology, basically the internet, to push forth
their propaganda and to recruit. Can you give me some
information on what we are doing to prevent the recruitment of
new members and the radicalization of individuals online?
General Hecker. Congressman, I would be happy to give you
that information in a closed session. I think there have been a
couple other questions along that line, and I can give you some
specifics.
Mr. Cisneros. Thank you.
I yield back my time.
The Chairman. Mrs. Hartzler.
Mrs. Hartzler. Thank you very much.
Thank you, gentlemen. I appreciate your work. We know that
we have had the degradation of ISIS in Syria and Iraq, and that
is very encouraging, but as we have heard, those ISIS fighters
are going across the world. And I was in the Philippines last
year and very concerned with the growth of the foreign fighters
there and ISIS growing. We know, in 2017, an ISIS-affiliated
group took over the city of Marawi for 5 months. And just last
month, we had a suicide bombing that killed 20 people, wounding
100 more in the Philippines.
So can you speak to the Department's assessment of ISIS's
current operational capacity in the Indo-Pacific region and
then address what the DOD partnership building efforts are in
that state?
Secretary West. Yes, Congresswoman. From a DOD perspective,
this is a very big problem, because this franchise, for lack of
a better term, that has grown up, some of it formed from the
former Abu Sayyaf but now affiliating themselves with ISIS, has
taken the tactic of suicide bombing and employed it. This is a
very difficult tactic to combat, and it does require the same
basic template that we have begun to use the world over, which
is a local partnership, some fiscal authorities, but then some
presence of U.S. forces to help them target and track, because
this is now happening at both a group level but also an
individual level, in terms of what we might call here lone-wolf
attacks.
Mrs. Hartzler. Would you say that the ISIS involvement
there and presence is increasing or decreasing? Do you think we
are getting a handle on this, or is this just burgeoning out of
control?
Secretary West. Congresswoman, my intelligence counterparts
are better informed. I would say we don't know whether we are
at the outset of what will be a long-term trend in terms of the
migration of this ideology and an end-state where you have
folks committing attacks on a regular basis.
Mrs. Hartzler. Okay, great. Just switching gears, ISIS grew
due to the very active recruitment efforts, which I am looking
forward to hearing what we are doing to counter some of the
social media recruitment, but also there was a real problem in
the beginning with financing. I believe the report that we were
given, $30 million a month in revenue ISIS was bringing in
there initially, and now it is down to $1.2 million a month in
2018, if I read that right.
But what is the status of the financing? Because that was
certainly a concern that helped fuel their rapid expansion
there initially. So how successful are we on cutting off their
financing, where is it coming from, and what are we doing to
target that?
General Hecker. Congresswoman, are you particularly talking
about the financing in the Philippines?
Mrs. Hartzler. No, just ISIS in general.
General Hecker. Just ISIS in general?
Mrs. Hartzler. Yes.
General Hecker. I have some numbers that I pulled from a
classified source that I can tell you about in the next
meeting, but I can say I think at this level, very broadly,
that ISIS's core has a relatively significant amount in their
coffers, if you will. Very little, though, in the Philippine
area there.
Mrs. Hartzler. Well, initially they got a lot of that
through taking over the oil rigs and shipping the oil over
through Turkey and then the kidnapping and asking for ransom
and things. So what methodologies are we seeing maybe still
financing? Or maybe that should be in our next setting. How are
they being financed?
General Hecker. I think we can broadly talk about it. The
oil is not there pretty much anymore, but now it is more of the
robberies, it is more of the kidnapping for ransoms, and those
kind of activities.
Mrs. Hartzler. Okay. Thank you very much.
I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you. Ms. Houlahan.
Ms. Houlahan. Thank you, gentlemen. I am sorry. I was just
in a meeting on Yemen, and I understand that a bit of my
question was asked already, but I will ask it more broadly.
What is your assessment of our competitors' support for
proxy groups that counter our national security objectives, and
do you see more Russian weapon sales or Iranian support for
proxy groups and militias on the rise, and if so, where other
than Yemen?
Secretary West. Thank you, Congresswoman. Broadly, yes,
proxy warfare is on the rise. Indeed, while warfare's nature
doesn't change, its face has changed in the last decade. And
specifically, as you pointed out, great powers are now
competing and in an irregular space, and we must quickly
adjust.
Ms. Houlahan. And my second question has to do with whether
or not you see either a rise in competition or an increasing
competition between al-Qaida and ISIS, and is that contributing
in Africa to any sort of anxiety that you have that there will
be an increased influence of terrorist groups like ISIS and al-
Qaida?
Secretary West. Congresswoman, I do know that, you know,
following the split in February of 2014, I believe, from ISIS
and al-Qaida in West Africa, as you point out, these groups'
affiliations, we have had mergers and then splits.
Stepping back, I am not sure it matters much to us except
for the fact that we have got to carefully prioritize these
threats and allocate the appropriate resources to them. What I
mean by that is terrorists with local ambition or little
capability do not deserve the same footprint or resources as
those who have demonstrated the capability and will to strike
the homeland.
Ms. Houlahan. And do you think if we pull out in any sort
of meaningful way from participating in Yemen that there will
be sort of a vacuum created between any of those groups that
will increase the competition and will allow for an increased
threat in the terms of sort of terrorism from al-Qaida or ISIS?
Secretary West. In Yemen, in terms of our counterterror
strategy, we are ruthlessly focused on al-Qaida and ISIS, and
we should continue to have a presence because these groups have
not only threatened us but demonstrated the capability to do so
against the homeland.
Ms. Houlahan. Thank you, gentlemen.
The Chairman. Okay. We are going to wrap up and go upstairs
for the classified briefing, but, Mr. Thornberry has a
followup. We will wrap up with that, and then we are going to
go upstairs to 2212.
Mr. Thornberry. Mr. West, I want to follow up on an answer
you gave to Mr. Gallagher a while ago about Iran's intention or
efforts to conduct terrorist attacks inside the United States.
I noticed that last week, in his World Threat Assessment, the
Director of National Intelligence listed at least two incidents
in his chart where Lebanese Hezbollah had attack planning
disrupted, including operatives detained, arrested, discovery
of weapons, explosive caches, detection of surveillance inside
the United States.
Now, I presume that you would not disagree that at least
their proxies have made efforts to conduct terrorist attacks
inside the United States?
Secretary West. That author is far more informed than I am,
Congressman.
Mr. Thornberry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
All right. We are adjourned. And we will reconvene probably
like 5 minutes, maybe 10 if the gentlemen need a brief break,
upstairs in 2212. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 11:48 a.m., the committee proceeded in
closed session.]
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A P P E N D I X
February 6, 2019
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
February 6, 2019
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[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
February 6, 2019
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GALLEGO
Mr. Gallego. I understand that there have been efforts to implement
changes and recommendations of AFRICOM's investigation into the ambush
in October 2017 that resulted in the deaths of four U.S. soldiers and a
number of Nigerien soldiers accompanying the unit in question. What
changes to policy have been made?
Mr. West. As a result of the Niger investigation report, then-
Secretary Mattis directed U.S. Africa Command, U.S. Special Operations
Command, the Department of the Army, and the Under Secretary of Defense
for Personnel and Readiness to conduct a comprehensive review of
procedures, policies, and training programs and report back to him with
a plan of action and corrective measures. The Acting Secretary of
Defense is currently reviewing these reports and all commendatory and
disciplinary actions related to the attack. After the Acting
Secretary's review, we will provide an update on the measures taken
consistent with the Niger investigation report to mitigate risk to and
increase the preparedness of members of the U.S. Armed Forces
conducting missions, operations, or activities in Niger and throughout
Africa. U.S. Africa Command has already begun implementing significant
changes and improvements at all levels, including with U.S. Special
Operations Command Africa and U.S. Air Forces Africa. Updates include
improvements to Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) standards and
requirements; increased synchronization and coordination between ground
forces, partner forces, and intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (ISR). There have also been changes to guidance and
directives to improve pre-deployment training and pre-mission battle
drill rehearsals with partner forces; sustainment of medical field care
training programs; as well as recommendations and support for awards
for valor by U.S. service members and foreign military personnel.
Mr. Gallego. What is AFRICOM and the wider DOD doing to ensure that
we are coordinating better with allies such as France and Niger in
austere and dangerous environments like North and West Africa?
Mr. West. Over the last year, USAFRICOM has improved integration
with partner countries in the region and our European allies. With
regard to our French allies, USAFRICOM has renewed agreements for
mutual support, formalized memorandums of agreement for medical
evacuation, and improved coordination on intelligence and logistics
support. DOD also provides other support to French CT operations,
including intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. U.S. forces
continue to work alongside our partners in Niger at the request of its
government. For instance, we are continuing the construction of a
Nigerien air base in Agadez. Once complete, this location will enable
partner operations against violent extremist organizations. More
detailed information can be provided in a classified setting.
Mr. Gallego. I am concerned that reprimands and blame for the
series of errors that led to the Niger operation in 2017 will fall
disproportionately on junior officers and enlisteds rather than on Army
and Pentagon brass that either knew or should have known of internal
U.S. problems that led to this incident. How is the Army and Department
proceeding with the review of this incident and policy concerning
reprimands and discipline?
Mr. West. In the wake of the Niger investigation report, then-
Secretary Mattis directed Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command
(USSOCOM), to provide the plan for individual accountability. The
Acting Secretary of Defense is reviewing the actions taken and planned
regarding individual accountability, and the Department will provide an
update once his review is complete.
Mr. Gallego. Your response to Mr. Moulton's question of whether you
disagree with former Secretary Mattis' opposition to a withdrawal of
U.S. troops from Syria was ``No, sir.'' Why?
Mr. West. As the principal assistant to the President in all
matters relating to the Department of Defense, Secretary Mattis
provided his best advice to the President. Sometimes there is
disagreement. Once given the order, however, the Department executed
those orders.
Mr. Gallego. I understand that there have been efforts to implement
changes and recommendations of AFRICOM's investigation into the ambush
in October 2017 that resulted in the deaths of four U.S. soldiers and a
number of Nigerien soldiers accompanying the unit in question. What
changes to policy have been made?
General Hecker. At this time, we are still waiting for Department
of the Army, Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), and U.S. Special
Operations Command (SOOCOM) to announce any changes that were
recommended.
Mr. Gallego. What is AFRICOM and the wider DOD doing to ensure that
we are coordinating better with allies such as France and Niger in
austere and dangerous environments like North and West Africa?
General Hecker. U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM) maintains a
partner-centric strategic approach across the entire area of
operations. This partner-centric approach comprises the following three
cross-cutting themes: First, the challenges throughout Africa cannot be
resolved by using the military element of national power alone. Second,
USAFRICOM aims to work by, with, and through partners and allies to
strengthen enduring relationships and ensure partner ownership of
solutions to various problems. Finally, in the most austere and
dangerous environments, USAFRICOM works with partners and allies to
continue to put pressure on the networks that resource and enable
Violent Extremist Organizations (VEO) in order to provide increased
security, and time and space for good governance. Over time, this
partner-centric approach aims to effectively facilitate coordination
with allies and strengthen partners and decrease U.S. security
assistance requirements.
In West Africa, specifically the Sahel region, the Department of
Defense (DOD) provides support to French counter-terrorism (CT)
efforts. Since 2013, the French Armed Forces (FAF) has conducted CT
operations against VEOs in northern and western Africa. USAFRICOM
provides logistic support, supplies, and services (LSSS) consisting of
air refueling services, fixed-wing and rotary-wing airlift, including
intra-theater and inter-theater, on a non-reimbursable basis. USAFRICOM
ensures coordination with the French Armed Forces through the
deployment of liaison and planning teams that co-locate at the
strategic, operational, and tactical headquarters.
Additionally in the Sahel, the U.S. supports the Group of Five (G5)
Sahel Joint Force (FC-G5S) as an African led, European-assisted and
U.S. supported regional approach. DOD aims to enable Sahel state
defense institutional development while supporting partner-led counter-
VEO operations. The FC-G5S presents an opportunity to coordinate and
integrate Security Force Assistance efforts with international partners
and facilitates sustainable burden-sharing. DOD supports an engagement
strategy that is partner-led and requirement driven to identify and
verify priority support requirements for the FC-G5S. DOD will continue
a bilateral security cooperation approach in accordance with U.S. law
and authorities but will maintain the flexibility to shift support
requirements based on partner decisions and operational capabilities of
the force. Through existing security cooperation efforts and planned
embedded planner support, DOD is well positioned to provide future
support and coordination within this austere environment.
In Niger, DOD partners with military forces and trains with them
during multiple exercises. In 2018 Niger hosted FLINTLOCK18, an annual
training exercise focusing on operational tasks, tactical events, and
command and control functions for U.S. forces to counter-VEOs. This
exercise is just one of many examples that enables and trains U.S.
forces within the region, but also allows for increased coordination
with multiple allies and partners.
In the Lake Chad Basin (LCB) region, the U.S. strategy to counter
VEOs includes strengthening the capacity of the security sector of the
LCB countries. The Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF) is an
African-led organization consisting of military and civilian elements
and include all of the LCB countries and Benin. The goal of the MNJTF
is to assist the LCB governments to develop rule of law frameworks, to
provide long-term security for the population, to build resilience of
the affected communities, and address the underlying socio-economic
political drivers that lead to violent extremism. The P3 countries
(U.S., France, and United Kingdom) supporting the MNJTF provide a
Coordination Cell, Liaison (CCL) to facilitate tactical and operational
planning and execution across the four operational sectors within the
MNJTF area of responsibility. The CCL is comprised of 15 personnel--of
which three are U.S. service members.
In conclusion, USAFRICOM's partner-centric approach aims to
effectively facilitate coordination with allies and strengthen partners
and decrease U.S. security assistance requirements--enabling better
coordination with allies such as France and Niger, among others, in
austere and dangerous environment within North and West Africa.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BROWN
Mr. Brown. Mr. West, last September, then-Assistant Secretary Karem
testified before members of this committee that ``ISIS remains stronger
now than its predecessor was when the United States withdrew from Iraq
in 2011.'' The National Strategy for Counterterrorism released in
October of last year declared ``ISIS remains the foremost radical
Islamist terrorist group and the primary transnational terrorist threat
to the United States''. Yet, just three months later, the President
declared via twitter that ``We have defeated ISIS in Syria'' and he
ordered the U.S. military's complete withdrawal from Syria. Between
September and December, what changed?
Mr. West. The statements are not mutually exclusive. Our counter-
ISIS campaign has effectively destroyed the ``physical'' caliphate in
Syria, eliminating a safe have that served as the crowning achievement
of ISIS. ISIS no longer governs a pseudo-state in Syria that, at its
height, attracted tens of thousands of recruits from around the world.
At the same time, the ideology of ISIS remains unchanged and the group
continues to seek ungoverned or weakly governed areas from which they
can launch attacks against U.S. interests. DOD remains committed to
working by, with, and through partners and allies, such as the 79-
member Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, to secure the enduring defeat
of ISIS.
Mr. Brown. Mr. West, by open sources we currently have 2,000 troops
in Syria; 5,200 in Iraq; 14,000 in Afghanistan. In addition, General
Thomas, SOCOM Commander, stated in his testimony to HASC last year that
we currently have deployed approximately 8,300 special forces personnel
across 90 countries. Can you tell me how many roughly how many special
forces personnel are deployed to Central America and Mexico?
Mr. West. The total number of USSOF (including enablers) deployed
to South America and Mexico fluctuates. However, there are typically
approximately 100 USSOF personnel deployed throughout Central America
(not including the Caribbean) and approximately 30-40 USSOF personnel
deployed to Mexico.
Mr. Brown. Mr. West, beginning with the Bush administration, the
United States made a concerted effort to use foreign aid as an
instrument in countering terrorism. During the Obama Presidency--and
under Republican majority Congresses--foreign aid was funded at a
fairly constant level of approximately $50B annually. The National
Strategy for Counterterrorism released in October declares that we will
``use all available instruments of United States power to counter
terrorism.'' Yet, the President's Budget in each of the last two years
has reduced foreign aid by 25% each year, only to have it restored by
Congress. Do you believe that reducing foreign aid by this amount
supports our strategy of using all instruments available to the U.S.?
Mr. West. Administration is seeking the resources we need to
support targeted efforts to advance our counter terrorism goals and
objectives, while pressing our allies and partners to contribute their
fair share to these joint efforts. I defer to the Department of State,
however, to further elaborate on U.S. foreign assistance and burden
sharing.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. STEFANIK
Ms. Stefanik. Secretary West, as you and I have discussed before,
we must not forget the long-term objectives when it comes to
counterterrorism, and by that I mean ensure that our successes are not
only of a kinetic nature. Throughout my time in Congress and as the
ranking member of IETC Subcommittee, I am very much aware of the
continuous work between the Department and Congress to achieve rigorous
oversight of dynamic counterterrorism operations through the Oversight
of Sensitive Military Operations Act (OSMOA). But as we approach year
18 of near-constant combat, it is critical that we understand our long-
term, sustainable objectives. While we have indeed made progress--and
in doing so have developed a surgical strike and direct action
capability second to none--we have yet to sustain many of our hard
fought gains. How do we ensure and measure regional and strategic
effects on the battlefield that contribute to national security and
protect our homeland?
General Hecker. Our principal measure of success is the number of
attacks against the homeland and U.S. interests abroad. DOD works
closely with other departments and agencies of the U.S. Government and
allies and coalition partners to continuously assess the effectiveness
of our approach as well as the progress of our partners towards
development of effective CT capabilities. Key conditions for success in
our approach will be the reduction of terrorist safe-havens and
terrorist attacks in a region, an increase in local and regional
security that facilitates good governance, and a sufficient number of
capable and competent security forces that adhere to the rule of law
and respect human rights, to address threats independently.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GAETZ
Mr. Gaetz. Counterinsurgency and drug interdiction is the primary
mission of 7th SFG based out of my district. Recently it has come to
light that a potential new area of influence for terrorists is
Venezuela. Hezbollah and Iran have interests in seeing a
destabilization of Venezuela.
Do you believe that Iran will use the instability in South America
to maneuver more of its irregular forces and terrorist partners into
the AO?
Do you believe that we are prepared to fight a COIN mission in
South America? What are the key differences between COIN in the Middle
East and COIN in South America?
General Hecker. [The information is classified and retained in the
committee files.]
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WALTZ
Mr. Waltz. In January, ELN, a U.S.- and EU-designated terrorist
organization, detonated a car bomb in Colombia, killing 21 people and
injuring 68 more.
Juan Guaido, President of Venezuela's National Assembly, said the
bomber spent years living in Venezuela. ELN terrorists are operating in
Venezuela, engaged in smuggling, drug trafficking, and illegal mining.
There are reports that ELN is actively recruiting hungry Venezuelans,
some as young as 15, taking advantage of the country's economic and
political crisis to reinforce their criminal enterprise. Furthermore,
ELN commander Pablo Beltran has pledged his support for the Maduro
regime.
How would you rate the threat ELN poses as a destabilizing force in
our hemisphere? Are there state-actors that are aiding or harboring ELN
terrorists?
Mr. West. I would defer to the intelligence community to provide an
assessment of the capabilities and threat posed by ELN. With that said,
we would welcome the opportunity to go more in depth on the issue
within a classified setting.
Mr. Waltz. Can you provide a status update of any Americans,
including dual-citizens and legal permanent residents, being held
hostage in Syria?
Mr. West. U.S. and partner forces are tracking U.S. citizens being
held hostage in Syria and continue to collect information that may
assist in their recovery, as well as the recovery of remains of U.S.
citizens murdered by ISIS. The interagency Hostage Recovery Fusion Cell
(HRFC) tracks hostage-related information from across the U.S.
Government, coordinates department and agency actions, and recommends
recovery options. Additional information can be provided in a
classified setting.
Mr. Waltz. The Idlib pocket where al-Qaida still has a presence.
What is our counterterrorism strategy for effecting al-Qaida, and
degrading, and continue the destruction of al-Qaida in that pocket?
Mr. West. The Coalition primarily operates in northeastern Syria
and in a 55-kilometer area surrounding the At Tanf Garrison in
southeastern Syria. To complement Coalition counterterrorism operations
in these areas, DOD seeks a political solution to the Syrian Civil War
under United Nations Security Council Resolution 2254. Such a political
solution is critical to addressing the terrorist threat across all of
Syria--including in Idlib.
Mr. Waltz. The Idlib pocket where al-Qaida still has a presence.
What is our counterterrorism strategy for effecting al-Qaida, and
degrading, and continue the destruction of al-Qaida in that pocket?
General Hecker. A Deputies Committee meeting was convened in late
November, 2018 to conduct an in-depth study, assessment and
recommendation concerning the current, and future DIME options for the
Idlib pocket. While it is recognized across the Department of Defense
(DOD), Intelligence Community, and Interagency what threat potentials
can emanate out of Idlib, it was agreed to provide time and space for
the Russia/Turkey tactical engagement for addressing Idlib to take its
due course. As a collective DOD/Intelligence Community approach, we
will continuously look at options that range across both military and
State capabilities for engagement if we feel the threat warrants taking
our eye off the current Defeat ISIS (D-ISIS) fight.
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. ESCOBAR
Ms. Escobar. Secretary West, recently the President said in an
interview that ``we'll come back if we have to'' in reference to the
troop withdrawal in Syria. Is this cost effective? What impact will
this back and forth have on readiness? Is this a sustainable solution?
Mr. West. The Department of Defense is drawing down forces in Syria
and leaving behind a residual force that will work by, with, and
through our partners to ensure the lasting defeat of ISIS. This is
expected to be a more sustainable approach compared to sustaining a
larger force in Syria. The Department will continue to prevent
terrorists from directing or supporting external operations against the
U.S. homeland and our citizens, allies, and partners overseas. Our
force posture and employment seek to be adaptable in the global
strategic environment while balancing the impacts of operations with
force readiness.
Ms. Escobar. Secretary West, has the Department conducted a cost-
benefit analysis of withdrawing and then going back to Syria if needed?
How would this cycle impact military readiness?
Mr. West. The Department of Defense has not done a formal cost
benefit analysis, USCENTCOM continues its force planning in Syria. We
are drawing down our forces in Syria, and leaving behind a residual
force that will work by, with, and through our partners to ensure the
lasting defeat of ISIS. This approach utilizes an adaptable force
posture in the global strategic environment and balances the impacts of
operations with force readiness.
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. HORN
Ms. Horn. Central Command-Afghanistan. In seeking to enable
stability in the region U.S. forces are focusing on two lines of
effort: 1) counter terrorist operations to disrupt and disable
terrorist networks, and 2) training and equipping the Afghan security
forces to maintain internal security. Much of this mission is carried
out through the deployment of the Security Force Assistant Brigade
(SFAB) in the train, advise, and assist model. It is no secret that
there have been challenges both expected and unexpected with the
training and engagement of Afghan forces.
Can you briefly review our overall strategy? What unexpected issues
are you encountering with the training of the Afghan forces, and what
solutions are you implementing?
How are the Afghan forces handling different emerging threats?
Can you discuss the risk of pulling back U.S. training and
financial support to the Afghan forces? What immediate and long-term
impacts would that have on sustainability in the region?
Mr. West. The ultimate goal of the 2017 South Asia Strategy is a
durable and inclusive political settlement. The overall strategy in
Afghanistan is focused on efforts to Reinforce, Realign, Regionalize,
Reconcile, and Sustain. There have been more promising indicators on
reconciliation over the last several months than at any time since
2002. We are also focused on applying maximum pressure on the Taliban,
and these efforts are designed to support Department of State efforts
towards reconciliation and a political settlement. Consistent with
this, we continue to support our Afghan partners with training, advice,
and assistance to increase their capabilities and effectiveness in
providing security and combatting terrorism. The addition of the SFABs
in 2018 extended the reach of U.S. advisors to 8 different Afghan
National Army (ANA) Brigades and 34 ANA kandaks. There is still
progress to be made, but the Afghan forces are pushing the fight
against the Taliban and against ISIS Khorasan. We are continuing to
advise at critical points to ensure the tactical and operational
success of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces. Right now,
there are no plans to withdraw U.S. forces from Afghanistan, and we are
committed to achieving a political settlement. Any changes to U.S.
force presence will be driven by conditions on the ground and informed
by ongoing assessments of current efforts.
Ms. Horn. Now a couple of questions on AFRICOM. There seems to be
an increased terrorist activity in the Central and East Africa region.
There was an alert published just two days ago by the U.S. Embassy in
Nairobi that read ``Credible information indicates Westerners may be
targeted by extremists in Nairobi and coastal areas of Kenya. This
message comes weeks after the al-Qaida-linked terrorist group al-
Shabaab took credit for the killing of 21 people in a hotel.
What specificity is being done to suppress the growing emerging
threats, specifically ones that seem to originate in Somalia?
What is AFRICOM's overall strategy for eradicating threats in the
area?
Mr. West. DOD efforts have focused on applying pressure
persistently to al-Shabaab, building relationships with key regional
and international partners, and building the capacity of Somali
security forces to address the threats in their own country. USAFRICOM
has the authority to conduct military direct action against al-Shabaab
and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in Somalia. These
strikes provide opportunity for the Federal Government of Somalia to
expand its influence and control in the country and allow time for the
Somali National Army to increase its capability to provide security in
Somalia. USAFRICOM's strategy entails a sustainable approach, building
strong, enduring partnerships with African and international partners
and organizations that are committed to improving security in Somalia,
and assisting in the development of elements of the Somali National
Army that respect human rights, adhere to the rule of law, and
contribute to stability in Somalia.