[House Hearing, 108 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
INTEGRITY AND SECURITY AT THE BORDER
THE US--VISIT PROGRAM
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INFRASTRUCTURE AND BORDER SECURITY
of the
SELECT COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JANUARY 28, 2004
__________
Serial No. 108-34
__________
Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Homeland Security
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/
house
__________
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SELECT COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Christopher Cox, California, Chairman
Jennifer Dunn, Washington Jim Turner, Texas, Ranking Member
C.W. Bill Young, Florida Bennie G. Thompson, MississPpi
Don Young, Alaska Loretta Sanchez, California
F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., Edward J. Markey, Massachusetts
Wisconsin Norman D. Dicks, Washington
W.J. (Billy) Tauzin, Louisiana Barney Frank, Massachusetts
David Dreier, California Jane Harman, California
Duncan Hunter, California Benjamin L. Cardin, Maryland
Harold Rogers, Kentucky Louise McIntosh Slaughter, New
Sherwood Boehlert, New York York
Lamar S. Smith, Texas Peter A. DeFazio, Oregon
Curt Weldon, Pennsylvania Nita M. Lowey, New York
Christopher Shays, Connecticut Robert E. Andrews, New Jersey
Porter J. Goss, Florida Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of
Dave Camp, Michigan Columbia
Lincoln Diaz-Balart, Florida Zoe Lofgren, California
Bob Goodlatte, Virginia Karen McCarthy, Missouri
Ernest J. Istook, Jr., Oklahoma Sheila Jackson-Lee, Texas
Peter T. King, New York Bill Pascrell, Jr., New Jersey
John Linder, Georgia Donna M. Christensen, U.S. Virgin
John B. Shadegg,T1 Arizona Islands
Mark E. Souder, Indiana Bob Etheridge, North Carolina
Mac Thornberry, Texas Ken Lucas, Kentucky
Jim Gibbons, Nevada James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
Kay Granger, Texas Kendrick B. Meek, Florida
Pete Sessions, Texas
John E. Sweeney, New York
John Gannon, Chief of Staff
Uttam Dhillon, Chief Counsel and Deputy Staff Director
Steven Cash, Democrat Staff Director
David H. Schanzer, Democrat Staff Director
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
______
Subcommittee on Infrastructure and Border Security
Dave Camp, Michigan, Chairman
Kay Granger, Texas, Vice Chairwoman Loretta Sanchez, California,
Jennifer Dunn, Washington Ranking Member
Don Young, Alaska Edward J. Markey, Massachusetts
Duncan Hunter, California Norman D. Dicks, Washington
Lamar Smith, Texas Barney Frank, Massachusetts
Lincoln Diaz-Balart, Florida Benjamin L. Cardin, Maryland
Robert W. Goodlatte, Virginia Louise McIntosh Slaughter, New
Ernest Istook, Oklahoma York
John Shadegg, Arizona Peter A. DeFazio, Oregon
Mark Souder, Indiana Sheila Jackson-Lee, Texas
John Sweeney, New York Bill Pascrell, Jr., New Jersey
Christopher Cox, California, Ex Jim Turner, Texas, Ex Officio
Officio
(ii)
CONTENTS
----------
Page
STATEMENTS
The Honorable Kay Granger, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Texas, and Vice Chairwoman, Subcommittee on
Infrastructure and Border Security
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 3
The Honorable Loretta Sanchez, a Representative in Congress From
the State of California, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Infrastructure and Border Security............................. 4
The Honorable Christopher Cox, a Representative in Congress From
the State of California, and Chairman, Select Committee on
Homeland Security.............................................. 6
The Honorable Jim Turner, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Texas, and Ranking Member, Select Committee on
Homeland Security
Oral Statement................................................. 8
Prepapred Statement............................................ 9
The Honorable Lincoln Diaz-Balart, a Representative in Congress
From the State Florida......................................... 13
The Honorable Norman D. Dicks, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Washington........................................ 47
The Honorable Jennifer Dunn, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Texas............................................. 10
The Honorable Sheila Jackson-Lee, a Representative in Congress
From the State of
Prepapred Statement............................................ 14
The Honorable Bill Pascrell, Jr., a Representative in Congress
From the State of New Jersey................................... 12
The Honorable John B. Shadegg, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Arizona........................................... 43
The Honorable John E. Sweeney, a Representative in Congress From
the State of New York.......................................... 11
WITNESSES
Mr. Asa Hutchinson, Under Secretary, Border and Transportation
Security Directorate, Department of Homeland Security
Oral Statement................................................. 15
Prepared Statement............................................. 19
The Honorable Maura Harty, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of
Consular Affairs, Department of State
Oral Statement................................................. 28
Prepared Statement............................................. 30
Mr. James May, President and CEO, Air Transport Association
Oral Statement................................................. 57
Prepared Statement............................................. 58
Ms. Kathleen Campbell Walker, Testifying on Behalf of American
Immigration Lawyers Association and Foreign Trade Association,
Inc.
Oral Statement................................................. 59
Prepared Statement............................................. 61
Mr. Dennis Carlton, Director of Washington Operations,
International Biometric Group, LLC
Oral Statement................................................. 71
Prepared Statement............................................. 73
Appendix
Material Submitted for the Record
Questions and Responses of The Honorable Maura Harty............. 85
Questions and Responses of The Honorable Asa Hutchinson.......... 93
Questions and Responses of Air Transport Association of
America.Inc.................................................... 110
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Questions and Responses of Mr. Dennis A. Carlton................. 111
Prepared Statement of Mr. Edward K. Pultorak..................... 112
Prepared Statement of Mr. J. Clark Robinson, President,
International Association of Amusement Parks and Attractions... 114
Prepared Statement of The Travel Industry Association of America. 116
INTEGRITY AND SECURITY AT THE BORDER
THE US--VISIT PROGRAM
----------
Wednesday, January 28, 2004
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Infrastructure and Border Security,
Select Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, D.C.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 11:04 a.m., in
Room 345, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Kay Granger [vice-
chairwoman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Granger, Dunn, Diaz-Balart,
Shadegg, Sweeney, Cox, Sanchez, Markey, Dicks, Pascrell, Turner
and Christensen.
Ms. Granger. [Presiding.] The Subcommittee on
Infrastructure and Border Security hearing will come to order.
As vice chair of the subcommittee, I am sitting in for
Chairman Dave Camp who is prevented from attending by a
Michigan snow storm. I know we will all understand that.
I would like to welcome and thank you for attending today's
hearing.
I see that the gentlelady from the Virgin Islands is here.
The chair asks for unanimous consent that Ms. Christensen
be allowed to sit and question the panel.
Today's business is to receive testimony regarding the new
border management system to record the arrival and departure of
foreign nationals into the U.S.--the United States Visitor and
Immigrants Status Indicator Technology program, which we call
US-VISIT.
This hearing will have two panels. The subcommittee will
hear first from Border and Transportation Security
Undersecretary Asa Hutchinson from the Department of Homeland
Security, and Consular Affairs Assistant Secretary Maura Harty
from the Department of State.
We will then hear from a second panel comprised of James
May, the president and CEO of the Air Transport Association;
Kathleen Campbell Walker, a member of the board of directors of
the El Paso Foreign Trade Association and a member of the
American Immigration Lawyers Association; and Dennis Carlton,
the director of Washington operations for the International
Biometric Group.
Thank you all for your participation.
The subcommittee is also expecting several additional
statements from outside groups that will be included in the
hearing record.
The chair would like to remind members that we have two
very qualified panels here with a great deal to contribute to
the discussion of the US-VISIT program.
In order to allow sufficient time for their testimony and
questions, the chair will urge members to give short statements
and to submit their full opening statements for the record. The
record will remain open for ten days after the close of the
hearing. Members are advised that they will receive an
additional three minutes during the question time if they waive
their opening statement.
The chair will begin with a short opening statement.
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 highlighted the
need to improve our national security by improving integrity in
the U.S. immigration system.
As a nation, we must have reliable methods for identifying
aliens who are inadmissible to the country as well as those who
overstay their lawful admission period.
At the same time, we cannot create policies or programs
that discourage or delay or prevent legitimate travel, commerce
and tourism.
The US-VISIT is an extensive border management system
developed to monitor the arrival and departure of foreign
nationals within the United States and to improve the
reliability and security of their travel documents.
The US-VISIT program will be implemented in phases over the
next several years to comply with congressional mandate.
As envisioned, foreign nationals traveling to the United
States will have their fingerprints captured and authenticated
at U.S. ports of entry. This biometric information we enter
into and compare with prints already in the automated biometric
identification system called IDENT.
Additionally, the biometrics will be checked when the
individual exits the country to confirm identity.
The alien's biographic information, including name and
place of birth, are checked through the Interagency Border
Inspection Systems, IBIS, which includes law enforcement,
immigration and intelligence databases to determine whether the
individual is a threat to national security, public safety or
is otherwise inadmissible.
Travelers entering the U.S. through the visa waiver program
will not be affected by the biometrical requirements of US-
VISIT. This program allows nationals from 27 countries to enter
the U.S. as temporary visitors without first obtaining a visa.
Travelers entering through this program are still screened
through the IBIS database. However, under current law, by
October 26, 2004, visa-waiver countries have to issue biometric
passports. Under this mandate, the biometric requirement for
visa-waiver travelers will be similar under US-VISIT.
The State Department plays a complementary role in the US-
VISIT program. State is in the process of equipping overseas
embassies and consular posts with the ability to capture
biometrics at the time of interview.
The key benefit of this initiative is that by comparing the
visa information from State with that taken at primary
inspection, Customs and Border Protection inspectors will have
additional assurance that an alien's visa is reliable.
Currently 50 consular posts are equipped to capture
fingerprints and photographs, and the remaining facilities are
on schedule to begin capturing biometrics by the congressional
deadline of October 26, 2004.
In November 2003, DHS began the pilot for the
implementation of phase one at Hartsville-Jackson International
Airport in Atlanta. During the voluntary pilot, over 20,000
individuals were screened through US-VISIT. And the system
turned up over 20 hits on inadmissible or wanted people.
DHS estimates that capturing the biometric information adds
approximately 15 to 18 extra seconds to an individual's
processing time.
On January 5, 2004, DHS added biometric collection for all
arriving visa holders at 115 airports and 14 seaports.
Two pilot programs for the exit component are under way at
Baltimore-Washington National Airport and the Port of Miami.
A persistent issue in all border security programs is
finding the right balance between security and legitimate
travel for tourism and commerce. There is concern from several
stakeholders about the impact US-VISIT will have on travel and
trade, particularly at the land borders. Some fear that the
program will create massive delays at border crossings.
The United States has more than 300 land, air and sea ports
of entry where international travelers are inspected and
permitted to enter the United States. Each year, more than 500
million people enter the United States. This hearing will
provide an opportunity to explore the implementation at the
land border and the different options under considerations for
the rollout.
Coming from a border state, I am particularly interested in
different plans and proposals for the ports of entry. Any
additional delays will have serious consequence for communities
on both sides of the border.
Over time, US-VISIT promises to strengthen the integrity of
the border security system.
The US-VISIT will improve the accuracy and consistency of
detecting fraudulent travel documents, verifying traveler
identity and determining traveler admissibility.
Again, I would like to thank our witnesses for being here.
I will conclude my remarks and enter my full statement for the
record.
Prepared Opening Statement of The Honorable Kay Granger, a
Representative in Congress From the State of Texas, and Vice Chair,
Infrastructure and Border Security Subcommittee
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, highlighted the need
to improve national security by improving integrity in the U.S.
immigration system. As a nation, we must have reliable methods for
identifying aliens who are inadmissible to the country as well as those
who overstay their lawful admission periods. At the same time, we can
not create policies or programs that discourage, delay or prevent
legitimate travel, commerce, and tourism.
The US-VISIT Program is an extensive border management system
developed to monitor the arrival and departure of foreign nationals
within the United States and to improve the reliability and security of
their travel documents.
The US-VISIT Program will be implemented in phases over the next
several years to comply with Congressional mandates. As envisioned,
foreign nationals traveling to the United States will have their
fingerprints captured and authenticated at US ports of entry. This
biometric information will be entered into and compared with prints
already in the Automated Biometric Identification System called IDENT.
Additionally, the biometrics will be checked when the individual exits
the country to confirm identity.
The alien's biographic information, including name and place of
birth, are checked through the Interagency Border Inspection System
(IBIS), which includes law enforcement, immigration and intelligence
databases to determine whether the individual is a threat to national
security, public safety, or is otherwise inadmissible.
Travelers entering the U.S. through the Visa Waiver Program will
not be affected by the biometric requirements of US-VISIT. This program
allows nations from 27 countries to enter the U.S. as temporary
visitors without first obtaining a visa. Travelers entering through
this program are still screened through the IBIS database. However,
under current law, by October 26, 2004 Visa Waiver countries have to
issue biometric passports. Under this mandate, the biometric
requirements for Visa Waiver travelers will be similar to those under
US-VISIT.
The State Department plays a complementary role in the US-VISIT
Program. State is in the process of equipping overseas embassies and
consular posts with the ability to capture biometrics at the time of
the interview.
The key benefit of this initiative is that by comparing the visa
information from State with that taken at primary inspection, Customs
and Border Protection Inspectors will have additional assurance that an
alien's visa is reliable. Currently, 50 consulate posts are equipped to
capture fingerprints and photographs and the remaining facilities are
on schedule to begin capturing biometrics by the Congressional deadline
of October 26, 2004.
In November 2003, DHS began the pilot for the implementation of
Phase One at Hartsfield-Jackson International Airport in Atlanta.
During the voluntary pilot over 20,000 individuals were screened
through US-VISIT and the system turned up over 20 hits on inadmissible
or wanted people. DHS estimates that capturing the biometric
information adds approximately 15-18 extra seconds to an individual's
processing time. On January 5, 2004, DHS added biometric collection for
all arriving visa holders at 115 airports and 14 seaports. Two pilot
programs for the Exit component are underway at Baltimore Washington
International (BWI) Airport and the Port of Miami.
A persistent issue in all border security programs is finding the
right balancing between security and legitimate travel for tourism and
commerce. There is concern from several stakeholders about the impact
US-VISIT will have on travel and trade, particularly at the land
borders. Some fear that the program will create massive delays at
border crossings. The United States has more than 300 land, air, and
sea ports of entry where international travelers are inspected and
permitted to enter the United States. Each year, more than 500 million
people enter the U.S. This hearing will provide an opportunity to
explore the implementation at the land border and the different options
under consideration for the roll-out.
Coming from a border state, I am particularly interested in
different plans and proposals for land ports of entry. Any additional
delays will have serious consequences for communities on both sides of
the border.
Over time, US-VISIT promises to strengthen the integrity of the
border security system. The US-VISIT Program will improve the accuracy
and consistency of detecting fraudulent travel documents, verifying
traveler identity, and determining traveler admissibility.
Again, I would like to thank our witnesses for being here. I will
conclude my remarks and enter my full statement for the record.
The chair now recognizes Ms. Sanchez, the ranking member of
the Subcommittee on Infrastructure and Border Security for any
statement she may have.
Ms. Loretta Sanchez of California. Thank you Madam Chair.
And it is a shame that Chairman Camp could not be here, but we
will slog on, as they say.
I appreciate all of you here today also.
Welcome back to our former colleague.
Because this US-VISIT program is very important to us, I
doubt that there is one member on this subcommittee who
disagrees how important and with the aims of this program.
But I have to admit that some of us on this subcommittee
wonder if the US-VISIT program, as it currently operates, is
really the most effective tool to deter potential terrorism for
the United States.
Also, Customs and Border Protection officers are already
being stretched thin under the new US-VISIT entry system. And
we still have not really added the exit system and implementing
phase two and phase three.
I think we will only strain them further.
A true entry-exit system makes a lot more sense than the
system that US-VISIT is in the process of checking people as
they arrive in the country but having no idea when they have
left.
I also think that most of us believe it is a good idea to
have more sophisticated visas and passports that contain more
information about these people, including the biometric
information that can give us a better verification of a
person's identity.
And I know that others share them, are with the efficiency
of the US-VISIT as a security tool, and also with the
implementation of this program.
I know that the program will enhance security to some
degree, but I am wonder how much. If the visa-waiver countries
are not required to participation in the US-VISIT, then isn't
that a big security hole?
I know that there are also plans for secure passports from
these visa-waiver countries. We were just in Europe discussing
some of these issues with some of those countries, some of
which, to tell you the truth, are having some difficulty trying
to figure how they are really going to comply with this by the
deadline that we set.
I guess I don't understand the relationship between the US-
VISIT program and this issue of the biometrics involved in the
passports of these visa-waiving countries. For example, will
there be different databases used?
And my number one concern is simply the overextension of
the people that we have doing this work. Are we making enough
investment in personnel and the infrastructure necessary to
ensure that all these components come together and that in fact
we have a system that is going to work for entry and exit into
this country?
Because the implementation of phase one of the US-VISIT
means that the entry and exit data from airplane passenger
manifests at the 115 airports and the cruise-ship passenger
manifests at the 14 seaports must be reconciled, thereby being
able to tell us if people are actually overstaying their visas.
It is a very complicated issue. And so I hope that today
you can shed some light on this.
I would just give one example that I just see as being a
major problem. Because right now, the checkouts that we have is
this pilot program with the kiosk at the airport, for example.
What if somebody forgets to do that or does not do that?
And then they are a legitimate good person, they are coming
back into the country the next time, and now we have all these
false positives and we have got to pull these people aside, and
it requires more resources and more of our time.
And in talking to some of my customs and border people,
they are already feeling like they are being pulled off of
cargo inspections in order to do green card holders and others
to try to get the entry portion of this US-VISIT going.
So maybe what we are doing is, possibly making ourselves
safer in one aspect, but really taking the eye off another area
that might be of concern to us, that of checking the cargo.
So I look forward to hearing from our panels and getting
some answers to these question.
And, again, thank you, Madam Chairman, for the time and for
having this hearing.
Ms. Granger. Thank you very much.
The chairman now recognizes Representative Cox, chairman of
the Homeland Security Select Committee for any statement he may
have.
Mr. Cox. Thank you Madam Vice Chairman.
Let me begin by commending our absent Subcommittee Chairman
Camp, who as you heard is bogged down in a Michigan snowstorm,
for scheduling this important hearing today. I know he did a
lot of work on this and looked for to being here, and he would
be very pleased to welcome our witnesses himself.
This is important to him and to all of us because our
country faces no greater challenge today than monitoring over
300 U.S. ports of entry for potential terrorist crossings,
while at the same time facilitating the legitimate trade and
travel and tourism that are the hallmarks of our free society.
The US-VISIT program is designed to meet this challenge.
And our witnesses today will give us an update on the progress
we are making.
I am especially pleased to welcome back Undersecretary Asa
Hutchinson to this committee. I, along with many on this
committee, know him as an esteemed former colleague and a
friend, and most importantly, as an extraordinarily capable
leader who is well equipped to lead the Department of Homeland
Security on border transportation and security issues.
Since assuming his position, Undersecretary Hutchinson has
supervised one of the largest reorganizations of our government
in history.
Among other accomplishments, his tenure has seen the
successful implementation of the first phase of the US-VISIT
program on schedule and indeed ahead of schedule with respect
to the use of biometric identifiers.
The department should be commended for meeting the
statutory requirement and deadline for an automated entry and
exit system.
And all air-and sea-port passenger arrival and departure
information is now collected and processed through the US-VISIT
program. This gives us the ability for the first time in our
history to create a list of those overstay their visas.
Undersecretary Hutchinson, we look forward to hearing from
you today on how DHS is implementing this program at our air
and sea ports of entry. We were especially interested in your
plan for the eventual rollout of the program to all of our
border points of entry, including land ports, and the handshake
that US-VISIT will make with interior enforcement.
I also look forward to hearing from Ms. Harty on the State
Department's efforts to ensure greater security with respect to
visa applicants. The State Department can also inform us of the
status of the 27 visa-waiver countries we have asked to add
biometric identifiers to their passports.
The role of the State Department's Bureau of Consular
Affairs has been vital to the effective implementation of US-
VISIT. Consular officials at 211 visa processing posts are the
frontline in our efforts to prevent would-be terrorists from
entering the United States.
When precise biometric data is captured overseas and linked
in real time to the Department of Homeland Security and other
federal agencies, we will be able to screen each visa applicant
against federal law enforcement databases and terrorist watch
lists.
We will also be able to ensure that a person arriving at
one of our ports of entry is the same person who obtained a
visa at our overseas consulate.
The US-VISIT program is a work in progress. But it is a
work that is moving ahead very rapidly.
During the recently concluded pilot phase at Atlanta's
Hartsville International Airport, US-VISIT stopped several
dangerous criminals and others using false information from
entering the United States.
The biometric enter-exit system contemplated by US-VISIT
will add integrity to our immigration progress. Just as
importantly, it is consistent with maintaining a defining
American tradition: opening our nation to legitimate travel,
business and tourism.
In just 15 seconds per visit, US-VISIT adds a layer of
protection to our border security system and permits our Border
Protection officers to focus their efforts on those that
warrant closer scrutiny.
But as I say, this is a work in progress and we have a lot
more hard work to do.
The US-VISIT program has not yet integrated all of the
existing law enforcement and terrorist databases into its
search capabilities. This is a complex task, and it needs
additional attention.
And while the rollout of the entry portion of the solution
has achieved great success, the exit portion of the program is
not yet fully delved with respect to the capture of biometric
data. This, too, is an important element because it allows the
system to verify that the person leaving our country is the
same person who entered.
We also need additional procedural guidance for travelers
trying to comply with the biometric exit requirements of the
US-VISIT program.
There are many questions about how this exit system
actually will be implemented.
There are also many questions about the eventual rollout of
the US-VISIT program at all of our land ports of entry.
Current law requires that DHS expand the entry-exit program
to the top 50 high-traffic land border ports by December 31st
of this year and the remaining entry points by December 31,
2005.
Is this a realistic goal? Do we have the technology? Do we
have the other essential infrastructure in place to accommodate
this plan without severely compromising the free flow of goods
and people.
Finally, under the visa-waiver program, citizens of 27
nations are not required to obtain visas to enter the United
States and thus are not part of the US-VISIT program. But under
current law, these countries will have to encode all of their
newly issued passports with biometric data beginning on October
26th of this year.
Reports indicate that the majority of the 27 visa-waiver
countries will not be able to meet this deadline. As a result,
current law could be interpreted to require that the citizens
of these countries obtain visas. This would cause a dramatic
increase in visa applications to our consulates and strain
relations with our closest allies.
It is also uncertain whether we would be able to
accommodate any such increase in applications.
Next month, members of this committee will visit Miami, the
U.S. Virgin Islands and Guantanamo Bay as part of our homeland
security oversight responsibilities. We will examine security
at air and sea ports in those locations, and we will witness
the US-VISIT program in practice.
This visit will be another expression of the committee's
interest in this important program and of our intention to
exercise responsible and effective oversight in this area.
Again, I want to thank our witnesses for coming to today's
hearing.
I want to thank our vice chairman for your consideration
during this opening statement, and I yield back the balance of
my time.
Ms. Granger. Thank you.
The chair will now recognize Ranking Member Turner for any
statements he may have.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
I am very pleased that the subcommittee has taken up the
issue of US-VISIT. Over the past two days I have been watching
some of the hearings before the National Commission on
Terrorist Attacks and the witnesses that have appeared before
the commission. And those hearings remind us once again of the
gravity of the responsibility that we have before us.
This Select Committee on Homeland Security is very much the
place where this issue must be vigorously examined and where we
must exercise strong oversight.
We all have a duty to make America safer.
And I thank the chairman and the ranking member of this
subcommittee for calling this hearing.
One month into the launch of US-VISIT is certainly the time
to ensure that we begin rigorous oversight.
Our obligation is to assess the effectiveness of the
program as a counterterrorism tool. And while I believe that
US-VISIT has potential, there are many questions that we must
all be willing to address.
First, will the US-VISIT program be implemented with a
comprehensive terrorist watch list so as to be most effective
in identifying and assisting in the apprehension of suspected
terrorists.
Secondly, do the program's current exemptions as to who
must participate create vulnerabilities that diminish the
effectiveness of US-VISIT as a counterterrorism tool?
And thirdly, can it be implemented effectively at all of
our air, sea and land ports of entry?
Obviously, much of the success of US-VISIT depends upon
intelligence information. I am a strong believer that border
security systems and programs are only as good as the
intelligence they are able to access. The information must be
reliable and provided to those who make decisions allowing the
entry of foreign visitors to our country in a time frame that
is meaningful. And I look forward to hearing testimony that
addresses these issues.
I also believe that while we are securing our borders, we
must not change the vision of America as a welcoming nation. We
are enriched by the cultural, political and social
contributions of those who visit our country.
As a Texan, I am also very much aware of the economic need
to ensure that our borders function smoothly, that our homeland
and economic security are closely linked, and that if we are to
succeed in securing our homeland, facilitating cross-border
trade and travel must be a part of the equation.
We can achieve all of these goals--homeland security and
growth and trade and travel--if our vision includes the
willingness to make the necessary investments in ports of entry
in our border and border communities.
We know that implementing US-VISIT is not going to be easy.
The challenges are greatest at our land borders. Land border
crossings are fundamentally different from airports and
seaports. You don't receive much advanced data on people or
cargo coming to a land border crossing. At many border
crossings, you have to deal with both passenger and cargo
inspections. If there is a backup either entering or leaving
the United States, our border communities pay a high price.
Lastly, US-VISIT implementation at our land borders must
involve the full participation of our neighbors to the north
and the south. If US-VISIT is going to be effective, we must
work with Mexico and Canada to ensure that implementation does
not result in a gridlocked border that benefits no one. If we
can secure the full cooperation of our neighbors, implementing
US-VISIT will be much more likely.
I look forward to hearing from all of our witnesses today.
And again I thank the chairman of the full committee and
the chairman of this subcommittee for holdings this hearing at
this time.
I thank you, Madam Vice Chairman.
Prepared Statement of the Honorable Jim Turner, a Representative in
Congress From the State of Texas
I am very pleased that this subcommittee has taken up the issue of
US-VISIT. Over the past two days I have been paying careful attention
to the hearings before the National Commission on Terrorists Attacks
and the testimony of witnesses before that Commission. The hearings
once again remind us of the gravity of the responsibility before us--
that this Select Committee on Homeland Security has the very great
obligation to find existing holes in homeland security and address
those vulnerabilities.
We have a duty to make America safer.
I thank the Chairman and the Ranking Member in calling for this
hearing. One month into the launch of US-VISIT it is certainly time to
ensure that we have rigorous oversight of the program.
Our obligation is to assess the effectiveness of this program as a
counter-terrorism tool. While I believe US-VISIT has potential, there
are many issues that need to be addressed:
Will the US-VISIT program be implemented with a
comprehensive terrorist watch list, so as to be most effective
in identifying and assisting in the apprehension of suspected
terrorists?
Do the program's current exemptions as to who must
participate create vulnerabilities that diminish the
effectiveness of US-VISIT as a counter-terrorism tool?
Can it be implemented effectively at all of our air,
sea and land ports of entry?
Much of the success of US-VISIT depends on intelligence
information.
I am a strong believer that border security systems and programs
are only as good as the intelligence they are able to access. The
information must be reliable, and provided to those who make decisions
allowing the entry of foreign visitors to our country.
I look forward to hearing testimony that addresses these issues.
I also believe that while we are securing our borders, we must not
change the vision of America as a welcoming nation. We are enriched by
the cultural, political and social contributions of those who visit our
country.
As a Texan, I also understand the economic need to ensure that our
borders function smoothly, that our homeland and economic security are
closely linked and that if we are to succeed in securing our homeland,
facilitating cross border trade and travel must be a part of the
equation.
We can achieve all of these goals- homeland security and economic
security--if our vision includes investing in ports of entry and in the
border and border communities.
We know that US-VISIT implementation is not going to be easy. The
challenge is greatest at our land borders. Land border crossings are
fundamentally different from air ports and sea ports. You do not
receive much advance data on the people or cargo coming across the
border. At many border crossings you have to deal with both passenger
and cargo inspections. If there is a backup either entering or leaving
the US, our border communities pay the price.
Lastly, US-VISIT implementation at our land borders must involve
the full participation of our neighbors to the north and the south. If
US-VISIT is going to be effective, we must work with Mexico and Canada
to ensure that implementation does not result in a gridlocked border
that benefits no one. If we cannot secure the cooperation of our
neighbors in implementing the US-VISIT system, it simply will not
succeed. I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses today.
Ms. Granger. Thank you.
The chair now recognizes Representative Dunn, who serves as
vice chair of the full committee.
Ms. Dunn. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman.
Good morning, ladies and gentlemen.
I am glad we have a full house today because it is
important that we all understand exactly how this program came
into being and where it is going.
The US-VISIT program has been the focus of much attention
in the last few months. And I look forward to learning about
the progress, for example, that the Department of Homeland
Security is making in implementing the new system at airports
and seaports.
I also look forward to discussing the challenges that are
certain to come along with the starting of such a program at
our land border crossings.
This program is of particular interest to this committee
because it is an example of federal partnership that were
envisioned during the actual creation of the Department of
Homeland Security.
The US-VISIT program is a result of the pooled resources of
and the open communication among the State Department, TSA, the
Department of Justice, Immigration and Customs Enforcement--or
ICE as we now know it--and Customs and Border Protection.
The program is of particular interest to me because I come
from Washington State, a border state, where residents and
businesses depend on open lanes at the border to get themselves
or their goods to or from a Canadian destination on time.
We are committed to maintaining American strong trade
partnerships while continuing to be innovative with programs at
the borders to track the movement of people and goods.
The Department of Homeland Security will turn one year old
in just about a month. In that time, it has developed and
implemented ground breaking programs at the borders.
The One Face at the Border Initiative is one example that
comes to my mind, and another, of course, is US-VISIT.
For the first time, we will be able to track foreign
visitors. We will be able to cut down on identification
document fraud. And we will make use of numerous databases to
identify terrorist suspects before they enter this country.
I will have questions that relate to a number of areas.
For example, as we move toward the more complex exit
portion of the system, I will be curious about your strategy,
Director Hutchinson, for collaborating with airport operators
such as those at Sea-Tac and others in my state but, also, all
over the country.
I would like to know if the new US-VISIT database links up
with and interfaces with others, for example, as Congressman
Turner suggested, the terrorist watch list.
I know you agree we must not forget about commerce as it
moves across our borders: What specific steps is the US-VISIT
team taking to make sure that we don't stop traffic at our
ports of entry and slow the movement of commerce?
And lastly, I realize that upgrading all United States
passports will need to include biometric data and that that is
a huge undertaking.
And I will be curious, Ms. Harty, to see how you see this
new priority changing the daily operations of the United States
embassies and consulates around the world.
I yield back.
Ms. Granger. Thank you.
The chairman now recognizes Representative Dicks for any
statement he may have.
Mr. Dicks. I want to welcome our witnesses, but I am going
to keep my time for questions.
Ms. Granger. Thank you.
The chair now recognizes Representative Sweeney for any
statements he may have.
Mr. Sweeney. I thank the vice chairwoman. I am going to
submit for the record. I think it is important that we hear
from our witnesses. I, as you know, Vice Chairwoman, I have to
leave at 12 o'clock for a meeting, but I will come back.
I just want to make two brief statements and thank the
witnesses for being here.
Yesterday I, too, watched the testimony of the 9/11
commission. Customs Inspector Jose Melendez-Perez testified. It
is widely believed that that inspector kept the 20th hijacker
out. However, unfortunately 19 others were let in.
I most particularly--this may be a rehash for some--really
would like to hear the witnesses expound on how this system
will have the desired effect of changing that process within
the nation.
And I also want to congratulate the Secretary, because as I
understand it, the department is some nine months ahead of
schedule on a number of directives. And it is at a time when
there is waning confidence. Because of all the confusion it is
nice. I think that is an important point that we stress so the
American people understand we are moving in the right
direction.
Ms. Granger. Thank you.
The chair now recognizes Representative Pascrell for any
statements he may have.
Mr. Pascrell. Thank you, Madam Chairlady.
I want to welcome good friend, Asa Hutchinson, who did a
terrific job at the DEA and is doing a great job at Homeland
Security.
Richard Reid was a British citizen--better known as the
``shoe bomber.'' And Zacarias Moussaoui--I believe I am
pronouncing that correctly--was a French citizen. They arrived
here legally, as far as know--as far as I have been able to
ascertain--from exempt countries.
And I hope that we keep this in mind as we, Madam Chair,
look through this very important effort to implement the
Patriot Act. After all, this comes out of the Patriot Act.
And everything that comes out of the Patriot Act is under
careful scrutiny by this Congress--and should be.
When our rights are reviewed, substantiated, supported I
think, Mr. Hutchinson, you would agree that--and this is my
opening statement, I realize that--that that is the main
business of why we are in the Congress in the first place.
The attacks of September the 11, 2001, emphasize the urgent
need to secure the visa-issuance process at our consulates and
the inspections process at our ports of entry.
We all know the grim truth: All 19 hijackers entered United
States ports easily.
This can simply never happen again.
Yet our country is still vulnerable. That is why we are
discussing this. Our borders are still arguably too porous, too
penetrable.
This, of course, is the uncomfortable reality of homeland
security. While we need to act with absolutely urgency to
improve our security levels, to do so in a truly effective
manner often takes time.
We see this with the US-VISIT program. In concept, security
our borders to protect our nation by identifying every person
who enters the country is an ideal solution. I think the
government, we all agree, has a right to know who is coming
into this country and who is leaving. We have a right to know
that as a very basic tenet of securing our neighborhoods and
our streets.
In reality, this is an enormous undertaking. It will be
costly. And many times it will be inconvenient. It will take
time. And as we have already seen, it can be ineffective as
well as being effective.
There are big holes in the program's ability to work. Among
other shortfalls, it does not compare the foreign nationals
entering this country against a list that we have waited for a
long time: the integrated terrorist watch list. You have heard
that mentioned before I bring it up. That is critical.
It would seem to me that that should be the main priority
that will help our law enforcement agencies, both national and
local, now that we have opened up the process of communication,
for the first time in a long time.
Individuals from 27 countries participating in the visa
waiver are currently exempt from the US-VISIT. In an age where
terrorism can strike any place, this to me is non-sensical.
Additionally, there are still serious questions about the
general ability of biometric identifiers. We know that we have
used the biographic identifiers in the past. We will continue
to use that.
And I am interested to find out whether you are going to
add fees to the biographic ones that already exist.
To say the least, while we need to secure our ports is
critical, we have a long way to go before we effectively
accomplish this goal.
This hearing will give us an exemplary opportunity to
discuss where we are in this difficult process, where we are
expected to be in the future, how we can help, because that is
what we are all about. We are all on the same page.
I look forward to the remarks.
And I thank you, Madam Chair, for your courtesy.
Ms. Granger. Thank you.
The chair now recognizes Representative Lincoln Balart for
any statement he may have.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
And I join in welcoming our distinguished guests this
morning.
It is important, I think, to put a spotlight on the issue
of US-VISIT. It is a critical issue. Protecting our citizens
from future terrorist attack is of the highest priority, not
only for me as a representative from southern Florida, but as a
member of this committee.
Our physical land borders and ports of entry must remain a
critically important line of defense. And I believe the
department, with the leadership of Undersecretary Hutchinson,
is doing just that.
I look forward to monitoring the progress of US-VISIT to
ensure that it is an effective tool in protecting the homeland
and not just a hindrance for travel and a deterrence to tourism
into the United States.
We must find the appropriate balance that allows the
department to utilize the most effective tools to combat
terrorism and allows commerce and transit to flow.
I would like to use this opportunity to raise another issue
that is critical to South Florida: the international transit
program, ITI.
The ITI program allows certain international air passengers
to travel through the United States for transit purposes
without first obtaining a visa. These are international
passengers whose final destination is not the United States,
but transfer at the airport on to another international flight.
The suspension of ITI, and in particular the suspension of
the Miami International Airport's use of its secure transit
lounges, could have an adverse impact on South Florida.
MIA receives more ITI passengers than any other U.S.
airport. America Airlines alone carries approximately 700,000
ITI passengers annually into Miami International Airport.
Iberia Airlines of Spain carries approximately 250,000 ITI
passengers annually.
Iberia Airlines, which uses MIA as hub for in-transit
passengers, reacted by initiated very serious plans to move
their hub to foreign airports. This airline alone generates
approximately 2,000 jobs and almost $200 million in business
revenue in South Florida's economy.
I commend Undersecretary Hutchinson for his attentive
response by authorizing Miami International Airport's temporary
use of its satellite transit lounge. This matter is critical
for the well-being of South Florida's economy.
I look forward to working with Undersecretary Hutchinson to
find a permanent solution that will protect our homeland and
allow Miami International Airport to continue as a hub for
flights to and from Latin America.
And again, I thank you, Madam Chairman.
Ms. Granger. Thank you very much.
Seeing no additional requests for time, we will proceed.
I would like to again thank our witnesses for being here.
I am sorry, you are not a member. You are not allowed to
make an opening statement.
Prepared Statement of the Honorable Sheila Jackson-Lee, a
Representative in Congress from the State of Texas
The Department of Homeland Security launched US-VISIT at 115
airports and 14 seaports on January 5, 2004. The stated objective for
US-VISIT is to enhance the nation's security while facilitating
legitimate travel and trade through our borders.
The security measures employed by this program begin overseas at
the U.S. consular offices that issue visas. Digital fingerscans are
taken at these offices and used to determine whether the applicant is
on a database of known or suspected criminals or terrorists. When a
foreign visitor with a visa reaches our border and seeks admission into
the United States, the fingerscans are used to verify that the person
seeking admission is the same person who received the visa. And,
another check is made for information about any involvement in
terrorism or crime.
US-VISIT also will include departure confirmation systems,
including an automated, self-service kiosk where visitors with visas
will scan their travel documents and repeat the digital finger scanning
process. The exit confirmation will be added to the visitor's travel
records to demonstrate compliance and record the individual's status
for future visits to the United States.
US-VISIT already has systems in place at airports and cruise ship
terminals. In addition, Congress has mandated that an automated entry-
exit program be implemented at the 50 busiest land ports of entry by
December 31, 2004, and at all land ports of entry by December 31, 2005.
I am very much in favor of improving security at our borders. I
support the efforts of the Homeland Security Department to implement
new programs that will achieve that objective without impeding
legitimate travel and trade through our borders. I am concerned,
however, about whether the US-VISIT program ultimately will be
successful.
The difficult challenges that this program faces are set forth in a
report issued on September 2003, by the General Accounting Office
(GAO). According to GAO, the scope of US-VISIT is large and complex; it
must meet a demanding implementation schedule; and its potential cost
is enormous. GAO observes in the report that many of the difficulties
are inherent to the program and cannot easily be changed. However, GAO
says, compounding these inherent problems are a number of others that
are attributable to the program's current, inadequate state of
governance and management. GAO questions whether US-VISIT will be able
to measurably and appreciably achieve the Homeland Security
Department's goal of enhancing national security while facilitating
legitimate travel and trade.
Implementation of the program is not my only concern. Even if the
Department of Homeland Security is successful in implementing US-VISIT,
the program may not make our country more secure in any significant
way. In 1998, a Senate Judiciary Committee Report (No. 105-197) found
that, ``implementing an automated entry-exit control system has
absolutely nothing to do with countering drug trafficking, with halting
the entry of terrorists into the United States, or with any other
illegal activity at or near the borders. An automated entry-exit
control system will at best provide information only on those who have
overstayed their visas.'' I am not convinced that the Senate Judiciary
Committee was wrong.
In its present form, US-VISIT only will apply to foreign visitors
seeking admission on the basis of non-immigrant visas. It will not
include aliens presenting lawful permanent resident documents. It will
not include visitors from the 27 countries participating in the Visa
Waiver Program. Most Canadians are not subject to US-VISIT. And, it
will be years before the system is fully operational at all of the land
borders. I do not believe that we can rely on this program to secure
our borders. Thank you.
We will begin with Under Secretary for Border and
Transportation Security at DHS, Asa Hutchinson.
We have received your written testimony. I ask you to
briefly summarize in five minutes your statement.
I want to add: All the accolades that have been heaped your
way are certainly deserved. I enjoyed coming into Congress and
serving with you. And you have done an excellent job in all the
ways you have served us.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ASA HUTCHINSON, UNDER SECRETARY,
BORDER AND TRANSPORTATION SECURITY DIRECTORATE, DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Hutchinson. Thank you, Madam Chairman. It is good to be
with you and the committee, Ranking Member Sanchez, Chairman
Cox, Ranking Member of the Full Committee Turner--thank you for
leadership and your partnership in the development of US-VISIT.
And it is a pleasure to be before you today to discuss this
important program of the Department of Homeland Security.
US-VISIT represents the greatest advance in border
technology in three decades. It is an historic achievement in
which we, for the first time in history, can use a biometric
ability to confirm the identity of those traveling to our
country with visas.
The Department of Homeland Security deployed the first
increment of US-VISIT on time, within budget, and has exceeded
the mandate established by Congress.
We also met the challenge that was given by Secretary Ridge
to include biometrics ahead of schedule.
This US-VISIT is in response to a congressional mandate--
the leadership of Congress long before the attack on America of
September 11 set the stage to develop a comprehensive entry-
exit system.
And some people would like to measure the effectiveness of
US-VISIT simply as a counterterrorism tool. But it is more than
that. That is an important measuring stick. But also, as
Congress well knew when it was first mandated, they would also
build the integrity of an immigration system to know who
overstays a visa, and that is also a measuring stick.
The deterrent value, the reduction of reliance upon
fraudulent documents and the security of our country all are
important goals of US-VISIT.
On January 5, US-VISIT entry procedures were operational at
115 airports and 14 seaports.
Our exit procedures, which fully comply with the
requirements of law, we based upon passenger departure
information that will allow the Department of Homeland Security
to identify visa overstays.
In addition, we have begun pilot testing biometric exit
procedure at one airport and one seaport.
As of today, more than 600,000 foreign visitors have been
processed through US-VISIT entry procedures without increasing
wait times. And more than 30 known criminals have been
prevented from entering our country.
Let me take a few minutes to explain how US-VISIT works.
Many of you have seen it at our airports already.
But currently, prior to US-VISIT, at a port of entry many
of the same procedures were still applicable today as was
previously. For example, a Customs and Border Protection
inspector still reviews each visitor's travel documents, such
as a visa and a passport, still asks the question about the
visitor's stay in the United States.
What is new under US-VISIT is that the inspector now uses
an inkless digital finger scanner to capture two finger scans
of arriving, non-immigrant visitors holding visas. The visitor
puts the left index finger and the right index finger on the
scan, and it very quickly checks it against the operable
databases. This check takes a matter of seconds.
The officer also takes a digital photograph of the visitor.
The biographic and biometric data are used to verify the
identity of the visitor against the data captured by the State
Department to ensure that the person entering the country is
the same person that receives a visa.
Those biometrics are also compared against a watch list.
In addition, the digital picture was taken at the visa
issuing post that is displayed to the CBP officer allows for a
visual comparison.
These are important tools for Customs and Border Protection
officers in their decision whether to admit a visitor to the
country or not.
Since the US-VISIT entry procedures were implemented, we
have significantly increased our capability to uncover
criminals, to enhance security and to increase the integrity of
our visa system.
A few examples, I think, would be appropriate. And these
are all since January 5.
A citizen of Colombia convicted of statutory rape was
intercepted on January 6 at the Miami International Airport
after he failed to appear for sentencing in New York City and
fled the country. He was arrested when he attempted to re-enter
the country and turned over to New York for sentencing.
One day later, on January 7, a citizen of El Salvador was
caught at JFK International Airport in New York City through
the use of the US-VISIT biometrics. This individual had
previously managed to leave and re-enter the U.S. 12 times over
the past year until he was caught by the US-VISIT. He had been
convicted of numerous driving offenses.
A citizen of El Salvador was intercept in New York on
January 10th who had previously been convicted of a DUI hit-
and-run death under another identity. This individual had been
able to successfully leave and re-enter the United States
despite outstanding warrants for his arrest, including a visit
as recently as December 12. US-VISIT caught that individual.
On January 14th, officers in Miami encountered a Peruvian
national attempting to enter the United States. He had
previously visited the United States in May of 2003, but his
name did not appear on any biographic watch list. A biometric
check under US-VISIT disclosed that he was in fact a convicted
cocaine trafficker wanted for escaping from a federal prison in
1984. He had previously entered the United States under a
fraudulent identity. He was caught under US-VISIT.
The same day in New York City, an officer intercepted a
female citizen of Trinidad after she had attempted to enter the
United States under a false identity. She admitted to officers
that she had paid $2,000 in Trinidad for a new passport and
visa under an alternate identity--only caught through the
biometrics.
One day later in Los Angeles, US-VISIT biometric checks
resulted in the interception of a Chinese national wanted for
probation violations following convictions for wire fraud,
conspiracy, food stamp trafficking and use of false Social
Security numbers. He had been attempting to enter the United
States through use of a false identity. He was successfully
caught by US-VISIT.
A citizen of Russia, on January 16th, attempted to enter
New York City after he had attempted to enter the United States
on an alternate identity. He was arrested for an assault case--
captured by US-VISIT.
In Tampa, Florida, on January 17th, a citizen of Jamaica
attempted to enter the United States but was caught by US-
VISIT. Officers learned that previously he had been arrested
and convicted in both federal and state courts on cocaine
trafficking charges. He had been able to successfully evade
detection and enter the United States over 40 times in the last
year prior to the implementation of US-VISIT.
On January 17th, officers in Miami intercepted a citizen of
Honduras after the biometric check disclosed that he had been
previously deported from the United States following drug
convictions.
January 18th, officers caught a Colombian national who had
used five different identities and three different dates of
birth as he attempted to enter the United States. Because of
the US-VISIT biometrics, that individual was apprehended.
In Atlanta, on January 19th, we intercepted a citizen of
Mexico after she attempted to enter the United States by using
false documents. The biometric checks discovered that she had
previously attempted to enter the United States in 1996 through
the use of false documents.
The illustrations go on and on and on.
One instance they had used eight different aliases and
three different dates of birth, and they were intercepted by
US-VISIT.
And so it is important to note that these important
security measures currently are capturing those that are
attempting to enter our country under false identity and with
previous convictions, many times under orders to be expelled
from the country.
But it also serves as a deferent as the word goes out that
we have this capability and you cannot underestimate the
importance of that deterrent.
It has not a negative impact on our wait times, which is a
commitment that we engaged in from the very beginning as we
developed this.
We have respected the privacy of our foreign visitors, and
the privacy assessment was published prior to the
implementation of US-VISIT.
Our partners have been very important in this endeavor. I
am delighted to be with Maura Harty, assistant secretary at the
Department of State. We could not have engaged and had the
success of US-VISIT without their partnership. That is an
ongoing effort, and I applaud the efforts of the Department of
State in working in partnership with us.
I also appreciate the private sector. James May will be
testifying later, who has done a terrific job with the ATA in
working with us, giving us their advice on what are the proper
solutions that we look to.
The airlines and airports have all been very valuable
partners as we have developed this.
As we look to the future, I know that the job is not
finished. And clearly, you can look at what has been
accomplished and say there is much more to be done, and that is
absolutely correct.
I am pleased to advise the committee that today we are
submitting to Congress the 2004 spend plan, which gives
Congress adequate time to review that in conjunction with the
GAO.
We are pleased with the 2004 spend plan that will outline
in a little bit more detail what we will be doing as we try to
accomplish the 2004 deadlines of US-VISIT of implementing this
at the 50 busiest land border ports of entry. And as has been
indicated, that is a huge list and challenge for us.
Another part of the 2004 spend plan will be to complete the
exit portion for our airports.
We currently have, let me emphasize, the biographic data
that will allow us to determine visa overstays. We want to be
able to enhance this with the biometric feature. We are testing
this with various pilots, one of them being at Baltimore
International Airport. We will test it in other arenas to
determine what is the best exit solution with a biometric that
we can work to implement as we continue to work with our
partners to see what is the best solution.
We have done this with the 2003 budget of $367 million to
achieve this successful deployment. In 2004 we have $330
million that has been allocated and appropriated by Congress
for this purpose.
The biggest challenges is to do this in the 50 busiest land
ports by the deadline of December of 2004.
I wanted to recognize the tremendous work of the program
director, Jim Williams, who is behind me, as well as his deputy
director, Bob Mockney and the entire Homeland Security team
that has worked together to meet the current goal and will be
working with the partners on the border to implement the 50
busiest land borders requirement in a way that does not
compromise the commerce that flows through the border each and
every day.
We are committed to building a program that enhances the
integrity of our immigration system by catching the few and
expediting the many. And we recognize that the U.S. is leading
the way internationally in this effort, but we will continue to
work with our international partners.
[The statement of Mr. Hutchinson follows:]
Prepared Statement of the Honorable Asa Hutchinson
Chairman Camp, Ranking Member Sanchez and other distinguished
Members, it is a pleasure to appear before you today to discuss the
Department of Homeland Security's US-VISIT program and how this fits in
with our commitment to protect the homeland.
US-VISIT represents yet another major milestone in enhancing our
nation's security and our efforts to reform our borders. It is a major
step towards bringing integrity back to our immigration and border
enforcement systems.
US-VISIT procedures are clear, simple, and fast for foreign
nationals. Upon arrival at the air or seaport, visitors will see
signage that clearly explains the US-VISIT procedures. This signage, as
well as explanatory boarding cards that many airlines are distributing
to their passengers, is translated into multiple languages and features
the campaign iconography to ensure people understand what to do when
they get to the primary inspection booth.
For foreign visitors traveling with visas, the additional US-VISIT
steps are simple. First, the officer directs the visitor to place his
or her left index finger on the small red window of the digital
fingerscanning device. Next, the visitor places his or her right index
finger on the scanning device. Finally, the officer takes a digital
photograph of the visitor. These procedures add, on average, 15 seconds
to the overall inspection process. There is no ink involved in the
digital fingerscanning process. The officer will then ask the visitor
standard, routine questions about his or her visit. The biometric data
and biographic information are compared to a series of watchlists and
databases, and within seconds the officer has the information he or she
needs to admit the visitor into the country or refer the visitor to
secondary inspection for further review.
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) deployed US-VISIT on
time, on budget, and has met the mandates established by Congress as
well as the challenge by the Secretary of Homeland Security to include
biometrics (fingerprints) ahead of schedule. Senior U.S. Customs and
Border Protection management has hailed it as the biggest improvement
to border inspection in more than three decades. By January 5, 2004,
US-VISIT entry procedures were operational at 115 airports (covering 99
percent of all foreign visitors entering the country by air) and 14
seaports, and we began pilot testing biometric exit procedures at one
airport and one seaport. As of January 23rd, more than 600,000 foreign
visitors have been processed under the new US-VISIT entry procedures.
Our border management system impacts the security of our citizens
and our visitors, affects billions of dollars in trade and travel, and
helps define relations with our international partners. There is a need
to improve this system and bring it into the 21st century with a new
integrated system of technological processes that will keep our
country's economic and national security strong. This 21st century
technology will provide an important step toward achieving the
President's goal of secure U.S. borders.
In just a few short weeks the first release of US-VISIT has
improved the security of our citizens and visitors. Our Customs and
Border Protection Officers are saying that the new tools we have put in
place truly help them do their jobs more effectively. They say it's a
major advancement in border control. US-VISIT integrates multiple
sources of information spanning multiple agencies and departments in
order to identify visitors who may pose a threat to the security of
this country. A primary source of information supporting the
identification of foreign-born criminal violators is the FBI's
Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System. (IAFIS) To
facilitate the inspectors' job at the border, the entrants' screening
results are processed and displayed on one screen in less than 15
seconds. Included in this processing time is the collection of the
entrants' fingerprints and photograph and matching certain information
with that collected by the Department of State at the time of visa
issuance. We intercepted a fugitive who had escaped from prison over 20
years ago. We caught and extradited a felon wanted for manslaughter in
San Diego. We finally stopped one drug dealer who had entered the U.S.
more than 60 times in the past four years using different names and
dates of birth. We continue to identify criminals every day at our
borders, and on January 19, we supplied crucial biometric information
to our partners at the Department of State and prevented an individual
from ever obtaining a visa.
The increase in security has not had negative effect on our wait
times or our commitment to service. But you don't have to take my word
for it. Albert Park, a Korean visiting his sister and arriving at John
F. Kennedy International Airport, told the New York Sun (January 6th
edition): ``I expected a lot more delays, but it was all pretty
smooth,'' and said, ``It definitely makes me feel safer.''
``We at the airport believe that this is a true enhancement,'' said
Bruce Drum, associate director of the Miami-Dade County Aviation
Department.'' (The Associated Press, January 5th)
And, there was this excerpt from the Washington Post (January 6th):
Some travelers who were fingerprinted and photographed at airports
across the country yesterday said the security procedures were swift,
and most said they were resigned to the new rules. ```I don't really
mind,'' said D.C. resident Salome Nnanga, a native of Ethiopia. ``I
think it's a very, very good idea to protect the country.''
We want to ensure that we continue to be a welcoming nation, a
nation that invites visitors to study, do business, and relax in our
country. We also owe it to our citizens and visitors to deny entry to
persons wishing to do harm, or who are inadmissible to the U.S. . Few
would dispute that these steps are necessary.
As we evaluate the first month of the program, it seems clear that
visitors appreciate the effort we are making to deliver security while
simultaneously facilitating the process for law-abiding, legitimate
travelers. We must continue to respect our visitors' privacy, treat
them fairly, and enable them to pass through inspection quickly so they
can enjoy their visit in our country. As people attempt to enter our
country, we must know who they are and whether they have committed a
crime that would make them inadmissible to the U.S. Moreover, as they
leave, we must know that they have not overstayed the duration of their
visa. This ability to verify identity means we can have security and
control without impeding legitimate travelers, and we can also help
protect our welcomed visitors by drastically reducing the possibility
of identity theft.
But we are not finished. This is a complicated job that will take
time to complete. In fact, US-VISIT is designed to be rolled out in
increments to ensure that the foundation is strong and the building
blocks are effective. With the deployment of the entry components at
air and sea ports, we have made a strong beginning, and going into
2004, we are on track to meet the December 31, 2004 deadline to
integrate entry-exit databases at the 50 busiest land border ports of
entry and to deploy biometric capabilities to verify certain visa
holders. We are seeing that we can accomplish what we set out to do:
keep out criminals and terrorists, enhance the integrity of our
immigration system, facilitate legitimate travel and trade and help
protect the privacy and identity of our visitors.
A Brief Overview
The US-VISIT program is a high-priority initiative of DHS. Working
with the Department of State, the Department of Justice, and other
federal agencies, we have made great strides in improving overall
border management through the collection of pre-arrival, arrival, and
departure information on foreign visitors and immigrants who apply for
visas and travel through our nation's air and seaports. The program
will ultimately record the entry and exit of certain visa holders at
our land ports of entry as well. The information will be used to report
on the numbers of aliens who have overstayed their periods of
admission. Ultimately these reports will enable DHS to seek aliens who
have not departed.
By recording more complete arrival and departure information, the
US-VISIT program will meet various Congressional mandates for an
integrated, interoperable, and automated entry exit system for foreign
visitors. More than that, it will also enhance the security and safety
of citizens, residents, and visitors by verifying foreign national
travelers' identities through the comparison of biometric identifiers,
by authenticating their travel documents, and by checking their data
against appropriate law enforcement and intelligence systems.
The goals of US-VISIT are to:
Enhance the security of our citizens and visitors.
US-VISIT is a history-making achievement that begins overseas with our
partners at the Department of State's visa-issuing posts, and continues
upon entry at Customs and Border Protection inspection booths. Already
US-VISIT has prevented 30 people who matched criminal databases from
entering the U.S.--one even before the visa was issued overseas. And,
just by implementing US-VISIT procedures, we have sent a warning to
those who believe they can skirt the system, to not even try.
Facilitate legitimate travel and trade.
The Department believes that, over time, US-VISIT will actually
speed up the processing times. Reports indicate that capturing
biometrics (two fingerscans and a digital photo) takes less then 15
seconds. The Automated Biometric Identification System (IDENT) system
takes only seconds to capture the person's information. The CBP
Officers often can ask fewer questions once the identity of the visitor
has been captured. Fewer people are being sent for secondary
inspection, and the overall time to `clear' a plane has not been
significantly impacted. We have also developed responsible mitigation
strategies if circumstances dictate that wait times have become
unacceptable at a port of entry. All of these improvements help to keep
trade booming and contribute to the economy of our nation.
Ensure the integrity of the immigration system.
Inherent in the US-VISIT program is its ability to identify
fraudulent documents. This tool aids in bolstering the integrity of the
immigration system. As we test various exit components, we further
strengthen the immigration system by identifying people who do not
comply with the terms of their admission.
US-VISIT also allows DHS to identify those visitors who have
overstayed their allotted time in the U.S. and will be available to
determine the future admissibility of such visitors. Through the use of
airline and ship manifests, US-VISIT already tracks who has arrived to,
and departed from, the U.S. Those departures are matched with US-VISIT
databases against the recorded entries. Information received from other
DHS databases, such as the Student and Exchange Visitor Information
System, or SEVIS, will be used to confirm a visitor's compliance with
U.S. immigration policy. Individuals for whom an entry exists, but for
whom there is no record of departure, are referred to U.S. Immigration
and Customs Enforcement for further investigation. If these overstays
are located, they may be placed in removal proceedings in accordance
with applicable immigration laws.
By providing vital data and assisting in the enforcement of
immigration laws, US-VISIT strengthens the overall immigration process
and ensures the integrity of our immigration system.
Safeguard the personal privacy of our visitors.
Biometric identifiers make it harder to steal someone's identity
even if their travel documents are lost or stolen. This is a
significant benefit US-VISIT delivers for the millions of legitimate
travelers we welcome each year. In addition, we must continue to
respect our visitors' privacy. We have a Privacy Impact Assessment
(PIA) being reviewed by external audiences and DHS has the first
statutorily created Chief Privacy Officer, Nuala O'Connor Kelly. Ms.
O'Connor Kelly along with the US-VISIT privacy officer has worked
closely with privacy experts at the Office of Management and Budget,
and with independent privacy consultants to prepare a PIA that
addresses the beginning increments of this program.
The Identity Verification Continuum
The Department of Homeland Security and Department of State
together have created an entire continuum of identity verification
measures that begins overseas, when a traveler applies for a visa, and
continues upon entry and exit from this country. Today, more than 50
visa-issuing posts have begun to capture fingerscans and photographs of
foreign nationals when they apply for visas, regardless of their
country of origin. This process will be in place at all 211 visa-
issuing posts worldwide by October 2004.
US-VISIT supports pre-entry processes by using information from the
Advance Passenger Information system (biographic, biometric, and
previous travel and visa information) to match information to
watchlists. This pre-entry processing establishes a single identity for
each foreign national that will be used in all interactions with US-
VISIT.
Program Implementation
The program is being implemented in increments. The first increment
was implemented on December 31 of last year. The other increments will
be deployed over the coming years with the ultimate goal of having a
robust system that can deliver all of the US-VISIT goals. The steps to
this program include:
Increment 1--12/31/03:
Collect and verify biometrics for foreign nationals
arriving with nonimmigrant visas at air and seaports of entry
Check admissibility against watchlists using
biographic and biometric data
Establish exit pilots
Increment 2A--10/26/04:
Issue U.S. biometric travel documents following
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) standards (all
countries)
Visa Waiver Program applicants must have machine
readable passports with biometric indicators in compliance with
ICAO standards
Deploy capability to read biometric travel documents
at air and sea POEs
Increment 2B--12/31/04:
Extend Increment 1 capability to 50 highest volume
land POEs
Increment 3--12/31/05:
Extend Increment 2B to remaining land POEs
Increment 4:
Launch initial roll-out of US-VISIT envisioned system
US-VISIT's Budget
We deployed US-VISIT on budget. During Fiscal Year 2003 we used
appropriated funds of $367 million to achieve successful deployment to
115 airports and 14 seaports. Specifically we have:
Implemented/interfaced systems to reduce redundancy
and make more information available
Upgraded our infrastructure to support added
biometrics
Deployed the US-VISIT system to 115 airports and 14
seaports on January 5, 2004
Initiated the exit pilot at one airport and one
seaport
Established the US-VISIT program office
During fiscal year 2004, we have a total of $330 million plus an
additional $10 million in no-year funds that we intend to use to
continue meeting our goals. Currently, our fiscal year 2004 Expenditure
Plan is in review; when these funds are released, we plan to:
Analyze, field test, and initiate deployment of
alternative approaches for verifying identity on exit at air
and sea ports of entry
Implement US-VISIT Increment 1 capabilities at the 50
busiest land border ports of entry by December 2004
Install biometric readers at all air, sea, and land
ports of entry
Continue building our program management capabilities
In addition, we plan to award a contract to a prime contractor for
further development of our end vision. This long-term vision will cover
foreign nationals and their interactions with U.S. officials before
they enter, when they enter, and when they exit. This comprehensive
approach to border management will lead to the creation of a virtual
border and will set the course for improved processes for management of
data on foreign visitors.
We have also requested that $25 million be released in the interim,
while the current year expenditure plan is in review. This will allow
us to continue our efforts without interruption and avoid impact to the
program that delays in schedule may cause.
Entry Procedures
US-VISIT procedures are already in place at more than 50 visa-
issuing posts, and all 211 visa-issuing posts will be deploying US-
VISIT technology by October, 2004. By capturing biometrics overseas,
before visas are issued, we are working together to strengthen national
security.
Once at the port of entry, visitors will find that many of the
procedures remain unchanged and are familiar to international
travelers. For example, a U.S. Customs and Border Protection Officer
still reviews each visitor's travel documents, such as a visa and
passport. The officer still asks questions about the visitor's stay in
the U.S.
What's new under US-VISIT is that the U.S. Customs and Border
Protection Officer now uses the inkless, digital ``fingerscanner'' to
capture two ``fingerscans'' of arriving nonimmigrant visitors holding
visas. The visitor puts the left index finger and then the right index
finger on the scanner. The officer also takes a digital photograph of
the visitor.
The biographic and biometric data are used to check the identity of
the visitor against the data captured by the State Department to ensure
that the person entering the country is the same person who received
the visa. Biometrics are also are compared against watchlists. At that
point, the U.S. Customs and Border Protection Officer will either admit
the visitor or conduct additional inquiries based on the verification
results. These procedures reduce fraud, identity theft, and the risk
that terrorists and criminals will enter the U.S. undetected.
A True Partnership
The Department is not doing this alone. We are collaborating with
other government agencies, most notably the Department of State, to
implement US-VISIT and inform the traveling public. We are working
closely with the air and sea travel industry regarding the requirements
of the US-VISIT program, as well as speaking with constituencies along
the land borders. We see our relationship with these groups as a
partnership.
We are also partnering with private industry to develop the best
technological solutions. In accordance with our published schedule, a
Request For Proposals (RFP) was issued in November 2003. The RFP
incorporates an acquisition strategy to ensure that the latest
available technologies will be incorporated into US-VISIT. The contract
for this technology is expected to be awarded in May 2004.
An important part of the program is public education. Travelers are
getting educated about the program before they arrive at the port of
entry. We are engaged in a worldwide campaign to inform them. This
campaign includes public service announcements, signage at ports of
entry, explanatory cards on airplanes and cruise ships, news media
coverage, and on-board explanatory videos.
Statutory Mandates
The principal law that mandates the creation of an automated entry
exit system that integrates electronic alien arrival and departure
information is the Immigration and Naturalization Service Data
Management Improvement Act of 2000 (DMIA), Pub. Law No. 106-215 (2000),
114 Stat. 339, codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. section 1365a.
But there are many other laws that also impact this program. In
order to handle all of the legal requirements and be able to best
monitor the progress, meet the requirements, and measure the success,
Secretary Ridge established US-VISIT.
(See Appendix I for details of these statutory mandates.)
We have prepared a Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA), which is being
reviewed by external audiences including several privacy advocacy
groups. This process is being spearheaded by DHS's Chief Privacy
Officer, Ms. O'Connor Kelly, the first statutorily mandated privacy
officer, to ensure that US-VISIT is in compliance with the appropriate
privacy rules and regulations. The PIA has been developed and published
in the Federal Register, and DHS is currently considering all comments
received.
The Chief Privacy Officer (Ms. Nuala O'Connor Kelly) and the US-
VISIT Privacy Officer (Steve Yonkers) have met with numerous advocacy,
privacy and immigration groups to solicit input and hear concerns,
which have been taken into account in the development of the program.
The US-VISIT PIA was hailed by many in the privacy community as an
excellent model of transparency, including detailed information about
the program, the technology and the privacy protections.
A copy of the PIA is attached as Appendix II.
Success Stories on Violators and Deployment of US-VISIT
Since US-VISIT entry procedures were implemented, it has resulted
in the interception of dozens of individuals who matched various
criminal databases. These included rapists, drug traffickers, credit
card and visa fraud criminals, and a convicted armed robber.
Here are details of a few examples.
(1) Interception of Drug Trafficker who Escaped from Prison
On January 14, 2004, at Miami International Airport, a man from
Peru was traveling to the U.S. When he arrived at the CBP
Officer's booth for admittance, he was enrolled in US-VISIT.
His fingerprints matched the ones already in a federal criminal
database. This man was wanted by the U.S. Marshals for escaping
from Latuna Federal Correction Facility where he had been
serving a sentence for a conviction of dealing cocaine. After
his escape, an arrest warrant was issued. In May of 2003 he re-
entered the U.S. without incident. Now, with the help of US-
VISIT biometric processes, this man was caught and extradited
by U.S. Marshals for the warrant. US-VISIT prevented a drug
trafficker from roaming the streets of Miami.
(2) Closing a Deportation Loop Hole
On January 18, 2004, a man who has had four aliases tried to
enter the U.S., even with a ``failure to appear'' warrant for
him. DHS/ICE issued the warrant on August 8, 2003, and since
then this man had entered the U.S. at least five times. Now,
with the ability to match fingerscans with those in a criminal
database, this man's luck ran out. He was extradited from the
U.S. and put on the next flight back to Columbia.
(3) Passport Fraud Uncovered
On January 14, 2004, a British West Indies Airways flight
arrived at JFK International Airport in New York carrying a
woman from Trinidad. Because US-VISIT begins at the visa-
issuing post, a photo of the visitor was on file and accessible
by the Customs and Border Protection Officer, who determined
that she had used a false name. In reality, the traveler was a
woman who had been arrested in April 2000 in New Orleans and
convicted of passport fraud. The woman was placed on five
years' probation and ordered not to enter the U.S. without the
attorney general's written permission. The woman, whose husband
lives in the U.S., had obtained a passport and U.S. visa by
fraud in Trinidad for $2,000. She was removed from the U.S.
A CBP Trainee Rises to the Occasion
U.S. Customs and Border Protection Officer Trainee Rafal Izycki was
working at primary inspection at Chicago O'Hare International Airport.
An Albanian national seeking admission into the U.S. appeared before
him and presented an Albanian passport. When Inspector Izycki compared
the State Department photo image provided by US-VISIT against the
photographs on the passport and visa, he realized that the person in
front of him was not the person who had obtained the visa. He
immediately referred the Albanian national for a secondary inspection
where it was determined that the passport had been photo-substituted
and the non-immigrant visa had been altered. The capability to access
the State Department photographs of visa applicants provides a powerful
tool for inspectors working to protect the U.S.
Land Issues
US-VISIT Increment 1 capabilities will be in place at the 50
busiest land ports of entry (POEs) by December 31, 2004, with processes
in place at the remaining land borders by December 31, 2005. Land
borders present a unique challenge in and of themselves, and each of
the 165 land ports of entry is different and challenging. We do know
that an inspection conducted at an air or sea entry point and one
conducted at a land border will be different.
We are currently developing the best solution for a technology to
be used at land borders to leverage biographic and biometric data.
US-VISIT Program Office Update
Secretary Ridge approved the creation of a US-VISIT program office,
and positions have been approved to fill the organization and manage
the program. The US-VISIT program team consists of representatives from
the various components of DHS responsible for border security,
including the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, U.S. Customs
and Border Protection, and the Transportation Security Administration.
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services is also represented. Other
DHS components that assist the US-VISIT team include the Directorate
for Management and the Science and Technology Division. In addition,
outside DHS, the team consists of representatives from the Departments
of Transportation, State, Commerce, Justice, and General Services
Administration.
Conclusion
US-VISIT is critical to our national security as well as our
economic security, and its introduction has been successful. But US-
VISIT can not be left unfinished. We must build upon the initial
framework and solid foundation to ensure that we continue to meet our
goals to enhance the security of our citizens and visitors while
facilitating travel for the millions of visitors we welcome each year.
We are committed to building a system that enhances the integrity of
our immigration system by catching the few and expediting the many, and
we recognize that the U.S. is leading the way in helping other
countries around the world keep their borders secure and their doors
open.
Appendix I
Statutory Mandates:
The principal law that mandates the creation of an automated entry exit
system that integrates electronic alien arrival and departure
information is the Immigration and Naturalization Service Data
Management Improvement Act of 2000 (DMIA), Pub. Law No. 10.6-215
(2000), 114 Stat. 339, codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. section 1365a.
DMIA amended previous legislative requirements for an entry exit system
that would record the arrival and departure of every alien who crosses
the U.S. borders. See section 110. of the Illegal Immigration Reform
and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996. Div. C, Pub. Law No.104-208
(1996), 110. Stat. 3009-558, codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.
(later amended by DMIA). DMIA requires that the entry exit system
consist of the integration of all authorized or required alien arrival
and departure data that is maintained in electronic format in
Department of Justice (DOJ) (now DHS) or Department of State (DOS)
databases. 8 U.S.C. section 1365a. This integrated entry exit system
must be implemented at all air and sea ports of entry by December 31,
2003 using available air and sea alien arrival and departure data as
described in the statute. DMIA also states that the system must be
implemented at the 50. most highly trafficked land border ports of
entry by December 31, 2004, and at all ports of entry by December 31,
2005, with all available electronic alien arrival and departure
information. DMIA also requires DHS to use the entry exit system to
match the available arrival and departure data on aliens and to prepare
and submit to Congress various reports on the numbers of aliens who
have overstayed their periods of admission and on implementation of the
system. 8 U.S.C. section 1365a(e). DMIA authorizes the Secretary of
Homeland Security, in his discretion, to permit other Federal, State,
and local law enforcement officials to have access to the entry exit
system for law enforcement purposes. 8 U.S.C. section 1365a(f).
In addition, section 217(h) of the Visa Waiver Permanent Program
Act of 2000. (VWPPA), Pub. Law No. 106-396 (2000), 114 Stat. 1637,
codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. section 1187(h), requires the creation
of a system that contains a record of the arrival and departure of
every alien admitted under the Visa Waiver Program (VWP) who arrives
and departs by air or sea. The requirements of DMIA effectively result
in the integration of this VWP arrival/departure information into the
primary entry exit system component of the US-VISIT program.
In late 2001 and 2002, Congress passed two additional laws
affecting the development of the entry exit system, partly in response
to the events of September 11, 2001. Section 40.3(c) of the Uniting and
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act). Pub. Law No. 107-56
(2001),115 Stat. 353, codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. section 1379,
required the Attorney General and the Secretary of State jointly,
through the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), and
in consultation with the Secretary of Treasury and other appropriate
Federal law enforcement and intelligence agencies, and in consultation
with Congress, to develop and certify a technology standard, including
appropriate biometric identifier standards, that can be used to verify
the identity of visa applicants and persons seeking to enter the United
States pursuant to a visa and to do background checks on such aliens.
In developing the entry exit system required by DMIA, section 414(b) of
the USA PATRIOT Act directed the Attorney General and the Secretary of
State to ``particularly focus on the utilization of biometric
technology; and the development of tamper-resistant documents readable
at ports of entry.'' 8 V.S.C. section 1365a note.
The legislative requirements for biometric identifiers to be
utilized in the context of the entry exit system were significantly
strengthened with passage of the Enhanced Border Security and Visa
Entry Reform Act of 2002 ``Border Security Act'' or EBSVERA) Pub. Law
No. 107-173 (2002), 116 Stat. 553, codified in scattered sections of 8
U.S.C. Section 302(a)(1) of the Border Security Act states that the
entry exit system must use the technology and biometric standards
required to be certified by section 403( c) of the USA PATRIOT Act.
Section 303(b)(1) requires that ``[n]o later than October 26, 2004,''
only machine-readable, tamper resistant visas and other travel and
entry documents that use biometric identifiers may be issued to aliens
by DHS and DOS. 8 U.S.C. section 1732(b)(1). This section, however,
does not invalidate unexpired travel documents that have been issued by
the U.S. government that do not use biometrics. Section 303(b)(1)
further states that the Secretaries of Homeland Security and State must
jointly establish document authentication and biometric identifier
standards for alien travel documents from among those recognized by
domestic and international standards organizations. Id.
Section 303(b)(2) requires that ``[n]o later than October 26,
2004,'' all ports of entry must have equipment and software installed
``to allow biometric comparison and authentication of all United States
visas and other travel and entry documents issued to aliens, and
passports'' that are required to be issued by VWP countries. 8 U.S.C.
section 1732(b)(2). The current statutory language also requires that
by that same date, VWP countries must have a program in place to issue
tamper-resistant, machine-readable, biometric passports that comply
with biometric and document identifying standards established by the
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). 8 U.S.C. section
1732(c)(1). The statute also states that on or after October 26, 2004,
any alien applying for admission under the VWP must present a passport
that is machine readable, tamper-resistant and that uses ICAO-compliant
biometric identifiers, unless the unexpired passport was issued prior
to that date. 8 U.S.C. section 1732(c)(2). The entry exit system must
include a database that contains alien arrival and departure data from
the machine readable visas, passports, and other travel and entry
documents. 8 U.S.C. section 1731 (a)(2). In developing the entry exit
system, the Secretaries of Homeland Security and State must also make
interoperable all security databases relevant to making determinations
of alien admissibility. 8 U.S.C. section 1731(a)(3).
In addition, the entry exit system component must share information
with other systems required by the Border Security Act. Section 202 of
the Border Security Act addresses requirements for an interoperable law
enforcement and intelligence data system and requires the integration
of all databases and data systems that process or contain information
on aliens.
The US-VISIT program requirements that foreign nationals provide
biometric identifiers when they seek admission to the United States are
further supported by the Department's broad authority to inspect aliens
contained in section 235 of the INA, 8 U.S.C. section 1225. Pursuant to
section 215(a) of the INA, the President also has the authority to
regulate the departure of aliens, as well as their arrival. President
Bush has issued Executive Order titled Assignment of Functions Relating
to Arrivals In and Departures From the United States delegating his
authority to promulgate regulations governing the departure of aliens
from the United States. In accordance with section 215 and with this
new Executive Order, the Secretary of Homeland Security, with the
concurrence of the Secretary of State, has the authority to issue this
rule which requires certain aliens to provide requested biometric
identifiers and other relevant identifying information as they depart
the United States. For nonimmigrant aliens, the Department may also
make compliance with the departure procedures a condition of their
admission and maintenance of status while in the country under INA,
section 214.
Many other provisions within the INA also support the
implementation of the US-VISIT program, such as the grounds of
inadmissibility in section 212, the grounds of removability in section
237, the requirements for the VWP program in section 217, the
electronic passenger manifest requirements in section 231, and the
authority for alternative inspection services in sections 286(q) and
235 of the INA and section 404 of the Border Security Act. These are
but a few of the most significant provisions that support US-VISIT from
among numerous other immigration and customs statutes.
US-VISIT Program, Increment 1
Privacy Impact Assessment
Executive Summary
December 18, 2003
Overview
US-VISIT, the United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator
Technology, is a legislatively-mandated DHS program that is designed
to:
Enhance the security of American citizens, permanent
residents, and visitors
Expedite legitimate travel and trade
Ensure the integrity of the immigration system
Safeguard the personal privacy of visitors
When fully implemented, US-VISIT will provide a dynamic, interoperable
system involving numerous stakeholders across the government. Increment
1, as the name suggests, is the first step in the implementation
process. Increment 1 proposes to integrate and modify the capabilities
of several information systems in order to accomplish the mission of
US-VISIT.
This Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) focuses on Increment 1 of this
entry exit system.
What Information is Collected
The US-VISIT program will collect and retain biographic, travel,
and biometric information (i.e., photograph and fingerprints)
pertaining to visitors.
Individuals covered by Increment 1 (``covered individuals'') are
nonimmigrant visa holders traveling through air and sea ports.\1\ The
DHS regulations and related Federal Register notice for US-VISIT
Increment 1 will fully detail coverage of the program. Information is
in the Committee file.
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\1\ Nonimmigrant visa entrants comprise a small percentage of the
330 million non-citizens admitted annually through ports of entry.
Establishing US-VISIT incrementally with this population will allow DHS
to test implementation of the system and to make revisions as needed
for future increments.
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Why the Information is Being Collected and Intended Use of the
Information
In accordance with Congressional mandates for an entry exit system,
information is collected from and used to verify the identity of
covered individuals who enter or leave the United States. This enables
U.S. authorities to enhance the security of the United States by more
effectively identifying covered individuals who are:
Known to pose a threat or are suspected of posing a
threat to the security of the United States;
Known to have violated the terms of their admission to
the United States; or
Wanted for commission of a criminal act in the United
States or elsewhere.
Information Access and Sharing
Information collected and retained by US-VISIT will be accessed by
employees of DHS components--Customs and Border Protection, Immigration
and Customs Enforcement, Citizenship and Immigration Services, and the
Transportation Security Administration--and by consular officers of the
Department of State. Strict security controls will be put in place to
ensure that only those personnel with a need for the information in the
performance of their official duties will be able to access information
in the system.
If necessary, the information that is collected will be shared with
other law enforcement agencies at the federal, state, local, foreign,
or tribal level, who are lawfully engaged in collecting law enforcement
intelligence information and who need access to the information in
order to carry out their law enforcement duties.
Consent Mechanisms
The admission into the United States of an individual subject to
US-VISIT requirements will be contingent upon submission of the
information required by US-VISIT, including biometric identifiers. A
covered individual who declines to provide biometrics is inadmissible
to the United States, unless a discretionary waiver is granted under
section 212(d)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. Such an
individual may withdraw his or her application for admission, or be
subject to removal proceedings.
Security
Information accessible to US-VISIT will be protected through multi-
layer security mechanisms that are physical, technical, administrative
and environmental and that are in compliance with the DHS IT Security
Program Handbook and DHS Baseline Security Requirements for Automated
Information Systems. These security mechanisms provide access control
to sensitive data, physical access control to DHS facilities,
confidentiality of communications, authentication of sending parties,
and careful screening to ensure that all personnel with access to data
are screened through background investigations commensurate with the
level of access required to perform their duties.
System of Records
A system of records notice (SORN)--normally required under the
Privacy Act--is not necessary for US-VISIT because no new system is
being developed for Increment 1. However, the ADIS and IDENT SORNs have
been revised to reflect US-VISIT usage.
Although US-VISIT derives its capability from the integration and
modification of existing systems, it nevertheless represents a new
business process that involves new uses of existing data and the
collection of new data items. As a result, there is a potential for new
privacy risks, which are addressed in the PIA.
Privacy Controls
US-VISIT collects, integrates, and shares personal information of
covered individuals. Covered individuals must consent to the
collection, use, and disclosure of this personal information if they
wish to enter or leave the U.S.
To address the privacy concerns associated with the program, US-
VISIT will implement comprehensive privacy controls, which will be
modified and updated as the system is revised and expanded. These
controls consist of:
Public education through transparency of the program,
including development and publication of a Privacy Policy that will be
disseminated prior to the time information is collected from potential
visitors; \2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ A copy of the Privacy Policy is appended to the full report.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Establishment of privacy sensitivity awareness programs for
US-VISIT operators; \3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ The legacy systems on which Increment 1 is built include
privacy sensitivity training requirements. This training will be made
mandatory for US-VISIT operators.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Establishment of a Privacy Officer for US-VISIT and
implementation of an accountability program for those responsible for
compliance with the US-VISIT Privacy Policy;
Periodic strategic reviews of US-VISIT data to ascertain that
the collection is limited to that which is necessary for US-VISIT
stated purposes;
Usage agreements between US-VISIT and other agencies
authorized to have access to US-VISIT data;
To the extent permitted by law, regulations, or policy,
establishment of opportunity for covered individuals to have access to
their information and/or allow them to challenge its completeness;
Maintenance of security safeguards (physical, electronic and
procedural) consistent with federal law and policy to limit access to
personal information only to those with appropriate rights, and to
protect information from unauthorized disclosure, modification, misuse,
and disposal, whether intentional or unintentional; and
Establishment of administrative controls to prevent improper
actions due to data inconsistencies from multiple information sources.
Contact Point and Reviewing Official
Contact Point: Steve Yonkers, US-VISIT Privacy Officer, (202)
298-5200
Reviewing Official: Nuala O'Connor Kelly, Chief Privacy
Officer, DHS,
(202) 772-9848
Comments
We welcome your comments on this privacy impact assessment. Please
write to: Privacy Office, Attn.: US-VISIT PIA, U.S. Department Of
Homeland Security, Washington, DC 20528, or email [email protected].
Please include US-VISIT PIA in the subject line of the email.
Ms. Granger. Thank you, Mr. Secretary, I appreciate that
very much. We will be back with some questions in just awhile.
The chair now recognizes Assistant Secretary Maura Harty
for her testimony.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE MAURA HARTY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY,
BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Ms. Harty. Thank you, Madam Chairman, members of the
committee. Thank you very much for inviting me here to testify
before you today on the role of the Bureau of Consular Affairs
in implementing biometrics programs in U.S. visas and
passports.
The inclusion of biometrics in international travel
documents is an important step in enhancing the security of our
nation's borders.
The Department of State's visa work abroad constitutes a
vital element in providing for our national security. We have
no higher responsibility than the protection of our citizens
and safeguarding our country's borders through the visa
process.
The consular officers of the foreign service who adjudicate
visas at our embassies and consulates abroad truly are the
first line of defense. Through them, our goal in fact is to
push the borders of the United States out as far from our
shores as possible to stop questionable or problematic
travelers overseas long before they ever reach our shores.
The biometric visa program will allow us to do just that by
helping consular officers identify visa applicants already
known to U.S. law enforcement.
The Border Security Act requires that no later than October
26, 2004, the Secretary of State issue to aliens only visas
that use biometric identifiers. To comply with this
requirement, the State Department began deployment of the
biometric visa program last September.
I am pleased to report that 55 posts now are already
enrolling fingerprints, and with a very aggressive rollout
schedule, the program will be in effect at all visa
adjudicating posts by the congressionally mandated October 26
deadline.
We will start issuing immigrant visas with the same
biometric features next month and have this program operational
at all immigrant-visa-issuing posts on the same date.
Under the biometric visa program, consular officers abroad
will enroll applicants' fingerprints with electronic scanners
at the visa interview windows, which will then be matched
against the fingerprint files of DHS's IDENT system.
Our scanner looks almost exactly like the scanner that
Undersecretary Hutchinson has already shown to you.
We are currently doing the match procedure at four pilot
posts and are experiencing a return time of approximately seven
to eight minutes at all four posts.
If the fingerprints match fingerprints in the IDENT
database, no action is taken until the derogatory information
is reviewed by a consular officer overseas.
We are currently discussing with the FBI the means to
readily access these files so that consular officers in the
field will have the necessary information to efficiently
adjudicate the visa application to conclusion.
The most important here that I would like to underscore is
that an IDENT hit overseas will freeze the visa application
process until that hit is resolved, meeting that very first
goal of pushing that border out as far from our own physical
borders as a nation as possible.
Now moving on to cases with no hits, once the visa has been
issued, our non-immigrant visa system sends the issued visa
data, including the visa applicant's photo and the fingerprint
identification number, to DHS. When the traveler arrives at a
port of entry, the US-VISIT system will use the fingerprint
identification number to match the visa with the file in IDENT
and compare the visa holder's fingerprints with those on file.
This one-to-one fingerprint comparison ensures that the
person presenting the visa at the port of entry is in fact the
same person to whom the visa was issued.
To guard against impostors and forged or counterfeit visas,
our visa data-share program has been upgraded for us with US-
VISIT so that CBP officers at ports of entry have complete
access to the travelers' visa files from the consular
consolidated database at their primary stations.
CBP officers at ports of entry sees the same photo and the
same bio data that the consular officer entered into the
consular consolidated database at posts overseas at the time of
the interview. This is a seamless operation.
The Border Security Act also established October 26, 2004,
as the date by which visa waiver program countries must issue
to their nationals only machine-readable passports,
incorporating biometric identifiers that comply with the
standards established by ICAO.
ICAO's decision to make facial-recognition technology the
standard passport biometric was not made until May of 2003,
leaving visa-waiver countries approximately 17 months to bring
a biometric passport from design to production--a process that
normally takes several years.
Although VWP governments share a commitment to making this
change--and all are making varying degrees of progress toward
complying with the biometric requirement--they have indicated
at this point that they will be unable to meet the deadline.
The legislative requirements of the Border Security Act
apply only to passports issued by visa-waiver program
countries, but not the U.S. passport, which I firmly believe is
the world's single most valuable travel document.
Although the law does not require of us what we are
requiring of the VWP countries, the Department of State has a
program that will produce the first biometric U.S. passport,
using the ICAO standard official recognition, in October of
this year.
We have planned to complete the transition to biometric
passports by the end of 2005.
Embedding biometrics into U.S. passports to establish a
clear link between the person issued the passport and the user
is an important step forward in the international effort to
strengthen border security. The Department of State is working
hand in hand with our colleagues and friends at the Department
of Homeland Security to ensure that we have a system that
continues to facilitate legitimate international travel and
properly identifies those who pose or could pose a threat to
prevent them from entering our country.
I think I speak for all of us here today when I say that
the continued commitment to ensuring the sanctity and security
of our borders and our nation is our number one priority.
I am happy to answer any questions you might have.
Thank you very much.
[The statement of Ms. Harty follows:]
Prepared Statement of The Hon. Maura Harty
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
Thank you for inviting me to testify before you today on the role
of the Bureau of Consular Affairs in implementing Section 303 of the
Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act (Border Security
Act). The inclusion of biometrics, in addition to the photograph that
has always been collected, in international travel documents is an
important step in continuing to improve our ability to verify the
identity of prospective travelers to the United States. In the process
of screening visas and passports domestically and abroad, additional
biometrics can serve as a useful adjunct to existing screening
processes that identify individuals who might be terrorists, criminals,
or other aliens who might represent a security risk to the United
States. The Department of State has invested substantial time, money,
and effort to implement the additional biometrics and ensure that
international visitors are aware of changes to the visa application
process and admission procedures in the United States. In so doing, we
have worked, and will continue to work, closely with our colleagues at
the Departments of Homeland Security and Justice (including the FBI).
As you know, the Border Security Act requires that no later than
October 26, 2004, the Secretary of State issue to aliens only visas
that use biometric identifiers. To comply with this requirement with
respect to nonimmigrant visas, the State Department began deployment of
the Biometric Visa Program on September 22, 2003, at the U.S. Embassy
in Brussels, Belgium, and quickly followed suit at the U.S. Consulate
General in Frankfurt and Embassies in San Salvador and Guatemala City.
I am pleased to report that the program is now operational at 55 visa-
issuing posts and with our aggressive rollout schedule the program will
be in effect at all visa-issuing posts by October 26 of this year. With
regard to immigrant visas, we will start issuing biometric visas in
February and have this program operational at all immigrant visa-
issuing posts by October 26, 2004.
The success we are having with the rollout of the Biometric Visa
Program should not detract from the accomplishments of the process
itself. I would like to walk you through the nonimmigrant visa process
from visa applicant enrollment to the traveler's arrival at the U.S.
port of entry.
Consular officers abroad oversee the fingerprint enrollment of the
visa applicants with fingerprint scanners at the visa interview
windows. Enrollment time averages about 30 seconds. As soon as the
fingerprints are enrolled they are sent electronically, along with the
photo of the applicant and biographic data, to the Consular
Consolidated Database (CCD) in Washington. The CCD relays the
fingerprint files to DHS's IDENT system in Rockville over a reliable,
direct transmission line, which sends the results back to the CCD for
relay back to the post. The current return time is approximately seven
to eight minutes at three pilot posts.
No visa can be issued until a response of no derogatory information
found is returned from the IDENT system. Until such information from
IDENT is received, the visa system is locked with regard to that visa
application. If the fingerprints match fingerprints provided by the FBI
in the IDENT lookout database, the IDENT system returns to the post an
FBI file number.
At present, Consular officers at posts overseas do not have desktop
access to the FBI record associated with that file number. As an
interim procedure, we are processing such cases through our National
Visa Center, where an FBI official receives and analyzes the FBI's
records and then forwards the information to post. We are discussing
means to enhance the efficiency of the process with the FBI, so that
consular officers in the field will have more direct access to National
Crime Information Center (NCIC) information that will be of use in
adjudicating the visa to conclusion.
If there is no match against the IDENT lookout database, then the
visa applicant's fingerprints are stored in the US-VISIT database in
IDENT, and a fingerprint identification number (FIN) is returned to the
post. Once the visa has been issued, our nonimmigrant visa system sends
to the DHS Interagency Border Inspection System (IBIS) the issued visa
data, including the visa applicant's photo and the fingerprint
identification number.
When the visa applicant arrives at a port of entry, the US-VISIT
system will use the fingerprint identification number to match the visa
with the file in IDENT, and will compare the visa holder's fingerprints
with those on file. This one-to-one fingerprint comparison ensures that
the person presenting the visa at the port of entry is the same person
to whom the visa was issued.
As I mentioned before, biometrics (including photos and
fingerprints) are a useful adjunct to the existing screening
procedures. Even though fingerprint data has only recently begun to be
incorporated into the U.S. visa issuing process, through our visa
datashare program, which has been upgraded for use at primary
inspection under US-VISIT, we are able to ensure the integrity of valid
visas that do not have associated fingerprint data captured at visa
issuance.
I will quickly outline the process by which visa datashare helps us
accomplish our goal of securing further the integrity of the U.S. visa.
Under visa datashare, the biographic data and current biometric data
(i.e. photo) from the issued nonimmigrant visa are stored on the IBIS
computer. When the DHS officer scans the visa at primary inspection,
the photo and biographic data of the applicant are extracted from the
database and projected on the screen. If the traveler has altered the
photo on the visa, the DHS officer will be able to make a comparison
with the original photo. In one such case under US-VISIT, a woman's
photo appeared on the screen, but the traveler presenting the visa was
a man.
If the visa is a complete counterfeit, nothing will appear on the
DHS officer's screen. In this way, US-VISIT is combating fraud and
protecting the integrity of the U.S. visa. At the same time, this
system facilitates travel for the legitimate traveler because the DHS
officer need not spend time examining the visa to ensure its
authenticity--the US-VISIT system is ensuring the visa authenticity.
The process for the biometric immigrant visa that includes a
fingerprint will be very similar. The visa itself will be printed on a
tamper-resistant document. There will be reliable datashare with DHS so
that the DHS inspector at the port of entry can verify the identity of
the traveler and the authenticity of that individual's status as a new
immigrant.
Let me now turn to the issue of the U.S. passport, which I firmly
believe is the world's most valuable identity and travel document.
First, I think it is important to note that improving passport security
is not a one-time effort. Instead, we are involved in a process of
continuous improvement that affects not just the physical passport
carried by an American citizen, but also the adjudication process that
determines whether an applicant is in fact a U.S. citizen.
Our latest efforts to improve the U.S. passport began in the late
1990's with the introduction of photodigitization technology to support
passport printing. Instead of gluing a physical photograph of the
applicant into a passport and protecting that photo with a laminate, we
introduced an entirely new technique that takes advantage of the many
improvements in digital technology during the last decade.
Photodigitization has been an unqualified success. Any passport with a
physical photograph is inherently susceptible to photo substitution. We
have now produced over 25 million passports using photodigitization and
the number of credible alterations we have encountered still number in
the single digits. I should add that domestic photodigitization has
been so successful that we have, in turn, returned the production of
passports issued abroad to our U.S. domestic production facilities so
that we can take advantage of the significant security improvements
embodied in the photodigitization process.
But, as good as photodigitization is, it is not the end of our
efforts. We are currently undertaking a total redesign of our passport
book to introduce the latest generation of security features as well as
a total update of the physical appearance of the inside of the book.
More significantly, we are also undertaking a massive effort to
introduce embedded biometrics into the U.S. passport through the
insertion of a contact-less chip, which will store biometric and
biographic data including digital photos. I think it is important to
note, however, that the legislative requirements in that section do not
apply to U.S. passports, only to passports issued by our partner
nations in the Visa Waiver Program.
Embedding enhanced biometrics into passports so that a clear link
can be established between the authorized bearer of that passport and
the user is an important step forward in the international effort to
strengthen border security. We recognize that convincing other nations
to change and improve their passport requires U.S. leadership both at
the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and practically by
introducing these changes into the U.S. passport. Thus, the Department
of State has underway a program that should result in the production of
our first enhanced biometric passports using the ICAO standard of
facial recognition techniques in October of this year and we plan to
complete the transition to this new biometric passport by the end of
calendar year 2005.
In addition to our enhanced biometric initiatives, we are moving
forward aggressively on two other programs to further improve further
the U.S. passport. The first of those programs is to redesign the
passport itself. We are well advanced on this project and expect to
have these new books in large-scale production later this year. We have
also implemented and expanded our data base which immediately alerts
ports of entry to any passports reported lost or stolen.
The second is to strengthen further our passport adjudication
process. We are negotiating new datasharing agreements with agencies
such as the Social Security Administration (SSA) so that we can gain
access to SSA data, which when combined with data from other sources,
will help to identify possible irregularities in passport applications.
We are also receiving additional data from the law enforcement
community to help prevent issuance of passports to persons who may be
flight risks. We are examining the possible uses of decision based
software techniques and commercial database searches as part of a
longer range effort to give passport adjudicators every possible tool
to ensure the accuracy of their decisions. We will complete the
scanning of applications with images for all currently valid passports
by April, making them available at the desktop level worldwide to
assist in adjudication. Finally, we should soon sign an agreement with
DHS that will allow border inspectors access to these electronic copies
of passport applications as a way to help strengthen our processing
systems for returning American citizens.
Now that I have addressed the accomplishments that we are making
towards improving the biometrics currently in our passports, I would
like to focus on other countries efforts towards the same end. The
Border Security Act set October 26, 2004 as the date when VWP travelers
with passports issued on or after that date must also have biometrics
(digital photos) incorporated in those passports that meet the ICAO
standard for use in visa-free travel to the United States. Visa Waiver
Program (VWP) governments have indicated that they will be unable to
meet the legislatively mandated deadline to issue to their nationals
only machine-readable passports (MRP) incorporating this enhanced
biometric identifier that complies with the standards established by
the ICAO.
ICAO's decision to make facial recognition technology the standard
passport biometric was not made until May, 2003, leaving countries only
17 months to bring a biometric passport that meets that standard from
design to production, a process that normally takes years.
Moreover, while the VWP country governments share a commitment to
make this change, many of them are encountering the same problems being
experienced by the Department of State in our effort to introduce
embedded enhanced biometrics into the U.S. passport. These issues
include needing final decisions through the ICAO process on security
matters, resolution of interoperability matters, as well as
comprehensive testing to ensure that the chips work successfully and
that they will continue to do so through the validity of the passport,
which is 10 years in most cases.
We have vigorously encouraged VWP countries to issue biometric
passports that meet the ICAO standard by the October 26, 2004,
deadline. The U.S. has played a leadership role in ICAO working groups
to advocate the successful inclusion of biometrics in travel documents.
In the G8 we strongly advocated support for ICAO leadership in
biometrics and participated fully in a special working group on
biometrics established by the G8 ministers of Home and Justice Affairs.
We are fully engaged in the group of 5 (US, UK, New Zealand, Australia,
Canada) in which there are continuing discussions on progress regarding
each country's efforts to produce the passport.
On the margins of international conferences, we have had repeated
meetings with VWP representatives to explain the process; at trade
conferences, State Department officials have made many public
appearances to educate VWP government representatives about the
requirements and deadlines. Many VWP countries have sent
representatives to Washington to meet with U.S. government
representatives and had full and open discussions on the issue. In
December, the Secretary of State sent a diplomatic note to the VWP
Embassies in Washington that conveyed the criteria for certification of
a biometric passport program and also noted that there is no waiver
available for the production deadline. The State Department followed up
by sending the text of the note to U.S. Embassies in the VWP countries
and requested the Embassies deliver the information to the host
government and have them reply by January 10. We are still receiving
responses from those countries.
In testament to our efforts, all VWP countries are making varying
degrees of progress toward complying with the requirement to have a
program in place to issue biometric passports; however, only one or two
countries may have production capability in place by October 26, 2004.
None of the larger countries (Japan, the U.K., France, Germany,
Ireland, Italy or Spain, for example) will begin issuing passports with
the ICAO biometric by October 26, 2004. Japan and the United Kingdom
say they will begin in late 2005; others may not come on-line until a
year after that.
Since travelers from VWP countries with non-biometric passports
issued on or after October 26, 2004 will need visas to travel to the
U.S., we estimate that the demand for nonimmigrant visas will increase
significantly over fiscal year 2005 to over five million applications,
nearly double last year's workload. However, once VWP countries begin
issuing passports with biometrics, the increased workload will
disappear. For example, in fiscal year 2003, mission Japan (Tokyo,
Osaka, Kobe and Naha) processed approximately 111,000 nonimmigrant visa
cases. The Japanese estimate that between October 26, 2004, and the
introduction of their biometrics-bearing passport projected for
November 2005, between 1.2 to 1.5 million Japanese would need visas. In
fiscal year 2006, the number would likely drop back to current levels.
The Department of State is working hand in hand with our colleagues
at the Department of Homeland Security to ensure that we have a system
that continues to facilitate legitimate international travelers and
properly identifies those who pose a threat to prevent them from
entering our country. I think I speak for all of us here today when I
say that the continued commitment to ensuring the sanctity and security
of our borders and our nation is the number one priority. I am happy to
answer any questions you may have. Thank you very much.
Ms. Granger. And I thank you very much.
I have a couple of questions. But, first, Undersecretary
Hutchinson, you gave some excellent examples of people we have
stopped from coming into this country because of this system.
But can you tell me specifically if someone gets to the
airport, what databases exactly does the biographical and
biometric information run through?
Mr. Hutchinson. The check goes through the Interagency
Border Inspection System, the IBIS system, which is a database
that includes information from 26 other databases, including
the Department of State's CLASS, the TIPOFF databases.
And so the various interagency databases that would give
you the necessary information to trigger a hit would be
included in the IBIS.
In addition, we are linked to the TSC, the Terrorist
Screening Center, for their list that they put together for
strictly the terrorist watch list.
Ms. Granger. Very good. And when the traveler is screened
through US-VISIT, does the IDENT start to take place in the
primary inspection? Does it go through the primary inspection?
Mr. Hutchinson. Yes, this is all done in the primary
inspection.
Ms. Granger. And you told us, again, how long does that
take and how much does that add to the time?
Mr. Hutchinson. Actually we are measuring it very
carefully, and the time for the system to do the check is on
average eight seconds. And that would be from when the finger
scan is taken, running through the system and back, eight
seconds.
We have not noticed any appreciable difference in any wait
times, which we have been monitoring. And one of the reasons
is, the inspectors obviously are conducting other business as
these checks are going on and asking other routine questions.
The eight seconds is actually cutting in half the response
time under the previous system because of the upgrades in the
system that we have been able to implement through US-VISIT.
Ms. Granger. Oh, very good, thank you.
Secretary Harty, there have been press reports criticizing
US-VISIT because the 27 visa-waiver countries will not be
processed through the system. But can you tell me what the
State Department is doing to enhance the security in those
passports?
Ms. Harty. Thank you for the question, ma'am.
The visa-waiver program administered by DHS with State
Department concurrence in various aspects of it is a
congressionally mandated program by which the meets and bounds
are defined.
The 27 countries in the program now have been judged to be
low-risk countries, travelers presenting less of a risk than
others out there. That implies, to a degree, a face in the
issuance ability and the integrity of the documents as issued
by their own respective countries.
We are always eager to continue to work together. We have
very, very good relationships with the 27 countries in the
program. We have been very communicative with them about the
deadline that Congress has set for next October 26, 2004.
This does give us pause and I am glad that you raise it. It
gives us pause because this is a challenge for us that has a
rather finite sort of beginning and end to it.
All of the countries in the program, about 80 percent of
visa-waiver travelers, come from Japan, the United Kingdom,
Germany, France, Italy and The Netherlands. All of the
countries in the program are striving to make the deadline.
As they do make that deadline, the problem in their
countries of our having to issue visas to their nationals will
in fact wane.
If I were to have to begin to issue visas to all visa-
waiver countries right now, it would, we estimate, be upwards
of 5 million additional visas we would have to adjudicate. That
would cause me to think about having to hire hundreds of more
consular officers and even foreign service national employees--
again, for a challenge that is somewhat finite in nature--as
the visa-waiver countries come into compliance with the October
26 deadline, at whatever point they are able to do that.
As a manager, I cannot, in all honesty, justify hiring so
many more people, perhaps even looking at constructing some
sort of additional space at consular sections or consulates
around the world to handle that workload.
So what we are doing is making sure the countries
understand the deadline.
We are making sure that our own procedures will call for us
to be as agile as possible, being concerned with what another
member of the committee spoke about earlier, a facilitation of
travel, also important to us.
The visa-waiver countries in the last five years have
accounted for some 68 percent of people who have come into this
country--exclusive of those who come in from Mexico and Canada.
This is a huge number of people. We do not want to deter that
travel.
What we do at all of our consulates and embassies is make
sure that the emergencies are taken care of, that students who
have a need to be here at a certain date will go to the front
of the line, that medical cases will go to the front of the
line, that business people who have a precipitous meeting of
which they were previously unaware go to the front of the line.
We will handle it just as efficiently as we possibly can.
We have asked for 161 new officers for this fiscal year, and
123 for next fiscal year.
We will do the very best we can to facilitate legitimate
travel to this country, but always keeping security as job one,
ma'am.
Ms. Granger. I am still a little unsure about what specific
security procedures they will go through, then. I understand
putting emergencies at the front--.
Ms. Harty. Thank you for that question, ma'am. I should
have added that visa-waiver-country travelers at the ports of
entry go through exactly--their names are checked through
exactly the same procedures as a namecheck is done overseas,
simply done by an inspector at a port of entry rather than at
an embassy overseas.
Ms. Granger. One last question for you, Secretary Harty: Do
you know if primary inspectors have access to the State
Department consular consolidated databases? And how does this
improve their screening ability?
Ms. Harty. Oh, yes, they do, and we are very proud of that
partnership.
I think that there is nothing better than an inspector at a
port of entry being able to know that he or she is in fact
absolutely and without a shadow of a doubt looking at the same
person who a consular officer has already looked at overseas.
And they do that by being able to pull up the photo that we
capture overseas. And that is done very, very quickly.
So if you were to apply for a visa this morning in Buenos
Aires, Argentina, and show up at Miami airport this afternoon,
that inspector would have that.
It is refreshed every seven or minutes around the world, so
it is very real time access to data that I think is very useful
to both sides.
Ms. Granger. Thank you very much.
Ms. Harty. Thank you.
Ms. Granger. And, Secretary Hutchinson, you talked about
how important US-VISIT is because it checks the people that are
coming in and all the security. But, then, the other thing is,
as they leave to make sure that they have left and who is
leaving was the same person that came in.
So what mechanisms are used to ensure that those people go
through the US-VISIT exit process and actually leave the
country?
Mr. Hutchinson. First of all, the exit procedure would be
information-base at our airports, and seaports, in which we
would get the departure passenger information from the airlines
or the cruise lines which would indicate that they left.
So biographically we can determine visa overstays who
leaves.
Your question is, how can you confirm their identity?
That's what we are testing at the Baltimore airport in a kiosk-
type solution, that we would have assistance provided to the
passenger as they check out.
The question would be: What mandates them to do that? How
can you guarantee that they do that?
We are looking at different solutions. There are
significant issues there, whether we put a gate solution,
whether we put it near the TSA screening counter.
But it is a mandatory requirement for the visitor to check
out. And if they fail to do that, we can monitor that with the
passenger information that is provided by the airlines.
And then there obviously would be a penalty attached to it
in the sense that they would have a more difficult time re-
entering if they did not exit in a proper fashion.
Ms. Granger. And what is the date that you are looking at
to have that completely operational?
Mr. Hutchinson. Well, as soon as we can. But that is a part
of the goal that we would have for calendar year 2004, would be
to formalize the exit system and to have the final exit
solution determined for our air and sea ports.
As to the full implementation date, we have not set that
yet.
Ms. Granger. One of the concerns that has come up so many
times is, people who come in the country, whether they are
students, whatever, a particular period of time, and there was
no tracking and so they actually didn't either return to school
or go to school. That will be a part of what you are doing
also, will issue a report to say who has overstayed their visit
also, isn't it?
Mr. Hutchinson. Well, first of all is to have the
information. And we do. You mention the foreign students, of
course, would be under our SEVIS, student exchange visitor
information system, which is tied into US-VISIT, in which we
would have the information when they left the university and
also left the country.
We are setting up and have set up an office of compliance
in ICE, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, which will be
responsible for handling this information for visa overstays.
It will be a vast amount of information that is created from
US-VISIT, the SEVIS system. We are building that capacity, but
that will be the enforcement responsibility of ICE.
Ms. Granger. Thank you very much.
Ms. Sanchez may inquire now.
Ms. Loretta Sanchez of California. Thank you, Madam Chair.
And once again, thank both of you for being here.
Madam Chair, before I ask my questions, I would like to
submit for the record some testimony from Ed Petrarch, who is a
senior Customs and Border Protection Officer at LAX, which
respect to what is going on with U.S. visa.
In his testimony, Assistant Secretary, that I just
submitted, one of the things that this senior Customs and
Protection officer says is that they are pulling off of cargo
screening to process low-risk U.S. citizens and green-card
holders so that there is an acceptable flow of passengers in
the international terminals under this US-VISIT.
In other words, they are getting pulled off cargo
inspection to process people.
So my question is: What have you asked for with respect to
personnel needs for this coming year? How many more people do
you need if you are pulling people off of one situation to try
to work on another situation?
Mr. Hutchinson. Thank you, and that should not be the case.
The same individuals prior to January 1 of this year that
did the inspection at our ports of entry in terms of processing
people are still doing it. There has not been a shift in
resources.
There may be emergency circumstances. But I do not believe
there has been any significant shift of resources to implement
US-VISIT. It is the same people that were there before to do
it.
In terms of new resources, that will be a part of the
budget submission in our testimony this year. We have enhanced,
thanks to the help of Congress, our inspection resources. And
we, with monitoring the wait times and not adding additional
resources for the US-VISIT implementation, I think we have been
successful with our existing resources.
Ms. Loretta Sanchez of California.That is nice. Again, the
testimony says that this is just not the case at LAX. So I
would ask that you might follow upon that and that you get back
to us about just what resources are required.
[Copy maintained in the Committee files.]
Now, there is also an internal memo that was done by
Assistant Commission Ahearn that outlined some mitigation
strategies when US-VISIT wait times exceed one hour.
The strategy simply is a series of fall-backs where you
collect biometric fingerprints from fewer and fewer people.
First, if it is over an hour, don't do those who are under
17.
Then if the wait is still too long, don't do those that
have biographical and photo data from the State Department.
Next, if there is a family traveling together, only do the
head of household.
And finally, move to sampling from certain types of visa
holders.
Why is your mitigation strategy to just keep letting more
people go through without doing what you just told us is the
intent of this program rather than to assess high-peak times,
or suggestive high-peak times, and figure out how much
personnel you really need to do that?
Can you explain why this memo and?
Mr. Hutchinson. Thank you. This is a new system. And so as
it was rolled out on January 5th, even though we had great
faith in it, we didn't know exactly how it would progress,
whether there would be difficulties.
We wanted to have some flexibility in the early stages of
this implementation that we didn't clog up our airports.
Well, it wasn't an hour tied to mitigation strategy; it was
if the wait times exceeded 10 percent over the normal wait
times, then they could implement a mitigation strategy.
But the good news is that there has been no instance in
which that mitigation strategy has had to be implemented,
because the wait times have not increased to that level. And we
have no reason to expect that it will.
So it was a precautionary step at the initial phases of the
implementation of US-VISIT.
Ms. Loretta Sanchez of California. So you are saying that
this memo in effect has no relationship to what is really going
on.
Mr. Hutchinson. Well, it had a very important foundation of
starting this rollout on the first day. But it was a backup
plan in the event that there was delays caused, or unforeseen
circumstances, as we processed US-VISIT visitors.
That has not been the case. I do not anticipate it being
the case in the future.
Ms. Loretta Sanchez of California. But if you had longer
waits, what was stated in this memo is the way that things
would be implemented currently.
Mr. Hutchinson. Correct. That was a memo that we did send
out. What you recited was not precisely what the plan was. But
there was a mitigation strategy.
You know, we have electrical outages from time to time.
Well, there is a mitigation strategy. When the system goes
down, you do things in the old way.
And in the same the US-VISIT, if we had to go to orange, we
might increase and broaden the requirements in a time of
heightened alert.
That is one of the benefits of this system is, there is
some flexibility in it.
And if from whether a power outage or other problems, it
can be adjusted in other ways.
Ms. Loretta Sanchez of California. I just find that not
collecting the information when really that is the main reason
for having this program is certainly a very strange way to
mitigate, not having enough resources.
I have some other questions, Madam Chair, but I see that my
time is over. So I don't know if we are coming back for a
second round, or I will submit--.
Ms. Granger. Then we can.
Ms. Loretta Sanchez of California. --to be answered by both
the undersecretary and the assistant secretary.
Thank you both for being here.
Ms. Granger. Thank you very much.
The chair now recognizes Chairman Cox for five minutes.
Mr. Cox. Thank you, Madam Vice Chairman.
Again, welcome Undersecretary Hutchinson, Ambassador Harty.
There has been a bit of news recently from the 9/11
commission. The 9/11 commission reported that more than one, at
least a few, of the 9/11 terrorists, possibly as many as eight,
forged their passports.
We also know that when they filled out their visa
applications, they either lied or in other cases just did it
differently than they were supposed to.
If US-VISIT is in place in the future and that pattern were
to repeat itself, what difference would it make?
And, Undersecretary Hutchinson, if could begin with you.
Mr. Hutchinson. It would make a significant difference.
That is one of the benefits is that there is less reliance on
fraudulent documents.
Usually a false passport has a false identity.
First--and I am sure Maura Harty would want to comment on
this--that would probably be prevented at the consular post
when the biometric is taken there. We will not have an
assurance that the person passing through the port of
inspection is the same person that they actually gave the visa
to.
And then secondly, we will be relying upon their biometric
to confirm that identity rather than simply the passport.
Mr. Cox. Ambassador Harty, do you want to address that as
well?
Ms. Harty. Certainly, thank you, sir.
I agree completely with what Undersecretary Hutchinson
said, that it would be our very strong belief, and our
experience even, in the information base of this new program
that the inspector at a port of entry is going to know, flat
out know, if the person in front of them is the person who was
seen at the embassy. They have a photo right there in front of
them.
And they also have what we have done. Using our reader, we
have taken a biometric, we have taken their fingerprint at our
embassy or consulate. We have run that name against the IDENT
system so we will know if there is any previous information on
a person already in the system.
Should we then move to the next step of issuing a visa,
then that same process will in fact occur at the port of entry.
So it is really a second check on the identity of a person
and something that knits up and marries up the bearer of the
passport with the face, with the person we have seen at a port
of entry.
So that in fact would be a little bit different than the
scenario in the past.
Mr. Cox. Now, this recent news from the 9/11 commission
also informs us that at least one of the 9/11 planners applied
for a visa using an alias in Saudi Arabia. Would this program
have stood in the way of that?
Mr. Hutchinson. Two things would happen there.
You mentioned Saudi Arabia, that the consular offices there
would receive the application for a visa. We also have a visa
security officer of the Department of Homeland Security in
Saudi Arabia that would add a security perspective on that visa
check.
So that is something that is new that we did not have two
years ago.
And then that name, if it is an alias, would be checked
against all of the watch lists.
I believe that we have an enhanced capability to determine
that that is an alias to the checks that we have if it is not a
legitimate name. That is the purpose of the background check.
Mr. Cox. Ambassador Harty?
Ms. Harty. Sir, if someone were to come into a consular or
an embassy overseas, and have a completely clean background,
such that they had never been in the United States before, or
had never come to the attention of any of the various entities
who contribute to the watch list that we have as a nation, it
is in fact possible that we would not know it were an alias, if
they had never come to our attention before.
But we do have another thing that we are working now.
One is, if they have ever come to our attention before in
that we have previously seen them and issued or refused a visa,
now that US-VISIT is up and running, now that we are enrolling
people overseas, we have their fingerprint, so that if we have
ever seen them before, despite the fact that they have used an
alias, we have their print and we will know that.
While that is one program as we have described up and
running now and getting better every day, we do have another
thing that we are looking at, and that is facial recognition.
It is a technology that is maturing.
However, we have a program at 13 different posts overseas
as well as what we are exercising in conjunction with the
diversity visa lottery to begin to explore yet another
technology beyond the fingerprint that we already have.
So we have technology we are using as well as technology
that we are experimenting with. We are always trying to push
the envelope, sir.
Mr. Cox. Just lastly on this watch-list question, I want to
ask you about the testimony that the 9/11 commission received
yesterday, that apparently having your name on a list of
suspected terrorists does not guarantee you a place on the
FAA's no-fly list.
And as I understood the testimony, that may still be the
case. Is this correct? And what impact would a suspected
terrorist presence, or non-presence, on FAA's no-fly list have
in the contest of the US-VISIT program?
Mr. Hutchinson. Well, the no-fly list, of course, would
certainly--one, they would not be flying on the airplane to
enter our airports, if they were on the no-fly list. They
should not be on there to begin with.
And so as part of our security measures, that should be
caught before they would get on that aircraft. And then in the
event that the system failed in a foreign country, we would
know about that before they landed by checking the biographical
data.
Your question is about whether everybody on other watch
lists, FBI's and so on, is on the TSA no-fly list. And the
answer there is that any agency can submit a name for the no-
fly list--CIA, FBI--but it has to be more than just a name.
We obviously want to have the biographical data, either an
address, a date of birth, because if you submit just a name, it
might hit against 200 different people that would be flying,
particularly if you used a very common name, ``John Smith in
the United States,'' or a very common name in the Arab world,
then it is not really accomplishing anything by putting that on
the no-fly list.
And so that is part of the distinction and discussion. We
are obviously wanting any information that would help us
identify those people that would be at risk. But we also want
as much information from the agencies as we can get.
Mr. Cox. Thank you, Madam Vice Chairman.
And I thank our witnesses once again.
Ms. Granger. Thank you.
The chair now recognizes Representative Pascrell for five
minutes.
Mr. Pascrell. Thank you.
Just some quick--.
Ms. Granger. Can I stop you? I am sorry, I didn't see Mr.
Turner come in. I apologize.
I recognize Mr. Turner now for five minutes.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Madam Vice Chairman.
Mr. Hutchinson, I understand Ms. Sanchez was asking you
about the problem of wait time, particularly at the airports.
And I have taken a look at this memo that was issued by the
department to field operations on January 2nd. And that was the
memo that lowered the wait time--or stated that if the wait
times exceeded one hour, then you could waive the US-VISIT
process, and prior to that, your regulation was that if the
wait time exceeded two hours.
Now, it is strange to me that during a period of orange
alert, you changed the rules and you told field operations that
if there is a wait time that exceeds an hour, you can just
waive all these requirements, when previously at least you had
a two-hour rule.
So it seems like you sent a terrible signal to field
operations with regard to the meaning of US-VISIT.
Because--.
Ms. Granger. Representative Turner?
Mr. Turner. If I read this--.
Ms. Granger. Would the gentleman yield, please--.
Can the witness have a copy, please--.
Mr. Turner. Sure.
Ms. Granger. --before you question him about that. He does
not have a copy of that memo.
Mr. Turner. Asa, would you like a copy of this?
Mr. Hutchinson. I would be happy to look at it, but go
ahead and ask me questions.
Mr. Turner. There was an article that I read on a Web site,
World Daily Net, where several of the frontline screeners were
quite upset with this change, because they felt very strongly--
and I could quote a couple of them to you.
But the bottom line is, we know that the intent of US-
VISIT, according to Secretary Ridge, is to add about 15 seconds
to the wait time of an average passenger. That is what we are
told anyway.
And so to me it seems like at the very point in time when
you are implementing the system to say that if the lines get so
long and the backup such that we are going to have an hour
wait, then you can just waive the program and bring people in.
Not only is it a significant security risk?because as you
know, you are building a system that obviously will do what you
said in your opening statement. It will catch a lot more
criminals and a lot more immigrations violations than we have
ever caught before just because we are creating the system.
But that is not the standard.
You know, this system, unfortunately, has got to be
airtight. And if we already are loosening the rules, then I
think we are moving in the wrong direction. And more important,
I think it sends a terrible signal to those frontline workers
who are out there dedicated to making this work and knowing the
importance of what they are doing, and then to say, well, if
the wait lines are too long, just waive all this stuff and let
everybody on in.
So I would urge you to take a look at that, to make
hopefully a reassessment of that, and certainly make it clear
to those who are out there on the frontlines, working for your
agency, that we want this system to work and be implemented,
and that this is not a system that just because the lines are
long we will waive it.
Now, I recognize that we are going to have a lot of
pressure?and I am sure you felt it--from those who are
concerned about backlogs and the effect on travel.
But the way we have to deal with that is reallocation of
resources to be sure that we move people on through in a timely
way.
And to send a message this early that we are going to
loosen the rules, I think is a bad signal for us.
The other area that I have concern about is one I have
expressed on numerous occasions, is about your linkage to the
Terrorist Screening Center.
We all know that the Terrorist Screening Center is not yet
collecting on a real-time basis the information from other
databases. In fact, in many cases the information on many
government watch-list databases haven't yet been incorporated
into the unified terrorist watch list.
But in terms of the way it is working for you now, I want
you to describe for me, if you will, whether the data used by
US-VISIT is adequately comprehensive and up to date? And
describe the relationship between US-VISIT and the Terrorist
Screening Center.
My impression is, that is not a real-time linkage. And even
when you submit information to the Terrorist Screening Center,
they have to manually check all these other databases.
And even on the important FBI list that they maintain, that
you utilize, through the IDENT program, the FBI doesn't update
that list but once every two weeks.
So what I am interested in is, what is the state of
achieving what I hope some day we will be able to say is a
real-time system of screening for terrorists that will be
available to your frontline inspectors so that when somebody
walks through and enters our country and walks through the
inspection station, they can get the information back in real
time to know whether that person is a dangerous person.
Mr. Hutchinson. Well, the check is first against the
Interagency Border Inspections System, our IBIS database, that
has 26 different databases, including the State Department's,
including the Department of Justice, other databases that make
that up, including Treasury, with our tech system, including
the Justice Department.
And then it is also checked against the terrorist list from
the Terrorist Screening Center.
Now is it real time?
If a name is added by the Terrorist Screening Center to the
watch list, it is in real time communicated and refreshed with
our databases so it can be an immediate hit if that passenger
would try to come through.
Now can the system be improved? Absolutely. This is a new
system. We are building the capacity. The TSC is strengthening
its ability as well. This is being refined every day.
But I believe that with the technology that we have, being
ahead of the schedule, the biometrics, that we have enhanced
the ability of increasing our security at our ports of entry
with US-VISIT even over and above what the congressional
mandate was.
If I might go back to your first question about the memo
that was sent out, it was not a change--it had nothing to do
with whether it was two hours at our land borders during
orange, because there was different wait times if it was at a
heightened alert level.
As we implemented US-VISIT, we specifically looked at what
happens if the system does not work right or it takes longer.
And on the first initial phases of it, this memo was sent out.
For example, we are not including in the regulation people who
are older than 79. Well, I think that is a reasonable exclusion
from those that we would have finger scans on. But if we saw
excessive problems, we would reduce that to age 69.
Now, I think that is a reasonable step in the initial
phases as we implement US-VISIT. It has not been used. But if
it was necessary, it would not be by a line inspector, it would
be by a supervisor that would have to make that decision.
And we have not had to use that. I do not expect we will
have to use that. But I think it was a prudent step to take as
we rolled this out in 150 airports on the first day.
Mr. Turner. Well, I just want you know, I have talked--.
Ms. Granger. Mr. Turner, your time has expired. We will
have a second round.
The chair now recognizes Representative Shadegg for five
minutes.
Mr. Shadegg. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
I want to follow up on a question both by Mr. Cox and by
Mr. Turner and have you clarify for me.
I recognize that biometrics do a great job of ensuring that
the person who showed up to obtain the visa at the consulate
outside this country is the same person who then shows up at
the port of entry coming into the country.
But Mr. Cox asked I think what is the critical question and
that is, what if that person, intent on deceit from the get-go,
and they show up with the intent of using a false name to apply
in the first place.
Mr. Under Secretary, you indicated that they check at I
think you call it--is that interagency border data system? Is
that right? And is that checked when they show up at the port
of entry? Or is that checked when they show and apply for the
visa at the consulate outside the United States, I guess is my
first question.
And second question would be: Is that the only database
that is checked, or are there other databases that are checked
as well at that initial stage to try to find out if the person
presenting himself or herself is who they claim to be?
Ms. Harty. Thank you for the question, sir.
With reference to what happens at a consular section
overseas the consular officer runs what we call a CLASS
namecheck, that is what we call our system. There are other
systems of the government that feed into that.
CLASS is built, and in fact the U.S. government's
counterterrorism watch list at this point, is built on a system
started by the State Department in 1987 called TIPOFF.
Recently, over the last several months, TIPOFF's database
has migrated over to TTIC and TSC.
TIPOFF had 120,00 names in it. It is being augmented every
day per Homeland Security Presidential Directive No. 6, so that
all agencies are beginning to feed as TIPOFF did. But TIPOFF
formed the very spine of the new single database that we are
all working towards.
The consular officers cannot, as they adjudicate a visa,
hit the print key on a visa until they have run that namecheck,
first and foremost.
Now, with US-VISIT, what we have done in the 55 posts where
we are already up and running is, we are adding to that, the
biometric collection. So, in addition to running our CLASS
namecheck, based on the TIPOFF watch list, we also now run the
biometric namecheck in four posts, at this point: Riyadh,
Jeddah, Sanaa and San Salvador.
We are waiting until we get the namecheck back from the
IDENT system, DHS's IDENT system, before we actually go ahead
and issue the visa.
We will, of course--it is brand new; this is a pilot--but
we will be bringing each of those online in the days, weeks and
months ahead.
The time that it takes from the time that we ask IDENT,
``What about this fingerprint? What do you know?'' and by the
time we get an answer back, it has been about seven to eight
minutes; again, not adding too much.
Mr. Shadegg. I think you have just told me what you told
Mr. Cox, which is that if they haven't encountered the system
already and if they are not in our database as having an issue
as to whoever they are, that person, they can get by the
system.
And I guess my question would be: How do we go beyond our
own database to look at the individual? Is there a way that we
coordinate with host countries to find out some verification
that this person is who they say they are?
Ms. Harty. Thank you, sir.
One of the things that changed dramatically in the post-
September 11 world is our strong, strong emphasis on
interviewing techniques and on using the visa interview as a
genuine tool to spot people who might or might not be exactly
what they say they are.
So we have at the consular officer training at the Foreign
Service Institute added additional courses on detecting
deception, added additional courses taught by other agencies of
the government who give us up-to-date information on trends out
in the field of a counterterrorist nature.
We have taken a detecting deception course and added it to
the basic officer training course. We have also taken it on the
road so that mid-grade and more senior officers can also get
this training.
In addition to that, several years ago we formed what is
called a VISAS VIPER Committee meeting at post. That is where,
on at least a monthly basis, all officers at an embassy in law
enforcement--I am sorry.
Mr. Shadegg. I am running out of time and I wanted to get
in one more question, but go ahead.
Mr. Hutchinson. There is layered protections from the
interviews and to the checks that are done. But certainly,
theoretically someone could come in with a clean record, with
an alias name, and if they are not in the system before, if we
don't have their fingerprints, the first time through it would
not be a catch.
Mr. Shadegg. I appreciate your candor on that. And I think
you will never build a system where that cannot happen. I just
wanted to know if they were working at it.
Let me ask the last question: When I go home to Arizona and
I describe all the work of your department and the efforts that
are being made to deal with people that present themselves at a
border checkpoint, or a port of entry, to tighten down and US-
VISIT and all these other efforts, they kind of tilt their
heads and look at me as if to say, ``Congressman, you are
crazy. Have you ever looked at the border?''
What difference does it make if we do all these things at
our ports of entry when, on the southern border of my state,
there literally is not even a three-strand barbed wire fence
for the majority of the border?
And I guess I would be interested in how you would respond
to that question from a constituent.
Mr. Hutchinson. They are related. And obviously you have
got to have two tracks going in the same direction. One is
tightening it up at the ports of entry, which we are doing.
That, in essence, could force illegal entrants to come across
the land borders. And so, you have got to tighten that up as
well. We are addressing that through technology in the same
way, but they are related, and we have to do both.
Mr. Shadegg. Thank you.
Ms. Granger. Thank you.
The chair now recognizes Representative Pascrell for five
minute.
Mr. Pascrell. I have some quick questions, and then I have
some ones that perhaps you can elaborate on, Mr. Secretary.
Have we tested and come to the conclusion as the reason why
we are concentrating on fingerprints in this biometric quest,
here, has it proven to be more conclusive than facial
identification, hand geometry, handwriting, retinal tests and
voice? Is that the conclusion you came to?
Mr. Hutchinson. The conclusion is that it is more widely
accepted in the international community, and we have obviously
the added feature with finger scans that you have databases of
criminals and terrorists that are taken in that fashion. You
don't have the same databases of retina scans, for example.
Mr. Pascrell. Is it more accepted than it is accurate?
Mr. Hutchinson. Well, I think it is both accepted and
accurate.
Mr. Pascrell. Okay, my next question is, if I may:
Approximately how many photographs do we have of suspected
terrorists that we can compare to the digital facial
photographs we now take of foreign visitors, approximately?
Mr. Hutchinson. I don't have that exact number for you.
Mr. Pascrell. Could you get that to us, please?
Mr. Hutchinson. I would be happy to.
Mr. Pascrell. Is there a database of fingerprints that we
have of suspected terror?
Mr. Hutchinson. Yes.
Mr. Pascrell. We do have that database?
Mr. Hutchinson. Yes.
Mr. Pascrell. You have that database?
Mr. Hutchinson. Well, it is accessed through?
Mr. Pascrell. No, I don't mean you personally, but your
department?
Mr. Hutchinson. Yes, absolutely.
Mr. Pascrell. Okay, my next question is this: You referred
to the history of security in terms of trying to see who is
coming in and out of this country.
I want to go back to 1998, in the Senate Judiciary
Committee. In fact, a few people mention this in their
testimony. And in that report to the Congress of the United
States on border improvement and immigration, it is
interesting. You go back to see, you know, where we have come
in four years due to the tragedy of 2001.
``The committee is keenly aware that implementing an
automated entry-exit control system has absolutely nothing to
do with countering drug trafficking, halting the entry of
terrorists into the United State or with any other illegal
activity near the borders. An automated entry-exit control
system will at best provide information only on those who have
overstayed their visas.
``Even if a vast database of millions of visa overstayers
could be developed, this database will in no way provide
information as to which individuals might be engaging in other
unlawful activity. It will accordingly provide no assistance in
identifying terrorists, drug traffickers or other criminals.''
I would like your brief comment on that, if I may.
Mr. Hutchinson. Well, again, you point out that one of the
original focuses was that you would be able to identify visa
overstays to add integrity to our immigration system. As that
was in 1998, that changed somewhat after the attack on America,
and there was a renewed focus by Congress that not only is it
important for the integrity, but also for security purposes.
And so, there was additional features and requirements that
were made and probably a little bit different perspective was
added after that.
Mr. Pascrell. And my final question is this?and I thank you
for your candidness. We can go back over this again at another
time. I think it is important enough.
Once the visa holder is enrolled in US-VISIT, his or her
arrival information will be stored in the automated fingerprint
identification system, better known as IDENT. It is a biometric
database. That is correct, isn't it?
Mr. Hutchinson. That is correct. That is correct.
Mr. Pascrell. Am I right in thinking that the information
for applicants for admission under the US-VISIT with no
criminal record are contained in the same database as
individuals for whom DHS is on the lookout for? Is that
accurate?
Mr. Hutchinson. Well, they are contained in the same IDENT
system, but there would be an individual file, really, for each
individual traveler, and it is separated from the criminal
databases that would be associated with that.
Mr. Pascrell. Mr. Secretary, in conclusion, let me say
this: I think that is unacceptable. I think to include within
the same database of criminals or those that have been
identified with criminal activity. All immigrants is an insult
to every immigrant that comes into this country under this
particular program.
I would suggest through the chair that you examine that
situation, separate these folks out, because they are not
criminals. You know that just as well as I do.
Ms. Granger. Thank you.
Representative Dicks is now called on for eight minutes.
Mr. Hutchinson. Madam Chairman, could I respond to this--.
Ms. Granger. Yes, you may.
Mr. Hutchinson. --very appropriate question by Mr.
Pascrell?
And I thank you for that comment. And we certainly would
not want to do anything that would denigrate or be offensive to
our immigrant population.
I would just emphasize that, for example, IDENT has the FBI
database as part of that. And there are separate databases
within that, so it would be a separate system for those people
that would be coming in, myself--or not myself--but any foreign
visitor that would be traveling. That is held in there for
facilitating their travel and the second time around.
So I appreciate your point, and we certainly want to make
that distinction.
Ms. Granger. Thank you.
Representative Dicks?
Mr. Dicks. Thank you.
The first increment of the US-VISIT program relies on two
fingerprints, isn't that correct?
Mr. Hutchinson. Yes.
Mr. Dicks. One from each index finger for the purpose of
checking that individual's identity against the various
databases.
As we have discussed before, two prints are not always
reliable for finding a person's records in some of our
databases. For example, the FBI's IAFIS system uses all ten
prints and will often not return a match when only two prints
are used.
GAO and some of the biometric industry have said that more
prints may be necessary for US-VISIT to work as well as it
needs to.
Now, you and I had this discussion, but to hear the
discussion today, 600,000 people have come in and, through this
system, used their two index fingers.
Now, if we had done this right and had them do either eight
or ten, we would have a much more reliable system. We are going
to have to go to that at some point in order to make this thing
work properly, as you and I have discussed--and I know there is
very strong feeling, both in the House and Senate, that two
fingers are inadequate.
I would just like to have your comment here on the record
for why we did it that way. I know we were trying to rush and
do it, but now it looks to me like we are going to have to go
back and redo this. And we missed the opportunity to get these
600,000 people the first time.
Mr. Hutchinson. Thank you.
And the two fingerprints are sufficient for identification
purposes, that you confirm their identity, which is the first
responsibility. If there is an identity question, they are
referred to secondary, where the multiple prints can be taken
to have a more accurate check against the FBI databases, to
make sure there is not any confusion.
And so it is a limited purpose of identity with the two
fingerprints.
And the State Department is a key in this, that they have
invested in the fingerprint scans that they are deploying as to
whether down the road there has to be additional fingerprints
that are added. But that is a question of our systems
development, a question of resources with the State Department.
But this is an immediate added security value for a very
low-cost amount. I think it was like $1 million for these and
all of our ports of entry. We were immediately able to get the
security benefit, and then we will see where the system has to
gravitate down the road.
Mr. Dicks. Ambassador Harty, what do you think? I mean,
would we be better off to do all ten or eight fingerprints at
first and get this thing right?
Ms. Harty. Sir, thank you for the question.
I would like to agree with Under Secretary Hutchinson that
in the first instance, we were in fact very much consumed with
getting the identity right, identifying a traveler, getting to
the issue of document fraud and making sure that the people who
showed up at ports of entry were the people we had seen
overseas.
I am not an expert on this subject, but I know that there
have been a number of studies done, and not all conclusive,
that you can find a number of different entities out there,
some who say eight or ten are better. Let me just say maybe
that is not the case. I think what we have is a very strong
desire at the beginning of the program to meet the
congressional deadlines to get the identification in place.
Mr. Dicks. I think the deadlines are somewhat more created
by the administration. The secretary said, ``We will do it by a
certain date.''
I think we ought to make sure we are doing it right by a
specific date. Because if we go to a two-finger system, and
then we have to go back to a ten-finger system because we
didn't get it right, that is a waste of a lot of money and
effort, it seems to me. My view is we should have done it the
more comprehensive way at first if there was any question about
it.
And the issue is that you have got the IAFIS database at
the FBI that is a ten-finger system. So, you are not going to
have this relationship, according to the experts that I talked
to.
I just wanted to bring that up, and hope you will take
another look at it.
Ms. Harty. Certainly, sir.
Mr. Dicks. We have talked about the southern border. The
northern border is of concern to me, being from Washington
State.
I noticed in the statistics that the CBP has assigned 9,539
border agents to the southern border compared with 990 on the
4,121-mile northern border. How do we explain the difference,
here?
Mr. Hutchinson. Well, we have added 1,000 agents to the
northern border, which is 1,000 increase. And obviously the
northern border has not been a focus prior to the security
lessons that we learned from 9/11.
So we are continuing to enhance that, but it is a challenge
on both the northern and the southern border.
Mr. Dicks. You know, I usually don't quote from The
Washington Times, but The Washington Times, in December, did a
very comprehensive article about the problems and challenges we
face in Canada. One thing it said was that since 1995, at least
15 persons identified to federal authorities as known
terrorists have been caught crossing the border from Canada.
Two in Blaine, in Washington State.
And also that there are Al Qaida sleeper cells, even today,
in Canada.
Are we talking to the Canadians about trying to get them to
strengthen their system? We may make this enormous effort here
in the United States, but if these people can enter into
Canada, be in sleeper cells, come across the border, that this
may become--we have already seen with Ressam that this has
happened once before.
Thank goodness for a great agent who found this person up
in Port Angeles in my district, or we may have had a major
incident at the Los Angeles airport or in Seattle.
What are we doing with the Canadians to try to get them to
cooperate with us on this?
Mr. Hutchinson. You are absolutely correct that there are
vulnerabilities in the northern border that have to be
addressed.
We are working with the Canadian counterparts. We have our
integrated border enforcement teams, which the Royal Canadian
Mounted Police and our Border Patrol are working together. We
have moved air assets to the northern border, including the
building of new facilities to accommodate those air assets. We
have put new technology there, surveillance equipment, sensors.
It is a vast, open border. There is a tradition of openness
there that we have had to take a much closer look at and
enhance the security on since 9/11.
We will continue to do that, but we are working closely
with the Canadian government.
Mr. Dicks. Are they doing a better job of trying to screen
people--do what we are trying to do in terms of keeping these
terrorists out of their country?
Mr. Hutchinson. They are. We are wanting them to do some
additional things, working with them. Obviously if you get to
North America, whether it is Canada or the United States, and
you have an open border, you can traverse back and forth.
And so, we need to on the front end have a common policy on
who gets into North America. That would enhance our security.
And we are working with them and with the State Department to
accomplish.
Mr. Dicks. I urge you to keep that up.
Now, let me ask you one more thing: When they go across the
border, you have trucks, you have cars. I know if you slowed it
down, you would have a backup for miles and miles and miles.
What kind of equipment are we using to scan these trucks
and cars? Do you know what we are using?
Mr. Hutchinson. Each inspector has their personal radiation
equipment. We also have non-intrusive inspection equipment, and
then we have radiation portals for the larger vehicles that go
through.
So a variety of different technologies that will accomplish
the inspection, both radiation detection as well as X-ray
examination to detect any anomalies in the shipment.
Mr. Dicks. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Ms. Granger. Thank you very much.
I have no additional questions.
I will call on Chairman Cox.
Do you have additional questions?
Mr. Cox. Madam Vice Chairman, I have a great many further
questions for our panel. I know we have another panel. And I
would yield to the vice chairwoman to excuse our witnesses,
provided that we might have the opportunity to follow up with
written questions.
Ms. Granger. Thank you.
Representative Turner, do you have additional questions?
Five minutes.
Mr. Turner. I just have one follow up.
Mr. Secretary, you made the comment about the inspections
going on at our land borders. You mentioned that we have
radiation detection portals. You mentioned the hand-held
devices.
Where do we have radiation portals that you were referring
to on our land borders?
Mr. Hutchinson. Well, if you are looking at the cargo
shipments, the trucks, we have portals in a whole host of
places on the northern and the southern border. I would be
happy to provide you with a precise list as to where they are.
Mr. Turner. And what is the criteria for utilizing them?
Mr. Hutchinson. Well, if, for example, a personal radiation
detector triggered, indicating there was some radiation being
admitted, then if it was a truck, it would be brought through
for closer examination in the larger portal.
In other places, where we have perhaps more equipment in
place, they are automatically run through the portal.
I was at a land point of entry on the northern border in
which every truck vehicle was being passed through the
radiation portal.
Mr. Turner. Well, in regard to radiation portals, I know
you have deployed some of those at seaports. And we don't yet
have enough at our seaports to really screen all the cargo
containers. And I was wondering if you have a plan and a cost
estimate of what it is going to take to have radiation portals
at all of our border crossings, including the seaports and the
land crossings?
Is this a goal of the department? Could you provide us with
a number as to what it would cost to have that kind of
capability?
Mr. Hutchinson. It is a goal. And I would be happy to
provide you with where they are deployed at the present time
and the schedule this year for deploying additional portals at
our land-and our sea-ports.
Mr. Turner. Well, do you consider it an appropriate,
pressing, and urgent need to have the capability at both
seaports and land crossings, to be able to have sufficient
radiation detection portals so that all cargo containers coming
across the land borders and into our seaports could be screened
for radiation?
Mr. Hutchinson. I would underscore the word ``could be
screened.'' It is important. And we consider it a high priority
to make sure this equipment is deployed. Obviously, we are not
deploying it in sufficient quantity, nor do I think we should,
that every container coming through the seaport would go
through that portal.
Those that we identify for further inspection or at risk
should go through there, and do go through there. And
sufficient portals should be deployed for that purpose.
Mr. Turner. How much money is requested in your most recent
budget request for radiation portals?
Mr. Hutchinson. The budget will be announced on I believe
next Monday. And we will be able to provide that figure for
2005.
Mr. Turner. You won't give me a little advance briefing
here, then?
Mr. Hutchinson. No, but I will go back and look it up.
Mr. Turner. Well, let me say this: I heard you state that
you weren't--and I understand this is the department's
position, that we do not need to screen all cargo containers
for radiation. And I really think you ought to rethink that
position.
I have been told--and I would invite you to check it out--
that we could have sufficient radiation detection portals at
all seaports, sufficient to allow all cargo containers coming
in on ships to be run through them and checked for radiation
for $75 million. Not a big price tag, if accurate.
And if you go down to the port of Norfolk, you can see
where they on their own, with their own money, have purchased
sufficient radiation portals to check for radiation. And as you
know, these hand-held devices that these folks have, they are
not really so much for screening as for really measuring the
dosage that they may be exposed to.
So I would urge you to reconsider that and to look at your
budget request and see if perhaps we couldn't get that taken
care of.
Are there deployed at any of our ports, particularly our
land crossings--.
Ms. Granger. Mr. Turner, you have gone over your five
minutes.
Mr. Turner. All right, I am sorry.
I will ask you again.
Mr. Hutchinson. Thank you for those comments. And we will
continue to evaluate. As the technology improves, it might be
more cost-effective, and we can do more.
Ms. Granger. Thank you.
The chair now recognizes Representative Shadegg for five
minutes.
Mr. Shadegg. Madam Chairman, I know you want to move on to
the next panel, so I will try to be as brief as I can.
Undersecretary Hutchinson, I know the deadline for the 50
highest volume land borders is at the end of this year. As I
understand it, your goal is to have contracts in place with the
private sector by May 1 to meet that deadline, is that correct?
Mr. Hutchinson. That's correct.
Mr. Shadegg. I will just ask one question with two parts to
it: One, can you briefly describe the challenges you face to
implementing this program at those land borders? In my State of
Arizona, we have a number that will fall into that category,
but some are very high volume crossings. Nogales is a hub of
commerce on the southern border of Arizona.
What challenges do you face, number one?
And number two, what are you doing to work with the
community to give them advance knowledge and kind of prepare
them for the shock of the new program, so that there is not a
negative reaction?
Mr. Hutchinson. Challenges and what we are doing to
prepare.
First of all, a good communication plan. We want to spend a
lot of time on the border, working with the communities and
bringing them in the process as we develop these solutions.
And I hope that there is some level of confidence--the fact
that we are trying to do this in the air and sea ports without
backlogs will indicate we have the same intent on the land
borders.
This illustrates some of the vastness of the problem. We
have the traveler population, air, sea and land, and you see
the land categories which we will face on the borders, you have
citizens, 120 million; permanent residents, 75 million; visa
exempt, which are primarily Canadians, 52 million; visa waiver,
1.8 million; regular visas, 4.5 million, but the border
crossing card, 104 million. And you compare that to the
airports and seaports, you are looking at 79 million versus 358
million.
So the challenge is multifold, compared to what we have
just done.
And with great respect to Congressman Turner who asked
about the mitigation strategy, we almost have to have a
mitigation strategy when it comes to land borders.
You know, we cannot just simply clog it. And so, we have to
implement this in a way that gives us a measure of security,
that has some flexibility to it but still is consistent with
the commerce that needs to flow through.
That is our challenge. We are looking at new technology.
First of all, in the 2004 spin plan, we are looking at having
the same solution that we have at our airports at our land
borders for regular visa holders that travel through.
And so, they would go to secondary inspection, be enrolled
in US-VISIT, just as they are now, but it doesn't clog the
border. That's 4.5 million visitors.
Visa waiver, obviously they go to our secondary inspection
now as well.
The big challenge is the border crossing card, which, if
they are used as a visa, would go to secondary inspection, can
be enrolled, but if they are just used for the crossing card
purposes, you are looking at 104 million people going through.
We are looking at R.F.-technology. We are looking at
different technologies that can accomplish some objectives of
what we want to do, consistent with the congressional mandate.
We are looking forward to working with this committee to meet
that challenge that we have.
Mr. Shadegg. I wish you luck.
Mr. Hutchinson. Thank you.
Mr. Shadegg. I yield back, Madam Chairman.
Ms. Granger. The Chair now recognizes Representative
Sanchez for five minutes.
Ms. Loretta Sanchez of California. Thank you, Madam Chair.
I just have a couple of questions--more that I will put
in--but I am really concerned about the accuracy and the lack
of connectedness of the different databases that we are
searching to find these people to check against them, to see if
they are bad people or good people.
I have been told that the databases contain a lot of
errors, conflicting information. And I guess my question is to
the policy or lack of policy that allows these problems to be
addressed, the erroneous data to be changed.
For example, let's say that I am mistaken for another
Loretta Sanchez who has a warrant out for her arrest. And I go
through the airport. And I have to sit down. I have to talk to
the CBP officer. I prove to him that in fact I am the
congresswoman that is Loretta Sanchez, not the fugitive. And he
sees that.
But there is no procedure in place right now from what I am
told to be able to change that in the database.
Which means that the next time I come to the airport, I get
treated in the same way, I get pulled aside as the bad Loretta
Sanchez. I have to sit down. I have to explain to this guy or
lady that, you know, that is just not the case.
So I guess my question goes to how are we integrating these
databases? What kind of policies do we have to ensure accuracy
and to eliminate mistaken identity problems, for example,
because, you know, it is not only a waste of my time, but it is
a waste of valuable resources in these officers on the front
line.
Ms. Harty. While I hesitate to speak for my colleague of
the Terrorist Screening Center, I did sit with her two days ago
at another hearing, so I would just like to give you in part
her answer and in part my own.
On the overseas side, we do often have that, as
Undersecretary Hutchinson alluded to earlier, where there might
be another person with your same name out there. We see that
somewhat regularly. That is why we have a very strong emphasis
on getting not only the name of the person, but a date and
place of birth, so that we can make sure that we are talking
about the right person.
We have procedures at State to remove somebody from the
system if in fact that information is erroneous.
On the part of my colleague from TSC, she mentioned exactly
the same thing, that one of the things of course they are very
interested in is facilitating legitimate travel by legitimate
people. That, in fact, she said, they do have a procedure and
have employed it--they haven't been up and running very long,
but have employed it on a number of occasions already,
specifically to make sure that honest, decent people who are
not the subject of a hit should not in fact have to fear
traveling through a U.S. port of entry.
You might want to add something to that, but that is, in
fact, what I heard her say just the other day.
Mr. Hutchinson. We have processes in place as well that
someone who is mistakenly identified can be removed.
But the problem you have expressed very well: If we have
information--intelligence that is received--that Asa Hutchinson
is planning a terrorist attack. And that is intelligence that
we get, perhaps it is electronic, maybe it is a human source.
And that is all we have. What do we do with that one name?
Now, I think the public would expect that that name would
be entered so we can be on the lookout for an Asa Hutchinson.
But there is not a date of birth with it. There is not an
address with it.
And so, sometimes you have bits of information. Sometimes
it is more limited. And so, we have--you are right--policy
questions. But we also have some huge responsibilities when we
have little bits of information to share it with the right
people.
Ms. Loretta Sanchez of California. You know, it really is a
problem. And even when you have the date of birth, for example,
because there is, in fact, another Lorena Sanchez that was born
on the same day, that lives in the same city that I live in.
So, you know, constantly confused.
And so, if we do it there, I can just imagine doing it at
the airport.
But more importantly, I represent the largest Vietnamese
population outside of Vietnam in the world. They all have the
same name, practically. And I don't know how that happens.
Maybe it was when everybody was being processed, it was easier
to give them Tranh or Wen, rather than, you know, what their
name was. Or maybe it is all the same family.
But they have the same names over and over and over again.
And this is one of the issues that they bring up to me.
As well as a very large Arab-American community in my area,
largest in California, that, you know, their names are
butchered all over the place.
So if it even looks close to something, they are being
stopped at LAX or other airports.
Mr. Hutchinson. And you are right. And so that is why we
want to have identifying information for the passengers who fly
that can distinguish them from just simply a name on a
terrorist list. And that is why we are developing our CAPS II
system, working with the airlines and the European Commission
to get the passenger name record data that will eliminate--help
reduce--the problem that you articulated.
Ms. Loretta Sanchez of California. And the other problem, I
would say, is just that the--just because one data base has the
new Loretta Sanchez or don't get this Loretta Sanchez, it
doesn't seem that a lot of the databases are also being updated
at the same time.
Thank you, Madam.
Ms. Granger. Thank you very much. That concludes the
testimony and questions for this panel. We thank both of our
witnesses very much. And the second panel can come to the
witness table now.
We are expecting a vote, probably between 1:45 and 2:00, we
understand.
Let me clarify, for the record, there was a question from
Mr. Dicks concerning the two prints in the IAFIS system that
comes from the FBI. And when the two prints are made, they can
still match with two points on the IAFIS system. If that is
true, after that match is made, that there is an indication
that there could be a match because there are only two prints
compared to 10 prints, there still could be a match on the two
prints.
Thank you.
I thank you for being here. We will now begin testimony
from Mr. May, from the Air Transport Association; followed by
Ms. Campbell Walker from the El Paso Foreign Trade Association;
and then by Mr. Carlton with the International Biometrics
Group.
Mr. May, we have received your written testimony, and ask
that you briefly summarize in five minutes your statement.
STATEMENT OF JAMES MAY, PRESIDENT AND CEO, AIR TRANSPORT
ASSOCIATION
Mr. May. Thank you, Madam Chairman. And since over the
years I have learned not to put you to sleep by trying to read,
I will just do that very thing.
Number one, we think the US-VISIT program is working well.
It is something that we had the pleasure of doing a test based
on at the Atlanta Hartsfield airport with Delta Air Lines, as
you are well aware.
We were very concerned that it would in the final analysis
significantly delay the process of passengers coming into the
United States. We were concerned that it would delay connecting
flights and so forth.
To date, it has worked well. The capture of the biometric
information has worked well. We are looking at probably 10 to
15 minutes on average on waits in there and 20 at the outside.
There are certain longer periods of time, but for the most part
the system is working well as it gets rolled out across the
country, with 115-some odd points of capture.
We have roughly 17.5 million passengers that we carry that
are arguably subject to the US-VISIT program, so it has a real
potential impact on us. So far, the entry program is working
well.
Exit, as you are well aware, is being tested at BWI. It is
a far more challenging environment going out than it is coming
in. To date, we are using DHS is using kiosks. They are set up
inside the security perimeter.
I think there are a couple of issues that we have raised
with DHS on the workability of those projects. The first is, I
think they need to do a little bit better job of signage. The
second is that they probably need to think about having sort of
an audio component to those kiosks, conceivable even multi-
lingual.
I think they are using one employee per five right now, and
they may have to kick that up a little bit along the way.
The goal for us on the exit is to make sure, as was the
case on the entrance, that we don't turn airline personnel into
immigration agents, number one; number two, we don't have a
system that ends up costing the airlines an additional millions
of dollars in security costs which we can ill afford--we are
already spending $3 billion a year on unreimbursed security
costs; and to have it be a process that works through quickly,
so as not to delay unduly our passengers and to have the
facilitation process work well.
To date, we are pleased with the cooperation we are getting
from DHS and the State Department. We think the program is
working well from our perspective. I am happy to answer any
questions you may have.
[The statement of Mr. May follows:]
Prepared Statement of James C. May
Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee, my name is James C.
May and I am President and CEO of the Air Transport Association of
America (ATA). ATA is the trade association for leading U.S. airlines.
Our members transport over 95 percent of all the passenger and cargo
traffic in the United States. Thank you for inviting me to appear
before you today to discuss the United States' Visitor and Immigrant
Status Indicator Technology Program--more commonly known as ``US-
VISIT''.
Congress mandated the US-VISIT program in the Enhanced Border
Security and Visa Reform Act of 2002. This statute established the
requirement that all foreign national visa holders be photographed and
fingerprinted upon arrival and prior to departure from the United
States. The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) broad Congressional
mandate to create an integrated, automated entry/exit system, recording
the arrival and departure of travelers is both ambitious and important.
Because the airline industry transports 51 million international
passengers each year, it is essential to our industry, and our
passengers, that this program improve overall border management while
further enhancing our Nation's security. We support DHS in its efforts
to create and implement US-VISIT.
While the airline industry is pleased to work with DHS and our
national security leaders to participate in these programs, we believe
it is critical that DHS adhere to the planned schedule for deploying
US-VISIT at the northern and southern land borders. This is especially
important since airline passengers make up only 4 percent of all U.S.
entrants subject to US-VISIT requirements while land borders make up 37
percent of such visitors. Until US-VISIT is deployed nationwide at all
border crossings, the system will not be effective in enhancing our
national security
We compliment the Department of Homeland Security, and
specifically, Undersecretary Hutchinson and the Office of Border and
Transportation Security, the US-VISIT Program Office, and the Bureau of
Customs and Border Protection (CBP), for working together to carefully
and completely plan for a successful implementation. Their attention to
careful planning, in full consultation with all interested parties has
been first rate. We look forward to continuing this cooperative
approach.
First, I will offer some lessons learned and observations about the
entry portion of US-VISIT. Second, I will address on-going concerns
with the exit pilot program. Finally, I will briefly mention some
overarching screening program concerns.
US-VISIT--ENTRY
As you know, the pilot for entry was conducted at Atlanta's
Hartsfield/Jackson International Airport, in partnership with Delta Air
Lines. We believe it was an excellent opportunity to test the process
both from the government and the industry perspective. The pilot
allowed everyone involved to become familiar with the newly deployed
equipment and to provide input at the implementation phase.
In the short time that the US-VISIT entry process has been
operational, the airlines have been very pleased with its smooth
operation. Airlines believe that a key to the initial success of the
US-VISIT entry process can be attributed to the increased federal
inspectors associated with the program.
We initially were wary of the decision to place the entry process
at the primary immigration inspection stanchions due to concerns over
staffing levels. Ensuring an adequate number of federal inspectors,
whether legacy INS or legacy Customs, has been a longstanding and
significant concern of the airline industry. If not adequately staffed,
such placement in the current configuration of most airports could not
accommodate the inevitable long lines due to the US-VISIT processing
requirements. In addition, these long lines not only delay our
customers and but also could possibly delay airport operations.
This DHS worked with us to address this staffing level issue;
therefore, we are satisfied that the US-VISIT entry process has not
inhibited or lengthened the overall passenger processing times as we
had feared.
US-VISIT--EXIT
As with the entry process, we appreciate the open communications we
have had, and are having, with DHS on the development of the exit
portion of the program. As you are aware, a kiosk approach is being
piloted at Baltimore/Washington International Airport (BWI). This
approach versus other possibilities--for example, processing eligible
US-VISIT passengers at the TSA checkpoint--remains an open question.
Given the opportunity to evaluate the exit pilot thus far, we have
some remaining issues we would like to see addressed. First, due to the
voluntary nature of the current pilot, we are concerned that the
underlying purpose of US-VISIT, monitoring both the entry and exit of
foreign nationals will not be met. Without government enforcement, the
airline industry could be put in a position of transporting an
ineligible passenger to the United States only to have to absorb the
expense of returning that passenger back to his originating airport.
Second, at the BWI pilot, the kiosks are located immediately beyond
the Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) checkpoint. US-VISIT
has placed signage both within the TSA checkpoint and immediately
beyond the checkpoint, directing passengers to the kiosks. We believe
that the signage is insufficient. At the TSA checkpoint, passengers are
too busy concentrating on keeping on eye on their belongings--coats,
shoes, jewelry, etc. to notice the signage.
Third, the kiosks are silent. Currently, the system relies on a
touch screen with icons to direct the passenger through the process.
From our observation, this is inadequate. More work remains to be done
to make the process easily understood and user friendly, particularly
for non-English speaking travelers.
As we continue through this pilot program, we understand that the
Office of Management and Budget has directed DHS to explore
alternatives to the kiosk system in capturing the biometric data. The
airline industry asks to participate in any discussions on this topic.
As you are aware, ATA opposes any requirement that airline staff
collect the biometric data, either at the check-in counters or at the
departure gates. Airline personnel should not be used as quasi-
immigration officers.
OTHER SCREENING ISSUES
We are aware that DHS is developing other passenger screening
capabilities, most specifically the CAPPS II program that may be
adapted to also readily identify US-VISIT exiting passengers. We would
urge that, as these programs develop, consideration be given to
combining screening and exit processing to better meet the needs of the
traveling public and continue to enhance vital security needs. We
believe that the nation's interests will best be served by a seamless,
fully integrated approach to passenger processing and screening. When
fully implemented the US-VISIT entry/exit program must be enforceable
and integrated into any new technologies and programs under development
at the DHS.
In conclusion, I want to reiterate our support for the
comprehensive and efficient implementation of the US-VISIT entry
program. We look forward to working with both the Congress and the DHS
to fine tune the processes and develop an exit policy that meets the
requirements of the law, but does not discourage travel to the United
States.
Mr. Chairman, thank you again for inviting me to testify on a very
important component to the nation's overall security policy. I will be
happy to answer any questions that you may have.
Ms. Granger. Ms. Campbell Walker?
STATEMENT OF KATHLEEN CAMPBELL WALKER, A MEMBER OF THE BOARD OF
DIRECTORS OF THE EL PASO FOREIGN TRADE ASSOCIATION AND A MEMBER
OF THE AMERICAN IMMIGRATION LAWYERS ASSOCIATION
Ms. Campbell Walker. Madam Chairperson and distinguished
members of this subcommittee, thank you very much for the
opportunity to be presenting testimony before you today.
I am currently on the executive committee of the American
Immigration Lawyers Association, an association of over 8,500
lawyers representing thousands of individuals who are trying to
comply with our immigration laws.
And in addition to that, since 1985, I have been a member
of the board of the El Paso Foreign Trade Association, now
known as the foreign trade association, on which we worked for
four years on establishing the first dedicated commuter lane in
the State of Texas. And in addition to that, we also worked on
the project, just recently implemented and introduced by
Secretary Ridge, the new FAST lane, concerning commercial
traffic.
The history that I am trying to bring is one of cooperation
and work with federal, state and local officials, trying to
create realistic solutions when we are talking about where the
rubber hits the road. And that is where I am down in El Paso
for the past 18 years.
I have got to say that we are extremely concerned that
unless a deadline is pushed regarding implementation of the 50
busiest land ports, which will include El Paso and many others
in the State of Texas and elsewhere, that we will have total
gridlock.
And I find it interesting in the analysis of the success so
far of US-VISIT. I would like to just make a few points. But I
am trying to make constructive comments, because if we don't
understand the reality of the process, we cannot give the
process the attributes and enhancements that it needs to
accomplish its objectives.
So I hope that these comments are taken in that light.
US-VISIT is supposed to be an exit and an entry system.
Obviously, as of January 5th, we don't have the exit part. And
if we did have the exit part, we would have a serious problem.
On the entry segment, as well, the Ahern memo you
referenced earlier is a logical memo, based on the realities
that we have economic trade interdependence here, and our trade
is paying for our security. So we have got to manage that
balance.
I think that it is an indicator that the memo was issued
that indeed additional resources are necessary to properly
implement. And that is all it states, a truism that needs to be
addressed.
From the perspective of land ports, for me the easiest way
for me to take a quick snapshot of what we are dealing with is
for hopefully those who haven't visited our land borders down
South, we hope that you will come visit and be our guests.
But on a different note, where do we stand right now on our
land borders, at our land ports?
First of all, we are not addressing that obvious point that
was raised earlier in testimony, that we don't have control of
our borders. We still have migration flows between our ports.
That is an issue that hopefully we will address with
comprehensive immigration reform legislation.
But on a different note about what are we dealing with
right now, we have pedestrians, a huge volume, coming through
our ports. In addition to that, commercial vehicles and
passengers vehicles.
We don't even have a basis IBIS check that takes a few
seconds being conducted on 100 percent of our pedestrians.
There is a 40 percent minimum requirement.
We don't have mandatory checks at all at that level being
conducted at our passenger vehicle lanes. The reason is that
they are lucky to have these mobile tech units in which they
are able to access IBIS if they type it in.
We don't have time to be able to actually get people
through and indeed access that information on everybody with
what we have in place right now.
And we cannot get it there by December 31st.
Another point is just flat infrastructure, land and people.
We don't have a spot for exit control at all of our ports. And
recently someone talked about they are going to buy 1,000
scanners. And 1,000 scanners to scan these biometric documents,
I am sorry, doesn't even begin to address the situation.
At one point in time they were saying if we got one scanner
a port, we would be doing great. Well, at one of our ports, we
have like 10 passenger vehicle lanes, 10 pedestrian, and five
or six commercial. So that is just at one port. How does one
scanner deal with that issue?
So what I am concerned about is, if we are going to make
the system work, let's assess it realistically and give it the
tools that it needs to be a success.
And I am not going to sit here and denigrate the efforts
made by the Department of Homeland Security and the Department
of State. Laudable efforts. Amazing work so far.
But there is a reality check that needs to be made before
we end up lulling ourselves into a false sense of security. And
I think that is the path we are going upon.
As far as the biometric check issue, I hope that someone
will ask me a really hard question later on, really about that
IDENT point, because if you look at your normal inspector--and
I have got to shut up very quickly, the normal inspector does
not have access to something called CLAIMS 3 regarding
immigration status. The normal inspector doesn't have access to
the CCD database they were talking about on the primary
inspection line.
So I would just like those issues described and discussed
later.
Thank you for the opportunity.
[The statement of Ms. Campbell Walker follows:]
Prepared Statement of Kathleen Campbell Walker
Mr. Chairman and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, I am
Kathleen Campbell Walker, Treasurer of the American Immigration Lawyers
Association (AILA). I am honored to be here today representing two
organizations, AILA and the Foreign Trade Association of the Paso del
Norte region.
AILA is the immigration bar association with more than 8,500
members who practice immigration law. Founded in 1946, the association
is a nonpartisan, nonprofit organization and is an affiliated
organization of the American Bar Association (ABA). AILA members
represent tens of thousands of: U.S. families who have applied for
permanent residence for their spouses, children, and other close
relatives to lawfully enter and reside in the United States; U.S.
businesses, universities, colleges, and industries that sponsor highly
skilled foreign professionals seeking to enter the United States on a
temporary basis or, having proved the unavailability of U.S. workers
when required, on a permanent basis; and healthcare workers, asylum
seekers, often on a pro bono basis, as well as athletes, entertainers,
exchange visitors, artists, and foreign students. AILA members have
assisted in contributing ideas for increased port of entry inspection
efficiencies and continue to work through their national liaison
activities with federal agencies engaged in the administration and
enforcement of our immigration laws to identify ways to improve
adjudicative processes and procedures.
The Foreign Trade Association of the Paso del Norte region was
originally incorporated in 1985 as the El Paso Foreign Trade
Association. The mission of the Foreign Trade Association is to enhance
and advance bilateral trade in the Paso del Norte region, which
includes El Paso, Texas, southern New Mexico, and the northern part of
the State of Chihuahua in Mexico, which includes Ciudad Juarez. The
Association's membership includes maquiladora executives and service
industry leaders from both sides of the U.S.-Mexico border. The
Association has a history of working with federal, state, and local
officials on both sides of the border to implement projects for the
improvement of cross-border trade and commerce. For example, the
Association spearheaded a four-year project partially funded by the El
Paso community to construct the first dedicated commuter lane in Texas
using Secure Electronic Network for Travelers Rapid Inspection (SENTRI)
technology. It also helped to implement the first FAST lane on the
southern border for commercial traffic in the past few months.
Both organizations appreciate the opportunity to testify today on
``Integrity and Security at the Border: The US-VISIT Program.'' While
our organizations differ in many respects, we both strongly hold the
view that it is vitally important to enhance our nation's security in a
way which balances our need for enhanced security with our economic
dependence on the international and the cross-border flow of people and
goods, which helps to pay for our national security.
I am here today to testify on the US-VISIT program and to offer
suggestions to help potentially ensure that this program works
efficiently and effectively, so that we can achieve a viable inspection
process and enhance security at our borders. Living in a post September
11 environment demands that we develop new programs that balance a
recognition of the fact that our nation is inextricably linked to the
world around us with the need to protect ourselves from those who would
do us harm. We all have much to learn from our past mistakes as well as
our past successes. I hope this testimony contributes to a productive
discussion.
What is US-VISIT? The United States Visitor and Immigrant Status
Indicator Technology program (US-VISIT) is the new automated entry/exit
system that is being implemented at our nation's ports of entry. It is
designed to collect and share information on foreign nationals
traveling to the United States (including travel details and biometric
identifiers), confirm identity, measure security risks, and assess the
legitimacy of travel in an effort to determine who is welcome and who
is not, and help speed traffic flow. The overall plan for the
implementation of US-VISIT calls for the collection of personal data,
photos and fingerprints, at U.S. consular offices abroad and at our
ports of entry, as well as broad database and information sharing. The
system also is intended to track changes in foreign nationals'
immigration status and make updates and adjustments accordingly.
Ultimately, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) plans to make
available information captured through US-VISIT at all ports of entry
and throughout the entire immigration enforcement system.
US-VISIT is the latest manifestation of an earlier program, Section
110 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
of 1996 (P.L. 104-208) (IIRAIRA). The concept of an entry/exit system
to monitor entries at and exits from our nation's ports of entry was
first articulated in Section 110, which created an entry/exit system
that would have applied to all non-U.S. citizens who entered or exited
the United States at any port of entry to identify visa overstayers.
Although subsequent laws altered both the deadline and the parameters
of the Section 110 entry/exit program, the general framework of Section
110 entry/exit remains the same today. [The Congressional deadline for
the entry/exit system was delayed by P.L 105-259 to October 15, 1998.
In P.L. 105-277, the deadline was pushed back to March 30, 2001, for
land ports of entry and seaports. This law did not affect the deadline
for implementation at airports.]
The Data Management Improvement Act of 2000 (P.L. 106-215) (DMIA)
amended Section 110 to require that the entry/exit system use data that
already was being collected from foreign nationals and prohibited the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) from imposing additional
entry or exit documentary or data collection requirements for purposes
of the entry/exit system. The act mandated the development of a
searchable centralized database and staggered the entry/exit
implementation deadlines into three very difficult to achieve time
frames as follows:
Airports and Seaports--December 31, 2003
Top 50 high traffic land border ports--December 31,
2004
Remaining implementation for all other ports--December
31, 2005
While the system set forth by Section 110, and amended by the DMIA,
must record entry and exit for foreign nationals without establishing
additional documentary or data collection requirements for the purposes
of the entry/exit system, the laws do not prohibit DHS from developing
new documentary or data collection requirements to implement provisions
contained in other laws. Certainly, the mandate of US-VISIT--to enroll
applicants for visas and admission to the U.S. via the collection of
two print fingerprints and a digitized photograph--is beyond current
procedures. The potential remains for DHS to include within US-VISIT
categories of foreign nationals now exempt from program participation,
including legal permanent residents, Canadian citizens, and Visa Waiver
Program participants.
In the post-9/11 environment, Congress took another look at the
Section 110 entry/exit system in the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 (P.L. 107-
56) (PATRIOT Act). The law encouraged the development of the entry/exit
system with ``all deliberate speed'' and as ``expeditiously as
practicable,'' and established a taskforce made up of governmental and
private industry representatives to review the establishment of an
entry/exit system. The law also mandated that the entry/exit system use
biometric technology and requires tamper-resistant documents readable
at all ports of entry.
With the passage of the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry
Reform Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-173) (Enhanced Border Security Act),
Congress addressed the entry/exit system as a program that balances
security with the economic realities of our busy ports. To strike this
balance, the act mandated that the entry/exit program utilize
technologies that facilitate the efficient flow of commerce and travel,
including interoperable data bases that aid in the determination of who
should be allowed entry into the U.S. Congress here clearly recognized
the need to balance improved border security with our nation's economic
security as it relates to the flow of people and goods through our
nation's ports of entry.
The First Phase of US-VISIT
Testing for the first phase of the US-VISIT program's
implementation at airports and seaports began in the Hartsfield
International Airport in Atlanta during November 2003. DHS reported
that during the pilot testing phase, over 140,000 individuals were
enrolled in US-VISIT and 21 individuals were intercepted upon entry.
DHS has not indicated whether these individuals would have been
admitted to the U.S. if the typical pre-VISIT inspections process had
been used.
On January 5th, the first phase of US-VISIT became operational at
14 seaports and 115 airports nationwide. DHS explained the five-day
delay in implementation (the program was originally set to begin on
December 31, 2003) as an effort to avoid disrupting holiday travel.
This delay, however, was more than a magnanimous overture, because the
first part of the year is traditionally a slow travel season.
Implementing US-VISIT while travel is light has led to reports that US-
VISIT's procedures do not cause appreciable delays. US-VISIT, as
currently implemented at our ports of entry, does not involve any
biometric security check prior to admission. And, subsequent
applications for admission by US-VISIT enrollees will only require a
biometric check to verify the identity of the enrolled foreign
national.
US-VISIT currently is set-up so that nonimmigrant visa holders
applying for admission to the U.S. through one of the US-VISIT
designated airports or seaports will undergo the standard inspection
process and simultaneously will be enrolled in the US-VISIT system. If
these individuals leave through a port with US-VISIT exit capabilities
(of which there currently is only one airport and one seaport), these
travelers must comply with US-VISIT exit procedures upon their
departure from the U.S. Unfortunately, such procedures are still
sketchy at best and the consequences for failure to comply can be
severe, according to the US-VISIT interim final implementing
regulations published at 69 Fed. Reg. 467-481.
Enrollment at the Ports of Entry under US-VISIT
During the first phase of US-VISIT's implementation, only
nonimmigrant visa holders who enter the U.S. through an air or seaport
that has US-VISIT capability will be enrolled in the program. The first
time DHS enrolls a traveler into US-VISIT at a port, the individual's
travel documents will be scanned, a digital photo and inkless
fingerprints of both index fingers will be taken, and the individual's
name will be checked against the Interagency Border Inspection Service
(IBIS) database and the wants and warrants section of the National
Crime Information Center (NCIC) database. Both of these checks are text
(not biometric) checks. IBIS contains certain terrorist watch list
information from the TIPOFF database maintained by the Department of
State (DOS).
The enrollment process is supposed to take about 10 to 15 seconds.
The primary reason for the speed of this process is that the security
check against the applicable biometric database, Automated Biometric
Identification System (IDENT), occurs after the visa holder is admitted
to the U.S. If DHS inspectors ran the IDENT checks during the
admissions process, it would add about five minutes to every US-VISIT
enrollment, thus generating such lengthy backlogs that the ports of
entry would essentially shut down.
The IDENT database, is a legacy INS database based on the same two
index prints as US-VISIT as well as a digitized photograph. The system
was created in 1994 and widely deployed from 1997 to 1998. It
originally contained a recidivist database and a lookout database
including all foreign nationals apprehended by the INS. The DOS also
maintains such a biometric database of all Mexican laser visa holders
(formerly known as border crossing cardholders). These laser visa
holders all were vetted through an IDENT check. Except for in the US-
VISIT context, the IDENT checks at ports of entry currently always
occur during secondary and not primary inspection, where the time
required to process information through IDENT is less of a concern.
Once the visa holder is enrolled in US-VISIT, his or her arrival
information will be stored in the IDENT biometric database. Therefore,
the information for applicants for admission under US-VISIT with no
criminal record or apprehension record with legacy INS or DHS are
contained in the same database as the individuals for whom DHS is on
the lookout. Such proximity between two distinct classes of foreign
nationals will lead to confusion as inspectors will have to determine
which individuals in IDENT are inadmissible to the U.S. and which have
merely been enrolled in US-VISIT.
After visa holders enroll in US-VISIT, they still will have to
provide fingerprints and have a digital photograph taken upon each
application for entry to the U.S. Ideally, future enrollees will be
able to swipe their biometric passport or visa, provide index
fingerprints and photo, and be checked for identity against the US-
VISIT database without further delay. This system would rely on US-
VISIT to identify the enrollee and the usual text-based IBIS database
check. Again, this procedure will not provide for a rapid biometric
check against any criminal or other biometric watch list database.
Departure from the U.S. under US-VISIT
Nonimmigrant visa holders are required to document their departure
from the United States with US-VISIT only if they depart the U.S.
through an air or seaport that has US-VISIT exit capability. Since
January 5, 2004, US-VISIT only has exit capability at the Baltimore-
Washington International (BWI) airport in Baltimore, Maryland and at
the Miami seaport. However, DHS plans to expand US-VISIT exit
capabilities to other ports of entry throughout 2004. At the moment,
the exit stations for US-VISIT are self-service kiosks that closely
resemble automated teller machines (ATMs). DHS has indicated that the
kiosks will be located within the secure area of air and seaports. The
Department also has stated that attendants will be assigned to monitor
the kiosk area and offer assistance. In addition, DHS has announced
that during 2004, it will test various exit methods, possibly including
a hand-held device that will permit DHS personnel to register the
departure of nonimmigrant visa holders. One of the problems with such
mobile units in the past has been lack of database connectivity. For
example, at land ports, passenger vehicle lanes are usually not
equipped with machine readable document scanners and mobile units with
access to the TECS (Treasury Enforcement Communications System)
database are used. Information has to be typed into the system and
database access is limited. Upon departure, database review is again
limited and not conducted against a criminal biometric database such as
IDENT.
DHS considers exit registration mandatory for visa holders who
depart from an air or seaport with US-VISIT exit capability. According
to DHS, entry/exit information is constantly updated, and if a visitor
overstays his or her authorized period of stay, US-VISIT will record
the failure to depart. However, prior experience with databases
designed to display the status of a foreign national indicated that
inspectors are not often given access to these resources. Legacy INS
experimented with the CLAIMS III database, which indicated the
immigration status of foreign nationals. Unfortunately, the use of that
database was frustrated by the fact that it was often down and not
accessible. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services also maintains an
internet-based on-line case status inquiry system which is not hooked
up to inspection lanes, and inspectors have a difficult time utilizing
this resource.
In addition to concerns about the usability of the US-VISIT
database, there are serious concerns regarding the accuracy of the
entry/exit information it contains. Inaccurate entry/exit data can have
a serious impact on visa holders in a variety of ways since presence in
or out of the U.S. is a critical issue for certain immigration benefits
such as: eligibility in terms of overstays and removals; physical
presence requirements for substantial presence determinations under our
tax laws; legal permanent residence abandonment issues; time spent in
the U.S. for naturalization purposes; etc.
Statements made by the DHS indicate that the Department appreciates
the potential negative effects of recording exit information before the
exit systems are fully operational and is considering a grace period
regarding exit requirements. However, there has not been any
confirmation of whether such a grace period exists, or whether failure
to exit properly will result in a case-by-case review similar to the
review permitted under Special Registration/National Security Entry/
Exit Registration System (NSEERS).
U.S. Consulates' Role in US-VISIT
Certain U.S. consulates have begun enrolling nonimmigrant and
immigrant visa applicants into the US-VISIT system when processing the
new biometric visa. Individuals enrolled at the consulates will still
be ``visited'' upon their entry to the U.S., in that they will have
their entry recorded via a biometric identity review. Currently, only
certain consular posts are issuing biometric visas. However, the State
Department is required to start issuing these visas at all 211 consular
posts by October 26, 2004--an extremely ambitious deadline. As with
port VISIT enrollment, two digital index finger prints and a photo are
taken of visa applicants. Such biometric information, however, is
checked against the IDENT database before visa issuance. Recently, at
the U.S. Consulate in Vancouver, visa issuance times were increased
from same day processing to 3-day processing due to the IDENT
clearance. This delay is marking the end of same-day visa issuance and
results in additional processing burdens on consular officers without
the necessary staff increases to attend to such demands in a more
timely manner. In addition, insufficient additional resources are
apparently being allocated to address these database check delays at
the source.
This IDENT requirement subsumes the personal appearance waiver
policy announced in 2003 by DOS that required interviews of applicants
between the ages of 16 and 60. Note that the IDENT check done by DOS
applies in both the nonimmigrant and immigrant visa application
process. Currently, US-VISIT only applies to nonimmigrant visa holders.
In addition to these delays, consulates in Visa Waiver countries
will likely suffer from additional delays due to an increased number of
visa applicants. A congressional mandate in the PATRIOT Act requires
Visa Waiver countries to issue tamper-proof machine-readable passports
(MRPs) that include biometric identifiers by October 26, 2004.
Individuals without a biometric MRP will have to apply for a visa at a
U.S. consulate and will be subject to US-VISIT enrollment at the post.
Their admission will then be recorded under US-VISIT procedures at the
port of entry.
The Relationship between NSEERS and US-VISIT
Special Registration/NSEERS at the ports of entry continues even
after the launch of US-VISIT this January. Registration for NSEERS and
enrollment for US-VISIT will continue to be separate processes until
US-VISIT incorporates NSEERS. (Such incorporation is not anticipated
until US-VISIT is fully developed.) Also, the two processes involve the
intake of different levels of data. Thus, it is difficult to
conceptualize an NSEERS process without a secondary inspection
component, which is typically not involved in most US-VISIT admissions.
Persons subjected to call-in or port of entry Special Registration
still must register their departure via NSEERS and must leave the U.S.
through a designated NSEERS port of departure. According to preliminary
reports, if US-VISIT has an operational exit kiosk at this port, and an
individual already has registered his or her departure at that airport
via NSEERS, the visa holder is not obligated to document his departure
with US-VISIT. Thus, someone subject to NSEERS departure control will
not need to register departure via both methodologies. There is,
however, no written confirmation of this procedure. Considering that
those who fail to comply with departure control rules under NSEERS may
be subject to inadmissibility under INA section 212(a)(3)(A)(ii), many
foreign nationals subject to both US-VISIT and NSEERS exit requirements
(as well as their counsel) are not clear on how to ensure that their
compliance is well documented in both systems. A public information
program is critical to help those wishing to comply to do so.
Expansion of US-VISIT to Land Ports of Entry
Although DHS has not announced a timeframe for the implementation
of new exit capabilities at our nation's airports and seaports, DHS
plans on deploying biometric document readers to all air, sea, and land
ports of entry by October 26, 2004. (Of course, the Mexican biometric
laser visa for business and tourist admissions has been in existence
for years, and yet such scanners have not been deployed to all ports.)
Implementing US-VISIT at our land ports of entry must take into
account the complex realities of these ports. For instance, after
September 11, 2001, when port officers attempted to subject all
applicants for admission to IBIS (text based) database reviews, the
resulting delays led to a modification of the policy. Such checks were
not conducted at passenger and commercial vehicle lanes due to
infrastructure limitations.
Unless Congress acts to delay the implementation of US-VISIT
deadlines, DHS will be required to expand the entry/exit program to the
top 50 high traffic land border ports by December 31, 2004 and to the
remaining ports of entry by December 31, 2005. Expanding US-VISIT to
land ports of entry raises a multitude of issues beyond those that
arise at airports, and presents a host of infrastructure, staffing, and
database challenges.
Border communities depend on the cross border flow of goods and
people for their economic survival. For example, in 2001, $22.7 billion
in imports and $16.1 billion in exports passed through El Paso's
international bridges, constituting 19 percent of total trade through
southern U.S. Customs Districts. Local El Paso economists estimate that
between 15 and 30 percent of El Paso's retail sales are derived from
Mexican nationals. Just in time inventory management in cross-border
manufacturing operations requires that Mexican and Canadian suppliers
make their deliveries to the U.S. in predictable intervals. Delays in
these cases can translate into disasters for these communities.
A June 1998 Senate Judiciary Committee report offers a compelling
example of the challenges faced at our land border ports of entry. The
report cites information from Dan Stamper, President of the Detroit
International Bridge Co. Mr. Stamper noted that the Ambassador Bridge
handles approximately 30,000 vehicle crossings per day. He calculated
that, ``assum[ing] the most efficient and remarkable entry and exit
procedures in the world [that] will take only 30 seconds per vehicle,
and making the equally optimistic assumption that only half of the
vehicles have to go through procedures, that would amount to an extra
3,750 minutes of additional processing time each day.'' As he sagely
pointed out, ``There are only 1,440 minutes a day.'' Thus, the
implementation of Section 110 would effectively close the border.
Unique infrastructure concerns also arise. The DMIA Task Force's
Second Annual Report to Congress notes that in fiscal year 2002, there
were 358 million land border entry inspections of people and 11 million
inspections of commercial vehicles. There are over 300 ports of entry
to the U.S. The report further states that as to current port
infrastructure: 64 ports have less than 25 percent of the required
space; 40 ports have between 25 and 50 percent of the required space;
13 ports have between 50 and 75 percent of the required space; and some
existing ports lack ``any land for expansion.''
In addition, the high cost involved in developing an appropriate
infrastructure also must be recognized. Along with the physical exits,
these ports need adequate lanes, technologies, and trained officials,
all of which costs, according to experts, more than $10 billion
dollars. Furthermore, in contrast to airport ports of entry, land ports
must deal with pedestrians, passenger vehicle occupants, and commercial
vehicle occupants. Our current admissions procedures at land ports
sheds some light on the complex environment in which US-VISIT will
supposedly be implemented.
Pedestrians: Currently, most pedestrian admissions are not
recorded. When randomly checked, pedestrians are checked against IBIS
(text-based) and the person and document are ``eye-balled'' for a
match. The current minimum mandated IBIS check is 40 percent. The
inspector may ask about the purpose of entry, where the person is from,
or why he or she has been outside the U.S. This process often takes
less than 5 seconds.
Occasionally, inspectors may check the person's visa against the
DOS Consular Consolidated Database (CCD), which houses a copy of the
visa the U.S. Consulate issued to that person. This additional check
helps to target those who use other's documentation or fraudulent
visas. Unfortunately, CCD access is not typically available in primary
inspection. Currently, no review done at the primary inspection area
verifies the identity of the person through a biometric check other
than via the human eye.
In order for a biometric check to be done, the person is taken to a
secondary inspection area where two fingerprints and a photograph are
taken. The person's biographical and biometric information is run
through the IDENT database, which then determines if this individual
has violated immigration status. If merited, some applicants for
admission may also be checked against the Integrated Automated
Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS), which is maintained by the
FBI. This database compares all ten fingerprints of the person against
its records. The IDENT checks typically take 5 minutes or less, and the
IAFIS checks can take 15 to 30 minutes or more depending on a variety
of factors.
Most foreign nationals are required to apply for an I-94 admission
document and pay a $6 fee upon application for entry to the U.S. The
procedures surrounding issuing the I-94 card often result in delays.
For example, there are often wait times of 30 minutes or more to be
interviewed to obtain the I-94. After the interview process, the
foreign national must go a separate location to pay the $6 fee and
receive the I-94. Too often, the official taking the fees is
unavailable and applicants must wait for more than 15 minutes for an I-
94 admission document to be issued. Currently, there is no exit
inspection for pedestrians and usually no space or personnel to perform
such an inspection.
Passenger Vehicle Occupants: Most passenger vehicle lane checks do
not involve checking databases against the applicant's visa. Often,
passenger vehicle inspectors will have access to Treasury Enforcement
Communications System (TECS), which is a database managed by legacy
Customs. It is possible to access IBIS via a mobile TECS unit, but the
system is not amenable to scanning documents, so data must be typed in
manually. In addition, to access CLAIMS III for immigration status
information, the person must be sent to secondary inspection for
further review. Therefore, if vehicle inspectors want to conduct
further checks on applicants, the applicants for entry must park their
car and walk in front of oncoming lanes of vehicles to get to the
secondary inspection area.
Exit lanes are usually not available to allow for exit inspection.
This fact is confirmed in the DMIA Task Force's First and Second Annual
Report to Congress. Obviously, in the passenger vehicle context, even
fewer IBIS checks are conducted than of pedestrians.
Commercial Vehicle Occupants: Commercial vehicle occupants
basically go through the same process as passenger vehicle occupants.
However, the commercial parking lot often is far away from the
secondary inspection area and commercial vehicle occupants must be
escorted to secondary by a port employee. Due to inadequate staffing,
often no staff is available to perform this function and foreign
nationals are often left waiting for long periods of time for further
review.
The DHS has indicated that enrollment in US-VISIT at land ports of
entry would occur in secondary inspection. [What DHS terms ``secondary
inspection'' in this context, is the point at which foreign nationals
obtain the I-94 admission card.] In order to speed processing of
automobile traffic at the land ports, DHS is investigating the use of a
radio frequency (RF) technology, which would transmit biographical
information to the inspections officer. This technology would be
similar to the SENTRI or NEXUS commuter programs implemented along the
southern and northern border, respectively. However, RF technology does
not resolve identity--and security-related database issues without
either pre-clearance review of the applicant or at least text-based
checks, as in airports upon admission. As noted by Jeane J.
Kirkpatrick, Director--Council on Foreign Relations Independent Task
Force on Homeland Security Imperatives, in her March 12, 2003 testimony
before the U.S. Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Border Security,
Citizenship, and Immigration, ``There will never be enough inspection
resources and it would prove self-defeating to subject every person,
conveyance, and cargo to the same inspection regime.'' She further
notes that the, ``inspections processes at a port of entry must be an
exercise in risk management.''
DHS issued a request for proposal (RFP) on November 30, 2003 for
US-VISIT, and is now considering three primary bidders: Accenture, CSC
and Lockheed-Martin. Award of a contract is expected by May 31, 2004.
US-VISIT_A Tool to Enhance Our Security?
Will US-VISIT help to enhance our security? While the jury is still
out, serious questions need to be addressed as to the achievable
mission of US-VISIT. A June 1998 Senate Judiciary Committee Report
(Senate Judiciary Report 105197 on S. 1360, Border Improvement
and Immigration Act of 1998, June 1, 1998) makes the following apt
comment:
The Committee is keenly aware that implementing an automated
entry/exit control system has absolutely nothing to do with
countering drug trafficking, and halting the entry of
terrorists into the United States, or with any other illegal
activity near the borders. An automated entry/exit control
system will at best provide information only on those who have
overstayed their visas. Even if a vast database of millions of
visa overstayers could be developed, this database will in no
way provide information as to which individuals might be
engaging in other unlawful activity. It will accordingly
provide no assistance in identifying terrorists, drug
traffickers, or other criminals. (emphasis added)
With regard to tracking visa overstayers, the report further
states:
Even if a list of names and passport numbers of visa
overstayers would be available, there would be no information
as to where the individuals could be located. Even if there was
information at the time of entry as to where an alien was
expecting to go in the United States, it cannot be expected
that 6 or more months later the alien would be at the same
location. Particularly, if an alien were intending to overstay,
it is likely that the alien would have provided only a
temporary or false location as to where the alien was intending
to go.
AILA has previously testified that immigration can best contribute
to our national security by enhancing our intelligence capacities. To
that end, AILA strongly supported the Enhanced Border Security Act. The
goal of this law is to make our borders the last line of defense. To
that end, it includes the following provisions: authorizes increased
funding for the DOS and INS, requires federal agencies to coordinate
and share information needed to identify and intercept terrorists;
encourages the use of new technologies by authorizing funds to improve
technology and infrastructure at INS, the Customs Service, and DOS,
targeting much of this effort at strengthening our nation's borders;
mandates the transmittal of advance passenger lists; and implements a
study to determine the feasibility of a North American Perimeter Safety
Zone. (This study includes a review of the feasibility of expanding and
developing pre-clearance and pre-inspections programs).
Given this law's ambitious provisions, Congress needs to step up to
the plate and provide the federal agencies impacted with the staffing
and funding levels they need to implement this measure's provisions, as
well as perform adequate oversight. It is simply unacceptable for
Congress to pass this bill and not give the federal agencies the
funding they need to do a good job. It is also unacceptable for the
agencies not to implement the mandates of this law.
Recommendations: Based on the above discussion and in order to
implement feasible security objectives without seriously harming the
international and cross border flow of trade and people, we submit the
following recommendations:
Realistic Assessment of the US-VISIT Program's Capabilities
1. Determine the limits of US-VISIT: Congress and the DHS must
step-back and determine the program's true capabilities and assess the
feasibility of every aspect of the program while US-VISIT is still in
its infancy. The 1998 Senate report on the entry/exit program
challenges the notion that an entry/exit system can be used as a tool
to prevent terrorism. If that is true, Congress must determine it now
rather than after billions of US tax dollars have been spent. If the
mission of US-VISIT is instead to catch visa overstayers and those with
a criminal record, the mission should be clarified. On the issue of
national security, a false sense of security is a failure.
2. Develop a comprehensive plan for US-VISIT: The Administration
and Congress should use the above assessments to develop a
comprehensive plan for US-VISIT that takes into account the achievable
goals of the program, necessary funding levels, infrastructure needs,
and appropriate deadlines.
3. Do not use US-VISIT as a substitute for increasing our
intelligence capacity: Security experts agree that our national
security is best enhanced by increasing intelligence and database
security checks performed outside the country. DHS should examine ways
to expand the use of pre-inspection stations and authorize pre-
clearances for low-risk travelers. By clearing travelers before their
voyage to the United States, inspectors will have more face time with
applicants and could better scrutinize each applicant for entry. Such
practices would reduce delays at the border and allow inspectors more
time to do their job. Pre-clearances also would provide international
travelers with a sense of certainty that they will be admitted into the
U.S.
4. Ensure US-VISIT receives the billions of dollars necessary for
adequate implementation: Congress must be prepared to spend the money
necessary to properly implement US-VISIT to achieve its mission. In
addition, Congress must conduct continual oversight to determine if US-
VISIT objectives are being met due to the alleged security importance
of the project. According to the DMIA Task Force's first report to
Congress, the U.S. government needs to appropriate billions of dollars
to purchase real estate, upgrade facilities, develop infrastructure and
technological capabilities, and hire inspectors to manage the entry/
exit program. With a preliminary estimated price tag of billions of
dollars, the $380 million appropriated in FY 2003 was grossly
insufficient to fund even the beginnings of this system. Without
sufficient funding, US-VISIT will not operate properly and will impede
the flow of the people and trade essential to our economic well being.
Database Recommendations
1. Make enforcement databases accurate: The concept of a watch list
database is dependent on accurate information. There must be
accountability to ensure accuracy. In addition, all public inquiries
concerning enforcement-related database entries should be consolidated.
The general public should be able to contact a central office to timely
remove inaccurate information so as to avoid the continuation of
injustices tied to the dissemination and provision of any inaccurate
information.
2. Increase the interoperability of database systems: DHS should
prioritize its efforts to increase the interoperability of the database
systems to give inspectors a more thorough and streamlined review of
each applicant requesting entry into the U.S. Currently, the separate
databases from the three immigration bureaus have not been fully
integrated into US-VISIT. Due to this lack of information transfer,
visitors who have applied for visa extensions might be detained for
overstaying their visas, when in reality; they had maintained proper
visa status. Having complete and correct information will make the
difference between having a workable secure system or a discredited
inefficient one.
3. Increase funding and oversight for IDENT to ensure that it is
efficient, reliable and accurate: Currently IDENT checks are being run
at the time of US-VISIT enrollment at the U.S. Consulates (thereby
delaying visa processing for each applicant by roughly three days in
some cases) and are run at the ports of entry after the foreign
national has entered the U.S. With the current IDENT processing times
and infrastructure capacities at the ports of entry, it would be
impossible to conduct IDENT checks upon admission without shutting down
the borders. Congress and DHS must determine if IDENT can be modified
so that checks can be done at the time of admission and then commit
funding to making that happen. If it is not possible, Congress must
understand that US-VISIT does not enhance our security checks through
the use of a biometric security database check upon admission. Instead,
US-VISIT runs a text-based security database check at the time of
admission and creates a catalog of established identities for foreign
nationals who have enrolled in the program.
4. Develop a biometric US-VISIT database: Currently, the biometrics
and biographical data of foreign nationals enrolled into US-VISIT is
warehoused within the IDENT biometric database. By lumping US-VISIT
enrollees in with criminals, we are sending the message that immigrants
are criminals. Furthermore, commingling these two groups makes it more
likely that errors will occur within the database and innocent
travelers will be denied entry into the U.S.
Infrastructure & Staffing Needs
1. Don't implement US-VISIT until an adequate infrastructure
assessment is done and put into place: The procedures for port
enrollment in VISIT versus consular post enrollment do not mirror one
another from a security review perspective. The reason for this
dichotomy is based on logistical limitations. Reassess the use of IDENT
checks and consider applying them only to higher risk segments of the
population. Currently, the only ``low-risk'' populations identified are
those under 14 or over 79. This method of exemption appears overbroad.
Exemption from the IDENT check and US-VISIT enrollment should be based
on intelligence, not stereotypes.
2. Realistically assess the staffing and infrastructure necessary
to implement US-VISIT: Such an assessment would involve answering many
questions including: How many ports have scanners, which read
passports, laser visas, etc. at commercial, passenger vehicle and
pedestrian lanes? What is the current level of overtime at the ports?
What are the processing times for I-94, immigrant visa processing, and
other adjudications before deciding the impact on our tourism and trade
of US-VISIT requirements?
3. Delay implementation at land border until an adequate
infrastructure is in place: The Border Security Act requires that DHS
not impede the flow of goods and people across our nation's borders.
Considering that the U.S. has over 300 ports of entry and, in 2001,
over 510 million people entered the U.S. (63 percent of whom were
foreign nationals) and over $1.35 trillion in imports entered the U.S.,
the potential devastating effect of delay at the land ports of entry
becomes clear. Furthermore, such delays would undermine the entire
effort to maintain an efficient border, and efficiency is a vital
component in increasing security.
4. Clearly define what constitutes an exit and allow for
flexibility in compliance with the exit requirements in the early
stages of US-VISIT: At this time, the airport and seaport exit
functions of US-VISIT are being piloted. DHS is testing an exit kiosk,
but it has also indicated that it will test handheld exit devices. DHS
must clearly define what constitutes an exit and ensure that the exit
function is clearly marked and cannot be ignored by an oblivious
foreign national. In addition, the government should clarify that the
negative consequences of those failing to properly exit during the
first few years of US-VISIT will only be applied to willful violators.
At land ports the lack of infrastructure makes it necessary to think
creatively about exit control (such as allowing frequent travelers to
skip the exit requirements since their multiple entries will verify
that they previously departed the U.S. in a timely fashion) or possibly
abandon exit controls there all together unless funding is allocated to
the infrastructure and personnel investment required.
Operational Assistance
1. DHS must increase its outreach to the public concerning US-
VISIT: DHS must inform US-VISIT enrollees of the program's
requirements, and information must be widely disseminated and presented
in a timely manner. Without adequate public notice on how to comply
with these new US-VISIT requirements, the program will not operate
properly and will impede the flow of people who are essential to our
economic well being.
2. Give US-VISIT enrollees a receipt and issue regulations allowing
leeway during the program's infancy: Without giving US-VISIT enrollees
physical proof of their entry and exit into US-VISIT, enrollees will
have no way to rebut system errors or to identify informational
mistakes inputted into the system. Additionally, during US-VISIT's
infancy, enrollees are facing much uncertainty regarding their
responsibilities under this program. A grace period for exit control
compliance and alternative methods by which visa holders may comply
with exit control without penalty are necessary to ensure that innocent
travelers are not unfairly penalized by US-VISIT.
3. Limit the US-VISIT process for our Mexican neighbors who hold
laser visas: Only require US-VISIT compliance for laser visa holders
when they would need an I-94 for admission. Do not require these
frequent travelers to enroll or be tracked by US-VISIT when they do not
go beyond 25 miles from the border (75 miles in Arizona) or remain in
the U.S. over 72 hours. The laser visa biometric database maintained by
State should be integrated into the US-VISIT biometric database. This
merger would update the US-VISIT database for all laser visa holders
without subjecting each laser visa holder to an initial US-VISIT
enrollment. Still apply random IBIS checks for security updates.
General Recommendations
Our nation's ports of entry are complex environments into which US-
VISIT has been thrust. The following recommendations will help provide
order and accountability to that complex environment, thereby creating
a more stable foundation upon which US-VISIT can be built.
1. Establish an immigration specialist position at the ports of
entry: It is important that immigration specialists be designated and
accessible to apply our immigration laws. For consistency and accurate
applications of our complex immigration laws, the decisions of these
specialists should be directed and coordinated by immigration counsel
within the office of the DHS General Counsel. Such legal counsel must
be coordinated with benefit-related adjudications housed in United
States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) and enforcement
policy and procedures applied by United States Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE).
2. Don't conduct redundant security checks: Many border residents
cross the international border several times per day. It is critical to
integrate existing voluntary frequent traveler programs so that
enrollment in one provides a uniform access process at all our ports of
entry. There should be one consistent enrollment process for air, land,
and sea admissions. The Application Support Centers in the U.S. could
help facilitate the process for those already here to enroll in such
programs by providing biometrics. The former U.S. Customs Service
created the C-TPAT program, which is a joint government-business
initiative to build cooperative relationships that strengthen overall
supply chain and border security. Why not allow and encourage employees
of qualifying employers to enroll in frequent traveler programs as
well? In addition, the NEXUS and SENTRI programs should merge and
become the same uniform process. Why not allow such enrollment
eventually at consular posts overseas as well? These actions require
major funding and staffing, and yet they improve security and reduce
congestion at our ports.
3. Access to counsel: Title 8 to the Code of Federal Regulations
was modified to restrict access to counsel at ports of entry based on
the law in existence at the time, which did not provide for expedited
removal at ports of entry with no right to any administrative review.
One of the bases cited for the ability to restrict such access was
administrative remedy. When the law was changed to allow expedited
removal from the U.S., no correction was made to the regulations.
Legacy Customs has long allowed access to legal representation at ports
of entry to deal with issues arising concerning the admission of goods.
For example, the ability to contact a fines, penalties, and forfeitures
officer to work on the release of goods held for some reason from
import to the U.S. Such a practice should be extended to foreign
nationals visiting our country. Just put yourself in their place
applying for admission to a foreign country. Would a U.S. citizen want
to be denied access to counsel or even an embassy representative due to
some misunderstanding or error at a foreign port of entry? If the
Golden Rule was ever needed, it is at our ports.
4. Place cameras at the ports of entry: Cameras have been used
successfully at many ports to record the behavior and statements of the
applicant and the officer. Inspections supervisors have praised the
tool from a personnel perspective and embassies and applicants for
admission have benefited from the recordings of this silent and
objective witness. In addition, in some cases, these cameras could also
implement cutting edge facial recognition technology to assist
inspectors. These cameras should be installed at least in all secondary
inspection areas.
5. Equal benefits and treatment and the development of a DHS
culture: In order to ensure that CBP functions properly, it must
develop its own unique culture in which immigration, agriculture, and
customs functions are treated with equal respect. In addition, a
continuing education component focusing on security and legal issues
must be linked to pay increases and advancement to improve the quality
of those guarding and applying the laws at our ports.
6. Rethink the I-94 card: I-94 cards and I-94W cards for visa
waiver applicants have never been secure documents, and there are a
myriad of ways to make these documents both more secure and more
efficiently distributed: issue I-94 cards with the approval notices for
initial grants of nonimmigrant work related visas; for business visitor
or tourists (B-1/B-2), tie the admission date stamped in the passport
to a default admission period (such precedent already exists in the 90-
day admission period under the Visa Waiver Program, and the prior
typical default admission period of six months for tourist admissions);
allow business visitors and tourists to apply for their admission
document via the internet before their travel and confirm identity upon
admission. In addition to these possibilities for issuing the I-94
card, fees for the card should never have to be collected by personnel.
Instead, metro/subway type toll collection machines could be utilized,
which would also result in decreased need for personnel oversight on
collection issues.
Ms. Granger. Mr. Carlton?
STATEMENT OF DENNIS CARLTON, DIRECTOR OF WASHINGTON OPERATIONS,
INTERNATIONAL BIOMETRIC GROUP, LLC
Mr. Carlton. I would like to thank the committee for the
opportunity to address you. I am Dennis Carlton. I am the
director of Washington operations for International Biometric
Group. On behalf of our company, I would like to talk to you
today about biometrics in the U.S. border management system.
Let me begin with a brief description of International
Biometric Group, so you better understand who we are and our
unique position in the world of biometrics.
IBG provides independent consulting services to government
and private industry customers interested in implementing
biometric technologies. We take a practical, hands-on approach
toward biometrics, having tested more than 50 different
biometric solutions over the past five years, so we know how
they are likely to perform in the real world.
IBG holds to a strict vendor-neutral policy, which enables
us to maintain close relationships with biometrics vendors
while ensuring our clients receive accurate and independent
advice on which biometric systems can best meet their needs.
One year ago, IBG delivered a report to the White House
Office of Science and Technology Policy entitled ``The Use of
Biometric Technologies in the United States Visa Issuance and
Border Entry-Exit Systems.'' I was the principal investigator
and author of this report.
In conducting research for this study, we visited several
U.S. consulates around the world, as well as American sea, air
and land ports of entry.
The OSTP report is a no-holds-barred look at the practical
challenges of implementing biometrics in the field, both at
consulates and at ports of entry.
IBG's report to the OSTP highlighted several issues related
to integrating biometrics within US-VISIT that are worthy of
re-emphasis before this committee. Biometrics should be
implemented in a manner that augments, rather than replaces,
existing border management I.T. systems. Biometrics alone
cannot replace the professional judgment of experienced border
management personnel.
The system also must be designed with an eye toward
continuing technology refreshment. The life cycle of biometric
products turns over at least as fast as other I.T. components.
The government must invest in continuing research and
development into improving biometric products. In the past few
years, there has been an explosion in new biometric
technologies being introduced into the marketplace, many of
which warrant the nurture of federal government.
The success of any biometric solution depends in great
measure on its stakeholders establishing realistic performance
expectations for the system. And given its unprecedented scale
and visibility, this will be especially true of US-VISIT.
Stakeholders need to have practical expectations as to the
performance of biometric technologies. The current generation
of biometric systems is not 100 percent accurate, but
biometrics don't need to be perfect in order to enhance border
security.
The mere presence of a device can positively link an
individual with the documentation that they carry. And this
will serve as a deterrent to many impostors.
In addition, the system design must incorporate a
comprehensive security and privacy architecture. Good security
and privacy practices are not antithetical and can both be
accommodated in US-VISIT. Biometrics themselves are privacy
neutral. It is the way they are employed and the protections
put in place to limit misuse that makes biometrics either
privacy invasive or privacy protective.
What is essential is that individuals are fully informed on
how their biometric data is collected, used, shared and
secured.
The advent of US-VISIT and biometric technologies at U.S.
ports of entry need not result in delay and inefficiency. There
are several means for mitigating the impacts of these changes.
First, border management solutions must be prepared to
accommodate multiple forms of biometric technologies. Although
the International Civil Aviation Organization has specified
facial recognition as the universal biometric for securing
machine-readable travel documentation, the U.S. will continue
to leverage its investment in fingerprint databases to identify
travelers who might pose a security threat.
A universal biometric solution is not necessary in order to
achieve a secure border management solution, so long as
countries agree to provide one another with the ability to
decode and match the specific biometric data associated with
the travel document.
Secondly, although the challenge of implementing biometric
identification at land ports of entry is daunting, it is not
insurmountable. IBG believes that portable fingerprint reading
devices can be employed to match the index fingers of
passengers in a vehicle with the travel documents that they
carry.
The capture of fingerprints must take place upstream from
the primary inspection station, so that a biometric search can
be completed before the vehicle reaches the primary inspection
position. In this way, the biometric search does not impact the
overall primary inspection time, and the primary inspector is
not distracted from conducting a thorough assessment of the
vehicle, its occupants and its contents.
At exit points from the U.S., the government should provide
a self-service kiosk type of solution that would allow an
exiting U.S. citizen a means for self-enrollment of their
travel-related documentation and biometrics.
In exchange for taking the time to scan an identity
document and provide a biometric sample, the citizen would be
entitled to use a type of blue lane that would offer expedited
processing upon their return to the U.S.
And finally, we should expect that most problems associated
with biometrically secured travel documents would be of an
innocent or inadvertent nature, rather than a fraud attempt.
The U.S. should provide travelers with a real-time problem
resolution solution, such as a phone number or e-mail address,
where they can immediately reach someone in an ombudsman-like
role who can begin the process of resolving the travel
documentation problem.
I will finish my remarks here and answer your questions.
[The statement of Mr. Carlton follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dennis Carlton
My name is Dennis Carlton and I am the Director of Washington
Operations for International Biometric Group of New York City. On
behalf of our company, I'd like to thank the committee for the
opportunity to talk to you about the technology called biometrics and
some of the likely the issues associated with introducing biometrics
into the border management system.
Let me begin with a brief description of International Biometric
Group so that you better understand who we are and our unique position
in the world of biometrics. International Biometric Group, or IBG,
provides independent consulting services to government and private
industry customers interested in implementing biometric technologies.
Our organization focuses on three primary functions: (1) evaluating and
reporting on biometric products and vendors, as well as the markets in
which they compete, (2) advising clients on how to implement biometric
systems, and (3) integrating a wide range of biometric hardware and
software to meet the security needs of our customers. We take a
practical, hands-on approach toward biometrics. We have conducted
extensive comparative performance testing of more than fifty different
biometric solutions so that we know how they're likely to perform in
the real world. IBG holds to a strict vendor-neutral policy, which
enables us to maintain close relationships with biometrics vendors
while ensuring that our clients receive accurate and independent advice
on which biometric systems can best meet their needs.
I'd like to take a moment to review some of the basics of
biometrics. A technical definition of biometrics is the automated
measurement of behavioral or physiological characteristics of a human
being to determine or authenticate their identity. In other words, it's
the use of computers to confirm who a person is by matching a behavior
or a permanent physical characteristic with similar records in a
database. Biometrics alone can't determine an individual's identity but
they can effectively distinguish one person from another. There is a
wide range of products in the market that can acquire and match a
person's biometric data to perform a quick and accurate identification.
With respect to border management, the U.S. has focused its attention
on fingerprint matching and facial recognition biometrics, although
other biometrics such as iris recognition, hand geometry, and speaker
authentication technologies are also being assessed.
One year ago, IBG delivered a report to the White House Office of
Science and Technology Policy entitled ``Use of Biometric Technologies
in the United States Visa Issuance and Border Entry/Exit Systems''. I
was the principal investigator and author of this report, a summary of
which has been included in the material provided to committee members.
In conducting research for this study we visited several U.S.
consulates around the world as well as American sea, air and land ports
of entry. The OSTP sought a no-holds-barred look at the practical
challenges of implementing biometrics in the field both at consulates
and ports of entry--I like to think we accomplished that goal. From the
OSTP research and our subsequent participation in several ongoing
initiatives involving biometrics and international travel security, IBG
has gained significant insight into the integration, performance, and
workflow challenges associated with implementing biometrics within US-
VISIT and our border management system.
IBG's report to the OSTP highlighted several issues related to
integrating biometrics within US-VISIT worthy of reemphasis before this
committee:
Biometrics should be implemented in a manner that
augments rather than replaces existing border management IT
systems. The fact that an individual matches the biometric
associated with a travel document does not ensure that the
individual qualifies for admission to the United States.
Biometrics alone cannot replace the professional judgment of
experienced border management personnel.
Since the current generation of biometric technologies
is not 100 percent accurate, a seamless exception handling
process must be incorporated throughout the design of the
system.
The system also must be designed with an eye toward
continuing technology refreshment. The lifecycle of biometric
products turns over at least as fast as other IT components--
US-VISIT should be designed with seamless transitions to newer,
more accurate solutions in mind.
The government must invest in continuing research and
development into improving biometric products. The centennial
of the Wright Brothers first powered flight serves as a
reminder that significant innovations may come from unlikely
sources. In the past few years there has been an explosion of
new biometric technologies being introduced into the
marketplace, many of which warrant the nurture of the federal
government. In addition to financial support, the federal
government may need to approve regulatory and legislative
changes to authorize the development of databases that can be
used to test the effectiveness of new biometric solutions.
The success of any biometric solution depends in great measure on
its stakeholders establishing realistic performance expectations for
the system; given its unprecedented scale and visibility, this will be
especially true of the US-VISIT system. Among the key performance
considerations are:
Stakeholders need to have practical expectations as to
the performance of biometric technologies. The current
generation of biometric systems is not 100 percent accurate but
biometrics don't need to be perfect in order to enhance border
security. The mere presence of a device that can positively
link an individual with the documentation they carry will serve
as a deterrent to many impostors. Border inspection personnel
use their professional judgment to resolve exception situations
every day; biometrics problems can be resolved in much the same
manner as any other identification document discrepancy.
The system design must incorporate a comprehensive
security and privacy architecture. Good security and privacy
practices are not antithetical and can both be accommodated in
US-VISIT. Biometrics themselves are privacy neutral--it's the
way they are employed, and the protections put in place to
limit misuse, that make biometrics either privacy-invasive or
privacy-protective. What is essential is that individuals are
fully informed on how their data is collected, used, shared,
and secured. For more information about biometrics and privacy
I commend to you an IBG-sponsored website dedicated exclusively
to the subject, www.BioPrivacy.org.
Reaching a consensus with our international partners
on privacy policy will be difficult because of significant
differences in our privacy expectations. In general, while
Americans often don't hesitate to provide personal data in
exchange for commercial benefits but frequently oppose sharing
such data with government, their counterparts in Europe and
Asia view cooperation with their government as a duty of
citizens in a civil society but don't feel similarly compelled
to provide personal data to commercial concerns. For the time
being, some parties have staked out extreme positions.
Compromise will mostly likely be achieved when views converge
toward a standard that defines a minimal exchange of a
traveler's personal or biometric data to effect efficient
commerce between governments.
The advent of US-VISIT and biometric technologies will certainly
alter the primary and secondary inspections processes at U.S. ports of
entry but these changes need not result in delay and inefficiency. Some
of the measures that can be taken to reduce the impacts caused by these
changes include:
U.S. border management solutions must be designed to
accommodate multiple forms of biometric technologies. Although
the International Civil Aviation Organization has specified
that facial recognition is the universal biometric to secure
machine-readable travel documentation, the U.S. will continue
to leverage its investment in fingerprint databases to identify
travelers who might pose a security threat. A universal
biometric solution is not necessary in order to achieve a
secure border management solution so long as countries agree to
provide one another with the software necessary to decode and
match the specific biometric data associated with a travel
document--this approach would allow Visa Waiver Program
participating countries to confirm the identity of one
another's citizens. A travel document that is secured by
multiple forms of biometric technologies would significantly
complicate the job of a forger or impostor. Eventually the U.S.
will need to employ biometrics to secure the travel documents
it issues its own citizens or risk having a U.S. passport
become the document of choice for fraudsters or terrorists
seeking to avoid being exposed by biometric identification.
The challenge of implementing biometric identification
at land ports of entry is daunting but not insurmountable. IBG
believes that portable fingerprint reading devices can be
employed to capture images of the index fingers of all
passengers in a vehicle in order to authenticate them with the
travel documentation they carry and to check against watch
lists of undesirable individuals. The capture of fingerprints
must take place `upstream' from the primary inspection station
so that a biometric search can be conducted before the vehicle
reaches the primary inspection position. In this way, the
biometric search does not impact the overall primary inspection
time and the primary inspector is not distracted from
conducting a thorough assessment of the vehicle, its occupants,
and its contents.
At exit points or other U.S. government service
centers such as post offices, the government should provide a
self-service kiosk that will allow exiting U.S. citizens a
means for self-enrollment of their travel-related documentation
and biometrics. In exchange for taking the time to scan their
identity documentation (e.g., driver's license, passport, etc.)
and providing a biometric sample, the U.S. citizen could use a
`Blue Lane' that would offer expedited processing when
returning. The success of solutions like the SENTRI system on
the U.S.-Mexico border and the U.S.-Canadian cooperative
program called NEXUS shows that both U.S. and foreign citizens
are willing to provide personal and biometric data to the
government in exchange for the very tangible benefit of
expedited border crossing. If they become widely used, these
solutions could help make a dent in the rise in identity theft
crimes by making it much more difficult for an identity thief
to travel internationally on a stolen U.S. identity document.
We should expect that most problems associated with
biometrically secured travel documents would be of an innocent
or inadvertent nature rather than a fraud attempt. It won't be
a sufficient solution to just turn away at an airline counter
or border post a traveler who has a problem matching a
biometric sample with a travel document. The U.S. should
provide travelers with a real-time problem resolution
solution--a phone number or email address where they can
immediately reach someone in an ombudsman-like role who can
begin the process of resolving their travel documentation
problems.
In summary, biometrics will play an increasingly important role in
enhancing the integrity of U.S. border management systems. With clear
guidelines and careful compliance with the rules of how, when, and
where biometrics will be collected and employed, these tools can
improve border security while at the same time protect the privacy and
dignity of the legitimate traveler.
I look forward to responding to the committee's questions.
Ms. Granger. Thank you.
We will now go to questions. We will adhere to the five-
minute rule, including my questions.
I will start with Mr. Carlton first.
You talked about the concern about mistaken or inadvertent
biometric identity mismatches. How would you propose to best
address those occurrences, especially from the perspective of
safeguarding privacy?
Mr. Carlton. Right now, the current border processes handle
that on a daily basis. There was earlier discussion about
common names--if a name of John Smith is entered into a text
database, you get all kinds of John Smith responses back. Some
of them may be wanted criminals. But it doesn't mean that you
push the button to bring in the SWAT team immediately because
there is a namecheck match.
The same thing would happen with a biometric search. From
the data I have heard so far from the folks at DHS, they have
been able to clear false matches of their current system in
about a minute--just over a minute right now. So they have
actually been able to resolve problems very quickly, even when
there is a biometric mismatch.
Ms. Granger. Thank you.
Ms. Campbell Walker, in your written testimony, you mention
that travelers going through primary don't have their biometric
data checked through IDENT prior to their admittance to the
country. That is in your written testimony.
But the panel that we had made it very clear that the US-
VISIT has provided primary inspectors with the new mission
capabilities allowing them to do immediate IDENT verifications.
Do you have an inside question about that?
Ms. Campbell Walker. Thank you.
Yes, I do, and thank you for the opportunity to address it,
because it is a very--well, to me it is--a very complex issue
in trying to figure out how to relay this information to the
panel.
The IDENT check pre-US-VISIT is a check of legacy INS
database. And it is a database of recidivist people who were
caught by Border Patrol and then brought back, trying to make
sure that you had a record so if they came back again, you
would know that they did this before, and then a look-out
database.
And what happens right now, is that if you are going to be
checked in IDENT, at where we are, you go into secondary and
they have an average of a three to five minute response time.
That is a full IDENT check, where it is a biometric check
against the full IDENT biometric database.
My understanding is that that same full biometric database
is being conducted by the Department of State in US-VISIT
enrollment abroad at our consular post. And Ms. Harty just
mentioned that it was seven to eight minute time frame for the
Department of State.
And now, let's compare it to the story about the enrollment
process for US-VISIT at our ports of entry, and here is where I
have a basic disconnect. Three to five minutes, seven to eight
minutes, 15 seconds.
When I asked the question to various port directors in
different states, what I am being told is that, yes, there is
an IDENT check, because, remember that when they are enrolled,
they go into the US-VISIT database as a part of IDENT, so the
identity is being confirmed. But the full IDENT check that we
all know and respect is not able to be conducted in a timely
manner, in 10 to 15 seconds.
So there is a modified version of it that they run the data
against, so that the time frame is shorter.
So, yes, I see in some ways that we have got an identity
check being conducted. But they are still basing the primary
watch list on the text check, so it is not the same thing. We
are not comparing it apple to an apple.
Ms. Granger. Thank you.
That is all the questions I have.
They are going to the IDENT in the State Department,
overseas, that is right. The question is the 15 seconds and
what that--it is confirming the identity, is that right?
We will have more information on that in the report.
Ms. Sanchez?
Ms. Loretta Sanchez of California. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Ms. Walker, I have several questions for you.
First of all, how would you characterize the US-VISIT
program? What I mean by that, we conceived it to be an entry-
exit system, predominantly to catch people with overstayed
visas, et cetera. Now it is more of a security tool.
What do you think are its positives and its negatives as an
immigration tool and as a security tool, given the years of
experience you have had in El Paso in particular?
Ms. Campbell Walker. From a positive perspective, it
definitely--if you are able to confirm someone's identity
timely, that is a positive thing. Definitely, if one is able to
run theoretically these IBIS text-based checks. The litany of
examples given by Undersecretary Hutchinson were very
instructive, and also the examples regarding Assistant
Secretary Harty.
But the class check, when it was being done, before US-
VISIT, would have brought up these examples that we are talking
about. Also the IBIS check would have brought up some of these
examples that we are talking about, if they were in the
database.
The patina being placed on this scenario by US-VISIT is the
possibility of identity verification, a great positive.
But let's face the situation: Once they are admitted and
they are in overstay, we don't have sufficient interior
enforcement to deal with it as it stands, to be able to follow
up on this.
There are several facets of this that we need to address to
make US-VISIT even have a possibility of success.
From a terrorist perspective, I am sorry, I still think we
have a very limited number of terrorist fingerprints that we
can run against, and we are not able to do that quick biometric
check against the full IDENT database now.
And I wanted to address a very quick point that Madam
Chair, Ms. Granger, mentioned earlier, on this IDENT issue and
IAFIS. And I hope that our biometric expert will speak in a
moment about that point.
IDENT and IAFIS, they are not fully integrated. There have
been several reports to that effect and the fact that we don't
have sufficient funding to allow said integration. That is a
critical component to eventually allow for further database
review.
Ms. Loretta Sanchez of California. Thank you.
You know, looking at this Phase 1, it has been pretty
successful, the implementation and the agencies getting this
all up. I think it is a decent start of where we are.
But I am really taking a look at the fact that we are
strained with respect to personnel and the resources just to
get that first phase. Now we are looking at Phase 2, Phase 3,
we are talking about land borders. What are your concerns,
knowing what you do, especially on the land border situation,
at the enormity--I mean, what are the lessons learned or what
do we have to watch out for, in particular with respect to
resources, to get this implemented elsewhere?
Ms. Campbell Walker. There is a great provision in the
second annual report of the Data Management Improvement Act
task force, report to the Congress, reflecting right now the
challenges at land borders, just in infrastructure and physical
facility alone.
I will try to remember this off the top of my head, they
indicate that there are several ports that have absolutely no
additional infrastructure to allow for expansion. This is
important if we are going to try to deal with exit at all and
for that matter increase the level of staffing necessary to do
these biometric checks of people coming in.
They have a chart showing that maybe 60 of them only have a
20 percent expansion capacity.
And already I believe Jim Williams has been quoted in the
paper indicating that he is concerned about the ability to
implement US-VISIT timely at land borders.
We don't have people for exit; we don't have land and
infrastructure; we don't have scanners; we don't have--people
right now, if you want to look at overtime that is being logged
in and paid by the government right now, just implementing our
current systems, it is out the window.
Plus people are leaving in droves because of the level of
stress they are put under and the demands placed upon them
right now.
These are incredibly difficult jobs these people are
carrying out, and they need support. And we just don't have the
capacity to do this in the time frame necessary.
Ms. Loretta Sanchez of California. Only 5 percent of the
people who are crossing our land borders actually are using
some type of visa. I know when I cross and they just kind of
look at me and they wave me on or what have you. I mean, what
does that signify with respect to trying to really figure out
who is coming in and who is going out under these phased
implementations to the program?
Ms. Campbell Walker. Well, let's face it, right now, I
mean, U.S. citizens are one of the least well documented, and
Mexican citizens are one of the best documented. Mexican
citizens--those who have laser visas--have a document that has
a biometric embedded in it with two prints and the digitized
photograph that is the basis for US-VISIT going forward.
We are not even able to merge that database with the IDENT
database right now, so that we don't have to enroll Mexican
citizens as they come across. The idea that every Mexican
citizen, when right now it is less than 5 second coming in, is
going to be two-printed and it is going to be 10 to 15 seconds,
it is quick to see what we are going to deal with as far as
time frames and backups on doing it.
It makes sense to deal with risk management at this point.
And why can't we go ahead and merge those databases and give
some relief to at least our Mexican neighbors as we are doing
to our Canadian neighbors to the north?
Ms. Loretta Sanchez of California. Thank you.
Ms. Granger. I now recognize Representative Turner for five
minutes.
Mr. Turner. Ms. Walker, I want to thank you for sounding
the alarm for us, because I completely agree with you. I think
we are ill-equipped and ill-prepared to be able to efficiently
and effectively implement US-VISIT at our land borders. And I
hope that this committee in a bipartisan way will call upon the
Department of Homeland Security to do the necessary analysis to
submit to the Congress what the needs are in terms of
personnel, infrastructure, data integration, in order to be
able to successfully implement US-VISIT at our land border
crossings without creating a crisis.
And it will be a crisis for many of our border communities
if we fail to provide the necessary support. And to my
knowledge, to date I have not seen--and I don't think the
department has prepared--a plan that would lay out for us what
the true cost of effective implementation of US-VISIT less than
one year from now should be in order to carry it out in an
effective way.
And so, we have got to do that. As you said, it is a
reality check.
And I was interested, you made mention of the deployment of
1,000 biometric scanners, and I don't know that you got to
expand upon that, about how inadequate that actually is. But I
would invite you to kind of talk about that, as one example of
how far we have to go.
Ms. Campbell Walker. Well, for me it is easiest just to
take a home example, so if you will indulge me, let me just try
to do that.
One of our major ports of entry is the Bridge of the
Americas. We have anywhere between four to six pedestrian lanes
there and then we have the Paso del Norte Bridge, where there
is maybe five to six pedestrian. And then you have maybe 10--
and they are trying to up it to 24 lanes--of passenger vehicle
traffic. And then we have at just the one, Bridge of the
Americas, and then there is the other 10 at the Paso del Norte
Bridge.
So there is no way that 1,000 is going to cut it. And so,
right now, the only thing they have right now at a passenger
vehicle lane is that I have a mobile text unit, which is that
legacy Customs-based system in which I type in to hook into the
IBIS check on someone.
But you don't IBIS check everyone in a passenger vehicle
lane.
And in fact, post-9/11, what happened was that they pushed
IBIS inspection percentages higher on pedestrians. So as our
pedestrian lanes bumped back because of the slowdown, people
got in cars.
Well, it doesn't take a rocket scientist, if you are a
really savvy terrorist, indeed if we are talking terrorism
here, to say, well, okay, if get on wheels versus walk across,
then, okay, the percentage is going to be less that I may get
caught. It is just mindboggling.
So what I am just hoping is that there is a realistic
assessment of where we are. The questions need to be asked: How
many lanes do you have? How much overtime do you have? How long
does it take you to get the checks?
Right now, in mobile text, what information can you
get?which I am pretty clear about that right now. And how long
is it going to take you and what is the implementation schedule
necessary to be able to accomplish ``X'' goals?
And I think we just had a recent GAO report stating that
Department of Homeland Security doesn't know how much it is
going to take to get some of these things done.
So it is a logical response.
It is a hard time frame to get this done. Heck, it has been
going on for seven years, trying to figure out how to implement
this. How are they supposed to do it in a matter of a few
months?
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Ms. Walker.
Ms. Granger. The chair recognizes Mr. Dicks.
Mr. Dicks. I want to compliment the panel on their
testimony.
Mr. Carlton, tell us about 10 fingers versus two fingers--
and I know you know the answer. Explain this. I think with the
IDENT system and the IAFIS system there is an example of flat
fingerprinting versus rolled. And because of the difference in
the two, there was a 40 percent discrepancy. Is that not
correct?
Mr. Carlton. I don't have the exact data, but let me try
and?
Mr. Dicks. Explain it for us. I think it is important.
Mr. Carlton. --discuss the general topic.
Mr. Dicks. Right.
Mr. Carlton. The issue with only capturing two flat fingers
from everyone is going to become a problem later on down the
road. As the size of the database gets bigger, the limited
amount of data that can be acquired from the two fingerprints
means that the system is going to start returning more and more
false matches, because there just isn't sufficient data to find
the matching record in the database.
So the issue you raised earlier is, you are pushing out
into the future a challenge of either re-enrolling everyone to
get eight or 10 fingers or some interim policy there.
But, yes, sir, eventually you are going to start running
into problems there.
Now, the data I have so far, that I heard just today from
my DHS colleagues, is that the performance of the fingerprint
systems they are using is actually very, very good. Their false
match rate is significantly lower than they had expected. And
that would be consistent with this initial rollout, when the
database is relatively small. It is a problem that will be
manifest later on.
Mr. Dicks. Well, why not do it right from the start? I mean
this idea that 600,000 people have come in, we have done it
with two when we could have very easily done it with 10. How
much longer does that take?
Mr. Carlton. See, I think the challenge right now is, in
part, that the technology is much better understood for the
single finger matching, both the hardware and the process of
using a single finger match. There is still work to be done in
the human flow of work from the employee side and let's say the
customer-client side in actually capturing all 10 fingerprints.
So there is the human element of being able to use the
technologies. It is just easier to use the flat finger, single
finger capture right now.
Mr. Dicks. Why were they doing it with flat fingers in one
situation and then rolled fingers in the other, which causes 40
percent discrepancy?
Mr. Carlton. The distinction is the requirements for law
enforcement versus a civil identification system. A law
enforcement system is typically based on fingernail to
fingernail roll of the fingerprint. And that is, as my
colleague is here, reaching for cup, that often from a crime
scene standpoint, it is not actually the flat part of the
fingerprint that is left behind. And so for forensic research,
you really need the whole fingerprint.
The other thing you have to understand is those
fingerprints that are captured in a rolled process, that takes
a long time and almost always requires a human being to help
guide the process of capturing those 10 fingers.
That is going to be very complex for people in consulates
overseas, because often they operate on the opposite side of a
hardened wall and glass from the public that they are trying to
serve, so you cannot actually even help someone if you wanted
to roll fingerprints.
So the practicality is, the capturing of fingerprints
overseas is going to have to be flat fingers.
Mr. Dicks. Okay.
I just would mention in the GAO report, currently FBI IAFIS
is only 40 percent accurate in matching their database of
rolled fingerprints to the flat prints in the IDENT system.
Does that make sense?
Mr. Carlton. It is entirely possible, yes, sir.
Mr. Dicks. So we have a problem here. The Appropriations
Committee is certainly trying to take steps to push them to do
the right thing here and at least to know that they have a
problem.
Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Ms. Granger. Thank you.
Mr. May, I appreciate your comments on the US-VISIT program
and I am certainly pleased to hear about the cooperation
between DHS and the private sector.
You had a concern about airline personnel playing a role in
collecting exit information from passengers. This is a little
information sheet that has been prepared by Homeland Security.
This is in English and Spanish and also visual. Do you think
the airlines would be willing to hand out these small
information cards to help people understand better?
Mr. May. Madam Chairman, we do hand out cards of that sort
in the one test area that exit is under way today. And so, I
mean, there are a number of areas where we can be helpful to
DHS in helping implement this program.
What we are not interested in doing, I would like to re-
emphasize, is having the exit program executed, if you will, at
the ticket counter or at the gate, which in effect turns my
agent into immigration's agents. And that is a non-starter from
our perspective.
Ms. Granger. I understand.
Ms. Sanchez, do you have further questions?
Ms. Loretta Sanchez of California. I just wanted, very
quickly, to ask Mr. May, you had some testimony about exit fees
and charging some exit fees in order to pay for some of this.
And I wondered if you had any comments you wanted to give to
this committee?
And lastly, Ms. Walker, I just wanted to make sure that the
initial question that you wanted to pose from your beginning
testimony about the IDENT system, if you had gotten everything
out that you think this committee should know about.
Mr. May. I think the key that this committee should know
about is, first of all, the fee issue: The airlines industry,
which already lost about $5 billion last year, is currently
spending today, now, probably $3 billion annually to comply
with federally mandated security measures.
We believe very strongly that federal security is a
function of the federal government, soup to nuts, start to
finish. That is point one.
Point two, vis-a-vis this exit program, we are concerned
about making sure that you capture information. It is voluntary
today. I agree with everything that has been said about the
magnitude of the problem when you expand to a land-based
environment, because you are only capturing a very, very small
percentage of the total traffic when you look at airlines, for
example.
I think they are doing a great job of putting it in place
for entry. They need to figure out how to better require people
to do this on exit, because the other unfortunate byproduct is,
you could sent somebody, when this becomes a regular part of
the process, somebody didn't check out as they left the United
States, they come back to the United States, they are
inadmissible, to use a term of art I have learned, and at that
point, we are responsible for returning them to their point of
origin at our cost.
And I am not exactly excited about the prospect of having
thousands of people being returned to their point of origin,
for any good reason. But if it is simply because they didn't go
through that exit process, that is going to further complicate
it.
So I am not suggesting there are any issues here that DHS
is not aware of. I am not suggesting that there aren't people
of great faith that are working on all of these issues. But I
think, as some of my colleagues on this panel have pointed out,
the magnitude of the effort is huge and I am not sure fully
understood by everybody to date.
Ms. Campbell Walker. In trying to shed myself of all of my
IDENT issues, just one more point. There was a comment
regarding the eight prints, why didn't we do the 10 prints from
the beginning, a very cogent response on that.
In 2005, though, the Department of State has already
indicated that they are planning on moving to eight prints as a
part of their process. And a part of it is due to the fact that
they expect the database to be so overloaded and unresponsive
that they are going to have to do that and in addition to that
provide additional documentation to help separate people.
So that is already a part of the issue.
But again, on the IDENT check, let us assume that they have
done something incredible, and that is great, if they have
managed to do a full IDENT check in 15 seconds, what a
marvelous thing if that has been accomplished.
But even if it has been accomplished, that 15 seconds, and
doing that check for every single person trying to be admitted
in a land border--because you cannot separate them out. There
is no place to say U.S. citizens go here, legal permanent
residents go here, those other people go here--will back us up
so far into Mexico on the southern border that we might as well
go back into negotiations regarding treaty acquisition of land,
which I don't think President Fox is going to appreciate.
So we need to really think this through before saying we
have got to meet that December 31st deadline.
Thank you.
Ms. Granger. I appreciate both panels, your testimony, your
attendance. The chair notes that some members may have
additional questions for this panel which they may wish to
submit in writing. Without objection, the hearing record will
remain open for 10 days for members to submit written questions
to these witnesses and to place their responses in the record.
There being no further business, I again thank the
subcommittee members and our witnesses today, and the hearing
is now adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 1:44 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
--------__
Material Submitted for the Record
Questions and Responses of the Honorable Maura Harty, submitted by the
Honorable Dave Camp
Question: Could you provide us with an implementation schedule for
posts as to biometric visa processing in the nonimmigrant and immigrant
visa context?
Answer: The implementation schedule is attached. The schedule indicates
the post name, type of biometric installation, start and finish dates
of the trip, and whether the post has gone live with biometrics. Each
trip includes biometric installation as well as general training and
hardware maintenance objectives. Before October 26, 2004 we will
install and go live with biometrics at all nonimmigrant and immigrant
visa issuing posts. As of March 10, 91 posts are processing biometric
nonimmigrant visas, and one post is processing biometric immigrant
visas.
CONSULAR AFFAIRS Biometric Installations Schedule for NIV and IV
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Biometric
Post Implementation Start Finish Comment
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FRANKFURT............................................ 2-print NIV 9/11/03 10/1/03 Completed
BRUSSELS............................................. 2-print NIV 9/17/03 9/30/03 Completed
SAN SALVADOR......................................... 2-print NIV 9/22/03 10/3/03 Completed
MONTREAL............................................. 2-print NIV 10/6/03 1022/03 Completed
CAIRO................................................ 2-print NIV 10/8/03 1016/03 Completed
OTTAWA............................................... 2-print NIV 10/14/03 1022/03 Completed
KAMPALA.............................................. 2-print NIV 10/15/03 1030/03 Completed
LAGOS................................................ 2-print NIV 10/15/03 11/5/03 Completed
DOHA................................................. 2-print NIV 10/20/03 11/3/03 Completed
TALLINN.............................................. 2-print NIV 10/20/03 11/3/03 Completed
RIGA................................................. 2-print NIV 10/22/03 11/6/03 Completed
HALIFAX.............................................. 2-print NIV 10/24/03 11/7/03 Completed
VANCOUVER............................................ 2-print NIV 10/24/03 11/10/03 Completed
ABU DHABI............................................ 2-print NIV 10/27/03 11/10/03 Completed
FLORENCE............................................. 2-print NIV 10/27/03 11/14/03 Completed
BANGKOK.............................................. 2-print NIV 10/29/03 11/21/03 Completed
COPENHAGEN........................................... 2-print NIV 10/31/03 11/14/03 Completed
RIYADH............................................... 2-print NIV 11/4/03 11/19/03 Completed
KUALA LUMPUR......................................... 2-print NIV 11/5/03 11/21/03 Completed
JERUSALEM............................................ 2-print NIV 11/5/03 11/21/03 Completed
TEL AVIV............................................. 2-print NIV 11/5/03 11/28/03 Completed
ANKARA............................................... 2-print NIV 11/6/03 11/21/03 Completed
DUBAI................................................ 2-print NIV 11/10/03 11/26/03 Completed
PORT LOUIS........................................... 2-print NIV 11/10/03 11/21/03 Completed
KUWAIT............................................... 2-print NIV 11/11/03 11/24/03 Completed
MAPUTO............................................... 2-print NIV 11/12/03 11/25/03 Completed
KOLONIA.............................................. 2-print NIV 11/12/03 11/24/03 Completed
MASERU............................................... 2-print NIV 11/12/03 11/26/03 Completed
SAN JOSE............................................. 2-print NIV 11/12/03 11/26/03 Completed
DAMASCUS............................................. 2-print NIV 11/17/03 12/2/03 Completed
BILISI............................................... 2-print NIV 11/17/03 12/2/03 Completed
ORONTO............................................... 2-print NIV 11/19/03 12/9/03 Completed
CALGARY.............................................. 2-print NIV 11/24/03 12/9/03 Completed
CHIANG MAl........................................... 2-print NIV 11/24/03 12/9/03 Completed
MOSCOW............................................... 2-print NIV 11/26/03 12/19/03 Completed
JEDDAH............................................... 2-print NIV 12/2/03 12/16/03 Completed
ASMARA............................................... 2-print NIV 12/3/03 12/16/03 Completed
B.S. BEGAWAN......................................... 2-print NIV 12/3/03 12/17/03 Completed
MUSCAT............................................... 2-print NIV 12/3/03 12/18/03 Completed
PANAMA CITY.......................................... 2-print NIV 12/3/03 12/19/03 Completed
ISLAMABAD............................................ 2-print NIV 12/3/03 12/19/03 Completed
ISTANBUL............................................. 2-print NIV 12/3/03 12/17/03 Completed
MINSK................................................ 2-print NIV 12/3/03 12/16/03 Completed
TASHKENT............................................. 2-print NIV 12/4/03 12/19/03 Completed
AMMAN................................................ 2-print NIV 12/5/03 12/23/03 Completed
CHISINAU............................................. 2-print NIV 12/8/03 12/19/03 Completed
KOROR................................................ 2-print NIV 12/8/03 12/19/03 Completed
SANAA................................................ 2-print NIV 12/8/03 12/24/03 Completed
QUEBEC............................................... 2-print NIV 12/11/03 12/23/03 Completed
BELIZE CITY.......................................... 2-print NIV 1/5/04 1/16/04 Completed
BRATISLAVA........................................... 2-print NIV 1/7/04 1/23/04 Completed
WINDHOEK............................................. 2-print NIV 1/7/04 1/22/04 Completed
CAPE TOWN............................................ 2-print NIV 1/7/04 1/20/04 Completed
BISHKEK.............................................. 2-print NIV 1/8/04 1/16/04 Completed
SURABAYA............................................. 2-print NIV 1/14/04 1/28/04 Completed
YEKATERINBURG........................................ 2-print NIV 1/14/04 1/29/04 Completed
DUBLIN............................................... 2-print NIV 1/14/04 1/27/04 Completed
MILAN................................................ 2-print NIV 1/15/04 1/28/04 Completed
BAKU................................................. 2-print NIV 1/22/04 2/4/04 Completed
DURBAN............................................... 2-print NIV 1/22/04 1/30/04 Completed
MELBOURNE............................................ 2-print NIV 1/22/04 2/4/04 Completed
RECIFE............................................... 2-print NIV 1/22/04 2/4/04 Completed
VALLETTA............................................. 2-print NIV 1/22/04 2/4/04 Completed
JAKARTA.............................................. 2-print NIV 1/30/04 2/17/04 Completed
BANJUL............................................... 2-print NIV 2/2/04 2/13/04 Completed
HONG KONG............................................ 2-print NIV 2/2/04 2/13/04 Completed
SAO PAULO............................................ 2-print NIV 2/2/04 2/25/04 Completed
ST PETERSBURG........................................ 2-print NIV 2/2/04 2/20/04 Completed
VLADIVOSTOK.......................................... 2-print NIV 2/2/04 2/9/04 Completed
YAOUNDE.............................................. 2-print NIV 2/4/04 2/19/04 Completed
ALMA TY.............................................. 2-print NIV 2/4/04 2/17/04 Completed
JOHANNESBURG......................................... 2-print NIV 2/4/04 2/20/04 Completed
N'DJAMENA............................................ 2-print NIV 2/6/04 2/18/04 Completed
PERTH................................................ 2-print NIV 2/6/04 2/17/04 Completed
SUVA................................................. 2-print NIV 2/6/04 2/19/04 Completed
HAMIL TON............................................ 2-print NIV 2/10/04 2/19/04 Completed
LUXEMBOURG........................................... 2-print NIV 2/11/04 2/27/04 Completed
PORT OF SPAIN........................................ 2-print NIV 2/11/04 3/5/04 Completed
ASUNCION............................................. 2-print NIV 2/11/04 2/24/04 Completed
AUCKLAND............................................. 2-print NIV 2/11/04 2/27/04 Completed
CASABLANCA........................................... 2-print NIV 2/11/04 2/24/04 Completed
HONG KONG............................................ 2-print IV 2/18/04 2/26/04 Completed
NIAMEY............................................... 2-print NIV 2/18/04 3/4/04 Completed
SYDNEY............................................... 2-print NIV 2/19/04 3/3/04 Completed
ASHGABAT............................................. 2-print NIV 2/25/04 3/9/04 Completed
NICOSIA.............................................. 2-print NIV 2/25/04 3/10/04 Completed
SANTO DOMINGO........................................ 2-print NIV and IV 2/25/04 3/16/04 Completed
MANAMA............................................... 2-print NIV 3/1/04 3/15/04 Completed
BEIRUT............................................... 2-print NIV 3/3/04 3/17/04 Completed
OUAGADOUGOU.......................................... 2-print NIV 3/3/04 3/16/04 Completed
PHNOM PENH........................................... 2-print NIV 3/3/04 3/15/04 Completed
RANGOON.............................................. 2-print NIV 3/3/04 3/16/04 Completed
HANOI................................................ 2-print NIV 3/4/04 3/18/04 Completed
FRANKFURT............................................ 2-print IV 3/9/04 3/17/04 Completed
BEIJING.............................................. 2-print NIV 3/11/04 4/2/04
BRIDGETOWN........................................... 2-print NIV and IV 3/11/04 4/2/04
GABORONE............................................. 2-print NIV 3/15/04 3/30/04
ALGIERS.............................................. 2-print NIV and IV 3/17/04 3/31/04
LJUBLJANA............................................ 2-print NIV 3/17/04 3/31/04
NOUAKCHOTT........................................... 2-print NIV 3/17/04 3/31/04
SKOPJE............................................... 2-print NIV and IV 3/17/04 3/31/04
SAN SALVADOR......................................... 2-print IV 3/22/04 4/1/04
BAMAKO............................................... 2-print NIV 3/24/04 4/7/04
SARAJEVO............................................. 2-print NIV 3/24/04 4/9/04
YEREVAN.............................................. 2-print NIV 3/24/04 4/8/04
PRAGUE............................................... 2-print NIV and IV 3/24/04 4/9/04
PRAIA................................................ 2-print NIV and IV 3/29/04 4/12/04
ACCRA................................................ 2-print NIV and IV 3/31/04 4/20/04
GUAYAQUIL............................................ 2-print NIV and IV 3/31/04 4/16/04
QUITO................................................ 2-print NIV 3/31/04 4/16/04
HO CHI MINH CITY..................................... 2-print NIV and IV 4/1/04 4/27/04
KIEV................................................. 2-print NIV and IV 4/7/04 4/21/04
DUBLIN............................................... 2-print IV 417/04 4/16/04
ISLAMABAD............................................ 2-print IV 4/7/04 4/21/04
TEL AVIV............................................. 2-print IV 4/17/04 4/13/04
BELIZE CITY.......................................... 2-print IV 4/12/04 4/20/04
MADRID............................................... 2-print NIV and IV 4/12/04 5/5/04
MSTERDAM............................................. 2-print NIV and IV 4/12/04 4/30/04
HELSINKI............................................. 2-print NIV and IV 4/13/04 4/26/04
JERUSALEM............................................ 2-print IV 4/14/04 4/20/04
GUANGZHOU............................................ 2-print NIV and IV 4/19/04 5/7/04
ANTANANARIVO......................................... 2-print NIV and IV 4/21/04 5/6/04
BANGKOK.............................................. 2-print IV 4/21/04 4/30/04
LAGOS................................................ 2-print IV 4/21/04 4/30/04
SINGAPORE............................................ 2-print NIV and IV 4/21/04 15/6/04
RIO DE JANEIRO....................................... 2-print NIV and IV 4/22/04 5/20/04
ABU DHABI............................................ 2-print IV 4/23/04 5/4/04
TUNIS................................................ 2-print NIV and IV 4/26/04 5/12/04
ULAANBAATAR.......................................... 2-print NIV 4/26/04 5/7/04
TEGUCIGALPA.......................................... 2-print NIV and IV 4/28/04 5/14/04
BELFAST.............................................. 2-print NIV 4/28/04 5/12/04
CARACAS.............................................. 2-print NIV and IV 4/28/04 5/19/04
DOHA................................................. 2-print IV 4/28/04 5/4/04
LONDON............................................... 2-print IV 4/28/04 5/25/04
MANAMA............................................... 2-print IV 5/3/04 5/12/04
TBILISI.............................................. 2-print IV 5/3/04 5/12/04
YAOUNDE.............................................. 2-print IV 5/3/04 5/12/04
PORT MORESBY......................................... 2-print NIV and IV 5/4/04 5/18/04
BOGOTA............................................... 2-print NIV and IV 5/5/04 5/28/04
BUENOS AIRES......................................... 2-print NIV and IV 5/5/04 5/28/04
ALMA TV.............................................. 2-print IV 5/5/04 5/11/04
SANAA................................................ 2-print IV 5/6/04 5/13/04
COLOMBO.............................................. 2-print NIV and IV 5/7/04 5/24/04
HARARE............................................... 2-print NIV and IV 5/10/04 5/24/04
SHANGHAI............................................. 2-print NIV 5/10/04 5/21/04
PARAMARIBO........................................... 2-print NIV and IV 5/11/04 5/26/04
JAKARTA.............................................. 2-print IV 5/12/04 5/21/04
NAIROBI.............................................. 2-print NIV and IV 5/12/04 5/28/04
NASSAU............................................... 2-print NIV and IV 5/12/04 5/28/04
LISBON............................................... 2-print NIV and IV 5/13/04 6/4/04
VIENTIANE............................................ 2-print NIV and IV 5/13/04 5/28/04
CAIRO................................................ 2-print IV 5/18/04 5/27/04
DAR ES SALAAM........................................ 2-print NIV and IV 5/19/04 6/1/04
LOME................................................. 2-print NIV and IV 5/19/04 6/2/04
ZAGREB............................................... 2-print NIV and IV 5/19/04 6/3/04
CHENGDU.............................................. 2-print NIV 5/20/04 6/4/04
KINGSTON............................................. 2-print NIV and IV 5/20/04 6/18/04
KUWAIT............................................... 2-print IV 5/24/04 6/11/04
NAPLES............................................... 2-print NIV and IV 5/24/04 6/16/04
JOHANNESBURG......................................... 2-print IV 5/26/04 6/4/04
STOCKHOLM............................................ 2-print NIV and IV 5/26/04 6/10/04
BELGRADE............................................. 2-print NIV and IV 5/31/04 6/18/04
MONTEVIDEO........................................... 2-print NIV and IV 5/31/04 6/16/04
PANAMA CITY.......................................... 2-print IV 5/31/04 6/9/04
ANKARA............................................... 2-print IV 6/1/04 6/11/04
ATHENS............................................... 2-print NIV and IV 6/2/04 6/25/04
BUCHAREST............................................ 2-print NIV and IV 6/2/04 6/18/04
SANTIAGO............................................. 2-print NIV and IV 6/2/04 6/18/04
MAJURO............................................... 2-print NIV 6/2/04 6/16/04
BIDJAN............................................... 2-print NIV and IV 6/3/04 6/18/04
BRASILIA............................................. 2-print NIV 6/7/04 6/30/04
SOFIA................................................ 2-print NIV and IV 6/7/04 6/24/04
LA PAZ............................................... 2-print NIV and IV 6/9/04 6/24/04
DDIS ABABA........................................... 2-print NIV and IV 6/10/04 6/30/04
SHENYANG............................................. 2-print NIV 6/10/04 6/23/04
BUDAPEST............................................. 2-print NIV and IV 6/16/04 7/2/04
DAMASCUS............................................. 2-print IV 6/16/04 6/25/04
LILONGWE............................................. 2-print NIV and IV 6/16/04 6/28/04
GUATEMALA CITY....................................... 2-print IV 6/16/04 6/22/04
MANAGUA.............................................. 2-print IV 6/16/04 6/25/04
MANILA............................................... 2-print NIV and IV 6/16/04 7/13/04
KIGALI............................................... 2-print NIV 6/21/04 7/2/04
MONROVIA............................................. 2-print NIV and IV 6/21/04 7/6/04
TIRANA............................................... 2-print NIV 6/21/04 7/2/04
LUSAKA............................................... 2-print NIV and IV 6/23/04 7/7/04
CONAKRY.............................................. 2-print NIV 6/23/04 7/7/04
GEORGETOWN........................................... 2-print NIV and IV 6/23/04 7/14/04
REYKJAVIK............................................ 2-print NIV and IV 6/23/04 7/6/04
SAN JOSE............................................. 2-print IV 6/23/04 7/2/04
AMMAN................................................ 2-print IV 6/28/04 7/7/04
LUANDA............................................... 2-print NIV 6/30/04 7/14/04
DAKAR................................................ 2-print NIV and IV 7/7/04 7/22/04
MATAMOROS............................................ 2-print NIV 7/7/04 7/30/04 BCC
TOKYO................................................ 2-print NIV and IV 7/7/04 7/30/04
ASUNCION............................................. 2-print IV 7/7/04 7/13/04
MBABANE.............................................. 2-print NIV 7/7/04 7/13/04
DJIBOUTI............................................. 2-print NIV and IV 7/8/04 7/23/04
HAVANA............................................... 2-print NIV and IV 7/8/04 7/30/04
SYDNEY............................................... 2-print IV 7/8/04 7/30/04
NOGALES CONS/TPF..................................... 2-print NIV 7/12/04 7/30/04 BCC
HAMILTON............................................. 2-print IV 7/14/04 7/20/04
MUMBAI............................................... 2-print NIV and IV 7/14/04 8/6/04
NEW DELHI............................................ 2-print NIV and IV 7/14/04 7/30/04
AUCKLAND............................................. 2-print IV 7/14/04 7/23/04
BRUSSELS............................................. 2-print IV 7/14/04 7/23/04
PORT-AU-PRINCE....................................... 2-print NIV and IV 7/14/04 8/4/04
LIBREVILLE........................................... 2-print NIV and IV 7/15/04 8/2/04
CHENNAI.............................................. 2-print NIV and IV 7/21/04 8/6/04
OSAKA-KOBE........................................... 2-print NIV 7/21/04 8/6/04
BAGHDAD.............................................. 2-print NIV 7/26/04 8/6/04 Tentative
dates
WARSAW............................................... 2-print NIV and IV 7/26/04 8/11/04
CALCUTTA............................................. 2-print NIV and IV 7/28/04 8/11/04
VANCOUVER............................................ 2-print IV 7/28/04 8/3/04
MERIDA............................................... 2-print NIV 8/2/04 8/20/04 BCC
SEOUL................................................ 2-print NIV and IV 8/2/04 8/20/04
KRAKOW............................................... 2-print NIV 8/2/04 8/17/04
OSLO................................................. 2-print NIV and IV 8/4/04 8/20/04
PARIS................................................ 2-print NIV and IV 8/4/04 8/27/04
BANGUI............................................... 2-print NIV 8/4/04 8/20/04
LONDON............................................... 2-print NIV 8/4/04 8/17/04
MEXICO CITY.......................................... 2-print NIV 8/4/04 8/24/04 BCC
MONTERREY............................................ 2-print NIV 8/4/04 8/25/04 BCC
RANGOON.............................................. 2-print IV 8/4/04 8/10/04
VILNIUS.............................................. 2-print NIV 8/5/04 8/20/04
VIENNA............................................... 2-print NIV and IV 8/11/04 8/26/04
COTONOU.............................................. 2-print IV 8/11/04 8/17/04
GUADALAJARA.......................................... 2-print NIV 8/11/04 9/1/04 BCC
NUEVO LAREDO CONSITPF................................ 2-print NIV 8/11/04 8/31/04 BCC
ROME................................................. 2-print NIV and IV 8/12/04 8/25/04
KATHMANDU............................................ 2-print NIV and IV 8/16/04 8/27/04
PONTA DELGADA........................................ 2-print NIV and IV 8/16/04 9/1/04 BCC
TIJUANA CONS......................................... 2-print NIV 8/16/04 8/20/04 BCC
NAHA................................................. 2-print NIV 8/18/04 9/2/04
KINSHASA............................................. 2-print IV 8/18/04 8/25/04
TIJUANA TPF.......................................... 2-print NIV 8/23/04 8/27/04 BCC
COPENHAGEN........................................... 2-Print IV 8/25/04 9/10/04
MUSCAT............................................... 2-print IV 8/25/04 9/3/04
CASABLANCA........................................... 2-print IV 8/25/04 9/3/04
PHNOM PENH........................................... 2-print IV 8/25/04 9/1/04
IAIPEI............................................... 2-print NIV and IV 8/30/04 9/24/04
CIUDAD JUAREZ CONS................................... 2-print NIV and IV 9/1/04 9/21/04
HERMOSILLO........................................... 2-print NIV 9/1/04 9/17/04 BCC
DHAKA................................................ 2-print IV 9/1/04 9/7/04
CIUDAD JUAREZ TPF.................................... 2-print NIV 9/6/04 9/15/04 BCC
NIAMEY............................................... 2-print IV 9/8/04 9/17/04
OUAGADOUGOU.......................................... 2-print IV 9/8/04 9/14/04
SUVA................................................. 2-print IV 9/8/04 9/17/04
MOSCOW............................................... 2-print IV 9/15/04 9/24/04
PORT OF SPAIN........................................ 2-print IV 9/15/04 9/24/04
NICOSIA.............................................. 2-print IV 9/17/04 9/28/04
MONTREAL............................................. 2-print IV 9/21/04 9/30/04
KUALA LUMPUR......................................... 2-print IV 9/22/04 10/1/04
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question: 2. At how many of these posts will you assign additional
personnel to assist in this processing?
Answer: For Fiscal year 2004, The Bureau of Consular Affairs created 80
additional overseas positions to meet both increased workload and
overseas biometrics requirements. In addition, CA will have established
186 new officer positions over a three-year period ending in fiscal
year 2005 to replace consular associates as adjudicators.
Question: 3. Is there sufficient staffing in State Department consular
offices to carry out the visa issuance process, including interviews,
US-VISIT enrollment and relevant security checks without causing delays
in the visa issuance process.
a. If not, how many additional consular officers are necessary?
b. Is there a need for additional facilities or a change in the
facility? If so, where and what facilities are required?
c. What is the impact on customer service?
Answer: a. The Bureau of Consular Affairs recently created additional
consular positions in order to compensate for the expanded workload
brought about by enhanced security procedures and biometric collection.
These positions will allow efficient visa processing in most cases with
few significant delays.
b. Many of our consular sections overseas operate without
adequate space. To ensure continued efficient and secure visa
processing, the State Department will require additional
funding for the construction of new overseas facilities with
sufficient consular workspace to meet existing demand and
growth.
c. Without adequate secure consular workspace, it is not
possible to deploy sufficient numbers of additional staff in
future to meet increased demand for visa services. The result
will inevitably be longer wait times for visas, decreased
waiting room space for visa applicants and inconvenience to
business travelers, students and tourists.
Question: 4. Please provide the Committee with a list of consulates
currently collecting biometric information and the types of data being
collected, how the information is collected and the time required to
collect the information.
Answer: The attachment indicates the consulates that are currently (as
of March 10) collecting biometric information for nonimmigrant and
immigrant visas. The biometrics collected are two index fingerprints
and a digitized photo. We also collect biographic data such as name,
gender, and birth date that must be associated with this biometric
information.
We collect biometric data during an in-person interview process at
the consulate. The process begins by the applicant supplying biographic
data and a photo. The biographic data is entered into a database and
the photo is captured electronically and added to the applicant's
record. The applicant's biographic information is sent to the CLASS
database to determine whether a lookout exists.
The applicant then goes to the interview window where a Foreign
Service Officer (FSO) or a cleared and trained Eligible Family Member
(EFM) verifies the photo image. Next, the applicant is directed to
supply two index fingerprints using an electronic fingerprint scanner
located on the other side of the window in full view of the FSO or EFM.
The fingerprints and photo are then sent electronically to DHS' IDENT
database to determine whether they match existing lookouts.
An FSO then verifies the biographic data, and interviews the
applicant. CLASS results are nearly always available before the
interview begins.
Following a review of IDE NT and CLASS records, the applicant's
documentation, and the interview responses the FSO then decides whether
to issue a vIsa.
Based on field experience to date the time required to collect
fingerprint data averages about 30 seconds per applicant.
Biometric Installations Completed as of 17 March 2004
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Biometric
Post Implementation Start Finish Comment
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FRANKFURT............................................ 2-print NIV 9/11/03 10/1/03 Completed
BRUSSELS............................................. 2-print NIV 9/17/03 9/30/03 Completed
SAN SALVADOR......................................... 2-print NIV 9/22/03 10/3/03 Completed
MONTREAL............................................. 2-print NIV 10/6/03 10/22/03 Completed
CAIRO................................................ 2-print NIV 10/8/03 10/16/03 Completed
OTTAWA............................................... 2-print NIV 10/14/03 10/22/03 Completed
KAMPALA.............................................. 2-print NIV 10/15/03 10/30/03 Completed
LAGOS................................................ 2-print NIV 10/15/03 11/5/03 Completed
DOHA................................................. 2-print NIV 10/20/03 11/3/03 Completed
ITALLINN............................................. 2-print NIV 10/20/03 11/3103 Completed
RIGA................................................. 2-print NIV 10/22/03 11/6/03 Completed
HALIFAX.............................................. 2-print NIV 10/24/03 11/7/03 Completed
ANCOUVER............................................. 2-print NIV 10/24/03 11/10/03 Completed
lA.BU DHABI.......................................... 2-print NIV 10/27/03 11/10/03 Completed
FLORENCE............................................. 2-print NIV 10/27/03 11/14/03 Completed
BANGKOK.............................................. 2-print NIV 10/29/03 11/21/03 Completed
COPENHAGEN........................................... 2-print NIV 10/31/03 11/14/03 Completed
RIYADH............................................... 2-print NIV 11/4/03 11/19/03 Completed
KUALA LUMPUR......................................... 2-print NIV 11/5/03 11/21/03 Completed
JERUSALEM............................................ 2-print NIV 11/5/03 11/21/03 Completed
ITEL AVIV............................................ 2-print NIV 11/5/03 11/28/03 Completed
lA.NKARA............................................. 2-print NIV 11/6/03 11/21/03 Completed
DUBAI................................................ 2-print NIV 11/10/03 11/26/03 Completed
PORT LOUIS........................................... 2-print NIV 11/10/03 11/21/03 Completed
KUWAIT............................................... 2-print NIV 11/11/03 11/24/03 Completed
MAPUTO............................................... 2-print NIV 11/12/03 11/25/03 Completed
KOLONIA.............................................. 2-print NIV 11/12/03 11/24/03 Completed
MASERU............................................... 2-print NIV 11/12/03 11/26/03 Completed
SAN JOSE............................................. 2-print NIV 11/12/03 11/26/03 Completed
DAMASCUS............................................. 2-print NIV 11/17/03 12/2/03 Completed
TBILISI.............................................. 2-print NIV 11/17/03 12/2/03 Completed
TORONTO.............................................. 2-print NIV 11/19/03 12/9/03 Completed
CALGARY.............................................. 2-print NIV 11/24/03 12/9/03 Completed
CHIANG MAl........................................... 2-print NIV 11/24/03 12/9/03 Completed
MOSCOW............................................... 2-print NIV 11/26/03 12/19/03 Completed
JEDDAH............................................... 2-print NIV 12/2/03 12/16/03 Completed
ASMARA............................................... 2-print NIV 12/3/03 12/16/03 Completed
B.S. BEGAWAN......................................... 2-print NIV 12/3/03 12/17/03 Completed
MUSCAT............................................... 2-print NIV 12/3/03 12/18/03 Completed
PANAMA CITY.......................................... 2-print NIV 12/3/03 12/19/03 Completed
ISLAMABAD............................................ 2-print NIV 12/3/03 12/19/03 Completed
ISTANBUL............................................. 2-print NIV 12/3/03 12/17/03 Completed
MINSK................................................ 2-print NIV 12/3/03 12/16/03 Completed
TASHKENT............................................. 2-print NIV 12/4/03 12/19/03 Completed
MMAN................................................. 2-print NIV 12/5/03 12/23/03 Completed
CHISINAU............................................. 2-print NIV 12/8/03 12/19/03 Completed
KOROR................................................ 2-print NIV 12/8/03 12/19/03 Completed
SANAA................................................ 2-print NIV 12/8/03 12/24/03 Completed
QUEBEC............................................... 2-print NIV 12/11/03 12/23/03 Completed
BELIZE CITY.......................................... 2-print NIV 1/5/04 1/16/04 Completed
BRATISLAVA........................................... 2-print NIV 1/7/04 1/23/04 Completed
WINDHOEK............................................. 2-print NIV 1/7/04, 1/22/04 Completed
CAPE TOWN............................................ 2-print NIV 1n/04 1/20/04 Completed
BISHKEK.............................................. 2-print NIV 1/8/04 1/16/04 Completed
SURABAYA............................................. 2-print NIV 1/14/04 1/28/04 Completed
YEKA TERINBURG....................................... 2-print NIV 1/14/04 1/29/04 Completed
DUBLIN............................................... 2-print NIV 1/14/04 1/27/04 Completed
MILAN................................................ 2-print NIV 1/15/04 1/28/04 Completed
BAKU................................................. 2-print NIV 1/22/04 2/4/04 Completed
DURBAN............................................... 2-print NIV 1/22/04 1/30/04 Completed
MELBOURNE............................................ 2-print NIV 1/22/04 2/4/04 Completed
RECIFE............................................... 2-print NIV 1/22/04 2/4/04 Completed
VALLETTA............................................. 2-print NIV 1/22/04 2/4/04 Completed
JAKARTA.............................................. 2-print NIV 1/30/04 2/17/04 Completed
BANJUL............................................... 2-print NIV 2/2/04 2/13/04 Completed
HONG KONG............................................ 2-print NIV 2/2/04 2/13/04 Completed
SAO PAULO............................................ 2-print NIV 2/2/04 2/25/04 Completed
ST PETERSBURG........................................ 2-print NIV 2/2/04 2/20/04 Completed
VLADIVOSTOK.......................................... 2-print NIV 2/2/04 2/9/04 Completed
YAOUNDE.............................................. 2-print NIV 2/4/04 2/19/04 Completed
ALMA TY.............................................. 2-print NIV 2/4/04 2/17/04 Completed
JOHANNESBURG......................................... 2-print NIV 2/4/04 2/20/04 Completed
N'DJAMENA............................................ 2-print NIV 2/6/04 2/18/04 Completed
PERTH................................................ 2-print NIV 2/6/04 2/17/04 Completed
SUVA................................................. 2-print NIV 2/6/04 2/19/04 Completed
HAMILTON............................................. 2-print NIV 2/10/04 2/19/04 Completed
LUXEMBOURG........................................... 2-print NIV 2/11/04 2/27/04 Completed
PORT OF SPAIN........................................ 2-print NIV 2/11/04 3/5/04 Completed
ASUNCION............................................. 2-print NIV 2/11/04 2/24/04 Completed
AUCKLAND............................................. 2-print NIV 2/11/04 2/27/04 Completed
CASABLANCA........................................... 2-print NIV 2/11/04 2/24/04 Completed
HONG KONG............................................ 2-print IV 2/18/04 2/26/04 Completed
NIAMEY............................................... 2-print NIV 2/18/04 3/4/04 Completed
SYDNEY............................................... 2-print NIV 2/19/04 3/3/04 Completed
ASHGABAT............................................. 2-print NIV 2/25/04 3/9/04 Completed
NICOSIA.............................................. 2-print NIV 2/25/04 3/10/04 Completed
SANTO DOMINGO........................................ 2-print NIV and IV 2/25/04 3/16/04 Completed
MANAMA............................................... 2-print NIV 3/1/04 3/15/04 Completed
BEIRUT............................................... 2-print NIV 3/3/04 3/17/04 Completed
BERN................................................. 2-print NIV and IV 3/3/04 3/19/04 Completed
OUAGADOUGOU.......................................... 2-print NIV 3/3/04 3/16/04 Completed
PHNOM PENH........................................... 2-print NIV 3/3/04 3/15/04 Completed
RANGOON.............................................. 2-print NIV 3/3/04 3/16/04 Completed
HANOI................................................ 2-print NIV 3/4/04 3/18/04 Completed
FRANKFURT............................................ 2-print IV 3/9/04 3/17/04 Completed
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question: 5. To date, how many fingerprints and photographs have been
collected in consulates?
Answer: As of March 10 we had 34,748,844 NIV photographs and 8,137,267
fingerprints in the Consular Consolidated Database. Of these
fingerprints, 7,866,251 were collected from applicants in Mexico,
primarily for Border Crossing Cards (BCCs), and 271,016 from applicants
at posts where we began collecting fingerprints starting in September
2003.
Question: 6. Are there any technical problems consulates encountered in
implementing this technology?
Answer: We believe that all problems are being effectively addressed
and that there are no major issues. As with any new system, areas for
improvements and refinements have been identified. For example, the
quality of some of the fingerprints captured by consulates had been
identified as an issue by DHS. The Department is addressing this issue
through improvements both in training and technology. Technical
improvements include replacing the fingerprint scoring software, the
software that determines the quality of the captured fingerprint, to
use the same software that is being used by DHS. We believe that this
will significantly reduce or eliminate the fingerprint quality problem.
We are also making other modifications to the system to streamline the
fingerprint capture process. Training is another significant issue, and
we are taking steps to emphasize the fingerprint quality in our
training, and developing detailed monitoring reports to identify posts
that have low quality.
Early in the startup process, the Department encountered several
instances of communications/data exchange problems with DHS' systems.
These problems appear to have been resolved by DHS and the current
workload is being processed in an expeditious manner. As workload
begins to increase as more consulates come on-line, the Department will
continue to monitor the situation and coordinate resolution of any
communications and/or data exchange problems with DHS.
Question: 7. What is the makeup of the State Department team
implementing biometric equipment at consular posts? How much
interaction and guidance does this team receive from US-VISIT in DHS?
Answer: Implementation ofbiometric equipment at all consular posts is
done with the on-site assistance of a team of contractors supplemented
by Foreign Service Officers and other State Department employees. The
same contractor carrying out the installations also produces the
software used for biometric collection.
Interaction with DHS takes place daily, primarily regarding
software development and data exchange. As installation teams identify
problems and possible improvements, we discuss these with DHS to ensure
that any changes we make will not interfere with the efficient
operation of the IDENT database. As more posts are brought on-line, we
also coordinate closely with DHS on data exchange issues to ensure
IDENT response times remain within agreed limits.
Question: 8. Please advise us of which posts have stopped issuing same
day visas either in the immigrant of nonimmigrant context due to this
requirement. Please advise us if each post is experiencing a turn
around time of seven to eight minutes for IDENT checks and of any time
frames over or under this estimate.
Answer: Most posts have been able to continue same day visa issuance
despite the new biometric requirements. CA is pleased with the
performance of the IDENT check, and the majority of the responses are
within our time budget. However we are still in the early stages of
this project and are at less that 25 percent of the anticipated volume.
We are monitoring this very closely and overall are cautiously
optimistic.
Question: 9. Please provide us with any case examples of potential
terrorists refused visas since January of 2004 under these procedures.
In specific, please advise us of the number of visa refusals/denials
under section 212(a)(3)(B) or 212(a)(3)(A)(ii).
Answer: So far there have been no examples of potential terrorists
refused visas since January of 2004 because they were identified as
potential terrorists under the new biometric procedures.
From January 2001 through March 07, 2004, there were 18 visa
applicants denied visas under Section 212(a)(3)(B) of the INA, and 12
applicants denied under section 212(a)(3)(A)(ii). They were initially
identified as potential terrorists by name-based terrorist watchlist
information that is included in the visa lookout system known as CLASS.
Queston: 10. Will the state Department be able to meet the
congressional deadline of issuance of biometric visas?
Answer: Yes, we will be able to meet the October 26, 2004 deadline.
Question: What action will the State Department take if Visa Waiver
Program participants are unable to meet congressional deadlines for
machine-readable and biometric passports?
Answer: By October 26, 2004, VWP countries must:
Be producing machine readable
passports (original deadline of 2003 waived by
Secretary Powell and extended to October 2004);
Have a ``program in place'' to produce
biometric passports (mandated by Border
Security Act);
Be producing biometric
passports(mandated by Border Security Act).
All VWP countries are now producing machine-readable passports. We
expect that all but a few of the current VWP states will have a
``program in place'' to produce biometric passports. However, it is
unlikely that any government participating in the VWP program will be
in large-scale production ofbiometric passports by the deadline. ICAO's
decision to make facial recognition technology the standard passport
biometric was not made until May 2003, leaving countries only 17 months
to bring a biometric passport from design to production. While the VWP
country governments share a commitment to make this change, many of
them are encountering the same problems being experienced by the
Department of State in our efforts to embed biometrics into the US
passport. The need to resolve these significant technical problems to
embed biometrics is the cause of these delays, not lack of will on the
part of the VWP countries. Most governments are likely to reach full
production of passports with embedded biometrics by late 2005 or early
2006.
The US has played a leadership role in ICAO. We have had repeated
meetings with VWP representatives to educate VWP governments about the
requirements and deadlines. In December Secretary Powell sent a
diplomatic note to the VWP countries regarding the criteria for
certification of a biometric passport program and noting that there was
no waiver for the production deadline. We are still receiving responses
from those countries.
Travelers from VWP countries with passports issued on or after
October 26, 2004 that do not contain biometrics will need visas to
travel to the States. This means that the Department of State could be
faced with an increase in demand of some 5.3 million visa applications
in fiscal year 2005 and a somewhat smaller increase in fiscal year 2006
as VWP countries come into compliance with the legislative requirement.
We estimate that we will be able to process only a fraction of that
additional workload with current resources and that the surge in
applications will result in long processing backlogs.
Secretary Powell and Secretary Ridge recently wrote Judiciary
Committee Chairman Sensenbrenner to advocate the need for prompt action
to get a legislative fix to the deadline and to advise him that they
welcome the invitation to testify before the Committee on April 21 on
the subject. If legislative relief does not occur, State has prepared
aggressive contingency plans to mitigate partially the impact of the
deadline. However, the Department will not be able to identify, and
mobilize resources to meet 100 percent of the demand before the problem
will be resolved by the production of biometric passports by the VWP
nations. The economic costs to the U.S. economy could be substantial.
Questions and Responses from the Honorable Asa Hutchinson
Question: 1. Will you be able to meet the DMIA statutory requirements
to collect arrival and departure information at the top fifty land
ports of entry by December 2004?
Answer: The US-VISIT strategy to meet the statutory guidelines of DMIA
and other legislation is an incremental approach to implementation. On
5 January 2004, DHS implemented the first phase to collect biographic
arrival data and biometric data upon entry in the air/sea environments.
This functionality was successfully expanded to capture arrival
biographic and biometric information during US-VISIT processing in the
passport control area in secondary of the 50 busiest land ports of
entry by the DMIA mandated deadline of 31 December 2004. Please note,
however, that the December 2004 deadlines imposed by DMIA require only
the integration of arrival and departure information. To that end, US-
VISIT is currently conducting exit pilot projects at several
international airports and will expand exit data collection
capabilities at land ports via additional pilot programs beginning no
later than July 31, 2005.
Question: 2. Please provide the Select Committee with an official list
of ports of entry at which US-VISIT is operational and not operational.
At ports where US-VISIT is not operational please provide a time line
for full implementation of US-VISIT.
Answer: The following lists all air and sea ports of entry at which US-
VISIT is operational as of December 2004. On November 9, 2004, US-VISIT
published a notice in the Federal Register (69 FR 64964) that lists the
50 largest land ports of entry where biometric screening at entry was
implemented by December 31, 2004. A copy of that notice is attached.
Airports
Agana, Guam (Agana International Airport)
Aguadilla, Puerto Rico (Rafael Hernandez Airport)
Albuquerque, New Mexico (Albuquerque International Airport)
Anchorage, Alaska (Anchorage International Airport)
Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland
Albany, New York (Albany International Airport)
Aruba (Pre-Flight Inspection)
Atlanta, Georgia (William B. Hartsfield International Airport)
Austin, Texas (Austin Bergstrom International Airport)
Baltimore, Maryland (Baltimore/Washington International Airport)
Bangor, Maine (Bangor International Airport)
Bellingham, Washington (Bellingham International Airport)
Boston, Massachusetts (General Edward Lawrence Logan International
Airport)
Brownsville, Texas (Brownsville/South Padre Island Airport)
Buffalo, New York (Greater Buffalo International Airport)
Calgary, Canada (Pre-Flight Inspection)
Chantilly, Virginia (Washington Dulles International Airport)
Charleston, South Carolina (Charleston International Airport)
Charlotte, North Carolina (CharlottelDouglas International Airport)
Chicago, Illinois (Chicago Midway Airport)
Chicago, Illinois (Chicago O'Hare International Airport)
Cincinnati, Ohio (Cincinnati/Northern Kentucky International Airport)
Cleveland, Ohio (Cleveland Hopkins International Airport)
Columbus, Ohio (Rickenbacker International Airport)
Columbus, Ohio (Port Columbus International Airport)
Dallas/Fort Worth, Texas (Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport)
Del Rio, Texas (Del Rio International Airport)
Denver, Colorado (Denver International Airport)
Detroit, Michigan (Detroit Metropolitan Wayne County Airport)
Dover/Cheswold, Delaware (Delaware Airpark)
Dublin, Ireland (Pre-Flight Inspection)
Edmonton, Canada (Pre-Flight Inspection)
El Paso, Texas (El Paso International Airport)
Erie, Pennsylvania (Erie International Airport)
Fairbanks, Alaska (Fairbanks International Airport)
Fajardo, Puerto Rico (Diego Jimenez Torres Airport)
Fort Lauderdale, Florida (Fort Lauderdale Executive Airport)
Fort Lauderdale, Florida (Fort Lauderdale/Hollywood International
Airport)
Fort Myers, Florida (Fort Myers International Airport)
Freeport, Bahamas (Pre-Flight Inspection)
Greenville, South Carolina (Donaldson Center Airport)
Hamilton, Bermuda (Pre-Flight Inspection)
Hartford/Springfield, Connecticut (Bradley International Airport)
Honolulu, Hawaii (Honolulu International Airport)
Houston, Texas (Houston International Airport)
Indianapolis, Indiana (Indianapolis International Airport)
International Falls, Minnesota (Falls International Airport)
Isla Grande, Puerto Rico (Isla Grande Airport)
Jacksonville, Florida (Jacksonville International Airport)
Juneau, Alaska (Juneau International Airport)
Kansas City, Kansas (Kansas City International Airport)
Kenmore, Washington (Kenmore Air Harbor)
Key West, Florida (Key West International Airport)
King County, Washington (King County International Airport)
Kona, Hawaii (Kona International Airport)
Laredo, Texas (Laredo International Airport and Laredo Private Airport)
Las Vegas, Nevada (McCarren International Airport)
Los Angeles, California (Los Angeles International Airport)
Manchester, New Hampshire (Manchester Airport)
Mayaguez, Puerto Rico (Eugenio Maria de Hostos Airport)
McAllen, Texas (McAllen Miller International Airport)
Memphis, Tennessee (Memphis International Airport)
Miami, Florida (Kendall/Tamiami Executive Airport)
Miami, Florida (Miami International Airport)
Milwaukee, Wisconsin (General Mitchell International Airport)
Minneapolis/St. Paul, Minnesota (Montreal, Canada (Pre-Flight
Inspection)
Nashville, Tennessee (Nashville International Airport)
Nassau, Bahamas (Pre-Flight Inspection)
New Orleans, Louisiana (New Orleans International Airport)
New York, New York (John F. Kennedy International Airport)
Newark, New Jersey (Newark International Airport)
Norfolk, Virginia (Norfolk International Airport and Norfolk Naval Air
Station)
Oakland, California (Metropolitan Oakland International Airport)
Ontario, California (Ontario International Airport)
Opa Locka/Miami, Florida (Opa Locka Airport)
Orlando, Florida (Orlando International Airport)
Orlando/Sanford, Florida (Orlando/Sanford Airport)
Ottawa, Canada (Pre-Flight Inspection)
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (Philadelphia International Airport)
Phoenix, Arizona (Phoenix Sky Harbor International Airport)
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania (Pittsburgh International Airport)
Ponce, Puerto Rico (Mercedita Airport)
Portland, Maine (Portland International Jetport Airport)
Portland, Oregon (Portland International Airport)
Portsmouth, New Hampshire (Pease International Tradeport Airport)
Providence, Rhode Island (Theodore Francis Green State Airport)
Raleigh/Durham, North Carolina (Raleigh/Durham International Airport)
Reno, Arizona (Reno/Tahoe International Airport)
Richmond, Virginia (Richmond International Airport)
Sacramento, California (Sacramento International Airport)
Salt Lake City, Utah (Salt Lake City International Airport)
San Antonio, Texas (San Antonio International Airport)
San Diego, California (San Diego International Airport)
San Francisco, California (San Francisco International Airport)
San Jose, California (San Jose International Airport)
San Juan, Puerto Rico (Luis Munoz Marin International Airport)
Sandusky, Ohio (Griffing Sandusky Airport)
Sarasota/Bradenton, Florida (Sarasota-Bradenton International Airport)
Seattle, Washington (Seattle/Tacoma International Airport)
Shannon, Ireland (Pre-Flight Inspection)
Spokane, Washington (Spokane International Airport)
St. Croix, Virgin Island (Alexander Hamilton International Airport)
St. Louis, Missouri (St. Louis International Airport)
St. Lucie, Florida (St. Lucie County International Airport)
St. Petersburg, Florida (St. Petersburg-Clearwater International
Airport)
St. Thomas, Virgin Island (Cyril E. King International Airport)
Tampa, Florida (Tampa International Airport)
Teterboro, New Jersey (Teterboro Airport)
Toronto, Canada (Pre-Flight Inspection)
Tucson, Arizona (Tucson International Airport)
Vancouver, Canada (Pre-Flight Inspection)
Victoria, Canada (Pre-Flight Inspection)
West Palm Beach, Florida (Palm Beach International Airport)
Wilmington, North Carolina (Wilmington International Airport)
Winnipeg, Canada (Pre-Flight Inspection)
Yuma, Arizona (Yuma International Airport)
Seaports
Long Beach, California
Miami, Florida
New York City
Port Everglades, Florida
Port Canaveral, Florida
Port Canaveral, Florida (Terminal 10)
San Juan, Puerto Rico
San Pedro, California
Seattle, Washington (Cruise Terminal)
Seattle, Washington
Tampa, Florida (Terminal 3)
Tampa, Florida (Terminal 7)
Vancouver, Canada (Ballantyne Pier)
Vancouver, Canada (Canada Place)
Victoria, Canada (Pre Inspection)
West Palm Beach, Florida
3. We understand that entry and exit enhancements at land borders will
be phased in throughout 2005 and 2006. Provide a description of what
enhancements are planned at land borders, including whether
enhancements are new construction or renovation of existing land border
facilities.
Answer: By 31 December 2004, US-VISIT entry processing will be
implemented at the 50 busiest land ports of entry and to all 165 land
ports of entry (POEs) by 31 December 2005 in secondary inspection.
Modification to entry and exit facilities is needed to accommodate
the technology required to implement the US-VISIT process. These
modifications may best be described as upgrades where new equipment,
power, conduit, and data connectivity are required to support the
mission. These upgrades will include facility renovations and
alterations to support the technology integration that will occur as
the processes and technologies mature. These enhancements are focused
on providing functionality to interior locations (typically secondary,
or passport control, areas). Following this initial operating
capability, modification to vehicle entry and exit lanes will be needed
to expedite legitimate travel and trade. In addition, US-VISIT will
begin pilot programs at 5 ports of entry by July 31, 2005, utilizing
radio frequency identification technology in order to document the
exits and any subsequent re-entries of persons both on foot and in
vehicles.
The US-VISIT program does not anticipate that the implementation of
the new process will result in additional delays at land borders, but
is mindful of the concerns expressed by various individuals and
organizations. The US-VISIT program has been meeting with various
community groups along the border to discuss their concerns. The US-
VISIT program anticipates utilizing advanced technology to meet
statutory requirements as we move into the future in order to
facilitate travel.
Question: 4. In your testimony you stated that US-VISIT was ``linked''
to the Terrorist Screening Center. Please provide a detailed
description of this ``link''. It is our understanding that while US-
VISIT uses data from the TSC which is resident in the NCIC, there is no
actual real time link to the TSC as the TSC has not yet set up its own
database. What is the eventual operational relationship you envision
between US-VISIT and the TSC?
Answer: It is correct that any TSC biographic record in NCIC queries
TECS for every traveler coming into country. TSC terrorist prints from
FBI IAFIS are also available if the FBI has provided said prints via
the link to IDENT. We note, however, that currently there does not
exist a real time link to the TSC. Our technical team is currently
working with the TSC in order to further refine our mutual data
sharing.
Question: 5. What checks are being conducted against passenger
manifests for arriving passengers at air and seaports?
Answer: Prior to arrival, information on passengers (including name,
date of birth, and document (passport/visa type and number) is checked
using the TECS/IBIS system
Question: 5.1. Who conducts these checks and how long do they take?
Answer: The TECS/IBIS checks are performed after departure from the
foreign port and prior to arrival at the U.S. port of entry by the
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) passenger analysis units located at
each port of entry. The exact time needed to conduct these checks will
depend upon the number of passengers, the number of officers to perform
the checks, and the results of each check. However, since they are
performed after departure and prior to arrival, they have no effect on
passenger wait times. If a potential hit is made, the traveler will be
flagged for further review. This same protocol is followed for
passengers arriving on cruise ships.
Question: 5.2. What specific checks do these include?
Answer: TECS/IBIS contains data derived from a variety of sources.
These include, but are not limited to, the following:
-- DHS immigration lookout data--NAILS;
-- Department of State terrorist and visa refusal data (CLASS
and TIPOFF);
-- DHS alien detention and removal information (DACS);
-- Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) data; and
-- Provides a conduit to the FBI's wants and warrants and
criminal information database (NCIC).
Question: 5.3. What specific databases, systems and watch lists does
IBIS interface or integrate?
Answer: See the answer for Q01537(2) above.
Question: 6. What checks are being conducted against passenger
manifests for arriving passengers at air and seaports?
Answer: See answer to Q01537.
7. We understand that the self-service, automatic kiosks allowing a
departing foreign visitor to automatically register their departure by
scanning their visa and capturing a fingerprint. In scanning the visa,
we understand that the proposed system will only read the information
on the visa that is within the machine-readable zone. This is despite
the fact that Congress has appropriated funds to increase the security
of the U.S. visa by impeding security features (ink, laminate. etc.) so
as to make the visa more tamper resistant.
Question: 7.1. Is it indeed the case that the kiosks are not yet
scanning and authenticating the special security features that are
imbedded in the U.S. visa?
Answer: At this time, yes. However, the scan of a U.S. nonimmigrant
visa is for the collection of biographic information in order to
provide a specific identifier to the biometric also collected at the
kiosk. The machine-readable zone of a visa or a passport can be used.
The biometric and biographic information from exit are then matched to
the information collected at entry, confirming the identity of the
individual.
Question: 7.2. If the kiosks are not scanning and authenticating the
special security features, does the Department plan to eventually do
so? If so, when?
Answer: There are no specific plans to incorporate authentication of
the U.S. nonimmigrant visa into the exit process, as the use of the
visa for departure is only needed to speed up the biometric matching of
a person's identity to the biographic and biometric information
collected during entry. DHS confirms the identity of the visa holder
against government held records, through the biometric match of the
individual.
Question: 8. What are the current alternatives for exit control being
considered at air and seaports?
Question 8.1. What is the schedule for such exit controls being put in
place at our air and seaports beyond the current one air and one sea
port?
Answer: A pilot test of alternative exit biometric collection devices
began in the summer of 2004 at 15 locations (13 air and 2 seaports) and
will continue until the end of March 2005. Once the device(s) is
selected, deployment to the remaining departure locations will be
completed. DHS anticipates that, depending on the receipt of funding
and necessary approvals, this deployment will be completed in 2005.
Question: 8.2. What are the staffing and infrastructure needs for such
implementation?
Answer: The staffing and infrastructure needs will be assessed as part
of the pilot evaluation. Depending on the device or devices chosen, the
needs may vary.
Question: 8.3. What database checks will occur upon exit in this
system?
Answer: As with the entry process, checks will be made against systems
in the US-VISIT environment. These include the Automated Biometric
Identification System (IDENT), a fingerprint biometric database and
against extracts provided through the FBI's Integrated Automated
Fingerprint Identification System (IF AIS). (Note however that the
IFAIS checks are currently not run in real time.) Additionally, the
information will be transmitted to the Arrival Departure Information
System (AD IS) to confirm the exit of an individual.
Question: 8.4. How will the public be educated on the measures to take
to comply with this system?
Answer: The US-VISIT program has a robust outreach effort in place to
educate visitors and explain US-VISIT procedures for both entry and
exit. In addition to providing information to our international
stakeholders in the travel and tourism industry and the business
community, we are working with the media in the visa waiver countries
to have them help us educate foreign visitors. We have provided
information to our colleagues in the Department of State Consular
Affairs Offices overseas so that they, too, can explain the required
exit process.
We have also produced print materials. When foreign visitors arrive
in the United States, they receive a card (exit card) that explains the
requirement to check out upon departing the country. When the visitor
leaves the country, he or she goes to the airline ticket counter to
check in for the flight and the ticket agent hands him or her an exit
card that explains the process and directs the traveler to an exit
station to check out. There will be directional signs visible to lead
the way once a visitor is through the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) security check point, and educational signs will
be located near the exit stations to explain what to do to check out.
And finally, an announcement will be made at the departure gates to
remind visitors to check out before boarding the plane.
Question: 8.5. What efforts have you made so far for this public
information campaign?
Answer: The public education campaign for exit has been coordinated
with stakeholders through speaking events, e-mails, trade shows, and
meetings. We have provided these valuable stakeholders with the
information they need to tell their customers what to expect when they
arrive in and depart from the United States. We have produced exit
cards, educational signs, and directional signs.
Additionally, the entry and exit requirements are incorporated into
the general US-VISIT materials, which include brochures, airport
signage, and on-board handouts in multiple languages; in-flight videos
in 15 languages; and public service announcements (PSA) being aired in
airport lounges.
Finally, a growing group of more than 500 stakeholders receive US-
VISIT information on a regular basis through our e-newsletter.
Question: 8.6. Has a policy been established to determine penalties for
those who are determined to have violated the terms of their visa
through US-VISIT?
Answer: An alien who fails to comply with the departure requirements
may be found in violation of the terms of his or her admission, parole,
or other immigration status. This rule states that an alien who is
covered by the requirements to provide biometrics on departure at new 8
CFR 215.8 may be found to have overstayed the period of his or her last
admission if the available evidence indicates that he or she did not
leave the United States when required to do so. A determination that
the alien previously overstayed may result in a finding of
inadmissibility for accruing prior unlawful presence in the United
States under section 212(a)(9) of the INA, provided that the accrued
unlawful time and other prerequisites of that statute are met, or that
the alien is otherwise ineligible for a visa or other authorization to
reenter the United States. An overstay finding could also trigger
consequences for a nonimmigrant visa holder under section 222(g) of the
INA. If the person is deemed to have overstayed his authorized period
of admission, his visa (including a multiple entry visa) would be
deemed void under section 222(g). Section 222(g) further states that
where a visa is void because the alien overstayed, he or she is
ineligible to be readmitted to the United States as a nonimmigrant
except on another visa issued in the consular office located in the
country of the alien's nationality, or where there is no DOS office in
the country, in such other consular office as the Secretary of State
shall specify. The requirement of obtaining a new visa from the
consular office in the country of the alien's nationality may be waived
where extraordinary circumstances are found. 8 U.S.C. 1202(g). The
Department intends to focus its enforcement of departure requirements
in this rule on cases where the alien willfully and unreasonably fails
to comply with this regulation. The rule provides that an alien's
failure to follow the departure procedures may be considered by an
immigration or consular officer in making a discretionary decision on
whether to approve or deny the alien's application for a future
immigration benefit. The rule does not, however, state that an alien's
failure to comply with departure procedures in every instance will
necessarily result in a denial of a future visa, admission or other
immigration benefit. For example, no alien will be penalized for
failing to provide biometrics on departure where the Department has not
yet implemented the departure facilities or procedures at the specific
port where the person chooses to depart. There may well be instances
where a consular officer or inspector, in his or her discretion and
after reviewing the totality of the circumstances, determines that an
alien's previous failure to comply with the departure procedures does
not result in a finding of inadmissibility or the denial of an
immigration benefit.
Question: 9. Is any integration or discussion going on with TSA to
possibly coordinate the Exit component with their plans to use
electronic boarding passes during security checks? Is it possible to
unite this process with the US-VISIT Exit to ensure that visa holders
are ``checked-out?''
Answer: US-VISIT is collaborating among multiple government agencies,
notably among the components of the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) and the Departments of State, Justice, Commerce, and
Transportation to take positive steps toward greater information
sharing. These partnerships are leveraging resources to improve data
availability to all agencies. Specifically, DHS is looking for ways to
partner with TSA to meet joint objectives and analyze current business
processes.
The award of the prime integration contract to the Smart Border
Alliance will allow the US-VISIT program to look at all aspects of a
traveler's entry and exit process and determine integration points from
operational and technical positions, which could include TSA's
processes. TSA is an integral partner in the ongoing exit evaluations.
10. Ms. Harty testified that IDENT checks at the consulate were taking
seven to eight minutes. A 001 Department of Justice Office of the
Inspector General IG report indicates that an IDENT check takes an
average of two minutes. US-VISIT enrollment takes ten to fifteen
seconds. The US-VISIT office has indicated that certain biometric
checks are conducted of US-VISIT enrollees after admission.
10.1. Please advise what improvement has been made on the IDENT
checks at ports of entry to allow a full IDENT check to occur in ten to
fifteen seconds.
Answer: The IDENT system is designed to be flexible and scalable. It is
tuned to provide different response times for different operational
requirements. For example, the system is sized to provide full lookout
checks against a fingerprint database for every traveler entering an
air and sea port of entry within 10 seconds. (In fact, the actual
response time is nearer 5 seconds). Because the time constraints at the
consular posts are different, IDENT is tuned to provide a response
against the lookout database and the US-VISIT (all individuals
enrolled) database in less than 15 minutes. Finally, IDENT is tuned to
check newly enrolled individuals within a set period of time after
admission. For future admissions, the individual is checked ``one to
one'' against a previously established unique record. At this time, we
do not believe it is necessary or feasible to run new enrollments
against all IDENT records, including those previously enrolled, within
the primary inspection process.
10.2. Please clarify the nature of the actual check if a less than
full IDENT biometric check is conducted at enrollment.
Answer: Upon enrollment into US-VISIT, resulting either from a
Department of State visa application or at a port of entry, a full
check is performed against the lookout database and the US-VISIT
database of enrolled travelers. When the individual arrives at the port
of entry, her/his identity is confirmed against a previously enrolled
identity, and a full lookout check is performed.
10.3. What actual portion of the IDENT database is checked within this
ten to fifteen second period?
Answer: Please note that it is the time it takes to collect the two
index prints from a traveler that is 10 to 15 seconds. This action is
performed anytime IDENT is queried, regardless of which business
process is being performed. Once the fingers are scanned, the IDENT
system will return a one-to-one match instantaneously, and a lookout
check in less than 10 seconds at primary.
Question: 11. A May 2003 report the Department of Justice Office of the
Inspector general indicated that the IDENT and IAFIS integration was
``at least two years behind schedule'' and that staff focused on the
integration were redirected to the NSEERS project. What is the current
status of IDENT and IAFIS integration? What is needed to expedite the
integration?
Answer: DHS has begun the deployment of the integrated IDENT/IAFIS
workstations. This provides for rapid identification of individuals
with outstanding criminal warrants through electronic comparison of
ten-print digital finger scans against a vast nationwide database of
previously captured fingerprints. The newly advanced capability allows
simultaneously search the FBI's fingerprint database--the Integrated
Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS)--and DHS's
Automated Biometric Identification System (IDENT). As of September
2004, integrated IDENT/IAFIS terminals with ten-print biometric
identification technology was operational in every U.S. Customs and
Border Protection (CBP) Border Patrol station throughout the country.
This deployment was completed months ahead of schedule, and was
expanded to include secondary inspection locations at all 115 air and
sea ports of entry and the 50 busiest land ports of entry. The
secondary inspection air, sea, and land port deployment was completed
in November 2004.
In addition, in FY 2005 appropriations language, Congress directed
the US-VISIT Program Office to report on the status of achieving real
time interoperability between IDENT and IAFIS, including steps DHS will
take to integrate IAFIS into IDENT, funds needed, and a time table for
full integration. While the integrated workstations will permit a
simultaneous search of IAFIS and IDENT, they will not allow local,
state and other IAFIS users to access DHS repositories. The language
also directs DHS to address recommendations in the Department of
Justice Inspector General report. US-VISIT expects to submit this
report in spring 2005.
The current biometrics being used at selected air and sea ports of
entry call for two fingerprints and a photograph of the foreign
national. While the Administration has maintained that it is currently
in ``increment one'' in a four stage process and it may likely move
towards using a ten-print system, will using two-prints impact the
agency's ability to capture individuals who are listed in the Federal
Bureau of Investigation's database, which uses ten-prints?
Answer: US-VISIT is currently able to perform checks against FBI
provided data utilizing the two fingerscan system. This ability has
already resulted in the identification of individuals, who were wanted
or had past criminal violations. As of 1/26/2005, approximately 2,300
persons have been flagged at ports of entry as having a hit against a
lookout system. Note however that the presence of a hit does not
automatically render the person ineligible for admission. The
Department of State has also flagged over 5,000 persons as hits when
the individuals were applying for a nonimmigrant visa oversea.
Although there was some early concern about false positives in a
two-print scenario, a recent National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) study of the US-VISIT IDENT system showed that the
false positive or False Acceptance Rate (FAR) appears to rise in a
consistent manner with the rise in the size of the fingerprint
database. This has been born out empirically. The FAR has proved to be
measurable and consistent. To deal with this, US-VISIT has developed
processes to efficiently manage the false positives as they occur. For
example, of the roughly 35,000 travelers who are processed through the
US-VISIT IDENT system every day, about 30 of travelers are identified
with a false positive against the lookout list and are sent to
secondary. The average time for a fingerprint examiner to clear a
lookout false positive is about three and a half minutes.
The NIST report cited here (C. L. Wilson, M.D. Garris, C.I. Watson.
Matching performance for the US-VISIT IDENT system using flat
fingerprints. NISTIR 7110) provides the justification for the
statements give about FAR. The answer neglects to cite the results from
another NIST report (R.A. Hicklin, H. Korves, B. Ulery, M. Zoepfl, M.
Bone, P. Grother, R. Micheals, S. Otto, C. Watson. Fingerprint Vendor
Technology Evaluation (FpVTE) 2003. NISTIR 7123) which clearly found
that increasing the number of fingerprints used in matching from two to
eight would substantially improve TAR (True Accept Rate) and
substantially reduce FRR (False Reject Rate).
The performance of the US-VISIT IDENT system is monitored very
closely. As the FAR rises with the size of the database, the US-VISIT
program office will make the necessary adjustments in the numbers of
fingerprint examiners and in the technology (which mayor may not
include adding additional fingers) to manage this.
The current two-print capture provides the ability to match against
appropriate records that are maintained by the FBI and provided daily
to US-VISIT. This is done on a routine basis. There is no difficulty
matching the two prints collected by US-VISIT against the 10 prints
provided by the FBI.
12. Please advise us of when and if you anticipate that an accurate
Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS) check
could be conducted at time of US-VISIT enrollment.
Answer: 12. At this time there are no plans to conduct such a check.
Checking every traveler against all the fingerprints available is not
operationally feasible, both because of the time it takes to capture 10
prints and the time it takes for the FBI to respond to the queries. The
capture of two prints takes between 10 to 15 seconds. Results are
returned to an inspector within two to 10 seconds - well within the
current time it takes to do an inspection. Even in a controlled
environment with a willing subject, experience has shown that the
capture time for taking 10 prints is anywhere from six to 10 minutes.
Currently, the results take two to 10 minutes. DHS modeling has shown
that even a few seconds can have a catastrophic effect upon wait times.
The answer that ``capture time for taking 10 prints is anywhere
from six to 10 minutes'' would be correct for ten rolled fingerprints.
NIST has never recommended the capture of rolled fingerprint as part of
the US-VISIT system. The NIST recommendation is ``To perform background
identifications, ten plain image impressions should be used for
enrollment and retention.'' The collection often plain impressions has
been demonstrated at NIST in approximately 20 seconds. Pilot tests by
the Department of State in Mexico have collected ten plain impressions
in one minute or less. Collection of ten plain prints does not require
physical contact with the operator of the collection system.
Question: 12.1. What are the current rates of false positives in
this scenario?
Answer: According to the National Institutes of Standards and
Technology (NIST) both two prints and 10 prints have a very high degree
of accuracy. Both have a True Acceptance Rate (TAR) of over 95 percent
(a measure of false negative). The US-VISIT IDENT system has TAR of 96
percent. What this means in practical terms is that if an individual
wishes to enter the country under a new name using a fraudulent
document, she/he would have to pass the Department of State visa
issuance and pre-entry processes, including checks against lookout
databases, the normal inspections process, and then that person would
only have a 3.5 percent chance of avoiding identification through
biometric means. (Overseas, a person would first be measured against
TAR as part of the DOS nonimmigrant visa issuance process, then again
when applying for admission to the United States.)
The NIST report cited here (C.L. Wilson, M.D. Garris, C.I. Watson.
Matching performance for the US-VISIT IDENT system using flat
fingerprints. NISTIR 7110) provides the justification for the
statements give about TAR of 96 percent. As with question 11, the
answer neglects to cite the results from another NIST report (R.A.
Hicklin, H. Korves, B. Ulery, M. Zoepfl, M. Bone, P. Grother, R.
Micheals, S. Otto, C. Watson. Fingerprint Vendor Technology Evaluation
(FpVTE) 2003. NISTIR 7123) which clearly found that increasing the
number of fingerprints used in matching from two to eight would
substantially improve TAR and reduce the chance of avoiding
identification through biometric means.
False positives or the False Acceptance Rates (FAR) for the US-
VISIT IDENT system have proved to be measurable and consistent. To deal
with this issue, US-VISIT has developed processes to efficiently manage
the false positives as they occur. For example, of the roughly 35,000
travelers who are processed through the US-VISIT IDENT system every
day, about 30 of them are false positives against the lookout list and
are sent to secondary. On the rare occasion that there is a false
positive, the average time for a fingerprint examiner to clear a
lookout false positive is only 3 minutes and 40 seconds. And as already
noted in answer to question 1548, the expanded deployment of the IDENT/
IAFIS program to all secondary inspection and Border Parole stations
allows our agents to simultaneously search both these data bases in
instances where we suspect that people are attempting to enter the
United States illegally.
Question: 12.2. What is the current timeline and cost for such
integration?
Answer: As there is no operational need, and because the cost would
prove prohibitive (in systems, facilities, and personnel), there is no
plan to perform 10-print IAFIS checks for US-VISIT. However, NIST
cannot comment on the projected cost of this integration but NIST
studies of both the IDENT and IAFIS systems show that this integration
would reduce the chance of avoiding identification through biometric
means.
Question: 14. How can inaccurate data in databases which US-VISIT is
interfacing and integrating be collected by a member of the public
subject to such errors?
Question: 14.1. Will you consider a contact through which such
corrections could be made?
Question: 14.2. Has there been any thought to establishing a contact
point at all field operation offices to correct erroneous admission
documents issued at ports of entry?
Answer: US-VISIT has established a redress process, giving travelers
processed through US-VISIT a fast and easy way to have their US-VISIT
records accessed and checked for accuracy, relevancy, timeliness, or
completeness. The first stage in the process occurs at the primary
inspection lane at the port of entry and provides immediate data
correction by the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officer. The
CBP officer can correct the traveler's name, date of birth, flight
information, and country-specific document number and document type
errors. Biometric errors are sent to US-VISIT for correction.Travelers
no longer at the POE can contact the US-VISIT privacy officer, who has
set a goal of processing redress requests within 20 business days. With
almost six million travelers processed through US-VISIT, only 33
individuals have contacted the Privacy Officer about their records. The
US-VISIT redress process is available at www.dhs/us-visit.gov and the
US-VISIT privacy officer can be contacted by telephone, fax or a new
email address at [email protected].
Question: 15. How is CLAIMS III being accessed during US-VISIT?
Answer: DHS has created an interface between CLAIMS 3 and a component
of the US-VISIT environment. This ensures that information about
pending immigration benefit applications, approved or denied, is
available to make determinations about whether someone is lawfully in
the country or has overstayed her/his admission.
Question: 16. Will Mexican biometric border crossing card holders be
subject to enrollment in US-VISIT?
Answer: Mexican nationals who present a Form DSP-150, B-1/B-2 visa and
border crossing card (BCC) upon arrival in, or departure from, the
United States, and who are not required to be issued a Form 1-94
Arrival Departure Record at the time of admission, are exempt from the
US-VISIT biometric data collection requirements. This means that
Mexican nationals who will travel beyond 25 miles of the border (75
miles if admitted in Arizona) or who will remain longer than 30 days
are subject to the US-VISIT biometric data requirements. This exemption
may change when the Department explores a longterm solution to record
the entry and exit of visitors crossing our land ports of entry.
Question: 17. Is it possible to integrate data that the State
Department has on biometric border crossing card users into the US-
VISIT database?
Answer: Yes. We have included this task in the FY 2005 US-VISIT
Expenditure Plan.
Question: 18. How many land ports of entry have scanners to read
biometric passports and visas?
Answer: All ports of entry have optical character recognition (OCR)
scanners to read machine-readable passports, visas, and other travel
documents. In addition, 51 land border ports of entry have scanners to
read the optical memory stripe of border crossing cards and alien
registration cards. While the standards governing biometric passports
have been developed, issues surrounding global interoperability,
durability, skimming, and eavesdropping on personal data are in the
process of being resolved. The Department of Homeland Security in
conjunction with US-VISIT, ICAO, NIST, ISO, and others, tested chips
and readers for e-passports/visas in July 2004 at the National
Biometrics Security Project Laboratory in Morgantown, West Virginia.
This was followed by a mock test at BWI airport in November 2004. Based
on the findings of these tests, plans are now being developed for a
live test, most likely at Los Angeles International Airport in June
2005.
Question: 19. How many inspection lanes (passenger, mass transit,
commercial, pedestrian) currently exist at our land ports at each
crossing? Please provide a list of this data?
Answer: There are 165 land ports of entry, of which there are 490
inbound primary noncommercial lanes, 176 primary commercial lanes, and
118 primary pedestrian lanes. Attached is a spreadsheet with a
breakdown by port of entry.
20. How many of the above inspection lanes have the capacity to take
fingerprints, which will be read against any portion of IDENT or any
other biometric database? Please advise of which ones have this
capacity.
Answer: This function is not performed at primary lanes, but at all 165
land ports, this function can be performed in secondary inspection in
support of primary/enforcement activities.
21. We understand that the State Department has refused to collect the
Student and Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS) fee on behalf
of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).
Question: 21.1. Have negotiations continued with the State Department
on fee collection?
Answer: The Department of State (DoS) and DHS have been working on fee
collection methods. Specifically, DHS proposed a pilot project to have
DoS collect the fee for DHS in China and India, where access to credit
cards and local postal services may be limited. Both the Under
Secretary for Border and Transportation Security, Asa Hutchinson and
Assistant Secretary for Consular Affairs, Maura Harty agreed to
investigate the viability of the proposal. The proposal suggested
leveraging the DoS relationship with local financial institutions to
establish a collection process in China and to use the same collection
process as the visa fee for the SEVIS fee at the embassies and
consulates in India. This collection process would include allowing the
student or exchange visitor to pay in local currency. DHS and DoS have
formed a working group to evaluate this option and identify points of
concern for further consideration. Discussions are ongoing on this
issue.
Question: 21.2. Because the proposed rule has no convenient way in
which to pay the SEVIS fee, what has DHS done in order to make this
easier for the student?
Answer: There is, in fact, a convenient way to pay the SEVIS fee. SEVIS
fee payment statistics illustrate that the students and exchange
visitors are not having problems paying the fee. Of the SEVIS fees
collected to date, 96 percent have been made via credit card. The
Student Exchange Visitor Program (SEVP) established several fee payment
options that were available beginning on September 1 for fee
collection. Students and exchange visitors have the option to pay with
a check by mail, with a credit card or debit card via the Internet, or
by third-party payment, such as through batch payment whereby sponsors
pay for an entire group of individuals, or where the student selects a
friend or relative to pay the fee on his or her behalf. SEVP continued
to review alternate payment methods that would allow the student or
exchange visitor to pay in local currency. Through no additional cost
to the program, on November 1 SEVP instituted a new fee payment option
with Western Union. This payment method allows applicants to pay the
fee in local currency in over 130 countries where Western Union offers
their QuickPayTM option. SEVP's relationship with the DoS
Office of Consular Affairs--who quickly alerted overseas Posts to
accept Western Union receipts as proof of payment--made this option
possible. These payment methods are working well. However, when
problems with fee payment do arise, SEVP has established the SEVIS fee
Case Resolution Unit (CRU) to provide individual assistance. SEVP is
aware of fee payment problems in Nigeria and Ghana, but those cases
only represent approximately 1 percent of the total student/exchange
visitor population. Western Union is expected to expand to Nigeria,
resolving fee payment problems there by the end of 2005. SEVP is
committed to ensuring that all students and exchange visitors are able
to pay the fee, and will resolve these cases individually.
Question: 21.3. Why isn't DHS collecting this fee once a foreign
student enters into the United States and has access to a United States
bank? Would this be a viable option for DHS?
Answer: Congress mandated that the SEVIS fee be paid prior to visa
issuance. The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility
Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) requires the collection of information relating to
nonimmigrant foreign students and exchange visitors and provides for
the collection of the required fee to defray the costs. The initial
1999 proposed fee rule required that educational institutions and
exchange visitor program sponsors collect the fee, based upon then-
existing law, and mandated that the fee be collected prior to visa
issuance. Congress subsequently amended the law to permit DHS to
collect the fee directly from the F-l, F-3, J-l, M-l, or M-3
nonimmigrants, but did not change the requirement that the fee be
collected prior to visa issuance. Based upon these amendments to the
law, the Final Rule provided for fee collection by DHS and required
that proof of payment be presented during the visa application process,
as was intended by Congress. SEVP recognizes that fee payment prior to
visa issuance can be a hardship for those students and exchange
visitors who are denied a visa; therefore, SEVP established a policy to
honor the initial fee payment for those students and exchange visitors
who re-apply for a visa within a period of 12 months.
Question: 21.4. If this requires a change in the law would DHS be
receptive to a legislative fix?
Answer: In principle, DHS does not object to exploring the possibility
of changing the law to allow for fee payment after the nonimmigrant
enters the United States. However such change may generate unique and
unforeseen problems for fee collection and processing, such as how to
guarantee fee payment. This issue would need to be fully analyzed to
determine the impacts on the program. If the student or exchange
visitor is given the option to pay the fee upon entry to the United
States, currently there is no mechanism that would enforce the payment
requirement.
Question: 21.5. Is it true that the SEVIS fee has been lowered for a
group of students (summer work travel/au pairs) to $35.00, and not any
other group that may spend a limited amount of time in the United
States such as a student participating in a six week Intensive English
Program?
Answer: Yes. Congress specified that the fee be reduced for only three
categories of exchange visitors (Camp Counselors, Summer-work/Travel,
and Au Pairs). Further, IIRIRA section 641 provides that an alien
seeking J-l status to participate in an exchange visitor program that
is sponsored by the Federal government is exempt from paying a fee. DHS
has clarified that those potential J-1 exchange visitors exempt from
the fee as participants in a Federal government sponsored exchange
visitor program are those participating in an exchange visitor program
with a program identification designator prefix of G-l, G-2, or G-3.
Some comments received on the proposed fee rule suggested that other
students and exchange visitors should be exempt from the fee.
Similarly, a number of comments suggested that the fee for other
programs be reduced below $100 to mirror the reduction that Congress
expressly provided to certain J-l participants, including lower fees
for short-term English language programs, for all English language
programs, for some or all short-term programs, for commuter students,
and for secondary school students. As noted in the Final Rule, Congress
specifically exempted from the SEVIS fee only J-l nonimmigrants who are
participating in an exchange visitor program sponsored by the Federal
government, and explicitly reduced it only for certain other J-l
nonimmigrants. DHS interpreted the Congressional mandate such that no
other groups of nonimmigrants should be exempt from the SEVIS fee or
have a reduced SEVIS fee based upon the principle of expressio unius
est exclusion alterius: when one or more things of a class are
expressly mentioned, others of the same class are necessarily excluded.
Question: 21.6. Is this $100 fee not a disincentive for short-term
study abroad in the United States when other countries not only have
much less stringent visa requirements, less denial rates but also much
lower fees?
Answer: A number of comments received on the proposed rule suggested
that the fee would deter participation of foreign students and exchange
visitors in United States programs. However, the statistical evidence
on the number of foreign students and exchange visitors recorded in
SEVIS does not support the argument that the $100 fee is a disincentive
to study in the United States. Between 2003 and 2004, SEVIS has seen a
slight increase in the number of students and exchange visitors in the
United States. The SEVIS fee was implemented on September 1, 2004. If
it were a disincentive to students and exchange visitors we would
potentially see a decline in the number of students and exchange
visitors coming to the United States. Additionally, compared with the
overall cost of a U.S. education or participation in an exchange
visitor program, the SEVIS fee does not significantly increase the
financial burden on foreign students and exchange visitor program
participants. It is possible, however, that the fee might deter the
participation of students and exchange visitors with the most limited
resources, particularly those from the least developed countries. While
DHS acknowledges this reality, the statute mandating the implementation
of the fee allows for no specific fee reductions, exemptions, or
delayed payments based upon a nonimmigrant's available resources or the
infrastructure limitations of his or her country. Further, intending F,
M, and J nonimmigrants are required by DHS and DoS regulations to
provide evidence of sufficient financial resources to support
themselves throughout their program. When considering the average cost
of a temporary stay in the United States, including all related program
costs, DHS does not believe that the SEVIS fee presents a burden
sufficient to act as a deterrent to F, M, or J program participation.
DHS notes that many schools and exchange visitor program sponsors, as
well as other interested third party organizations (such as advocacy
groups), already make special efforts to assist these nonimmigrants.
DHS commends and encourages this assistance and, to facilitate such
assistance, DHS will accept fee payments from third parties.
Question: 21.7. Why has this not been implemented for all short term
study groups, and not just the summer work-study group?
Answer: Same answer as in Question 5 (QO1562).
Question: 21.8. Could a blanket rule of three months study or less be
implemented for reducing the fee to $35?
Answer: DHS does not believe that this is a viable option, for two
reasons. First, Congress mandated that SEVP be a fully fee-funded
program and that the SEVIS fee be collected specifically to defray the
costs associated with the program. Reducing the fee for a significant
number of nonimmigrants would force DHS to increase the fee amount for
other nonimmigrants in order to offset the reduction. Second, costs for
administration of the program and the processing of non immigrants
occur mostly up-front in the process and do not vary based on the
length of time that the nonimmigrant is in the United States.
Consequently, it is appropriate to spread the cost of the program as
equally as possible among all of the participants.
Question: 22. What is the current make up of the US-VISIT staff? Is
current staffing sufficient to manage, implement and oversee the US-
VISIT program?
Answer: The current staffing level for US-VISIT is 115 federal
positions. Weare currently in process of hiring up to the 115
positions.
Question: 23. We understand that US-VISIT may collect a different
biometric for future use. Is this correct and which type ofbiometric
does DHS expects to use in the long term.
Answer: Currently, US-VISIT uses fingerscans and digital photographs.
Other biometrics are being assessed, not only by US-VISIT but also by
other DHS components, for potential use.
Question: 24. Who will have access to US-VISIT biometric information?
Answer: By collecting the appropriate biographic, biometric, and other
immigration related information at the first contact with an
individual, and sharing the information in a timely manner with
appropriate decision makers, those charged with ensuring the integrity
of our immigration system can make better decisions. These decision
makers include consular officials from the Department of State, Customs
and Border Protection officers, Immigration and Customs Enforcement
agents, and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services officers from the
Department of Homeland Security.
This critical information on foreign nationals must be shared, ,
with other law enforcement and intelligence agencies as they, too, bear
responsibility for protecting our country. This information is shared
appropriately with law enforcement and intelligence agencIes.
Question: 25. Will information be removed from US-VISIT when an
individual becomes a US-citizen? How will removal of that information
be accomplished?
Answer: US-VISIT currently retains the information collected for a
defined duration (100 years for ADIS and 75 years for IDENT), even if
the individual later becomes a United States citizen. However, as US-
VISIT matures and decisions are made regarding whether the existing
systems will be integrated, modernized, and/or retired, the data
retention periods for US-VISIT data will be reviewed and adjusted to
reflect the redefined needs of the Department. One of US-VISIT's
primary goals is to safeguard the personal information that is being
collected in a way that is responsible and respectful of privacy
concerns. The Department is achieving this goal by implementing a
comprehensive privacy program that ensures personal information is
protected from misuse and improper disclosure, and is destroyed when no
longer needed for its stated purpose. DHS is committed to updating the
US-VISIT database when a person becomes a U.S. citizen. DHS is
currently working with USCIS.''
Question: 26. What has DHS done to promote information and educate
travelers about US-VISIT? I agree that we need to keep track of who is
coming into our country, but I am not sure that US-VISIT program will
help us significantly in our effort to keep terrorists out of the
country. When do you estimate that US-VISIT will be deemed ``in place
and fully functional?'' Can you enlighten me on the benefits that we
can expect in our war against terrorism when US-VISIT is ``in place and
fully functional?'' (Jackson-Lee)
Answer: US-VISIT has a robust outreach effort in place to educate
visitors and to explain US-VISIT procedures for both entry and exit. In
addition to providing information to international stakeholders in the
travel and tourism industry and the business community, US-VISIT
personnel are working with the media in visa waiver countries to
educate foreign visitors. Information has been provided to the
Department of State Consular Affairs offices overseas so that they can
explain the required exit process as well. The campaign has identified
the basic points of contact (touch points) to help ensure that foreign
visitors are fully aware of US- VISIT's goals and procedures. The
continuum begins overseas, with outreach to media and stakeholders, and
collaboration with the State Department and visa-issuing posts. The
outreach touch points continue through the journey to the U.S., arrival
at the port of entry, and departure. Campaign materials are itemized
and described below.
US-VISIT is enhancing the integrity of all aspects of immigration
and border management processes while also providing a significant law
enforcement benefit. The system has already begun to demonstrate its
value as a law enforcement and national security tool. For example,
through September 30, 2004:
The system validated the identity and the
authenticated documents of 1,931,550 aliens.
Matches against biometric watch list records at entry
resulted in 333 adverse actions, including matches for
individuals convicted of rape, drug trafficking, manslaughter,
federal prison escape, visa fraud and immigration violations.
Recurrent biometric checks after entry identified 104
individuals who committed crimes, most notably rape, or
otherwise violated their immigration status, generating leads
to Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) for possible
removal from the United States.
Question: 27. It will be enormously expensive to establish and fully
implement US-VISIT. What security measures would you recommend if
Congress provided the Department of Homeland Security with a matching
amount of money to use for other purposes?(Jackson-Lee)
Answer: The Administration is convinced that the money spent on US-
VISIT is an extremely important investment in our nation's security.
Congress should continue its support of US-VISIT. US-VISIT remains a
top priority for DHS because it enhances security for our citizens and
visitors while facilitating legitimate travel and trade across the
borders. DHS deployed the first increment on time and within budget.
During FY 2003, US-VISIT continued to make progress in achieving its
mission by maintaining an aggressive implementation schedule. As a
result, the US-VISIT program is reaching out to stakeholders in an
organized fashion, complying with capital investment planning
guidelines, and managing day-to-day activities in a controlled and
effective manner.
Question: 28. If US-VISIT had been ``in place and fully functional''
when the 9-11 terrorists entered the United States, would it have made
any difference? Why or on what basis? (Jackson-Lee)
Answer: It is always difficult to predict what might have happened.
However, the USVISIT system, when fully implemented, will provide a
comprehensive picture of most foreign nationals, and will be able to
identify those who--like three of the September 11 th hijackers--have
overstayed the terms of their visas. In addition, US-VISIT has already
enhanced the integrity of the immigration system by identifying
imposters. To the extent that this acts as a deterrent for others who
may intend harm to our citizens and visitors, US-VISIT may have already
dissuaded terrorists from exploiting our system.
Attachment for answer to Q01556:
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ENTRY--
Count LOCY--NEW LPOE NAME Non-- Entry--Commercial Entry--
Commercial Pedestrian
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1 SLU San Luis....................................... 5 1 2
2 AND Andrade........................................ 2 0 2
3 DOU Douglas........................................ 7 0 2
4 LUKLukeville...................................... 3 0 1
5 MAP Marisposa--Nogales West........................ 4 2 1
6 NAC Naco........................................... 2 1 1
7 NOG Nogales East................................... 6 0 6
8 SAS Sasabe......................................... 1 0 1
9 PNH Pittsburg...................................... 2 0 0
10 ABG Alburg......................................... 1 0 0
11 ABS Alburg Springs................................. 1 0 0
12 BEB Beebe Plain.................................... 1 0 0
13 BEE Beecher Falls.................................. 2 1 0
14 CNA Canaan......................................... 1 1 0
15 DER Derby Line BS--1-91............................ 4 1 0
16 DLV Derby Line BS--Rte. 5.......................... 2 0 0
17 ERC East Richford--Richford Rte 105................ 2 0 0
18 HIG Highgate Springs............................... 5 1 0
19 MOR Morses Line--Franklin.......................... 1 0 0
20 NRN Norton......................................... 2 1 0
21 NRT North Troy..................................... 1 0 0
22 PIV Pinnacle Road--Richford........................ 2 0 0
23 DRIF Richford Rte 139............................... 2 0 0
24 WBE West Berkshire................................. 2 0 0
25 BUR Burke--Jamisons Line........................... 1 0 0
26 CHM Champlain...................................... 7 3 0
27 CHT Chateaugay..................................... 2 0 0
28 CHU Churubusco..................................... 1 0 0
29 CNN Cannon Corners................................. 1 0 0
30 FTC Fort Covington................................. 2 0 0
31 MAS Massena........................................ 4 1 0
32 MOO Mooers......................................... 2 0 0
33 OGD Ogdensburg..................................... 3 0 0
34 OVE Overton Corners................................ 4 0 0
35 ROU Rouses Point--St. Johns Hwy.................... 3 0 0
36 TRO Trout River.................................... 3 0 0
37 EPI Eastport....................................... 3 1 0
38 PTL Porthill....................................... 2 1 0
39 BWA Boundary....................................... 1 0 0
40 DVL Danville....................................... 1 0 0
41 FER Curlew--Ferry.................................. 1 0 1
42 FWA Frontier....................................... 1 0 0
43 LAULaurier........................................ 2 0 0
44 MET Metaline Falls................................. 2 0 0
45 NIG Nighthawk...................................... 1 0 1
46 ORO Oroville....................................... 2 0 0
47 ROO Roosville...................................... 2 1 0
48 OTM Otay Mesa--San Diego........................... 13 6 6
49 SYS San Ysidro--San Diego.......................... 24 0 16
50 TEC Tecate......................................... 2 1 1
51 VAS Virginia Avenue--San Diego..................... 0 0 0
52 BBM B&M--Brownsville............................... 4 2 2
53 BRO Gateway--Brownsville........................... 5 4 4
54 FAL Falcon Heights................................. 1 0 1
55 HID Hidalgo........................................ 11 1 4
56 LOILos Indios..................................... 4 4 2
57 LSELos Ebanos..................................... 1 0 1
58 PGR Progreso....................................... 4 2 2
59 PHR Pharr.......................................... 4 4 1
60 RIO Rio Grande City................................ 3 3 1
61 ROM Roma........................................... 4 1 1
62 VIB Los Tomates--Brownsville....................... 4 4 2
63 PRE Presidio....................................... 3 2 1
64 LARLaredo AF--Convent Street...................... 4 0 3
65 LCBLaredo--Columbia............................... 4 3 1
66 LLBLaredo-Lincoln--Juarez......................... 12 0 0
67 LWTWorld Trade Bridge--Laredo IV.................. 0 8 1
68 BWM Bridgewater.................................... 1 0 1
69 CAM Calais--Milltown............................... 1 0 0
70 CLS Calais--Ferry Point............................ 2 1 0
71 COB Coburn Gore.................................... 2 1 0
72 EAS Easton......................................... 1 0 0
73 EPT Eastport....................................... 1 0 0
74 EST St. Francis--Est Court......................... 1 1 2
75 FOR Forest City.................................... 1 0 1
76 FTF Fort Fairfield................................. 2 1 0
77 FTK Fort Kent...................................... 2 1 0
78 HML Hamlin......................................... 1 0 0
79 HTM Houlton........................................ 6 2 0
80 JKM Jackman........................................ 2 1 0
81 LlMLimestone...................................... 1 1 0
82 LUBLubec.......................................... 2 0 0
83 MAD Madawaska...................................... 1 1 1
84 MTC Monticello..................................... 1 0 1
85 ORI Orient......................................... 1 0 1
86 SPA St. Francis--St. Pamphille..................... 1 1 2
87 SRL Jackman--St. Aurelie........................... 1 0 0
88 STD St. Francis--Daaquam........................... 1 1 0
89 VCB Vanceboro...................................... 2 0 0
90 VNB Van Buren...................................... 2 1 0
91 CHF Chief Mountain................................. 2 1 0
92 DLB Del Bonita..................................... 1 1 0
93 GOA Goat Haunt..................................... 0 0 1
94 MGM Morgan......................................... 1 1 0
95 OPH Opheim......................................... 1 1 0
96 PIE Piegan......................................... 2 1 0
97 RAY Raymond........................................ 1 1 0
98 SCO Scobey......................................... 1 1 0
99 SWE Sweetgrass..................................... 2 1 0
100 WCM Willow Creek................................... 1 0 0
101 WHI Whitetail...................................... 1 1 0
102 WHM Wild Horse..................................... 1 1 0
103 WHT Whitlash....................................... 1 1 0
104 AMB Ambrose........................................ 3 1 0
105 ANT Antler......................................... 1 1 0
106 BAU Baudette....................................... 2 1 0
07 CRA Crane lake..................................... 1 1 0
108 CRY Carbury........................................ 1 1 0
109 DNS Dunseith....................................... 2 1 0
110 ElY Ely............................................ 1 0 0
111 FRT Fortuna........................................ 1 1 0
112 GPM Grand Portage.................................. 2 1 0
113 HNN Hannah......................................... 1 1 0
114 HNS Hansboro....................................... 1 1 0
115 INT International Falls............................ 2 1 1
116 LANLancaster...................................... 1 1 0
117 MAl Maida.......................................... 1 1 0
118 NEC Neche.......................................... 1 1 0
119 NOO Noonan......................................... 1 1 0
120 NOY Noyes.......................................... 2 1 0
121 NRG Northgate...................................... 1 1 0
122 PEM Pembina........................................ 6 3 0
123 PIN Pine Creek--Roseau............................. 1 1 0
124 POR Portal......................................... 1 3 0
125 ROS Roseau......................................... 1 2 0
126 SAR Sarles......................................... 1 1 0
127 SHR Sherwood....................................... 1 1 0
128 SJO St. John....................................... 3 2 0
129 WAl Walhalla....................................... 1 1 0
130 WAR Warroad........................................ 1 1 0
131 WHO Westhope....................................... 1 1 1
132 ANP Antelope Wells................................. 1 0 0
133 BOA Bridge of the Americas (BOTA) El Paso.......... 10 4 4
134 COL Columbus....................................... 2 1 1
135 FAB Fabens......................................... 2 0 1
136 FTH Fort Hancock................................... 1 0 1
137 PDN Paso Del Norte--El Paso........................ 10 0 8
138 SEL Stanton Street Bridge.......................... 3 0 0
139 STR Santa Teresa................................... 2 2 1
140 YSl Ysleta--El Paso................................ 12 6 4
141 TUR Turner......................................... 1 2 0
142 CAl Calexico....................................... 10 0 4
143 IVP Calexico East--Imperial Valley................. 8 3 2
144 DCB Detroit Ambassador Bridge...................... 10 7 0
145 DCT Detroit Tunnel................................. 9 0 0
146 PHU Port Huron--Blue Water Bridge.................. 8 6 0
147 SSM Sault Ste. Marie............................... 2 1 1
148 ADT Amistad Dam.................................... 1 0 0
149 DLR Del Rio........................................ 4 2 1
150 EGP Eagle Pass..................................... 5 0 1
151 FDE Eagle Pass II.................................. 6 2 1
152 LEWLewiston-Queenston Bridge...................... 7 3 0
153 PBB Peace Bridge--Buffalo.......................... 7 4 1
154 RAI Rainbow Bridge--Niagara Falls.................. 19 0 4
155 WHL Whirlpool Rapids----Niagara Falls.............. 3 0 1
156 THO Alexandria Bay--Thousand Island................ 6 2 0
157 ALC Alcan.......................................... 2 1 0
158 DAC Haines--Dalton Cache........................... 1 1 0
159 SKA Skagway........................................ 1 1 0
160 BLA Peace Arch--Blaine............................. 7 1 0
161 LYNLynden......................................... 3 2 0
162 PHY Pacific Highway--Blaine........................ 6 3 0
163 SUM Sumas.......................................... 4 2 0
164 PTR Point Roberts.................................. 4 1 1
165 PKC Poker Creek.................................... 1 0 1
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total.......................................... 490 176 118
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Air Transport Association of America. Inc. Responses to Questions
Question: 1. The US-VISIT Program is an extensive border management
system that requires participation and cooperation from a wide variety
of stakeholders. How has the Air Transport Association participated in
the discussions leading up to the implementation of phase one of US-
VISIT?
Answer: ATA has participated extensively in discussions with DHS
leading up to the implementation of phase one of US-VISIT. ATA's
involvement dates back to working with and providing input to legacy-
INS staff on the original ``entry/exit'' program. Coordination has
continued with the creation of the Department of Homeland Security and
the announcement of US-VISIT in early 2003. US-VISIT staff have availed
themselves to ATA and our carriers for advice and to answer questions.
During the Atlanta pilot, US-VISIT staff conducted weekly conference
calls with stakeholders. In addition, US. VISIT worked very closely
with Delta Air Lines and ATA for the Entry pilot that was conducted at
Atlanta's Hartsfield/Jackson International Airport late last fall. ATA
continues to work with US-VISIT on the Exit phase. Coordination on the
Exit phase includes bi-monthly conference calls to discuss.
Question: 2. In an effort to better prepare passengers for Exit
requirements, would airlines be willing to hand-out the small
information card with a passenger's boarding pass?
Answer: Yes, ATA carriers would be willing to assist the government in
whatever means possible to better prepare passengers for the Exit
requirements. We would ask that an adequate, ongoing supply of the
information card be provided to the carriers at the full expense of the
government. The information cards also need to be printed in multiple
languages to better serve our passengers.
Question: 3. What are your recommendations for additional public
outreach and education for US-VISIT?
Answer: US-VISIT has done an effective job of putting together a public
outreach and education effort for US-VISIT. Their efforts have included
updating U.S. government websites (DHS, CBP, ICE, and the State
Department) to include information on US-VISIT; working with the State
Department to provide the embassies and consulates abroad the necessary
materials and information; issuing press releases and providing
material to the news media.
ATA recommends that DHS consider creating a link on their homepage
specifically for US-VISIT that could have timely updates on entry/exit;
the where's, what's and how's of the program; Exit locations (both
cities and airports); and user friendly airport maps detailing the
location's of the Exit kiosks and how to use them. There could also be
information directed to passengers who are coming to the United States
about what to expect when they go to U.S. embassies and consulates for
their visas.
ATA also recommends that US-VISIT consider posting signs at
departure gates in foreign airports informing passengers what to expect
upon arrival into the United States. We would hope that DHS would work
with foreign governments and/or the foreign airport authorities to
provide signage as a customer service notification.
Question: 4. Has ATA membership noticed additional passenger wait times
during immigration and customs processing due to new US-VISIT data
collection?
Answer: ATA member airlines have not noticed significant increases in
wait times during immigration and customs processing due to new US-
VISIT data collection. We have been impressed with the coordination
between US-VISIT and Customs and Border Protection (CBP) to ensure a
careful and successful implementation of phase one. However, we will
continue to monitor the issue as we move into the summer peak travel
season which begins in April. Adequate levels of CBP inspectors on the
primary lines are paramount to avoiding long lines in the FIS
facilities which delay our passengers and could cause disruptions for
airport operations.
Question: 5. Current Federal law requires that by October 26, 2004, all
Visa Waiver Program (VWP) countries must have capabilities to produce
biometric passports in order to remain in the program. Concern has been
expressed that many of the 27 VWP countries will be able to meet this
deadline. Has ATA done any studies looking into the impact this
deadline may have on the travel industry?
Answer: No, ATA has not done any specific studies on how the October
26, 2004, deadline will affect the travel industry. However, in 2003,
ATA was a strong advocate for delaying the October 1, 2003, requirement
for all Visa Waiver Program travelers to have a valid Machine Readable
Passport (MRP) for visa-free entry into the U.S. ATA was concerned that
insufficient preparatory work had been completed and that serious
disruptions of the processing of visitors into the United States could
occur. As you know, Secretary Powell exercised his waiver authority and
extended the deadline to October 26, 2004--which now coincides with the
requirement for VWP countries to begin producing biometric passports.
Many of the same issues surrounding the October 1, 2003,
requirement for MRPs also apply to the upcoming October 26th date.
State Department Assistant Secretary Maura Harty has testified several
times that most VWP countries will not be capable of issuing passports
with biometrics by the deadline. Premature implementation of the
requirement will cause a great deal of confusion for the traveling
public and will contribute to a world-view that travel to the United
States is an unpleasant hassle. That will greatly discourage travel to
the United States, which will significantly harm the national economy
as well as the airline and travel and tourism industry.
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Questions and Responses of Dennis A. Carlton, Director Washington
Operations International Biometric Group
Question: 1. The current biometrics being used at selected air and
sea ports of entry call for two fingerprints and a photograph of the
foreign national. While the Administration has maintained that it is
currently in ``increment one'' in a four stage process and it may
likely move towards using a ten-print system, will using two-prints
impact the agency's ability to capture individuals who are listed in
the Federal Bureau of Investigation's database, which uses ten prints?
Answer: In the near term, the Department of Homeland Security's
decision to capture and match the flat impressions of the two index
fingers of foreign nationals seems a practical compromise. To comply
with the aggressive deadlines imposed by federal legislation and to
achieve the programmatic milestones set by the Secretary of Homeland
Security, the US-VISIT Program Office chose to implement technologies
the department had successfully deployed in the recent past. Since it
is an extension of the existing IDENT system, the two flat finger
capture/matching solution being employed in US-VISIT Increment One is
fully compatible with the two-print database format of IDENT. However,
this means that the two flat fingers captured for US-VISIT will be
subject to the same matching accuracy and throughput infirmities when
searching against the rolled fingerprints contained in the Department
of Justice's Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System
(IAFIS) as all other two-finger inquiries sent from IDENT.
Studies have shown that matching flat fingerprints against a
database comprised of rolled fingerprints is not as accurate as
matching rolled prints against rolled prints. The `disconnect' between
rolled and flat prints is not likely to be resolved by US-VISIT--
forensics specialists will continue to prefer the additional data
available from rolled prints while civil government applications like
US-VISIT will use flat prints because they are much easier to capture.
Over the longer term, as the US-VISIT database grows to comprise
tens of millions of records, two fingers will not provide sufficiently
unique data to consistently return only one matching database record.
As a consequence, queries are likely to begin returning several
potential matching records, necessitating additional research to
distinguish true from false matches. IBG and others in the biometrics
industry believe that at least four or more fingers will need to be
captured from each subject in order to maintain adequate matching
accuracy and throughput. Individuals originally enrolled with just two
fingerprints will need to be reenrolled using four or more fingers;
this reenrollment could be accomplished when an individual appears for
a visa renewal.
Question: 2. You characterized the challenge of implementing
biometric identifier at land ports of entry as ``daunting,'' yet
surmountable. Could you elaborate on how this challenge could be
overcome, both at the ports and ``upstream,'' keeping in mind that the
largest ports are extremely busy, handling millions of entrants year-
round?
Answer: The key to successfully implementing biometric
identification at land ports of entry is to provide multiple means by
which travelers can be `pre-identified' before they reach the point of
primary inspection. IBG believes the vast majority of travelers will
readily cooperate with `pre-identification' programs so long as the
enrollment process is considered reasonable and the enrolled traveler
is provided expedited transit across the border. For instance, at the
Peace Arch port of entry in Blaine, Washington almost 25% of annual
border crossings are by enrollees in the joint U.S.-Canadian NEXUS
alternative inspection program. Though NEXUS program participants must
submit to an extensive background investigation by both American and
Canadian customs and immigration authorities, their reward is being
able to cross the border using a dedicated lane that can reduce what
sometimes can be an hour+ wait in regular lanes to just a few minutes.
Travelers should have several options for identifying themselves
prior to reaching the land port primary inspection point. Biometric
matching need not and, in fact, should not be performed for the first
time at the point of inspection--the inspecting officer must not be
distracted from conducting a thorough evaluation of the demeanor and
behavior of the traveler. In pedestrian lanes, biometrics could be
matched through a combination of active (fingerprint capture) and
passive (facial image capture) methods as travelers pass through pre-
inspection choke points. In vehicle lanes, fingerprint samples could be
captured prior to the inspection position, using portable devices that
can both read data from travel documents and match fingerprints from
inside the vehicle.
U.S. citizens could be encouraged to register their travel
documents (e.g., their drivers license, passport, or other form of ID)
and biometric samples prior to their departure at kiosks located at the
land ports and other government offices, such as post offices,
throughout the border region. Upon their return to the U.S., registered
travelers would be afforded the privilege of using expedited processing
lanes.
Question: 3. Based on what you have observed, to what extent has
the US-VISIT program office given consideration to overcoming the
challenge of implementing a biometric identifier at land ports of
entry?
Answer: The US-VISIT program office has evaluated several
alternatives for employing biometrics at land ports of entry. The
Departments of State and Homeland Security have accumulated extensive
experience capturing and matching biometrics as part of the Border
Crossing Card enrollment process. This past year, DHS conducted a pilot
program to assess the practical issues associated with matching the
biometric data recorded on the BCC with a live biometric sample
provided by the cardholder. In addition, DHS has been acquiring
biometric samples from and conducting background investigations of
thousands of NEXUS and SENTRI cardholders. Biometric identification
procedures will have to be both flexible and creative in order to
accommodate the wide range of port configurations and environmental
conditions at U.S. land ports of entry.
Question: 4. How do you propose to best address the inevitable
occurrences of ``mistaken'' or inadvertent biometric identity
mismatches, especially from the perspective of safeguarding privacy?
Answer: Experience acquired from Increment One of the US-VISIT
program has shown that DHS already has implemented effective methods
for quickly resolving biometric identity mismatches. As part of the
Increment One technology upgrades at the primary inspection positions,
inspection personnel now have access to significantly more traveler-
related data from both DHS and DOS databases. For instance, primary
inspectors can now access records from the Department of State's
Consolidated Consular Database to review the information upon which the
DOS Foreign Service Officer adjudicated a visa application. When a
biometric mismatch occurs, an inspector has real-time access to text
data that can be used to quickly determine that the traveler's
documentation doesn't match the record returned by the biometric
search. Initial indications have shown that biometric mismatches have
occurred at a rate far lower than had been predicted and that the
primary inspector has resolved mismatch errors and sent the traveler on
their way in an average of about one minute. Thus, travelers are
subjected to minimal inconvenience and their privacy and dignity are
protected.
Prepared Statement of Edward K. Pultorak, Senior CBP Officer, NTEU
Chapter 111--Lose Angeles International Airport
Chairman Camp, Ranking Member Sanchez, distinguished members of the
Subcommittee; I would like to thank the subcommittee for the
opportunity to testify on one of the Bureau of Customs and Border
Protection's (CBP) newest programs--The U.S. Visitor and Immigrant
Status Indicator Technology U.S. VISIT) program.
I am proud to have been part of Customs for over 32 years. In 1971,
I started with Customs as one of the original sky marshals. In my
capacity as a sky marshal I flew over 1 million miles on TWA Airlines
over the course of three years. In 1974, I became a United States
Customs Inspector at JFK International Airport in New York until 1976
when I then began working Customs pre-clearance in Bermuda for six
years. In 1983, I started working as a Customs Inspector at Los Angeles
International Airport (LAX) where I have worked during the past 21
years. In addition to my job as a Senior legacy Customs Inspector and
now Senior CBP Officer, I have been an employee representative for
NTEU, proudly representing over 400 Customs personnel at LAX for over
10 years.
U.S. VISIT PROGRAM AND CBP OFFICER TRAINING:
The Immigration and Naturalization Service Data Management
Improvement Act of 2000 (DMIA) P.L. 106-215 mandated the creation of an
entry/exit system for non-U.S. citizens into and out of the United
States that would record all arrival and departure information of every
alien who crosses the U.S. border. This system is now known as U.S.
VISIT.
While the official roll out of the U.S. VISIT program is only 3
weeks old, I would like to bring the subcommittee's attention a few
concerns that legacy Customs and INS inspectors, such as my self, would
like the subcommittee to be aware of with regard to the implementation
and future use of the U.S. VISIT program.
On January 5, 2004 the U.S. VISIT program was introduced at 115
U.S. international airports and at 14 seaports of entry across the
country, including my port of entry, Los Angeles International Airport
(LAX), one of three busiest international airports in the country with
approximately 8 million international passengers annually.
As has been stated by previous members on the panel, the U.S. VISIT
program is intended to process visitors holding visas as they enter the
United States. The U.S. VISIT technology uses scanning equipment to
collect ``biometric identifiers,'' such as fingerprints, in an inkless
process, along with a digital photograph of the visitor. Together with
the standard information gathered from a visitor about their identity
and travel, the program is intended to verify the visitor's identity
and compliance with visa and immigration policies. All data obtained
from the visitor is then stored as part of the visitor's travel record.
At exit points, visitors will check out at kiosks by scanning their
visa or passport and repeating the simple inkless fingerprinting
process. The exit confirmation will be added to the visitor's travel
records to ensure compliance. It is my understanding that the U.S VISIT
program will be expanded to include the 50 busiest land ports of entry
by December 31, 2004, and all U.S. ports of entry by December 31, 2005.
As the subcommittee is aware, on September 2, 2003, Secretary Tom
Ridge announced the creation of a new CBP officer position and the
``One Face at the Border'' initiative. Under this plan, a new position,
the Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Officer would combine the
duties of legacy inspectors from Customs, INS and APHIS into a single
front- line border security position at the 307 official ports-of-entry
across the United States.
As some of my fellow Customs inspectors have testified at previous
hearings, I and the legacy Customs employees I work with believe that
combining the border protection responsibilities that were held by
three highly-skilled specialists into a single front line inspector
position continues to raise some serious concerns. Each of the job
responsibilities from the three legacy inspection agencies is highly
specialized and distinct. By utilizing one employee to perform all
primary and secondary inspection function programs, including the new
US-VISIT program, the agency is diluting the expertise that has made
the United States border inspection personnel second to none.
Prior to the creation of the CBP officer position, legacy Customs
inspectors received 9 to 12 weeks of intensive basic training on
Customs Service rules and regulations alone. Under the new CBP officer
training guidelines legacy inspectors, such as myself, will be
transitioning into the new CBP officer position in the spring of this
year by way of classroom training, CD-ROM computer teaching and on-the-
job training for programs such as US-VISIT. While the new training will
lead to a broader knowledge of the INS rules and regulations of entry
for passengers entering the United States, there remains a concern
among the employees I represent as to whether it will provide the
specialized expertise necessary to ensure the successful accomplishment
of the other traditional legacy Customs and INS anti-terrorism missions
that are now part of the Department of Homeland Security.
Currently, legacy Customs and INS inspectors are ``cross-trained''
as to the most basic Customs and INS procedures for entry into the U.S.
for passengers and goods. Traditionally, if a legacy Customs inspector
was faced with a complicated visa entry situation at an airport or land
border primary inspection station they had the ability to send the
passenger to a more intensive secondary inspection where an experienced
legacy INS inspector could make a determination as to the validity of a
particular visa. It remains unclear as to whether experts in visa
issues or other specific Customs and INS border protection matters will
continue to be available for secondary inspection once the full
implementation of the CBP officer training is completed for all legacy
Customs personnel and new CBP Officers. I feel strongly that specific
expertise must be maintained, especially in light of the ramping up of
the US-VISIT program to all 317 official ports of entry by the end of
2005.
With the recent introduction of the U.S. VISIT program the issue of
staffing continues to be a concern. For example, at a number of
airports across the country since the introduction of U.S. VISIT,
legacy Customs inspectors who are highly trained in cargo inspection
have been pulled from their current anti-terrorism cargo and passenger
assignments to assist legacy INS inspectors by processing only low risk
U.S. citizens and green card holders at airport immigration processing
stations in order to maintain an acceptable flow of passengers in the
international terminals. The CBP officers I represent hope that
Congress will continue to provide additional CBP Officer staffing to
enable legacy CBP Officers such as myself the ability to continue
working in our areas of expertise to continue our traditional missions
of facilitating legitimate trade and preventing terrorism.
Other issues of concern that have been raised by both the legacy
Customs and INS personnel that I work with involve the current
exemption of international travelers from countries who are part of the
Visa Waiver Program (VWP) and how it relates to the U.S. VISIT program.
In addition, there are also concerns about the use of only selected
databases by the U.S. VISIT program.
Currently, the U.S. VISIT program applies only to foreign visitors
seeking admission on non-immigrant visas but does not apply to visitors
seeking admission from Canada and Mexico or countries participating in
the Visa Waiver Program (VWP), or lawful permanent residents (green
card holders). Also at this time, the U.S. VISIT program will not apply
to foreign visitors seeking entry at land border ports of entry where
over 81 percent of international passengers are processed. Currently,
only 19 percent of international passengers are processed at air and
sea ports of entry.
The fact that travelers from 27 countries who participate in the
VWP and travelers entering through Canada and Mexico are currently
exempt from U.S. VISIT should raise serious concerns with the members
of this subcommittee. Future terrorists with no criminal or terrorism
history could possibly exploit the waiver program that currently
exempts such countries as Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy,
Japan, Singapore, Spain and the United Kingdom to name a few.
In addition, front line legacy Customs and INS inspectors I have
talked with have serious concerns with regard to the lack of federal
watch list and criminal databases currently being used by the U.S.
VISIT program. It in my understanding that currently the U.S. VISIT
program uses the traditional Customs (TECS), INS and TSA databases, but
does not fully utilize other terrorist and criminal watch lists
maintained by other federal agencies such as the State Department and
U.S. Marshal's Service. The success or failure of entry/exit programs,
such as U.S. VISIT, rely entirely on the quality of information
available to the DHS personnel using it. If U.S. VISIT is to be truly
successful as a terrorist fighting tool the DHS must lead the effort to
consolidate and standardize the federal government's watch list
structures and sharing policies to enable front line CBP Officers to
successfully accomplish their anti-terrorism missions.
The men and women I work with, as well as the thousands of other
CBP Officers across the country are deeply committed to their mission
of protecting our borders from terrorism. In order to do that, we must
continue to provide these men and women with the resources they need to
effectively do their job. Again, I want to thank the subcommittee for
the opportunity to share my thoughts on the very important issues
concerning the CBP's U.S. VISIT program. I would be happy to answer any
questions that subcommittee members may have.
Prepared Statement of J. Clark Robinson, President International
Association of Amusement Parks and Attractions
As president of the International Association of Amusement Parks
and Attractions, and on behalf the board of directors and our general
membership, I appreciate the opportunity to submit testimony for the
hearing record on this very important subject.
Introduction
Founded in 1918, the International Association of Amusement Parks
and Attractions (IAAPA) is the largest international trade association
for permanently situated amusement facilities worldwide. Headquartered
in Alexandria, VA, IAAPA represents over 5,000 member companies from
more than 85 countries, including virtually all multi-park companies
such as Disney, Universal, Busch Entertainment, Paramount and Six
Flags. Our membership includes amusement/theme parks, waterparks,
amusement manufacturers and suppliers, family entertainment centers,
arcades, zoos, aquariums, museums, and miniature golf venues.
According to Amusement Business magazine and other industry
analysts, America's 600-plus parks and attractions hosted approximately
322 million visitors in 2003, generating over $10 billion in revenue.
An annual compilation of the world's ``Most Visited Amusement/Theme
Parks'' indicated that the United States had 16 of the top 25 most
attended parks globally during the past year. American amusement
facilities take great pride in their commitment to providing quality
family entertainment to visitors from our own country and countries
around the world.
The Need for Safe, Open Borders
The amusement industry supports enhanced border security measures,
understanding that seamlessly safe travel helps to bolster consumer
confidence in our product. However, the industry is concerned about the
implementation schedule of security measures and the adverse impact it
might have on travel by foreign visitors.
Since 9/11, the travel and tourism industry has seen significant
decreases in international travel to the United States. Over a two-year
period following September 11, 2001, international travel to the U.S.
declined twenty percent, resulting in a loss of $15 billion in visitor
spending. Over 300,000 jobs in the travel industry were lost as a
product of the decrease in international travel.
While the need to enhance physical safety is paramount, the United
States must also be vigilant in ensuring enhanced economic security
during that process. As a result, the amusement industry, in
conjunction with the entire United States travel industry, cannot
support the current congressionally mandated deadline of October 26,
2004 for Visa Waiver Program (VWP) countries to begin issuance of
biometric passports to their citizens. We request that VWP countries be
provided extra time to phase in these new, more secure documents.
Amusement Industry Supports Biometric Passports, Phase-In Needed
Both the United States and the international theme park community
support implementation of a biometric passport program for Visa Waiver
countries. Biometric identification will undoubtedly enhance security
by allowing more vigorous screening of visitors. The further
development and issuance of machine-readable, tamper-resistant,
biometric passports will reduce the number of fraudulent and suspicious
passports used to gain illegal entry into this country.
While illegal entry must be prohibited, legitimate travel into the
United States must be permitted to continue without significant
disruption. The State Department's Bureau of Consular Affairs has
indicated that VWP governments will be unable to meet the legislatively
mandated deadline to issue biometric passports. It is currently
believed that at best, only three of the twenty-seven Visa Waiver
countries will be able to meet this deadline, and that none of the
larger countries (United Kingdom, Japan, Germany, France, Italy or
Spain) will be able to issue biometric passports by October 26, 2004.
Officials have indicated that these VWP governments will not be capable
of producing biometric passports until late 2005 or 2006.
Visa Waiver travelers with non-biometric passports issued on or
after October 26, 2004 will be required to obtain a visa for travel to
the United States. As governments in Visa Waiver countries will be
unable to issue passports with biometric identifiers, the demand for
nonimmigrant visas for travel to the United States will overload the
processing abilities of U.S. consulates overseas. The State Department
has indicated that the demand for non-immigrant visas would at least
double, leaving them unable to process requests in a timely manner.
We fear that these requirements will serve as a disincentive for
tourist travel to the United States. The biometric passport deadline
for Visa Waiver countries will create an actual barrier for some
international travelers and a perceived barrier for others. Fewer
international visitors to the U.S. will result in less spending and job
loss in the amusement industry across the country.
We suggest that at least a one-year extension of the October 26,
2004 deadline for biometric passports be considered to allow Visa
Waiver countries the necessary time to begin issuing biometric
passports to their citizens. Extension of this deadline would give VWP
governments the opportunity to complete development of these more
secure documents while maintaining the flow of Visa Waiver travelers to
the United States.
Conclusion
As U.S. theme parks are just now beginning to recover from the
events of the last two years, another barrier to inbound travel would
be detrimental to the industry. In 2002, Visa Waiver travelers spent
approximately $38 billion in the United States. Over 10 million
international visitors traveled to the United States from VWP countries
last year. Congress has recently recognized the importance of
international inbound travel, appropriating millions of dollars last
year to the Department of Commerce to establish programs that will
promote travel to the United States in foreign markets.
Extending the biometric passport deadline for Visa Waiver travelers
by at least one year would allow the seamless flow of legitimate travel
into the United States to continue, while providing VWP governments
with the opportunity to successfully meet and comply with requirements
mandated by the Border Security Act. Homeland security must be defined
as more than a mere protection of the physical. The implementation of
security measures must account for the economic health of the nation as
well.
I thank you again for the opportunity to submit this testimony for
the official record.
Prepared Statement of The Travel Industry Association of America
The Travel Industry Association of America (TIA) submits the
following comments for the record.
TIA is the national, non-profit organization representing all
components of the $528 billion U.S. travel and tourism industry. TIA's
mission is to represent the whole of the travel industry to promote and
facilitate increased travel to and within the United States. Our more
than 2,000 member organizations represent every segment of the industry
throughout the country.
International business and leisure travel to the U.S. is a vital
component of our national economy. In 2002, over 42 million
international visitors generated $83.5 billion in expenditures, $12
billion in federal, state and local tax revenue, and accounted for one
million jobs nationwide. International travel and tourism to the U.S.
is a service export, and in 2002, generated a positive balance of trade
of $5.5 billion.
International visitation has continually declined over the past
three years. Overseas travel to the U.S. was down 31.8 percent in 2003
compared to 2000 levels. This decline has drastically reduced the flow
of tax revenue to all levels of government and reduced our
international balance of trade. Since 2000, the loss of international
travel to the US. has cost our economy $15.3 billion in expenditures.
The decline in travel is due to a variety of reasons, including
fear of travel because of terrorism, a downturn in the global economy
and confusion over new US. visa and border security procedures. While
some of the causes are beyond the reach of an individual country,
actions by the U.S. government can either enhance or harm our nation's
ability to attract increased international travel to the U.S. and
create more jobs and economic opportunities for states and cities
across the country. For this reason, the US-VISIT program must be
implemented with traveler facilitation as one of its primary goals.
Otherwise, international travelers might not wish to return to the
U.S., or may be deterred from visiting in the first place.
TIA supports the US-VISIT program as envisioned for airports and
seaports. TIA believes that the program meets the Department of
Homeland Security's dual missions of protecting the nation's security
and economy. By developing a system that verifies the identity of
travelers quickly and efficiently, US-VISIT adds to the protection of
the homeland while ensuring the continuous flow of legitimate
international travelers entering and exiting the country.
However, TIA does have several concerns about the implementation of
the US-VISIT program. Congress should seriously consider these issues
as the program moves forward.
Postpone Deadline for Biometrics Passports
The Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002
introduced a new security element to traveler documentation: biometric
identifiers. Capturing a person's biometric and using it as part of the
entry process will allow inspection officials to know the person before
them is the same person to whom the passport or visa was issued.
Biometrics are just now being incorporated into newly-issued U.S.
visas. They will also be required in all new passports issued by the 27
countries participating in the Visa Waiver Program beginning on October
26, 2004.
TIA supports the use of biometrics in travel documents. However,
most of the Visa Waiver Program countries will not be ready to issue
these newer biometric passports until late 2005 at the earliest.
Missing the deadline would mean that many tourist and business
travelers from those countries would have to obtain visas for entry
into the U.S. The State Department estimates that as many as 5 million
VWP travelers would be affected by this deadline.
Forcing Visa Waiver Program travelers to get visas will deal a
crippling blow to an already ailing travel industry. Approximately two-
thirds of all overseas (excluding Canadian and Mexican) business and
leisure travelers, or nearly 13.5 million visitors, enter the U.S.
under the Visa Waiver Program. Overseas travel to our nation is already
down 32 percent over the past three years. Additional losses will send
even more workers from the travel and tourism industry to the
unemployment line. It is unrealistic to expect travelers accustomed to
visa-free travel to spend the money and time to obtain a U.S. visa to
visit our country. Especially when these travelers have many other
appealing intemationa1 destinations that are visa-free. Additionally,
the State Department lacks the capacity to meet this potential increase
in demand. A loss of those 5 million travelers would cost the U.S.
economy $15 billion in sales and thousands of jobs.
It is important to note that the U.S. Department of State will not
be able to start issuing biometric passports until well after the
October deadline. While the State Department is not required by law to
do so, it is hypocritical for the U.S. to require other countries to do
what we cannot.
The October 26 deadline is a Congressional mandate. The
Administration does not have the authority to extend the deadline.
Therefore, TIA calls on the House Select Committee on Homeland Security
to support at least a one-year extension of the October 26 deadline. By
doing this, Congress will provide the time necessary to allow these
important trade and political allies to begin producing passports in a
way that will not discourage inbound international travel to the U.S.
Concern Over Delays
TIA is very pleased that enrollment in the program has only added
an average of 15 seconds to the normal inspection process. We commend
Homeland Security for their efficiency.
It is critical that this level of performance be maintained during
peak travel periods and also when the U.S. travel and tourism industry
recovers its lost market share. As stated above, overseas travel to the
U.S. has dropped by approximately one-third over the past three years.
TIA is concerned that Homeland Security will not have sufficient
personnel to maintain a 15second US-VISIT inspection time when
international visitation returns to 2000 levels. TIA urges Congress to
provide adequate funding so that Homeland Security will have sufficient
inspectors available to immediately meet the demands peak travel
periods.
While TIA is pleased with the efficiency by which individuals are
processed, TIA also believes it is important to process entire flights
in a timely manner. The time an individual spends at primary inspection
is not the only time issue. There is also the concern over how long an
individual waits to finally reach a primary inspection booth. TIA
supports the original Congressionally mandated goal of a maximum wait
of 45 minutes per individual. Although this mandate was repealed in the
Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 (PL 107-
173), TIA believes it is still a useful and important goal for Customs
and Border Protection inspectors to meet. TIA urges Congress to
allocate funding to provide sufficient inspectors for the US-VISIT
program both to meet the IS-second individual inspection time and to
keep the wait in line to under 45 minutes.
If primary inspection is perceived to be too much of a hassle, many
visitors will be discouraged from returning to the U.S. in the future.
It is critical that the US-VISIT program have the requisite staff to
keep wait times and inspection times to a minimum. Otherwise, both our
security and our economy will suffer.
Outreach to Traveling Public
TIA urges Homeland Security to increase efforts to educate the
international traveling public about the US-VISIT program.
International travelers coming to the U.S. for business and pleasure
should be told who is impacted, and who is not impacted, by this new
program. Visitors need to understand in advance what to expect in the
process, and what they can do to make the process go more smoothly.
The international traveling public increasingly perceives that the
myriad of new security rules is creating a ``Fortress America.''
International travelers do not just consider the impact of a single
rule, but view all rules and programs in total. They have noted the
increase in visa fees, new visa interview requirements and growing visa
denials. They are also aware of machine-readable passport deadlines,
the future use of biometric identifiers in U.S. visas and Visa Waiver
passports, collection and use of advance passenger information, or API,
along with US-VISIT.
By and large, these new rules and requirements make sense from a
homeland security perspective, and TIA supports these efforts to
enhance national security. But for many prospective international
visitors, wave after wave of new travel requirements paint a ``big
picture'' that the United States is becoming a destination that is too
difficult to enter, too expensive to visit and simply not worth the
effort. In their opinion, the ``welcome mat'' has been pulled. TIA has
heard accounts of how this negative perception has resulted in lost
business. While the Department of Homeland Security cannot respond to
every misperception and rumor, the opportunity exists to set the record
straight on the US-VISIT program and tell international travelers
exactly what the program is and who it affects.
In conclusion, Congress must act in two areas to ensure the
continued success of the US-VISIT program and allow the U.S. to remain
a viable destination for international travelers. Congress must act
immediately to extend the October 26 deadline on biometric passports by
a minimum of one year. Congress also must ensure that the US-VISIT
program has sufficient funds and personnel to meet security and
efficiency objectives. TIA also urges the Department of Homeland
Security to increase outreach and education efforts to the
international traveling public.