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+ - THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND THE FISCAL YEAR 2008 BUDGET
+
+[House Hearing, 110 Congress]
+[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
+
+
+
+ THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND THE FISCAL YEAR 2008 BUDGET
+=======================================================================
+ HEARING
+
+ before the
+
+ COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET
+ HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
+
+ ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
+
+ FIRST SESSION
+
+ __________
+
+ HEARING HELD IN WASHINGTON, DC, MARCH 6, 2007
+
+ __________
+
+ Serial No. 110-12
+
+ __________
+
+ Printed for the use of the Committee on the Budget
+
+
+ Available on the Internet:
+ http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/house/budget/index.html
+
+ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
+
+33-756 PDF WASHINGTON DC: 2007
+---------------------------------------------------------------------
+For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing
+Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866)512-1800
+DC area (202)512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2250 Mail Stop SSOP,
+Washington, DC 20402-0001
+
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+ COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET
+
+ JOHN M. SPRATT, Jr., South Carolina, Chairman
+ROSA L. DeLAURO, Connecticut, PAUL RYAN, Wisconsin,
+CHET EDWARDS, Texas Ranking Minority Member
+JIM COOPER, Tennessee J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina
+THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine JO BONNER, Alabama
+ALLYSON Y. SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania SCOTT GARRETT, New Jersey
+MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio THADDEUS G. McCOTTER, Michigan
+XAVIER BECERRA, California MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida
+LLOYD DOGGETT, Texas JEB HENSARLING, Texas
+EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California
+MARION BERRY, Arkansas MICHAEL K. SIMPSON, Idaho
+ALLEN BOYD, Florida PATRICK T. McHENRY, North Carolina
+JAMES P. McGOVERN, Massachusetts CONNIE MACK, Florida
+BETTY SUTTON, Ohio K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas
+ROBERT E. ANDREWS, New Jersey JOHN CAMPBELL, California
+ROBERT C. ``BOBBY'' SCOTT, Virginia PATRICK J. TIBERI, Ohio
+BOB ETHERIDGE, North Carolina JON C. PORTER, Nevada
+DARLENE HOOLEY, Oregon RODNEY ALEXANDER, Louisiana
+BRIAN BAIRD, Washington ADRIAN SMITH, Nebraska
+DENNIS MOORE, Kansas
+TIMOTHY H. BISHOP, New York
+[Vacancy]
+
+ Professional Staff
+
+ Thomas S. Kahn, Staff Director and Chief Counsel
+ James T. Bates, Minority Chief of Staff
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+ C O N T E N T S
+
+ Page
+Hearing held in Washington, DC, March 6, 2007.................... 1
+Statement of:
+ Hon. John M. Spratt, Jr., Chairman, House Committee on the
+ Budget..................................................... 1
+ Hon. Paul Ryan, a Representative in Congress from the State
+ of Wisconsin............................................... 3
+ Hon. Gordon England, Deputy Secretary of Defense; ADM Edmund
+ P. Giambastiani, Jr., USN, Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of
+ Staff; and Hon. Tina W. Jonas, Under Secretary of Defense--
+ Controller/Chief Financial Officer......................... 6
+Prepared statement of:
+ Hon. Jeb Hensarling, a Representative in Congress from the
+ State of Texas............................................. 5
+ Secretary England, et al..................................... 7
+
+
+ THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND
+ THE FISCAL YEAR 2008 BUDGET
+
+ ----------
+
+
+ TUESDAY, MARCH 6, 2007
+
+ House of Representatives,
+ Committee on the Budget,
+ Washington, DC.
+ The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:05 a.m., in room
+210, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. John Spratt [chairman
+of the committee] presiding.
+ Present: Representatives Spratt, Cooper, Allen, Schwartz,
+Kaptur, Becerra, Doggett, Blumenauer, Boyd, McGovern, Sutton,
+Scott, Etheridge, Hooley, Moore, Bishop, Ryan, Barrett, Bonner,
+Diaz-Balart, Hensarling, Lungren, Mack, Campbell, Tiberi,
+Porter, and Smith.
+ Chairman Spratt. Secretary England, Secretary Jonas and
+Admiral Giambastiani, we are grateful that you have come here
+again to testify about the defense budget. To help us better
+understand the assumptions that underlie, the President's 2008
+discretionary budget provides $643.7 billion for what we call
+``Function 050,'' National Defense. That makes this the largest
+defense budget since the Second World War. Of this amount,
+$501.9 billion is for the so-called ``base defense budget,''
+and $142 billion is for operations associated with Iraq and the
+global war on terrorists. Nearly $623 billion of the total goes
+to the Department of Defense and falls in your domain.
+ The defense budget has been on an upward, ascending
+trajectory over the last 6 years, and the President's budget
+for 2008 continues this trend. With the retirement of the baby
+boomers on the horizon, 77 million of them marching to their
+retirement as we meet today, and the budget pressures that will
+bring to bear on Social Security, Medicare and Medicaid, we
+have to ask ourselves ``is the enlarging, setting and enlarging
+an unprecedentedly large peacetime defense budget
+sustainable?''
+ We are fighting the battle of the budget here on this
+committee, trying to balance the budget over a reasonable
+period of time. We both said 2012. The President has accepted
+that goal as the goal we should all strive to attain, but the
+question is can we accommodate your defense plans within a
+budget that comes to balance in the year 2012.
+ It also appears that we have underestimated various costs
+of the war in which we are now engaged, particularly in Iraq.
+We certainly did not estimate the magnitude of the aftermath,
+what would ensue the active fighting, and the cost there has
+been enormous.
+ In addition, in recent days we have been awakened to the
+fact that there is another cost that we did not fully
+appreciate or accrue, and that is the cost of treating our
+veterans who are coming back with grievous injuries, some of
+which are mental as well as physical.
+ The base defense budget, as we call it--that is, without
+supplementals--is $37 billion above the amount that CBO says is
+needed to maintain current services for 2008 and $237 billion
+above current services for over 5 years. That makes it not just
+the biggest single element in the budget, the discretionary
+budget, by far but also the fastest growing, faster growing
+than even most of the entitlement programs.
+ These increases capture, however, only a portion of the
+total increases to the defense budget since the beginning of
+the Bush administration, total defense spending increase under
+the administration's policies, which include war costs for
+2009, that will exceed the CBO baseline set in January 2001,
+when Mr. Bush took office, by $1.7 trillion. This amount will
+likely increase because the administration includes after 2009
+no funding for our military operations in Iraq or Afghanistan.
+For the first time, the administration has requested funding
+for war operations for the upcoming year along with its base
+budget, and for that I commend you for including that request.
+It has been long overdue.
+ Using supplemental appropriations to fund war operations
+has been problematic for various reasons, but it does require
+the military frequently to divert funds from regular accounts
+to pay for war costs, to borrow from Paul to pay Peter. Until a
+supplemental is enacted and it increases, the practice has many
+effects, one of which is on readiness, which is a concern to
+all of us.
+ The administration's current request for the wars in
+Afghanistan and Iraq, $170 billion for 2007, of which $70
+billion has already been appropriated, $145 billion for 2008,
+are the largest yet and reflect increases of $50 billion and
+$25 billion respectively over the 2006 funding level. We are
+very interested in learning the details that underlie these
+estimates and are hoping to get your assurances that the budget
+is not only providing for the needs of our servicemen and
+servicewomen while they are in harm's way but is also providing
+for the needs of those who have been injured and have returned
+with injuries that are physical and mental.
+ I am also concerned regarding our overall security
+priorities in the budget. Are we actually putting funds toward
+those programs that address the most severe and serious threat
+we face? For example, the President has stated on several
+occasions that our number one security concern is nuclear
+weapons or other weapons of mass destruction in the hands of
+terrorists. If the funding to combat this threat has been
+lacking, the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, for
+instance, which is designed to secure nuclear materials in
+Russia and other states of the former Soviet Union, would help
+ensure that these dangerous materials have not fallen into the
+wrong hands. The one thing they lack is nuclear materials. The
+9/11 Commission recommended that we place the highest priority
+on this, but I am concerned that we have not done it. While
+funds have been plentiful to finance large weapon systems to
+combat traditional, many would say, Cold War threats like
+missile defense, funds have been lacking to combat the more
+likely threat, unconventional, asymmetrical threats posed by
+terrorists. The 2008 budget cuts the Cooperative Threat
+Reduction by $24 million. That is not a lot of money, but it is
+a significant cut in a program that addresses what we would
+commonly concede, I think agree, stipulate, is the largest,
+most serious threat we face, particularly stateside in the
+United States.
+ Secretary England, we look forward to your testimony on the
+budget. We hope you can give us a better understanding of the
+assumptions that underlie it, the assumptions you have used in
+building the budget and the long-term consequences. Before
+turning to you for your statement, though, let me ask Mr. Ryan
+for any statement he has to make.
+ Mr. Ryan. Thank you, Chairman. I, too, want to welcome the
+Secretary and the Admiral to the hearing.
+ In evaluating the President's defense requests, it is
+helpful to look at it in both a financial and a strategic
+context because since the end of the Cold War we have been
+trying to readjust our national defense posture to meet a
+vastly different set of security challenges from those we have
+been accustomed to. It is what the Pentagon likes to call
+``transformation.'' it has been going on since the Berlin Wall
+came down, and it is going on today. The difference is now that
+instead of managing a head-to-head competition between nuclear
+superpowers we have a worldwide war against terrorism in which
+adversaries can strike at any time, anywhere from Baghdad to
+London to New York City, and emerging nuclear threats from
+smaller countries like North Korea and Iran.
+ Our struggles with this transformation are reflected in our
+defense spending patterns of the past few decades, and if you
+could call up chart number 1, please, that would be very
+helpful.
+ Have you got it, Jose?
+
+
+ Well, if you saw chart number 1, what it would be showing
+you is--yes. Can you see it right here? There you go. I thought
+we had this figured out last week.
+ Throughout the 1990s, we financed national defense for
+about $300 billion a year in straight nominal dollars. In fact,
+it was almost flat through the middle part of the decade until
+1999. Then it grew again, and since 9/11, defense spending shot
+up. Okay. There we have chart number 1. So you can sort of see
+the valley and the floor for a while. Under the President's
+request, it would keep rising to just shy of $650 billion this
+next year. Even excluding amounts for direct combat operations,
+base defense spending next year would be nearly one-half a
+trillion dollars even though there was no longer a Soviet Union
+or any other global superpower for us to deal with, but when we
+look at these figures adjusted for inflation the impact becomes
+clear and the picture becomes a little more in focus.
+ Chart number 2, please.
+
+
+ This chart shows total defense spending in constant
+dollars, including war costs in the past and in the present,
+and it reflects how our defense spending in the 1990s actually
+declined sharply in real terms after the collapse of the Soviet
+bloc and a rapid victory in the Persian Gulf War. That trend
+began to change toward the end of the 1990s, and since 9/11, of
+course, defense spending has shot up dramatically, and again,
+our level of defense spending in real terms is even higher than
+it was at the culmination of the Cold War.
+ The point is we enjoyed a peace dividend, but that peace
+dividend was really hollow in the sense that we simply ignored
+the threat that was looming out there. Now we know the threat.
+It is clearly here. We clearly have to deal with it, and we
+believe that--I think most of us believe the first
+responsibility of the Federal Government is to protect the
+country in national security. It is our first responsibility.
+We have a much more dangerous world we are living in today
+where threats come from multiple sources, not just one
+superpower, but with so much money that we are dedicating to
+this primary responsibility of the Federal Government, it is
+all the more incumbent on us to watch how we spend this money.
+ By dedicating so much money and so many increases, which
+clearly have a case to be made for them, we have to watch our
+taxpayer dollars, and this is an area where I think the
+Pentagon has a lot of room for improvement, whether it is IG
+reports, whether it is GAO reports, because this is the most
+important function of the Federal Government, the basic
+responsibility, because you have, no matter how you measure it,
+a need to rise up to the challenge and face these threats.
+While all of these taxpayer dollars--rightfully so--are being
+dedicated to these, we have to be ever more vigilant on how
+these dollars are being spent, and we have to make sure that
+this transformation is complete so that our DOD is structured
+toward the 21st century threats and not still hanging onto
+constituencies within the Pentagon and here in Congress from
+the 20th century.
+ With that, I want to thank the chairman, and I know in one
+hearing we are not going to get all of the answers to our
+questions, but I think we can get a good start on how we are
+going to establish accountability and how we are going to fully
+transform the Pentagon to mirror the 21st century threats we
+have, and I thank the chairman.
+ Chairman Spratt. Secretary England, thank you again for
+coming. We have your written statement. We will make it part of
+the record so that you can summarize it to any extent you like,
+but the floor is yours, and you may proceed. Thank you very
+much for coming.
+ Oh, one thing before you do start. I would like to ask
+unanimous consent that all members who did not have an
+opportunity to make an opening statement be allowed to submit
+an opening statement in writing and enter it into the record at
+this point.
+ [The prepared statement of Mr. Hensarling follows:]
+
+Prepared Statement of Hon. Jeb Hensarling, a Representative in Congress
+ From the State of Texas
+
+ Secretary England, thank you for joining us again today to discuss
+the Department of Defense's priorities for 2008. I look forward to
+working with my colleagues to ensure that our servicemen and women have
+all the resources they need for victory. However, I do wish to raise
+concerns today regarding the Walter Reed Army Medical Center.
+ The Washington Post has detailed, through a series of articles, the
+squalid conditions and neglect that many outpatient servicemen were
+forced to endure in Building 18. I appreciate Secretary Gates' prompt
+response and I am confident that my fellow Texan Pete Geren will serve
+ably as the acting Secretary of the Army. Yet, this kind of situation
+must never be allowed to happen again. What concerns me most are
+reports that suggest that senior Army medical officers knew of these
+conditions as far back as 2003.
+ As Secretary Gates' independent review group moves forward, I hope
+that several important questions are answered. I would like to know why
+the broken outpatient care system at Walter Reed was not reported up
+the chain of command, and if individuals with knowledge of the
+situation that predates recent reports will be held accountable for
+their negligence. I would like to know if the Department of Defense
+plans to investigate other facilities in addition to Walter Reed and
+the National Naval Medical Center to ensure that such a situation never
+happens again. Finally, I would like to know what the Army plans to do
+in the interim to fix outpatient care for those servicemen and women
+that are already in the system. Please address these concerns in
+writing to me as soon as possible.
+ Secretary England, I agree with Calvin Coolidge's maxim, ``The
+nation which forgets its defenders will itself be forgotten.'' We have
+an obligation to make this situation right, and ensure that our
+soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines receive the care they deserve
+when they return home.
+
+ Chairman Spratt. Thank you very much. We look forward to
+your testimony.
+
+STATEMENTS OF HON. GORDON ENGLAND, DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE;
+ ADM EDMUND P. GIAMBASTIANI, JR., USN, VICE CHAIRMAN, JOINT
+ CHIEFS OF STAFF; AND HON. TINA W. JONAS, UNDER SECRETARY OF
+ DEFENSE-CONTROLLER/CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER
+
+ Mr. England. Mr. Chairman, thank you, Mr. Ryan and members
+of the committee.
+ First of all, thanks for the opportunity to be back.
+Hopefully, the last time we were together was helpful to the
+committee, and we are available, frankly, whenever you need us
+for either private discussions or for any hearing, and so we
+are pleased to cooperate with the committee. I do not really
+have an opening statement because this is our second
+appearance, but I will make just a comment or two if I can.
+ You are right. The defense budget has gone up, but it has
+gone up because of threats to our Nation. The Nation, in my
+judgment and, I think, in the judgment of most Americans, faces
+a broader array of security challenges than perhaps ever
+before, as commented here by Mr. Ryan. Just the threat of
+terrorism is obviously a great threat to America. We have been
+attacked right here in Washington, D.C. and, of course, in
+Pennsylvania and in New York. We are still dealing with
+countries like Iran and North Korea with nuclear ambitions and
+their track records of proliferation of support to terrorists,
+and then of course we always have concern about China and
+Russia, and their future paths are not clear, and we do have an
+obligation, obviously, to deter future aggressions. So we do
+have significant investments.
+ Also as pointed out, we did have very, very low investments
+throughout the 1990s. As to the comments made about our Cold
+War equipment, I will tell you we actually do not have a large
+amount of any type of equipment. We do not have many programs
+in production today. A lot of our equipment is aging, not
+getting newer. So, if anything, the U.S. military is aging. It
+is not that we are buying a lot of high tech equipment for
+other purposes, and of course, a lot of our expenditures are
+due to the war itself.
+ Also, another comment. When comparing to the past, I would
+remind the committee we now have an all-volunteer force, so we
+have members and their families, the spouses and children, and
+obviously the all-volunteer force is vastly more expensive than
+the forces we had in the past. That said, it is also vastly
+more capable.
+ So we do have the three requests here before the Congress,
+and that is the 2007 supplemental. It is the GWOT cost in 2008,
+and it is the 2008 budget. Regarding 2008, the last time we
+met, I indicated then that the war costs in 2008--not knowing
+if that is going to be more or less than we have today, we took
+the approach and just set a straight line from 2007, and so the
+baseline for 2008 will likely change either up or down based on
+what is happening on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan, but
+that was the best estimate that we had in terms of our
+expenditures based on the 2007 level going into 2008.
+ So with that, I believe everybody understands the basis of
+what we turned in in terms of these three budget requests.
+ Mr. Chairman, what I would like to do is just myself,
+Admiral Giambastiani and Ms. Tina Jonas, answer any questions
+that we can for the committee.
+ [The prepared statement of Secretary England follows:]
+
+ Prepared Statement of Hon. Gordon England, Deputy Secretary of Defense
+
+ Chairman Spratt, Representative Ryan, Members of the House Budget
+Committee, thank you for the opportunity to meet today to discuss the
+current defense budget requests. We all share a common objective--to
+protect and defend America, and to take care of our men and women in
+uniform and their families.
+ The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Giambastiani
+and the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) Ms. Jonas are here
+with me, and the three of us look forward to your questions.
+ Today, America and our friends and allies face a broader array of
+security challenges than ever before. Terrorists have declared their
+intention to destroy our very way of life. Rogue states like Iran and
+North Korea--with nuclear ambitions and track records of proliferation
+and support to terrorists--pose threats to their neighbors and beyond.
+And major states like China and Russia, whose future paths are not
+clear, continue to pursue sophisticated military modernization
+programs.
+ The defense budget requests before you will provide our joint
+warfighters with what they need to accomplish their mission of
+protecting and defending America--our land, our people and our way of
+life. Specifically, the budget requests support four major areas:
+ Modernizing and recapitalizing joint warfighting
+capabilities;
+ Sustaining the all-volunteer force;
+ Improving the readiness of the force; and
+ America's efforts, together with our partners, in Iraq,
+Afghanistan and elsewhere, in the war on terror.
+ There are three requests for the Department of Defense before the
+Congress: the President's request for Fiscal Year 2008 includes the
+base defense budget request for $481.4 billion; and $141.7 billion to
+fight the Global War on Terror. The FY 2007 Supplemental Appropriation
+Request for the Global War on Terror is for $93.4 billion. The total
+request is $716.5 billion.
+ That is a lot of money by any measure--Secretary Gates has called
+it ``staggering''.
+ To put the size of the request in historical context--in 1945,
+toward the end of WWII, the Department's budget as a percentage of GDP
+was 34.5%. During the Korean conflict, it was 11.7%; in Vietnam--8.9%;
+and in Desert Storm--4.5%. Even during the Reagan build-up in the
+1980's, the defense budget was 6% of GDP. Current defense spending--at
+about 4% of GDP--is the smallest proportion ever spent on defense
+during wartime.
+ The Department understands its fiduciary responsibility to Congress
+and to the American people to spend their money wisely. Part of that
+responsibility is making sure that the defense enterprise itself runs
+as effectively--and efficiently--as possible. So the Department is
+continually updating, adapting, and improving its processes--including
+decision-making, acquisitions, and auditing.
+ A few words about each of the requests before you:
+ The FY07 Supplemental covers the costs of contingency operations--
+primarily Iraq and Afghanistan--until the end of the Fiscal Year. One
+way to think about it is that these are ``emergency'' costs, brought
+about by the current war effort, which the Department would otherwise
+not have had at this time. This request is based on near-time
+information--with high fidelity. Frankly, the request is urgent--if
+these funds are delayed, the Department will have to start re-
+programming, with all the attendant disruptions.
+ The FY08 GWOT request provides funding starting with the new fiscal
+year in October. Actual requirements will depend on events on the
+ground in Iraq and Afghanistan--so the Department has used projections
+based on current monthly war costs to determine the numbers. In Iraq--
+as Secretary Gates has testified--there should be good indications
+about how well the military strategy is working by this summer,
+including how well the Iraqis are keeping their commitments to us.
+ The base budget is what we use to ``man, organize, train and
+equip'' America's armed forces. It is about sustaining the force and
+also investing in future capabilities.
+ As we go forward, it is important not to lose sight of the long-
+term strategic picture while we prosecute the current war. It is
+important both to fund near-term tactical expenses and to invest in
+long-term deterrence--since it is a lot less expensive to deter than to
+fight and defeat. Finding the balance requires hard choices * * * and
+failing to find it means that the Nation could be at risk.
+ The Department's greatest asset is our people. America is blessed
+that in every generation, brave men and women step forward to serve a
+cause higher than themselves. The Department responds by continuing to
+support a high quality of life for our servicemembers. Success in that
+regard is reflected in the Services' ongoing ability to meet recruiting
+and retention goals:
+ All four Services met or exceeded AC recruiting goals
+throughout FY 2006, and continued to do so through Jan 2007.
+ In Jan 2007, four of six components exceeded their RC
+accession goals (except USAR, 99%, and USNR, 93%)
+ In Jan 2007, AC retention remained solid. All but USN met
+their year-to-date missions, and USN expects to meet its goals for the
+full fiscal year.
+ RC attrition remains well within acceptable limits in all
+reserve components.
+ Thank you for your support of our men and women in uniform, their
+civilian counterparts, and their families--for the funding and
+authorities they need to accomplish the mission.
+
+ Chairman Spratt. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.
+ In my opening statement, I referred to the fact that--and I
+think everyone would agree--we underestimated the gravity and
+the cost and the complexity of the aftermath of the war in
+Iraq, and the question I would put to you this morning is there
+is another element of cost that we have underestimated and
+another factor that we have not sufficiently attended to, and
+that is the impact on soldiers and sailors and airmen and
+Marines who have returned to this country, particularly those
+with head injuries, spinal cord injuries, PTSD, and injuries
+like that, some of which are hard to diagnose but are
+nonetheless real medical problems.
+ Do you feel that we may have overlooked that aspect of the
+problem, that dimension of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan,
+and are we adequately providing in our budget request for 2008
+the amount of money needed to make Walter Reed truly the
+premier Army hospital, to have Bethesda provide the same sort
+of care? You have other military hospitals throughout the
+country and our Veterans Administration facilities, which
+should be under purview. Are you satisfied that we have got
+enough money in our budget to deal with that aspect of this
+problem?
+ Mr. England. Mr. Chairman, I would say at this point
+uncertain, frankly. We actually have two kinds of medical
+treatment. We treat over 9 million people in the TRICARE, which
+is the insurance account, and we have about 4.5 million in what
+we call ``primary care'' for military and their families, so
+Walter Reed falls under the latter category. In total in the
+budget, there is about $40 billion, so I would say when we put
+the budget together, you know, our best estimate was, yes, that
+handles all of the care we need. However, based on past events
+here in the past month or in the past few weeks, obviously
+there is some question if we will need to shore up some of
+those accounts, and in fact we are looking right now in the
+2007 supplemental as to possibly moving some of that money
+around just to make some money available in case we need to do
+something to Walter Reed in the near term based on the findings
+of these independent commissions and the work going on at
+Walter Reed.
+ So know that we are committed to do whatever we have to do,
+and if we have to reprogram or move money or, frankly, ask for
+money, we will not hesitate to do that. I would expect that,
+within the monies we have, hopefully we can move money and
+accommodate whatever we would have to do based on whatever the
+findings of the various studies and commissions are at Walter
+Reed.
+ I am looking at the whole medical health program. So I
+would have to say uncertain based on what we have all learned
+here in the last month and weeks.
+ Chairman Spratt. Could you give us an idea of what you
+think may have to be reprogrammed to meet the problem that is
+now emerging?
+ Mr. England. Well, near term--I mean people are going to be
+looking at this to understand, and right now, of course, the
+only thing that has come to light is potentially the outpatient
+care issues at Walter Reed. That is all that has really been
+identified. Now, both the Secretary of Defense and I know the
+services under the President are all putting together study
+groups to look not only at that but at the broader range. Near
+term, I would expect that this is in the tens of millions of
+dollars if we need to address something immediately at Walter
+Reed, and we can accommodate that just by, you know,
+reprogramming our own funding, but if it is beyond that, I mean
+if there is a total redo of some sort in terms of our medical
+capability, then obviously we would have to reexamine that when
+those reports come in, and that is just unknown at this time,
+Mr. Chairman.
+ Chairman Spratt. Let me ask you about the anticipated
+amounts to cover the military operations in Iraq and
+Afghanistan.
+ Thus far, we have appropriated about $503 billion for those
+two engagements plus operations; namely, the North American air
+defense and other aspects of enhanced security stateside. This
+year's budget for 2008 includes a substantial increase, a
+supplemental of $145 billion on top of $170 billion that will
+be provided for 2007--$70 billion already provided, $100
+billion to come when the supplemental for this year is passed.
+That is a rather high level of expenditure in light of the fact
+that in 2009 you anticipate or you insert a plug number of $50
+billion for the cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, North American
+security, and enhanced security for that particular year.
+ Do you think that $50 billion is adequate? In the outyears,
+2010, 2011 and 2012, there is no adjustment at all. Do you
+think that is realistic?
+ Mr. England. Mr. Chairman, I would expect there is some
+cost. Now, here is the dilemma we have in terms of estimating
+cost. In 2008, the GWOT cost--I do not want to call it a
+``supplemental,'' but I guess it is, but the GWOT cost that was
+turned in with the budget, itself, as you rightly indicated, is
+$141.7 billion. Now, to some extent, that is a plug because it
+is an extension of the 2007 number, and of course events are
+changing on the ground as we sit here in both Iraq and
+Afghanistan. So we took an extension of 2007 for 2008, not
+knowing what the circumstance on the ground would be in both
+Iraq and Afghanistan. So, as I indicated, that number will
+certainly change somewhat, either up or down, and in looking
+out into the future--I mean, in the past, the plug was put in
+in past years for $50 billion, even last year with the budget,
+so that has sort of been what we have done each year in the
+past on this. I think it is a number not knowing what the
+results on the ground will be, but they will be refined as we
+know more about it. But I would expect there is going to be
+some activity both in Afghanistan and in Iraq for some period
+of time, so I would not expect that will be zero, but I would
+also expect, as we get closer to that, that we would give some
+realistic estimate.
+ Chairman Spratt. Well, our objective is to balance the
+budget by 2012, but in the years 2010, 2011 and 2012, we do not
+have a number from the Department of Defense for what you think
+is a reasonable ballpark estimate based on most likely
+scenarios about deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan. CBO has
+decided, in doing an outyear forecast over a 5- and 10-year
+period of time, you have got to have something to stick in
+there, to put in those particular slots, that approximates
+reality. There are conventional forecasting calls simply for
+repeating the supplementals, and yet they think maybe $145
+billion--let us hope--is too high a supplemental to repeat
+indefinitely for the foreseeable future. We hope it will taper
+off and come down, and CBO, trying to be realistic, makes that
+assumption, too. They have one particular model for assuming
+the cost of outyear deployments. It is based on a scenario that
+assumes that the number of deployed troops in support of Iraq
+and Afghanistan will gradually drop off from 220,000-225,000
+today to a steady state of about 70,000-75,000 in 2013. If
+future costs continue to be split 85 percent to Iraq, 15
+percent to Afghanistan, the war cost under this scenario,
+according to the CBO, could be $764 billion, which is $514
+billion more than is captured in the President's budget.
+ How does that particular estimate strike you? Is that out
+of the ballpark or is that in the ballpark for what we are
+likely to encounter in those years for which there is either
+not a full number, 2009, or no number at all for the
+supplemental costs in 2010, 2011 and 2012? Is $764 billion for
+that period of time a reasonable estimate for what we are
+likely to incur?
+ Mr. England. Mr. Chairman, I mean I just have no idea. I
+mean they have some set of assumptions. I mean I do not know
+how you would--I do not know how they can possibly end up--I
+mean maybe, as you said, they put a plug number in, but here we
+are trying to project for 2008, and we do not know what the
+number is for 2008. I mean we just projected for 2007, so I do
+not know how you would estimate 2009, 2010 and 2011 at this
+point in time. I guess people can put a plug number in.
+ Chairman Spratt. Well, how does the Defense Department--
+since the advent of program budgeting haven't you done a 6-year
+defense plan or set up a 5 future years defense plan that
+encompasses this year and 5 future years, and in doing that
+don't you have to do scenarios and do takeout costs--takeoffs--
+based on those scenarios?
+ Mr. England. Well, we do, and we typically base it on a
+certain size of the force for our normal operations and
+whatever our procurement budgets are and our normal O&M
+operations, but that is not like being in war, so I mean they
+are all peacetime numbers, basically, that we put in our
+budget. So it is training; we know how many steaming days, how
+many MOs, you know, fuel costs; we know how many people are in
+the military; we know our personnel cost, et cetera.
+ Chairman Spratt. And all of those indices are up and
+trending upward, are they not?
+ Mr. England. The size----
+ Chairman Spratt. Flying time, steaming time, tank miles,
+all of that is trending upward and does not show any signs of
+near-term decline. Surely, you have got----
+ Mr. England. It is up. Yes, sir. It is in our base budget.
+It is up. In addition, there is the straight line projection
+for the war cost in 2008.
+ Chairman Spratt. Well, surely in doing the Future Year
+Defense Plan, you have made some assumptions about the
+deployment of forces. You do not just project these things into
+thin air when you have got a certain reality, and the reality
+is we are heavily engaged in two combat situations right now,
+and we have a global war on terror. That is the main thing.
+Isn't the Defense Department doing certain scenarios and doing
+cost takeoffs from that to be inserted into a realistic
+theater?
+ Mr. England. Mr. Chairman, we have increased the size of
+the force, so you will see the increased size of the force,
+65,000 for the Army and then another 27,000 for the Marine
+Corps. So that growth is included, and that is in our base
+budget, and the normal training, equipment and deploying of
+those forces is all included in the base budget. So the base
+budget is reasonably straightforward in estimating those
+expenditures going forward along with our acquisition and our
+research and development program and our personnel costs. So we
+know that pretty well going forward, but the war costs--I mean
+how much will we be spending in the war, to what level of
+activity we are going to have in the war, how much equipment
+will be lost, I mean that is extraordinarily hard to predict,
+and that has, by the way, been always the discussion about like
+a 2007 supplemental and trying to put things in the base
+budget. The advantage of the supplemental has been to us that
+it is a near term and we can do that with a high degree of
+fidelity. We are looking forward. We are just literally sort of
+guessing the environment. So I think it would be very, very
+hard to go estimate future war costs. Obviously, there are some
+costs there, but in trying to estimate those costs, you just
+have to pick a set of assumptions, and they would merely be
+assumptions that could be either right or wrong, and I am not
+sure how one would go about that with any degree of fidelity.
+ Chairman Spratt. Let me ask you about weapon systems
+procurement. How many systems, if you know, are in the SAR, or
+in the Selected Acquisition Reporting system?
+ Mr. England. I believe it is all of our--pardon me. I
+believe it is all of our major systems. Yes, ACAT-1-D. So our
+major acquisition programs are in the SAR, Mr. Chairman.
+ Chairman Spratt. Do you have a percentage increase for
+these programs, a current program estimated cost as opposed to
+the baseline cost when the program was approved for advanced
+development and production and procurement and went into the
+SAR reporting system?
+ Mr. England. Well, the SAR changes--pardon me.
+ Mr. Chairman, the SAR changes depending on, for example,
+how many units we decide to buy. So those numbers will change
+dramatically as programs mature and you go into production and
+you change both your schedules and your acquisitions.
+ Chairman Spratt. How about on a program unit cost basis?
+ Mr. England. We do----
+ Chairman Spratt. Do you have any estimate of how much the
+SAR system subject to the SAR reporting have increased on a
+program unit cost basis from the date of the initial estimate?
+ Mr. England. Yes, we do know that. We know that on each
+program, and eventually that is what makes up the SAR.
+ Chairman Spratt. Have you got an overall percentage
+increase for those?
+ Mr. England. I guess that is--I mean we can get it. It
+depends on over what period of time, so there is a baseline
+each year established----
+ Chairman Spratt. A baseline to the most recent reporting
+period, which I guess would have been December 31st. I am
+talking about SBIRS, for example--the space-based infrared
+satellite system--which is a replacement for DSP, the increase
+on a program unit basis. There are only a few of those, a
+handful or a dozen or so, if that, 315 percent. The F-22, 188
+percent. Not all of this happened on your watch. I will say,
+for both of those programs, I think their origins were before
+your administration, but what are we doing to rein in, police
+and control the cost growth in these major acquisition systems?
+ Mr. England. Let me first turn it over to the Vice Chairman
+because across the board, Mr. Chairman, there is a lot of
+effort underway in terms of all of our processes, methods in
+DOD because we are aware of the cost increases, some, frankly,
+predicted because quantities change and programs change, some
+just cost growth. So we are doing a lot of process changes, and
+a lot of that falls into the requirements area, and so, if I
+can, let me turn it over to Admiral Giambastiani because that
+is where the requirements are determined.
+ Chairman Spratt. Admiral.
+ Admiral Giambastiani. Mr. Chairman, first of all, I am
+going to speak to you as what is called a Chairman of the Joint
+Requirements Oversight Council. It is a group of which, as I
+said, I am the Chair, and the four Vice Chiefs participate, the
+four Vice Chiefs of the Services. We set and validate military
+requirements for systems.
+ One of our problems in the past--and it continues today--is
+that sometimes we in the military set unrealistic requirements
+which, frankly, cost the taxpayer and cost us programmatically
+more than we should have signed up for. There are a variety of
+reasons for that. Some of them could be, for example, that we
+have technologies out there that we are trying to chase because
+they will give us a tremendous capability difference.
+ So what we have done in this inside the JROC is to look at
+cost drivers across all of these. I do not want to get too
+technical here, but I could give you chapter and verse on this
+in a very long answer, but we have gone after cost drivers. We
+have looked at technology readiness levels. We have looked at
+what can be delivered within cost and schedule limits to
+provide additional capability. Let me give you a couple of real
+world examples of where we have gone back and looked at
+programs where we had a requirements problem.
+ One of them is the Joint Tactical Radio System. When I
+arrived at the Pentagon 18 months ago, we were faced with a
+potential Nunn-McCurdy breach on this program. The cost was
+going to rise from about $3 billion to an estimated $6 billion
+for the whole program. This is a very important program for the
+Department of Defense and for our military forces. It gives us
+a networking capability to network all of our forces. We went
+back and did a requirement scrub. We looked at the program, and
+we actually kept it within its $3 billion cost estimates, and
+we went from 33 separate wave forms that were required down to
+8. Now, what does that mean? We could probably meet 80 percent
+of our requirements with these 8 wave forms, and to get to the
+33 total it would require a substantial amount of money and a
+lot of time, plus the technologies were not available. So we
+have looked at these cost growths. We have looked at risk
+factors, and we have tried to contain them inside the JROC
+side.
+ We also are trying to bring together in all of these
+communities acquisition requirements and resources, all of us
+together in each of these forums so we are not independently
+looking at what a program will do, and Ken Kreig and myself as
+the Cochairman of the Defense Acquisition Board have brought
+this into play with a repeated number of programs that we have
+been reviewing. The Deputy has been very supportive of these
+efforts, and we have been able to rein in a number of other
+programs, a weather satellite program where we had considerable
+growth, and we changed the requirements as opposed to holding
+them steadfast that it was the Holy Grail we had to chase.
+ So what I wanted to let you know is that we have been
+working very hard here over the last 18 months, since the
+Deputy and I have been in office, to make sure that we can
+constrain cost growth on these programs and get to the problem
+early.
+ One last comment I would give you on the JROC. There are
+congressional requirements for Nunn-McCurdy breaches on all
+programs that I have already spoken to. We have instituted in
+the JROC a requirement for the services and agencies who are
+building programs to come to the JROC if there is a 10 percent
+cost increase and talk to us about requirements before it is
+too late in the process to make a difference in what we are
+buying and what we are building.
+ Mr. England. Mr. Chairman, if I can add also, there has
+been, I believe, like 120 studies in terms of how to improve
+acquisition in the Department of Defense, and there have been
+two of them on my watch, frankly, and our conclusion, having
+gone through literally one of them, was to go through the prior
+120 and pull out all of the issues and make sure we understand
+them.
+ Our conclusion is that it is primarily a process issue in
+the Department of Defense. That is, we do actually get to
+control this either by how we set the requirements or how we do
+the acquisition or how we deal with our supplier base. So we
+have major efforts, and we just turned in a report to the
+Congress. We have major efforts in the Department of Defense in
+terms of how do we improve our processes within the Department
+of Defense to get a better return on our investment in our
+acquisition area.
+ That said, I will tell you that it is very difficult.
+Everything we deal with is pretty much advance technology, and
+therefore, I mean it is a hard environment for us, but we can
+do better and we are working to do better in this regard.
+ Chairman Spratt. Just two final questions because I am
+taking up all this time with these things that I think are
+necessary for us to cover. Both are with respect to additional
+costs. One is the recent decision to surge the troop level in
+Baghdad and to conduct intense urban operations within the City
+of Baghdad, which requires 21,500 combat troops. CBO has said
+that that 21,000 does not include a full complement of support
+and logistical backup support troops.
+ Number one, is that correct? Number two, what is the
+overall cost of this latest strategy, this surge strategy,
+including the complement necessary to provide adequate support?
+ Mr. England. Mr. Chairman, the CBO estimate, I believe, was
+like 35,000 troops or something like that above the 21,000. It
+was an extraordinarily large number. We did not agree with that
+number. When the Chairman testified for the 21,000--when the
+Chairman and the Secretary of Defense testified for the 21,500,
+they said that it was 21,500, but it could be 10 or 15 percent
+higher in terms of added support troops, and that is likely the
+case. I mean our estimate is we will be above the 21,500 by
+about 10 or 15 percent. Now, also, there are requests in the
+field--I mean the war is a dynamic. It is not something you can
+estimate everything every day going into the future, so the
+commanders on the ground always have different requests coming
+into the Department of Defense, and we do have some requests
+from the commanders in the field--General Petraeus--but those
+numbers are still relatively low. I think the maximum of his
+request, not all validated, is still less than about 7,000
+troops. So, at this point, our expectation is the number of
+support troops could go above 21,500 by about 4,000, maybe as
+many as 7,000 if the commanders on the ground request and they
+are all validated, but it will be much lower, in our judgment,
+than what the CBO estimate is. So, while there will be some
+variation----
+ Chairman Spratt. Can you give us an idea of costs with the
+support troops included?
+ Mr. England. Yes. If you add those troops and you add
+whatever else we know is being asked for at this time--I will
+say validated at this point--it is somewhere over $1 billion.
+ Chairman Spratt. That is between now and September 30th?
+ Mr. England. Yes, between now and September 30th, and that
+is the only--and by the way, the only costing for the plus-up
+for the 21,500 is until October 1. In other words, there is no
+funding in the 2008 budget. We did not fund anything. The
+Secretary of Defense's view is that we will know shortly, and
+certainly by this summer we will have a very good idea of how
+the plus-up plan is working in Iraq, and therefore we have not
+funded anything in the 2008 budget for that plus-up, so----
+ Chairman Spratt. Now, the General was quoted in the
+Washington Post on February 16 as saying that the increase of
+17,500 Army combat troops is only the tip of an iceberg and
+will potentially require thousands of additional support troops
+and trainers. Is he misquoted there?
+ Mr. England. I am not sure what the 17,500 number is, and I
+do not know what the General was referring to. I know that if
+you look at all of the requests we have in the Department of
+Defense, the total requests at this point is 4,000 to 5,000.
+There is one other request for some aviation assets, but they
+have not been validated by the Joint Chiefs. So of everything
+that I know that has been requested, the number in terms of
+support troops is about 7,000, but those that have been
+validated total about 4,000 troops, and that is a little over
+$1 billion, but our expectation is we would not ask for new
+money. I mean, for the purposes of the budget, we would just
+reallocate to cover those funds.
+ Chairman Spratt. One final question.
+ Admiral Giambastiani. Mr. Chairman, if I could, I would
+like to add that I think the Deputy Secretary has accurately
+described the requests that are currently outstanding.
+ Chairman Spratt. One final question.
+ As to the replacement, repair, refurbishment of equipment
+that has been badly damaged, worn out or otherwise abandoned
+and destroyed in the battle theater, these costs are fairly
+substantial. Could you give us just some ballpark notion of
+what the reset expense is going to be this year and next year
+and into the foreseeable future?
+ Mr. England. Do you have the specific numbers?
+ Ms. Jonas. Yes.
+ Mr. Chairman, we have in the supplemental--in the 2007
+supplemental, we have included $13.9 billion. That would bring
+the total, given what was provided in the Title IX funds to
+2007, to $37.6 billion, and we have an equal amount requested
+in the 2008 GWOT request.
+ Chairman Spratt. $13 billion? $14 billion?
+ Ms. Jonas. $37.6 billion for the entire year of 2008, and
+for 2007, the amount pending before the Congress right now in
+the supplemental is $13.9 billion. If you add that to what has
+already been appropriated for 2007, you come up with $37.6
+billion.
+ Chairman Spratt. And that amount has been requested for
+2008 as well then?
+ Ms. Jonas. Yes, sir. Uh-huh.
+ Chairman Spratt. And is part of it in the supplemental? Is
+all of it in the supplemental?
+ Ms. Jonas. The $13.9 billion is requested in the
+supplemental. For 2008, we have got an OA GWOT request that
+covers 12 months.
+ Chairman Spratt. So some of it is in the supplemental, and
+some of it is in the base budget.
+ Ms. Jonas. Correct, sir.
+ Chairman Spratt. Going forward, what is the likely expense
+there? I will say that the Commandant of the Marine Corps and
+the Chief of Staff of the Army told the Armed Services
+Committee that if we stop tomorrow you will still have probably
+3 years, maybe 4 of expenses at this relative range to catch up
+with all of the equipment problems.
+ Mr. England. Okay. I believe we have said--I am surprised
+at the 3 or 4 years. The discussions that I have had in our
+planning is, once the war ends, there are 2 years, and those 2
+years are in the order of $15 billion to $20 billion a year, so
+maybe that is 3 or 4 years, but I would expect a residual
+amount is probably about right, Mr. Chairman. So it is probably
+$30 billion, maybe $40 billion, again depending on the war
+itself, but there will be a residual cost once the war ends of
+all of the equipment still in country to come back and be
+refurbished and reset.
+ Chairman Spratt. Okay. Thank you very much.
+ Mr. Ryan.
+ Mr. Ryan. I want to ask a couple of questions about the
+supplemental request.
+ You have two F-35 Joint Strike Fighters in your
+supplemental request; is that correct, Mr. Secretary?
+ Mr. England. Yes, but frankly, Mr. Ryan, we are
+reconsidering that. I mean we had some feedback from this
+committee and from other committees, so we are looking at that,
+and as I said before, there are some other requests we have.
+For example, I just mentioned this over $1 billion for, you
+know, the support. So we are looking now at perhaps
+restructuring that because it is a valid point. I mean they do
+not show up in time to affect a war.
+ Mr. Ryan. That is why I was going to ask the question. When
+are they even going to be ready?
+ Mr. England. Well, they are ready in about 2010.
+ Mr. Ryan. 2010?
+ Mr. England. But nonetheless--I mean there are lower
+priorities and other things, so we would defer those, but I do
+want to comment that there is a principle that is very
+important here, and that is, as we lose equipment and we are
+not buying the old models, we do need to recover the cost of
+the equipment lost, and our practice today is to buy whatever
+is in production. In the case of the airplanes----
+ Mr. Ryan. The F-16s are still in production, are they not?
+ Mr. England. But not an Air Force version, so you have to
+go back because we are not buying F-16s for U.S. Military
+today. They are all international sales, so you would have to
+go back and build a unique model for literally one or two
+airplanes, which would not be reasonable. So we try to cover
+what I call either the ``loss'' or the ``accelerated
+depreciation cost,'' recover the cost so we can reinvest it.
+ Now, if we do not do that, it is true it will not affect us
+this year or next year, but at some point in the future, we
+will be short equipment, and we will have another problem in
+terms of our asset base. So there is a principle that is
+important, but we can reallocate and reprioritize, and we are
+working to do that right now. So I expect because of other
+pressing needs we will move those to the bottom of the priority
+list, and we will put other needs in place of them.
+ Mr. Ryan. Yes, I would encourage you to do that. I
+understand the principle. It is a logical principle, but it is
+obviously not something that you are going to get into the
+production and what we would consider as crossing the threshold
+as being relevant in the supplemental.
+ You also had five C-130s in the supplemental request. Have
+we lost any C-130s? Have we lost any C-130s in the last year?
+ Mr. England. I believe we have lost, but we have also been
+using them at a much higher rate. So, again, this is the
+accelerated depreciation. However, this falls in the same
+category. Basically, other than the helicopters and UAVs, all
+of the fixed-wing airplanes we are now looking to move out and
+reprioritize what is going to be new in the 2007 supplemental.
+ Mr. Ryan. I would encourage you to do that because we are
+looking at what should really be on the base side of the budget
+and what ought to be in the supplemental to really measure the
+war costs, and maybe our line of definition is a little
+different than yours, but I would hope we err on the side of,
+if it looks like it ought to be in the base, it ought to stay
+in the base and not in the supplemental.
+ Mr. England. But help me here, Mr. Ryan, because what
+happens is, when we go to war, I mean we fly those C-130s maybe
+10 times the hours that we would in peacetime. So, at the end
+of the war, we have a whole lot of C-130s that are now near the
+end of life that need to be replaced because of the war, so
+they really are war costs, and again, they are costs that need
+to be recapitalized at some point, so----
+ Mr. Ryan. I understand that, and I know with BRAC you have
+got more coming in. Heck, you have got a bunch coming from
+Milwaukee, you know, in the hope that you are going to use them
+that are from the 1980s. You know, we flew on 1963 vintage C-
+130s 10 days ago in Baghdad, so we know you are using old
+stuff, but the point is that that is something, from my
+perspective, that is really base spending. If a Humvee or a
+Stryker gets, you know, hit by an IED, that has got to be
+replaced in the supplemental. That is totally legitimate. If a
+1963 C-130 is getting worn down because it is flying more, you
+know, I would think that that is something that you could
+better prepare for in the base than in an emergency
+supplemental, and knowing that you have more C-130s coming into
+your pipeline because of the way the BRAC is working, I would
+just encourage you to take a look at maybe pushing some of that
+stuff back into the base budget. Especially if we are going to
+come up with more money for the surge, hopefully that can be
+offset with some of these other things that you have in the
+supplemental.
+ I just simply want to put that out there for you because it
+is much easier to pass a supplemental here in the House if it
+is really truly supplemental, if it is truly emergency spending
+for the war and not perceived as base spending irrespective of
+a very legitimate principle you just articulated, but I just
+wonder sometimes.
+ I wanted to go on to one more thing because I want to stick
+to 5 because I know a lot of guys here have to ask questions
+and women as well. I did not mean it in that way there. Walter
+Reed.
+ Chairman Spratt. Do you want to restate that?
+ Mr. Ryan. Yes.
+ A lot of members--excuse me. I saw Betty over there. A lot
+of members have questions.
+ Walter Reed. Look, this is on the top of everybody's minds.
+We have seen the appalling cases on television. I think just
+about every one of us has probably gone up there ourselves. You
+know, I go to the Malone House and the hospital, and we have
+seen good quality care, and we have gotten reports from
+constituents, but we have also seen just these appalling
+reports.
+ Please tell us what exactly is being done now, and where
+are you on all of this? We have seen a lot of changes in the
+last week. Where are we?
+ Mr. England. Mr. Ryan, I will tell you. I mean, obviously,
+the simple things, cleaning up rooms and fixing rooms and all
+that, that is straightforward. It probably has been done. The
+question is really more fundamental than that, and that is
+specifically how do we deal with outpatients, and are we doing
+that adequately. I think the conclusion is--and it is obvious
+we are not doing that adequately. I mean it is unacceptable.
+The Secretary said that. You know how the Secretary feels about
+holding people accountable. So that is unacceptable and will be
+fixed, and both the Secretary, as I commented, and the
+President and within the services all have independent teams
+now looking at this, so whatever issues they uncover, I mean,
+we will fix. We will fund. We will fix because it is
+unacceptable. We want the absolute best care for our men and
+women who serve and their families. So I mean there is work to
+be done in this regard to find out, you know, exactly how deep
+this problem goes, but however deep it goes it will be fixed. I
+mean there is no question about that. We will do whatever is
+required and are committed to do it from the President down
+into the Department, into the services themselves. So we will
+do whatever is necessary and take those steps and do it
+quickly.
+ Mr. Ryan. Well, I have got several other questions, but I
+am going to yield just in the interest of time to let the other
+members ask. Thank you.
+ Chairman Spratt. Mr. Cooper.
+ Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
+ Mr. Secretary, I was glad to hear you just say that you and
+the Pentagon will do whatever is required to fix the problem.
+My guess is that is going to require you to reverse some of
+your prior testimony today because what we heard at Walter Reed
+yesterday was that due to the Base Closing Initiative Walter
+Reed is about to be shut down, even the fine hospital, the
+inpatient facility, that no one has questioned the care of, and
+that patients will be transferred to a larger, new facility
+somewhere on the Bethesda Naval Hospital campus, and that all
+sounds fine in theory, although General Kiley said that he had
+recommended against the closure. He warned us it would cost
+billions of dollars; he did not know where the money was going
+to come from, and I hate to think that we are going to be
+asking veterans to sacrifice a known and excellent facility in
+favor of something that is unknown, unbuilt and, as far as we
+know, unfunded.
+ The disconnect is this. You told Mr. Spratt, our chairman,
+that the Pentagon and the administration still refuse to
+estimate war budgets in the outyears. You are fine estimating a
+base budget, but you want to be precise and you do not know
+what wars will cost. So even though we are 5 or 6 years into
+this one, you refuse to plan for the outyears.
+ Well, how are we going to be planning for a new veterans
+hospital for the casualties of war 2, 4, 6, 8, 10 years hence
+unless you have some estimate of the casualty flow and their
+needs? Because an elaborate amount of planning is involved, and
+if the Defense Department refuses to plan and disclose those
+numbers to us, then you force agencies like the Congressional
+Budget Office and others to come up with their own estimates,
+and they are not the Pentagon--you presumably know better than
+we do--and in order to make sure that our veterans are cared
+for, that our troops are cared for, we have to have some sort
+of outyear estimates of war costs, and yet judging from the
+President's budget, a couple years from now everything is over
+and there is no more war even though the President himself has
+called this the long war.
+ You know, I think our job is to come up with a 5-year
+budget, and we are not even being supplied with 5-year war
+numbers by the Pentagon. So we have to solve this disconnect if
+only for the sake of the troops.
+ Mr. England. A comment first about the BRAC.
+ Mr. Cooper, the BRAC money is in the budget, and the plan,
+which had basically all of the support, I believe, in the
+Pentagon, was the military was to build a new hospital at
+Bethesda, which is very nearby, but of course--you know, I mean
+Walter Reed is an old building. So the objective was to build
+another facility attached, to refurbish and rebuild a lot of
+new physical plants at Bethesda, and at Bethesda we also have
+the medical school where all of our doctors train, and NIH is
+right across the street where they spend tens of billions of
+dollars in medical research. The whole objective was to have a
+world class, one world class facility for all of our men and
+women who need medical care. So rather than have two
+facilities, each one partially used and spread out, it is to
+have one world class facility in terms of medical research and
+tie it in with NIH and everything we could.
+ So that was the objective, and the plan is that that would
+be transitioned in 2011, so we would actually start building
+the facility, you know, as part of this planning process. I
+mean it all has to be finished by 2011 in BRAC, but the funding
+is in there to do that, and so all of that planning is in
+place, and that is how we would proceed, and I understand
+people are going to take a look at that again, but the
+rationale I think, at the time at least, was sound.
+ Mr. Cooper. What is the casualty flow estimate for 2009,
+2010, 2011, and 2012?
+ Walter Reed today is currently overcrowded. It is not a
+half-empty facility. We need to know what the Pentagon's plan
+is for the long war, and you should share that with this
+committee and the American people. What is the casualty flow in
+those outyears that you are expecting to be able to serve at
+these hospitals?
+ Mr. England. Okay. I do not have that, but I will give you
+that, which is the basis of the new facility that would be
+built at the Bethesda location. Where we now have the Bethesda
+Naval Hospital, that would be the National Walter Reed. It
+would be the Walter Reed National Military Hospital. Again, I
+will get you the specifics, but a lot of work went into that
+for at least a year's work to prepare for that and to make sure
+that we had, you know, the right approach. But again, I mean,
+based on recent events, all of that will be looked at again,
+but it was a sound basis in terms of those decisions.
+ [The information follows:]
+
+ The planning to satisfy the base realignment and closure
+requirement to build new medical facilities in the national capital
+region included an analysis of potential requirements for bed capacity,
+using historical numbers, an understanding of the capacity of the
+Military Health System in total, and a surge capacity factor. These
+determinations show that the proposed Walter Reed National Medical
+Center at Bethesda and the new facility at Fort Belvoir will meet the
+requirements for the patient population in the national capital region.
+ From a planning perspective, we do not project casualty flow data
+in the fashion implied by the question. Instead, we use Service-
+provided casualty rates to generate future medical planning
+requirements within operational scenarios. Wartime medical force
+capabilities are determined using the Medical Analysis Tool and
+compared to the current force structure to identify capability
+requirements.
+ Force size, time, scenario, posture, medical threat, and medical
+planning factors are entered into the casualty generator model
+(currently the Joint Integrated Casualty Model) which produces
+population at risk, time, unit locations, and casualty (battle and non-
+battle) data that is then provided to the Assistant Secretary for
+Health Affairs for use. Alternatively, output from the Analytic Agenda
+can be provided for studies focused more in the near term. The Services
+then validate the analytical results/models.
+
+ Mr. Cooper. I see that my time has expired, Mr. Chairman.
+ Chairman Spratt. Thank you, Mr. Cooper.
+ Mr. Barrett.
+ Mr. Barrett. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
+ Secretaries and Admiral, thank you for being here today.
+Let us change the subject just a little bit.
+ I know in the current budget there is an increase of troop
+strength by about 92,000, Mr. Secretary. I have had some
+concerns over the years of whether we had enough active duty
+soldiers, sailors, airmen. We are relying more and more on the
+National Guard and Army Reserve and all of our reservists.
+ Is this number, the 92,000, enough? I know there is news
+about the possibility of funding another Stryker Division in
+the National Guard. Can you comment on both of these two areas?
+ Mr. England. Well, I mean, again, Mr. Barrett, I guess
+events will dictate if it is enough, but based on the
+projection today in terms of brigade combat teams and based on
+the best estimate of our combatant commanders and what they
+foresee for the future, the 92,000 appears to be the right
+number. I mean that is how we got to that number. There are
+also some increases, also small, for the National Guard and the
+Reserves--the Army, National Guard and Reserves. I do not see
+that we have a problem, frankly, neither with the Air Force or
+Navy. The Navy has actually come down in manpower. The Air
+Force is planning to come down in manpower, and of course the
+Air Force Reserve--or Guard, I guess. It is Guard--is an
+integral part of the service itself. I mean they fly regularly
+as part of the Air Force itself.
+ So I will be happy to open this up to the Admiral because,
+again, it really is a military decision in terms of sizing, but
+all of the work last year led to that. We had various options
+in terms of sizing. We finally ended up with the 92,000 total
+growth, the Army and Marine Corps combined.
+ Admiral Giambastiani. From the overall numbers, as the
+Deputy has stated and as you have mentioned, it is 82,065 for
+the Army over a period of about 5 years, 27,000 for the U.S.
+Marine Corps over a period of about 5 years, but what also
+exists inside this is an increase in our Special Operations
+Forces. For example, the President's budget for 2008 has about
+5,800 within that 92,000 that will be an increase in Special
+Forces, and with the type of conflict we are seeing today and
+that we could project out into the future, growth in Special
+Forces/irregular warfare is very important.
+ So what I would say to you is these are our best estimates.
+I think both the Commandant of the Marine Corps and the Chief
+of Staff of the Army are comfortable with this. Both the
+chairman and I are comfortable that this is about right and
+that, within that number, having some of these specialty units
+created is very important. So there is movement not only on the
+top line but on what is inside it.
+ Mr. Barrett. Okay. Let us hold on the Stryker question. Let
+us get to a program that is important to South Carolina and to
+the Nation, the MOX Program, which is taking some of this
+weapons grade plutonium and taking it off the market and
+turning it into fuel and mobilizing it.
+ Where are we, Mr. Secretary? I know that we have pushed it
+from the South Carolina delegation, the Georgia delegation. We
+are getting some pushback in the House. Do you have any idea
+whether the Department of Defense is involved in working with
+this MOX Program at all?
+ Mr. England. Mr. Barrett, it does not sound familiar. It
+just does not ring a bell with me, so I will have to look into
+it. Maybe it is an energy program. I am just not sure. So I
+will have to answer back to you. I am just not knowledgeable of
+the program, sir.
+ Mr. Barrett. Okay. I know it is primarily done by the DOE,
+but there has been some involvement with the Department of
+Defense, and if we could get some push from you guys on this
+program, that would be fantastic. If you could get back with me
+on that, that would be great.
+ Mr. England. We will get back with you.
+ [The information follows:]
+
+ The Mixed-Oxide (MOX) program is a Department of Energy program,
+but the Department of Defense maintains an active interest in the
+strategic material reserve, which includes weapons grade plutonium, the
+feedstock for the MOX program. DOD and DOE work together via the
+Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC) to assure interagency agreement on the
+sustainment and disposition of the reserve. Material that is in excess
+of the strategic reserve can be jointly released and would be available
+for the MOX program.
+
+ Mr. Barrett. Okay. One last, quick question. I do not have
+a lot of time.
+ Equipment. I know we are chewing it up left and right. Some
+of it is being destroyed. Some of it is just getting flat worn
+out. Are we keeping up with the equipment replacement, making
+sure that what we have got is up and running and all of that
+good stuff?
+ Mr. England. We are now, although I have to tell you, Mr.
+Barrett, that we fell behind because we did not have any
+substantial money in the supplemental for the reset until the
+2005 budget. So we were fighting the war, and we did not have
+significant funds, maybe $5 million or so, and then we started
+putting substantial funds in in 2005. So, at that point, the
+result was we ended up with damaged equipment sitting at the
+depot doors but not enough money to put them through the
+depots. Now, since then, frankly, we have asked for--and the
+Congress has been very supportive, and as Tina said, I believe
+that total now is--what?--$63 billion, Tina, total?
+ Ms. Jonas. Yes. We have invested $63 billion so far in
+addition to what we are requesting now.
+ Mr. England. So now a lot of money has flowed, and so the
+equipment is now in the system and flowing out. That has left
+some shortages while it flows out the back end of the depots in
+terms of the refurbishment, but I believe the funding is in
+place now. You know, the organization is in place. It is just a
+question of pushing that equipment through the depots.
+ Mr. Barrett. Fantastic.
+ Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
+ Chairman Spratt. Thank you, Mr. Barrett.
+ Mr. Becerra is not here.
+ Mr. Doggett.
+ Mr. Doggett. Thank you for your testimony.
+ While the number of American troops in Iraq today is about
+139,000 and escalating, the number of troops from other
+countries, I believe, is about 14,000 and shrinking. The
+British have, of course, announced that they are beginning a
+phased withdrawal.
+ What is the best estimate that you have of the number of
+troops from other countries that will be deployed in Iraq at
+the end of this year?
+ Admiral Giambastiani. If I could, Congressman, I would just
+say that that number that you are quoting is fairly accurate.
+However, the trend actually is now going to go back up. We see
+this go up and down. It has been going down for a period of
+time in small numbers, but the Georgia government has decided
+to--this is not the State of Georgia but Georgia, the country.
+It has decided to put a brigade combat team into Iraq, so this
+will be--I do not know exactly the size of their brigade, but
+it is probably somewhere between 3,000 and 4,000 people, and
+that will be a big addition, if you will, to come into Iraq.
+There are some other countries that we typically do not talk
+about--they have asked us not to talk about them publicly--that
+contribute to this operation, and I would say that those
+numbers are not counted for. They are small, but they are in
+there.
+ Mr. Doggett. So what is the best estimate of the number of
+troops from other countries that will be there at your end?
+ Admiral Giambastiani. I will have to give you the best
+record. I looked at--the number you quoted is about accurate.
+If we take a snapshot today, I can give you, in a classified
+setting, where we think we are going to go here, at least in
+the short term, in the next few months.
+ There is no unclassified information about----
+ Admiral Giambastiani. There is some classified information.
+I can provide you that also.
+ Mr. Doggett. Okay. Can you just give me the best estimate,
+unclassified, of what the number will be at the end of the
+year?
+ Admiral Giambastiani. I don't have it here. I will get it
+for the record for you.
+ Mr. Doggett. Okay. Well, if you are going to submit it
+hereafter then, would you do it for the end of the year and for
+the end of the fiscal year, September 30 of next year?
+ Admiral Giambastiani. If I could, because each of these
+governments has their own Parliaments, their own Congress.
+ Mr. Doggett. I am not even asking you to identify by
+country.
+ Admiral Giambastiani. We will get you the best estimate we
+can by the end of the year.
+ Mr. Doggett. And for the end of the fiscal year as well,
+two numbers.
+ Admiral Giambastiani. Yes, sir.
+ [The information follows:]
+
+ [DELETED]
+
+ Mr. Doggett. But over the short term, you are able to say
+that you think that the country of Georgia will basically
+substitute for the reduction the British are making?
+ Admiral Giambastiani. I wouldn't say they did it as a
+result of what the British are doing. They have decided to
+bring a brigade forward, and the British are taking down about
+1,600 of 7,000-plus. As you know, they are going to move 1,400
+or 1,500 of them to Afghanistan, and they have announced that
+publicly, and the Georgia Government will about double, I would
+estimate right now, based on the size of the brigade, about
+double what the British have taken down.
+ Mr. Doggett. There are reports in several papers today that
+the Department plans to ask for another supplemental. Do I
+gather that that is inaccurate and that you will simply
+reprogram moneys to pay for these support troops for other
+purposes?
+ Mr. England. Yes, sir, that is our best estimate.
+ Mr. Doggett. Your best estimate is that we have seen the
+last supplemental for Iraq for this year?
+ Mr. England. That is my best estimate. Yes, sir.
+ Mr. Doggett. And you mentioned the fact that there is no
+money programmed for the escalation next year and said that was
+because the Secretary has said that you will know by this
+summer if this escalation plan is working.
+ Mr. England. That is correct, sir.
+ Mr. Doggett. And is there already underway a plan for what
+to do if it does not? I know there are no failures in Iraq, but
+if it has to have some adjustment, is there an adjustment plan
+already underway?
+ Mr. England. Could you repeat the question for the admiral?
+ Mr. Doggett. Yes, sir. You say you will know if it works by
+the middle of the summer--or by the summer, to be more precise.
+Do you have underway a plan in case it does not meet your
+expectations?
+ Mr. England. Sir, let me answer first and then you can fill
+in if you can. Sir, I will tell you the plan at the Department
+of Defense is to execute this and execute it to a satisfactory
+conclusion, which is why we have no money going forward because
+our expectation is it will work.
+ Now the question is: Is there an alternative? There is none
+I know of, but let me ask Admiral Giambastiani if he knows of
+any other approach.
+ Admiral Giambastiani. What I will tell you is that a
+commander always has a plan. They put together what we call
+branches and sequels. These are alternate routes if something
+happens, which way do you move? When conditions change, you
+move in a different direction to respond to those types of
+conditions, and I expect that General Petraeus and his staff
+are doing those types of things right now.
+ Mr. Doggett. Have you found the plan--is there any plan
+that would cost out withdrawal of troops, such as Mr. Allen
+asked you about at the last hearing? He asked for you to come
+back and tell us about what the cost of withdrawal of troops
+would be.
+ Mr. England. There is no effort underway to do that,
+Congressman. There is no effort underway to plan for a
+withdrawal from Iraq. We have no such effort underway in the
+Department of Defense.
+ Mr. Doggett. So you don't expect to be able to fulfill his
+request?
+ Mr. England. I don't expect to be able to fulfill his
+request.
+ Mr. Doggett. Thank you.
+ Chairman Spratt. Mr. Lungren, I believe.
+ Mr. Lungren. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Maybe I am
+the only one here who thinks that the amount of money we are
+spending on our national defense is insufficient for the
+requirements of the threat that is out there. But I recall
+being here in the last 2 years of the Carter administration
+when we reached, I think, the lowest point in GDP spending for
+national defense in modern history at that time, and we were
+required to do the Reagan buildup. And yet I look at the
+numbers I have got before me, and we are far below where we
+were during the Carter administration before we began the
+buildup at 4 percent GDP.
+ When the figures I have in your statement, Mr. Secretary,
+are that we are spending about 4 percent GDP, does that include
+the supplemental request?
+ Mr. England. Yes, sir, it does.
+ Mr. Lungren. One of my concerns is the maintenance of an
+all-volunteer force, which in some ways has to sustain itself
+by allowing for our consideration of our greatest asset, as you
+say, Mr. Secretary, our people. In order for us to keep our
+recruiting and our retention goals, it seems to me we not only
+must equip them with the best equipment and you spend a lot of
+time talking about the technology side of things, which I
+think, frankly, gives us the edge, but do we spend as much
+attention in preparing the budget for our people? And what I
+mean by that is how can we possibly allow something to happen
+as we have seen at Walter Reed?
+ I watched the testimony yesterday, and I saw two Army
+generals take responsibility, and I appreciate them taking
+responsibility. But it is after the fact. It is like when I
+used to convict guys and send them to prison, and they found
+God after they were facing prison. And I believe in conversion,
+but I would have rather had them find God before they were
+facing a jail cell.
+ Does this budget have as much concern for the health and
+welfare of our troops as it does for technology? I mean, do you
+plan as much for that, for modernization and recapitalization
+of our warfighting capability? I am really--I am just at a
+loss. I have been out there talking to my constituents about
+how we would never, ever let our troops down. And I have been
+out there to Walter Reed, and I guess I was shown the good side
+of Walter Reed. But I, for the life of me, don't know how I can
+answer that question when I go home and have my next town hall
+meeting. Because you have come here and you have talked about
+how we do war planning, how we do budgeteering, how we go
+forward, and I believe all that. DOD has the most impressive
+mechanism for budget going forward of any of the agencies and
+departments of government that I have seen, absolutely.
+ So how can we have this fall through the cracks with our
+troops? And I don't think we can wait 5 months. I mean, I have
+heard we are going to have a commission, and I understand
+Senator Dole and Donna Shalala are going to be the two cochairs
+of that commission, but I can't go home to my constituents and
+say, in 5 months we will have the answers for you.
+ What are the answers now? And what can we do now? And if we
+can reprogram money for these other things, why can't we
+reprogram money in the budget right now to fix the problem, so
+that if I have a constituent call me and say, I am getting the
+runaround, and they are talking about paperwork, and I can't go
+to this Army hospital, how can I tell them that within 6 weeks
+or within a month we are going to see real change? What do I
+say?
+ And I address that both to you, Admiral, and Mr. Secretary.
+ Mr. England. We are going to do everything we know to do.
+So every single thing identified will be fixed immediately.
+Everything. We are putting money, we are moving money right now
+in the supplemental to have money available to handle whatever
+may have to be done at Walter Reed near term. So we are doing
+that. We are physically right now working that issue, and
+reprioritizing within the budget so we will immediately have
+money available to deal with any issues at Walter Reed. So we
+won't wait.
+ My only comment was, depending on what they find in terms
+of longer-term funding, we may need to make changes, obviously,
+depending on the extent of the findings. But in the meantime,
+anything that is found will be fixed. I would say that you are
+embarrassed, as is everyone else in DOD----
+ Mr. Lungren. I am not worried about being embarrassed. I am
+worried about these guys who are out there, the men and women
+who we have promised and now it looks like we have failed. I
+just want to find out from you, and I would like to find out
+from the admiral how much time the Joint Chiefs of Staff spend
+on worrying about this issue.
+ Because I mean, another question I would have, even though
+my time is up, is why do I hear from veterans and why do I hear
+from folks who say Bethesda is far superior to Walter Reed? And
+I have heard that for years and I basically thought it was just
+Navy guys talking over Army guys, but now it looks like it is
+true.
+ So, Admiral, how much time do the Joint Chiefs of Staff
+spend looking at this? And this is a priority. And what can we
+say to our constituents is going to be done within the next
+couple weeks--not with a commission, God bless the commission--
+but I have been around here long enough to know what
+commissions do and how long they take. It is our responsibility
+as Members of Congress, and your responsibility, all of us
+together, to fix this as soon as possible.
+ Admiral Giambastiani. Well, first of all, let me say as a
+member of any service, not just as a member of the Joint Chiefs
+of Staff, this situation is unacceptable. You know that
+already, we know that. But let me just say, you have heard
+repeatedly, I did a press conference after visiting Walter Reed
+right after the story broke with Secretary Gates. He said at
+that time, I continue to say, we continue to say, that this
+situation is unacceptable. But it is a leadership failure, and
+I think we need to go a little bit below what that means.
+ I have learned over many many years as a military officer
+that you get what you inspect, not what you expect. I learned
+that over 30 years ago. And what I would say to you is this
+fundamental lack of leadership up and down the chain here is,
+frankly, getting in and delving into problems.
+ Now, as a member of the Joint Chiefs, but also as a senior
+military officer, I and my wife spend a substantial amount of
+time, like the other chiefs do, visiting with these wounded. I
+have done it four or five times within the last 2 months.
+ I was just, for example, at a dinner on Friday night, and
+we encountered a problem with a spouse who is having difficulty
+finding temporary housing for her child and herself. And her
+husband could not speak with us because he was heavily
+medicated at this dinner. In fact, he was sleeping. And we are
+currently working with General Cody and the Army staff to find
+them a location. That is just the real-world example.
+ These types of things go on all the time where we go out
+and look for problems. What has been missed here is the
+systemic problem of taking care of outpatients that have moved
+from the phenomenal inpatient care that they get at all of our
+facilities. We had insufficient caseworkers assigned here.
+General Cody has testified to this, and has talked to me and I
+have talked to him personally about it. The caseworker loads
+are unacceptable when there are 1 to 125. There is no way, no
+matter how good the caseworker is, they can handle 125 cases.
+It is just not possible. So they have been working to reduce
+that to about 1 in 25 or 1 in 30. That is one example.
+ Another one is who, in fact, does these simple inspections?
+I have been doing barracks inspections through my entire
+military life, and I just simply don't understand how we could
+have a failure of leadership to do those types of things.
+ So these are the things that us senior folks are talking
+about. Why we missed these is unacceptable. As the deputy said
+to all of us, it is embarrassing. It really is, because that is
+not the way we were brought up.
+ So where did we fail within the chain of command? So many
+of these are not resource problems. Frankly, they are
+leadership problems. And that is what I want to tell you as a
+military officer. That is why we aren't happy about the
+situation. We expected--I mean, I have been dealing with the
+wounded for a long time. We do find problems all the time, and
+we do try to take care of them with the appropriate staffs. We
+didn't have the right ombudsman system set up. It is a very
+confusing maze of bureaucracy for some of these people. All
+they need is a single number or a single person to talk to and
+it makes their life much easier so we can route the problems in
+the right way.
+ Chairman Spratt. Thank you, Mr. Lungren. Mr. Blumenauer.
+ Mr. Blumenauer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would just say I
+share Mr. Lungren's frustration, but I would like to focus, if
+I could, on two items here. One, there was a reference I
+believe, Mr. Secretary, to the expense associated with an all-
+volunteer Army, military; that it is more expensive and it
+distorts slightly some of the cost comparisons.
+ I guess my question--and I don't expect that you would have
+it right now, but I would like to have supplied some analysis
+about how much more expensive is the volunteer Army,
+particularly--and if you can parse out how much of that expense
+is because we have weakened our standards, we are bringing in
+less qualified people, we are forcing out qualified people
+because of their sexual orientation. We are having to pay
+higher benefits to meet our recruiting, the whole series of
+things that are associated with that.
+ I wonder if you could for me provide an answer of how much
+is just the all-volunteer force that we had before, and the
+extra costs that are associated with the recruiting and
+retention problems now that have resulted in the things that I
+talked about.
+ My second question was touched on by the Chairman earlier
+when he referenced what is probably the biggest threat that we
+face, the weapons of mass destruction getting into a terrorist
+network. I think we all agree that that is the single most
+terrifying prospect that has the potential of inflicting more
+damage on this country. In fact, I think it was President Bush
+who said a couple years ago that the biggest threat facing this
+country is weapons of mass destruction in the hands of a
+terrorist network.
+ Yet the budget that has been given to us finds over $4.5
+billion for F-22 Stealth fighters, sort of Cold War weapons. It
+finds $3 billion for the Navy DDG 1000 Stealth destroyer, but
+cannot find enough money to maintain even the current level,
+which is only--I think it is only $372 million that has been
+cut 6.5 percent; $24 million for the cooperative threat
+reduction.
+ What thinking goes into investing in Cold War weaponry of
+billions and billions of dollars and shortchanges the
+cooperative threat reduction, cutting it by $24 million?
+ Mr. England. So the first question dealing with the----
+ Mr. Blumenauer. I would be happy to take something in
+writing.
+ Mr. England. Well, there is a GAO report, Congressman, it
+came out last year, on the costs of the all-volunteer military.
+It serves a whole analysis which is on the record; and the
+average cost, all that is included. And we have some
+supplemental data if you need that. But they undertook a
+comprehensive study, and so that is all document available. We
+will make sure you get that report, and whatever other comments
+we have on the report.
+ Mr. Blumenauer. Mr. Secretary, the extra costs associated
+by declining standards, by increased benefits, the changes that
+have taken place because of the stresses on the military in the
+last couple years, is that in that report?
+ Mr. England. No. But I don't believe there is a cost there.
+We don't have declining standards. I believe that that is not
+appropriate.
+ Mr. Blumenauer. Is that a myth that we are bringing in
+people with felony records that we previously would have
+denied; that there are people that don't have the training
+skills that previously would not have been accepted?
+ Mr. England. No. The people all meet our standards. This is
+a question about do people get a second chance. We have a whole
+program, by the way, our National Youth Get Challenged program
+where, across the country, I mean, we work--we bring 70,000, so
+far, young people who have had problems in the past; we bring
+them in, help them get education, help them get--a lot of them
+come up, not a lot, but a number of of them go into the
+military, they get jobs, we rehabilitate. So certainly we don't
+have a policy where because people have had some problem in the
+past, they are barred from the military. I mean, if they meet
+our standards, and we give them an opportunity, the military
+has always been helpful to people who have had problems in the
+past, but we have not changed our standards but we will address
+that with you. But your other question----
+ Mr. Blumenauer. With all due respect, in my district I have
+watched you recruit two autistic kids into the forces. And to
+suggest that there hasn't been a reduction in standards and
+there hasn't been pressure to drag people in because of
+declining enrollment, I beg to differ.
+ But to the second, about the threat reduction, I see my
+time's----
+ Mr. England. Can I ask the admiral just to make a comment
+first?
+ Admiral Giambastiani. I would like to tell you,
+Congressman, that I served in Vietnam and we had wonderful
+people serving at that time. But I have lived in this military,
+and as soon as I came back to Washington in 1975, I went into
+the All-Volunteer Force Recruiting Command. This military today
+has much higher standards than we have ever had since I have
+come into the service. I have been wearing my uniform for 41
+years, and I have some experience with this. I have sat on
+waiver boards back in 1975, 1976, and 1977. I have looked at a
+lot of kids. We issue a lot of waivers because we want to look
+at young kids who use marijuana, for example, one time and we
+want to talk to them about drug usage. We want to talk to them
+about misdemeanors.
+ There are some people and there have always been people in
+the last 30 years or so that we have brought in with felonies.
+But we look very carefully at them. We have initiated Second
+Chance programs.
+ Mr. Blumenauer. With all due respect, I said that I would
+request this--this is the part that I wanted in writing,
+because there was a difference, and parse out what the
+difference is in terms of the pressures in the last 2 years and
+the changes that have been taking place. Whether you think all
+of a sudden now we are increasing the rehabilitative efforts
+altruistically or whether it is the result of failed policies--
+--
+ Admiral Giambastiani. I think you have misinterpreted my
+comment.
+ Mr. Blumenauer. What I am interested in is the costs
+associated over the last couple of years of the all-volunteer.
+I had hoped to get in my time a response to the issue that the
+Chairman had raised earlier about billions and billions for
+Cold War weapons and we can't fully fund the cooperative threat
+reduction.
+ Mr. England. I have your answer, sir. Could I answer your
+question? Last year we had in the Cooperative Threat Reduction
+program, we funded $370 million. This year our request is $248
+million. And the reason there is a reduction is because--and
+the reason it is a reduction is because they have completed--
+the chemical weapons destruction facility in Russia has
+completed that job. So we were funding them to destroy chemical
+weapons. They completed that task, and based on that cost no
+longer being there, it came down to budget this year. So that
+was based on the completion of a program in Russia.
+ Mr. Blumenauer. I note that we have had the bipartisan
+panel chaired by former Senate Majority Leader Howard Baker,
+and former White House Counsel Lloyd Cutler suggested we could
+spend up to $30 billion over the next 10 years. And so it seems
+a little ironic that we have this one little piece that has
+been taken care of and that there aren't larger, more important
+threats to deal with.
+ And I would, Mr. Chairman, hope that we could maybe seek a
+little sense of--if the Department of Defense thinks that this
+problem has been solved, that there isn't billions and billions
+of dollars' worth of problems that could be dealt with.
+ I appreciate your answer about why you dropped that out,
+but it begs the question about a vast problem worldwide that
+appears to be being shortchanged.
+ Thank you for your courtesy.
+ Chairman Spratt. Mr. Becerra.
+ Mr. Becerra. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very much,
+Mr. Secretary, for being with us. I know some of these issues
+have been covered, so I am going to try to go through some of
+this quickly.
+ First, just to be on the record, I want to express my
+outrage and distress at what we are learning about the
+treatment of some of our Active Duty personnel who have been
+injured and many of our veterans who seem to not be receiving
+the highest quality, not just care, but attention that they
+deserve.
+ Yesterday I was at Walter Reed to visit one of the service
+members who is from my--not just my district, but my town of
+Eagle Rock in Los Angeles, California. And it is disturbing
+when you hear some of the reports that are out there.
+ So I am glad to see that the Secretary of Defense is moving
+forward along with the Secretary of the Army to try to resolve
+some of these matters. But without using words that are not
+appropriate here in public, I would say that many of us hope
+that this gets taken care of as quickly as possible and with
+whatever money we have, and I think you have indicated that
+where you need to, you will reprogram dollars. We need to make
+sure that happens as quickly as possible.
+ Mr. England. We will do everything and anything necessary,
+Congressman.
+ Mr. Becerra. Appreciate that, Mr. Secretary.
+ I would like to focus on a couple things. I would like to
+put up, if I could, chart No. 9, because to me it is
+distressing to hear that we are having to appropriate another
+close to $100 billion for the war in Iraq, and some of it for
+Afghanistan as well, at a time when we see very little end in
+sight in terms of what the President continues to propose.
+
+
+ And to me, chart No. 9, this chart that you see now, is
+extremely compelling. This reflects the costs of the Gulf War
+which George Bush Senior initiated on behalf of this country.
+And when you take a look at the gross cost of $61 billion, that
+right there is minuscule compared to what the costs are today
+of this war in Iraq and Afghanistan. But when you recognize
+that, that 1991 Gulf War ended up costing us about $2 billion
+to the Treasury because we got reimbursement from some of the
+countries that didn't necessarily contribute as many troops,
+and we also were able to get some in-kind contributions as
+well. By the time you take into account what we got back by our
+partners, our Coalition partners, our costs to have gotten
+Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait was a lot less than what we
+initially paid.
+ What distresses me and the reason I bring up this chart is
+we find none of that with this war which George Bush, the son
+of Senior, has taken us to in Iraq where we can expect to have
+not just participation by the so-called Coalition partners in
+the war effort, but certainly in terms of reimbursing us for
+the yeoman's work that our men and women in uniform are doing
+when others aren't willing to contribute the forces to do so.
+ I wish we could say that we are going to have a net cost of
+$2 billion for this war in Iraq, but I daresay that that is
+going to be the case.
+ When we put up chart No. 10, this will tell you why I am
+extremely distressed. Not only can we not expect to have moneys
+reimbursed to us from the work men and women are doing in this
+war in Iraq--and this may be tough to read because the print is
+small--but when we are not getting the best use of our dollars
+for the work that we are doing, then you really have to be
+distressed. When you see that our men and women on the ground
+don't have all the equipment that they need, the armor that
+they need, that their vehicles haven't yet been equipped with
+the armor they need completely when they are taken out to the
+field to battle. It is distressing when you read that some of
+our other projects, which will do nothing today to help our men
+and women on the ground in Iraq, are over budget by over 100
+percent, it has got to make you think, what the heck is going
+on?
+
+
+ Our principal focus should be on our men and women and
+making sure they are the best-equipped, best-trained and best-
+protected troops that we have out there. But when I take a look
+at the fact that the Space Based Infrared System, a project
+which was supposed to cost $4 billion is now estimated to cost
+over $10 billion; when we were supposed to get five satellites
+and now we are hoping to get three; and the cost has escalated
+more than 315 percent--or the future combat systems which was
+supposed to cost $82.5 billion now is estimated to cost $127.5
+billion, a 54 percent increase, you go on and on and on and on.
+ There is not much of a question here because there is not
+much time for you to try and answer this. I hope what you will
+all do is go back and discuss with folks at the Pentagon that
+we seem not to be quite as focused as we should be. We
+obviously need to have the systems that will protect our people
+and others in the world and provide them with the freedoms that
+we so cherish, but not at 300 percent over the initial cost.
+And we have to figure out ways to do this right, because when
+you have got soldiers at Walter Reed Hospital who are not
+getting the medical services that they need, when you have
+heard in Walter Reed Hospital stories of how rats and vermin
+are infesting some of the rooms where we have some of our
+soldiers, and when you hear the fact that some of our soldiers
+are going into Iraq without all the body armor that they need,
+it makes you wonder why we are spending 300 percent over cost
+to some of these systems that are costing tens of billions of
+dollars.
+ So I hope you will take that back and know that this
+Congress is hoping to try to resolve this, to be as supportive
+as we can of the men and women in uniform without wasting the
+taxpayer dollar.
+ I will yield back the time, Mr. Chairman.
+ Admiral Giambastiani. If I could, sir, I just want to talk
+about armor for a moment, because I think it is very important.
+This is a very good example of where congressional support for
+funding has helped us tremendously.
+ Mr. Becerra. Please, Admiral, go right ahead.
+ Admiral Giambastiani. We went into this Operation Iraqi
+Freedom with under 500 nontanks, armored vehicles that weren't
+tanks or Bradleys, for example up-armored Humvees, we only had
+under 500 across the entire military. Today we have 42,000,
+just to give you an idea. Nobody operates outside of a forward
+operating base out of their base when they are inside Iraq or
+Afghanistan without going out with the proper armored vehicles.
+ Number two, with regard to personal body armor, helmets and
+the rest, we do not allow people to go outside without the
+proper equipment, period. And we outfit them properly with all
+of the right equipment. When they do what we say, we call it
+going outside of the wire. All of these folks do this. And with
+your support we have produced hundreds of thousands of sets of
+this armor that go out there.
+ I was just in Iraq and Afghanistan about 3-1/2 weeks ago. I
+went out and took a look at the new types of body armor, for
+example, that we have got on marines. I looked at a squadron
+just going out on patrol. They had full-length body armor. They
+were using new Nomex suits which are fire retardant, and we
+have got significant orders.
+ The only thing I would tell you is that we can't get some
+of this stuff that you all have appropriated money for fast
+enough to them, but we are producing them as quickly as
+possible.
+ I also rode in these latest V-shaped up-armored vehicles. I
+have done that repeatedly over a number of times at the
+National Training Center in Iraq. I have gone on improvised
+explosive device training courses in Iraq and driven these
+vehicles personally. My point to you is that we don't allow
+them outside without the appropriate equipment. That is the way
+we equip them.
+ Mr. Becerra. Mr. Chairman, if I could just say thank you to
+the admiral for his response. I think you would find a very
+receptive Congress if this is what we saw you telling us that
+you needed that extra money that you didn't expect because you
+have to make sure that the troops have the up-armor they need,
+that they have all the equipment that they need. But when at
+the same time we see the massive overruns on some of these
+other systems defense systems, it makes you cringe, because we
+know that there are still stories of men and women coming back
+saying they didn't have everything they needed.
+ So I appreciate the response. Looking forward to continuing
+to work with you. But there is a need to have more
+accountability at the Pentagon, because the men and women, when
+they follow their orders and they go on the ground, they expect
+that we will have done the best we can with the dollars we have
+to make sure that they are prepared.
+ Admiral Giambastiani. Yes, sir, that burden falls on us as
+leaders and managers here to make sure that we have the
+appropriate accountability. I would just solicit your strong
+support for this fiscal year 07 supplemental to help us as soon
+as possible. There are a lot of armored vehicles. There is a
+lot of armor. There is a lot of equipment in there to equip our
+troops, and we can use it as quickly as you approve it.
+ Mr. Becerra. Thank you.
+ Chairman Spratt. Thank you Mr. Becerra. Mr. Tiberi.
+ Mr. Tiberi. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am sorry I was late
+and I apologize for missing your testimony. I look forward to
+reviewing it.
+ I just have one question, Mr. Secretary--thank you for
+coming today--one I know hasn't been asked, because it deals
+with a central Ohio issue. I have been working with the Ohio
+National Guard over a FYDP issue for a new Guard Training
+Center in central Ohio, in Delaware, Ohio. And the proposed
+facility was originally on the future year's defense plan for
+2011. However, that was originally. However, now it has been
+pushed back to 2013. It was originally for 2010, been pushed
+back for 2013.
+ I know you may not be able to answer the question right
+now, but this has a huge impact on the Ohio National Guard
+which is being asked to do more and more in our war on terror.
+The State of Ohio has appropriated money to share in the cost
+of the facility. That money now is in jeopardy because of this
+being pushed back on the FYDP to 2013 and I, with other members
+of the delegations of the Appropriations Committee and Armed
+Services Committee tried to work to move it back. But I would
+hope that the Department of Defense would work with the Army to
+begin the process of restoring that money, because it is
+critically important as the Guard is being asked to do more by
+the Department of Defense.
+ So I know you may not be able to answer the question now as
+to why it happened and how we can correct this problem, because
+it is having an impact on our men and women who serve in the
+Guard, but I hope that you would get back to me on that
+particular issue, the Ohio National Guard in Delaware, Ohio.
+ Mr. England. Mr. Tiberi, you are right; I don't have the
+answer. But you are also right, we will get back with you so we
+will have somebody----
+ Mr. Tiberi. Thank you very much, sir. I look forward to
+working with you.
+ Mr. England. Thank you.
+ Chairman Spratt. Ms. Sutton of Ohio.
+ Ms. Sutton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
+ Secretary England, I just have several questions and they
+are sort of--they are all related but yet individual in their
+own right. We have heard a lot of talk today about the
+conditions at Walter Reed, and I would just like to add my
+voice to those that have already been raised here. The problem
+that seems to be missed, though, in your response, Admiral and
+Secretary England, is it is not enough to just say that we are
+going to look at what we need to do and we are going to correct
+it. The question that my constituents want to understand and I
+want to understand is how in the world could this have
+happened, and people in positions such as yours, who are
+accountable for making sure that these facilities have what
+they need and are executing their responsibilities, didn't see
+any red flags or had to wait until the paper broke this story.
+ Mr. England. First of all, let me just say it is not a
+resource issue. I think the generals have both testified
+yesterday, and you heard the Secretary, this is a leadership
+issue. But like the general, however, I mean for 5 years we
+have been dealing with our veterans and we go out to the
+hospitals regularly and we meet them at dinner and ballgames
+and all sorts of things, and it has never come up. It is sort
+of a strange but it hadn't come up to us. So I didn't know
+about it. No excuse, but didn't know about it. I guess other
+people didn't know about it.
+ So that said, we have a problem. And the systems weren't
+working right. Now if the systems were working right, we never
+would have had this problem. It would have been fixed
+instantly. People at the low level and, like the admiral said,
+somebody would have inspected and we would have had enough
+feedback. And I will say this: Over the years, I mean my office
+and, I think, the admirals, whenever anybody has an issue that
+comes to us, we fix the issue. And I guess it was always my
+view that, you know, some people sort of of fell through the
+cracks.
+ Well, it turns out, I guess, if you look at all this over a
+period of time, it has probably been enough people that you
+should have had some indication that there was a systemic
+problem rather than just random cases. There will always be a
+random case. So we missed the signals. And I wish we hadn't. We
+wouldn't be here. We wish we had known this earlier, we could
+have fixed it. But it is not a resource issue. It is an issue,
+I think--the admiral said, it was the first time I heard that
+expression, it is not what you expect, it is what you inspect.
+So it didn't happen right and people have been held
+accountable. And the system is being fixed and everything at
+Walter Reed will be fixed and anyplace else will be fixed.
+ Ms. Sutton. With all due respect, I like that phrase too.
+It is what you inspect, and I think this Congress needs to
+inspect how this could exist without people knowing about it
+and addressing it before it broke in the paper.
+ The second question that I would just kind of like to
+raise, I was struck by your testimony, Mr. England, about our
+joint warfighters with what they--let me just read it from the
+beginning:
+ The defense budget request before you will provide our
+joint warfighters with what they need to accomplish our mission
+of protecting and defending America; our land, our people, and
+our way of life.
+ So am I correct in understanding that that is what any war
+that we are involved in, one of those purposes is served by
+every war that we are involved in, protecting and defending
+America, our land, our people and our way of life?
+ Mr. England. So I am not sure, what is the question?
+ Ms. Sutton. The question is, are those the three purposes
+that any war that the United States of America is involved in
+should be about?
+ Mr. England. Well, it is to protect our citizens, to
+protect our friends and allies, it is to promote freedom and
+democracy. I guess I could write a dissertation, but at the
+core that is what we do. Our job is to protect and defend the
+country, our citizens, and our friends and allies and to deter
+and prevent wars in the future. So we try to defer, we try to
+prevent wars, we try to work cooperatively with countries, and
+so we have funding in there to work with countries around the
+world to establish ties with their militaries. So it a broad-
+based mission. At the core it is to defend the country and our
+way of life over a long period of time.
+ Ms. Sutton. Well, thank you. That is obviously much more
+expansive than the words on the paper. So I appreciate that.
+And just following up on that, Secretary England, on July 16,
+2006 the DOD comptroller sent a guidance memo to the military
+services that required that they provide 2007 supplemental
+estimates by September 1, 2007. And when you received those
+estimates on September 1, I would be interested in knowing how
+much those services' supplemental requests totaled, and then I
+would like to understand why 2 months after those estimates
+were due to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, why you
+sent out a guidance memo to the services submitting--asking
+them to submit war estimates that included requirements for a
+broader definition, again, of a longer war against terror. What
+was the purpose of that memorandum as the follow-up to the
+first request?
+ Mr. England. Okay. So first of all, requests come in from
+the services, what we call raw requests. It comes to the
+comptroller and the comptroller vets those. So some things may
+be in the base budget, some things may have been funded in the
+past. So we make sure there is no double-counting and all that.
+ But we would be happy to provide you those numbers. But we
+make sure that when requests come in, it is not something that
+is already funded, it is something in another budget, et
+cetera.
+ So the comptroller vets all those numbers and typically
+they change, typically they come down quite dramatically
+because just maybe fund another bucket and all those things
+that people making requests didn't know about. So we go through
+a long vetting process in the comptroller's office, and then
+the requests I put out later was because we had some very
+specific requests by our combatant commanders.
+ And if we go into the base budget for the global war on
+terror, then, of course, you know we have a long lead time.
+ So, for example, we did a 2008 budget last year, worked on
+it during the year. It will be debated this year. It will
+become available basically next year. So it could be a 2-year
+delay in terms of actually having funds available. We had some
+needs that we felt needed to be addressed. It was the global
+ear on terror. So we said let's address them, because there is
+something that needed to be address.
+ That said, as I indicated earlier, we are reprioritizing
+and those funds will be lower in terms of their priorities. So
+just like our airplanes, you know, we will likely reprioritize
+those funds just because they are a lower priority. But the
+intent was to address the needs identified by our military of
+things they felt--equipment, whatever they needed to prosecute
+the war in their part of the world.
+ Ms. Sutton. Thank you.
+ Chairman Spratt. Mr. Scott.
+ Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
+ Secretary England, I understand the monthly costs,
+beginning of Iraq 2003, were $4.4 billion per month; monthly in
+2004 was about $5 billion per month; 2005 was $6.4; 2006 was $8
+billion; and this year with the increase of about 40 percent,
+we would assume it is about $11 billion per month for being in
+Iraq. Does that sound about right?
+ Mr. England. That is about right. I believe that is
+correct.
+ Mr. Scott. Is 2008 expected to be more or less?
+ Mr. England. I believe it is less because of the--well,
+again, based on, quote, the place holder we have in 2008, it is
+$143 billion, $141.7 billion, it is less than the total for
+this year.
+ Mr. Scott. Okay. Now we don't expect a supplemental in
+2008, is that right?
+ Mr. England. So let me be clear because it gets a little
+bit confusing. We turned in the 08 GWOT at $141.7 billion,
+which is an extension of the 2007 again, because we don't know
+what the events on the ground will be next year.
+ Mr. Scott. Well, we are fighting a war so we don't know.
+But we don't expect a supplemental in 2008.
+ Mr. England. I would expect that the $141.7 will be
+modified either up or down before we actually get to this stage
+next year, just because we will know more at that point in
+time.
+ Mr. Scott. Does the budget include sufficient funding to
+avoid any further delays on CBN 78?
+ Mr. England. Yes. That is in the base budget. My
+understanding is the Navy has funded that, so there is no
+further delays. I believe--I will have to go back to the Navy,
+though, and confirm that, Mr. Scott.
+ Mr. Scott. Is there sufficient funding for maintenance of
+the ships that have already been built in the budget?
+ Mr. England. Yes. Now I say that ``yes'' because we
+increased the O&M accounts in 2008. So the O&M accounts are
+higher in 2008, so my expectation would be that they are fully
+funded. Again, I will get the Navy to confirm that for you.
+ Mr. Scott. We have a real tight budget. We are charging
+veterans additional fees and everything. It is a real tight
+budget. There is a proposal to move one of the carriers home-
+ported in Hampton Roads down to Florida at a cost that has been
+estimated at hundreds of millions of dollars, maybe a billion
+dollars. Could you consider leaving the ship there in Hampton
+Roads to save a billion dollars that could go to shipbuilding
+or other important costs?
+ Mr. England. Mr. Scott, I will have to sort of put my old
+Secretary of the Navy hat on here and go back to when those
+decisions were made. When we decided to retire the Kennedy, we
+still wanted two ports on the east coast and two ports on the
+west coast we could have our carriers, just for the security
+aspects of it, so that we didn't have everything in one
+location. So at least when I was in that position, the
+rationale and my commitment at that time is that we would move
+a carrier to Florida so we would continue to have a higher
+degree of security for our fleet.
+ Mr. Scott. Your chart--you didn't know you were going to be
+charging veterans to pay for their own health care back then. I
+mean, you didn't know the budget was going to be as tight. So
+we will be seeing how that moves along.
+ On BRAC, is there sufficient money in the budget to clean
+up Fort Monroe? The costs of that were estimated at hundreds of
+billions of dollars. And I thought it was an absurd decision to
+make, but it was made. Is there money in the budget to pay for
+the cleanup?
+ Mr. England. Mr. Scott, I will have to get back with you.
+ Mr. Scott. As you know, there is a reverter clause, and
+when you give the property back to the Commonwealth of
+Virginia, it has got to be cleaned up if you stop using it as a
+base. So I will look for that answer.
+ Mr. England. We typically do include those costs, but let's
+confirm it and I will make sure to get back with you.
+ Mr. Scott. I just have a couple seconds. I wanted to get in
+another question. You are aware of the good services we have in
+modeling and simulation in the Hampton Roads area. Are you
+using modeling and simulation to the extent practicable for
+planning and training?
+ Mr. England. Let me turn it over to the admiral who is more
+of an expert than I am.
+ Admiral Giambastiani. The answer is, what I would say is it
+is adequate for what we are doing. There are some desires to do
+more. We are doing a tremendous amount though. And that is what
+is significant.
+ As you know, Mr. Scott, from my time down on the Joint
+Forces Command, the Department has invested heavily in modeling
+and simulation. We have extended it to training. We are
+extending it to intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance
+predictive tools. This is a burgeoning market, and frankly we
+are going to do more in the future. We are going to continue to
+do more. It is a growth industry. That is the bottom line.
+ Mr. Scott. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
+ Chairman Spratt. Mr. McGovern.
+ Mr. McGovern. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you
+for being here once again. I want to associate myself with the
+comments of some of my colleagues here on the whole Walter Reed
+issue, and I wasn't going to go down that road with
+questioning, but after listening to some of your responses, I
+wanted to make a couple of points.
+ You know, Admiral and Mr. Secretary, you both have said
+that this is a leadership problem. Well, if it is a leadership
+problem, then a hell of a lot more than two people need to be
+fired, more than an Army Secretary and more than a two-star
+general. The fact of the matter is, this is not only a
+leadership problem, it is a systematic problem, it is an
+institutional problem. And as The Washington Post pointed out
+yesterday in their story entitled ``It Is Not Just Walter
+Reed,'' there are examples of neglect and mistreatment and poor
+conditions all over this country. And so when you say it is not
+a resource problem, I don't know how you are going to be able
+to fix all that you are going to need to fix, because it is
+widespread, without additional resources.
+ I mean, we have stories of--you know, we learn about the
+Walter Reed stories about the mold, mice, and rot in Walter
+Reed's buildings, but that is not the only place where you have
+those conditions. We had a woman quoted yesterday, a mother who
+was horrified when her 21-year-old son was discharged from the
+Naval Medical Center in San Diego a few months ago and told to
+report to the outpatient barracks, only to find the room
+swarming with fruit flies, trash overflowing, syringes on the
+table.
+ You have situations where there are not enough nurses,
+where you have wounded or injured leading the troops, stories
+from Fort Campbell, Kentucky, talking about yellow signs on
+doors stating that our barracks had asbestos.
+ To fix that is going to require millions and millions, if
+not billions, of dollars if in fact--what really should have
+been known a long time ago, and I can't believe that the
+stories haven't trickled up because, you know, this is not a
+new phenomenon and notwithstanding the fact that the newspapers
+have kind of broken this story. I mean, it just takes my breath
+away when I hear you say that you just didn't know about this.
+And you know, we make a big deal about going before the
+American people during this time of war and saying, you know,
+our men and women who are serving, you know, are our first
+priority. We are going to take care of them not only when they
+are over there, but when they come home. And you have--again,
+this is not just about Walter Reed. I mean, this is all across
+this country.
+ And so I would say to you, with respect, that it is not
+just a leadership problem; that it is a systematic problem,
+that it is an institutional problem, and it is a resource
+problem. Because when Senator Dole and former Secretary Shalala
+finished their recommendations, I can bet you that the cost of
+fixing what needs to be fixed is going to be phenomenal. So
+with all due respect, I would not say it is not a resource
+problem, because I think indeed it is going to become one and
+it is going to cost this country a great deal to be able to
+fix. If you want to respond, I would appreciate any----
+ Mr. England. I guess we are waiting to see. I don't know if
+this is a systemic problem. Maybe you are right, Mr. McGovern.
+I just don't know. I guess when people look at it, we will find
+out. My comments: It is not a resource problem means that if
+something needs to be done, funds will be made available. To
+the best of my knowledge, in the past we have made the funds
+available that were requested and needed. And so if there is a
+shortcoming, we will fix it. I mean, it is clear----
+ Mr. McGovern. Part of what this committee is about is to
+figure out how much we need to devote to these issues, and so
+if you are coming before us and saying it is not a resource
+problem, when in fact I think we all know it is going to
+require a substantial amount of money to fix--this is not just
+Walter Reed.
+ Mr. England. If it needs it, we will do it. It is that
+simple. If they need money, we will fix it and do it. I don't
+know the extent until somebody looks at it. But again, it is
+not a resource issue in terms of people wanting the funds to
+fix it. I mean if we need funds to fix it, we will do it. It is
+our highest priority. We will do it. So there is no question we
+will apply whatever resources we need to this problem. I don't
+know how widespread it is. I don't know if I arrive at your
+conclusion, but we will find out and do whatever it takes.
+ Mr. McGovern. Again, it kind of again stuns me when you,
+you know--you read and you hear, you know, that there are
+facilities that have signs up that say, you know, ``Stay
+Away,'' this is asbestos filled. When you hear stories of
+soldiers going back and going into situations where the
+conditions are not even sanitary. I mean, these are our men and
+women who we are putting in harm's way. And so, you know, we
+are going to need to make--you are right, we are going to need
+to come up with the resources. And it is going to add
+substantially to what we need to do in this Congress, but it
+also, again, it just never came to our attention, none of these
+stories ever trickled up to the level where we thought we
+needed to take action.
+ I mean it is clear, I mean just read The Washington Post
+story yesterday, you know, this is a widespread problem. And it
+is just--again, it takes my breath away when I hear it never
+got up to our level. Who is everybody talking to? And we also
+have--the Post talks about, you know, scare tactics used
+against soldiers who will write sworn statements to assist
+soldiers and their medical needs. Clearly some of these people
+are told just to shut up.
+ So I wasn't going to pursue this line of questioning or
+make a statement because I know my colleagues did it more
+eloquently, but this is more than a leadership problem. And if
+you believe it is a leadership problem, you are going to have
+to fire a lot more than than two people.
+ Admiral Giambastiani. If I could from a military
+perspective, it is a fundamental leadership problem, and the
+reason why I will tell you this is that there are root causes
+for these failures. There are root causes. There are systemic
+problems that you must go look at. And that is what we are
+doing now. We can fix certain things immediately, but the
+question is, why didn't our leadership at the high levels, the
+mid-grade levels and the lower levels determine that we had a
+problem here? That is why we will say in general terms, and as
+I said before, it is much more than just the mantra. It is a
+leadership problem.
+ You must look through this entire chain of command to
+figure out why we weren't addressing these. Let me give you an
+example----
+ Mr. McGovern. If that is the assessment, then our current
+leadership at every level has failed miserably.
+ Admiral Giambastiani. We clearly have failed with regard to
+how we are taking care of our outpatients. There is no doubt
+about it.
+ Mr. McGovern. Thank you.
+ Chairman Spratt. Mr. Etheridge.
+ Mr. Etheridge. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
+ Mr. Secretary, welcome. Thank you for your service. I
+appreciate your testimony before this committee and I don't
+envy your task of defending this administration's budget and
+record. And I associate myself with the comments that have been
+made as it relates to our veterans, and I suspect you are going
+to have a lot of Members visiting a lot of VA hospitals. And I
+have been to some and a lot needs to be done.
+ I would like to note that the President's proposed Defense
+budget of $622.8 billion is the largest budget that we have had
+since Japan surrendered in Tokyo Bay, and that has already been
+talked about this morning. And let me just say that since I
+have been in Congress, I have voted for every Defense
+authorization bill, every appropriation bill and every
+supplemental. So I want that as a part of the record.
+ But the vast amounts of sums being consumed by the Defense
+Department is staggering. I say that because--let me just read
+something for the record--because I think it needs to be on the
+record--before I ask my question, because the ongoing war in
+Iraq and other places is driving this troubling budget train.
+ Four years ago this month, your predecessor testified in
+front of the Appropriations Committee and he said--and I
+quote--``The oil reserves for that country,'' talking about
+Iraq, ``could bring between $50 and $100 billion over the
+course of the next 2 to 3 years. We are dealing with a country
+that can really finance its own reconstruction and relatively
+soon.'' We are dealing with a country that can--excuse me.
+ Now, you can't be held responsible, and I recognize that,
+for what your predecessor had to say and I appreciate that. But
+I would like to note for the record that Iraq is not financing
+its own reconstruction. Foreign countries like China, Japan,
+Saudi Arabia, Libya and others are financing the reconstruction
+and our war in Iraq by buying America's debt. The bill will
+come due not on this administration's watch, but our
+grandchildren will be left with this bill. And I think that is
+a pretty sorry record when we look at it in that regard.
+ Mr. Secretary, you stated in your testimony that improving
+the readiness of the force is the number three priority in this
+budget. I am very concerned about the effective readiness for
+our troops. I happen to represent Fort Bragg and an awful lot
+of Guard and Reserve soldiers who have been in Iraq, and I have
+heard from them the stories of how they did not have body armor
+and other stuff. We are hearing reports that military equipment
+is wearing out much too quickly, and much quicker than was
+anticipated, and reset costs are well beyond what was expected.
+Our sources report the supplemental process, as we have just
+heard in the Pentagon, was expanded greatly.
+ So my question is this: Can you tell us what measures you
+have in place to maintain the readiness of the force and how
+the status of those things are measured, how we are measuring
+it? And secondly, how do you prioritize and determine the needs
+of such necessities such as simple things like body armor and
+the things that really protect our troops on the ground,
+creating the humongous number of casualties and wounded men and
+women who are coming home?
+ Mr. England. So, Congressman, we get our requests from the
+services coming on their budget request. And take armor. I mean
+we have had a lot of iterations of both body armor and vehicle
+armor. As the admiral said at the beginning of this war, we had
+less than 500, quote, armored vehicles; we now have about
+43,000. But those 43,000 are iterations of armored vehicles as
+we have gotten better and better at this.
+ Mr. Etheridge. Mr. Secretary, how in the world do we send
+these men and women into harm's way, though, without the
+equipment that was necessary? I think that is the question the
+American people would have me ask today.
+ Mr. England. I think if you listen, the Army will tell you
+they went through this whole nineties, right? I mean the
+procurement budgets were pretty much savaged, and they started
+out the beginning of this administration $56 billion in the
+hole. So when this war started there was a deficit, a big
+deficit, d we have been working, I mean, we have been working
+hard through these supplementals to build up all that equipment
+so we now have, as the admiral said, 43,000----
+ Mr. Etheridge. We kept being told we were ready to go,
+nothing--there would be no problem. We can march in and it
+would all be over. All of a sudden we are finding out not only
+do we not have the right equipment but we don't have enough of
+it.
+ Mr. England. The adversary has a say about how things
+unfold. So the adversary had a say, and it is a very lethal
+adversary and they have very lethal weapons, and so we keep
+going through the iteration of our equipment, which we do all
+the time, so we can provide the very best we can for our
+soldiers, so we keep getting them better sets of body armor, we
+keep getting them better sets of armored vehicles. We are still
+doing that today.
+ There are new iterations always coming out to provide them
+the very latest we can provide them, and those funds are in the
+supplementals.
+ Now that said, in the 2008 baseline budget you mention
+readiness, the budget in the 2008 baseline, there is an
+increase of $16.8 billion to improve force readiness. And that
+is more training in the base budget in addition to what is in
+the supplemental, that is equipment repairing and replacement,
+because some of that is in the base also and in intelligence
+and support. So the 2008 budget, there is significantly more
+funds in 2008 than there was in 2007. But again, I would
+iterate the comment that the Vice made, the 2007 supplemental
+is crucial. There is a lot of money there. It is for equipment
+and it is for armor and it is all sorts of things. And if the
+one thing I could encourage would be for the Congress to pass
+this supplemental as soon as possible, because it is funding
+that we need to protect our men and women who are doing this
+fight every day. So I mean that is one way you can be
+extraordinarily helpful to us is to get this supplemental out
+as soon as possible, but by the middle of April would be ideal,
+frankly.
+ Mr. Etheridge. Thank you Mr. Secretary. Thank you, Mr.
+Chairman. I just hope in the future we will get numbers that
+will show us also what the costs, the residue costs are as we
+talk about our men and women who are in these VA hospitals and
+others who are really having problems. Thank you sir.
+ Chairman Spratt. Ms. Schwartz is not here. Mr. Bishop of
+New York.
+ Mr. Bishop. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, Mr.
+Secretary, Admiral. A couple of things. First, I certainly want
+to associate myself with the remarks of all of my colleagues on
+both sides of the aisle with respect to the outrage at Walter
+Reed and elsewhere within the medical system. And I guess one
+of the things that bothers me the most about this--this is
+really a comment, I am not asking for a response--is with the
+tens of thousands of people that we have working for the
+Department of Defense, the tens of thousands of people we have
+working for the Office of Veterans' Administration, that it
+took two reporters from the Washington Post to bring this issue
+to the level of attention that it has received.
+ Mr. Secretary, you have described it as fixing it as our
+highest priority. Respectfully, I would say that, if caring for
+our soldiers as they recover from their wounds were such a high
+priority, this would have been discovered and acted upon by
+someone in the employ of Department of Defense. We would not
+have to rely on two, I would say, courageous reporters for the
+Washington Post, and I will not ask for a comment. You have
+commented enough on that.
+ There was a report released, I think last week or the week
+before, that suggested that 90 percent of our Guard and Reserve
+forces were not ready for deployment. Either there was
+insufficient equipment, insufficient training, and so on. My
+question is: A, do you accept that number? Do you agree with
+that number? If you do, what are the plans to rectify that
+situation given the enormous dependence we now have on Guard
+and Reserve?
+ Admiral Giambastiani. If I could, Mr. Bishop, first of all,
+as a former Commander of U.S. Joint Forces Command where our
+National Guard forces report to Joint Forces Command when they
+come under Title X authority, they must report their readiness.
+They report their readiness in a classified system. So, to your
+question about--I think, actually, the estimate was 88 percent,
+is what it said, were not ready, and what I would tell you is
+it is the statement that they are not ready that is incorrect,
+okay?
+ What I would then tell you is there were references to, I
+believe--and I did not read all of these articles completely,
+but there were references to--and I talked with Mr. Panaro, who
+is the Chairman of this Commission on the National Guard, about
+this statement. About half of the forces within the National
+Guard are ready at all times to respond to State emergencies.
+Now, that was not stated anywhere in this article, and General
+Blum would testify to that, and he would come up here and tell
+you--and I confirmed before I came over here today--that in
+fact about 50 percent of our forces are ready immediately for
+any type of State emergencies. What the readiness these units
+report on through the Federal side is their readiness to meet
+wartime conditions, and their required readiness is to go out
+and be able to respond to a wartime situation.
+ So what I would say to you is that the ``88 percent''
+number is correct if you modify it from not ready to that they
+will respond to wartime crises with the equipment and the
+training and the rest of it that they go out to.
+ Mr. Bishop. I just want to be clear.
+ Admiral Giambastiani. I just want to be sure you understand
+they are not ready; they are not fully ready equipmentwise.
+ Mr. Bishop. I am trying to understand the distinction.
+ So, in response to the question of what percentage or what
+proportion of our Guard and Reserve troops are ready to respond
+to a wartime situation, what is that number?
+ Admiral Giambastiani. I have asked the question for our
+system to give me the exact number, and they have not done
+that, but let me just explain the reason why I do not have that
+answer to you.
+ I talked to General Smith, as a matter of fact this
+morning, from Joint Forces Command, on it. Our readiness
+system, once again, on the classified level has C1, C2, C3, and
+C4, and what I want to read to you is what C3 is. All of our
+National Guard units are supposed to be units that possess the
+required resources, and the unit is trained to undertake many
+but not all portions of the wartime missions for which it is
+organized or designed, and then there is a level below that of
+C4. Most of our units for equipment readiness are in the C4;
+whereas, they are supposed to be at the C3 level, what I just
+described to you. So, to correct the equipment part of the
+equation, what we have done is put a huge amount of money--and
+I would ask the Comptroller to tell you how much. It is in the
+$20 billion to $30 billion range for equipment readiness
+problems that we have funded over the last series of budgets.
+ Mr. Bishop. I am sorry. As to the $20 billion to $30
+billion number that you are citing, it is in the base budget or
+is it in each of the supplementals that aggregates to one of
+your----
+ Admiral Giambastiani. It is a combination of all of the
+above.
+ Mr. England. No. No. I can answer that.
+ In the 2005 to 2013 budgets, there is $36 billion for
+National Guard and Reserve equipment.
+ Is that right?
+ Ms. Jonas. That is right. From the fiscal year 2008-2013,
+about $22 billion is in the base budget. We have another $2.7
+billion between the 2007 and 2008 GWOT requests for about $24.6
+billion for the Army Guard. We have another $5.3 billion for
+the Air Guard. Your total across all three bills is about $30
+billion for 2008 to 2013. What the Deputy quoted was the 2005
+number being----
+ Admiral Giambastiani. To give you an example, the
+President's budget for 2008 has $4.5 billion for Army Guard and
+Reserve equipment. The 2007 Title IX Appropriations Act had
+$3.3 billion. Those are subcomponents of what the Comptroller
+just gave you.
+ Mr. Bishop. Okay. Thank you very much.
+ Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
+ Chairman Spratt. Isn't there another component, and that is
+the training component, the individual unit training, the joint
+training component that frequently becomes a deficiency when
+the unit is shipped out to another theater and simply cannot
+maintain the training for its basic assignment?
+ Admiral Giambastiani. Yes, sir. That is correct. There are
+certain types of training that somebody may be trained for to
+do, but they have been redirected from, say, full spectrum
+warfare to counterinsurgency. So they train for
+counterinsurgency, deploy for counterinsurgency, and they may
+not have the full spectrum side of this. That is correct.
+ Chairman Spratt. Thank you, sir.
+ Ms. Hooley.
+ Ms. Hooley. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
+ Thank you, Mr. Deputy Secretary, for being here and for
+your service.
+ Mr. England. Ms. Hooley.
+ Ms. Hooley. As I understand it, the current MEDCOM policy
+is that all soldiers who mobilize or demobilize at a base are
+required to go to that base for follow-up care. Because Oregon
+and a dozen other states have no bases, our Guard troops must
+remain for weeks at the base they were deployed from for
+follow-up care, bases that can be hundreds and, in most cases,
+thousands of miles away from their families and their homes. As
+a result, Guardsmen frequently deny injuries during their
+demobilization process to avoid having their deployment
+extended far away from their homes and their families, taking a
+chance they can seek treatment later on from the VA.
+ Let me give you a couple of examples of what happens when
+these Guard troops request treatment upon demobilization.
+ Take an SFC with the Oregon Guard, who is on the East
+Coast, with medical issues. He has a wife and 6 children, and
+the separation of the deployment has strained their
+relationship to a breaking point. He has seen his family once
+in the last 3 months. My question is why wasn't he sent to Fort
+Lewis, which is much closer--150 miles away. Why can't he use
+TRICARE to have his injuries looked at and treated at home with
+a local physician?
+ Another story involves an Air Force Specialist with a wife
+and 2 young children, who has seen his young family stateside 3
+times in the last 3 months--once because the Army sent him home
+for convalescent leave and the other 2 times over the holidays
+because his wife drove she and her children out to the East
+Coast because they could not fly to see him. Why won't the
+military structure change to the new reality of an operational
+Reserve and allow them to be treated closer at home?
+ An Oregon soldier with no family at home has not seen a
+medical professional for 3 months because he is waiting for an
+administrative board to look at whether he is retainable or
+not. The Army has 90 days to review this before making a
+decision. All of his personal belongings were left either in
+Afghanistan or in Oregon. Because the soldier must wait for a
+van shuttle to get around he purchased another vehicle. Why is
+he not waiting for a decision, again, at Madigan or Fort Lewis,
+which is much closer to home?
+ If 4 out of 10 soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan are Guard
+or Reserve, isn't it time for DOD to adjust this MEDCOM policy
+and make improvements to the demobilization process for Guard
+members in States like mine that have no military treatment
+facilities?
+ I am going to ask a couple other questions, and you can
+answer them all at the same time.
+ The Independent Commission on the National Guard and
+Reserve, a document I am sure you are familiar with, has
+outlined in their most recent report to Congress a plan to
+begin to address the problem with the Guard. Their price tag is
+$39 billion. Yet, your plan calls for $9 billion to address the
+very same problems. How do you explain the cost difference of
+this well-respected objective commission in your estimates?
+ [The information follows:]
+
+ The National Guard and Reserve equipping needs received additional
+funding in the last few years and is projected to continue to receive
+funds toward equipment shortages.
+ The Fiscal Year (FY) 2008 President's Budget Request has $5.7
+billion for the Guard and Reserve equipment procurement with $3.7
+billion going to the Army National Guard (ARNG) and $760 million going
+to the Air National Guard (ANG). Additionally, the FY 2007 Supplemental
+Appropriation provided $1.0 billion specifically for ARNG procurement.
+ The Department's procurement plan for Guard and Reserve equipment
+over the Future Years Defense Plan--FY 2008-FY 2013 is $36.6 billion
+with $22 billion for the ARNG and $5.2 for the ANG.
+
+ The next question is I hope that you are looking at
+governance structure and changes, and I guess what governance
+structures are you implementing--changes are you implementing
+now to address the fact that the Guard is now an operational
+Reserve rather than a strategic Reserve?
+ Mr. Deputy Secretary, right now, due to equipment not being
+rightfully transferred back to States, again in my State,
+Oregon, the Oregon Guard supply unit of trucks, equipment and
+people is at 44-percent capacity. Our governor is getting ready
+for and has had flood season. Fire season is coming next.
+Because of the DOD's policy of not returning what should
+rightfully be at our State's disposal, my State does not have
+the equipment or troops it needs to be fully prepared for these
+likely events. When is this vital equipment going to be
+returned not only to my State but to other States?
+ Last, it my understanding that a military standard for
+helmet liner pads was written which lowered the standard of
+performance from the performance of the original helmet liner
+pads in order to provide for competition and get the pads at a
+lower cost. How much money did you save, and do you really
+think it is worth it given the number of traumatic head
+injuries that we are seeing?
+ Mr. England. There are a lot of questions there, Ms.
+Hooley.
+ Ms. Hooley. Right.
+ Mr. England. I mean, first of all, it would be terrific if
+I could have your paper just so we could respond to your
+examples.
+ Ms. Hooley. I would love to have you respond to them.
+ Mr. England. Good. Could you, please? That would be very
+helpful and particularly your specific cases, so I can get
+people to look at them and understand it. That would be very
+helpful. A couple of them, though--so, if you give me that, I
+will definitely look into it and close the loop with you on
+that.
+ As to the governance, you know, we have changed the policy
+for Reserves and Guard in terms of time so that we have
+actually changed the 1 in 5 so that it is 12 months deployed
+and 5 years, basically back, but whatever it is it is a 1 to 5
+ratio, so that was announced by the Secretary in terms of the
+deployment.
+ As to the equipment, I would like to talk to General Blum
+about that. My understanding is that the combat equipment is in
+theater. Obviously, I am not sure what all the specialty is of
+the Oregon National Guard, but as for the trucks and all of the
+things they need for a state-type response, my understanding is
+that the Guards do have that. I mean the question of readiness
+is, one, readiness at the State level; the second is readiness
+for Afghanistan and Iraq, and the third is readiness for accord
+in an all out war-type thing with----
+ Ms. Hooley. Well, we do not have readiness for any of
+those.
+ Mr. England. So we need to get with General Blum. We will
+do that. If you will provide me with that data, I will follow
+up with General Blum for you and also follow up with the Army
+with your other specific questions.
+ [The information follows:]
+ care for demobilized soldiers at mtf's closer to home
+ Reserve Component Soldiers released from active duty can seek care
+through TRICARE if they have an approved line of duty (LOD) condition.
+The unit commander must complete the LOD investigation and provide it
+to the Military Medical Support Office (MMSO) in Great Lakes, Illinois,
+or the local Military Treatment Facility (MTF). MMSO can authorize care
+for LOD-related medical services in the civilian TRICARE network. The
+local MTF can provide services in the MTF for the LOD condition.
+ Active or Reserve Component Soldiers assigned to a Warrior
+Transition Unit may request assignment to the MTF closest to their home
+or family.
+ Also, Reserve Component Soldiers who are on medical retention
+processing orders and assigned to Warrior Transition Units (WTUs) may
+be referred to a Community Based Health Care Organization (CBHCO) with
+duty near home.
+ The specific criteria for assignment into the CBHCO are:
+ (1) Soldier requires at least 60 days of clinical evaluation,
+treatment or convalescence.
+ (2) Soldier has a medical condition(s) that can be reasonably
+managed by the CBHCO using available TRICARE-approved providers and
+within TRICARE standards in the Soldier's community.
+ (3) Soldier has been assessed for mental health and social support
+status, and has been cleared by a licensed behavioral health provider.
+Behavioral health clearance does not imply the absence of issues,
+rather that issues can be safely managed with the available community
+and family resources. High risk Soldiers or Soldiers with high risk
+Family members are not suitable candidates for remote command and
+medical management.
+ The CBHCO program is currently serving approximately 1,300 Soldiers
+around the country.
+
+ Admiral Giambastiani. If I can, Deputy, I would like to add
+to one thing, though.
+ Ms. Hooley, about 85 to 90 percent of the equipment that we
+are operating on inside Iraq is active component equipment.
+Some National Guard and Reserve component equipment was brought
+to theater, about 10 to 15 percent of the total. That is mainly
+combat gear, bridging gear; in other words, things to go across
+rivers, small streams and those types of things, specialty
+gear, but generally, as the Deputy has stated, lots of the
+trucks and other things--we have brought some of that over, but
+most of this equipment is active component gear, so that tells
+you that we had a deficiency in equipment before. We knew that,
+and that is why we have put this $30 billion plus into buying
+more.
+ Ms. Hooley. It would sure be interesting for me to look at
+or to have you look at whether or not, before somebody becomes
+a flag officer, they should serve a year with the Guard or
+Reserve since they have been so important to our operation in
+this war against terrorists so that there is a better
+understanding with the military about some of these problems
+that I have talked about today. I mean the simple thing is,
+when you are on MEDCOM, that you go back to the base where you
+are deployed from and not to the one closest to your home or
+going to your home and using TRICARE. I mean those are things
+that I think the Department has to begin to understand and to
+recognize.
+ Mr. England. Ms. Hooley, if you, again, will provide me
+with your paper, I will look into each one of those issues, and
+we will get--first of all, it would be helpful. I mean I
+appreciate the input. It is helpful input.
+ Ms. Hooley. Okay.
+ Mr. England. So that would be terrific to provide that, and
+secondly then, we will close the loop and get back with you on
+it, but I think it would be helpful just to understand that
+there are a couple more cases that we can have the folks look
+at----
+ Ms. Hooley. All right. Thank you very much.
+ Mr. England [continuing]. To better understand this issue.
+ Ms. Hooley. Thank you. Thank you for your time.
+ Mr. England. Thank you. It is helpful. I appreciate it.
+Thank you.
+ Ms. Hooley. Okay.
+ Chairman Spratt. Mr. Moore.
+ Mr. Moore. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Mr. Deputy
+Secretary, thank you for being here today and the others as
+well, and I just want to ask a couple of questions here.
+ As you know, since September of 2001, the United States has
+spent more than $500 billion for military operations in Iraq
+and Afghanistan. The nonpartisan Congressional Research Service
+estimated in September of 2006 that the Iraq War costs
+taxpayers almost $2 billion a week, nearly twice as much in the
+first year of the conflict, and 20 percent more than the last
+year. Despite the huge sum of money that is being spent on this
+conflict in order to provide equipment, in some situations our
+troops in harm's way are still lacking the protective gear they
+desperately need. According to an Associated Press story which
+appeared in the Kansas City Star on January 31 of this year,
+the Defense Department Inspector General's Office pulled up,
+roughly, 1,100 service members in Iraq and Afghanistan and
+found that they were not always adequately equipped for their
+missions, and I want to read just a portion of this story to
+you. Again, this is dated January 31 in the Kansas City Star
+Associated Press.
+ ``Hundreds of U.S. troops in Iraq and Afghanistan have
+experienced shortages of key protective equipment, including
+armor vehicles, roadside bomb countermeasures, and
+communications gear, a Pentagon survey released Tuesday showed.
+The Defense Department Inspector General's Office pulled up
+1,100 service members and found they weren't always adequately
+equipped for their missions. The troops were interviewed in
+Iraq and Afghanistan in May and June of 2006. Those surveyed
+reported shortcomings with the vehicles outfitted with armor,
+cruiser weapons, which are weapons that take more than one
+person to handle such as artillery or a large machine gun,
+electronic countermeasure devices such as equipment designed to
+foil roadside bombs by interfering with cell phone signals that
+may be used to detonate them and communications equipment.''
+ Mr. Deputy Secretary, I do not for one minute think that
+you do not want to provide everything we need to our troops,
+and I think you feel exactly as Members of Congress do, that we
+should do everything we can to protect our troops, but I am
+very discouraged when I read articles like this.
+ Mr. England. Mr. Moore, I, actually, followed up with the
+Army on this issue. I can tell you cruiser weapons--I mean we
+have an enormous number of cruiser weapons. I mean the Army
+does not understand that comment. We have huge numbers of
+cruiser weapons.
+ The electronic countermeasures, without going to classified
+areas, for the counter-IED, because the threat keeps changing,
+we keep changing to fit the new threat, but that is like, you
+know, measures and countermeasures, and that is where we are,
+and we have, I believe, in the budget this year $4.8 billion in
+this counter-IED. But I mean, look, the adversary is good, and
+we have to adjust to them, and so we are building all kinds of
+equipment, and they keep moving on and we keep moving on, but I
+can assure you that gets addressed, but at any given time you
+are not always going to have the latest equipment because we
+are constantly developing the latest equipment and fielding it,
+and there is obviously time to get it out of the factories and
+into the theater. I mean armor vehicles--as the Admiral said,
+nobody goes, quote, ``outside the wire'' without having the
+right armor vehicles, and we keep improving and buying new
+versions of that also, so we keep upgrading and at any given
+time you are absolutely right. I mean nobody has the latest
+equipment every day because it is just not possible to do. I
+mean, unless we were to hold things static, then we would, but
+we do not want to do that, and neither do our men and women in
+uniform.
+ So, I mean, there is probably some validity in this, but I
+think it is a mixture of things. I mean it is not just as clear
+as that article portrayed. I can assure you that----
+ Mr. Moore. This article is based, of course, on a poll of
+1,100 troops serving in Afghanistan and Iraq, and that is what
+they believe, rightly or wrongly. That should be a concern to
+all of us, I think.
+ Mr. England. Admiral.
+ Admiral Giambastiani. If I could, Mr. Moore----
+ Mr. Moore. I hate to stop you, but I have got 1 minute
+left, and I have got another area I want to cover very
+carefully and at least get this out and give you a chance to
+respond.
+ I talked to Secretary Rumsfeld in a small meeting of about
+10 or 12 Members of Congress, and Secretary Rumsfeld was
+there--and this was, I think, a couple of years ago--and I
+said, ``Mr. Secretary, I am very concerned about the stress we
+are putting, our country is putting, on our Guard and Reserve
+units. Our active people knew what they signed up for when they
+signed up. Our Guard and Reserve units have been used in ways,
+I think, that were never contemplated when most of them signed
+up. They have been deployed and redeployed twice and sometimes
+as many as three times now. It is putting incredible stress on
+families. It is putting incredible stress on job situations
+back home, and I have tremendous respect for all of our troops
+and whatever unit they serve in and whatever active Guard or
+Reserve, but I am very concerned about the devastation I think
+we may be doing to our Guard and Reserve units, and I just
+wonder if we can count on some sort of change of policy or at
+least a study of this to decide what we need to do in the
+future.''
+ Mr. England. The Secretary, Mr. Moore, did announce a new
+policy because of the issues you cite, so recognized issues,
+and now the policy is, as I commented before, 1 in 5 for every
+Reserve and National Guard so they can plan, and so the units
+will be called up as a unit, and they will be 1 in 5 so they
+know that once they serve, 1 time in, 5 times out, but I also
+have to tell you it will not happen immediately. I mean that is
+the long-term policy as we adjust to getting there, but that
+had been announced by Secretary Gates when he came in office,
+to provide better stability and better planning by the people
+who serve and also by their employers.
+ Mr. Moore. Thank you, sir.
+ Admiral Giambastiani. Mr. Moore, if I could, just to
+respond to you on the equipment issues----
+ Mr. Moore. And I was not trying to cut you off.
+ Admiral Giambastiani. I understand, sir.
+ What I wanted to just mention to you is that I do not know
+exactly the number of, for example, counter-improvised
+explosive devices that we had, these jammers, if you will, but
+it was probably less than 1,000 when we went into Afghanistan
+and when we went into Iraq.
+ Today, we have about 28,000, and we are building them as
+fast as we can produce them with the best software code and
+also the best hardware capabilities that we can put into them,
+and we are just rolling them out as quickly as possible with
+the very substantial help of Congress here. As the Deputy said,
+we have put $4.4 billion into this most recent request here for
+counter-IED stuff. Like armor, we are producing it as fast as
+we can.
+ As a commander, when you are in the field and if you do not
+have a sufficient amount of jammers, for example, you will
+compensate for that by not operating as many vehicles to do
+that. So I am sure there is truth to what some of these troops
+are talking about, and we run these down. There is no doubt
+about it. Every time the enemy has a vote and they change their
+tactics or change their weaponry, we will respond also or try
+to anticipate with new armor, new equipment so that we can do
+it as quickly as possible, and that is why we have tried to
+break down a lot of bureaucratic barriers to deliver this stuff
+with your support here in the Congress.
+ Thank you.
+ Mr. Moore. Thank you, Admiral.
+ Chairman Spratt. Ms. Kaptur.
+ Ms. Kaptur. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much.
+ Hello, Secretary England, and both of your colleagues.
+ Mr. England. Good morning. Is it still morning?
+ Ms. Kaptur. I guess so.
+ I wanted to thank you for your service, first of all, all
+of those who are in the room here with you, all of those under
+your command. We all know you are following orders.
+ I want to say for the record I do not agree with the orders
+you are following. I think that the orders by this Commander in
+Chief were reckless. He miscalculated the enemy, and he
+miscalculated and was unprepared for the nature of this
+invasion, and I use as some of my evidence for that the fact
+that your supplemental this year is larger than your base
+budget request. That is another sign to me of total lack of
+preparation for what our soldiers are facing and what this
+department is facing in theater. When you come up with a
+supplemental of 93 point, I think, 4 or 5 and the base budget
+was $70 billion and you look at the relationship there----
+ Mr. England. No. No. Ms. Kaptur, you are confused there.
+The budget last year, the supplemental, the first part of the
+supplemental, was $70 billion. This part of the supplemental is
+$93 billion. So those two together are supplementals, not the
+base budget.
+ Ms. Kaptur. Yes, but I am talking about the global war on
+terror, and the point is you are constantly supplementaling us.
+You are not providing the request in the base budget. So the
+budgeting on this has been very arcane, in my opinion, and I do
+not remember in my years in Congress ever seeing a budget
+piecemealed like this, and that shows to me you are trying to
+tack on every time there is a shortage or you need something
+out in theater and coming to us with a supplemental, so I
+totally disagree with this.
+ I disagree with your statement where you say that we are
+spending very little on this war because it is only 4 percent
+of GDP. I do not want to get into this in too much detail, but
+let me just say that the GDP is an improper number compared to
+World War II or any other decade when the United States was
+independent financially. Right now, we are owing so much to the
+rest of the world we are borrowing to fund this government. We
+have got a debt of nearly $9 trillion, and that does not count
+the debt in the private sector. America is borrowing her way
+forward. We are not paying these bills, and then we knock a
+full point off of GDP because of our nearly $1 trillion trade
+deficit, and we are watching our currency fall all over the
+world in relation to other currencies. So the result here at
+home is stagnant incomes for our families. The middle class is
+falling backward, and we have extraordinary rises in poverty.
+So I take exception to what you are saying that this is not a
+lot of money piled on to the type of GDP that we are
+experiencing today. Those are not my questions. Those are my
+statements.
+ My questions are: I know so many soldiers, and they are so
+brave, and I have just met with so many of them again over in
+the Middle East and here. We know victory means one-third
+military, two-thirds diplomatic, political and economic, and it
+is that two-thirds that is missing, so we keep pushing it on
+our soldiers to solve all of the problems over there.
+ Mr. Secretary, do I have your assurance, of the brigades
+that are going to be deployed into theater, are they going to--
+and the ones that will be deployed into urban warfare in
+Baghdad, will they all be trained at 29 Palms at Fort Ord in
+California?
+ Admiral Giambastiani. I think I should answer that, Ms.
+Kaptur, and the answer is some will be. The answer is no. Some
+will be trained by the units from these locations in their home
+stations. I think you know this from the State of Washington.
+ Ms. Kaptur. Well, I wanted to say something about that.
+ I know a Marine who was trained on a Howitzer. He is going
+to be deployed in about 3 weeks. He is down at Camp Pendleton.
+He is not out there in California. They told him he is going
+into Anbar Province, and he is going to be doing door-to-door
+clearance. All right. I do not like that. I think that if we
+send anybody into that environment they ought to have full
+training, and so I am going to submit some questions to the
+record on who we are sending and what they are being trained
+on. One of my----
+ Admiral Giambastiani. Please submit them, ma'am, and we
+will answer each one of these individual ones, but when we take
+a Marine or a soldier or a sailor or an airman to do another
+job--we call that ``in lieu of jobs''--we will take somebody
+from a different area. We train them for that job before we put
+them into it.
+ Ms. Kaptur. Well, I would like to know the difference in
+training there because this goes right down into the unit,
+their ability to protect one another, and when you shift
+somebody's responsibility like that--I can tell you that one of
+the soldiers who was killed in my district was separated from
+his unit. He was put in some other responsibility. They have to
+train in the unit. We have to give them the best training in
+the country, and I think that we are seeing the kind of
+shifting down at the unit level that we have seen in the
+budget.
+ So my time is running out, but I just want to say we have
+an Ohio sergeant in the Army who has just been transported to
+Walter Reed. I visited him out at Landstuhl, and he has a
+severe spinal cord injury. What I want to ask you, Secretary
+England, is--and this sort of follows on what Ms. Hooley said.
+He has to go to a spinal injury center in our country--there
+are only four of them--for what he has, we are told, for rehab,
+all right? Now, none of them are located near where he comes
+from in Ohio or where he is deployed out of, Fort Collins,
+Colorado, so they give his wife some kind of a ticket or
+something where she can go visit him wherever he is going to be
+put, and we do not know where he is going to be put yet, but he
+also has a mother and father who live in Ohio. Isn't there a
+way that the Department--I mean, for this young wife--they had
+only been married for a few months before he was deployed. She
+is going to have to do all of this. Is there any way that you
+could handle the travel so that that ticket, if the wife is not
+there, could be somehow given to the family so that they could
+have follow-on with this young soldier? He is so terribly
+injured. This is going to be a long road for this family. Could
+you consider some type of alteration in the way you are
+handling this so these families can deal with the reality of
+the seriousness of these injuries?
+ Mr. England. I believe we do that. I mean we bring whole
+families in for our militaries. So if you will give me this one
+case, I will look into it. It would be helpful to deal with the
+specific case because, I mean, we do bring in parents and
+family, but if you will give me that particular case, I will
+look into it personally.
+ Ms. Kaptur. All right. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much.
+I do have one question for the record also.
+ I would like the Department to give to me, since the
+beginning of the war, every single contract you have signed
+with Aegis Corporation either directly or through an
+intermediary. I do not care if it was the Coalition Provisional
+Authority, whether it was the reconstruction process over there
+in Iraq, and I want to know the dates, the amounts, who signed
+the contracts. I want to know who is being employed and what
+countries they are from. I will submit a longer question for
+the record. A-E-G-I-S, out of Britain.
+ Mr. England. A-E-G-I-S?
+ Ms. Kaptur. Yes. Every time, not just the reconstruction. I
+was over in Baghdad, and they had me meet with the company when
+I was over there, and they were only talking about contracts
+that were with the reconstruction authority. I want to know
+those that were signed under the CPA with that same company,
+and that was not given to us when we were there.
+ Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
+ [The information follows:]
+
+ The contractor is Aegis Defence Services, Ltd. (AEGIS) of 118
+Piccadilly, LONDON W1J7NW. AEGIS was awarded the Reconstruction
+security services contract in May 2004; contract number W911SO-04-C-
+0003. The award was made under full and open competition. AEGIS was one
+of six (6) submitted offers. Selection was based upon the factors and
+subfactors established in the solicitation, to include, technical
+(performance) management and cost, and the Source Selection Authority's
+review of the evaluation results and his integrated assessment and
+comparisons of the strengths, weaknesses, and risks of the proposals
+submitted. AEGIS' proposal had significant strengths over the other
+offeror's and demonstrated a thorough understanding of the contract
+requirements. AEGIS is registered in the DoD's Central Contractor
+Registration (CCR), and is neither a debarred nor suspended contractor.
+The contract was awarded to AEGIS as it provided the best value to
+satisfy the needs of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) for Iraq
+reconstruction security services. The contract is cost reimbursable
+with a fixed fee.
+ Under the contract, AEGIS provides a variety of security functions
+at both the national and operational level. AEGIS provides security
+services to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), Gulf Region
+Division (GRD) throughout Iraq and to the Joint Contracting Command-
+Iraq/Afghanistan (JCC-I/A). Based upon the U.S. Central Command
+(USCENTCOM) contractor census, as of April 5, 2007, AEGIS employs
+approximately 1,000 employees in Iraq, 250 of whom are Iraqis.
+ Request For Proposal (RFP) W91GXZ-07-R-0004 was issued on January
+19, 2007, to re-compete the reconstruction security services contract.
+JCC-I/A extended the current AEGIS contract through late November 2007
+as a protest was filed at the General Accountability Office that
+prevented an award prior to expiration of the current contract; the
+extension ensures continued security services for the Iraq
+reconstruction effort. The contract, as extended through November 2007,
+is valued at $447,515,614.
+
+ Chairman Spratt. Thank you, Ms. Kaptur.
+ Secretary England, Undersecretary Jonas, Admiral
+Giambastiani, thank you very much for coming. We very much
+appreciate it, and we have learned something from your answers.
+We would appreciate your answers for the record to the
+questions that have been put to you.
+ I would also like to ask unanimous consent that members who
+did not have the opportunity to ask questions be given 7 days
+to submit questions for the record.
+ Mr. England. That would be fine. I would be happy to
+cooperate. Nice being with you again, Mr. Chairman.
+ Chairman Spratt. Thank you very much.
+ [Whereupon, at 12:40 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
+
+
+
+