[House Hearing, 105 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
OVERSIGHT OF UNITED STATES COUNTERNARCOTICS ASSISTANCE TO COLOMBIA
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY,
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE
of the
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT
REFORM AND OVERSIGHT
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FIFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 14, 1997
__________
Serial No. 105-7
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
39-818 WASHINGTON : 1997
____________________________________________________________________________
For Sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; (202) 512-1800
Fax: (202) 512-2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-0001
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM AND OVERSIGHT
DAN BURTON, Indiana, Chairman
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
J. DENNIS HASTERT, Illinois TOM LANTOS, California
CONSTANCE A. MORELLA, Maryland ROBERT E. WISE, Jr., West Virginia
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
STEVEN H. SCHIFF, New Mexico EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
CHRISTOPHER COX, California PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida GARY A. CONDIT, California
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
STEPHEN HORN, California THOMAS M. BARRETT, Wisconsin
JOHN L. MICA, Florida ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, Washington,
THOMAS M. DAVIS, Virginia DC
DAVID M. McINTOSH, Indiana CHAKA FATTAH, Pennsylvania
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana TIM HOLDEN, Pennsylvania
JOE SCARBOROUGH, Florida ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
JOHN SHADEGG, Arizona DENNIS KUCINICH, Ohio
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois
MARSHALL ``MARK'' SANFORD, South DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
Carolina JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire JIM TURNER, Texas
PETE SESSIONS, Texas THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine
MIKE PAPPAS, New Jersey ------
VINCE SNOWBARGER, Kansas BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
BOB BARR, Georgia (Independent)
------ ------
Kevin Binger, Staff Director
Daniel R. Moll, Deputy Staff Director
Judith McCoy, Chief Clerk
Phil Schiliro, Minority Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on National Security, International Affairs, and Criminal
Justice
J. DENNIS HASTERT, Chairman
MARK SOUDER, Indiana THOMAS M. BARRETT, Wisconsin
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut TOM LANTOS, California
STEVEN SCHIFF, New Mexico BOB WISE, West Virginia
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida GARY A. CONDIT, California
JOHN McHUGH, New York ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois
JOHN L. MICA, Florida CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
JOHN B. SHADEGG, Arizona ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
STEVE LaTOURETTE, Ohio JIM TURNER, Texas
BOB BARR, Georgia
Ex Officio
DAN BURTON, Indiana HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
Robert Charles, Staff Director
Sean Littlefield, Professional Staff Member
Ianthe Saylor, Clerk
Ronald Stroman, Minority Professional Staff
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hearing held on February 14, 1997................................ 1
Statement of:
Busby, Morris, former Ambassador to Colombia; and Major F.
Andy Messing, Jr., United States Army (Ret.), executive
director, National Defense Council Foundation.............. 80
Gelbard, Robert S., Assistant Secretary, Bureau of
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs,
Department of State........................................ 4
Serrano, Major General Jose Rosso, director, Colombian
national police; and General Harold Bedoya Pizarro,
commander, Colombian Armed Forces.......................... 51
Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:
Bedoya Pizarro, General Harold, commander, Colombian Armed
Forces, prepared statement of.............................. 63
Busby, Morris, former Ambassador to Colombia, prepared
statement of............................................... 83
Gelbard, Robert S., Assistant Secretary, Bureau of
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs,
Department of State:
Information concerning assistance furnished under the
authority of section 506(a)(1) of the FAA.............. 48
Information concerning extraditions...................... 47
Information concerning ``river patrol boats''............ 50
Prepared statement of.................................... 8
Messing, Major F. Andy, Jr., U.S. Army (Ret.), executive
director, National Defense Council Foundation:
NDCF Colombia Report 1997................................ 95
Prepared statement of.................................... 91
Serrano, Major General Jose Rosso, director, Colombian
national police, prepared statement of..................... 55
Valdivieso, General, prepared statement of................... 70
OVERSIGHT OF UNITED STATES COUNTER-NARCOTICS ASSISTANCE TO COLOMBIA
----------
FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 14, 1997
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on National Security, International
Affairs, and Criminal Justice,
Committee on Government Reform and Oversight,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:08 a.m., in
room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. J. Dennis
Hastert (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Hastert, Schiff, Mica, Souder,
LaTourette, Barr and Barrett.
Staff present: Robert Charles, staff director and chief
counsel; Sean Littlefield, professional staff member; Ianthe
Saylor, clerk; Ronald Stroman, minority professional staff; and
Ellen Rayner, minority chief clerk.
Mr. Hastert. The Subcommittee on National Security,
International Affairs, and Criminal Justice will come to order.
First of all, I want to bid everyone good morning and thank
you for coming today. This is the subcommittee's first hearing
of the 105th Congress. This is also my first hearing as
chairman of this subcommittee. I think we have our work cut out
for us, especially what we are going to talk about today, the
drug war, in this country, in our southern hemisphere, and, of
course, in the world.
The drug usage rates of our young people clearly show the
drug war must continue. Frankly, that is why we are here today.
I want to pause long enough to welcome all our new members
and our returning members and to extend a special welcome to
our ranking member, Mr. Tom Barrett. I look forward to working
with Tom and developing a very, very fine relationship. I hope
over the next 2 years in the many important oversight
challenges we face that we can do it together on a bipartisan
basis.
The title of today's hearing may lead one to believe that
this hearing is only about Colombia. It is certainly about the
heroic efforts of certain Colombians in the drug war, including
General Serrano, General Bedoya and Prosecutor General
Valdivieso; but it is also about the youth of America, our
children, and, frankly, our future.
In the last 3 years, six homicides in Aurora, IL, the town
of my birth and the town I represent, have been drug related.
As recently as June, Claudia Remos and Juan Medina were killed
and their bodies dumped on a road side. Six-year-old Nicholas
Contreras was shot and killed in his sleep in a drug-related
crime. We must stop the effect of drugs in our country.
The overwhelming majority of the cocaine and heroin that
leaves Colombia is headed straight to cities and towns like
Aurora, IL; and the target population for the growing and
diversifying drug cartels is mainly our youth. The
international drug onslaught is the most insidious national
security threat we face as a Nation. This is why it is so vital
that we provide ample counternarcotic support to the brave and
honest men and women who work hard in the drug war in this
country and in Colombia. Those individuals are fighting not
only for Colombia's survival but also for ours.
The timing of this hearing, just weeks prior to the annual
recertification decision by the President, is not a
coincidence. I am concerned that last year's decision to
decertify Colombia impeded foreign military sales to Colombia.
If the President decides to decertify Colombia for the second
year in a row, I am at least hopeful that he will present
Congress with the legislation that will allow the military
sales for the limited purpose of counternarcotic missions.
I also plan to work with the Department of State and the
Committee on International Relations to find a way to expedite
the transfer of these tools that are needed to fight this war.
Every day that a DC-3 or a Huey or Black Hawk helicopter is not
flying, more drugs reach our streets. We cannot afford to have
any more delays in the transport of equipment or spare parts in
our counternarcotics support for Colombia.
International drug trafficking organizations based in
Colombia are the world's leading producers of cocaine.
Colombian traffickers also continue to supply marijuana to the
United States, and recent indications are that Colombian drug
trafficking organizations are making quantum leaps in the
production and trafficking of heroin.
Colombia is engaged in a drug war, and its outcome affects
all Americans. Some of the bravest men and women in the world
are entangled in a war against the narcotraffickers and the
guerillas that support them.
There should be no mistake. The guerillas of Colombia long
ago abandoned ideology. They work with the international drug
traffickers--providing security, cultivating crops and manning
cocaine labs. The guerillas engage in some of the most ruthless
behavior in our hemisphere. They kidnap, they kill, and they
sustain their carnage with drug money provided by American
consumers, most of them kids.
Today's hearing will focus on what the United States can
and should do to generally support the counternarcotics efforts
in Colombia to stop these deadly drugs and violent drug
traffickers before they get to the United States shores.
Let's lay it on the line. There can be no doubt that
Colombia's political and judicial systems are confronting
corruption. Sentences for drug traffickers need to be
strengthened, and a re-examination of money laundering and
extradition needs to take place now.
However, honest Colombian Government officials like General
Bedoya and General Serrano should be applauded and certainly
fully supported. How can we ask honest Colombians like these
men to continue putting their lives on the line every day
without basic United States support for the international drug
effort? The truth is that such support is both good government
and cost-effective to us at home in the United States.
Before proceeding with our first witness, I am pleased to
turn to my colleague, the subcommittee's ranking minority
member, Tom Barrett of Wisconsin, for any opening remarks he
might have.
Mr. Barrett. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and congratulations
on heading this subcommittee. I am looking forward to working
with you, and I am very optimistic that we will be able to work
closely on a lot of these issues which are basically
nonpartisan in nature. I think that this committee plays an
important role; and, as evidenced by the hearing today, this is
a committee that will look into issues that have tremendous
importance to our country.
The issue of drug trafficking in America is clearly one of
the most serious issues we face as a Nation; and, as the father
of three young children, I share with you the concern of easy
access of drugs to American youth and will do everything I can
to make sure we have the tools necessary to combat drug use
both internationally and domestically.
The cost to our society of illegal drug use is staggering.
Substance abuse and addiction cost is now estimated at $400
billion a year. Two million Americans use cocaine at least once
a week, and 500,000 are addicted to crack cocaine.
Colombia has a close relationship to this problem, because
the threat to the United States from Colombia is significant.
Eighty percent of the cocaine available in the United States is
produced in Colombia, and 60 percent of the heroin being seized
in the United States can be traced to Colombia.
This is a timely hearing since the administration will be
making many important decisions in the future, including the
very important issue of whether to continue decertification of
Colombia. I am very excited and very interested to hear from
our witnesses today because I think this issue of how we deal
with a foreign government and how we deal with the drug problem
in another country is a very thorny issue; and I think all of
us agree that we, as a country, have to do everything we can to
stop the drug trafficking from Colombia and other countries but
also make sure we are doing it in a prudent way.
So I look forward to this hearing and turn it back over to
you.
Mr. Hastert. At this time I would ask, without objection,
that all opening statements be submitted for the record. Any
objection? So ordered.
I would like now to welcome Assistant Secretary of State
for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs,
Ambassador Gelbard. Ambassador Gelbard has been involved in our
foreign relations with Latin America since his service with the
Peace Corps. In addition to his assignments to European and
African issues, Ambassador Gelbard served as Ambassador to
Bolivia from 1988 to 1991, and most recently is the Principal
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American affairs.
I think probably when you find a tough place to deal with,
Ambassador Galbard tends to be there; and it shows the great
confidence our administration has in him.
Ambassador, we are pleased to have you here. If you would
stand and raise your right hand, the committee's rules require
me to swear you in.
[Witness sworn.]
Let the record show the witness responded in the
affirmative. Thank you.
Please proceed with your opening statement. I assume you
have an oral statement. Anything else will be submitted for the
record.
STATEMENT OF ROBERT S. GELBARD, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF
INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT
OF STATE
Mr. Gelbard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Please let me also congratulate you on your chairmanship. I
think it is worth stating that, thanks to your efforts, in
addition to some others, the budget for my bureau dedicated to
counternarcotics and anti-crime measures throughout the world
was substantially increased for this fiscal year; and I
appreciated your efforts very much, sir.
As you said, sir, I do have a written statement that I
would like to submit for the record. I am pleased to have this
opportunity to discuss with you the United States
counternarcotics policy toward Colombia.
President Clinton denied certification to Colombia last
year because the efforts of Colombia's honest officials were
being undermined by corruption at the highest levels of the
Colombian Congress and Government. Our challenge was to
maintain pressure on a president we believe to have been
influenced and even corrupted by traffickers, while also
supporting constructive Colombian anti-drug efforts.
The strategy has produced progress on some of our key
objectives over the last 12 months. We have maintained support
for essential counternarcotics programs and institutions in
Colombia. In fact, from fiscal year 1996 to fiscal year 1997,
we have doubled our assistance, most of which is destined for
the Colombian national police.
At the same time, we pressed the government to take
specific policy and legislative actions to strengthen the law
enforcement and judicial sectors. These include strengthening
money laundering laws and enacting tough asset forfeiture and
sentencing laws; extradition of Colombian nationals wanted for
crimes abroad; supporting investigations and prosecutions
targeting corrupt public officials; stepping up coca
eradication and opium eradication; agreeing on a bilateral
maritime agreement; continuing law enforcement and judicial
action against traffickers, along with their prosecution,
conviction and sentencing to prison terms commensurate with
their crimes; dismantling of their organizations; and
forfeiture of their front companies and ill-gotten proceeds.
These objectives should not have come as a surprise to the
Colombian Government. In 1994, shortly after his election,
President Samper promised to increase the penalties for drug
traffickers, remove plea bargaining loopholes and send the
political cronies of the cartels to jail. In fact, he put these
promises as well as many others in a letter he sent to Members
of the U.S. Congress.
Instead of following through, however, Samper publicly
attacked the Prosecutor General's Office for its far-reaching
investigation of political corruption known as the ``Case
8,000.'' An investigation in which he himself was implicated as
well as other top administration and congressional figures.
Despite credible evidence that his political campaign had
accepted more than $6 million in drug money, President Samper
was exonerated by the Colombian Congress through a patently
flawed process.
From our standpoint, however, the evidence that Samper
aided and abetted drug traffickers was sufficient to warrant
the revocation of his visa last year. The denial of
certification, international pressure and the threat of
economic sanctions has produced some progress on key
legislation, a maritime agreement this year and expanded the
eradication program.
The Government of Colombia has failed, however, to follow
through on promised counternarcotics action or to confront
fully the drug interests that contributed millions of dollars
to President Samper's campaign. In concrete terms, the
Colombian Government effectively ignored United States warnings
that the Cali kingpins continued to run their operations from
prison.
In late January, a few weeks ago, top drug lords Gilberto
and Miguel Rodriguez Orejuela were sentenced to absurdly short
prison terms, accompanied by ridiculously small fines. Given
the mandatory sentence reductions under existing Colombian
sentencing guidelines, these international criminals could
ultimately serve only 4 or 5 more years apiece in prison.
If President Samper had acted promptly on his own 1994
commitments that he put in writing to this Congress, these
sentences might have reflected the seriousness of their crimes.
In stark contrast to the Colombian sentences, a United States
Federal judge on January 31st of this year sentenced Mexican
drug lord Juan Garcia Abrego, a long-time associate of the
Rodriguez Orejuelas, to 11 life terms, a fine of $128 million
and forfeited assets worth $350 million. Interesting contrast.
Despite the obvious inadequacy of Colombia's law, the
Samper administration has made so serious an effort to
reinstate the case for reinstatement of extradition or to
launch a constitutional reform initiative.
We will hold the Government of Colombia to the promise its
new Ambassador just made to President Clinton when he presented
his credentials that the government will introduce such a bill
next month. Meanwhile, our request for four top Cali
traffickers have gone unanswered, and we have learned that the
government has never filed them in the Colombian Supreme Court
as promised.
The asset forfeiture law passed in December is a good one.
However, the legislation must stand a review of the
constitutional court, a test which some Colombians observers
believe the law was designed to fail. Moreover, the first
attempt at implementation of the law failed when the hold on
assets placed in the names of the family and friends of the
Rodriguez Orejuela brothers was lifted at the time of their
sentencing.
We can only judge the Colombian Government by its concrete
actions. As recently as late last year, while the investigation
and trial of the Cali kingpins was under way, Samper and
Interior Minister Serpa were actively pursuing negotiations
with the Cali mafia kingpins, which clearly would have
undermined the efforts of the Colombian police and the
Prosecutor General's Office. This revelation was merely another
reminder that President Samper's commitment to take on the top
traffickers must be evaluated on the basis of specific results
rather than on stated intentions.
While failing to address certain issues, the Samper
administration sought to recover international legitimacy by
improving cooperation on other fronts, including its agreement
to the United States-funded expansion of the coca crop
eradication and its initialing, several weeks ago, of a
maritime interdiction agreement.
Private sector leaders have begun to press the government
to pass key legislation, and Colombian industry has sought more
direct cooperation with the United States to counter the drug
trade. The Colombia Flower Growers Association has taken a
particularly courageous stand in favor of the asset forfeiture
law and extradition.
Unprecedented application by the President of the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act against the Cali
mafia front companies also stimulated the private sector, and
particularly the private bankers association, to implement
tighter voluntary controls over its members.
At the operational level, our counternarcotics cooperation
with the Colombian national police and its leader, General
Serrano, the Prosecutor General's Office and the elements of
the armed forces remain very good. In the past year, we doubled
our assistance to Colombia from $22.6 million to some $44
million this fiscal year to support interdiction law
enforcement and eradication operations. Part of this increase
will be devoted to purchasing nonlethal military equipment and
spare parts.
We also have dramatically increased our aviation support to
the Colombian national police, including the provision of 12
additional helicopters and the use of additional spray and
support aircraft. We will soon deploy five upgraded spray
aircraft worth $84 million by the end of next month and 12 more
UH-1H helicopters associated with the President's 506(a)(2)
drawdown package. We have also allocated for the first time
funds to support the army and the rest of the armed forces in
counternarcotics efforts.
Combined police-military interdiction efforts in 1996
focused on denying drug cultivators and processors the
chemicals used to process cocaine. This effort produced a
substantial increase in precursor chemical seizures and in the
number of laboratories destroyed. At the same time, the shift
in focus of interdiction operations and the devotion of more
resources to the eradication program resulted in a significant
drop in the seizure of drug trafficking aircraft, cocaine, and
heroin as compared to 1995.
We have worked more closely than ever with the Colombian
police to carry out a much-enhanced aerial eradication program.
Our expanded aerial eradication program in 1996 presented
significant challenges which the Colombian police have accepted
without hesitation. The military also rose to this challenge,
increasing their support to the police eradication effort.
However, despite the clear commitment of the Colombian
police to the eradication program, the Colombian Government has
strongly opposed the testing of safe granular herbicides, such
as hexazanone, which we know to be significantly more effective
in killing coca than the current herbicides being used.
Colombia's coca crop expanded by over 30 percent last year.
This is in contrast to Peru, where there was an 18 percent
decrease. It expanded from almost 51,000 hectares to over
67,000 hectares, in spite of our efforts to expand the
eradication program and make it more effective. Cultivation
increased by 13 percent between 1994 and 1995 and has also
tripled since 1987.
Colombia now provides 32 percent of all coca produced in
the world. This continued expansion points to one of the
greatest challenges Colombia and we together face in stamping
out the drug trade.
The crop has been steadily expanding since 1987, and we
must recognize the decisive role played by some of Colombia's
insurgent guerilla groups. They identified an economic
opportunity--the insatiable desire of drug traffickers for a
reliable source of cocaine products--and carved out a
significant portion of that market for themselves.
The increased self-sufficiency of Colombia's drug industry
has significant implications for our efforts to eliminate this
scourge. Those guerilla fronts engaged in the industry now have
a proven source of income and a vested interest in expanding
and protecting the trade. These guerilla fronts constitute a
real threat to Colombian anti-drug forces deployed to eradicate
fields and the American personnel who support them, including,
sadly, the loss of one American life late last year.
In this environment, Colombian counternarcotics cooperation
and the government's clear support of its own police and
military, prosecutors, judges, and other government officials
on the front line of this struggle are more important than
ever. We have implemented a strategy that is producing some
progress on key legislation, and that has galvanized the
private sector in taking a more active role in pressing for
action. We have seen results clearly from decertification last
year.
We must continue to provide a high level of direct support,
assistance and encouragement to those in Colombia dedicated to
ending this drug scourge and the corruption it has engendered.
Above all, we must continue to make clear to the Colombian
Government that the American people expect concrete results.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Gelbard follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9818.001
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9818.002
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9818.003
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9818.004
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9818.005
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9818.006
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9818.007
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9818.008
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9818.009
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9818.010
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9818.011
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9818.012
Mr. Hastert. Thank you very much for your testimony. I
think we understand very clearly why the administration used
the tool of decertification to try to move the Government of
Colombia into areas that they seem to lack and should be
improved upon, but after President Clinton announced Colombia's
decertification on March 1, 1996, it seems to me that there was
a lack of the State Department's perception of what effect
decertification would have on assistance programs. As a matter
of fact, the State Department did not announce their decision
that only foreign military financing was prohibited and that
foreign military sales were not, which involved some of the
spray planes and the helicopters and some of the things that
were necessary to make those, that equipment fly.
From March until September, the State Department prevented
all assistance from reaching Colombia, and only in September
did the State Department announce that FMF, or financing, and
not sales assistance was blocked by decertification. Can you
help us or enlighten us as to why that decision to decertify
was taken when no one seems to have understood, basically, the
ramifications, at least in the movement of equipment, to
General Serrano and others that needed that equipment after
decertification?
Mr. Gelbard. The President made the decision to decertify
Colombia because there was a clear unwillingness on the part of
the Government of Colombia to cooperate with the United States
in counternarcotics efforts. All indicators were very clear in
their failure to comply with the commitments that Samper
himself had made, as I mentioned earlier, to the Congress of
the United States, in an unsolicited letter he sent in July
1994.
Just running through the various commitments he gave made
it very clear they did not comply. So it was a clear-cut
decision that the President made. It was a difficult decision
because it was the first time a President of the United States
had ever decided to decertify a democratic government, but it
was based on the unanimous recommendations of the President's
relevant Cabinet members to him.
The decision to decertify did not in any way affect the
support provided to the police. It did not in any way affect
that support, I want to be very clear. Nor did it affect this
provision, the provision of spray planes, for example, which
are flown by the Colombian police. Now, because the spray
program was stalling, we have provided, with the agreement of
the Colombian Government, American pilots to spray and to
train, while they are spraying, Colombian pilots in what is a
very difficult endeavor.
However, the clear-cut interpretation of the law, the
Foreign Assistance Act, was that under decertification it was
not possible to provide military assistance to the Colombian
armed forces under FMF and FMS. We supported efforts in the
Congress to change that law last year, and unfortunately, the
Congress was unable to vote in favor of that change. We
continue to support a change in that law so that we could
provide FMF and FMS assistance to the Colombian armed forces.
Nevertheless, what I am doing in this fiscal year, as I
mentioned in my testimony, is for the first time providing
funding to the Colombian military from my own budget; and we
have in our Congressional presentation for fiscal year 1997
budgeted $5 million to support their counternarcotics efforts
out of the $44 million that is currently in the budget.
Mr. Hastert. Well, let's just try to clear some things up
here.
As you well know, I was in Colombia last year, last spring,
and met with the Ambassador and tried in a limited period of
time to see what the operation was, and I had a meeting with
General Serrano and others. It seems to me that was the time,
right after that decision was made, early April, the decision
was made in March, the decertification decision, due to the
judgment of the State Department lawyers, and others did delay
critical counternarcotics aid under FMS. Is that right or not?
Mr. Gelbard. It wasn't just State Department lawyers, it
was Pentagon lawyers and Department of Justice lawyers; and
with all due respect to the lawyers on the committee--I am not
one--I too was quite frustrated by the lack of movement and
decision on this. But as a result, we did support the desire to
change the law. As I say, we were quite frustrated by the
inability to do so.
Mr. Hastert. So there was a delay in the movement of the
equipment.
Mr. Gelbard. To the military, not to the police.
Mr. Hastert. The police--well, let's work on it. We will
hear testimony later and certainly try to clear that up.
Also, in your opinion, the police--General Serrano was
complying, and he happens to be the lead commander in beating
back the narcotics traffickers in my opinion and I think many
other opinions. Do you feel he had all the assistance he
needed?
Mr. Gelbard. We have strongly supported General Serrano,
whom I have known for all the time he has been in his job, even
before he was promoted to this position. I strongly supported
his being named to this position and urged the Government of
Colombia to appoint him. We have worked very closely with him
to try to provide everything we could. Unfortunately, the
Government of Colombia itself has significantly reduced the
budget of the military and the budget of the police, so they
have decreased their support to these entities.
Mr. Hastert. Well, I think it is our purpose here to
certainly try to work together, and we are not trying to find
any indictments of the past. We are trying to find how we can
work through this thing in the future.
As you well know, and in my opening statement, not giving
these people the tools to do the job means there are more drugs
and more death in our districts here in the United States, and
certainly we want to find that solution and that answer. It is
encouraging in your testimony hearing you say that you are
suggesting and advising an increase in that budget; is that
correct?
Mr. Gelbard. It is more than suggesting and advising. We
have targeted $44 million of support to Colombia to the
military and police in this fiscal year, and that was what was
provided to the Congress in our congressional presentation
for----
Mr. Hastert. For this coming fiscal year.
Mr. Gelbard. Yes, sir.
Mr. Hastert. I will yield my time to the gentleman from
Wisconsin.
Mr. Barrett. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ambassador Gelbard, you stated your frustration with the
delays in getting assistance to the military. I look at
something that happened under the first decertification
process. If Colombia is decertified again, will we face a
similar problem, or was that the result of a first-time
decertification?
Mr. Gelbard. We are working and would like to work with
this Congress to work together in a very cooperative way to
effect the kinds of changes that I mentioned earlier to permit
the transfer of such equipment in FMF and FMS cases.
Mr. Barrett. So the decertification measure still provides
barriers to you in what you think you should be doing.
Mr. Gelbard. Yes, sir. Let me just say, the legislation
which would have amended the law was defeated in the final days
of the last Congress, so that's why we are not able to move the
equipment under those cases.
Mr. Barrett. Specifically what would that legislation do?
Mr. Gelbard. That would provide waiver authority so that
the administration would have the authority to approve such
cases.
Mr. Barrett. I assume there will be some who would argue
that, lacking that authority, we should not decertify. What are
the benefits of decertification even without the ability to
move that military?
Mr. Gelbard. As I alluded to earlier, it is crystal clear,
very sadly, that the Colombian Government under President
Samper took very little action from the time he was sworn in on
August 7, 1994, until March 1, 1996, when they were
decertified.
We have seen significant efforts in the last year to make
progress, both right before the decertification decision and,
oddly enough, in the last few weeks. The maritime interdiction
agreement was just initialled a few weeks ago. The asset
forfeiture agreement was just approved in late December, and
there will be a special session of the Colombian Congress
opening up next week to consider, finally, a much harsher
sentencing law. This is clearly because of their concerns about
possible decertification again. It's a sad story that there's
only a positive response under threat or when there is actually
decertification, but we have seen in the face of this
corruption that that is the only thing that has produced
results from the government itself.
Mr. Barrett. My sense, from the questioning of the chairman
and others, on this issue is that the transport of military
equipment is the issue here. Is that correct or are there more
issues underlying the issue of decertification?
Mr. Gelbard. That has not been--that has been an adverse
consequence of decertification.
The other adverse consequences are that under the law there
is a prohibition of the use of OPIC and Eximbank financing to
countries that are decertified. We obviously don't like that
because that hurts American companies. It hurts their
competitiveness overseas. But in terms of all the rest of the
consequences of decertification, we feel it has proved helpful,
sadly.
Mr. Barrett. OK. Again, if we were to put together the
perfect policy for you so as to provide you with the best tools
for fighting drugs in Colombia, would that entail--and I assume
from your comments that at a minimum the administration is
leading toward decertification again--but would decertification
plus a change in the law, would that, do you think, make this a
more effective battle?
Mr. Gelbard. This has been, in fact, a relatively small
part of the total amount of assistance provided to Colombia, so
overall we don't feel that it's had an overwhelming effect.
One important positive element that I should mention is
that General Bedoya is now willing to dedicate Army units just
to programs involving counternarcotics. That was not the case
before in the Colombian military with his predecessors. One of
the restrictions we have had in my own budget has been that our
assistance has to go 100 percent for counternarcotics, it can't
go for multiple purposes.
General Bedoya and I discussed this just last night, and on
the basis of this, we already, as I said, had budgeted $5
million in assistance for the Colombian military outside of the
FMF, FMS issue. So we can provide assistance to them that way.
Mr. Barrett. If you again could just go over the level of
assistance and the changes, that would be helpful to me.
Mr. Gelbard. This fiscal year we are increasing commodities
to the Colombian police--aircraft parts, tools, avionics, field
investigative equipment--from $7.4 million to $12.6 million.
Training is at $1.5 million. Aircraft operations and so on are
doubling from $4.1 million to $8 million. Military assistance
would involve $2.5 million in commodities, $1 million in
training and $1.5 million in other programs.
Judicial sector reform, we are now picking up support for
this very important program of $250,000, and we're providing
aviation services. We will be providing aviation programs at
$14 million, and in addition, new equipment this year involving
UH-1H helicopters valued at $10.8 million, Bell 212 helicopters
valued at $9 million, and OV-10 Bronco aircraft valued at $84
million. So actually that is a total of $147.8 million.
Mr. Barrett. How does this compare to other countries?
Mr. Gelbard. Far and away greater in terms of equipment and
support to the interdiction law enforcement authorities.
Mr. Barrett. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Hastert. Just a quick followup. That's for this coming
fiscal year; is that correct?
Mr. Gelbard. The current fiscal year, sir.
Mr. Hastert. Let me just--another quick followup. The
President could have had a 614 waiver; is that correct?
Mr. Gelbard. The President theoretically could. We are
studying that possibility right now.
Mr. Hastert. Thank you. The vice chairman of this
subcommittee, Mr. Souder from Indiana.
Mr. Souder. Good morning. I've got a couple of questions. I
thought I heard you say a minute ago that the Colombian
Government had reduced support for the national police and
General Serrano.
Mr. Gelbard. General Bedoya told me that the budget
provided to the armed forces and the police has been
significantly reduced.
Mr. Souder. Do you know what, when you say significantly?
Mr. Gelbard. I would suggest you ask him when he appears.
Mr. Souder. OK, because one of the core questions that's
hard for a lot of people to understand here is, we have a
democratic government in Colombia, and yet you are praising the
national police, you are praising the attorney general, you are
praising to some degree the military of Colombia, saying they
are fighting with us, they have been courageous, they have
obviously lost many lives in trying to do this.
How do you explain that balance?
Mr. Gelbard. In the case of the prosecutor general, he is
independent from the government. He is actually part of the
judiciary, and under the 1991 constitution, is independent.
In the case of General Serrano and the Colombian police, as
I say, we were actually quite instrumental in getting President
Samper to remove a highly corrupt predecessor head of the
national police, General Vargas.
Mr. Souder. Was that enacted by the decertification?
Mr. Gelbard. This was earlier than that, this was in 1994,
and I personally provided the then minister of defense, who is
now incarcerated himself for corruption, with significant
information about General Vargas' corruption.
General Serrano was appointed in his stead. He was at that
time the police attache here, had worked very closely with
government agencies such as DEA, and we felt at that time
enormous confidence in him. It has been very clear that General
Serrano has been heavily criticized by his own government, by
his own congress, but he has shown enormous courage, both
physical and moral, by continued to pursue the right course.
Mr. Souder. What is kind of curious to me is, it seems like
the most critical--I'm trying to sort through the
decertification process--the most critical thing, ideally, and
it's very frustrating, I know, when we were in Colombia, their
frustration with the court process--they get somebody, and then
they get off, and the sentencing problems you've talked about.
But the most critical thing in this is the fact that we
have the police, the defense and the attorney general on our
side, and we are trying to put pressure on the rest. Would you
agree that that--in a decertification process, is that
something you look at?
For example, if a country has a bigger problem in their law
enforcement and police and defense, would that make them more
or less likely to be decertified? Because corruption--I mean,
we're looking in almost all these countries at mixes of this,
and obviously one of the things I am hinting at, in Mexico we
have a huge problem with the attorney general, we have a huge
problem with corruption of the police, we have a huge problem
with corruption in the military, and I am trying to sort out
how you are making your decision of who you are certifying and
who you are not certifying.
Mr. Gelbard. When I announced the President's decision on
certification last year, first of all, I made it a point to
single out the excellent cooperation and work done by the
Colombian police and by Prosecutor General Valdivieso and his
staff. The test of the law, as I said then--and under the law,
it's very clear; you can ask Congressman Mica, because I think
he helped write that law--is whether the government has
cooperated with us.
The government, in this case, is the one headed by
President Samper. We did not believe then that it was
cooperating with us. The President still has not made his
decision, obviously, on this year's certification process, but
will.
We tried to be very careful in terms of separating out the
cooperation, the extraordinary cooperation we have received in
working with General Serrano and his police, now with the army,
with the prosecutor general, and with some others, from the
undermining that has taken place on a consistent basis by
others in the government.
As I mentioned in my oral statement, the government has not
even yet pursued what President Samper promised in his letter
to the Congress in terms of extradition. He promised in this
letter--he said we will present to Colombia's Congress
stringent new anticorruption legislation. Well, it comes as no
surprise that he hasn't done that.
So we have seen, on the one hand, efforts by serious,
patriotic people, but--and then they themselves have come out
and thanked us for our support, but then they have been
undermined by corruption. So the decision had to be made, based
on the final results, and the final results we see in terms of
the pathetic and just discouraging sentences for the Rodriguez
Orejuelas, who continue to run their businesses from jail.
Mr. Souder. I am not interested in trying to defend the
President of Colombia, where he takes his money and what he's
done. What I am saying is, the concept of the government here
is nebulous when there are independent parts of the government;
and what you are saying is, you would rather have the support
of the president even if the police are corrupt, the defense
may be corrupt, and there's changes in attorney general. But
you would rather have the support of the president than, in
Colombia's case, where we don't have the support of the
president, but we have pressure in parliament and we have the
support of the people actually cracking down in the drug war,
who are dying and fighting for it. That's what I am trying to
sort out.
If it's just the President and what he is promising to do--
in fact, in your statement, you said the measure is what is
being done, and in Colombia, they are fighting and dying; and
part of my concern is that in some of the other countries that
we're dealing with, they don't seem to be at the enforcement
point, but they seem to be giving us some of the lip service.
Mr. Gelbard. Congressman, what we're interested in, as I
said many times in my statement, are concrete results. When we
look at the concrete results, as I outlined some of them in the
statement, and this was clearly the case by March 1st of last
year, the concrete results, the bottom line, were inadequate.
In spite of efforts by the police, in spite of efforts by
General Valdivieso and others, but the concrete result, bottom
line, were clearly inadequate.
There is as much cocaine coming into the United States or
being produced in Colombia as ever before. As the chairman
said, there is more heroin being produced in Colombia than ever
before. So that's the bottom line we've got to look at. We've
got to look at the commitments that the government and the
president himself made, and the kinds of laws that are
necessary to produce the concrete bottom line results.
Mr. Souder. Thank you, I am looking forward to working with
you.
Mr. Hastert. Thank you. I just want to say the gentleman
from Indiana will serve as the vice chairman of this
subcommittee. We're very proud of the work that he has done. He
travelled with me last year to Mexico, Panama, Colombia,
Bolivia, Peru, and certainly is a person we'll depend on a
great deal to follow you through with on these issues.
It's my pleasure to turn to the next gentleman on the
panel, somebody who is very astute in the law and very famous
in that area, the gentleman from New Mexico, Mr. Schiff.
Mr. Schiff. Thank you, Mr. Chairman; thank you for holding
this hearing.
Mr. Ambassador, I'd like to ask a very basic question
first. Every nation's government has a constant fight with
corruption and influence of the criminal elements of one form
or another. As you know, our own government is not immune from
such infiltration. But yet, at least as is popularly
understood, the Government of Colombia seems to have the worst
problem virtually in the world in that regard. Again, that's
the image of the Government of Colombia.
What I'd like to ask is, is that an accurate perception of
the Government of Colombia, and if so, can you explain why the
Government of Colombia, the Nation of Colombia, seems to have a
worse problem with such criminal infiltration than other
governments do, acknowledging that the problem is universal?
Mr. Gelbard. Well, first of all, Congressman, I wouldn't go
so far as to say they have the worst corruption problem in the
world. I think Nigeria may have that honor, but it's
interesting, Transparency International just did some rankings
on it, and I'd be happy to see if I could get them to you,
because there is an interesting correlation between nation-
states where the rule of law does not prevail, and where there
is significant drug corruption--Nigeria, Burma, Colombia, a
number of others.
The tragedy of Colombia has been violence for many decades,
going back many, many years; and particularly, I think one of
the really dramatic and serious problems that we and the rest
of the international community need to focus on more is--
particularly in the post-cold war period, we have new
international security threats which are affecting democratic
institutions, social and economic institutions. Transnational
crime is clearly one of the most extraordinary that has
developed. Drug trafficking and transnational crime are
corrupting institutions everywhere, and Colombia, sadly, is one
of the most dramatic cases, as you say.
We have seen that the extraordinary financial power of the
drug traffickers has now enabled them to corrupt a government,
and lots of other elements throughout that society, including
economic and social institutions. This is one of the great
tragedies because it's one of oldest democracies in the Western
Hemisphere.
I think, once again, our--the decision by the President to
decertify and the extraordinary decision by the President to
revoke Samper's visa have caused a lot of elements and sectors
in the Colombian society to really focus on this problem more
than ever before. As I mentioned, we now have the Colombian
Bankers Association, who actually came to us last year because
they knew that the Colombian Government was doing nothing
against money laundering, and the Colombian Bankers Association
came to us to ask for training. That helped shame the Colombian
Government into doing things against this, too. That is just an
example.
I mentioned the Flower Growers' Association. There are lots
of other elements in the Colombian private sector and there are
lots of American companies who do business in Colombia who are
also trying to help provide this kind of influence to urge
cleaning up their institutions. We think that is important.
Mr. Schiff. That leads, I think, to the second question and
that is this hearing is very important because it points out,
particularly with the witnesses that will follow, that even in
countries that are on the high end of the list, which Colombia
is among at least the group you have mentioned, there are
individual nationals in those countries, including high-ranking
officials themselves, who don't want to tolerate the
infiltration of crime and corruption----
Mr. Gelbard. Absolutely.
Mr. Schiff [continuing]. And who at great risk, great
personal risk, wage that fight. We all saw here in Washington,
DC, just a few nights ago, how dangerous it is to be a police
officer in any country; that the threat of death is, again,
another universality, unfortunately. Nevertheless, in Colombia
I understand that thousands of police and antidrug law
enforcement officers have been assassinated in that country,
which demonstrates how many people don't want to tolerate that
situation.
That leads me to what seems, to me, the inconsistency that
you may have explained with the other pressures in Colombian
society. You have spoken well and I think with every
justification of Generals Bedoya and Serrano, and you said that
we were able to influence the appointment of General Serrano as
the head of the police in Colombia. If we believe that General
Samper is closely allied with the criminal elements in
Colombia, frankly, how are we able to do that?
Mr. Gelbard. First, before I answer that, I would like to
just add a point to what you started out talking about. I fully
agree with what you say. I could not agree with you more in
terms of the extraordinary courage of people in the Government
of Colombia and in the private sector of Colombia, who really
have--are extraordinarily patriotic in doing this. But I would
also like to mention the people in our own government who do
this, people in our Embassies in Colombia, Bolivia, Peru, and
other places around the world because it takes extraordinary
courage for those people, including former Ambassador Busby,
who is sitting here, to have lived under threat for extended
periods of time.
As I mentioned earlier, a contract employee of the American
Government was recently killed in Colombia while he was
involved in eradicating coca. I think our own people, as I know
you will agree, sir, deserve equal support.
Mr. Schiff. I am glad you added that, Mr. Ambassador.
Mr. Gelbard. In terms of your question, we have tried--we
have recognized very clearly through the extraordinary step of
the revocation of a sitting democratically elected President's
visa. Revoking a sitting President's visa is, as I said, an
amazing step. The only other case I can think of where this has
been done in memory is Kurt Waldheim. Revocation of visas is
not, one could argue, an enormously important step, but it is a
sign of shame and it is taken as that, because holding an
American visa is important.
We are not going to try to interfere in Colombia's internal
affairs. They elected him. They knew what they were getting.
His record has been clear for decades. What we have tried to
do, though, is establish standards under which we are prepared
to cooperate and support Colombia in many other ways. It is up
to the Colombian people, obviously, to decide how they want to
be ruled, but it is up to us and the rest of the international
community to decide how we are going to deal with those kinds
of individuals.
Mr. Schiff. I have one last question, Mr. Ambassador.
If we could set aside the legalese, I wonder if you could
explain in direct terms what you feel the goal of our policy
should be in terms of the ability for decertification, but then
the recommendation, if I understood you correctly, for a
waiver. I mean, if the President decertifies a country under
the law, but then has a waiver, what then can the President do
and not do? What is the goal you are striving to achieve with
that?
Mr. Gelbard. By decertification, what we are trying to
achieve--we outline in very clear ways to that government in
very explicit terms the measures that we hope they will
undertake to have a cooperative relationship with us. We did
that with Colombia in 1995, in 1996 and we have done it again
this year.
We hold them to certain standards and we ask them to
undertake certain measures and accomplish those measures. Then,
as I said, the test of the law is whether that government is
cooperating with us or whether it is fulfilling the measures of
the 1988 Vienna Convention.
Mr. Hastert. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Gelbard. The only problems I see in the law right now,
really, are this issue about military assistance, that we would
be--that I would be delighted to have changed and that we
supported.
Similarly, as I mentioned to Congressman Barrett, the
effects, the negative effects, it has on American business. All
our other programs have not only continued, as I say, they have
increased and even doubled. So we are trying to be able to
focus very clearly on our objectives.
Mr. Schiff. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Hastert. I thank the gentleman from New Mexico.
Now it is my privilege to introduce the gentleman from
Florida, who has been writing pertinent legislation, one of our
senior Members and he was writing that legislation probably
while many of us were just cutting our teeth on legislation,
that is. Mr. Mica from Florida.
Mr. Mica. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ambassador Gelbard, welcome back. We have been in this
battle, I guess, for more than a decade and a half together and
I appreciate your leadership.
I have some questions, though, today. Maybe I ought to
cover, first, the question of certification and waivers. As you
mentioned, I was active in helping to draft the certification
law and I just had staff check over the evening to see if we
had originally included the waiver when we wrote it, and we did
not. It was added as an amendment in 1988 and it was an
amendment contained in the International Narcotics Control Act
of that year. In fact, it did provide a waiver--I think it is
pretty clear. You said you have had trouble, I guess, with
Justice and DOD attorneys as far as interpretation.
Is that correct?
Mr. Gelbard. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mica. Well, we have had, I think, through this
committee, and the chairman of the full committee wrote back, I
believe it was in November, a request that a waiver be granted,
and no action--I think that went to General McCaffrey--which
disturbs me.
In checking also on waivers that have been granted under
this Section 614 authority, I find waivers have been granted by
the administration to Serbia and Montenegro on almost a half a
dozen occasions; at least twice to Somalia, to Haiti, to
Rwanda. There are two pages of waivers that have been granted.
There seems to be plenty of precedence when, in fact, it is in
the national interest for waivers to be granted.
I can't believe the administration doesn't consider this
instance as in the national interest and has been dragging
their feet. I will provide you with copies of those. That is
the first point.
The second point that concerns me is I see the PR that
Colombia is doing getting ready for their certification
campaign. They have got this ad that is appearing about how we
are well on the way to making drug traffickers suffer as much
as the people they supply. Then they talk about how they are
making them suffer. The pounds of cocaine have--that have been
seized have actually been reduced from 1995 to 1996. The acres
of coca destroyed have actually been reduced from 1995 to 1996.
It sounds like some serious suffering.
What concerns me also is in your testimony you said at the
same time the shift in focus of interdiction operations and
devotion of increased resources to eradication programs, that
is on page 9. So you would think that we had gone from
interdiction--actually interdiction has increased. We have gone
away from interdiction--to eradication.
Page 10, then, you testified, the Colombian coca crop has
expanded over 30 percent last year from 51,000 hectare acres to
67,000 hectare acres. So it seems that the emphasis, area of
emphasis that they are taking is also a failure, eradication
and interdiction.
Is that correct?
Mr. Gelbard. Well, let me respond to several points you
made, Congressman. As you say, you and I have known each other
a long time and I have enormous respect for your background and
experience in these issues.
I have to say that I obviously noticed this media blitz. I
think the timing is clearly geared to certification.
I also noticed this lovely color supplement that is 17
pages in Forbes Magazine on Colombia called, ``The Leading
Latin American Economy.'' It is a multifaceted economy,
obviously. That costs about $1 million to put that in here, as
we understand it.
What we also understand is that all of these newspaper ads
cost about $252,000. We also understand they have provided
about $2 million to public relations firms around here to
improve their image. I think what Colombia ought to be focusing
on are accomplishments instead of their image.
Some of that money perhaps could have been added to the
military and the police, instead of reducing their budgets, and
I think that would have been for the good of the Colombian
people and the international community.
Mr. Mica. Well, the information you have provided, the
information I have, shows that both interdiction is down and
eradication is down.
Mr. Gelbard. Well, the interdiction results have decreased.
As you said--I, too, noticed that in these ads, I was surprised
that they show--that they would take out full page ads to show
that the results have gotten worse. That is amazing.
Mr. Mica. Well, the whole thing is alarming, Mr.
Ambassador.
The other ad that they don't see is the headlines that I
see in my district, and I have held this up before. When we
were in--when we were in Colombia, Mr. Hastert, Mr. Souder and
others, we were told that there are 10,000 hectare acres now of
heroin growing, that heroin will be cheaper on the streets of
our cities than cocaine in short order. This is what is
happening in my central Florida suburban area. We are not
talking about urban ghettos of Detroit, New York, Los Angeles.
So I am not interested--we are not interested in PR. We are
interested in some action also.
Mr. Gelbard. I understand. Let me say, on opium poppies, I
think the area under cultivation, we have just completed our
survey and I mentioned the coca crop up 32 percent. We think
the opium poppy crop is about 6,300 hectares, which is a slight
increase over the past.
However, you are absolutely right, Congressman, because
almost all of the heroin that is being produced in Colombia is
coming to the United States. The Cali Cartel has now used the
same mechanisms that it has used to distribute cocaine for
distributing heroin. They are using loss leaders to sell heroin
at very high purity levels at a very low price and they have
taken ownership of the heroin distribution all through the East
Coast.
When I talk to the DEA in New York, in Baltimore, in
Philadelphia and other places in the East Coast, Hartford, you
can't find Southeast Asia heroin on the streets of those cities
anymore. It is Colombian heroin. That shows that it has
continued to increase even while--the police have made strong
efforts. The military are making strong efforts. But absent the
kind of governmental support that we were discussing,
Congressman, earlier, absent the framework of laws, absent
other kinds of support, they are going to be--they are going to
be able to continue to pump this stuff out.
We have only now been able to negotiate a maritime
interdiction agreement, and we have seen a significant shift in
the use of ships from airplanes as a way of getting drugs to
our shores now and to Europe, where there is a significant
increase, too, in cocaine and heroin coming from Colombia.
Mr. Mica. I have other questions but my time has expired.
We will get back. Thank you.
Mr. Hastert. I will advise the gentleman, we will come back
for a second round to anyone who may have another question or a
round of questions.
I just have a quick followup question or observation on
this. On a couple of statistics that we have been throwing back
and forth here today, basically, you have said that the
interdiction is down of drugs coming out of Colombia, and one
of the reasons that some people have said that is because we
have been doing more spraying and the Colombians have been more
effective at killing hectares of cocaine.
Also, it was interesting to see that some people predicted
the amount of cocaine moving out of Colombia is actually up, no
matter what the interdiction is. That also is explained by some
folks that there has actually been a huge decrease in the
amount of cocaine or coca paste coming up from Peru because of
the success of the air bridge, and that is no longer a
dependable market or at least as dependable as it was. So the
narcotraffickers are really concentrating on growing their own
crop in a sense. Is that valid?
Mr. Gelbard. You are absolutely right on Peru. It is a
combination of the support we have given to the Peruvian
military and police on interdiction and law enforcement on the
one hand and the support we have given to--we and other nations
have given to Peru for alternative development on the other.
The price of coca went way down. We are providing funds for
other livelihoods and people are literally walking off the
land. So there is an 18 percent decrease nationwide.
In Colombia, I don't think there has been a real shift from
interdiction to eradication. There has been a significant
increase in eradication efforts, but interdiction and law
enforcement efforts have continued.
The problem has been, I think, overall corruption. Once
again, the statistics are not ours. These are statistics
provided by the Colombian Government themselves.
Mr. Hastert. Thank you, Ambassador.
The next gentleman I would like to introduce is certainly
somebody who has distinguished himself on this panel and
others, the gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Barr.
Mr. Barr. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Ambassador, I don't really necessarily have any problem
with the administration's decision last year on
decertification, and I have heard your testimony today and have
read a great deal of material and I think it is admirable that
this administration has reached the conclusion that campaign
financing scandals involving foreign leaders are very serious
matters, worthy of very extraordinary action, even hampering
our war against drugs by cutting off certain types of
assistance and taking the extraordinary step of denying a visa
to a leader of a foreign country because of a campaign
financing scandal. But I am somewhat concerned about what
appears to be inconsistencies in the way the administration is
approaching these matters and in particular some
inconsistencies that appear to me certainly to be
inconsistencies with regard to the International Narcotics
Control Strategy Reports, or INCSR.
For example, I know under that process, and pursuant to the
law, Colombia and Mexico, among many other countries, fall into
the very same categories of major drug producing and drug
transit countries. Both Colombia and Mexico fall under the same
categories as major money-laundering countries, yet the action
of this administration last year, in terms of the extraordinary
step of decertifying and then not even applying for a waiver
and, as my distinguished colleague from Florida has said,
waivers have been requested in, I think, far less important
circumstances, that is, if the administration places
counternarcotics activities at a high priority. Yet, with
regard to looking at Colombia and Mexico, for example, which
have a great deal in common in terms of the pervasive
corruption in their societies and in terms of their preeminent
role in sending drugs into this country, action was taken last
year only against Colombia and not against Mexico.
I don't know whether this has anything to do with the money
that we have extended to Mexico--and I am glad that the
President highlighted in his State of the Union that they
repaid us in record time or something--but the fact of the
matter is, I think Mexico does not have a great deal to be
proud about and I think that this administration ought to be
doing more to talk not so much about Mexico paying us back in
record time for money extended to them, that a number of us
think we had no right to do anyway, with Mexico's increasingly
sorry record of corruption and direct massive involvement in
sending drugs into this country.
I would like your explanation of why action was taken
against Colombia in terms of decertifying them and not against
Mexico. Second, I would appreciate, again, an explanation of
something that a couple of the other members of the panel have
touched on, and that is why the administration has failed to
take advantage of the very, very broad authority that I presume
lawyers on your staff, and I know you are very familiar with,
under, for example, 22 U.S.C. Section 2364. It is very broad
authority for the President to, simply by notifying the
specified Members of Congress of his intention, very, very
broad authority to continue or expand military assistance,
which is, as you said, to these countries that can be used for
eradication and counternarcotics efforts, why the
administration has not sought to take advantage of that.
Obviously, they are aware of it, because it is a
longstanding statute provision, the waiver provision, going
back 36 years. There were two Members of this Congress last
year that wrote to General McCaffrey specifically requesting
that that action take place.
Mr. Gelbard. I know nobody here is going to sit and
question the decision of the President to have decertified
Colombia led by a clearly corrupt President who has had a
history of involvement with drug traffickers, of soliciting and
receiving drug money going back to 1982, a clear history, no
question. All of the information is out there.
I personally sat down with then Candidate Samper in
November 1993, and told him we had exquisite intelligence which
indicated from lots and lots of sources, now out in the public
domain, that he and his associates were soliciting and
receiving drug funds for their campaign. He denied it, of
course.
I told him he needed to stop right then, because we would
know if it continued and the relationship with him, if it
continued and he were elected President, would be bad.
He went back to Colombia and it continued. The proof is out
there now about soliciting and receiving more than $6.6 million
in drug funds. We have seen the consequences.
The President took the decision to decertify Colombia, a
very important decision based on the test of the law, which was
whether the government was cooperating with us. The government
was not cooperating with us.
The test of the law was also applied in the case of Mexico
and the President believed, and I believe, that President
Zedillo was cooperating with us.
The President hasn't made his decisions for this year for
1996. That will come out toward the end of this month. But
there have been clear-cut cases, examples of progress in terms
of our cooperation with Mexico during President Zedillo's
administration.
The lack of institutional capabilities in Mexico, I think,
were fairly clear compared to Colombia. We have a strong,
honest police with strong, dedicated, honest leadership.
Mr. Barr. In Mexico?
Mr. Gelbard. In Colombia.
Mr. Barr. OK. Good.
Mr. Gelbard. We have the same in the Prosecutor General's
Office. We now have in General Bedoya, a serious, honest person
who wants to work with us in closer ways than ever before on
counternarcotics and, as I mentioned, for that reason we have
taken the step of now allocating funds directed to the armed
forces for the first time out of my budget.
President Zedillo and many of his ministers have now been
trying to push for much better results in Mexico, and over the
course of 1996, I think, we have already seen some dramatic
changes.
For example--and, Congressman, knowing your distinguished
record as a prosecutor, you would understand this--they have,
for the first time, started extraditing their own nationals,
without precedent. They deported to the United States Juan
Garcia Abrego, who I mentioned earlier, who has now received,
as I mentioned, 11 life terms and many others. These are very
important, unprecedented steps.
We have begun cooperation with Mexico in counternarcotics
with their army and we are seeing very strong, positive results
as a result of that military-to-military cooperation, now
engaged in interdiction as they had already been engaged in
eradication.
We are seeing seizures up significantly in Mexico as a
result of cooperation that we have with the Army, with the Air
Force and with certain police elements.
They have now passed a major money-laundering law for the
first time and they have implemented it and already making
cases. They have passed an organized crime law, modernizing the
tools that you, as a former prosecutor, are familiar with, that
in most countries are novel ideas, such as allowing evidence
from wiring tapping that is court authorized to be used in a
court of law, which had not been allowed before.
Arrests are up of drug traffickers, arrests are up--both
domestic and foreigners who are in the country. Seizures are up
of heroin. They are up something like 79 percent in Mexico.
Seizures of cocaine are up.
So we think there has been progress under President
Zedillo, but in terms of the contrast--and I obviously can't
predict where the President is going to come out on
certification. In fact, the recommendations haven't even gone
to him yet.
Mr. Barr. The second question that I had, please, about why
the President has not sought the waiver and what----
Mr. Gelbard. First, what we did--what we were--what we did
concur with were the efforts in the House International
Relations Committee to get an amendment to the law to permit
this. As I said earlier, unfortunately, the Congress failed to
pass that amendment, and I regret that.
Mr. Barr. I am talking about the existing law.
Mr. Gelbard. I am talking about the existing law--of trying
to change the existing law about prohibition on FMF and FMS. We
have been working with the issue of a 614 waiver. I also know
that the Congress in the past has criticized the administration
for over use of the 614 waiver.
So we do hope to be able to provide assistance to the
military. But once again, this is a relatively small part of
overall assistance to Colombia. The more important issue, I
think, is that we, through my budget, which is the main source
of funds far and away to Colombia, are going to be providing
this year equipment and support worth $147.8 million to
Colombia. That is an extraordinary amount.
Mr. Barr. But why hasn't the administration sought the--and
I maybe disagree with you. I think the waiver in 22 U.S. 2364
is very broad. Why hasn't the administration used that as a
tool to get assistance directly to the military and the police
in Colombia?
Mr. Gelbard. Assistance to the police has gone through.
Mr. Hastert. I think we will come back with a second round
and be able to ask those questions.
Mr. Barr. OK.
Mr. Hastert. The gentleman from Ohio.
Mr. LaTourette. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for
having this hearing.
Mr. Ambassador, in preparing for this hearing I was struck
by some of the strength of the remarks made by various
officials in our government about President Samper. In your
testimony on page 4 and again you repeated it, I think, in
questioning with Mr. Barr, that you reached the conclusion that
the President has aided and abetted drug traffickers and that
led to, in part, to the decision to revoke his visa.
I was reading an observation by our Drug Czar, I think our
new national Drug Czar, Drug Policy Director, Mr. McCaffrey,
who indicated that he has been--the President has been
complicit with international criminals. I think even our
Ambassador to that country made the observation that although
he says all sorts of things, he has done very little and he has
no friends in Washington.
As someone who is coming to this committee afresh, I have
read and I have heard you say today that there is an
observation that $6.6 million found its way apparently into
President Samper's campaign coffers from drug traffickers. I
have heard you--I hadn't read it before, but I heard you say
for the first time that apparently you have uncovered a history
of that type of transaction since 1982.
Is it the conclusion of the administration that the
acceptance of these funds from questionable characters equals
he must be complicit and therefore coddling or caving into drug
traffickers, narcotraffickers, or is there additional evidence
that that is, in fact, the case?
I guess what I am getting at is, I suppose one could make
the argument that he has accepted a campaign contribution. He
wrote a letter to Congress saying that he would do certain
things; he didn't do it. Therefore, it must be the campaign
contribution equaled he didn't get the money laundering
statutes passed through his Congress. Or is there other
evidence that you are familiar with that leads you to that
conclusion?
Mr. Gelbard. The Cali Cartel has never been known to have
provided support without a quid pro quo. We believe that there
are--there is information which causes us to believe that there
were direct consequences of the receipt of these funds.
Mr. LaTourette. OK. I think that is an important--at least
to me, it is an important question, because I don't think that
you would argue that merely, as Mr. Barr, I think, was asking
you, the mere acceptance of campaign contributions from people
of questionable character equals that you do what they want you
to do in contravention to the best interest of your Nation,
certainly.
Mr. Gelbard. The President made the decision to revoke the
visa under a provision of the law which deals with individuals
who aid and abet drug traffickers.
Mr. LaTourette. OK. If I could fast forward now to the
present day, and I was very interested in Mr. Mica's
questioning and also your showing us the Forbes Magazine piece.
I don't think there is anything wrong with a country promoting
itself and saying that it is a nice place to visit, has a
strong economy. But there have been other things in the news
recently. In particular I was interested in a raid that
apparently occurred down at the end of January in Colombia at a
drug manufacturing center, and I have observed two spins put on
that.
One is that it was a huge distribution or manufacturing
center that could have supplied up to half the manufactured
cocaine down in Colombia on an annual basis. I have also read
sort of a sarcastic piece that says, well, they knew about it
for a long time and they waited until the recertification
decision was coming up here in the United States in March and
that is when they sprung it.
Do you have an observation as to whether this is window
dressing or whether or not this is evidence of increased and
enhanced drug enforcement activities and the redoubling of the
effort by the Colombian Government?
Mr. Gelbard. I don't believe that the Colombian police or
the Colombian Army or the Colombian Air Force would undertake a
laboratory raid because of any proximity to certification. We
have a great deal of trust in them and their leadership and
that is why we work with them so closely. But I think this goes
to, in fact, part of my own experience.
I was Ambassador to Bolivia when during part of that time--
this goes to also some of your questioning, Congressman--we had
a President then in Bolivia, Jaime Paz Zamora, who had been
corrupted by the drug traffickers, and his visa was also
revoked, by the way.
We were working very closely with the Bolivian police and
Bolivian Air Force on some significant counternarcotics
achievements, on a separate track from what the government
itself was doing and the governmental leadership, and it is
possible to do that.
We have a very close collaborative relationship with the
police, the Army, the Prosecutor General's Office.
Mr. LaTourette. Likewise, I assume the activity that
occurred maybe a week ago, I understand there was an 11-city
sweep that occurred down in Colombia relative to rooting out
suspected trafficking activity, that you would put in the same
category?
Mr. Gelbard. Well, what I would say is that, as I mentioned
earlier, I don't think it is a coincidence that suddenly the
government has moved at the end of December to get the asset
forfeiture law passed; that suddenly we have seen them
initial--agree and initial the maritime interdiction agreement,
which we have been pursuing for a few years; that suddenly they
are having an extraordinary session of their Congress next week
to try to discuss a sentencing law.
We happily will take the results. They are important
results. But the timing isn't coincidental.
Mr. LaTourette. That was what I was going to ask you.
Although you may question their timing, you consider them to be
significant progress on the part of the Colombian Government?
Mr. Gelbard. On those issues, once again, I think the
certification process helps.
Mr. LaTourette. OK. If I could just ask you a technical
question relative--on the extradition question. Am I correct in
my understanding that in order for Colombia to modify their
policy on extradition there would have to be a change to their
constitution? Am I correct on that?
Mr. Gelbard. There are two interpretations. There is one
school of thought which says they have to modify the 1991
constitution and in that case, the Cali Cartel clearly was able
to buy enough votes in the constitutional convention to exclude
that.
There is another school of thought which says that the
bilateral--the treaty we have with Colombia, which I think is
the 1979 treaty, would override the constitutional provision
and that apparently is going to be taken to the highest court
in Colombia soon.
Mr. LaTourette. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Gelbard. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Hastert. A couple of quick questions and then I think
we will go on a round of quick followup questions, if we could.
Mr. Ambassador, one of the obvious things of the whole drug
war, multinational drug war, you can grow coca leaf, turn it
into paste, transport it, remanufacture it into cocaine, crack;
same with heroin, and the poppy and the heroin. It comes in--
most of it at least comes into this country wholesale,
retailed, retailed again, sold on the street, literally
multiplying its value not by tens or by hundreds but by
thousands, sometimes millions of factors.
That money--in order for all that work to be done, there is
no value in all of that movement unless the money comes back to
the person who is in charge. Money laundering probably is one
of the--is the tie to this. What nation in the world is No. 1
in money laundering? Can you give me a crack at that.
Mr. Gelbard. The United States.
Mr. Hastert. What country is No. 2?
Mr. Gelbard. Hard to say. Let me say, I fully agree with
you. This is why we have tried to put major emphasis on a money
laundering initiative that is included in Presidential
Directive 42 on international crime.
We have tried now to marshal all of our resources in the
U.S. Government through Treasury, Federal Reserve, Justice, and
the State Department and others, to work with countries to put
major emphasis on antimoney laundering, much more than ever
before.
Secretary Rubin, in fact, chaired a little over a year ago
a hemispheric conference on money laundering and we are
pressing governments such as Colombia to take the strongest
possible action.
An example of Samper's cynicism was at the Miami
Hemispheric Summit, where he called for a hemispheric
convention on money laundering and Colombia hadn't even
criminalized money laundering yet.
They subsequently passed a weak money laundering law. We
are now pressing them to toughen that law and then to take
other measures.
We are doing the same with other governments in the region,
whether they are large governments, such as Venezuela, Mexico,
which, as I say, has now adopted a tough money laundering law.
Or even small Caribbean countries which are used as centers for
dirty money, such as Antigua. But we are doing the same also
around the world, and this has been a Presidential initiative.
Mr. Hastert. In fact, the United States is No. 1. Mexico is
probably No. 2. Panama is probably No. 3 and, you know,
Colombia is down there No. 4 or 5 or 6, which doesn't validate
anybody or give them a license.
The fact is, all the money comes into this country and we
are doing a very poor job, because the money--drugs wouldn't
come into this country unless the money could flow out again. I
think one of the emphases that I would say that this Congress
ought to do is take a look at how we can make our laws better
and enforce those laws.
Mr. Gelbard. Can I say, I agree with you. What's happening,
though, when I talk to DEA and other law enforcement
organizations, which work inside the United States, what they
are telling me is now the tough--there are very tough
antimoney-laundering laws in the United States and enforcement
has been dramatic. The result is that drug traffickers are now
shipping their money out by--in cash and they are shipping it
out in containers.
Jim Milford, who is now the Deputy Administrator of the DEA
and was previously the head of their Miami office, has told me
about seizures of tens of millions of dollars that they have
picked up in Miami of money going out of the country on its way
back to Colombia. We have got to be able--the hard part is
getting a handle on those containers. That is very hard.
Mr. Hastert. We even had testimony that, as a matter of
fact, it is more difficult to pack street dollars, street cash
into those containers; it takes more container volume than the
drugs that come in on them.
Mr. Gelbard. The other thing, if I could say, sir, is that
we have been working for a number of years, since the Financial
Action Task Force, which is the multilateral organization that
deals with this, based in Paris, which was set up a number of
years ago, to try to establish international standards against
money laundering. We and some of our allies in Europe and Japan
have been working together to urge countries such as Colombia,
Mexico, Panama and others, including the European countries
such as Austria, which has never ratified the Vienna
Convention, to take strong action on money laundering.
Mr. Hastert. I have one quick question before my round is
up here. During our period of time on decertification, the
Colombian military and police continue to fly excess United
States Huey helicopters. Five of them were shot out of the sky
by the narcotraffickers and guerilla armies. It took the
administration about 6 months to replace these excess
helicopters, based chiefly on trying to get legal opinions
whether it was right or wrong during this period of time.
Just as there have been sometimes delays of months in
trying to find spare parts to make the DC-3s fly, which got
materials out into the jungles, and also the herbicides that
were needed, we also delayed the delivery of the Blackhawk
helicopters. I am not even sure they are on the shores of
Colombia yet. This has all happened since basically the
decertification of Colombia.
In view of the numbers of Americans dying from violence on
American streets because, in part, this happens, how can we
expect that not to happen again?
Mr. Gelbard. First of all, that had nothing to do with
certification. The Blackhawk transaction is a commercial
transaction and, in fact, we and the Pentagon got Sikorsky to
agree to jump Colombia to the front of the line to get their
helicopters. The first helicopters are, in fact, arriving
tomorrow in Colombia.
Second, last year we provided 12 more helicopters, 12 Huey
helicopters to them. We have provided three Bell-212
helicopters and are about to provide three more.
We have given them all the spray planes we have got
worldwide. As I mentioned, we have lost two, one to ground fire
and one when tragically an American pilot crashed. We are about
to provide five more OV-10 Bronco aircraft; two this month,
three by the end of March. We will be providing 12 more Huey
helicopters within the next month or so. So we feel we are
moving this as rapidly as we can and as rapidly as their
absorptive capacity can handle.
I would point out that the operating rate in Colombia for
aircraft is lower. It is about 65 percent. It is lower than we
have in Peru and Bolivia, about 85 percent. So it is not just a
question of pumping equipment in. It is also a question of
maintaining that equipment well and being able to use the spare
parts.
Mr. Hastert. Getting the spare parts there?
Mr. Gelbard. We have provided $4 million in spare parts
this last year, too. Thank you.
Mr. Barrett. During the course of this conversation this
morning, we have heard you praise the political leadership in
Mexico, but not have such great praise for the military or
police in Mexico and, in contrast, in Colombia there has been
strong praise here for the police and military, but obviously
no praise at all for the political leadership.
Can you site some examples where some of the higher regions
of the government and Colombia has undermined the hard-working
efforts of the police and the military?
Mr. Gelbard. I think the primary examples would rest in
cutting their budget, first of all.
Mr. Barrett. How much is the budget?
Mr. Gelbard. I don't have any answers on that, but I would
suggest you might want to ask General Bedoya about that. But
one would think that if, as even President Samper says, the
fight against the guerilla terrorists and the fight against
drug trafficking are as high priorities as he says they are,
then their budget would go up, the way ours did.
Second, they did nothing to try to move expeditiously on a
new sentencing law that was promised almost 3 years ago. That
would, I think, have helped enormously in terms of not just the
morale, but the rule of law for the police, who had superb
performance in capturing the leadership of the Cali Cartel. So
here they captured all of these people, but then they were
brought to jail and, as I said earlier, they have received
ridiculous sentences; no forfeited assets because the law was
just passed now.
Money laundering, the money-laundering law that was finally
passed was weak and the government made no effort to make it a
serious law.
The kind of stringent anticorruption legislation, and those
are President Samper's words, that he promised has never been
presented, and on and on.
Meanwhile, a very interesting example is the cooperation
between the Minister of Interior and a German citizen, an
apparent German espionage agent, named Werner Mauss. They were
apparently looking to have the German Government, which
ultimately refused, broker a deal for the Cali Cartel, which
would have resulted in them getting off scot free and keeping
20 percent of their assets. That is an amazing example.
This man, Mauss, working with the Interior Minister, was
also trying to corrupt the contracting process and hurting
American companies and was also trying to make deals with the
guerrillas. He was trying to free German hostages, but he was
getting the ransom raised and getting a percentage of that.
That endangered the lives of American citizens who were held
hostage.
So this is all part of what the government and President
Samper have been doing.
Mr. Barrett. OK. Thank you.
We have heard some criticism of the administration's
actions today, but I don't think we have heard any criticism of
the decision to pull the visa of President Samper.
Is there a way to turn the heat up even more? Have you
considered pulling his diplomatic visa? Is that something that
could be considered? What is the next way to put the spotlight
or keep the spotlight on him?
Mr. Gelbard. We have revoked the visas of a large number of
Colombian Government officials, of ministers or former
ministers, Members of Congress. We have frozen the assets, as I
say, of a lot of the front companies.
We have considered other measures and are considering other
measures, but I would rather not get into them today.
Let me also add, though, that I think it is not coincidence
at all that when Secretary Albright recently presented our
human rights report, Colombia was clearly targeted as one of
the leading offenders. One of the examples that we have looked
to is the fact that President Samper has also put into place a
very harsh censorship law against the press and I think that is
another example of this overall atmosphere we have seen. But we
are considering others--other measures.
Mr. Barrett. I am glad you mentioned the human rights
concerns because that is something we haven't talked about this
morning. In your analysis, where have the majority of the human
rights violations occurred, by government officials?
Specifically, where are we seeing the human rights violations
in Colombia?
Mr. Gelbard. We have been very concerned, as have
nongovernmental organizations, by human rights problems,
particularly through the military.
General Bedoya, I think, has been making a major effort, as
did the former Minister of Defense and now Ambassador in
Washington, Esguerra, to try to improve that situation. In
fact, General Bedoya and I discussed that issue yesterday. We
feel that General Bedoya is making serious efforts on this
problem.
I have to say, though, that there is no question that the
real human rights problem has also been at the same time what
the guerilla terrorist groups have also been undertaking, the
FARC, ELN and other groups. They have kidnapped foreigners and
their own citizens. They have murdered hundreds upon hundreds
of other people. Once again, we think the institutions are
trying to make improvement. We regret very deeply that
President Samper is trying to curtail press freedom and we have
spoken out quite strongly about that.
The Congress of the United States, in its last session,
approved a new law called the Leahy amendment, under which
funds from our budget have to take into account human rights
elements. We are stringently, of course, obeying that law and
are working very closely with the Colombian Government to
assure that our assistance takes into account all appropriate
and serious violations.
Mr. Barrett. So you have drawn up lists of offending units
or you will be drawing up lists?
Mr. Gelbard. Sorry?
Mr. Barrett. Have you drawn up lists, then, of offending
units or will you be doing that?
Mr. Gelbard. Ambassador Frechette has been working very
closely with General Bedoya and the new Minister of Defense on
this issue, yes.
Mr. Barrett. OK. Thank you.
Mr. Hastert. A quick followup. You mentioned press
censorship. One of the things we try to do here is to try to
keep updated on what is going on in Colombia from the Colombia
press. One of the major papers, El Tiempo, that comes out of
Colombia, apparently, at least, in our reading, doesn't say--
they seem to be speaking out quite bravely on a lot of issues
and it really doesn't seem that there has been a lot of
censorship, at least in our view of this. Any comment on that?
Do you think El Tiempo, for instance, has been severely
hampered?
Mr. Gelbard. El Tiempo is very brave. El Espectador and
others have taken very strong stands. The censorship law, if I
remember correctly, is particularly directed at television and
radio and the idea is that their licenses can be revoked.
Mr. Hastert. OK. That narrows that down.
Mr. Gelbard. Yes.
Mr. Hastert. Significantly.
Mr. Souder. I want to restate the obvious here before I
start out, and that is that none of us have any interest in
defending the actions of the President of Colombia. Partly in
discussions with you, when we went down there, we didn't meet
with him. We met with President Zedillo and others.
At the same time, one of our obligations--and, quite
frankly, I find this whole advertising campaign very insulting,
about how we make decisions here, and they got pretty bad PR
advice, that--but one of our jobs here is to make sure that
there is fairness. We want to make sure that Colombia isn't
just being used as a whipping boy solely when the problem is
far beyond that.
I want to sort through one of the difficult issues that
faces us in almost all these nations, and that is the problem
of the mixing, as President Zedillo told us, of narcoterrorists
and, in fact, the revolutionary movements in those countries
and how the different governments can deal with that.
For example, we get mixed up in the human rights questions
and the narcotics questions and the revolutionary groups, and
those things are not separated from each other. Often, the
human rights restrictions that--so, for example, we have had
problems with President Fujimori in the past; and when you
shoot down airplanes you aren't necessarily reading the Miranda
rights as you are shooting down the airplanes, although they
make some attempts to do that; that in Burma we have a problem
there both in the electoral process but also, up in the
northern part of Burma, in trying to get cooperation.
When we cutoff any relations, we are having trouble getting
control. You see it going into the Yunnan province in China
and--because of the Muslims there. It is not even clear that
the National Government of China can control that.
In Mexico, we have corruption down at the regional levels
and in their police departments, and Zedillo is concerned that
that is going to be a revolutionary--tied in with the
revolutionary movements.
The question comes as to how are you distinguishing--and
let me put this in a provocative way. Is some of the reason we
are isolating Colombia, which--clearly, we have seen the movie
Clear and Present Danger. Ambassador Busby, I think, made the
funniest statement when we were there, which was, I asked him
how accurate the movie was; and he said, very accurate, except
I died in the movie.
While we see that and it is easy to focus on Colombia, we
need to make sure that the only reason we aren't isolating
Colombia is that flowers and coffee may not be as potent as the
trade that we want to do with China or Mexico and that we
balance--and I want to see an even type of approach to all of
these different countries.
I would like you, in particular, to comment on how you see
the drug trafficking and the revolutionary movements and the
human rights mixing in four of the most explosive and major
drug areas of the world: Peru, Colombia, Burma and Mexico.
Mr. Gelbard. Nobody is picking on Colombia, Congressman.
Mr. Souder. They deserve being picked on. The question is
on being isolated.
Mr. Gelbard. I am disliked in lots of places around the
world. We have--this hearing happens to be on Colombia. If this
hearing were on Nigeria, you would hear me say the same things
but maybe more. If this hearing were on Burma, you would hear
me saying the same things about the SLORC; and I will talk a
little bit about that, if you would like.
Mr. Souder. OK. What about Mexico and China?
Mr. Gelbard. We feel very strongly--I am not sure how much
the Mexicans like me, either.
My job relates to trying to develop stronger
counternarcotics cooperation and results worldwide. I feel very
strongly about it. This is not the easiest job in the world,
obviously; and it is sure not the most enjoyable.
We have taken a very strong stand on these issues
worldwide, worldwide. When I came into this job, and knowing
that Congressman Mica was now a Member of Congress and would be
watching me very carefully, I looked at the certification law
and I said that as long as I am the person responsible for
managing this, I am going to take this very seriously. We have
seen--I think if you examine the results, you will see that
there has been a significant change in the way that this
administration has dealt with certification, has dealt with
money laundering, has dealt with a whole range of these issues
than ever before.
We are, obviously, concerned about trying to work a balance
on many of these issues. If you read through the various laws--
and we have to be guided by the letter and the spirit of the
laws--there are often conflicts in the laws, and there are
often conflicts among Members of Congress as they interpret the
laws.
I am tremendously concerned, for example, about the fact
that an enormous amount of heroin that comes into the United
States comes from Burma, as are you. But there are also Members
of Congress who are very concerned about impeding our ability
to deal with that problem.
What I am trying to do is work with the United Nations Drug
Control Program, through that kind of program, to develop a
program with integrity to deal with eradicating opium poppies
and having crop substitution, particularly in the Wa area. I
have been in the Yunnan province in China. I have spent a lot
of time with the Chinese authorities and with others. We also
see an enormous amount of corruption in the SLORC and in lots
of other places in Burma.
In Colombia, we have been trying to develop serious
programs to deal with the ever-increasing problem, the overlay
between the guerilla terrorist movements, drug trafficking and,
increasingly, cultivation.
The phenomenon of the involvement of the guerilla terrorist
groups in drugs isn't new. In 1985, when I became involved with
this for the first time professionally, it was quite apparent
then. The FARC at that time were guarding drug laboratories and
benefiting from it. The M-19 at that time apparently was on
contract from the Medellin Cartel when they murdered a large
number of members of the Colombian Supreme Court.
This is--but the law also says that any assistance from my
budget has to go 100 percent against drug trafficking. It can't
be used for multiple purposes. But this--this is what General
Bedoya and General Serrano and I were discussing just last
night, how we can work together in certain regions of Colombia
where it's clear that the guerrilla terrorist groups are
involved very clearly in drug trafficking, in cultivation,
protecting cultivation, and we can have programs that will
fully be in concurrence with American law. We had some detailed
discussions about that last night.
That is also why we have now explicitly put $5 million in
our budget specifically for the military of Colombia. But, at
the same time, we have to be very clear in our own minds about
our own standards and our own beliefs as well as the law
regarding human rights.
In Peru, if I can just say, yes, there were obviously a
great deal of concerns about human rights. They have less to
do, in my mind, with forcedown and shootdown of aircraft; but
we also were faced with a law that may or may not have had a
certain meaning regarding civil aircraft.
As you probably know, Congressman, I led the fight to make
sure that we would be able to provide realtime intelligence
support to the Air Forces of Colombia and Peru. We are doing
that now. We are doing that with great results. But we have had
to be very careful, in part because we fundamentally believe in
the rule of law and the need to have effective programs that
won't be undermined over the medium and long term.
Mr. Souder. You know, once again, I want to reiterate that
I believe that you have been committed and have been pushing in
this administration for that. I want to make sure that you
understand, too, that in addition to the countries that are--
quite frankly have less financial clout in the world, Burma,
Colombia and some of the others, compared to some of the bigger
countries, that some of us want to see the same pressures
across the board. We are not faulting--we want to keep pushing
you, but we are not necessarily faulting where you have been.
Mr. Hastert. I thank the gentleman.
The gentleman from Florida, Mr. Mica.
Mr. Mica. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Gelbard, one of the problems
with the decertification law as we wrote it--and we wrote it
back in the 1980's--was it tied foreign aid into drug
eradication or drug efforts by nation; and many of the nations
were poor and were dependent on U.S. assistance, received large
U.S. assistance.
One reason I don't think it worked with Colombia too well
is, actually, it's a pretty wealthy nation. It's one of the
wealthiest in the western hemisphere.
I think our subcommittee and Congress needs to look at
imposing some further pain on countries that don't need this. I
think Senator Grassley is looking to multidecertifications;
like the second strike, if they decertify Colombia that we look
at some real pain for that country. So that is one thing that
we may need to look at, that we talked about.
Ambassador, the members of the committee went down; and we
went to Colombia, we went to Peru, we went to Bolivia, other
areas, Panama, Mexico. If this administration had really
emasculated the interdiction program and even some of the
eradication programs, if we came back and we put together all
the resources that everyone needed or asked for--I don't think
there wasn't anything that you all didn't ask for that we
didn't deliver. We felt that policy was a disaster. Our
experience in looking at it proved that it was a disaster.
Then in September--and you alluded, too, in your testimony,
too, the problem now with some of the air cover and other
things that now these folks are going to--riverine strategy,
taking the stuff out in boats and ships. In September, Barbara
Larkin, Assistant Secretary of Legislative Affairs, sent the
chairman, I think Mr. Gilman, notifying them of a drawdown for
funds. This is--I talked about the other pot, the FMS pot. This
is your pot, under State. That was to buy patrol boats, because
we saw the problem now with this new pattern of trafficking and
other equipment.
It's my understanding that even in September, when you told
us that this was going to be done, that nothing has been done
in ordering this equipment. Is that correct?
Mr. Gelbard. No, that is not correct.
We have moved to provide--this is the program under Section
506(a)(2), if I am not correct--is that right?
Mr. Barr. Yes.
Mr. Mica. Yes.
Mr. Gelbard. We have moved to try to establish the proper
agreements with the nations involved so we can send the
equipment there.
The Colombian--we have needed two provisions under the law.
One is an end user agreement and the second is an agreement on
human rights. We finally received that agreement from the
Colombian Minister of Defense on February 11th. We were delayed
by the Colombian Government.
Mr. Mica. So it's the agreement?
Mr. Gelbard. That is done.
Mr. Mica. But these still haven't been ordered, right? This
equipment?
Mr. Gelbard. No. It is all ordered, and it is ready to move
now that we have----
Mr. Mica. I would have to disagree with that. I have the
manufacturer back--in the back of the hearing room here, and he
tells me nothing has been done.
The same thing for Peru. If you turn to the
administration's letter--and I don't know of any
decertification in Peru--we will also furnish three river
patrol boat craft to Peruvian security. We are asking for a
drawdown of $13.75 million. This stuff hasn't even been ordered
yet. They tell me it will take, after the order, 120 days, half
a year, before this is produced.
So we went down in April. You requested this in September;
and nothing is done, at least as far as ordering the equipment.
Is that correct?
Mr. Gelbard. I don't order the equipment. This is--excuse
me. This is the Department of Defense. I am sorry, but I can't
answer for the Department of Defense on this one.
Mr. Mica. Mr. Chairman, I would ask that our staff look
into this. This is absolutely uncalled for.
Now, we have talked about moving to eradication; and we--I
have a confidential report here that we had 12 aircraft in the
air on eradication. Then we went down to eight, and now we are
down to five. Is that correct? Are we now flying only five or
is this wrong?
Mr. Gelbard. No, that is not right.
Mr. Mica. How many are we flying?
Mr. Gelbard. I have said several times today, Congressman,
that we have nine spray planes there. We had 11. Two were
destroyed, including the loss of life. We have increased the
number of helicopters substantially in Colombia, and we now
provide something like two-thirds of----
Mr. Mica. What about the eradication?
Mr. Gelbard. Can I give you some details?
Mr. Mica. How many eradication planes are flying today?
Mr. Gelbard. I am just about to give you the details.
We have nine U.S. Government-owned Turbo Thrush spray
planes. We have----
Mr. Mica. That are flying today?
Mr. Gelbard. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mica. What about----
Mr. Gelbard. We have a Casa-212 transport aircraft, a
Cessna 208 helicopter or aircraft, three Bell-212 helicopters.
Plus we have a very large number of helicopters that we have
provided to the Government of Colombia, to the police,
including 12 additional helicopters that we gave them last
year.
Mr. Mica. What about the status, finally--I guess, my time
is running out here. It's my understanding, in 1994, that the
Department of State installed an individual without any prior
practical or technical experience in counternarcotics operation
as the director of the NAS, Narcotics Affairs Section, of the
Embassy. Is that individual still there or the same person in
charge since 1994, do you know?
Mr. Gelbard. The individual who is heading the narcotics
assistance section has been doing an outstanding job.
Ambassador Frechette obviously feels that this is the highest
priority in his work; and he spends personally a great deal of
time on these issues, as does his deputy.
We have a very large staff in that Embassy. In fact, we
just hired a retired colonel, whom I personally know, to run
all of our air assets. The total amount of air assets that we
have, as I say, is extraordinarily large.
Mr. Mica. So we have the same person in charge of the air?
Mr. Gelbard. We have the same person in charge.
One point I want to make on the 506(a) program, by law the
equipment provided under that law--under that program--comes
from stocks and inventories in the U.S. Government. So I am
confused as to whether anything would be ordered from any
private companies. But the law states, as I understand it, and
I could be wrong, that it's a drawdown authority from stocks
and inventories.
Mr. Mica. Well, when this is over, I would like to
introduce you to the vendor, who is in the back. It is also
stated in here what you would be purchasing.
Mr. Hastert. The gentleman from Florida, it is time to move
on.
The gentleman from Georgia.
I might add, just for the record, too, you characterized
that as a confidential report. That was a private sector report
and not a government report. Is that correct?
Mr. Mica. Yes.
Mr. Hastert. Thank you.
The gentleman from Georgia.
Mr. Barr. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Previously, when we were having a discussion, Mr.
Ambassador, you mentioned that at some length, as I recall, the
great steps that Mexico has taken, the laws and so forth; and
you were very kind to mention the work that my office had done
in Atlanta in drug cases. Prosecutorial offices, of course,
wherever they are located, whether they are located in Mexico,
Colombia or Atlanta, the success of their efforts can be
measured only by the willingness and the ability of
prosecutorial offices to carry out the laws that are passed.
Passing laws that look great on the surface really means
very little and sometimes can be worse than not passing them at
all because then it becomes a smoke screen that is held up as
evidence of great progress that is being made simply because
they passed these tough laws, but that is not being used, then
we still have a very serious problem. We all know, I think,
today that the problem that we have is with extradition and
that no progress has been made on that. I know the
administration is trying to get the Government of Colombia to
do something about that.
But I think you mentioned Mexico, and I am not really sure
that Mexico's--that the track record of the Mexican Government
in recent years really merits a great deal of compliment. Isn't
it true that we really have just over the last 4 years
requested literally dozens of extraditions that they have only
complied in three cases, the Mexican Government, that is?
Mr. Gelbard. We obviously feel that extradition is one of
the fundamental tools worldwide, and we have been pressing
nations around the world to negotiate, implement, ratify,
implement world class, up-to-date extradition treaties. Let me
say that we have been very pleased under Attorney General
Reno's leadership in particular that we have now been
successful in negotiating a series of new extradition treaties.
Recently one in Bolivia came under force----
Mr. Barr. That is fine. I will put into the record that the
administration has done a great job in these areas. I am
talking about Mexico.
Mr. Gelbard. What has happened with Mexico, as I said
earlier, is that they started for the first time to extradite
nationals early last year, and this was important because it
was without precedent. Under their law, it says they can
extradite people under exceptional circumstances. We obviously
would like to see them extradite an awful lot more people. I
don't have the exact numbers that they have extradited so far,
but we clearly would like to see many more.
Mr. Barr. It is my information that there have been only
three, and one of those was a U.S. citizen. So I--but----
Mr. Gelbard. In terms of U.S. citizens and other nationals,
I believe--and I would be happy to get you the statistics on
this--that they have extradited a great deal more. The question
is really how many of their own nationals have they extradited,
how many they are prepared to do.
[The information referred to follows:]
In 1996, there were 13 extraditions altogether. Two of
these were Mexican nationals; the others were U.S. citizens or
other nationalities.
Mr. Barr. That is the question, and it is my information
that they have only extradited two. If you have differing
information, I would be happy to receive it.
Mr. Gelbard. We have been pressing them to do more. When
the new Attorney General was just here 2 weeks ago, the
Attorney General, I, and others, General McCaffrey, have been
putting them at the very top of our priority list.
Mr. Barr. I appreciate that, and I understand we have been
pressing the Colombian Government to do more, notwithstanding
the problems we have been having with the president himself
down there. Again, I don't want to beat a dead horse, but I
feel, and I think you can gather, that maybe some other members
of the panel share my concern here that we are applying one
standard to Colombia and a very different standard to Mexico.
I would like to, in the remaining short period of time that
I have, to return to an area that we left unfinished earlier,
although in subsequent discussions you touched on some of the
things that I was going to mention also. The letter from
September 1996 concerning the waiver under 506(a)(2), and that
is fine, although I am concerned, as Mr. Mica is, that there is
a big difference between the documents being sent forward and
the action being actually taken to get the equipment in the
hands of the folks down there in Colombia.
But again, has there been no effort to look at the other
waiver authority contained in the same section in the earlier
paragraph (a)(1) in terms of assistance? I think it is
particularly important not so much in the large picture but in
the small picture that our military, if the President would
look at this, could be getting some much needed equipment down
there very, very quickly. We know that we are having--they are
having a problem with the helicopters and delays in getting
them repaired, the DC-3, the mini-guns which they have expended
the money on their own because apparently somebody made the
decision that the use of mini-guns would violate human rights
or something. But isn't the authority that the President could
be exercising under (a)(1) a tool that could help here?
Mr. Gelbard. Let me just get back to the issue under
(a)(2). According to law, we have to have guarantees about the
use of equipment, and we now also have to have guarantees about
human rights provisions. The Colombian Government only gave us
those assurances on the 11th of this month. We are now moving,
and we have, the military are moving to move that equipment to
Colombia rapidly.
Mr. Barr. Could I just suggest, to help you all out, that
we have the gentleman here today, and you deal with him on
regular basis, and he has stated, I think, very accurately that
tremendous--and he has worked with us in this area; why does it
take that long? You have the men here. You deal with them on a
regular basis.
Mr. Gelbard. Because Ambassador Frechette felt he needed
assurances from the Minister of Defense, and the Minister of
Defense just gave it to him now. I am--in the terms of
506(a)(1), I have got to study that, and I would like to give
an answer for the record on that.
Mr. Barr. I would appreciate that very much.
Mr. Hastert. I would like to state we are going to ask that
the authorities submit written questions and have those
questions answered and have the record left open.
[The information referred to follows:]
In order to direct that assistance be furnished under the
authority of section 506(a)(1) of the FAA, the President would
have to first determine and report to Congress that: (a) an
unforeseen emergency exists which requires immediate military
assistance to a foreign country or international organization;
and (b) the emergency requirement cannot be met under the
authority of the Arms Export Control Act or any other law
except this section. On the other hand, in order to provide
assistance under section 506(a)(2) of the FAA, the President
would have to determine and report to Congress that it is in
the national interest of the United States to direct a drawdown
for, among other things, the purposes and under the authorities
of chapter 8 of part I of the FAA (relating to international
narcotics control assistance).
The assistance being provided to the CNP and the Colombian
military for CN assistance in accordance with a section
506(a)(2) FAA drawdown directed by the President on September
31, 1996, is part of a large package of CN assistance designed
to strengthen and maintain the CN efforts of a number of
countries in South America and the Caribbean, including
Colombia. Under these circumstances, it was determined that
section 506(a)(2) was the most appropriate authority under
which to authorize this drawdown, although it is not
inconceivable that CN assistance could be provided under the
authority of section 506(a)(1), given the appropriate
circumstances.
Mr. Hastert. The gentleman from Ohio.
Mr. LaTourette. Thank you, and I will be as brief as
possible.
In your earlier testimony, you talked about increased
levels, principally from your budget, dealing with the--
although if I broke it down--22.6 going to 440 million, if I
remember that correctly. Will the certification decision
upcoming on March 1st affect the State Department's commitment
to increasing these dollar amounts in this next fiscal year?
Mr. Gelbard. No.
Mr. LaTourette. There is also a----
Mr. Gelbard. There is a waiver authority, one, against, I
don't know what the decision will be, but there is a waiver
authority under the law so we can continue to provide
counternarcotics assistance.
Mr. LaTourette. Something that hasn't been touched on yet
in response to the certification decision in 1996 and in
response to the polling, and I understand we have a blacklist
of some little over 300 Colombians that are considered to be
front companies. Has there been retaliation by the Colombian
Government either in trade advantages or other activities vis-
a-vis the United States Government or American businesses?
Mr. Gelbard. I think to a degree there has been. But I
think it is hard to disaggregate that from the standard high
levels of corruption which exist. One example was a contract
recently for their national civil registry which alluded to
earlier where a German company, Siemens, appears to have found
ways to gain unfair advantage on the contract, perhaps by
bribing. Bribes are tax deductible under German law, amazingly.
They were continually disqualified after they had won the
contract, by coincidence. Then it came down to between a French
and an American company, and my understanding was the American
company was clearly best qualified.
Ultimately they decided not to award the contract. We have
seen other cases, and I have heard of other cases from American
companies, but I think they would prefer I not mention them by
name.
Mr. LaTourette. I understand.
I want to yield the rest of my time to Mr. Mica, but this
is a published report that it talked about. Even though you
declined to mention specifically other measures the U.S.
Government may take, there is a published report today that
talks about airline flights in Colombia and other things that
may or may not occur in the course of the certification
process. If you put--I would appreciate the opportunity to send
a written inquiry about that. My particular question is the
impact that it would have on American concerns doing business
in Colombia. I will be glad to supply this in writing to you,
Mr. Ambassador.
With that, I would like to yield the balance of my time to
Mr. Mica.
Mr. Hastert. Without objection.
Mr. Mica. Bob, back to this reason that we can't seem to
get this equipment. We are trying to get things down to these
countries that have been cooperating also, and here is a letter
from the Department of State, September 14th. It says Peru has
been cooperating, and talks about the great cooperation, and
they want to get river patrol boats to the Peruvian security
forces to intercept the cocaine base, asked for the money. You
said somebody in DOD is holding up some of this. This is your
money; this isn't FMF.
Mr. Gelbard. As I said, I don't have the letter in front of
me, so it is hard for me to answer. Is this the 506(a)(2)
program?
Mr. Mica. Yes.
Mr. Gelbard. That is from military inventories and
drawdowns. It is off the shelf. Under the law, it is off the
shelf----
Mr. Mica. That is not what it says here, because it talks
about some specifics that will be acquired to--in any event,
Bob, is there somebody at DOD that is not cooperating that we
can talk to? We want to get this equipment to them. I don't
care if it's off the shelf. It is not in the Yungay, where it
needs to be, or in the Riverine program. So what is the
problem? You wrote us asking for this in September, or the
State did, and it is still not there.
Mr. Gelbard. This is done by the Defense Supply Agency. I
will be happy to get you specific answers on this within the
next few days.
[The information referred to follows:]
The ``river patrol boats'' will be provided to Peru for
counternarcotics (CN) assistance as part of the FAA section
506(a)(2) drawdown directed by the President on September 31,
1996. This drawdown included CN assistance for a number of
countries, including Peru. Prior to delivery of any of the
assistance, we needed to assure ourselves that appropriate end-
use, security and retransfer assurances were in place from all
recipient countries, and that end-use monitoring systems would
be effective. Once that process was completed, DSAA was
authorized to begin to execute the drawdown. On February 21,
DSAA ordered the Special Operations Command to draw down three
Boston Whalers, which are scheduled to be delivered to Peru in
March, 1997.
Mr. Mica. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Gelbard. Let me just add I am as frustrated as you on
this because, when the bureaucracy doesn't move, I know who
eventually gets blamed. But I also want to see the equipment
out there, more importantly. I want to see them having this
stuff that they could use, whether it is airplanes or boats or
anything else; and it is a source of eternal frustration for me
when they don't move faster.
Mr. Mica. Thank you. I will yield my few remaining seconds
to Mr. Souder.
Mr. Souder. In a fairness question, you have rejected the
ability of the President of Colombia to travel on a visa. We
have a report here that suggests that one of the Governors of
Mexico has been also in--implied that he is involved with a lot
of drug money and drug trafficking. Would you be willing to
look at revoking his visa as well?
Mr. Gelbard. We look at numerous examples with frequency.
Our bureau does try to examine this with seriousness, so we are
prepared to look at all information.
Mr. Souder. We will followup.
Mr. Hastert. Just two very quick questions before our time
is done. First of all, there has been a lot of talk. You talked
about the efforts of the--some aspects of Colombian Government,
especially people like Mr. Valdivieso or and General Serrano
and others. Will you brief the new Secretary of State on the
progress that Colombia has made, certain aspects before the
decision on certification or decertification is made?
Mr. Gelbard. Yes, sir.
Mr. Hastert. That will happen?
Mr. Gelbard. Yes, sir.
Mr. Hastert. In the process, whether Colombia is certified,
decertified, whether there are waivers, whether there are
certain areas of aid moved forward, as you talked about, what
exactly will be the issue or the determinant factors of whether
there is certification or decertification that will take place
in this coming year?
Mr. Gelbard. We have been outlining, as we have each of the
last several years, specific measures for the Government of
Colombia which we hope they will undertake during the course of
this calendar year to improve performance. We have--I can, for
example, give you a list of things we asked them to do for
1996. We asked them to attack corruption, pass strong laws and
regulate the finance industry, insure key traffickers don't run
their empires from jail, expose front companies, convict major
traffickers with serious sentences, reconsider the current
policy of non-extradition of nationals, improve eradication and
look at granular herbicides, enhance interdiction including
rapid response by the military, better cooperation and expand
courts and customs, and so on.
We are very transparent about this, and we have periodic
discussions. Ambassador Frechette meets regularly, thanks to
the excellent cooperation we have had with the foreign minister
and others, and they go over this every couple of months. I
have had periodic conversations here with their charge before
the Ambassador came. We have gone over it in very clear
specific terms.
Mr. Hastert. I thank you for your testimony today. It has
been very candid, and we wish you great success in your work.
As we welcome two very distinguished generals, I also want
to recognize two others in the audience, two senators are with
us today. The two senators have a response to the law for the
asset forfeiture and the current proposed amendment to the
Constitution on extradition. We would like to welcome Senator
Herman Vargas and Senator Claudia Blum. Thank you and thank you
for being with us today.
At this time, it is a great pleasure and honor to introduce
General Serrano. The general has combated internal corruption
in the police force, captured six of the seven leaders of the
Cali Cartel. The people of Colombia and the people of the
United States are indebted to him for his great service on the
war on drugs.
With him today is General Bedoya, the decorated, certainly
accomplished commander in his field. He leads the national
military. He has brought his forces into the fray to support
the war on drugs and certainly is a very fine complement and
leader in this area and works arm and arm with General Serrano.
We thank both of you gentlemen for being here today, and we
look forward to your testimony. Because you are a national of
another country, we will not ask you to swear your testimony.
We would ask you to begin your testimony, General Serrano. We
also welcome the translator, Mr. Acevedo.
STATEMENTS OF MAJOR GENERAL JOSE ROSSO SERRANO, DIRECTOR,
COLOMBIAN NATIONAL POLICE; AND GENERAL HAROLD BEDOYA PIZARRO,
COMMANDER, COLOMBIAN ARMED FORCES
Mr. Serrano. Thank you, Chairman Hastert and friends of
Colombia. It is an honor for me to be here with you today.
Together with other Colombians, amongst them Mr. Herman Vargas
and Senator Claudia Blum, those senators that were in charge of
proposing the bill for the asset forfeiture. Thank you, Mr.
Hastert and Mr. Mica, for having gone to Colombia to understand
the problems firsthand.
From my position as head of the Colombian police, we have
been charged with carrying out the fight against the
international narcotics organizations. In less than 6 months we
incarcerated the heads of the most important criminal
organization in the world. For those purposes, we had the aid
and support of the United States, especially with the help of
members of the CIA and the DEA that work with us shoulder to
shoulder. We also received help from the Department of State
through the NAS.
I have got to tell you, however, that the narcotics trade
in Colombia is extremely complex. Because having two coasts
that can be used to bring in precursor chemicals, a coast that
we, of course, do not build or otherwise--these coasts also
allow and facilitate the exit of the drugs from Colombia.
Additionally, we are able to transfer and transport money,
and it is also very easy for the narcotics traffickers to
travel by plane. All this means that we have an international
problem.
We are all, in part, responsible. The way I believe that we
need to solve this problem, after having fought the fight for
more than 10 years, is that we all recognize our own errors and
we don't start putting the blame on our neighbor. Sometimes I
hear some countries saying that I'm only a transit country. But
also in those countries there are people that allow those
planes to arrive and then they turn around and send the drugs
on to the countries in which it is consumed.
I am well aware of many of the details of what is a war. We
have always received tremendous help from the United States. If
we had not received that help, the problem today would be even
greater. There are some people here that do understand this
very well. For example, General McCaffrey, Mr. Constantine, and
others as well as many Members and Representatives and Senators
of this important Congress that understand well the dimensions
of this problem.
The work that we do, we do because we believe in it,
because we are aware of the fact that narcotics trafficking is
evil. It has injured the world community, and it is the worst
plague this century has known. We do not want to see our
children or our grandchildren as drug consumers, nor do we want
their lives to be taken because they have fallen to drug
trafficking.
In Colombia, along with the Colombian Armed Forces, a
tremendous effort is being undertaken, of course, under the
direction and leadership of President Samper, because he is the
commander and chief of the Colombian Armed Forces. Little could
be done, in reality, if he did not personally support these
efforts.
This year a special tax has been imposed--a war tax, $74
million will be--$74 million will be received through this
mechanism, and they will be invested in communications
equipment and other vehicles and in strengthening our
intelligence apparatus. Those resources, added to the resources
that we get from the United States, will allow that in the year
that is before us the final results will be even better.
You all well know that Colombia has three principle
problems in relation to narcotics trafficking. Unfortunately,
we have marijuana that we find through eradication. When we
approached the end of that problem, cocaine appeared. Now as we
approach the end of the cocaine problem, the opium poppy
appears. It is the only country in the entire world where all
three of these problems have appeared. For these reasons, our
job is difficult and complex, but in this fight we have
obtained some satisfactory results.
In Colombia, the narcotics organizations are true
multinational entities. They have administrative staff, they
have managers, they have legal representatives, they have heads
of security. This is the type of organization that we have had
to fight, and that is what we have to do.
I would ask that greater efforts be done on the part of the
United States to impede the flow of precursor chemicals.
Without acetone, caustic acid, or sulfuric acid there would be
no drug production. As far as that is concerned, no efforts
have been had in that area.
The amount of money that is moved around and the precursor
chemical trade is perhaps as big as the amount of money
produced by the drug trade itself. For these reasons, beyond
asset forfeiture and money laundering, an effort must be made
on the part of the international banking community so that not
as many dollars find their way into this trade.
One particular narcotics trafficker had $150 million in
barrels and no bank noticed its movement. Last year tremendous
efforts were made to eradicate. Mr. Hastert, you personally
know how difficult it is to actually fumigate in the Colombian
jungle. Despite all of these difficulties, we have fumigated
over 40- and 17,000 acres of amapola, or opium poppy, and we
have destroyed more than 800 laboratories. Last week we
destroyed a laboratory that had--that was more than 4
kilometers wide. Last night I was informed of the destruction
of another large laboratory in the south of Colombia.
This means that our work is ongoing and permanent and that
with good help and good understanding this war will be won. The
capture of different criminals was spectacular last year and
the year before. After drawing up extensive plans with the CIA
and the DEA, actions were had against the Cali Cartel, and the
cartel was brought to its knees. One particular narcotics
trafficker, Santacruz Londono, was able to initially avoid
actions of the police; but after 40 days of running from us, he
died fighting the police. Let that be a lesson to all the other
narcotics traffickers because we will fight them, and we are
controlling them.
But in this war, economic aid is very important. Our
countries are poor countries, and we do not have all the means
and resources to throw at this fight. While it is true that we
do receive aid, it would be important that this aid be
increased so that we can increase the fumigation efforts and
the eradication efforts. The only country in the world that
fumigates is Colombia. In these fumigation efforts we have lost
five helicopters and two airplanes that have been shot down by
the illicit narcotics traffickers.
I would like to clarify something about the presence of
guerilla groups in the areas in which there are illicit crops.
It is undeniable that the Colombian guerilla groups have lost
any remnant of political ideology and that they have now become
allies of narcotics traffickers. This clarification is very
important when considerations are being dealt with on helping
the Armed Forces help us in the fight. If they had helicopters
or different resources, they could protect us so we are not
killed while we carry out our activities.
I would also like to briefly mention the impact that the
decertification has had. For me it has been very difficult to
explain to my men that fight--the daily fight and convince them
and tell them that, while they support our efforts, while they
admire our efforts and our sacrifices, they still have
decertified us. I am not a politician nor do I understand
political considerations, but what I do know is that in my
country we feel stigmatized because of this decertification. My
11,000 police officers would be more motivated to continue in
this fight because, before being police officers, we are
Colombians.
On the other hand, the decertification has affected us
severely in the FMS cases that have to do with the procurement
of spare parts for helicopters, munitions and explosives, and
training. I believe that those resources have been sorely
missed, and I have always believed that the less aid, the more
narcotics trafficking.
We have always used all the aid and resources that have
been granted us as transparently as possible. The results are
well known to you, Mr. Hastert, and, above all, you know that
we are committed to this fight. We will not abate. We will win
this war. We are going to win this fight in spite of the pain
that visiting the different funeral services of my men that I
have to go to. One given day I had to go to four funerals, and
at the end of the day I could no longer cry. I no longer had
words to explain to the widows of my men why it is that the
narcotics traffickers have killed their husbands.
My men are killed in the jungles of Colombia, and they are
willing to sacrifice their lives because they recognize that
narcotics trafficking is a plague because it brings tremendous
stigmatism to Colombia. But rest assured, Mr. Hastert, that the
great majority of Colombians are honest and are committed to
fighting this fight. Not even death has kept us from this
fight. Let me tell you that since 1980, more than 3,000 of my
men have died. Pablo Escobar in Medellin in 1 year alone had
500 killed. He used to pay $2,000 per policeman. In spite of
this situation, we have never, never fallen back. On the
contrary, we remain vigorous, we remain motivated in the fight.
You have heard us in the past, and we are willing to continue
in the future.
I would like to end giving you a message not as a policeman
but as a Colombian citizen. My country needs to be certified.
My men are more motivated when they work as certified. Thank
you very much.
Mr. Hastert. Thank you, General.
[The prepared statement of Jose Rosso Serrano follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9818.013
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9818.014
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9818.015
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9818.016
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9818.017
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9818.018
Mr. Hastert. I might ask that we are kind of bumping up
into some time constraints, so if General Bedoya could
summarize his statement.
General Bedoya. Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee,
thank you for having invited me to this meeting. I would like
to, as the oldest soldier in Colombia and commander of the
Colombian Armed Forces, express to you the friendship that the
Colombian Armed Forces have with the United States. That is not
new, but that was born when many years ago together we fought
together to defend liberty, freedom, democracy in Korea.
I want to let you know that the Colombian Armed Forces
entered into the narcotics fight completely last year. The
government considered at that time that it was an aggression,
an attack against the people of Colombia and against the
country as a whole. It was also decided that the police did not
have the capacity nor the means to fight groups such as the
ones that they were fighting.
Additionally, in the jungles of Colombia, which comprises
about a third of all of Colombia, it was discovered that the
large cocaine or drug processing laboratories were protected
and guarded by groups that have now become terrorist narcotics
traffickers themselves.
Last year, last August 30th in the Caqueta region, we lost
26 soldiers in the battles with the narcotics traffickers.
Right now we have more than 60 soldiers that are currently
kidnapped and are in the hands of these narcotics traffickers.
This is without mentioning the other efforts and other
activities that we have done in other regions such as the
Guaviare and Putumayo.
But this human sacrifice has not been in vain. Beyond this
we have made significant improvements in the destruction of
laboratories and in the capture of different allies. With the
national police, we have been able to work together to fight
and to defeat the different elements of the narcotics trade. We
as Colombians understand that we need to destroy the
laboratories and the plantations of illicit crops wherever they
may be found in Colombia. But we also understand that the
problem of illicit narcotics is a regional problem.
Many other countries such as Peru and Bolivia also fight
this plague. The United States itself deals with the problem of
drug consumption. Still other countries produce the chemical
precursors that are necessary to produce illicit drugs. An
entire infrastructure has been put into place to continue this
illicit trade.
We the people of Colombia have suffered at hands--we have
suffered at the hands of illicit narcotic traffickers. However,
our tradition is of freedom, of working toward ending this.
That is why it is so important that this fight, this war
against illicit narcotics, that is why it is so important that
we find allies, that we find co-workers, that we find the
understanding necessary to eliminate the problem.
The Colombian Armed Forces have suffered from the
decertification decision. Our young officers have been unable
to return to the training courses here in the United States.
The different types of sales amongst them, the FMS cases are
currently suspended or otherwise have been suspended. It is
difficult to understand how it is that in this fight, in which
all of us must work toward the solution, those of us who are
fighting the fight in the jungles and in the mountains are the
ones that actually suffer the effects of the decertification.
In some areas we don't even have the munitions necessary to
fight the fight, much less helicopters.
On the other hand, our common enemy, the narcotics
traffickers, had at their disposition a fleet of airplanes and
other equipment, and they have no restrictions on how they
might purchase things or where they get their money.
In a frontal fight, you have to clearly determine who your
enemy is. We are now the enemy. The enemy is internal narcotics
that is prevalent in the entire world.
The Colombian people can be characterized as noble, a
working people, and they also have suffered. We consider the
United States as our ally in this fight and hope that together
we will continue to fight and win the battle.
Last year alone in the activities that were carried out in
the south of our country, the Colombian Armed Forces spent over
$24 million of their budget. We destroyed laboratories, we
destroyed laboratories and other elements that would have been
able to produce 45 billion cocaine doses, with a possible
street value of $284 billion.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to be before
you today, and with General Serrano, we are ready to answer any
of your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Bedoya follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9818.019
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9818.020
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9818.021
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9818.022
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9818.023
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9818.024
Mr. Hastert. I thank both of the distinguished gentlemen
for being with us here today, and certainly it is an
unbelievable story to tell. Unfortunately, your colleague
General Valdivieso could not be with us today, however, we have
received his statement and that will be included also in the
record.
[The prepared statement of General Valdivieso follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9818.025
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9818.026
Mr. Hastert. Again, gentlemen, we thank you very, very much
for your presentations.
General Serrano, one of the things that happened in this
city just last week was the death and burial of a very
courageous policeman. You talked about the deaths of many of
your valiant and courageous men. How many men have you lost in
the last year?
General Serrano. In 1996, we lost 36 policemen and 61 were
injured.
Mr. Hastert. General Bedoya, how many men did you lose?
General Bedoya. Last year the Colombian Armed Forces lost
330 soldiers in action.
Mr. Hastert. What about the year before?
General Bedoya. The year before the figures are basically
the same, but added to this, you have to consider the 60
soldiers that are currently kidnapped in the south of Colombia
and 10 who are kidnapped in the Uraba region.
Mr. Hastert. How about General Serrano?
General Serrano. The year before, 27 or 28 policemen were
killed, and these numbers are getting better because the
Colombian police are learning to defend themselves. But the
attacks, the ferocity of the attacks has increased.
Mr. Hastert. Thank you, I certainly award anybody's comment
at all of you.
General Serrano, President Clinton's decision to decertify
Colombia on March 1, 1996, it certainly had detrimental effects
on the economy and your efforts to fight the war on drugs. How
did it affect your ability to do your job?
General Serrano. We were unable to receive $8 million in
spare parts and munitions, which is what we most use and need
to fight this fight. We also lost training. Many policemen had
been coming to the United States to prepare themselves for the
war. However, there have been efforts on the part of the State
Department to send us 12 helicopters. It is hoped that those
helicopters will eventually arrive in Colombia sometime this
semester.
Mr. Hastert. The process, the equipment that you needed
last year, and of course the DC-3 aircraft that you use for
support and for some of the drug eradication, how do you use
those DC-3 aircraft and how many are in your inventory and what
are their approximate ages?
General Serrano. We have two DC-3s. These DC-3s are World
War II vintage, but they have been souped up. They have been
given new turbines, and it is a reliable airplane, but without
the constant flow of spare parts, they only last 1 or 2 months
before they need repair.
Mr. Hastert. How do you use them?
General Serrano. These are used basically to transport
personnel to the jungle regions, because they can land on short
airstrips. They are also used to transport chemicals that are
needed to carry out the fumigation.
Mr. Hastert. Have the spare parts that are needed to keep
these airplanes flying been available?
General Serrano. Yes. While the spare parts must be asked
for, eventually they are forthcoming.
Mr. Hastert. In 1995, you lost a DC-3 in a rather serious
accident in August. How did that affect your counternarcotic
activities?
General Serrano. That airplane was out of service for more
than a year. It had to be sent to the United States to be
repaired and was sorely missed while it was not in service.
However, it has begun to help again.
Mr. Hastert. Mr. Mica.
Mr. Mica. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Welcome, General. We are pleased to see you here and
appreciate your tremendous effort.
I have a question relating to mini-guns. It is my
understanding that you began a purchase from the United States
in 1991 of these mini-guns. Could you tell us what the status
of that program is and what the need of those weapons is for?
General Serrano. The story of the mini-guns is a long one.
Mr. Mica. Well, I have 5 minutes.
General Serrano. When I was Director, when the General was
Director of the Antinarcotics Police, the mini-guns arrived,
but they did not arrive--all of the mini-guns did not arrive.
The complete equipment that they needed did not arrive.
Efforts were made to purchase the remaining elements that
were needed for the mini-guns with our own moneys; but it was
impossible. I even proposed that from our budget money be set
aside, and about this I spoke with Mr. Hastert. We are still
waiting for the authorizations to use them because now
something has been said about the police being unable to use
these weapons because they might possibly violate human rights.
But they are extremely important in the fumigation activities
and the fumigation runs in which we have lost five helicopters
and two airplanes.
Mr. Mica. How would the mini-guns be used again? Can you
explain that?
General Serrano. The mini-guns would be used in the
helicopters, in the 206 helicopters to provide effective
response when the other helicopters are attacked, in an attempt
to dissuade these attacks from occurring.
Mr. Mica. General Bedoya, can you tell me your perspective
of the problem with these mini-guns, and maybe also the
timeframe? Was some of this equipment--well, this equipment
order goes back to 1991, and I guess that some of these
problems predate the decertification; is that correct? Can you
give us a little explanation of what took place and the timing?
General Bedoya. These special machine guns that are being
referred to here are support weapons that are used to provide
support to the units that actually fight. Generally, these
weapons--these are weapons that were used to support troops as
they exit from the helicopters. These are used to suppress the
attacks while the soldiers themselves are leaving the
helicopters.
Mr. Mica. The problem relating to the acquisition of
weapons, the parts, predates certification, decertification?
General Bedoya. Yes, we have had different sorts of
problems in the different sorts of sales that we have been
trying to get from the United States, among them the FMS cases,
for about 4 years. Before decertification came around, the
problem was some sort of human rights issues that were being
raised. This has made it impossible for us to receive around
$35 million of elements that we would either have purchased or
elements that would have been given to us.
Mr. Mica. You talked about the guerillas and ELN. Aren't
they violating human rights, don't they have, at least, last
count, I thought we had five American hostages?
General Bedoya. These terrorist groups that you refer to
last year kidnapped more than 1,000 Colombian citizens and they
killed another 1,000. These groups carry out illegal
activities, and of course they do not respect any international
convention or they do not respect any human rights.
In the different areas and regions where the narcotics
production is carried out, there are many people that are
employed in this production, and when the armed forces arrive
in the area, these people complain to the armed forces of the
human rights violations that are perpetrated by these narcotics
trafficking and guerilla groups.
Mr. Mica. The mini-guns that we talked about, would they be
used in this fight against the narco-terrorist guerillas?
General Bedoya. Yes, these guns would be used to fight the
narcotics-terrorist insurgence groups.
Mr. Hastert. Mr. Barr.
Mr. Barr. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I thank both of the generals, not only for being here
today, but also for their tremendous work on behalf of all
ciitzens of both our countries who believe in the rule of law
and in personal freedom and in continuing the fight against the
plague of drugs.
In your view, and I say this to both generals, is the fight
against narcotics simply a matter of treating it as a disease,
or is it, in fact, a war against forces of evil who seek to
destroy the very foundations of our societies?
General Serrano. To me, it is an all-out war, a war of
money that comes from illicit sources and destined to the
injury of our youth. It is a war in which there are no ethical
values.
The only thing that really matters is the opulence, without
heeding the consequences that the people that consume these
drugs have to face. Narcotics trafficking has indeed changed
the course that the world has taken. Today many people want to
get rich quickly through narcotics trafficking instead of
working. The worse thing is that there are many people that
believe that narcotics trafficking is a business and not a
crime. For this reason, it is a war that has to be fought
because of the effects that it has, the malicious effects that
it has in world society.
General Bedoya. Narcotics trafficking began sometime in the
1980's. We are not traditionally and never have been narcotics
traffickers. It is drug activities that has made the people of
Colombia poorer, and has distorted, in many cases, local
economies and has contributed to the spreading of many
diseases.
In this war that has been brought, Colombians have had to
fight the hardest fight, where we have had to fight an
international Mafia that uses our country as a production
center, but that has its foundations in many other places in
the world as well. To fight this war, just as the term implies,
we need special laws to fight this war. To destroy not only the
laboratories and the illicit crops themselves, but also that
would allow us to capture those that benefit from this terrible
trade, be they in Colombia or abroad.
For this reason, it is so important that the United States,
being the country that it is that is the leader in the fight
against narcotics, that they understand that the people of
Colombia are victims of the activities of an internal Mafia
that benefits from narcotics trafficking.
Mr. Barr. Thank you.
I think both Generals made statements that recognized, or
indicating that they recognize that there is a very close
connection between the narcotics organizations and the
guerillas. Has that information been made known to the U.S.
Government?
General Serrano. Yes, because the Government of the United
States has worked with us. In my experience, wherever there is
cocaine or coca crops or opium poppy, or laboratories, these
guerilla groups provide protection. We have definitive proof.
The guerilla has established percentages that they charge per
kilo of cocaine that is produced.
They have also established fees for the entry of chemical
precursors and they have established fees for the use of
clandestine airstrips and also for the transportation of the
different elements. All told, we estimate that their share is
about 25 percent of the value of the cocaine that is produced
and transported in the areas in which they operate.
Mr. Barr. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, will there be a chance to ask just a couple
of additional questions?
Thank you.
How many guerillas do you estimate are active in Colombia
right now? We have seen published reports here of 14,000.
General Bedoya. In order to complement the answer that was
given to your previous question, I want to let you know that
here I have documents that have been made known both to the
Colombian media and the international media, and I personally
want to give these documents to you so that you can see
firsthand how it is that the relationship, the old relationship
between the guerillas and the narcotics traffickers actually
is. Even though they are dressed in the old ideologies of
political fight and political insurgency, and unfortunately
some other countries in the region respond to that disguise,
they try to justify many times their crimes.
In response to your current question, currently there are
approximately 10,000 narcotics terrorists that used to be
called guerillas.
Mr. Barr. Is military aid from the United States to
Colombia being used to defeat the narco-guerillas?
General Bedoya. The terms under which the military
assistance from the United States is supplied to Colombia does
not allow its use in the fight against guerillas. That is
because there has not been established in the eyes of the
public a relationship, a direct relationship between guerilla
groups and narcotics traffickers.
Mr. Barr. But it is our government leaders that make these
decisions, and in your view, have our leaders in this country
been given sufficient information to clearly understand that
these are one and the same enemy that we are fighting?
General Bedoya. Locally, it is understood and a well-known
fact that this relationship exists. Regionally, it is well-
understood and recognized that this relationship exists. Many
times, much information has been given to the United States
Embassy in Colombia, and some of that information showing this
relationship, setting out how it operates, the General has here
with him, and wishes to give it to the subcommittee so that
relationship can be more clearly understood.
Mr. Barr. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, might I ask unanimous consent those documents
be made part of the record.
Mr. Hastert. Without objection, so ordered.
[Note.--The information referred to can be found in
subcommittee files.]
Mr. Barr. Thank you.
Would it be or is it a mistake to block the use of funds
from the United States to be used against narco-guerillas
simply because some people may say there is no connection
between the guerillas and the narcotics traffickers?
General Bedoya. It is a mistake, because in Colombia the
groups that used to call themselves guerillas are now narcotics
traffickers. We have films that have been produced by these
same groups, in which they show themselves producing,
processing, and trafficking in these illicit substances. That
is why these groups get so much funding and that is why these
groups have airplanes and are able to use tremendous resources
to fight us.
Mr. Barr. Just one very quick final question, Mr. Chairman.
I appreciate the extra time.
Speaking of weapons, can you tell us what sort of weapons
the narco-guerillas have available and are using to kill your
men and to stop your efforts to go after them?
General Bedoya. These groups principally use the AK-47
that, as you know, has European origin, Eastern European
origin. They even have rockets and different sorts of munitions
that come from the same source. There are other types of
munitions that come from other sources, but they are secondary
sources.
Mr. Barr. So would it be fair to say that these groups are
very well armed, and that your inability to continue to get
ammunition and defensive weapons systems, such as the mini-gun,
is putting your men at a real disadvantage?
General Bedoya. These narcotics traffickers get their
weapons from the international arms dealers and many times it
is a drugs-for-weapons exchange.
Mr. Barr. Insofar as they purchase their weapons with
money, is that money that is coming directly from drug
consumers?
General Bedoya. Yes. Basically the moneys that they use to
purchase these weapons comes from the areas of cultivation, the
areas of production, and there is some evidence that they even
have some exporting capacities.
Mr. Barr. Do we see any evidence that other terrorist
groups outside of Colombia are involved?
General Bedoya. The specific evidence we have is
specifically related to the FARC, that is definitive. Regarding
other groups, it is very possible that they also participate.
We don't have specific evidence as of yet, but we do know that
they do gain their funds and they do supply the funds that they
acquire through kidnapping.
Mr. Barr. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Hastert. I thank the gentleman.
I would like to finish with just a series of questions
that, if you could just answer them very briefly, what we are
trying to do is to establish something in the record that I
think pulls together a lot of your testimony today.
First of all, on the issue of the guerillas, ELN and FARC,
originally, my understanding is these groups were freedom
fighters in their own minds, leftist guerillas that were
ideologically trying to overthrow the government because they
believed that their philosophy was superior. Is that still the
truth today or are they still an ideological group, or are they
driven by narco-funds, in your opinion?
General Bedoya. At the end of the cold war they no longer
could get their funds from other sources, including the Soviet
Union. Now they get their resources from drug traffickers.
Mr. Hastert. The other part of that question is, however
they get their money, are they still driven by an ideology, in
your opinion?
General Bedoya. They no longer are driven by ideology. They
have converted themselves into common criminals and now move
along those lines.
Mr. Hastert. To follow up, you say in your testimony today
that they take approximately 25 percent of the proceeds from
the drugs grown, manufactured, transported in their areas of
operation; is that true?
General Serrano. Absolutely true. The truth is, the sad
truth is that in that area, the tax collector is the FARC.
Mr. Hastert. Is it also true, from other testimony that we
have had prior to today, that these organizations have
committed transgressions against humanity, they, in a sense,
have no regard for people's civil rights, and the operation of
protecting drugs and the growing of drugs, the manufacture of
drugs and the transportation of drugs is the No. 1 importance;
human rights are not important to these people?
General Serrano. They violate all sorts of rights,
including human rights. In the cocaine processing laboratories,
we find young children of 13 years old that have been pressed
into labor. They also exploit women and children, and whoever
attempts to communicate to the legitimate authorities the
existence of any movement of cocaine or the existence of a
processing laboratory is immediately assassinated.
Each group of these different organizations has a band of
assassins that they use to make sure that the law of silence is
enforced and that the different debts are paid. But the worst
violation they commit is the poisoning of Colombia's youth.
Mr. Hastert. To follow up on that, could you give me--we
know that the kidnappings are rampant, that civilian murder is
rampant. Can you give us a number about in the last year how
many murders have been committed and how many kidnappings have
been perpetrated, to the best of your knowledge?
General Serrano. Last year, in Colombia, there were 1,200
kidnappings. We were able to rescue 250. Sixty percent of the
kidnappings that occur in Colombia are carried out by the
narcotics guerillas.
Mr. Hastert. How about murders?
General Serrano. About 10 percent of these kidnappings end
in the assassination of the people that have been kidnapped. On
a general level, all told, per year, there are about 28,000
murders.
Mr. Hastert. 28,000 murders.
General Serrano. Yes, 28,000 murders per year.
Mr. Hastert. Second point. According to other testimony
that we have been able to accrue, is it not true, systematic
recruitment of children and kidnapping the children by the FARC
and ELN have taken place to press these children into service
for narco-trafficking purposes?
General Bedoya. In the different documents and in the video
that we will be giving to you, you will find children of
different ages that are kidnapped from 10 or 11 years old and
are kept within the criminal organization all their lives. This
is a reality that is ongoing in Colombia.
Mr. Hastert. Is it true that an area known in your country
as Miraflores, which is approximately the size of the State of
Texas, that that area is virtually overrun with guerillas and
narco-traffickers?
General Serrano. While it was true in the past, ever since
we started the operations last year, the control of this zone
by the narcotics traffickers and the guerillas is being
eliminated. That situation will come under control. It is
specifically in that area where the efforts to fumigate are
concentrated.
Mr. Hastert. The capability to move into that area and to
control it and the FARC, to fight the guerillas and narco-
traffickers depends upon the use of DC-3s and Huey helicopters
and other equipment you have got; is that true or not true?
General Serrano. As far as the police are concerned, the
ability to carry out these efforts relies on the airplanes that
are used for the fumigation and on the DC-3s and on the
helicopters.
A brief example so that you might understand further: When
an airplane leaves on a fumigation run, the actual illicit
crops are to be found more than an hour's flight away and the
plane must hastily perform the fumigation runs and return so
that it will have enough fuel to make the entire run. It is a
completely--it is an area that is completely overrun by jungle
and that is very far away from the normal means of
transportation.
Mr. Hastert. Any holding up of that equipment because of
decertification by our country to your country has a serious
consequence of the transportation, the growing, manufacturing
and transportation of drugs back into this country; is that
true or not, in your opinion?
General Serrano. The decertification affects not only
Colombia's morale but it also affects the logistics of the
operation. It also divides the countries into supposedly, good
guys, and supposedly, bad guys. It has a direct effect on the
ability to procure spare parts, in the procurement of weapons
and explosives.
Mr. Hastert. In effect, you are facing, basically, a civil
war within your nation because of this constant turmoil driven
by the profits from narcotics. How much longer, with limited--
maybe this is not a fair question. With limited ability to
fight these problems, how much longer can you sustain this
without added help?
General Serrano. It is a war that is being fought between
the narcotics traffickers and the Colombian Armed Forces. We do
not know how long it will take to see what effects the
reduction in the entry of precursor chemicals, on the reduction
in consumption. All of these different elements, we do not know
how long it will take for them to have an effect on the war.
Without help, narcotics trafficking will rise, and without
help, without aid, we will not be able to last for very long.
The antinarcotics division of the police is--uses fundamentally
the assistance that is received from the United States. Without
that assistance, they could not function the way they do.
General Bedoya. In Colombia, there is no civil war as such.
What we are talking about are simple criminal activities of
narcotics traffickers and terrorists that direct their
activities against the Colombian institutions and the Colombian
people themselves.
Mr. Hastert. I think the use of civil war is probably a bad
choice, but it is an imperative struggle between, in essence,
good and bad.
For the record, so that the record is clear, and whatever
other record that we have been able to establish here today,
has President Samper ever prevented either one of you from a
wholesale attack on narco-traffickers?
General Serrano. Never. In the 2 years that I have been the
director, there has never been any interference in our
activities. Quite to the contrary, before we were able to
capture the members of the Cali Cartel, there was a lot of
pressure that we get that done.
Mr. Hastert. Thank you.
I want to put myself out on a limb, two things I would like
to say. First of all, I try not to put myself on a limb very
often, but General Serrano and General Bedoya, certainly your
efforts, I think, have been heroic. That is in the reports we
have had, I was able to confirm that visiting your company, I
was able to talk to many, many people in your country, in the
southern hemisphere, and in this country.
General, your efforts are certainly our best hopes for the
plague that is upon us, upon our children, upon this country,
and upon the citizens that want to live a decent life. It
affects our people almost as badly as it affects your people.
We hope that we can win this war and that we can have peace
from the plague of drugs.
It takes a great effort on nations and politicians, elected
officials, and people who serve your country such as yourself.
I think, I don't know how you would ever put together a
nomination for a Nobel Peace Prize, but I think you are
certainly deserving by your fine effort. I hope that we can say
we support you and this country is behind you all the way. When
you have to talk to the next widow in the next funeral you go
to, I hope you express that we stand behind you as well.
Thank you for your testimony.
At this time, I would ask for our final panel to come
forward. Certainly it has been an overwhelming experience today
to have the first two panels before us, but you will not be
disappointed in the third panel, I can tell you that.
I would like to welcome at this time, Ambassador Morris
Busby and Major Andy Messing. Ambassador Busby served as the
United States Ambassador to Colombia. I have been able to visit
Colombia, have the privilege and the benefit of his insights.
Major Messing has retired from the Army after 21 years of
distinguished service, including service in Special Forces and
Special Operations for over 18 years. He has had firsthand
experience in the jungles of Colombia.
Gentlemen, if you will both stand and raise your right
hands, our committee rules require me to swear you in.
[Witness sworn.]
Mr. Hastert. Let the record show that the witnesses
responded in the affirmative.
STATEMENTS OF MORRIS BUSBY, FORMER AMBASSADOR TO COLOMBIA; AND
MAJOR F. ANDY MESSING, JR., UNITED STATES ARMY (RET.),
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, NATIONAL DEFENSE COUNCIL FOUNDATION
Mr. Hastert. Thank you and please proceed with your
statements. And, Ambassador Busby, if you will begin.
Mr. Busby. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
I would like to thank the committee for the opportunity to
appear here today. I have submitted for the record a short
statement, and, since the hour is going on, perhaps I could
just hit some of the high points.
I was in Colombia at the time that President Samper was
elected and participated in the early moments of disintegration
of the relationship between the United States and Colombia.
I am, as you will notice from the statement, somewhat
critical of our handling of United States-Colombian relations
in the ensuing couple of years.
Mr. Hastert. Mr. Ambassador, would you pull your mike up a
little bit closer, please.
Mr. Busby. Sure.
Mr. Hastert. Thank you.
Mr. Busby. In saying that I am somewhat critical of the way
we have handled this, let me also say that certainly Mr. Samper
gets no kudos from me. I would also like to take this
opportunity to add my voice to those of the many brave and
thoughtful Colombians who have called for him to relinquish the
office of the presidency so the country can begin healing
itself.
Having said that, it is awfully easy to sit here and
criticize what others have done.
I firmly believe that the tools which you, the Congress, as
well as the administration have given to the hands of our
policymakers are inadequate. There was a lot of talk here this
morning about the certification process. I greatly fear that,
as it has evolved, the certification process tends to dominate
useful policy. We see what was described here today, million-
dollar ads in Forbes Magazine, lots of public relations.
The kind of strictures and restrictions that are placed on
our policymakers in that legislation I think need to be
reviewed.
I was, at one time, the deputy chief of mission in Mexico
when Enrique Camarena, our DEA agent, was killed. I was
Ambassador to Colombia for 3 years, and I will tell you that in
circumstances such as those, strict adherence to the
legislation as it is currently drafted is a hindrance rather
than a help to rational policymaking.
As my first statement, I would like to say that I would
recommend that you and the administration review that
legislation to make sure that, as you are currently applying
it, and it has the intent that originally was designed. That's
not to say that I am critical of congressional oversight and,
in fact, as a former member of the executive branch, I will
tell you that I very much recommend to you that you exercise
congressional oversight. It is just that policy has tended to
be made in a public forum where I think oftentimes subtle and
delicate initiatives die a very sure death.
Mr. Chairman, you asked me to specifically comment on the
types and amounts of support that the U.S. Government should
provide to the Government of Colombia. I greatly fear that,
given the animosity that we currently feel toward the Colombian
administration, that the situation in Colombia is not going to
improve as long as Mr. Samper is in office. I would certainly
hope that, until that occurs, we do not abandon the cause for
which so many Colombians have given their lives. I have the
greatest admiration for the gentlemen who just appeared before
you, and I think they deserve our support. In fact, I do
believe that it is essential that we as a government continue
to support the Colombian counternarcotics forces.
As much as we disapprove of Mr. Samper, we should recognize
that it's unlikely that he is going to depart before the end of
his term. There's no doubt about our animosity toward him. We
have taken away his visa. What more public demonstration could
there be? I think it's ludicrous to argue that giving aid to
the counternarcotics forces is going to help him politically or
that to withhold it is going to weaken him further. The die has
been cast, and we should act in what is our own self-interest.
I also could not help smiling as I heard some of the
questions and answers relating to the so-called guerrillas in
Colombia. I will tell you with certainty, Mr. Barr, and Mr.
Chairman, that during the entire 3 years I was there, I sent
reams of paper and facts and figures laying out for the
government, our government, the relationships between the FARC
and the ELN and the narcotics traffickers. I made countless
recommendations that we should, in fact, recognize that
relationship in policy and that we needed to work with the
Colombian military and the Colombian police in combating the
ELN and FARC. I had these mental images of the Washington
establishment sort of levitating and shaking every time I would
send these cables up.
My sense has been that the problem is twofold. One, there
is a broad perception that, if we were to work with the
Colombian military and police on the FARC and the ELN problem,
that somehow we are going to get ourselves immersed in a
terrible human rights problem. The second problem is that I
think that we, as a government, recognize the complexity of
this situation and have decided not to get involved in it.
But to my mind, I will tell you that I am firmly convinced
that, so long as the FARC and the ELN continue in the numbers
that they are and so long as they continue their relationship
with the narcotics traffickers, we can pour money into Colombia
on counternarcotics. But if we continue to say it can only be
used for counternarcotics purposes, and we have these very,
very tight, end-use provisions that we have to adhere to, you
will not solve that narcotics problem in Colombia.
That may not be true elsewhere, but in Colombia, the two
are so inextricably linked that it is a true head-in-the-sand
attitude to think you can look at counternarcotics and not look
at the FARC and the ELN in that relationship. I think that is
something which this committee could perhaps take a leadership
role in.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, I would like to make a point that
has been alluded to but no one has addressed it directly, and
that is I would like to recommend that you and your colleagues
consider the funding levels for some of the infrastructure
development programs. By that, I am referring to programs to
aid in the administration of justice and, in particular,
military and police training. I think that these are programs
which have tended to fall by the wayside as a part of the
certification process and there's nothing that we do in these
countries which is as valuable and which has such long-term
benefits as bringing Colombian police and military officers to
the United States for training, having a true interaction
between our military and police, who function in a truly
democratic society, setting an example for them and providing
them with the tools that they need. The same thing is true with
the administration of justice program. There was a $34 million
program when I was in Colombia. I was very strongly supportive
of it.
The institutions of government, and in particular the
institutions of justice in these countries, are very weak and
it is something that we need to work on if we truly are looking
for a longtime solution.
Mr. Chairman, again, thank you for the opportunity to
testify before you, and I will respond to any of the questions
that you or any other members may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Busby follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9818.027
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9818.028
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9818.029
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9818.030
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9818.031
Mr. Hastert. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.
Mr. Messing, Major.
Mr. Messing. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for allowing me to
testify. As the executive director of the National Defense
Council Foundation in the study of antidrug operations, I have
been to Colombia nine times since 1985, my last trip being in
mid-January. Coincidentally, since you mentioned Miraflores,
that's one of the end points that I went to.
Colombia is 1 of 15 countries that I have been to in
analyzing this dark side capitalist phenomenon which adversely
affects America on socioeconomic, political and security
levels.
In my first trip to Colombia, the American Embassy staff
arranged for me to visit the then ``special anti-narcotics
unit,'' SANU. This group of heroic men were in the first
element of drug fighters which were supported by American
agencies. Ironically, at the time, they were not really
supported by their own government, and most of the men I met
with then have since been killed.
However, times have changed. In my latest visits, it is
clear to me that the key government elements are dedicated to
reducing the drug threat to their society and ours.
Accordingly, the catalytic event to their metanoia was the
assassination of a Presidential candidate in 1989. That rocked
their nation and awakened their nomenclature. They finally
understood that this was no longer just a Gringo problem but
their problem, too. It actually became a threat to their
national security, their sovereignty and their way of life.
They then understood that this tiny group of narcissistic and
hedonistic criminals were impacting their ability to have a
democracy and operate a positive light side capitalist
structure. Because I bifurcate capitalism into dark side and
light side capitalism, and it gives you an ability to talk in a
different level when you do that.
Every part of their society, i.e., their politics, their
sociocultural and economic being, and their safety was in
jeopardy. It was no longer--it no longer was a cash cow to
jump-start their economy, as their economy had its own
vitality, as has already been testified to. Plain and simply
put, it became a contest of survival.
Fortunately, there was a stalwart and honest core of
Colombians that were prepared to lead the counterattack against
this strong and greedy foe. Men like General Serrano, who just
testified, and women like Foreign Minister Emma Mejia,
understood the risks and acted in the best interests of all.
Now, they need our help to press this counterattack on this
transforming and growing scourge.
In the late 1980's, the initial drug operators were urban
based, dark side businessmen. By the mid-80's, their buying
power allowed them to rent key guerilla elements to provide
them security, buy off authorities, they were able to buy off
authorities and buy into legitimate businesses. When they
committed acts that went beyond the pale in the late 1980's and
into the early 1990's, the key groups in government which were
led by the then-vetted national police, went after this heinous
leadership.
As this management group was rolled up in the early 1990's,
America's support, which had been increasing and as a matter of
fact, under a lot of the leadership of Ambassador Busby sitting
next to me, reduced markedly beginning in January 1993 with the
election of a new administration. At the same time, the rural
based guerrillas who had been the apprentices to these drug
lords filled the void left by apprehended drug lords.
As this all occurred, America effected a reduction in
support and even applied decertification into the mix, because
of the Samper equation. This--because of this, a scandal
emerged focusing on Colombian President Samper having taken
some $6 million into his election efforts from drug sources.
Like our own President Clinton, who is caught up in a
similar problem with the Indonesian Lippo Bank, and now we are
finding out the Chinese Government infusing money into--
allegedly infusing money into the democratic mechanism, party
mechanism, Samper has allowed antidrug forces to strike at the
heart of drug apparatus in the interests of all concerned.
Meanwhile, as a distortion of this picture, the State
Department and select others have harped on a flawed strategy
of bifurcating the now drug guerrillas from the drug trade in
spite of overwhelming open source evidence to the contrary.
This is an important point I might bring up, and even a U.S.
Interagency Intelligence Report proving this fact, which the
administration is not releasing until apparently after the
March certification issue is settled.
This affects our support and modus operandi in addition to
interjecting the Presidential politics of both countries. Alas,
and in a curious fashion, nowhere is to be seen the United
States or international environmental or animal rights groups,
as thousands of square miles of virgin, triple canopy jungle
and millions of animals and fish have been eradicated while
rivers have been polluted from drug chemicals because of the
drug trade. Furthermore, human rights groups seem reluctant to
comment on the rights of victims of the drug trade or against
the drug guerrillas. Additionally, and in that regard, four
Americans are being held hostage by these elements as we speak.
Several--three of the hostages have been held for over 4 years.
In conclusion, the confusing combination of politics,
economic interests and other factors should not hide the
salient fact that to not help the good guys in Colombia and
elsewhere, those in the first trench of the drug war, will mean
America will have to deal with the problem closer to home,
initially on our border but then in our neighborhoods. Each
time it gets closer to us, it is more expensive in terms of
lives and money. To be even more plain, to not help our
friends, maybe even hurt them, means an additional 40 to 50
tons of cocaine and 1 to 2 tons of heroin, worth over $500
million, on to our streets in the next 12-month period.
This will cause an additional $50 billion to $60 billion
worth of collateral damage to America. The question to this
august body, are you prepared to act to prevent this?
America can engage in antidrug actions while not
sacrificing our principles and promoting better conduct on the
part of our allies. We need to not act like a kid taking away
the football so the game stops, causing volumes of good guys
and innocents to die in Colombia and paving the way for
increased turmoil in our own country. Therefore, this
foundation recommends that the certification of Colombia go
forward immediately, as it is in the best interest of both
countries. This, with the understanding made with Colombia,
that the rule of law and human rights are an important aspect
in the conduct of this conflict.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would also like to ask that a confidential report that we
had made in the past few days, which we have embargoed until
today, be admitted into the testimony.
Mr. Hastert. Without objection.
Mr. Messing. Thank you, sir.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Messing, and the report
referred to follow:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9818.032
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9818.033
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9818.034
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9818.035
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9818.036
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9818.037
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9818.038
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9818.039
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9818.040
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9818.041
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9818.042
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9818.043
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9818.044
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9818.045
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9818.046
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9818.047
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9818.048
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9818.049
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9818.050
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9818.051
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T9818.052
Mr. Hastert. Thank you, gentlemen.
Representative Barr.
Mr. Barr. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ambassador Busby, were you here for the testimony earlier
today?
Mr. Busby. Yes, sir.
Mr. Barr. OK. Then both by way of that and by way certainly
of your own personal background in service to our country, you
are well aware of the things that we have been talking about,
including the references to the--let me get the citation here--
22 U.S.C. Section 2364, the provisions under both (a)(1),
regarding the President's ability to furnish assistance
notwithstanding other findings and other laws, as well as
subsection (a)(2), regarding sales. In your experience and with
your knowledge of these sorts of authorities and how they have
been used or not used in the past, is it appropriate to
recommend consideration by the President of the authority under
(a)(1), as well as under (a)(2), to try and get as much as we
can to the enforcement authorities in Colombia to meet the
challenge posed to them by the narcotics and grower groups?
Mr. Busby. Well, I confess to you that I am not as familiar
with the law as what you give me credit for. In the broadest
sense, let me just say that I think that absolutely we need to
find a mechanism, either within that law or we need to modify
that law, which will permit us to express our extreme
displeasure with the political leadership of a country such as
Colombia, and we are displeased with them and we should be
displeased with them, but at the same time permit us to go
forward with assistance to gentlemen like Generals Bedoya and
Serrano. Absolutely that is what we should do if there is
agreement, from a policy point of view, between the
administration and you gentlemen.
Now, how one goes about doing that and whether you can do
that within the structure of the legislation as it currently
exists, I am not sure. That would be something which the
lawyers would have to examine.
I will also say that in my experience, often people on both
sides of that question hide behind that law. I think that if
everyone agreed, we would always find a way to get around the
restrictions of the law. But from a policy point of view,
absolutely what you are suggesting is what I would recommend;
yes, sir.
Mr. Barr. Thank you.
I have really been quite impressed with the imaginative use
and interpretation of Federal laws by this administration when
they want to. For example, last year, we heard testimony from
some individuals from this administration with regard to how it
is that the resources of the FBI can be used to investigate a
purely domestic crime in Haiti. There are a number of folks,
including myself, that suspected that decision was made for
purely political reasons, not under Federal laws. And I have a
serious question about their very imaginative and very broad
interpretation of that particular statute.
Yet in this case they seem to be relying on very, very
pinched legalistic definitions and interpretations of these
laws such as prevents, for example, as we heard from the last
panel, the use of even the limited military assistance that
this administration is willing to provide to the army and to
the police forces down there, telling them they can only use it
to go after the narcotics people and not the guerrillas when,
in fact, I think that it is very, very well documented and well
known to this administration and prior administrations that the
two groups really are operating hand in hand. I don't know if
there's a question in all of that, but something that you said
triggered that.
Mr. Busby. Let me put myself back into one of my previous
incarnations.
I went through something very similar to this, about 3\1/2\
or 4 years ago, and I was very, very intent on gaining some
public recognition from the U.S. Government that there was a
linkage between the narcotics traffickers and the guerilla
groups. I mean, that was my objective, to do that, because if--
once we could establish that, then, of course, the next step,
which was beginning to work with them on the guerilla problem,
became easier.
People basically said: Well, if you want to do that, you go
right ahead but expect to be sued, expect someone to come up
and use the law against you as a public official for not
adhering to the end-use provisions that are built into the law
that say you will not use this equipment for anything other
than counternarcotics purposes. If you want to make the policy
determination that going after the FARC is a counternarcotics
purpose, do so at your peril.
Those are the kinds of problems that you run into when you
have conflicting legislation and people who take various
positions on various issues. That's a serious thing.
Mr. Barr. Not exactly a standing-tall foreign policy type
decisionmaking process.
Mr. Busby. I like to think that I stood as tall as anyone;
but when someone tells me that I am going to jail because I
make a policy determination, I tend to listen to what they say.
Mr. Barr. Well, I would question that sort of advice. I
mean, when I was in the executive branch at the CIA, for
example, we would go to legal counsel to make sure that there
is a way within the bounds of the law to do something. If you--
if the question is posed to these folks, give me a reason not
to do something, now that's a lot easier. But I am somewhat
disturbed, particularly in light of what the former two
witnesses, the two generals from Colombia have told us, that
there is very, very clear documentation, well known to this
administration, that these two groups, the guerilla groups and
the narcotics trafficking groups, are operating essentially as
one organization, one paying the other a large percent of the
profits, and yet they rely on these very pinched
interpretations. I suspect it's for policy reasons they have
made that decision because they want to.
With regard to the specific--the specific point--one other
specific point that I forget which one of the generals made,
that it would help them tremendously if we could take a look
here in this country at perhaps strengthening or modifying in
some way our laws to prevent the introduction of precursor
chemicals into Colombia, are you familiar with that? Are there
some specific things, perhaps from a policy standpoint, in your
experience, that you could tell us that we should specifically
be looking at there?
Mr. Busby. Yes, sir. We in the United States some years ago
began to recognize that tracking precursor chemicals and
tracking money was really a very effective way to get at the
organizational infrastructure of the traffickers. We, the
Americans, have done a pretty good job at that, in my opinion.
Where you run into problems, in my experience, and I saw
this in Colombia, is when you try to take the next step and
engage the international community, when you go to the Germans,
to the French, to the Swiss, to other manufacturers and say
that we want you to impose on your industries all of these
tracking provisions and end-use provisions for chemicals that
are precursors. That has been an international initiative
which, in my experience, has gone virtually nowhere.
We have tried to do that with the Colombians and certainly
under Cesar Gaviria, the previous president, they were very
much in support of that.
I am not aware, frankly, that we, the United States, are
deserving of any rocks being thrown our way on that. We have
taken some really very effective measures. But I do believe
that the international community--that it's an initiative which
we need to pursue and pursue very strongly.
I tend to believe in the efficiency of that. I do think
that if you could cutoff the flow of chemicals--money without
saying, but if you could cutoff the flow of chemicals or put
some real strictures on that, you could put--you could put the
traffickers at considerable risk. A lot of those chemicals come
up river from Brazil.
Mr. Barr. There is no initiative from the administration at
this point to even look at that, much less propose legislation,
is there?
Mr. Busby. I am sorry. I have been out of the government
for a couple of years. I really don't know the current state of
play.
Mr. Barr. OK. There isn't.
Mr. Messing, you, as Mr. Busby, have experience in a lot of
different countries, including Colombia and another country
mentioned today, Mexico. From your background and knowledge of
the--both the political and the police and military situations
in both of these countries, could you just very, very briefly
compare the integrity and the efforts of the Colombian anti-
narcotics efforts, particularly General Serrano and his troops
and General Bedoya and his troops, to their counterparts in
Mexico?
Mr. Messing. Well, you have to understand that these
organizations will always have some thin layer of corruption,
as our own police forces do and our own military does in some
respect. I mean, there will be a very thin layer of corruption
in both of the militaries. You will have some group that will--
a cellular group that will be involved in death squad
activities. You will have some very small group that will be
involved in corruption; they have been corrupted by the drug
lords. But for the most part, the Colombians have had an
aggressive program, particularly in the police, to vet their
elements. As a matter of fact, several years ago, there were,
you know, literally 6,000, to 7,000 police vetted from their
national police force over a period of time.
This is a good indicator. It shows progress toward them
doing the right thing. So in terms of whether I am comfortable
with the Colombian national police versus the Mexican national
police, who haven't gone through this severe vetting program
like the Colombian national police, I would prefer to work with
the Colombian national police.
But having said that, you always have to encourage them to
continue vetting and, you know, the police and the military.
One of the programs that the Ambassador mentioned has an
astounding effect on the viability of these forces. It is joint
training that we have with those elements. It's very important,
because they learn through osmosis and directly that human
rights is important; that proper conduct is important. They
learn civic action. They learn a whole plethora of ideas from
us that they take back to their country, and these ideas will
help the police and military move toward the democratization of
their country while lowering levels of violence. That's what
this is all about.
Mr. Barr. You did mention the term civil rights--human
rights and we talked about that, as you know, from being here
during the previous two panels. Would you and, Ambassador
Busby, if you could both just comment very, very briefly on
this human rights issue, and in particular where should the
real focus of our concern over human rights violations in
Colombia be with regard to the narcotics traffickers and the
narcotics organizations and the guerrillas or with the police
and military forces, which we all know in any country, as you
said, are not perfect. Where ought to our concern over human
rights be?
Mr. Busby. Well, let me just say several things about that,
because it was an issue that was of great concern the whole
time I was there. First, I think it is indisputable that there
are human rights problems within the police and the military in
Colombia. The evidence is clearly there.
Having said that, it is also indisputable that the
leadership of those organizations neither condones it nor
supports it and, in fact, are working very, very hard to try
and root out human rights abuses. They do try and train their
people. There is no institutional bias toward human rights
abuses but, rather, the contrary.
Mr. Barr. That, I think, is a very important distinction.
Mr. Busby. Yes, sir.
My feeling is that many of the human rights abuses in
Colombia occur because they are--it may not be a civil war, but
they are a country at war with themselves. Because of the
immaturity of the justice system, both civilly and within the
military, that police and military many times feel enormous
frustration, that they can go arrest somebody or they can do
these things and nothing ever really happens. And, therefore,
out of frustration----
Mr. Barr. Something else may happen.
Mr. Busby. Something else happens.
Mr. Barr. Like the frustration in this country sometimes.
Mr. Busby. That goes to the point I tried to make at the
end of my very brief statement.
I think one of the focuses of our efforts should be on
building those institutions up so that, in fact, you remove
that level of frustration and, in fact, you bring the rule of
law to these countries.
It's very, very underdeveloped in Colombia, although they
have made some attempts to overhaul their justice system. But
there's a long way to go.
Mr. Barr. Excuse me. Does decertification help that process
or hamper it?
Mr. Busby. Oh, I think it hurts it. I mean, I think the
whole certification process, as I have said to Congressman
Mica, who helped draft that legislation, I am rather critical
of that because I think it does, in many ways, hinder our
ability to pick and choose what we want to do.
Mr. Hastert. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Busby. Let me say one additional thing, just following
up on the previous question. I think that one of the
initiatives that we had under way, and I spoke to President
Gaviria about it many times when I was there, is that the
process by which we select our police officers and train them
or our military officers or our government officials is very
different from what you have in these countries. If you--as you
well know, if you want a security clearance in the United
States, you get investigated. You have people talk to your
family. They talk to your neighbors. There is an extensive
background investigation that is done on you before you are
given access to sensitive information, and there is
psychological training for policemen, and so forth. None of
that exists. None of that exists.
I went to see a ranking cabinet officer once in Colombia,
and she said, ``I am really very worried about, you know,
information leaking out of my office, and so forth, and I think
it's my secretary.''
I said, ``Well, who is she?''
I don't know. I don't know, you know.
I went into, well, how are these people selected?
Well, they are just hired.
So you have to understand, it's also a very, very difficult
proposition to work in some of these countries trying to decide
who do you work with, who do you not work with, who is corrupt,
who is not corrupt. You only decide that over a period of some
time, sometimes years, making decisions on who you think you
can trust.
So all of these things are correctable, and I think that
they are something that deserves some emphasis from a policy
point of view on our part.
Mr. Hastert. The gentleman from Florida.
Mr. Mica. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ambassador Busby, I heard your comments relating to the
certification law, and I probably have to agree with you that
it hasn't been that effective with Colombia because we don't--
we really don't even have a handle on that country that the
legislation was originally intended to give us leverage with.
But I am wondering what you think could be an action by
this Congress or this administration to show the Colombians and
others that we mean business. How can we get their attention on
this matter?
Mr. Busby. Well, sir, with regard to the Colombian
leadership, as I said, I find it hard to think of anything else
we could do to display our animosity toward Mr. Samper and the
people around him. I mean, we have taken his visa. We have
publicly castigated him. We have done virtually everything
possible to let him know that we don't like him. As I said
earlier, he gets no kudos from me, either.
The problem I have is that the structure of the
legislation, as I understand it, oftentimes does not allow you
to pick and choose what you are going to do in a particular
country. I think it is--has been not very helpful to cutoff FMS
sales to Colombia. I think that that's just--we should have
avoided that somehow.
I also think that, although there are certain times when
public debate on things like this is very useful, sometimes it
is a hinderance to trying to solve the problem because
everybody tries to make political points.
What I think should happen is that the Congress and the
administration should sit down and look at the whole range of
interconnecting legislation that applies to these kinds of
situations and try to perfect it, try to make it better, more
useful, more flexible, perhaps. I know that implies a certain
level of working together that isn't always there, but I
sincerely believe that.
Mr. Mica. Well, another one of the problems we have, and
Mr. Hastert saw it and his predecessor, Mr. Zeliff, who chaired
this subcommittee, saw the same thing, is this approach and the
legislative remedy or the administrative remedy covers a number
of legislative committees of jurisdiction, a number of
agencies.
We had written to the drug czar asking that the President
request a waiver, and I think that he doesn't--the drug czar
really doesn't have any authority. He is sort of a fancy
coordinator. But we face the same problem here because the
solutions are handled by State, by the Department of Defense,
by the Department of Justice and by other Federal agencies.
Do you see any solution to our jurisdictional problem, any
recommendations?
Mr. Busby. Well, I know, of course, of your long record and
the chairman and other members on this committee of trying to
resolve some of these organizational issues. I will tell you
what I honestly think, and that is that the only person who can
really bring order out of this and make it work is an elected
official, and that's either the President or the Vice
President.
I tend to believe that the Secretary of State is never
going to tell the Secretary of Defense how to spend his money.
Nor do I think that General McCaffrey for all of his abilities
is going to tell the Secretary of State how to conduct foreign
policy, no matter what his so-called title might be. But you
correctly, I think, perceive it, that it is just a coordination
role.
Mr. Mica. Well, I think it has been a lack of executive
leadership, and that's definitely a problem; no interest in the
issue, or limited interest until of late. Then we see the
bureaucratic morass.
Now, State had--we talked about FMS and the President does
have authority to grant a waiver. I cited examples of where
waivers have been granted in much less national interest than
this instance, and nothing still is done as far as FMS and that
military pot. But then I gave examples here and cited back in
September they had asked--or had notified us, they didn't have
to ask--they notified us that State was going to move forward
on providing the Colombians and Peruvians and others with
equipment, and still nothing has been done with that.
How do you get a handle on this?
Mr. Busby. Well, I mean, sir, I think you know the answer
to the question. These are policy issues. These are policy
determinations. Again, my recommendation for some time has been
that we need to look at the organization under which we conduct
counternarcotics--well, our entire drug policy arena,
everything from treatment to demand reduction to our
international programs and everything.
My frustrations, and I worked on this for 15 years or more,
is that it--the same frustration you have. How do you, in fact,
get a handle on all of this and really begin to resolve the
problem? It's a very, very difficult thing to do, the way we
are currently organized and the way you are currently
organized.
That, to my mind, is something that is really worthy of
some effort on the part of the Congress and the administration,
how you do this.
Mr. Mica. One more important thing. Again, I am really
frightened for this country and for every community, knowing
what we saw last year, and you were with us on the trip when
the chairman and others went down to Colombia and we were told
there were 10,000 hectare acres of poppies under production
now.
Is there anything that we can do in this heroin area--and
now it is starting to stream in. We heard testimony today,
Ambassador Gelbard talked about the production, but you are
going to be able to get heroin on the streets of this country
as cheaply as crack in the near term, and availability is
dramatically increased, plus use among the most vulnerable, our
youth.
Is there anything you can do--now, you have been there. You
have been to Colombia as Ambassador. You know the situation
better than anyone. Is there anything you recommend that we can
do to get a handle on this now?
Mr. Busby. Sir, I think that the best thing we can do in
the short term, the best thing we can do, is support General
Serrano and General Bedoya, begin to work with them. Most of
that--most of that opium poppy cultivation, it's a very
organized thing, and the guerrillas are very involved in it.
The FARC is very involved in the heroin production.
In the short term, we need to make sure that the aid is
flowing to these people who are fighting it.
In the long term, I think we need to take a very hard look
at our overall policy of how we are conducting our business
with regard to interdiction, eradication, demand reduction and
all of that, because that's the long-term solution.
Mr. Mica. Finally, I guess you would support then that this
administration, when they come out with their strategy for
1997, drug policy strategy, that interdiction and eradication
would be, I guess, included in that agenda, which has been sort
of cast aside in their past plan?
Mr. Busby. Well, I must say, I tend to agree with General
McCaffrey. I think it's a waste of effort to come out with a
yearly strategy. We ought to have a 10- or 20-year strategy.
Mr. Mica. It is also--as you well know, it's interdiction,
it's education, it's treatment.
Mr. Busby. I was just going to say, I think----
Mr. Mica. But when it is missing--one of the legs of the
stool is missing, and you have had that policy, it's time to
realize that you have got to approach it from all aspects.
Wouldn't you agree?
Mr. Busby. Yes, sir.
I think--I would say two things. One, organizationally we
need to be able to bring the full power of U.S. capability
against this problem and do it in a focused way, which I don't
think we do very well.
Second, there is no silver bullet to this, and you have to
do all of it. Any administration that thinks that treatment is
going to work and we can do away with the interdiction or the
interdiction is going to work and we can do away with demand
reduction, simply doesn't understand the problem. You have to
do all of these things, and you have to do them over some
extended period of time and destroy the infrastructure by which
the traffickers have been able to build these empires. That's
what we should be doing.
Mr. Mica. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Hastert. I thank the gentleman from Florida.
To both of you gentlemen, I appreciate, first of all, your
long endurance this morning to sit through a lot of testimony
and now enduring it yourself here. But to get through this last
round, I would like to ask both of you a couple of questions.
First of all, Ambassador Busby, could you assess previously
the threat posed to our security by narcotraffickers in
Colombia? What do you see?
Mr. Busby. Our security in Colombia?
Mr. Hastert. Our security here, what happens to this
country because of the narcotraffickers?
Mr. Busby. I am sorry? You are talking about what happens
to the United States?
Mr. Hastert. Yes.
Mr. Busby. Well, I admit to being a little bit of a radical
about that. I think, if you look at the history of the United
States, you are hard-pressed to come up with a phenomenon that
has affected us as deeply and adversely as drugs have. I don't
mean just trafficking. I am talking about the use of drugs,
everything that surrounds it.
I think it is, in its purest sense, a real threat to our
society, not necessarily to the institutions of government or--
drug traffickers are not going to overthrow the U.S.
Government. But seriously, the deterioration that takes place
at various levels of our society I think is marked and
measurable, and therein lies some of the frustration that I
have in our failure to be able to focus all of the capabilities
we have to try and bring about some resolution of the problem.
So I think it's a very clear threat.
Mr. Hastert. Do you feel that the narcotics assistance
section at the Colombian Embassy has been effectively
administrated?
Mr. Busby. It was--it was certainly effectively
administrated when I was there.
I don't know enough about it to really comment on that.
Mr. Hastert. The drug czar has asked, and this is for your
opinion, obviously, has asked that maybe he would have 10
percent flexibility in his budget, that he can act upon that
budget and implement those funds at his discretion. Do you
think that would be a positive tool?
Mr. Busby. Yes, sir, I do. I do.
Mr. Hastert. Why?
Mr. Busby. I tend to think that a little more centralized
control over budget and policy is what is needed.
Now, again, having said that, I am not so sure that the
President is ever going to be enabled--is never going to be
able to empower one Cabinet officer over the other and,
therefore, Presidential leadership is absolutely essential to
make it happen. But having some more centralized view of all of
this, that is not law enforcement, it is not health, it is not
international but, rather, something else, I think, would be a
good thing.
Mr. Hastert. There has been some questions previously today
trying to compare Mexico to Colombia, and I know that you have
had some experience in both countries, especially the oversight
job that you had as Ambassador on terrorism. How would you
compare General Serrano's record, I guess you would say, of the
Colombian national police on the counternarcotics efforts
compared to what's going on in Mexico at the same type of
level?
Mr. Busby. Well, the history in Colombia is very, very
different from Mexico. The Colombians decided back in the early
1980's that they were going to accept and seek and use United
States assistance. As a result, the Colombian national police,
in particular, have been the recipient of a lot of help from us
which was freely given and which was freely accepted.
Therefore, the working relationships that we have had
historically have had their ups and downs but, nonetheless,
have been very close.
That is not in any way the case in Mexico. In fact, our
relationships with the police in Mexico and with the Mexican
military have been far, far more standoffish, and I think that
the results clearly speak for themselves.
We work and have always worked closely with the Colombians.
I had very high respect for their professionalism and integrity
when I was there. I think the record with Mexico has been far,
far more spotty.
Mr. Hastert. One of the things that General Serrano said,
and he said it in passing, and I am really sure if anybody
picked it up, he said one of the most injurious things that has
happened since the decertification was the inability for--to
get his men training, to get--in how to do things; and they
have had that luxury before with the cooperation from the
United States and, I would imagine, our agencies, DEA, CIA and
other agencies that do that.
In your opinion, has President Clinton's decision to
decertify Colombia on March 1, 1996, had a significant
detrimental effect on the levels of counternarcotics support
Colombia is receiving from the United States via the Department
of State on foreign military sales?
Mr. Busby. Certainly on foreign military sales because it
is my understanding that there are restrictions placed on that.
That's a serious problem, I must say, because you lose IMET,
the training programs, you lose military assistance, you lose a
whole lot of things.
As far as characterizing it as serious or nonserious, and
so forth, I don't have the figures in front of me. I am not
really competent to speak to that.
I have the impression, although it may be anecdotal, that
that is a true statement.
Mr. Hastert. Major Messing, before I recognize you for a
couple of questions, I would like to also recognize, and I see
him in the audience, another dedicated member of the National
Defense Council, Gil Macklin. We certainly appreciate him being
here today.
Let me ask you one of the same questions. Do you feel that
the national assistance section at the Colombia Embassy has
been effectively administered? You have been down there, been
in the jungles. How do you feel about that?
Mr. Messing. Well, I agree with Congressman Mica in terms
of that there's a leadership flaw here. I mean, I go back to El
Salvador. I had 57 trips in El Salvador between 1982 and 1991,
and I saw Ambassador Dean Hinton and Ambassador Tom Pickering
act, and I also worked at the State Department under Ambassador
Rich Armitage. They would pick up the phone, and they would
holler into the phone. All of a sudden a C-141 or a C-5A would
show up and have what the Salvadorians needed or, in the case
of Rich Armitage, when he was working in the NIS section at
State, a C-5A would be landing in Russia, you know, chock full
of medical supplies or whatever was the case.
The point is that the leadership involved is not providing
the pressure and guidance, pressure to their people and
guidance to their people, to get things done.
You know, this failure results in lives of Colombian
policemen being lost, and that's later translated into
additional cocaine on our streets; and it involves collateral
damage to the United States.
So, you know, without this enthusiastic, directed
leadership from Washington, from the Ambassadorial level, from
the section level, you can't get things done.
Mr. Hastert. Can I ask you a question then to followup on
that?
Mr. Messing. Yes.
Mr. Hastert. I think I inferred from your answer, and I am
not trying to put words in your mouth, but are you saying that
people aren't getting out and doing the job they should do, in
your opinion, or are they?
Mr. Messing. Well, there's a whole section in the U.S. drug
control policy and international operations paper that I gave
to you a couple of months ago that talks about personnel
selection. Failure to staff all levels of the drug control
program correctly virtually foredooms it to failure. You know,
when you hire a guy who has just been with the Department of
Agriculture to run a criminal--anticriminal element, who should
be versed--well versed in anti-narcotics operations and who
doesn't mind putting on a bulletproof vest and going out to
Miraflores, and when you hire an agronomist or an agriculture
guy or whatever, you are not going to have the kind of results
that you need.
Fortunately, I heard recently that one of our sterling
State Department anti-narcotics people is being transferred
from another country into Colombia, but he won't be there for a
few months. So you can't have this failure of lack of correct
personnel selection and expect to have results. I mean, it just
doesn't work that way.
You have to have the brightest, the best and the bravest
that are put into a hybrid team, and this talks about it also--
let's see. There's another section in here. It talks about that
you have--maybe it's in the recommendations portion. But you
have to have a hybrid team of gutsy men and women that are
knowledgeable and experienced to go in and that have the backup
from the United States to go in there and thwart the drug lords
and the drug guerrillas. You have to have this kind of
combination of effort.
Mr. Hastert. Let me ask you a another question that's very
similar to the question I asked Ambassador Busby. How do you--
as someone that's been underground in Colombia, how do you
assess the national security threat, both to Colombia and the
United States, from narcotraffickers?
Mr. Messing. Well, it is clear to me. I mean, when you have
got----
Mr. Hastert. Let me interrupt you just for a second. I used
the framework before and I misspoke in addressing the letter
to--or question to the general, I said civil war. I don't mean
civil war, but certainly there's a huge war going on between
two forces. How do you assess that?
Mr. Messing. Well, again, I have to go back to the dark
side/light side capitalist example as one of the things. When
you have dark side capitalist elements that are antidemocratic,
they are monopolistic, and they are a very small element that
tries to take control of the country and impact on its
sovereignty. It's the tail that starts to wag the dog of the
sovereignty of Colombia, in that regard. Their narcissistic
enterprises wind up impacting on us on the streets of America.
Like I said earlier, if you--if this decertification--if
this certification doesn't come through, even a certification
with a waiver of some sort, it will translate directly into 40
to 50 tons of cocaine on your streets, on Congressman Mica's
city and district, and on the other Members of Congress, where
you feel the impact. The collateral damage is in an exponential
way worse than the amount of assistance that you can provide.
I mean, we are talking $50 billion to $60 billion worth of
collateral damage to the United States as a result of not
certifying, not boosting the morale, not giving them the
equipment they need, not supporting them in the first trench,
the most inexpensive part of the drug war versus--the border
versus our neighborhood. I mean, it's almost goofy, it is
almost goofy not to understand that American interests are
first.
There's a part in here that talks about strategy. This was
written in 1990, because we were critical of the Bush
administration. The point is that in strategy you have to
understand the first priority is the war on drugs, and that
translates into America; and the second is the maintenance of
the country's democratic institutions.
Mr. Hastert. To followup on that, we just had a note handed
to us from our district office that today in Waukegan, IL--
that's not very far from my district--they just had a bust of
400 pounds of cocaine. That sounds like a tremendous amount of
drug. But in the whole scheme of things, it's just a very small
fraction of what comes out of Colombia. But that did come from
Colombia.
Mr. Messing. Mr. Chairman, drug dealers just tried to buy a
Soviet submarine for the transportation of drugs.
Mr. Hastert. One last question I would like to address to
you, Ambassador. In your opinion, do we face, I guess to coin a
phrase, a chemical laundering problem? We had General Serrano
talking about precursors. We understand that many of these
products come from places like Germany and Holland and other
places, but even from the United States, if we can ship--if
somebody wants to ship a product, tons or thousands of gallons
of product to Poland or the Bahamas or Germany and then it
finds its way back to Colombia, is that a problem? If it is,
how can we start to get a handle on that?
Mr. Busby. Yes, sir, that is a problem. In the tracking of
precursor chemicals, I think DEA and FBI both have whole
sections that do nothing but that.
It is a very difficult proposition because you are talking
about a legal commercial product.
How we get a handle on it? I go back to what I responded to
Mr. Barr. I think the only way you get a real handle on it is
to work with the producing countries of those chemicals to put
some tracking restrictions and end-use restrictions on them,
and also work with Colombia and other countries that produce
drugs to track the importation of those kinds of chemicals.
Mr. Hastert. The question is: How much of that chemical
comes from this country and goes to other countries?
Mr. Busby. I don't know. DEA could give you those figures.
Mr. Hastert. But is it significant?
Mr. Busby. The impression that I have, and I had it from
the time that I was in Colombia, is that we have made some
substantial progress. We, Americans, have made some substantial
progress on that. We have made no progress in terms of
chemicals produced in Brazil, Germany, France, places like
that.
Mr. Hastert. Thank you very much. I certainly appreciate
both of you gentlemen being here today. As I said, we have had
a lot of questions and a lot of answers, and I hope we have
made some headway, No. 1, in understanding and, No. 2,
establishing a record, that we need to move forward.
We need to have better ideas. We need to think outside the
traditional square to solve this problem. If we didn't have the
courageous people like General Serrano and others, General
Bedoya who was here today, and others, we wouldn't even be able
to get a toehold to solve the problem.
We appreciate your testimony. This is not the last hearing
that we will have on this issue. We will continue to work at
it.
This hearing of the Subcommittee on National Security,
International Affairs, and Criminal Justice is adjourned. Thank
you.
[Whereupon, at 2:02 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
-